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Crisis Committee CRISIS COMMITTEE Lyon Model United Nations 2018 Study Guide Libyan Civil War !1 LyonMUN 2018 – Libyan Civil War Director: Thomas Ron Deputy Director: Malte Westphal Chairs: Laurence Turner and Carine Karaki Backroom: Ben Bolton, Camille Saikali, Margaux Da Silva, and Antoine Gaudim !2 Director’s Welcome Dear Delegates, On behalf of the whole team I would like to welcome you to LyonMUN 2018 and this simulation of the Libyan Civil War. It is strange to feel that such an important topic that we all remember happening is already over 7 years old. Therefore, we felt it would be a good time to simulate it and think about the ways it could have gone. As delegates you will each be given characters to play in this crisis. These were real people who made a difference within the actual Civil War and have their own objectives and goals. You are tasked with advancing the goals of your character and making sure that they end up doing well out of this crisis. Every action will have consequences, everything you do will have ramifications, and mistakes can be deadly. Your chairs will be there to help but they will also be representing characters and have their own interests, meaning they may not be fully trustworthy. Behind the scenes you will have a backroom which will interpret your directives and move the plot forward. We will be there to read what you say and put it into action. However, a word to the wise, the way your wish may be interpreted may not be ideal. Therefore, it is important to be clear and specific when sending directives, lest they be interpreted in a mischievous way. I look forward to meeting you all at LyonMUN. I hope this guide is useful. Thomas Ron – Crisis Director for LyonMUN 2018 !3 Table of Contents 1. Director’s Welcome – Page 2 2. Table of Contents – Page 3 3. History of the Topic – Pages 4 – 27 4. Society, Politics, and Economy of Libya – 28 – 43 5. Cabinets - !4 History of Libya Timeline: 1951-16 January 2011 A brief summary of Libya’s history till 1951 Libya is known to be a country of rich history, even though it was never historically considered to be a center of population or power. Nevertheless, its history combines a great number of ethnically diverse groups on its ground: the Berbers, the Romans, the Phoenicians, the Arabs. This is due to the fact that thorough its history, Libya was known to be submissive to foreign power, which helped shape its future civilisation. It should be noted that Libya’s name is a neologism, a resemblance to Algeria as well, formed by the conquering Italians in the 20th century. Libya’s map was not entirely drawn until the mid-20th century, seeing as the Ottomans, Italians and the British were fighting for dominance of the land. It was divided into the following three ancient provinces: Cyrenaica in the east, Tripolitania in the west and Fezzan in the south into one regency of Tripoli under the Ottoman Empire’s rule. Cyrenaica was also where Senussi's grandson (a political religious group founded by Muhammad bin Ali al-Sanusi, and was known to be a tribe in Cyrenaica), Idris, resided and would one day become the ruler of the United Libyan Kingdom. More importantly, the Senussis showed their support to !5 Germany and the Ottomans in World War I, but were opposed to the post-war Italian colonisation of their region shortly after. Idris was, despite the Italian colonization, recognized as the Emir of Italian Cyrenaica by Benito Mussolini in 1917. During World War II, Idris and the Senussis formed an alliance with the British in an attempt to end the Italian colonisation. This aided in the Italian and German defeat in Africa in 1943 against the British. A few years later, in 1949, their British ally supported Idris in his efforts to declare the independent Emirate of Cyrenaica- and when he was also known as the Emir of Tripolitania, he continued his work with the goal of a gradual Libyan unification. Soon after, during December 1951, he announced the United Libyan Kingdom, consequently naming himself as King. Nevertheless, Arab nationalists were vehemently opposed to the close ties Idris kept with the West, considering him a puppet to the foreign forces. King Idris I was known to be a true monarch, dismissing claims for changes and democratic wishes. His rise to power had a significantly poor effect on the country’s situation, but from an economic point of view, they were dependent of British and US airbases, and international aid which helped their economy flourish. The situation quickly changed in 1959 with the discovery of important oil reserves and the possibility of independence. King Idris began discussing and negotiating the eventual withdrawal of foreign forces from Libyan lands, but his work was suddenly put to an end in 1969 by a bloodless coup d’état, led by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and his troops. The Gaddafi regimen !6 September 1st, the year of 1969, Muammar Gaddafi became the country’s leader, following the famous episode of the coup d’état in Benghazi by a group of young army officers known as The Free Officers Movement against King Idris I, who consequently fled the country. The monarchy, as well as the monarchial constitution, was thus put to an end. Gaddafi then established the “Libyan Arab Republic” with the help of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) under the following slogan: freedom, socialism and unity, and would continue "in the path of freedom, unity, and social justice, guaranteeing the right of equality to its citizens, and opening before them the doors of honorable work." The regimen broke free from the restrains of the British and American government, and commenced its process of nationalization. Having discovered important oil reserves, the Republic quickly asserted itself through activities of exchange, and through setting higher price points for the oil. The Qaddafi regime was especially known to preach Arab unity and the Islamic brotherhood. In fact, its government refused the notion of communism, due to it being atheist, and decided to interpret socialism through its own devices by introducing Islamic principles and combining them to the economic, political and social Libyan reality. Following his rise to power, Gaddafi, assisted by the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council (also known as the RCC) built what would later be called “the !7 state of the masses”, a socialite state in 1977. Its general purpose was to ensure free healthcare, public education free of charges and available to both sexes, subsidized food and cars as well as sufficient running electricity across the country. “The great man made water system” was also introduced, enabling all citizens to benefit from free water. In addition, Libya’s per capita income was ranked as the fifth highest in Africa, further demonstrating the strong financial role the country had at the time. In addition, it further affirmed itself as an Arab nation, with Islam as its state religion. In reference to the Arab unity, it slowly began to dissolve as soon as conflicts arose between different governments. Libya had a clear position supporting the Palestinian cause against Israel, and had an active role in the Middle Eastern and African revolutions. Between the months of July and August 1977, tension surfaced between Libya and Egypt, and was followed by the progressive fall out of the Gaddafi regime relations with the rest of the Arab world. On March 2, 1977, the General People’s Congress declared that the name of the Republic became the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and the latter term is a neologism meaning “state of the masses” as mentioned above. Then, in 1986, the country was renamed and became the Great Socialist’s People Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. And during that time, what stood out the most was a significant drop in both the demand for oil and its prices on the global market. The result was immediate: Gaddafi had slowly started to lose his poignant economic role. His reforms were not as frequent anymore, and Libya was furthermore on a developing pause: the citizens were not hesitant to show their discontent with the current situation. The response was radical, with a number of movements of opposition !8 forming against the country’s leader, but were quickly put down by the latter and his army (they either faced arrest or execution). The beginning of opposition While Gaddafi was no longer using Libya’s oil wealth for development within Libya, he was using it to interfere in the affairs of other nations, creating tensions both in the immediate surrounding regions and bringing international condemnation. Gaddafi openly supported movements such as the IRA, and the ANC led by Mandela; it was widely suspected, and sometimes known, that his government participated in, or at least aided, acts of terror through these proxies. Gaddafi also took it upon himself to invade neighbouring African states including Egypt (which led to the Libyan-Egyptian War), and Chad in the 1970/80s. Gaddafi claimed a need to support anti-colonial, ad anti-imperial movements internationally. At this point, observers began to doubt his mental state and erraticism. In 1972, Gaddafi formed the Islamic Legion, in an attempt to ‘Arabize’ the region and unify it, starting with Chad, and the Sudan. Meanwhile, in Darfur (a Sudanese western province), Gaddafi supported the Arab Gathering, an organisation that drew much international criticism for its apparent racism against non-Arabs. These groups were composed of immigrants who, in 1981, were recruited with no military training and poor equipment on the false promise of civilian jobs in Libya.
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