After Gaddafi 01 0 0.Pdf

Benghazi in an individual capacity and the group it- ures such as Zahi Mogherbi and Amal al-Obeidi. They self does not seem to be reforming. Al-Qaeda in the found an echo in the administrative elites, which, al- Islamic Maghreb has also been cited as a potential though they may have served the regime for years, spoiler in Libya. In fact, an early attempt to infiltrate did not necessarily accept its values or projects. Both the country was foiled and since then the group has groups represent an essential resource for the future, been taking arms and weapons out of Libya instead. and will certainly take part in a future government. It is unlikely to play any role at all. Scenarios for the future The position of the Union of Free Officers is unknown and, although they may form a pressure group, their membership is elderly and many of them – such as the Three scenarios have been proposed for Libya in the rijal al-khima (‘the men of the tent’ – Colonel Gaddafi’s future: (1) the Gaddafi regime is restored to power; closest confidants) – too compromised by their as- (2) Libya becomes a failing state; and (3) some kind sociation with the Gaddafi regime. The exiled groups of pluralistic government emerges in a reunified state. will undoubtedly seek roles in any new regime but The possibility that Libya remains, as at present, a they suffer from the fact that they have been abroad divided state between East and West has been ex- for up to thirty years or more. Some will certainly find cluded because there is a general view inside the new roles: Colonel Khalifa Haftar has already been country that this must not happen. Although it might recalled from the US, where he had been living in be a temporary consequence of scenario (1), it is re- exile after renouncing the regime in the wake of its sisted because almost certainly it would result in two defeat in Chad in 1987. He is now engaged in trying satrapies, one depending on Egypt (Cyrenaica) and to create a credible military force in Cyrenaica. the other on Algeria and/or Tunisia (Tripolitania and the Fezzan). Existing forces (1) The regime survives Then there are those who have renounced the re- This outcome, of course, is implicit in the African Union gime in the wake of the current insurgency. The am- peace plan and has been rejected by the National bassadorial core abroad has seen significant defec- Transitional Council in Eastern Libya precisely be- tions, from the foreign minister, Moussa Koussa, to cause it would mean that the Gaddafi regime would the ambassador to the United Nations, Abdurrahman be seen as a legitimate negotiating partner. This is Shalgam. There have also been defections from something that the insurgency refuses to contem- within the administrative core of the regime, such as plate, so a negotiated path to regime survival is not Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, the former justice minister for- possible, even in the imaginative scenarios proposed mally in charge in Benghazi, and the former interior by Saif-al-Islam Gaddafi. minister, Abdel Fattah Younes al-Abidi. These will form an important well of administrative and diplo- The alternative is that the regime imposes itself by matic expertise on which any new regime must rely. main force. It is extremely difficult to imagine this as an outcome because Libyan special forces are simply Certain groups will have no place at all. Top of the too small and have suffered considerable attrition at list will be Colonel Gaddafi himself and his immedi- the hands of the Coalition’s no-fly zone policies – 30 ate family, despite Turkish, African Union and other percent of their armour and heavy weaponry is now diplomatic initiatives to rehabilitate some, if not all, of said to have been destroyed. This leaves the third them. In one sense this is a tragic irony because the option that the country remains divided but this also, one voice in Libya calling for democratic transition in the long run, will not be tolerable as it creates a and taking concrete steps in that direction in recent political vacuum that neither side will accept and both years has been Saif al-Islam Gaddafi. He has, how- will seek to correct, by main force if possible. ever, disqualified himself by his enthusiastic support for his father’s brutal crackdown on the rebels at the (2) A failed state start of the insurgency. It has been argued that, as a result of the violence, The irony here is doubled by the fact that he had also Libya will degenerate into a failed state in which tribal been the patron of a significant group of Libyan intel- factions will constantly challenge each other for su- lectuals trying to plan reform even under the Gaddafi preme power, with no faction enjoying sufficient force regime. Their values reflected those of the educated to dominate. This assumes that Libyan politics has urban elites now emerging as an urban middle class, been frozen in tribal stasis for the past forty years. particularly in Tripoli but also in Benghazi around fig- The assumption is incorrect: although tribes still exert 2 European Union Institute for Security Studies considerable power, their powerbase is rural and If, then, a new political system were to emerge, the Libya is a predominantly urban society in which tribal likelihood is that it would be pluralistic in nature simply ethos, as mentioned above, may be important, but because there is no credible military force available has to compete with other forms of collective iden- to figures outside the regime to impose a dictatorship tity. and those forces available to regime figures are too small to make such an outcome effective. This will As part of this scenario, it is argued that the Sirtican particularly be the case if the Eastern-based National tribes – the Qadhadhfa, the Warfalla and the Maghraha Transitional Council achieves success in over-turning – have a major investment in the regime and they will the regime for it knows that it cannot, as presently provide the drive for the collapse of the Libyan state, constituted, claim to represent the totality of Libyans, particularly against the tribes of Cyrenaica. It is true not least because of ancient tribal tensions between that the original revolution represented a reversal of East, Centre and West. The likely appearance of tribal power with formerly subservient tribes coming such a new political system is described below. to dominate their previous masters. It is also true that resentment continues to fester today as a result of A new government this forty-year-old reversal. However, the unity of the three Sirtican tribes is not guaranteed – the Warfalla were victimised after the failed Bani Walid coup in That leaves the question of what such a new gov- 1993 and the Maghraha have never shown the same ernment will look like. There is, first of all, going to kind of loyalty to the regime as the Qadhadhfa. And have to be a transitional administration. This will the latter are a small tribe, whose power derives only not necessarily be the National Transitional Council from their close connections with the ruling regime. in Benghazi as it may be too heavily weighed to- wards Cyrenaica for Tripoline tastes. Almost cer- It is much more likely that the Warfalla and, probably, tainly it will be modified by the inclusion of figures the Maghraha will see that their interests are best from Tripolitania and will include those incipient civil served by turning against the regime – one faction society institutions that were beginning to emerge, of the Warfalla, indeed, declared for the insurgency often based on lawyers’ associations – they, after all, originally. This would leave the Qadhadhfa isolated sparked off the insurgency in Benghazi. It will not and it would lack the power to impose itself alone. In have formal democratic legitimacy but it will be forced other words, the Cyrenaica insurgency will probably to create a political arena in which elections for a con- be able to quash any potential threat to a unified state stitutional assembly could take place within a matter once the regime is toppled, thus avoiding the Libyan of months. state collapsing into chaos. In addition, most of the Tripoline tribes have not committed themselves to The new constitution – at least one draft already ex- the regime. They are waiting to see who comes out ists – will then have to be approved by referendum so on top but they also know that the Gaddafi regime, that parliamentary elections will be possible. What having lost control of half the country, is no longer a legislative institutions will be proposed by the consti- credible political force. tution is not clear. Furthermore, what the elections will produce is virtually impossible to predict as all the (3) A pluralistic outcome above groups and interests will compete for power. What will emerge, despite having, no doubt, a formal The third possibility is that, in some way, the Gaddafi similarity to democratic systems elsewhere, will rep- regime collapses and a new pluralistic political sys- resent a coalition of other interests – tribal and eth- tem emerges from the ashes. The regime is likely to nic (the Berbers of the Jabal Nafusa have their own collapse precisely because it has lost credibility and resentments), religious, urban elites and business those still supporting it decide to cut their losses and (there is already a nascent private sector) – strug- cease to support the regime. The Arab press has gling for primacy. It will not include the Gaddafi clan reported that the regime is now so fearful of further or their tribal supporters and it will represent an un- high-level defections that it has sequestrated major easy compromise between West and East, between political figures in the Bab al-Aziziyah barracks – Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, with the Fezzan holding Colonel Gaddafi’s home – and that it has already had the balance and Sirtica being isolated.

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