JANUARY 2020 Libya’s Haftar and the Fezzan CRU Policy Brief One year on Since early 2019, Libya’s eastern-based military commander Khalifa Haftar has exerted significant efforts to position his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) as the territorially-dominant force across the country’s western half. An ostensible takeover of the Fezzan, the country’s southwestern province, was the first step of that conquest attempt. This policy brief examines the depth of the LNA’s territorial gains there, and describes the dynamics used. Haftar’s discourse, which depicts his armed coalition Jonathan Tossell as the sole entity capable of countering extremism and ensuring stability, stands in contrast with the reality. The LNA’s policies of outsourcing, deploying proxy forces and short-term alliances inflamed relations between local communities. Towards the end of 2019, the LNA displayed greater conflict sensitivity in its operations in the Fezzan, but risks remain. The international community must use diplomatic pressure on Libyan authorities to ensure steady socioeconomic investment in the traditionally neglected province. Haftar and the Fezzan – One year on Exactly a year ago, the self-styled Libyan was twofold. First, there was an opportunity National Army (LNA)1 and its leader, to improve the LNA’s international legitimacy eastern-based field marshal Khalifa Haftar, by addressing issues in the Fezzan that were embarked on a campaign to take control affecting key global actors. For example, of the Fezzan, a vast region encompassing there was growing international unease Libya’s southwest. at local armed groups’ three-month- long blockade of al-Sharara, the Fezzan’s The southern advance was ostensibly framed largest oil field. Also, there was a desire as a move to rid the region of terrorist and from certain international actors, mainly criminal groups,2 but the underlying rationale France, to curb the potential of Chadian rebel groups stationed in southern Libya.3 Second, territorial control of the Fezzan was 1 The official title is the Arab Libyan Armed Forces, a means of boosting the image of the LNA although Libyan National Army is used more as a more legitimate representative of the conventionally. Libyan populace than the Government of 2 Mahmoud, K. (2019), LNA Launches Operation to Secure South as Sarraj Reveals Root of Dispute with Haftar. Online: https://aawsat.com/english/ home/article/1548056/lna-launches-operation- 3 In August 2018 an attack was carried out against secure-south-sarraj-reveals-root-dispute-haftar the Chadian government from Libyan soil, the first (Accessed 01-01-2020). such cross-border attack since 2009. CRU Policy Brief National Accord (GNA), whose influence has airstrikes against perceived ISIS targets – it been confined to the west of the country. is clear that the region is far from stable and Moreover, a campaign to rid the south under control. of ‘terrorists’ would enhance the LNA’s international position as a reliable counter- One year on and the wider Libyan landscape terrorist force,4 and the Fezzan would has changed. As international policymakers become yet another platform from which to consider greater engagement with the launch a march on Tripoli later in 2019. country’s eastern-based forces in the months ahead, this policy brief might At first, the advance was largely welcomed provide vital insights by analysing Haftar’s by southerners themselves, keen for greater 2019 experiences in the Fezzan. In his investment and attention to be paid to international overtures, Haftar has long their region, and early assessments of its portrayed himself and the LNA as the only effectiveness were also positive. In March, entity able to provide security and stability Ghassan Salamé, head of the United Nations in Libya, yet as this paper demonstrates, Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), stated such stability is based on opportunistic that the LNA operation had ‘brought a alliances and divide-and-rule tactics large measure of security and stability to rather than on durable coalition building. the South’.5 In November, Haftar himself Additionally, by establishing how some of praised the campaign as having successfully 2019’s most inflammatory events in the extended his army’s ‘control to the far south’.6 Fezzan unfolded, this brief will provide recommendations for the international However, when these sentiments are community for how best to apply external contrasted with the reality of events in pressure on Libya’s national actors. the Fezzan in 2019 – towns isolated from disaster relief, outbreaks of ethnic conflict, displacement of communities, and US Background and early tactics The Fezzan is the source of Libya’s major oil 4 El Gomati, A. (2019), Haftar’s Rebranded Coups. and water reserves, and although sparsely Carnegie Sada. Online: https://carnegieendowment. populated it is the home of various ethnic org/sada/79579 (Accessed 01-01-2020). and tribal groups, many of which transcend 5 United Nations Support Mission in Libya (2019), the region’s modern-day borders with Remarks of SRSG Ghassan Salamé to the United Algeria, Niger and Chad. Nations Security Council on the Situation in Libya, 20 March 2019. Online: https://unsmil.unmissions. At first, Haftar’s early year incursion into org/remarks-srsg-ghassan-salam%C3%A9- the Fezzan made significant progress. united-nations-security-council-situation-libya-20- The al-Sharara oil field resumed production march-2019 (Accessed 01-01-2020). following months of mostly nonviolent 6 Ebleblou, R. (2019), disturbances including civilian protests, acts املشري حفرت لـ ‘اندبندنت عربية’: .Online: https://www .سندخل طرابلس عاجال وليس آجال independentarabia.com/node/69031/%D8%B3%D of sabotage, and the presence of local armed 9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AD%D9 groups. The LNA seemingly secured control %88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8% of Sebha, the Fezzan’s largest city and de A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B1- facto capital, with apparent efficiency, and %D8%AD%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D9%- by February LNA forces had established 84%D9%80-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D a presence in the city. 8%A8%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AA- %D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9- In order to gain territory in the Fezzan, %D8%B3%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84- Haftar’s primary obstacle was the Tubu, %D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84- a non-Arab ethnic group that constitutes %D8%B3-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%84 a well-armed, sizable minority population %D8%A7-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3- %D8%A2%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A7%C2%A0?f throughout southern Libya. The Tubu bclid=IwAR1lYp0rZPTUkW46TBT2NovVzgSEMrAK community was a former ally of Haftar IyTJNY7NJ8knPLcqRQ6XW1L1lIs (Accessed 01-01- but has grown defiant in recent years in 2020). response to several factors. These include 2 CRU Policy Brief the LNA’s policy of courting Arab tribes and uninterested in obstructing the LNA opposed to the Tubu, the creation of the conquest, ceded their positions in Sebha GNA in 2016 and their desire to align with as a ‘gesture of goodwill’ and re-stationed the ‘legitimate’ Tripoli government, as well themselves further south as LNA affiliates as Haftar’s recent blanket denunciation of advanced, giving the LNA an early-statement all Tubu armed groups as Chadian rebel victory.9 Once in position, Haftar shored up armed groups. This shift in stance reflects his Sebha incursion with a deployment of Haftar’s political ambitions, keen to be seen security forces from Cyrenaica and other as ousting Chadian rebels from the Fezzan aligned areas, establishing an exogenous to appease international actors such as military presence and checkpoints within the France. On the domestic front, the military city. The negotiated move was championed by commander seeks to seduce southern Libya’s pro-LNA media as a display of sheer military key Arab tribes, many of which have a history strength, a rhetoric that only served to enrage of conflict or strained relations with the Tubu. the Tubu further south in the Fezzan. As per the latter policy, Haftar sought to co-opt certain Arab groups on the ground A closer inspection of the in Sebha, such as the Awlad Suleiman campaign: an introduction to and Magarha tribes.7 The Magarha had been ostracised in the post-revolution era Murzuq and Ghat due to their pro-Gaddafi history, and were eventually won over by Haftar’s gradual, Murzuq is a Fezzan town where Ahali often languid, efforts to reintegrate pro- (a collective term for tribeless Arabs, relatively Gaddafi elements.8 Although significant low in military strength and cohesiveness) armed factions of the tribe had been and Tubu make up the majority of the incorporated into the LNA in 2017 and population. Economically, the town plays 2018, some elements of the Awlad Suleiman a key role in Libya’s gold mining operations, remained sceptical of Haftar’s Fezzan with an estimated 70 percent of the local advance, and as the dominant entity in population connected to the activity, which Sebha were under little immediate pressure has been dominated by Tubu.10 Strategically, to submit to the LNA. The latter stuck to its the town is significant because it has anti-Tubu rhetoric and afforded Arab tribes emerged in recent years as the stronghold of free rein, which manifested itself in the form anti-Haftar sentiment in the region. of a frontal clash in the Murzuq area. Since the post-2011 closure of the Algerian The initial response from local Tubu armed border, Ghat has become an economically groups in Sebha was markedly muted, isolated town in the Fezzan.