2 1 groups, criminal and of terrorist region the rid to amove as framed ostensibly was advance southern The ’s southwest. encompassing region avast , of the control take to acampaign on embarked KhalifaHaftar, marshal field eastern-based (LNA) Army National Libyan self-styled the ago, ayear Exactly One year on and the FezzanHaftar – (Accessed 01-01-2020).(Accessed secure-south-sarraj-reveals-root-dispute-haftar home/article/1548056/lna-launches-operation- with Haftar Dispute of Root Reveals Sarraj as South Secure to conventionally. although Libyan National is Army more used Mahmoud, K. (2019), (2019), K. Mahmoud, Forces, Armed Libyan Arab the is title official The neglected province. traditionally in the investment socioeconomic steady ensure to authorities Libyan on pressure diplomatic use must community international The remain. risks but Fezzan, the in operations its in sensitivity conflict greater of 2019,end displayed LNA the the communities. Towards local between relations inflamed alliances and short-term forces proxy deploying LNA’s of outsourcing, The policies reality. the with contrast in stands stability, and ensuring extremism of countering capable entity sole the as coalition his armed depicts which discourse, Haftar’s used. dynamics the describes and gains there, LNA’s of the depth the territorial examines brief policy This attempt. conquest that of step first the was province, southwestern country’s the Fezzan, of the takeover ostensible half. An western country’s the across force territorially-dominant the as (LNA) Army National Libyan self-styled his position to efforts significant exerted has Haftar Khalifa commander military 2019, early Since Libya’s eastern-based One year on Libya’s Fezzan the and Haftar JANUARY 2020 . Online: . Online: 2 but the underlying rationale rationale underlying the but https://aawsat.com/english/ LNA Launches Operation Operation Launches LNA 1 and its leader, and its

3 of Government the than populace Libyan of the representative legitimate amore as LNA image of the the of boosting a means was Fezzan of the control territorial Second, Libya. in southern groups stationed rebel of Chadian potential the curb to France, mainly actors, international certain from desire a was there Also, oil field. largest Fezzan’s the of al-Sharara, blockade long three-month- groups’ armed local at unease international growing was there example, For actors. global key affecting were that Fezzan in the issues addressing by LNA’s legitimacy the improve to international an opportunity was there First, twofold. was such cross-border attack since 2009. since attack cross-border such first the soil, Libyan from government Chadian the In August 2018 an attack was carried out against against out carried was 2018 attack an August In 3

Jonathan Tossell CRU Policy Brief CRU Policy Brief

National Accord (GNA), whose influence has airstrikes against perceived ISIS targets – it been confined to the west of the country. is clear that the region is far from stable and Moreover, a campaign to rid the south under control. of ‘terrorists’ would enhance the LNA’s international position as a reliable counter- One year on and the wider Libyan landscape terrorist force,4 and the Fezzan would has changed. As international policymakers become yet another platform from which to consider greater engagement with the launch a march on later in 2019. country’s eastern-based forces in the months ahead, this policy brief might At first, the advance was largely welcomed provide vital insights by analysing Haftar’s by southerners themselves, keen for greater 2019 experiences in the Fezzan. In his investment and attention to be paid to international overtures, Haftar has long their region, and early assessments of its portrayed himself and the LNA as the only effectiveness were also positive. In March, entity able to provide security and stability Ghassan Salamé, head of the United Nations in Libya, yet as this paper demonstrates, Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), stated such stability is based on opportunistic that the LNA operation had ‘brought a alliances and divide-and-rule tactics large measure of security and stability to rather than on durable coalition building. the South’.5 In November, Haftar himself Additionally, by establishing how some of praised the campaign as having successfully 2019’s most inflammatory events in the extended his army’s ‘control to the far south’.6 Fezzan unfolded, this brief will provide recommendations for the international However, when these sentiments are community for how best to apply external contrasted with the reality of events in pressure on Libya’s national actors. the Fezzan in 2019 – towns isolated from disaster relief, outbreaks of ethnic conflict, displacement of communities, and US Background and early tactics

The Fezzan is the source of Libya’s major oil 4 El Gomati, A. (2019), Haftar’s Rebranded Coups. and water reserves, and although sparsely Carnegie Sada. Online: https://carnegieendowment. populated it is the home of various ethnic org/sada/79579 (Accessed 01-01-2020). and tribal groups, many of which transcend 5 United Nations Support Mission in Libya (2019), the region’s modern-day borders with Remarks of SRSG Ghassan Salamé to the United , and . Nations Security Council on the Situation in Libya, 20 March 2019. Online: https://unsmil.unmissions. At first, Haftar’s early year incursion into org/remarks-srsg-ghassan-salam%C3%A9- the Fezzan made significant progress. united-nations-security-council-situation-libya-20- The al-Sharara oil field resumed production march-2019 (Accessed 01-01-2020). following months of mostly nonviolent 6 Ebleblou, R. (2019), disturbances including civilian protests, acts املشري حفرت لـ ‘اندبندنت عربية’: .Online: https://www .سندخل طرابلس عاجال وليس آجال independentarabia.com/node/69031/%D8%B3%D of sabotage, and the presence of local armed 9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AD%D9 groups. The LNA seemingly secured control %88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8% of Sebha, the Fezzan’s largest city and de A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B1- facto capital, with apparent efficiency, and %D8%AD%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D9%- by February LNA forces had established 84%D9%80-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D a presence in the city. 8%A8%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AA- %D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9- In order to gain territory in the Fezzan, %D8%B3%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84- Haftar’s primary obstacle was the Tubu, %D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84- a non-Arab ethnic group that constitutes %D8%B3-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%84 a well-armed, sizable minority population %D8%A7-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3- %D8%A2%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A7%C2%A0?f throughout southern Libya. The Tubu bclid=IwAR1lYp0rZPTUkW46TBT2NovVzgSEMrAK community was a former ally of Haftar IyTJNY7NJ8knPLcqRQ6XW1L1lIs (Accessed 01-01- but has grown defiant in recent years in 2020). response to several factors. These include

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the LNA’s policy of courting Arab tribes and uninterested in obstructing the LNA opposed to the Tubu, the creation of the conquest, ceded their positions in Sebha GNA in 2016 and their desire to align with as a ‘gesture of goodwill’ and re-stationed the ‘legitimate’ Tripoli government, as well themselves further south as LNA affiliates as Haftar’s recent blanket denunciation of advanced, giving the LNA an early-statement all Tubu armed groups as Chadian rebel victory.9 Once in position, Haftar shored up armed groups. This shift in stance reflects his Sebha incursion with a deployment of Haftar’s political ambitions, keen to be seen security forces from and other as ousting Chadian rebels from the Fezzan aligned areas, establishing an exogenous to appease international actors such as military presence and checkpoints within the France. On the domestic front, the military city. The negotiated move was championed by commander seeks to seduce southern Libya’s pro-LNA media as a display of sheer military key Arab tribes, many of which have a history strength, a rhetoric that only served to enrage of conflict or strained relations with the Tubu. the Tubu further south in the Fezzan.

As per the latter policy, Haftar sought to co-opt certain Arab groups on the ground A closer inspection of the in Sebha, such as the Awlad Suleiman campaign: an introduction to and tribes.7 The Magarha had been ostracised in the post-revolution era Murzuq and Ghat due to their pro-Gaddafi history, and were eventually won over by Haftar’s gradual, Murzuq is a Fezzan town where Ahali often languid, efforts to reintegrate pro- (a collective term for tribeless , relatively Gaddafi elements.8 Although significant low in military strength and cohesiveness) armed factions of the tribe had been and Tubu make up the majority of the incorporated into the LNA in 2017 and population. Economically, the town plays 2018, some elements of the Awlad Suleiman a key role in Libya’s gold mining operations, remained sceptical of Haftar’s Fezzan with an estimated 70 percent of the local advance, and as the dominant entity in population connected to the activity, which Sebha were under little immediate pressure has been dominated by Tubu.10 Strategically, to submit to the LNA. The latter stuck to its the town is significant because it has anti-Tubu rhetoric and afforded Arab tribes emerged in recent years as the stronghold of free rein, which manifested itself in the form anti-Haftar sentiment in the region. of a frontal clash in the Murzuq area. Since the post-2011 closure of the Algerian The initial response from local Tubu armed border, Ghat has become an economically groups in Sebha was markedly muted, isolated town in the Fezzan. It is also the perhaps owing to their being considerably homeland of the Libyan Tuareg, who make up outnumbered by Arab armed groups. the overwhelming majority of the population. Additionally, the LNA had initially approached Strategically, the town is important because them in a relatively diplomatic manner, of its location at the southwest tip of Libya, framing the Fezzan advance as Haftar’s making it a transit hub for migration and for commitment to security in the southwest. licit and illicit trade. It is also close to , Tubu armed groups, now outnumbered the nearest major town to the al-Sharara oil field. Ubari hosted tribal consultations where Tuareg armed groups collectively declared

7 Murray, R. (2019), Libya: Haftar’s ‘Divide and Rule’ Plans on the Edge of the . Italian Institute for International Political Studies. Online: 9 Lacher, W. (2019), Libya’s Conflicts Enter a Dangerous https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/libya- New Phase. German Institute for International and haftars-divide-and-rule-plans-edge-sahel-23866 Security Affairs. Online: https://www.swp-berlin. (Accessed 01-01-2020). org/10.18449/2019C08/ (Accessed 01-01-2020). 8 In particular, Haftar’s embrace of the Magarha’s 10 https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north- 12th Brigade and its anti-Misratan coalition from /north-africa/libya/179-how-libyas-fezzan- 2015 onwards proved pivotal. became-europes-new-border.

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their allegiance to the LNA on 9 February, From Haftar’s perspective, outsourcing the paving the way for the resumption of oil advance in the Fezzan not only enabled production. him to contest territory with minimal LNA casualties against the militarily powerful By the end of February, and following the Tubu, but also allowed him to concentrate events in Sebha, some observers suggested LNA personnel and resources in the Haftar had secured control of other strategic northwest of the country and Tripoli, in towns such as Ghat and Murzuq, and indeed particular from March onwards. In Murzuq, the Fezzan at large.11 Yet these optimistic the LNA deployed Darfuri and early perceptions began to contrast radically also enabled local Arab tribes such as the with the reality. In the months that followed, Awlad Suleiman, Zway and local Ahali to the weaknesses and unforeseen by-products fight against the dominant Tubu forces. of the LNA’s somewhat successful strategy in Sebha – particularly the use of local Haftar, who has Zway lineage,13 enlisted groups – were laid bare in the more volatile Zway Arabs from southeastern Libya to ethnic context of Murzuq. Simultaneously, fight against the Tubu in Murzuq, despite, the LNA’s policy of securing short-term or wilfully ignorant of, the post-2011 clashes territorial gain in the south and then almost between the two communities. Disputes instantly turning its attention to a sustained between the Zway and Tubu have taken assault on Tripoli, at the expense of short- place predominantly in the southwestern and medium-term security or governance city of , where the Zway constitute provision in the Fezzan, has been keenly the majority, and reached violent peaks in felt in the peripheral town of Ghat. The 2011-2013 and 2015 over control of smuggling remainder of this policy brief will examine routes. A truce was mediated in 2015 and has key themes with particular reference to been in place ever since, but relations remain these two towns, both of which offer unique highly volatile and vulnerable to external insights into the lasting impression of the provocation.14 With licence from afar via LNA LNA campaign in the south. commanders in , the Zway, Awlad Suleiman, Sudanese mercenaries and others perpetrated indiscriminate violence against The legacy of outsourcing the Tubu community in early 2019. There was particularly heavy conflict in February, The LNA’s incursion into the Fezzan was an resulting in more than a dozen civilian deaths atypical military advance in the sense that and 200 displaced families.15 In response it was largely implemented via proxy forces. to this incident, and considering the LNA’s Haftar enlisted the services recruitment of the Zway to be an act of of mercenaries from abroad, most notably deliberate provocation, the Tubu of Murzuq Sudan, alongside empowering certain local set about displacing entire communities of actors, in a policy that served to undermine the Ahali population. By March the LNA and local peace agreements and stoke hostilities associate proxies had turned their attention between different ethnic and tribal groups.12 towards Tripoli, and GNA-aligned Tubu forces regained control of Murzuq. In the

11 Wilson, L. and Pack, J. (2019), The Islamic State’s 13 Profazio (2019), op. cit. Revitalization in Libya and its Post-2016 War of 14 McGregor, A. (2016), The Strategic Topography Attrition. Combatting Terrorism Center at West of Southern Libya. ETH Zürich Center for Security Point. Online: https://ctc.usma.edu/islamic- Studies. Online: https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/ states-revitalization-libya-post-2016-war-attrition/ digital-library/articles/article.html/77004588-f3fc- (Accessed 01-01-2020). 4b4c-83a9-b1ff37cb64d9/pdf (Accessed 01-01- 12 Profazio, U. (2019), Push for Southern Libya Tests 2020). Ethnic Ties and Regional Alliances. International 15 Zaptia, S. (2019), Over 200 Displaced in Recent Institute for Strategic Studies. Online: https://www. Murzuq Fighting. Online: https://www.libyaherald. iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/03/southern-libya com/2019/02/27/over-200-displaced-in-recent- (Accessed 01-01-2020). murzuq-fighting/ (Accessed 01-01-2020).

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months that followed the Tubu continued elements, yet the recent experiences of Ghat to enact revenge upon the Ahali. Conflict and Murzuq indicate that this is not the case was brutal towards the end of summer, with in practice, and certain LNA policies have an intensification of clashes culminating in only served to further destabilise the country. a notorious Tubu assault on 17-18 August; Ghat witnessed consistent heavy rainfall in approximately 10,000 Murzuq residents were June that flooded an estimated 70 percent of displaced in that month alone.16 the municipality. This led to a humanitarian crisis, with over 1,000 residents displaced, When the LNA approached Ghat in early entire food stockpiles destroyed, drinking 2019, it negotiated an alignment with the water contaminated, and telecommunications town in exchange for recognition that local shut down in the region. Despite promising Tuareg tribes and governance structures to provide basic services to local Tuareg would administer proceedings on the ground. tribes for facilitating the LNA advance into The LNA also provided assurances that it the Fezzan, Haftar offered little practical would increase investment and resources assistance in Ghat during or after the in the town as part of a longer-term flooding, having largely abandoned the commitment to the Fezzan. As a result, in region since March. early March 2019 the LNA announced it had taken control of Ghat without a fight.17 Yet, The LNA’s decision not to provide material by once again being reluctant to intervene support in Ghat, despite its commitment to directly, it is questionable whether, aside Tuareg forces there, stems from a desire not from media optics, the LNA had secured to invest heavily in the area’s security sector any tangible presence or influence in Ghat. in light of priorities elsewhere. Yet in Murzuq, Sources within the Tuareg military relations the reluctance to provide security as the council, speaking to Clingendael in May local ethnic conflict escalated is strategically and June, claimed that for military issues more complex. After announcing its control Tuareg armed groups were first and foremost of Sebha in February, the LNA brought in its accountable to national-level forces, whether own security force from to shore from Tripoli or Tobruk, rather than to their up its position. Reluctant to deploy similar tribe. Yet for daily governance, the population resources in Murzuq, where local conflict of Ghat continued to recognise Tuareg tribal inflamed by external provocations has been structures. far more intense than in Sebha, the LNA has effectively contributed to growing insecurity in the Fezzan. The subsequent power LNA reluctance to act as vacuums and cyclical violence have created security provider an environment of insecurity in which extremist groups can prosper. In turn this has slightly damaged the LNA’s international Another prominent theme stemming from image – with notable international forces the LNA’s 2019 activities in the Fezzan is its losing patience with events they perceive reluctance to act as a security provider in to be counter to the image of Haftar as multiple settings. Haftar has courted local a counter-terrorism actor. and international support on the grounds that he can restore security and stability to Libya and rid the country of extremist The role of the GNA in the Fezzan

16 International Organization for Migration (2019), Part of the LNA’s motive behind its 2019 Murzuq Flash Update (20 August 2019). Online: Fezzan campaign was to gain territory at https://displacement.iom.int/reports/murzuq-flash- the expense of the GNA, to posit Haftar as update-20-august-2019 (Accessed 01-01-2020). 17 Zaptia, S. (2019), LNA Claims Control of Ghat in control of not only eastern Libya, but also and Awainat. Online: https://www.libyaherald. the southwest. Early efforts by the GNA to com/2019/03/03/lna-claims-control-of-ghat-and- counter this were insufficient. For example, awainat/ (Accessed 01-01-2020). in February 2019 the GNA appointed Ali

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Kana, a prominent Tuareg military figure, provide humanitarian aid via daily air drops as commander of the Sebha military zone, lasted only two days, while trucks carrying although by this time the LNA had already supplies were late or failed to arrive due to made progress in co-opting Tuareg and Arab the poor roads surrounding Ghat. As such tribes and had gained control of Sebha.18 the GNA failed to exploit the governance Although the GNA continues to liaise with vacuum created by LNA neglect, and local powerful armed groups in the region, this groups assumed responsibility. The mayor of has not translated into an effective foothold. Ghat, Qomani Salah, is quoted as saying that For example, in Murzuq, the Southern ‘Most relief materials came from civil society Protection Force (SPF) came to the fore from organizations and [ordinary] people.’24 May onwards as a prominent armed entity. Headed by the late Hassan Musa Sugi,19 the Tubu-majority SPF is loosely affiliated The future of the Fezzan with the GNA,20 and announced it had taken control of Murzuq in August. However, In September 2019, the GNA-SPF affiliation is an opportunistic conducted four airstrikes against ISIS targets relationship, predicated on the LNA being within the space of ten days in the Fezzan. a mutual enemy, and is therefore unlikely The strikes killed 43, or roughly a third of to provide the GNA with long-term tangible the ISIS force believed to be active in the influence in Murzuq. province. Locals also assert a fifth strike took place that was not officially acknowledged, In Ghat, the GNA had an opportunity to suggesting an accompanying operation by garner local support in the wake of the the CIA, which has been increasing its drone widespread flooding, especially with LNA capacity in the region.25 Both the timing and interests focused elsewhere. In June location of these strikes is significant. Prior the GNA announced it had allocated LD to September the US had not conducted a 10 million (EUR 6.5 million) as a disaster single airstrike in Libya in 2019.26 relief fund.21 However, a local resident spoke to Clingendael in November and The US intervention is an indication that the asserted that this fund never materialised in LNA’s involvement in the Fezzan, instead of the town. He went on to say that ‘The only reducing jihadi activities there, contributed external assistance we received was from to bolstering them. Indeed, months after Algeria.’22 The extent of Algeria’s assistance the LNA allegedly took over the area, the was corroborated by Moulay ag-Didi, head US Department of Defense said it was of the Supreme Social Tuareg Council in seeing ‘regeneration of the ISIS capability’, Libya.23 Moreover, a GNA commitment to adding that it was now easier for the terror organisation to recruit in the Fezzan.27

18 Profazio (2019), op. cit. غات بعد السيول: النازحون يشكون من ,( Karnfouda, R. (2019 Hasan Musa Sugi was killed in the November 2019 24 19 /Online: http://alwasat.ly/news .التالعب يف مواد اإلغاثة .assault on al-Feel oilfield 20 Heras, N. (2019), The GNA’s Muscle in Southern libya/247539 (Accessed 01-01-2020). Libya – Southern Protection Forces Leader Hasan 25 Schmitt, E. (2019), U.S. Drone Strikes Stymie ISIS Moussa Keley. The Jamestown Foundation Militant in Southern Libya. Online: https://www.nytimes. Leadership Monitor. Online: https://jamestown. com/2019/11/18/world/africa/drone-strikes-isis- org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/August-2019_ libya.html (Accessed 01-01-2020). MLM-1.pdf?x96934 (Accessed 01-01-2020). 26 Stancy Correll, D. (2019), AFRICOM Conducts 21 Zaptia, S. (2019), Ghat Flooding Causes Deaths Third Airstrike in a Week Against ISIS-Libya and More Than 1,000 Displaced. Online: https:// Members. Online: https://www.militarytimes.com/ www.libyaherald.com/2019/06/05/ghat-flooding- flashpoints/2019/09/27/africom-conducts-third- causes-deaths-and-more-than-1000-displaced/ airstrike-in-a-week-against-isis-libya-members/ (Accessed 01-01-2020). (Accessed 01-01-2020). 22 Telephone conversation between Clingendael and 27 Babb, C. (2019), VOA Interview with US AFRICOM Ghat resident, November 2019. Spokesman. Online: https://www.voanews.com/ 23 Telephone conversation between Clingendael and africa/voa-interview-us-africom-spokesman Moulay ag-Didi, November 2019. (Accessed 01-01-2020).

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US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper said Fezzan, in addition to southern Cyrenaica. in November that the US would ‘continue to Unlike other Zway officers, al-Abaaj mow the lawn’28 to contain extremist threats possesses a strong track record of mediating in Libya, implying ongoing US counter- with Tubu forces. His appointment suggests terrorism activity despite the LNA claiming an attempt by Haftar to be more inclusive to be on top of the issue. in forthcoming policies towards the Fezzan. In the first few weeks of his appointment, Whether directly prompted by the airstrikes al-Abaaj toured the Fezzan region, starting or otherwise, the LNA and its international in Ghat and including a visit to Murzuq. backers have undertaken efforts to rectify The tour was intended to reaffirm the LNA’s the situation. For example, following the presence in the region, and to reassure local dramatic escalation of violence in August, allies and aligned groups. both and the UAE – the LNA’s primary international financiers – have embarked on Haftar’s change in tack, coupling inclusive, diplomatic ventures to achieve reconciliation regionally sensitive recruitment with with the Tubu. In September the UAE enlisted international mediation, heralds a more Mohammed Adam Lino, Murzuq deputy in optimistic outlook for the LNA’s future in the the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, Fezzan, although the question remains as to to find common ground between the LNA why such considerations were not manifest and the Tubu as a means of going forward during the January and February advance. after months of violence in Murzuq. Lino is The likely answer is that Haftar sought to a prominent figure in the Tubu community, use the Fezzan as an opportunity to curry and during his visit to Abu Dhabi was political favour with key Arab constituencies encouraged to accept an LNA-aligned and international actors, consequently presence in Murzuq. He officially rejected exacerbating local ethnic tensions in a this proposal, yet upon his return he manner that could have been avoided. reportedly received a vehicle as a gift from the UAE,29 implying that other material Finally, in mid-November, forces affiliated to offerings may have been granted and that Ali Kana launched something of a renewed the Tubu had in fact signalled some form of offensive against LNA interests in the Fezzan, approval. In Moscow, Adam El Tibawi, head with eyewitness reports first suggesting a of the Tubu National Assembly, led a Tubu presence of military units near the al-Sharara delegation to meet with the Russian deputy oil field. Days later, the SPF were reported foreign minister in November, where they to have entered al-Feel, another Fezzan oil discussed the situation in southern Libya.30 facility. The LNA’s response was decisive, with a series of airstrikes – likely foreign, As for the LNA, in October, Haftar appointed given their high precision – allowing the Belkasem al-Abaaj as Governor of Southern LNA to reassert control of al-Feel, but Military Zones, responsible for the southern what is more indicative is the reluctance of most Tuareg to get involved or join Kana’s approach. This suggests a collective Tuareg 28 Snow, S. (2019), AFRICOM Demands Return of US mindset not to go against the LNA, and a Drone Shot Down by Russian Air Defenses Over substantial component of the Tubu now Libya. Online: https://www.militarytimes.com/ appear to be resigned to the LNA’s presence flashpoints/2019/12/10/africom-demands-return- in the region in 2020. Yet, the death of nine of-us-drone-shot-down-by-russian-air-defenses- Tubu children in the southern town Um over-libya/ (Accessed 01-01-2020). al-Aranib, as a result of a 29 November LNA 29 Telephone conversation between Clingendael and airstrike, acts as a reminder that the LNA’s local Tubu resident, November 2019. ability to abandon its ethno-nationalistic bias 30 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian should not be overestimated31. Federation (2019), Press Release on Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov’s Meeting With a Delegation of the Libyan Toubou Tribe. Online: https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/ 31 Xinhua. (2019), Airstrikes in Libya Kill 14 Children news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/ in 72 Hours. Online: http://www.xinhuanet.com/ id/3885744 (Accessed 01-01-2020). english/2019-12/02/c_138598934.htm.

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Recommendations

Based on the above overview, this policy brief Haftar’s early 2019 tactic of acquiring offers the following key recommendations territory or local alignment but then failing to for policymakers: provide security or services demonstrated a 1. The Fezzan warrants continued reluctance to be held financially or materially international engagement and responsible in the Fezzan. In its more recent investment. As we enter 2020 the GNA’s appointments and initiatives, the LNA has influence at national level continues to demonstrated a conflict-sensitive approach, diminish. In turn, the LNA’s positioning but is still falling short. If the international as the de facto representative of Libya in community chooses to view the LNA as the international arena becomes more of a legitimate political and security actor, it a reality. As the international community must pressure the LNA to make long-term increases its engagement with the LNA in investments in the southwest. In the months 2020, it must also demand accountability ahead, international policymakers should on the part of the actor, from a security apply pressure on the LNA to improve perspective and a socio-economic Fezzan livelihoods and access to services, perspective alike. Libya’s southwest particularly as Haftar seeks enhanced remains pivotal to the future stability international legitimacy. In turn, such of Libya, given its abundant natural stabilisation endeavours in the Fezzan would resources, the presence of powerful positively contribute to other international armed groups there, and its geographical policy priorities, such as the protection of position as gateway on the East African migrants and counter-terrorism. migration route. 2. External pressure on the LNA could contribute to stabilisation. Events in the first two months of 2019 highlight the ill-conceived strategy deployed by the LNA, which did much to provoke ethnic tensions and local conflict throughout the year. However, the latter half of 2019 has seen the LNA, and its international backers, responding somewhat to external pressure, most notably from the United States.

8 About the Clingendael Institute Clingendael – the Netherlands Institute of International Relations – is a leading think tank and academy on international affairs. Through our analyses, training and public debate we aim to inspire and equip governments, businesses, and civil society in order to contribute to a secure, sustainable and just world. www.clingendael.org/cru  @clingendaelorg [email protected]  The Clingendael Institute +31 70 324 53 84  The Clingendael Institute  Newsletter

About the author

Jonathan Tossell is a Junior Researcher at Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit. He focuses primarily on local governance and the rule of law in Libya, but is also interested in migration, working with non-state actors, and the promotion of civic space throughout North and East Africa.