The United Nations Response to the Libyan Crisis

Home , Libyan National Army, Tripoli Brigade

Report No: 201, August 2015

THE UNITED NATIONS RESPONSE TO THE LIBYAN CRISIS

ORTADOĞU STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR MERKEZİ CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

ORSAM

Süleyman Nazif Sokak No: 12-B Çankaya / Ankara Tel: 0 (312) 430 26 09 Fax: 0 (312) 430 39 48 www.orsam.org.tr, [email protected] THE UNITED NATIONS RESPONSE TO THE LIBYAN CRISIS

ORSAM Report No: 201

August 2015

ISBN: 978-605-9157-05-6

Ankara - TURKEY ORSAM © 2015 Content of this report is copyrighted to ORSAM. Except reasonable and partial quotation and use under the Act No. 5846, Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works, via proper citation, the content may not be used or republished without prior permission by ORSAM. The views expressed in this report reflect only the opinions of its authors and do not represent the institutional opinion of ORSAM. Prepared by: Nebahat Tanrıverdi Yaşar, Research Assistant, ORSAM

ORSAM 2 Report No: 201, August 2015 Contents

Preface...... 5

Introduction ...... 7

I. UN-BROKERED PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE UN’S POLICY SHIFT ...... 9

II. WHAT DOES THE UN AIM TO DO IN LIBYA? ...... 13

a. Government of National Accord ...... 13

b. High State Council ...... 16

c. National Army ...... 17

III. THE REFLECTIONS OF THE LIBYAN POLITICAL AGREEMENT IN THE FIELD ...... 18

a. Tripoli-Tobruk Struggle ...... 18

b. The Issues of Libyan National Army and Militia Forces ...... 21

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS ...... 24

ENDNOTES ...... 27

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PREFACE

The “Arab Spring” uprisings triggered a series of social movements and regime changes in the Middle East and North Africa. Although these events spreading across the region have been related to each other; the uprisings surfaced in a different way in the areas where they were experienced, and resulted in different consequences. Libya is one of the most striking and dramatic examples of this difference. For the last four years, some analysts argued that democratization was only possible in Libya in the region which started over from scratch. Others, on the contrary, drew the attention to militia forces and security problems due to the collapse of the state. The developments in Libya, which was at the centre of these diametrically opposed arguments, have revealed that it is difficult to bring stability to the country. In addition, after the elections in June 2014, the emergence of two governments and parliaments in the country as well as the second civil war, demonstrates how unsteady Libyan politics was. During Libya’s last four years, which have been shaped by conflicts among tribes, political turmoil, civil war and conflict, the United Nations (UN) inarguably played a critical role.

Libya, governed by Muammar Gaddafi for 42 years, slid into a bloody civil war among tribes soon after protests started in Benghazi on 15 February 2011. Under these circumstances, the UN Security Council adopted the Resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011 and authorized a series of measures including embargos in order to reach a solution in a peaceful way. Because of insufficiency of these measures, on 18 March 2011, the UN Security Council passed the Resolution 1973, which allowed no-flight zone and military operations for Libya. Right after the adoption of this resolution, on 19 March, forces of international military coalition started air strikes named ‘’Odyssey Dawn’’. Later, operations were transferred to NATO’s command. This international military intervention authorized by the UN not only ended Gaddafi’s rule but also it triggered Libyan crises which had been going on since 2011 and whose impact exceeded the Libyan borders. After the military intervention, the transition plan prepared by the UN failed, and hence Libya slid into deep multi-dimensional crises. Under these circumstances, the UN has been leading a negotiation process in order to solve Libya crisis since the fall of 2014 and thus has been playing a key role in terms of the future of the political balance in the country.

Considering the fact that the UN has played a crucial role for the last four years and will continue to play an important role in terms of the developments in Libya, this study aims to help to understand the UN’s approach to Libya crisis, expectations, and purposes. In the first chapter, this report evaluates the UN’s policy change for Libyan crisis and fundamental dynamics of this change. The second chapter is devoted to political agreements presented by the UN to the parties. The third chapter assesses the political and military impact of the Political Agreement signed on 11 July 2015. The last chapter discusses the applicability of the UN’s purposes and predictions within the framework of the latest developments in the field.

For those interested in the subject, this report contains significant findings and data serving a better understanding of daily developments and current conflict dynamics in Libya as well as the possible impact of the negotiations on Libya. I would like to un- derline the importance of the efforts for political solution in Libya again and wish good reads. Assoc. Prof. Şaban Kardaş President of ORSAM

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ORSAM Report No: 201, August 2015 ORSAM ORSAM ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

Prepared by: Nebahat Tanrıverdi Yaşar, Research Assistant, ORSAM

THE UNITED NATIONS RESPONSE TO THE LIBYAN CRISIS

INTRODUCTION The United Nations (UN) has unquestion- the balance of power among these forces, ably played a critical role in the history of it is obvious that the Libyans and Libya’s modern Libya. Especially the UN Security future, will suffer the most, since the sides Council’s resolutions significantly affected cannot defeat each other. In addition, Libya, whose independence was recog- the ongoing conflict empowers warlords nized by the UN in 1951. But the UN’s and radicalism, and thus complicates the most important decision, which also can problems, which have already been hard be considered as a turning point in Libya’s to resolve. history, is the UN Security Council Reso- lution 1973 issued on 18 March 2011, be- The conflicts between the parties have cause the Resolution 1973 paved the way been accelerated, deepened and regionally for international intervention in Libya. scattered since the summer of 2014. Es- Gaddafi’s fight against the opposition in pecially, strategically important airports, Libya turned into a civil war within a very oil pipelines, roads, harbors and city cen- short time. The suppression of the opposi- ters have become targets of air attacks tion by the legions and forces loyal to Gad- and become battle fields. Also, deepening dafi laid the ground for the international conflicts increase the rate of civil causali- intervention. International military inter- ties every passing day. In addition to this, vention, which was limited to air opera- these conflicts destroy the country’s infra- tions, not only ended the Gaddafi period, structures that are necessary for civilians but also triggered the Libyan crisis, which to continue their daily lives. Furthermore, has been continuing since 2011 and the the number of the displaced Libyans has effects of which has transcended the bor- gradually risen. There is a remarkable ders of the country. Following the military increase in illegal immigration from Sub- intervention, the UN has failed to imple- Saharan countries to Europe due to the ment the transition plan in the country instability in Libya. This increase in il- and Libya has faced with a deep multidi- legal immigration reveals a human trag- mensional crisis with multiple-actors. edy with accidents in the Mediterranean. Tragic news about boats full of refugees The ongoing bloody and difficult struggle outbound from Libyan ports is increasing between two parliaments, two govern- with each passing day. Since 2011, it is re- ments, and militia forces has been dragged ported that approximately 10,000 refugees towards a dramatic turning point. Under have died in deadly incidents in the Medi- the current circumstances, considering terranean Sea.

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It is claimed that ISIS controls the center Skhirate, Morocco. However, the progress of Benghazi, Derna and Sirte and even is partial due to the rejection of the agree- has gained ground in several other cities, ment by the GNC in Tripoli. Hence, end- especially in Tripoli. This general picture ing the instability in Libya will be possible has reached an alarming level with Egypt’s through overcoming this partiality. air operations in Libya on 16 February 2015 and call on the UN Security Council In order to answer the question of wheth- for an international military intervention er the compromise between the rival to Libya. Parallel to these developments Libyan parties is enough to overcome the in Libya, the United Nations Support Libyan crisis, it is necessary to analyze the Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) stepped up fault lines of UN-backed road map as well the negotiation process which has been as the political agreement. In this context, brokered since September 2014 for rec- onciling the parties in Libya. However, it this study analyzes the negotiations bro- remains unanswered whether it is possible kered by UNSMIL since the summer of to end the civil war, fragmentation and the 2014. The first part of the study discusses ongoing bloody clashes between militia the shifts and the fundamental dynamics forces through a political compromise be- of those shifts in UNSMIL’s policies to- tween the House of Representatives (HoR) ward Libyan crisis since the summer of in Tobruk and the General National Con- 2014. Then, three draft agreements that gress (GNC) in Tripoli. Considering the were presented by the UN to the rival Lib- fact that both governments do not have yan parties since April 2015 are discussed firm sovereignty over their own alliance within the context of the mechanisms pro- blocs as well as the areas they are located posed by the UN for the resolution of the in, the challenges of resolving the Libyan crisis, and the road map. This part of the crisis can be understood better. study evaluates the structures, institutions Despite all these difficulties, the UN Spe- and the roadmap. Discussing the Libyan cial Representative for Libya achieved Political Agreement, which was signed by relative progress in the negotiations that the HoR in Tobruk on 11 July 2015, with a were held since the summer of 2014 and comparative analysis, this study, assesses the Libyan Political Agreement was signed the goals and projections according to by the HoR in Tobruk on 11 July 2015 in their applicability.

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I. THE UN-BROKERED PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE UN’S POLICY SHIFT

The UN has been making efforts to con- Nonetheless, it should be noted that Lib- vince the Libyan rival parties for a political yan Political Agreement is still impartial solution within the framework of a road and does not cover all the parties in Libya. map, since September 2014. The UN-bro- Although international and regional ac- kered peace negotiations, conducted in tors put extensive pressure on the GNC four different countries since September in Tripoli, it will not be possible to reach 2014, have evolved in four main phases. a concrete outcome without ensuring the The negotiations started in the form of acceptance of all parties. Hence, it would a very narrow scope talks in Ghadames, be beneficial to analyse the phases of the then evolved into a wide range of talks UN-brokered negotiations. and finally turned into direct negotiations with the meeting held in Berlin, Germany I. The HoR-oriented Initial Negotiations: in June 2015. At the end of this process, The UN peace talks, brokered by Special 18 out of 22 members of the Libyan Po- Representative of the Secretary-General litical Dialogue signed the Libyan Political for Libya, Bernardino León, began in Agreement in Skhirate, Morocco on 11 Ghadames, a southern town in Libya on July 2015. The Libyan Political Dialogue 29 September 2014.1 The peace negotia- also included four representatives from tion in Ghadames was limited to the HoR each rival government in Libya, the GNC members and 40 deputies who boycotted in Tripoli and the HoR in Tobruk. The the HoR, and the GNC in Tripoli was not representatives of the GNC boycotted the involved in this process. 2 final meetings held in July 2015 and refused to sign the political agreement. Six Following the failed coup attempt on 17 mayors including the mayors of Tripoli, February 2014, retired Major General Benghazi, Misrata and Zintan; the Na- Khalifa Haftar has returned to the politi- tional Forces Alliance (Taḥaalof al-Qiwaa cal scene with another coup attempt on 16 al-Wataniyya) and Muslim Brotherhood’s May 2014 and Karama (Dignity) Opera- political wing in Libya, Justice and Con- tion. After Prime Minister Ali Zaidan was struction Party (Hizb Al-Adala Wal-Bi- dismissed from the post of Prime Minis- na), participated into the signing ceremo- ter in March 2014, the political balance ny. Although the GNC in Tripoli refused has changed in Libya. The Zintan tribe to sign the agreement, the participation (Ali Zaidan is a prominent member of the of the parties supporting the GNC to tribe), which lost its dominance over the the signing ceremony raised the number GNC in Tripoli, sought to create an alli- of agreeing parties. In addition, Special ance with Haftar and created a block with Representative of the Secretary-General the support of the military and militia for Libya, Bernardino León, together with forces loyal to them. This crisis, deepened other representatives of the UN and West- by the Karama Operation, has come to an ern countries, continue to call the GNC to impasse with the government crisis. Un- be a part of the agreement. der these conditions, the country held the elections on 28 June 2014 in order to get The present situation is important for Lib- of the crisis. However, the new political ya, which has been dragged into instability scene emerging with the July 2014 election and the civil war very rapidly after 2011. could not solve the crisis. Moreover it has

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institutionalized the fragmentation of the negotiations, the UN presented a new country and brought a deeper crisis of two approach by revising its policy. In this parliaments and two governments, one in context, León decided to move the nego- Tobruk, the other in Tripoli. In this cri- tiations to Geneva and expand the scope sis, the UN has adopted a pro-HoR policy of the participation.3 Both governments arguing the legitimacy and bindingness and parliaments, representatives of city of June 2014 Election. In this regard, the councils and militia forces were invited UN, during this time period, accepted the to the talks in Geneva held on 15 January GNC in Tripoli as an actor creating crises 2015. The GNC in Tripoli announced that following the expiry of its mandate, and they declined to participate to the talks in concentrated its political initiatives on Geneva. However some members of the the HoR in Tobruk. These political efforts GNC and representatives of Misrata city concentrating on the HoR led to general council acted against this boycott decision acceptance of the “internationally recog- and participated in the talks.4 Although nized government/parliament”. the breach of the GNC decision by some figures led to reactions, by doing so, their At this point, it should be noted that the participation prevented the GNC total UN did not invite the GNC in Tripoli to isolation from Geneva talks and provided these talks. In Ghadames talks, the UN 5 aimed to increase the HoR’s legitimacy as an indirect representation for the GNC. well as ending the debate over the 2014 The GNC, leaving aside its initial attitude, general elections by convincing the depu- announced that they may participate in ties boycotting the HoR. However, despite the talks if the negotiations would contin- 6 the limited participation, the talks were ue in Libya. Inability to obtain a positive deadlocked and a positive result could not result after two rounds of talks in Geneva, be obtained. the lack of willingness of the parties to compromise and the intensification of the II. Expanding Participation: Following clashes during the rounds of talks led to a the failure of the HoR-oriented initial deadlock in the Geneva talks.7

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III. Inclusion of the GNC to the Negotiation the Libyan Political Agreement draft.8 Process: Geneva negotiations revealed that Meanwhile, the raid to Tripoli, organized the limited participation in the talks had a by the forces loyal to Khalifa Haftar, who negative impact on the process, and then supported the HoR, led to the risk of the the UN decided to consider the GNC’s talks in April 2015, during the second demands and sought to include more par- round of the talks.9 In 16 April, although ties in the negotiations once again. In this the GNC suspended its participation in context, the UN gave positive response to the proximity talks, the second round was the GNC’s demands. But then, due to 3 also completed.10 As a result of these talks, suicide attacks in Kubbe town of Derna, the UN has presented the third version of located 250 kilometers east of Benghazi, the draft agreement to the parties on 28 which resulted in 47 people’s death, the April 2015.11 UN moved talks to Morocco. Thus, the negotiations that the GNC in Tripoli also IV. Direct Negotiations and Balancing attended began in Skhirate, Morocco in Policy: The UN aimed to strengthen the March 2015. The negotiations in Skhi- legitimacy of the HoR in Tobruk with the rate, Morocco took place in the form of negotiations in Ghadames, and in the con- indirect talks composed of two rounds text of this approach, brokered the talks between the parties. Also, León aimed to in Geneva, and Morocco, Skhirate with a increase chances of success in the talks broad participation. Since the initial talks, with the active participation and support the UN is convinced that the legitimate of regional actors, by moving the talks to political interlocutor, in a political resolu- Morocco, Skhirate. tion, should be the HoR in Tobruk. The UN assesses that the HoR in Tobruk is Following the first round of proxim- militarily more advantageous compared to ity talks held between 12 March and 26 the GNC in Tripoli. According to the UN, March 2015, the parties started the sec- compared to the GNC in Tripoli, the HoR ond round of talks on 15 April 2015 and in Tobruk, which has the support of forces began to negotiate framework notes of loyal to Haftar, military units of Barqa fed-

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eralist regional government led by Ibra- High Council of State’s opinions would be him Judhran, and Libyan Air Forces, could binding for the HoR. The context of this provide stability in Libya.12 Therefore, binding opinion was not defined specifi- the UN aimed to impose the road maps, cally; hence its application would deter- which treats the HoR in Tobruk as the le- mine if it was going to be veto power or gitimate sovereign power in Libya, over revision power of laws. Naturally, the draft the GNC in Tripoli. This road map had agreement was accepted by GNC, but this three main objectives. These objectives time rejected by the HoR.16 As a result, the are the establishment of a government of situation of the negotiations went back national accord, the ceasefire agreement to the Geneva talks. But this time, the between the parties, and the formation of GNC decided to participate in the ongo- Libyan national army with the withdrawal ing talks, while the HoR announced that of armed forces and the militias from the they will boycott. However, this decision cities. These aspects have been the main was not observed by some groups, hence a axis of each revised draft of the Libyan Po- partial participation to the talks had been litical Agreement. realized.17

On 28 April 2015, the GNC in Tripoli In consequence, the UN’s approach to the announced that they rejected the draft Libyan parties has completely changed agreement offered by the UN on 27 April with the next draft agreement released 2015, while the HoR in Tobruk declared on 8 June 2015. In this draft agreement, that they would accept the draft.13 The the HoR-oriented approach of the UN GNC harshly criticized UNSMIL, de- was abandoned, and a new approach aim- manded a new appointment in place of ing at a balance among the parties has León, and accused the UN of taking sides emerged. However, in this approach, the in the dispute. All these reactions indi- HoR in Tobruk still continued to be the cated that the GNC would not accept the predominant party. Likewise, this situa- draft agreement.14 As a result of the GNC’s tion can be seen more clearly in the fifth objections, the UN decided to revise the draft agreement presented to the parties draft agreement and created a new road on 2 July 2015.18 The UN revised sig- map which could meet the demands of the nificantly the articles of the fourth draft GNC on 8 June 2015. The most significant agreement, which provided more powers revision of the final draft is the new addi- to the GNC in Tripoli, gave the GNC the tions to the High Council of State, which authority to monitor and even balance became a parallel organ to the legislative the HoR in Tripoli, and transformed the body, the HoR. For example, according to GNC in Tripoli as a “consultative council”. the this draft, the vote of no confidence Consequently, a compromise was reached against the Government of National Ac- with the HoR in Tobruk, which rejected cord required the agreement of two-thirds to accept the fourth draft. This fifth draft of the members of the HoR as well as the agreement was accepted and signed by the High Council of State.15 Moreover, the parties on 11 July 2015.

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II. WHAT DOES THE UN AIM TO DO IN LIBYA?

The UN has made vigorous efforts to for- ment of a Government of National Accord mulate a political agreement which can as one of its main targets. From this point create a compromise among the Libyan of departure, the UN wants to establish a parties during the negotiation process ini- political authority through a Government tiated in Ghadames in September 2014. of National Accord with the consent of Presenting five drafts to the opposing parties, solving the fault lines in the cri- parties, the UN aims, with its peace talks, sis through this political authority. In that to make the parties agree on a road map context, both in the agreement drafts and that will end the civil war that it considers the agreement signed on 11 July 2015, the becoming more and more of an interna- official legislative authority is the HoR, tional security threat. It partially achieved while the executive authority belongs to its goal when 18 out of 22 members of the the Government of National Accord. In Libyan Political Dialogue signed the polit- the draft agreements announced in April ical agreement. Leon, in addition, left the and June, the Government of National Ac- door open for reconciliation to the GNC cord is identified as the main actor of the in Tripoli, which rejected the agreement. transitional period. According to the draft agreements, the Government of National All the draft agreements presented by the Accord will be the sole executive author- UN have shared three common themes: a ity, and it will consist of a Council of Government of National Accord, forming Ministers chaired by the Prime Minister, councils to include several Libyan politi- and will be accompanied by two Deputy cal agents and a national army to resolve Prime Ministers and numerous ministers. the security problems as well as ending the The Government of National Accord will fragmentations caused by the militia. The have its headquarters in Tripoli, but will road maps that the UN has created for be able to perform its functions from any each of those topics require an in-depth other city. However, this point indicated analysis. Focusing on the agreement text in the agreement leaves the door open signed by the parties on 11 July 2015 at the for a governmental chaos for the divided center, this section will look at the solu- parliament and governments in Tobruk tions that the UN seeks in Libya within the and Tripoli. As the UN lacks faith in par- framework of agreement texts presented ties, it wants to abolish this dualism, and by the UN under three main titles. has taken this step as a countermeasure, if any disputes between the parties would a. Government of National Accord arise in the future. By this way, the UN plans to move the transitionary actors to During the talks in Ghadames, the UN has the safe zones and continue the process, tried in Libya, to place the HoR on a legiti- in any case of disputes. These points in mate and irrefutable foundation. Howev- the draft agreement were also carried on er, understanding the fact that currently, the signed agreement text. The term of no option that limits itself to the HoR will the Government of National Accord com- be enough, the UN has shifted the aim of prises the one-year-term after the signing the talks in Geneva to reconcile the par- of the agreement. The agreement draft ties. Consequently, the process carried out also projects that no other government by the UN has designated the establish- may be established in this one-year-term

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by referring to the Libyan constitution. agree upon a candidate for Prime Minis- On the other hand, the task duration may ter. On the signed agreement, however, only be prolonged by one additional year. these parts have been amended. First of Although the third and fourth drafts re- all, the procedure to vote a no confidence quired the HoR special session, the agree- against the Government of National Ac- ment text signed on 11 July 2015 restruc- cord has been completely amended. Ac- tured this article, specifying that “The cording to the agreement, the procedure term of the Government of National Ac- to vote a no confidence can be initiated cord will automatically be prolonged by with 50 signatures of from the HoR. Fol- a year, should the efforts to recreate the lowing the petition, the HoR needs to constitution not be completed”. On the consult with the State Council, and then other hand, in case the elections are car- 150 representatives out of 200 has to vote ried on, and an executive authority is cre- for no confidence in the voting within the ated through the elections, the term of the HoR. With the new layout, authority the Government of National Accord will end State Council had on the fourth draft has automatically. As a result, the term of the been removed, and the HoR has become Government of National Accord will not the sole authority on a vote of no-confi- be longer than two years, and it will remain dence. Besides, the procedure to nomi- in office until the elections are completed, nate a new Prime Minister has also been and a new government under a new par- reorganized. In case of death or resigna- liament is formed. According to the agree- tion of the Prime Minister, the authority to ment draft, a vote of no confidence against nominate a new Prime Minister has been the Government of National Accord re- given to the HoR. The State Council and quires the agreement of two-thirds of the the Libyan Political Dialogue, which also members of the HoR and the State Coun- shared this authority, have been removed cil. In addition, death or resignation of the from the process in the agreed text.19 Prime Minister will lead to the resignation of the whole government. In this case, the The agreement also includes the Gov- outgoing government will continue func- ernment of National Accord forming a tioning as a caretaker government until “Council of Ministers” and a “Presidency a new government is formed. If such an Council of the Council of Ministers”. The event occurs, five representatives from executive powers will be possessed to a each of the HoR and the State Council will major extent by the Council of Ministers. form the Libyan Political Dialogue, and The duties of the Prime Minister will be:

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• Representing the State in its foreign • Establishing and implementing the Gov- relations, ernment program, • Accrediting the representatives of states • Proposing the necessary draft laws to and foreign bodies in Libya, perform its tasks and submitting them to the HoR for endorsement, • Supervising the work of the Council of Ministers, • Issuing bylaws as well as administrative decisions and directives required • Issuing and negotiating laws endorsed to implement the Government program, by the HoR. • Managing national affairs in the interest The duties of the Presidency Council of of the country, according to laws, by- the Council of Ministers will be as follows: laws, regulations, and decisions in force,

• Assuming the functions of the Supreme • Preparing the draft general budget and balance sheet of the State, Commander of the Libyan army, • Developing and implementing neces- • Appointing or removing the Head of the sary emergency financial arrangements General Intelligence Service, in cooperation with the relevant institu- • Appointing (or removing) the ambas- tions, sadors and representatives of Libya and • Negotiating international conventions appointing (or removing) the senior of- and agreements. ficials, According to the 10th Article of the fourth • Following 10 days of submission to the agreement draft, the Government of Na- HoR, declaring states of emergency, war tional Accord is responsible to submit a and peace, and adoption of exceptional draft law in consultation with the State measures upon the approval of the Na- Council and the National Defense and Se- tional Defense and Security Council, curity Council that will specify the competencies of the Libyan Army. It needs to • Concluding the international agree- fulfill this responsibility in 3 months into ments and conventions endorsed by commencing its functions, as well as pre- the HoR. senting the draft law to the HoR within The duties of the Council of Ministers are: this time frame. These subjects are also

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among the parts that have been amended as an advisory council. Likewise, the HoR in the agreement text. has become the sole authority in new ap- pointments and removals. The HoR needs With the amendment, a commission with the vote of two-thirds in the parliament to the cooperation of the Government of remove and reappoint. National Accord, the State Council and the National Defense and Security Coun- b. The High Council of State cil needs to be formed to create the law specifying the competencies of the Libyan The principles concerning the High Coun- Army. In accordance with the agreement cil of State are regulated in the Articles 19 th drafts, as well as the 12 Article of the to 28 in the draft, and the Article 18 and signed agreement, the legislative powers the 19 in the agreement text. According to are exercised by the HoR during the transi- the 19th Article of both the draft and the tional period. On the other hand, whereas agreement text, the High Council of State is in the draft, the regulation concerning the the highest consultative body of the State, legislative power was named “The Legisla- and enjoys a legal personality and financial tive Authority”, the agreement has the same independence. It will carry out its duties part renamed as “HoR”. The positions that within this framework. In the agreement the HoR can appoint or remove are speci- draft, the High Council of State was able th fied in the 15 Article. According to the to express opinions with a qualified major- fourth draft, the HoR was able to meet ity that was binding to the HoR. As such, with five representatives from each of the the High Council of State was able to ex- Central Bank of Libya, the Libyan Politi- press advisory opinion and offer necessary cal Dialogue and the State Council to ap- proposals to the HoR considering interna- point, remove or change the Governor of tional agreements. Also, the High Council the Central Bank of Libya, the Head of the of State was required to answer the writ- Audit Bureau, the Head of the Administra- ten demands of the HoR within 14 days. tive Oversight Authority, the Head of the However, the condition of “qualified ma- Anti-corruption Authority, the Head of jority” that was needed to express binding the High National Electoral Commission opinions in the draft was changed to “two and the Public Prosecutor. Following the thirds”. In addition to this, the HoR has the establishment of the Government of Na- right to reject or adopt the binding opin- tional Accord, there was a need to gather ions of the State Council with the signed in order to define and appoint the names agreement. As a result, the agreement has to fulfill those positions. The process and ceased the “binding opinions” of the State methods to discharge those currently in Council from being “binding”, which re- these positions to appoint new ones were moved the veto power of the State Council the same. However, the signed agreement the draft agreement provided. According also majorly changed this section. First of to the agreement, the State Council, needs all, the 60-day process was lowered to a 30- to answer the HoR’s written demands with- day process according to the agreement. in 21 days. Finally, the article enabling the Also, the power to appoint the Governor Prime Minister and the ministers to attend of the Central Bank of Libya, the Head of the State Council’s sessions was removed the Audit Bureau, the Head of the Admin- from the section which regulated the com- istrative Oversight Authority, the Head of petencies and the operation of the State the Anti-corruption Authority, the Head Council. Apart from these, there are no of the High National Electoral Commis- differences between the fourth agreement sion and the Public Prosecutor was given draft and the signed agreement. to the HoR. The Central Bank of Libya, the Libyan Political Dialogue and the State According to the Article 22, the headquar- Council who had their shares in this power ters of the High Council of State is located in the fourth draft can only take part in the in the capital, Tripoli. Its term will end appointment and the removal processes with the end of the term of the Govern-

ORSAM 16 Report No: 201, August 2015 THE UNITED NATIONS RESPONSE TO THE LIBYAN CRISIS ORSAM ment of National Accord. The 23rd Article • Assist fact-finding commissions and regulates the fundamentals of the creation anti-corruption institutions with their of the High Council of State. According duties. to the article, the High Council of State will consist of 120 members. 90 members c. The Libyan National Army in the UN among them will be selected from the Draft members of the GNC, while the remaining There are 14 articles (Articles 36 to 49 in 30 members will be selected from the re- the fourth draft and Articles 35 to 48 in spected and trusted Libyan personalities, the signed agreement) under the headline while taking into account the geographic “Security Arrangements”. These 14 articles dimension, cultural components and the have been preserved in the 11 July 2015 representation of women and youth. On agreement as they were in the fourth draft. the other hand, the power to nominate With the articles in this section, the UN new members during the transitional pe- tried to create a roadmap for the recon- riod will be exercised by the High Council struction of military and police forces. First of State. A commission will be established of all, the duty to establish and develop a solely to ensure the connection between military and police force was given to the the State Council and the Government Government of National Accord. The of National Accord. The draft agreement agreement draft has regulated numerous stated the primary aim of the transitional security measures that are advised to be process as preparation of laws and legal implemented during the reconstruction amendments for referendum and elec- period. These interim security measures tions. In this framework, the commission th include establishing a ceasefire, the with- regulated by the 24 Article is responsible drawal of militia from cities, residential ar- for the achievement of these aims. Article eas and critical infrastructure installations 25 designates the responsibilities of the as well as disarmament. According to the State Council in a more detailed fashion. Article 36, which regulates these interim According to this, the State Council is re- measures, the Government of National sponsible for: Accord is required to establish the neces- • Providing the needed support during sary bodies to implement and inspect these the implementation of the Libyan Po- aims. The Committee for Monitoring the litical Agreement, Implementation of the Interim Security Ar- rangements (Article 39) will be able to es- • Supporting the national unity, tablish sub-committees, while being able to • Protecting of the core foundations of request assistance from the UN if needed. society, With the ceasefire entering into force with • Supporting the economic and social the signing of Libyan Political Agreement, development projects that are in accor- the militia will withdraw starting from the dance with governmental programs, and capital Tripoli, and afterwards from the priorities, residential areas and buildings (Article 41- • Combating terrorism, extremism, vio- 42). 60 days into the ceasefire, all heavy and lence and exclusion, medium weaponry will be collected by the UN (Article 43). Articles 44 to 47 include • Supporting the efforts to re-establish the expression of interest about the social national reconciliation and social peace reintegration and rehabilitation of the dis- through current mechanisms, armed militia. According to the article, the • Ensuring the safe return of refugees and Government of National Accord will carry displaced persons, out the necessary regulations for reintegra- • Support the peace efforts and rejection tion and rehabilitation. Also, the suitable of the culture of violence and hatred ex-militia may also be transferred into se- through the means of media, curity forces.

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III. THE REFLECTIONS OF THE LIBYAN POLITICAL AGREEMENT IN THE FIELD a. Tripoli-Tobruk Struggle the elections could not put an end to the crisis, and instead, led to the emergence The negotiations led by the UN since of two rival camps, which are the GNC in September 2014 reached a concrete but Tripoli and the HoR in Tobruk. a partial outcome with the signing of the political agreement on 11 July 2014. The These two rival camps, named as Tobruk- majority -18 out of 22 members- of the Tripoli strife are composed of the umbrel- Libyan Political Dialogue, which attended la structure relying on the military and the negotiations, held in Morocco, Skhirat political alliance; hence gather a lot of dif- and also included the GNC, signed the ferent components under their roof. The Libyan Political Agreement. Although the military force of the GNC in Tripoli, which agreement does not deal with the vital is- controls west of the country, is known as sues such as resource and power sharing Libyan Dawn (Fajr Libya). Libyan Dawn is or political and administrative system, it largely consisting of Misratan militias, and brings some critical developments regard- also includes Zuwayah militias, many dif- ing the change in the political balance in ferent brigades and militias from Tripoli, the field. However, it is too early to predict forces from Ghariyan and Amazigh and that such a shift in the balance of power in Toubou Berberians. The most important Libya would bring stability and consensus. and well-known military unit of Libyan On the contrary, it is more likely that the Dawn is the Libya Shield Force, which is shift in power balance may trigger a new officially one of the General Staff forces, wave of clashes in the country. Due to the but practically acting as an autonomous desires of tribes, which would aim to pro- brigade. Misratan militias, together with tect existing assets, expand their territo- Muslim Brotherhood, are the dominant ries, positions and gain more advantages elements of the Libya Shield Force. Until in the changing balance, there is a high 2014, the Libya Shield Force had been op- possibility for possible clashes in the near erating in Tripoli, Misrata, Benghazi, and future. Homs, but in the last one year has largely lost its effectiveness in Benghazi. Similarly, The political crisis, which emerged just it is stated that the Libya Shield Force lost after the dismissal of Ali Zeidan from the control of some areas in Tripoli. More- prime ministry in March 2014, was dead- over, the Tripoli Brigade, close to Abdul locked with Karama (Dignity) Operations Hakim Belhaj, head of Al-Watan party, led by General Khalifa Haftar on 16 May is among the forces of the Libya Shield 2014. This process not only resulted in the Force. The reasons behind Amazigh’s de- emergence of two parliaments and two cision to side with Libyan Dawn are ongo- governments in Libya, but also Zintan’s ing disputes and conflict with Zintan tribe, departure from the GNC. It is an impor- which sided with the opposing camp, the tant turning point, because Zintan tribe HoR in Tobruk. Amazigh has been living is one of the most strong and influential in the region around Jebel Nafusa, west of Libyan tribes, which is located in the west the country near Tunisian border, whereas of Libya and has strong militia power. In Zintan also located in the Nafusa Moun- order to resolve the crisis, the GNC de- tains area. Similarly, Misratans sided with cided to hold elections in June 2014, but the GNC due to some political concerns

ORSAM 18 Report No: 201, August 2015 THE UNITED NATIONS RESPONSE TO THE LIBYAN CRISIS ORSAM and disputes with opposing camp, instead tion Party, the political wing of Muslim of shared aims or ideologies with the Brotherhood. Accordingly, this develop- GNC. Tuaregs as well as Toubous, who ment may trigger a shift in the balance of had stayed as nonaligned for a long time, power in favour of the HoR. This also sig- were involved in Tobruk-Tripoli struggle nals weakening in the block represented because of their territorial expansion poli- by the GNC. In particular, the decision of cies in Fezzan. Tuaregs sided with Tripoli Misrata Municipal Council as well as the following Toubous’s alliance with Tobruk. Justice and Construction Party to support the agreement has triggered a process of The military force of the HoR in Tobruk altering the balance of power. is called as Dignity (Karama) Operation Alliance. This alliance has the support of Even relative secession of Misrata, which is Haftar’s special forces; federalist Barka the largest and most powerful component government’s military forces led by Ibra- of Libyan Dawn, is quite a debilitating de- him Jadhran; the Libyan Air Force; Zintani velopment. During the crisis that emerged militias from west Libya; and Toubous with the formation of two parliaments and from south Libya, who entered into al- two governments after the June 2014 Elec- liances in the recent period. In addition, tion, Misrata has sided with the GNC in Haftar has formed the Sahawat around Tripoli and played a strategic role with its Benghazi by the end of 2014, after his fail- military power enabling the GNC to reach ure to defeat forces in Benghazi with air even to Fezzan. It also has an indisput- strikes. The source of the HoR control able contribution in ensuring the security over the eastern Libya is the support of of Tripoli. But the alliance between Mis- powerful and largest tribes living in Barqa rata and the GNC was formed within the (Cyrenaica) region and gathering under framework of mutual political needs and federalist Barqa government. Federalists concerns, rather than ideological similar- were in conflict with all the other politi- ity. Therefore, since the Ghadamis nego- cal groups in Libya until February 2014; in tiations, Misrata has responded positively the summer of 2014 they made a political to the mediation initiatives brokered by alliance with the HoR, just as Zintan tribe the UN. In this regard, Misrata sent its did. Ibrahim Jadhran was named a com- representatives to the talks in Geneva de- mander of the Petroleum Defense Guards spite the GNC’s decision of boycott, and after 2011 Revolution but removed from gave the clear signals that its alliance with his position in 2013. Aftermath, Jadhran the GNC was conditional. In addition, a seized and secured control of eastern position change of Misrata, which has a ports, such as Sidra and Ras Lanuf with vital role within the GNC block, raises the his armed units; and then transformed possibility of “demonstrative impact” for them into defence force of federalist Barqa other tribes and actors in Libya. government. Federalist Barqa government has an autonomous power and structure; Also, the Justice and Construction Party’s as well as holding strategically important consent for the agreement, which declare facilities of eastern Libya thanks to mili- the HoR as the legitimate legislative body tary forces led by Jadhran. in Libya, means a political regression for the GNC. Justice and Construction Party With the signing of Libyan Political agree- has received 10% of the votes in the 2012 ment on 11 July 2015, the HoR in Tobruk elections; won 17 of 80 seats allocated to is accepted as a legitimate legislative body. party lists in the GNC; and thus became Among signatory parties, there were forc- the second largest party following the Na- es and actors supporting the GNC such as tional Forces Alliance. In addition, it is Municipal Councils of Misrata, Benghazi, estimated that the party has the support and Tripoli, and the Justice and Construc- of the significant number of deputies al-

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located to the independent lists, which is are reports that other municipal councils around 120 seats.20 It is also expressed that are trying to deal with the HoR follow- the Justice and Construction Party is the ing Misrata. However, the core strength strongest group within the GNC in terms and importance of the GNC rest upon the of party discipline. Therefore, the impact continuing functions of state bureaucracy and power of the party has gone beyond remaining from state bureaucracy in Trip- the number of its deputies. The most oli. As long as the GNC controls the finan- striking example in this respect is the role cial and administrative state institutions played by the party during the vote of no- such as the Constitutional Court, Ministry confidence for the government led by Ali of Oil and the Central Bank, it will not be Zaidan and dismissal of him from Prime a preferred option to ignore or marginal- Ministry. After Ali Zaidan’s dismissal, the ize the GNC. Therefore, during the UN- Justice and Construction Party has con- brokered negotiations, the issues such as tinued to be one of the most active actors. transfer of the HoR to Tripoli, withdrawal However, these developments have not of militias and armed forces from Tripoli, yet turned Misrata or the Justice and Con- and removal of military forces from stra- struction Party into the primary allies of tegically important facilities were brought the HoR. In consequence, the UN backed to the agenda without any revisions. The agreement has triggered the process of GNC accepted the fourth draft agree- establishing a new political equilibrium, ment, because the GNC might have a rather than establishing a new political position which can balance the HoR as balance in the country. well as become an equal partner through the State Council formulation, stipu- At this point, it is obvious that there are lated by this draft agreement. Although defections within the GNC block and the fourth draft agreement also accepted the GNC has lost a significant level of its the HoR as the only legitimate legislative political and military support. This will body, at least, the authorities and pow- strengthen the HoR’s hand in both po- ers of the State Council were available to litical and military terms. Likewise, there create equality between the HoR and the

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GNC in practice. However, the fifth draft militia forces have become great tools as agreement, which was later signed by the well as game-changing agents. majority of Libyan Political Dialogue in Morocco, restricted almost all the powers The governments after October 2011 at- of the State Council, and transformed it tempted to integrate militia forces, the into an advisory council, which can only most important military troops of the civil express views. This situation is far from war. Two critical strategies were imple- the GNC’s expectations and makes it dif- mented in this regard: disarmament and ficult to convince the GNC politically in conversion to military units under the the coming period. control of a central army. The disarmament of the militia was a project of the Na- tional Transitional Council as well as the b. The Issues of Libyan National Army parliament and governments in charge af- and Militia Forces ter the elections in the country, while the The efforts to formulate a national army armament was increasing uncontrollably. under the UN-led draft agreement, to- However, the militia forces procured a re- spectable amount of armament during the gether with the issues of eliminating or civil war, with many of them in possession regulating militia forces, which has be- of heavy weaponry such as tanks. Besides come one of the most vital issues in the their physical power, the militia forces also country since 2011, deserves a separate succeeded in administrative self-institu- and detailed evaluation as it directly af- tionalization through establishing auton- fects the other subjects of the agreement. omous bodies. Small-scale armed groups Muammar Gaddafi was afraid of any pos- also integrated into these administrative sible coup against his rule, and therefore bodies after the civil war. The initiatives took numerous precautions to weaken the and projects to convince the fighters in Libyan army to eliminate such a possibil- militia forces for disarmament also be- ity. Especially after the 1990s, numerous came inadequate and hence these efforts tribes influential in the army were target- failed consequently. Primarily, taking an ed, their members were ousted from the active role during the civil war, the mili- army and new legions consisting of paid tia forces refused disarmament to protect foreigners were established in control of their newly-acquired powers. Gaddafi’s wingmen and sons instead of the national army. Therefore, Libyan national In response to these failures, the new gov- army dispersed during the 2011 civil war, ernments attempted to put the groups and the soldiers either participated in mi- under a central military command, when- litia forces or formed militia-like regional ever disarmament was not an option. The units. Paralleling the situation of army, mi- efforts to unite the militia forces, which litia forces, despite the fact that they lack a were autonomous and controlling certain central military coordination, became the territories, under a central military com- most important agent in the country with mand were not successful, either. On one the impact of continuing armament trend hand, the central government was not during post-2011 era. These aforemen- powerful and superior enough to control tioned militia forces have filled the securi- the militia forces under a single command; ty gap on the one hand, and ironically have on the other hand, the leading members of become the biggest security threat in the the militia forces resisted strongly to these country, on the other. Since the beginning efforts. In consequence, the militia forces of the civil war, it is estimated that around continue to be autonomous. 1700 militia forces have emerged in Libya. In the power struggle between tribes, in- Therefore the new governments, changed fluential families and ideological group, their strategies and provided the militia

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forces with a juridical status, and attached in a short time indicated in the text, the them to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. parties need to elaborate the details and Thereby, the militia forces were converted agree on them. into armed forces of the country, in addition to the national army. The govern- Moreover, the UN draft agreement has ment legally recognized the autonomy of no encouraging programs for the disar- the militia, and in practice admitted being mament of the militia forces. The biggest weak against the militia forces with this hurdle faced about the militia forces in the implementation. post-2011 era was to convince the armed Libyans into disarmament. As there is no The considerations for security arrange- military structure to force the militias into ments in the agreement remain limited to disarmament or to assimilate the militia just being declarations of will. Consider- forces in, the initiatives to disarm the forc- ing this aspect, during the post-2011 era, es were unsuccessful. At this point, it is these wills had been declared endlessly, worth noting that personal security con- but the efforts became unsuccessful one cerns are the primary motive pushing Lib- after another. Between 2011 and 2014, yans into forming armed groups. At the many alternative strategies were tried in same time, we need to emphasize that the Libya to solve the militia issue. Firstly, tribes are not clashing for power only, but disarmament and rehabilitation was tried, also for survival. The Libyan demograph- and negotiations were conducted to en- ics are also quite hectic in the post-2011 sure the withdrawal of the militias from era. For example, the reason for the clash the city centers. Afterwards, attempts to between Tuaregs and Toubous in Fezzan unify the militia forces under a central lie in Tuaregs’ wanting to expand into command and then to integrate them to Toubou territory, as much as the Tripoli- the existing system were carried on. From Tobruk struggle. Similarly, the expansion dispersing the militia forces to the taming of the militia forces of Misrata and Zintan them within the system, none of these tac- to Fezzan and becoming a party within the tics actually worked. As a result, the UN conflicts further deepened the concern for agreement draft now needs to go beyond survival. from being a declaration of will, and put forward a road map, which shows how Finally, the withdrawal of militias from it plans to solve the problems that other residential areas, cities and strategically practices have failed to solve. important buildings pose some problems encountered in other areas. It is a fact that For example, expecting a success on the militia forces exist in port towns and stra- implementation of the ceasefire and with- tegically important points such as popu- drawal of the militia forces by gathering lated city centers, airports, oil refineries the rival groups and local actors under and infrastructural facilities. Since 2014, “the Committee for Monitoring the Im- there have been bloody clashes in these plementation of the Interim Security Ar- places. While the civil airport under the rangement” is quite optimistic. Gathering control of Zintan tribe was bombed by the rival groups doesn’t guarantee a reso- the forces under the control of the GNC, lution to the problem or the implementa- many areas in Tripoli have been bombed tion of the UN-led road map. Of course, by forces under the control of the HoR. the efforts of bringing clashing actors Therefore, it is of critical importance that under a single organizational structure these cities are cleared of clashes. How- provides a strong basis for solving this ever it is not clear under the agreement problem, but this could only be taken as a as to whom the militia forces will hand starting point. If the UN wants to accom- down the control. The agreement stipu- plish the implementation of the road map lates that the withdrawal will take 30 days,

ORSAM 22 Report No: 201, August 2015 THE UNITED NATIONS RESPONSE TO THE LIBYAN CRISIS ORSAM while the disarmament will take 60. The creates an impression that all militias are UN doesn’t specify a timetable or a core external forces currently deployed in resi- structure about the establishment of a na- dential areas. However, the majority of the tional army. For example, if forces under militia forces are locals, taking care of the the control of Tobruk are given the central local security. As long as no structure to role in the structure of the National Army, how is it going to be possible to convince fulfill the security problem is established, the militia forces in Tripoli? Also the ex- it seems impossible for the militias to pression of “withdrawal of the militias” withdraw.

ORSAM Report No: 201, August 2015 23 ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

The negotiations led by the UN in order age. However, contrary to this image and to put an end to the Libyan crisis as well as assumptions; the HoR has not provided the signing of the Libyan Political Agree- the expected success in the field yet. The ment by 18 out of 22 members of the HoR in Tobruk, despite its military advan- Libyan Political Dialogue on 11 July 2014, tages, could not expand its area of con- were considerably significant for reaching trol with the operations carried out since a conflict resolution in the Libyan crisis. 2014. Despite all efforts, to which should The most fundamental tendency in the be added the serious amount of contri- UN’s approach for the conflict resolu- butions from Egypt after its air strikes in tion since September 2014 is to lead the Derna, the HoR in Tobruk could not gain formation of institutional mechanisms, the control of the center of Benghazi and which can bring the rival parties together. Derna. As a result, the military forces of A range of solutions to the issues, from the HoR are far from ensuring control of economy to politics and security, are not the whole country, contrary to the UN’s part of this negotiation process. The UN expectations. aims to leave the process to the Libyan actors after the formation of mechanisms With the signing of Libyan Political Agree- which can ensure coordination, and then ment on 11 July 2015, the HoR in Tobruk withdraw its position to a supporter. How- is accepted as a legitimate legislative body. ever, there are serious obstacles in front of 18 out of 22 members of Libyan Political the possibility of opening a path for the Dialogue participating in the negotiations resolution in Libya through the UN-bro- in Skhirat, Morocco accepted this agree- kered and political agreement. ment. It is significant that there are parties among the signatories that have been First of all, a set of defective assumptions supporting the GNC and Libyan Dawn. of the UN decreased the possible suc- Although the GNC in Tripoli refused to cess of the process to considerably lower sign the agreement, this situation indi- rates. The UN seems to be convinced that cates that there has been defection within the legitimate political interlocutor, in a the GNC coalition. Especially, the deci- political resolution, should be the HoR sion of Misratan City Council, which is a in Tobruk. Likewise, the second titles of significant military power in the country, each draft agreement are the announce- to support the agreement carries the po- ment of this conviction. The most impor- tential of changing the existing balance of tant factor shaping the conviction of the power in favor of the HoR. In addition, the UN in this direction is the assumption political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood that compared to the GNC in Tripoli, the in Libya, the Justice and Construction HoR in Tobruk, which has the support Party’s, support for the agreement will of forces loyal to Haftar, military units strengthen the hand of the HoR political- of Barqa federalist regional government ly. In this respect, it is possible to foresee led by Ibrahim Judhran, and Libyan Air that Libyan Political Agreement signed Forces, is more advantageous. From this on 11 July 2015 could trigger a process point of view, the HoR in Tobruk reflects that changes the balance of power in the militarily more powerful and capable im- country. Hence, it can be argued that the

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UN-backed political agreement paved the the GNC militarily. Khalifa Haftar tried way for the process of establishing a new to defeat the GNC military by launching political balance rather than establishing military operations against Tripoli for a new political balance in the country. a very long period, but did not succeed. This process might end with ensuring the Also, it is not a rational option for th HoR legitimacy of the HoR in the country, but to launch a heavy military operation in this is only one of the options. The prob- Tripoli, the capital city of Libya, because ability of the realization of this option de- the HoR aims to operate, seize the control pends on the HoR’s ability to construct its of the state bureaucracy and initiate state authority over its current alliance as well formation in Tripoli. But, in the end, it is as expand its authority over other military extremely difficult to convince the GNC, and non-military actors in Libya. Conse- whose demands are not met by the State quently, the political agreement has initi- Council, projected by the Libyan Political ated a new process of struggle rather than Agreement. Together with the HoR’s pow- establishing a balance in the field. er expansion, this fact reveals the possibility of upcoming clashes in the near future. The UN has put the HoR on the main axis of the negotiation process, which began in Another defective assumption of the UN Ghadames and reached a concrete level is that the recognition of the HoR in Tob in Morocco. Although the UN aimed to ruk by the GNC in Tripoli as well as rec- balance its pro-HoR approach with the onciliation between the two in the context fourth draft agreement, with the final ver- of a political resolution will put an end sion of the agreement, it strengthened to the military conflicts among militias the position of the HoR. The GNC in and military forces. Yet, in this context, it Tripoli refused to sign the final version of would be possible to establish a national the agreement despite the fact that some and integrated Libyan army with this na- elements within the GNC agreed on it, tional reconciliation between two parlia- because the final version reduced the au- ments and militia forces. These predic- thority and powers of the State Council tions are based on the assumption that which were ensured by the fourth draft. the two parliaments have the ultimate au- At this point, it is obvious that there are thority over all military and militia forces. defections within the GNC alliance, and However, neither the GNC in Tripoli has the GNC has lost militarily and politically total control over the militia forces, nor significant and powerful allies. This devel- the HoR in Tobruk has total control over opment will strengthen the HoR in both the forces loyal to Haftar, military units of political and military spheres. Likewise, Barqa federalist regional government led there is recent news that after Misrata, by Ibrahim Judhran, or Libyan Air Forces. other city councils have paying efforts to Both the Libyan Dawn led by the GNC in deal with the HoR. However, one of the Tripoli and Karama Operation Alliance factors that made the GNC a crucial actor led by the HoR in Tobruk are umbrella is the remnants of the state bureaucracy structures based on military and political in Tripoli. The most critical of these insti- alliances. Persuading the political elites tutions are the Constitutional Court, the for consensus is only a small part of the Central Bank, and Ministry of Oil. As they problem. The main part of the problem is continue to function in Tripoli that was to convince the militias and other forces controlled by the GNC, it will be difficult for a reconciliation process. This situa- to ignore or marginalize the GNC. tion reveals itself clearly in the decisions of Misratan City Council and the Justice Hence in the upcoming days, there are two and Construction Party to support the po- options for the HoR and its alliances: con- litical agreement despite the GNC’s rejec- vincing the GNC politically or defeating tion.

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All the governments formed during the part that has not been revised in any way Libyan National Transitional Council as in all draft agreements. In this respect, it well as the GNC have not achieved suc- is possible to think that the UN has not cess in resolving the problem of the militia opened the issue of the security arrange- forces and their efforts failed to reach a ments to the discussions. But, despite this successful solution. Between 2011-2014, attitude, the arrangements about security several alternative strategies have been in the political agreement are limited with adopted to resolve the problem of the the declaration of will, and do not foresee militia in Libya. These alternative strate- a concrete plan and regulations on how gies are, respectively, disarmament and to resolve this issue, which could not be rehabilitation, convincing the militias to resolved by the Libyan authorities since withdraw from city centers through ne- 2011. Concrete road map, together with gotiations, disciplining the militias under arrangements which can promise a suc- a central command and lastly integrating cess, requires targeting the fundamental them to the system. However, these ef- dynamics which have cultivated the mili- forts have failed to achieve a desired suc- tia issue in Libya. The resolution of this is- cess. The UN took the militia issue as a big sue fostered by a set of elements from sur- concern during the negotiation process vival concerns to power struggle requires and in the agreement text. The articles a more comprehensive and determinant on Libyan National Army are the second approach.

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ENDNOTES

1 “UN dialogue seeks to end Libya crisis”, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/ news/middleeast/2014/09/un-dialogue-seeks-end-libya-crisis-20149306471155215.html (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

2 “Ghadames to Host UNSMIL Brokered Talks”, Libya Analysis, 28 September 2014. http://www.libya- analysis.com/ghadames-to-host-unsmil-brokered-talks/ (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

3 “UN mediates Libyan talks in Geneva”, Al Jazeera, 15 January 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/ middleeast/2015/01/un-mediates-libyan-peace-talks-geneva-2015114142537190536.html (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

4 “Misrata rejects Congress boycott as UN confirms Geneva talks to go ahead tomorrow”, Libya Her- ald, 13 January 2015. http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/01/13/misrata-rejects-congress-boycott-as- un-confirms-geneva-talks-to-go-ahead-tomorrow/#ixzz3fldeTHvm (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

5 “UN to hold Libya talks amid doubts over participation”, Middle East Eye, 14 January 2015. http:// www.middleeasteye.net/news/un-hold-libya-talks-1137698148#sthash.KOf7tm92.dpuf (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

6 Khalid Mahmoud, “Libyan parliament deputy speaker: Tripoli will join peace talks”, Asharq al Awsat, 25 January 2015. http://www.aawsat.net/2015/01/article55340805/libyan-parliament-deputy-speaker-tripoli-will-join-peace-talks (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

7 “Escalating crisis in Libya despite peace talks”, ISS Africa, 2 February 2015. https://www.issafrica.org/ pscreport/situation-analysis/escalating-crisis-in-libya-despite-peace-talks (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

8 “Libyan parties open new round of UN-backed political talks aimed at restoring ‘stability and pros- perity’”, UN News Centre, 15 April 2015. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50597#. VaOaxPntlHw (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

9 “Haftar forces launch offensive to ‘liberate’ Tripoli”, Al Jazeera, 21 March 2015. http://www.aljazeera. com/news/middleeast/2015/03/haftar-forces-launch-offensive-liberate-tripoli-150321141149326. html (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

10 “UNSMIL Morocco Talks Begin Even As Haftar’s Planes Strike Mitiga Airport”, Mozayix, 16 April 2015. https://mozayix.com/unsmil-morocco-talks-begin-even-as-haftars-planes-strike-mitiga-airport/ (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

11 3rd Version of Draft Libyan Political Agreement, Libya’s Channel, http://www.libyaschannel.com/ wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Draft-Agreement-27-April-ENGmarked.pdf (Access Date: 11 Au- gust 2015); 4th Version of Draft Libyan Political Agreement, UNSMIL, http://unsmil.unmissions. org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=pvy_G4Fzt4c%3d&tabid=3543&mid=6187&language=en-US (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

ORSAM Report No: 201, August 2015 27 ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

12 See for the debates on federalism and Barqa Autonomous Government in Libya: Nebahat Tanrıverdi Yaşar, “Oil and Politics: Understanding the recent political rift in Libya”, ORSAM Foreign Policy Analysis, 26 March 2014. http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=2621 (Access Date: 11 August 2015); Nebahat Tanrıverdi Yaşar, “Federalizm Kaosa Çözüm mü?”, Ortadoğu Analiz, May-June Issue 6/62, pp.. 36-38. http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/trUploads/Yazilar/Dosyalar/201457_10nebahatta nriverdi.pdf (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

See for the military forces loyal to Haftar and HoR: Nebahat Tanrıverdi Yaşar, “Libya’da İkinci İç

Savaşın Adı: Karama (Haysiyet) Operasyonu”, Ortadoğu Analiz, Temmuz-Ağustos Issue 6/63, pp. 28- 30. http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/trUploads/Yazilar/Dosyalar/2014714_nebahattanriverdi.pdf (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

13 “Libya’s Tripoli parties reject ‘shocking’ UN peace draft”, Middle East Eye, 29 April 2015. http://www. middleeasteye.net/news/libyas-tripoli-parties-reject-shocking-un-peace-draft-1815497370#sthash. canXGxms.dpuf (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

14 “Libya Dawn militias demand UN to withdraw its envoy”, Libya News Today, 30 April 2015. http:// www.libyanewstoday.com/libya-dawn-militias-demand-un-to-withdraw-its-envoy/ (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

15 4th Version of Draft Libyan Political Agreement, Article 1/5., UNSMIL, http://unsmil.unmissions. org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=pvy_G4Fzt4c%3d&tabid=3543&mid=6187&language=en-US (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

16 “Libya’s GNC accepts UN draft proposal”, Al Araby, 17 June 2015. http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/ politics/2015/6/17/libyas-gnc-accepts-un-draft-proposal(Access Date: 11 August 2015) ;“Libya’s HoR rejects UN peace proposal”, TRT World, 10 June 2015. http://beta.trtworld.com/news.php?q=mea- libyas-hor-rejects-un-peace-proposal-2825 (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

17 “Germany hosts UN talks on Libya despite dispute over power-sharing plan”, Fox News, 10 June 2015, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/06/10/germany-hosts-un-talks-on-libya-despite-dispute- over-power-sharing-plan/ (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

18 5th Version of Draft Libyan Political Agreement, UNSMIL, http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Portals/unsmil/Documents/Libyan_Political_Agreement_2_July_15.pdf (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

19 Article 4, 5th Version of Draft Libyan Political Agreement, UNSMIL.

20 In the report issued by SWP, it is argued that the independents associated with the groups as follows: Independents Associated with National Forces Alliance (25), Associated with Justice and Con- struction (17), Associated with Other Parties and Groups (23), Genuine Independents (55). Wolfram Lochar, “Fault Lines of the Revolution”, SWP Research Paper 2013/RP 04, May 2013, http://www. swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2013_RP04_lac.pdf (Access Date: 11 August 2015)

ORSAM 28 Report No: 201, August 2015 Report No: 201, August 2015

THE UNITED NATIONS APPROACH TO THE LIBYAN CRISIS

ORTADOĞU STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR MERKEZİ CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

ORSAM

Süleyman Nazif Sokak No: 12-B Çankaya / Ankara Tel: 0 (312) 430 26 09 Fax: 0 (312) 430 39 48 www.orsam.org.tr, [email protected]