CRISIS COMMITTEE

Lyon Model United Nations 2018 Study Guide

Libyan Civil War

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LyonMUN 2018 – Libyan Civil

War

Director: Thomas Ron

Deputy Director: Malte Westphal

Chairs: Laurence Turner and Carine Karaki

Backroom: Ben Bolton, Camille Saikali, Margaux Da Silva, and Antoine

Gaudim

!2 Director’s Welcome

Dear Delegates,

On behalf of the whole team I would like to welcome you to LyonMUN 2018 and this simulation of the Libyan Civil War. It is strange to feel that such an important topic that we all remember happening is already over 7 years old. Therefore, we felt it would be a good time to simulate it and think about the ways it could have gone.

As delegates you will each be given characters to play in this crisis. These were real people who made a difference within the actual Civil War and have their own objectives and goals. You are tasked with advancing the goals of your character and making sure that they end up doing well out of this crisis. Every action will have consequences, everything you do will have ramifications, and mistakes can be deadly. Your chairs will be there to help but they will also be representing characters and have their own interests, meaning they may not be fully trustworthy.

Behind the scenes you will have a backroom which will interpret your directives and move the plot forward. We will be there to read what you say and put it into action. However, a word to the wise, the way your wish may be interpreted may not be ideal. Therefore, it is important to be clear and specific when sending directives, lest they be interpreted in a mischievous way.

I look forward to meeting you all at LyonMUN. I hope this guide is useful.

Thomas Ron – Crisis Director for LyonMUN 2018 !3 Table of Contents

1. Director’s Welcome – Page 2

2. Table of Contents – Page 3

3. History of the Topic – Pages 4 – 27

4. Society, Politics, and Economy of – 28 – 43

5. Cabinets -

!4 History of Libya

Timeline: 1951-16 January 2011

A brief summary of Libya’s history till 1951

Libya is known to be a country of rich history, even though it was never historically considered to be a center of population or power. Nevertheless, its history combines a great number of ethnically diverse groups on its ground: the , the Romans, the Phoenicians, the Arabs. This is due to the fact that thorough its history, Libya was known to be submissive to foreign power, which helped shape its future civilisation. It should be noted that Libya’s name is a neologism, a resemblance to as well, formed by the conquering Italians in the 20th century.

Libya’s map was not entirely drawn until the mid-20th century, seeing as the

Ottomans, Italians and the British were fighting for dominance of the land. It was divided into the following three ancient provinces: in the east,

Tripolitania in the west and in the south into one regency of under the ’s rule. Cyrenaica was also where Senussi's grandson (a political religious group founded by Muhammad bin Ali al-Sanusi, and was known to be a tribe in Cyrenaica), Idris, resided and would one day become the ruler of the

United Libyan Kingdom. More importantly, the Senussis showed their support to

!5 and the Ottomans in , but were opposed to the post-war

Italian colonisation of their region shortly after. Idris was, despite the Italian colonization, recognized as the Emir of Italian Cyrenaica by in

1917.

During World War II, Idris and the Senussis formed an alliance with the British in an attempt to end the Italian colonisation. This aided in the Italian and German defeat in Africa in 1943 against the British. A few years later, in 1949, their British ally supported Idris in his efforts to declare Emirate of Cyrenaica- and when he was also known as the Emir of , he continued his work with the goal of a gradual Libyan unification. Soon after, during December 1951, he announced the United Libyan Kingdom, consequently naming himself as King.

Nevertheless, Arab nationalists were vehemently opposed to the close ties Idris kept with the West, considering him a puppet to the foreign forces.

King Idris I was known to be a true monarch, dismissing claims for changes and democratic wishes. His rise to power had a significantly poor effect on the country’s situation, but from an economic point of view, they were dependent of

British and US airbases, and international aid which helped their economy flourish.

The situation quickly changed in 1959 with the discovery of important and the possibility of independence. King Idris began discussing and negotiating the eventual withdrawal of foreign forces from Libyan lands, but his work was suddenly put to an end in 1969 by a bloodless coup d’état, led by Colonel

Muammar Gaddafi and his troops.

The Gaddafi regimen

!6 September 1st, the year of 1969, became the country’s leader, following the famous episode of the coup d’état in by a group of young army officers known as The Free Officers Movement against King Idris I, who consequently fled the country. The monarchy, as well as the monarchial constitution, was thus put to an end. Gaddafi then established the “Libyan Arab

Republic” with the help of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) under the following slogan: freedom, socialism and unity, and would continue "in the path of freedom, unity, and social justice, guaranteeing the right of equality to its citizens, and opening before them the doors of honorable work." The regimen broke free from the restrains of the British and American government, and commenced its process of nationalization. Having discovered important oil reserves, the Republic quickly asserted itself through activities of exchange, and through setting higher price points for the oil. The Qaddafi regime was especially known to preach Arab unity and the Islamic brotherhood. In fact, its government refused the notion of communism, due to it being atheist, and decided to interpret socialism through its own devices by introducing Islamic principles and combining them to the economic, political and social Libyan reality.

Following his rise to power, Gaddafi, assisted by the Libyan Revolutionary

Command Council (also known as the RCC) built what would later be called “the

!7 state of the masses”, a socialite state in 1977. Its general purpose was to ensure free healthcare, public education free of charges and available to both sexes, subsidized food and cars as well as sufficient running electricity across the country.

“The great man made water system” was also introduced, enabling all citizens to benefit from free water. In addition, Libya’s per capita income was ranked as the fifth highest in Africa, further demonstrating the strong financial role the country had at the time.

In addition, it further affirmed itself as an Arab nation, with Islam as its state religion. In reference to the Arab unity, it slowly began to dissolve as soon as conflicts arose between different governments. Libya had a clear position supporting the Palestinian cause against Israel, and had an active role in the

Middle Eastern and African revolutions. Between the months of July and August

1977, tension surfaced between Libya and , and was followed by the progressive fall out of the Gaddafi regime relations with the rest of the Arab world.

On March 2, 1977, the General People’s Congress declared that the name of the

Republic became the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and the latter term is a neologism meaning “state of the masses” as mentioned above. Then, in 1986, the country was renamed and became the Great Socialist’s People Libyan Arab

Jamahiriya. And during that time, what stood out the most was a significant drop in both the demand for oil and its prices on the global market. The result was immediate: Gaddafi had slowly started to lose his poignant economic role. His reforms were not as frequent anymore, and Libya was furthermore on a developing pause: the citizens were not hesitant to show their discontent with the current situation. The response was radical, with a number of movements of opposition

!8 forming against the country’s leader, but were quickly put down by the latter and his army (they either faced arrest or execution).

The beginning of opposition

While Gaddafi was no longer using Libya’s oil wealth for development within Libya, he was using it to interfere in the affairs of other nations, creating tensions both in the immediate surrounding regions and bringing international condemnation.

Gaddafi openly supported movements such as the IRA, and the ANC led by

Mandela; it was widely suspected, and sometimes known, that his government participated in, or at least aided, acts of terror through these proxies. Gaddafi also took it upon himself to invade neighbouring African states including Egypt

(which led to the Libyan-Egyptian War), and in the 1970/80s. Gaddafi claimed a need to support anti-colonial, ad anti-imperial movements internationally. At this point, observers began to doubt his mental state and erraticism.

In 1972, Gaddafi formed the Islamic Legion, in an attempt to ‘Arabize’ the region and unify it, starting with Chad, and the . Meanwhile, in Darfur (a Sudanese western province), Gaddafi supported the Arab Gathering, an organisation that drew much international criticism for its apparent racism against non-Arabs. These groups were composed of immigrants who, in 1981, were recruited with no military training and poor equipment on the false promise of civilian jobs in Libya. In 1987, the Libyan offensive on Chad began, and the Islamic Legion maintained a force of

2,000 in Darfur, to conduct cross-border raids into Chad almost continuously. This led in turn to an ethnic conflict in Darfur that, between 1985 and 1988 killed

9,000. This conflict, inter alia, led to the emergence of the Janjaweed, a militant

!9 group that the USA would eventually accuse of perpetrating genocide in Darfur in the 2000s.

Gaddafi’s foreign policy caused a deterioration of Libya’s

foreign relations, most notably with Western states, leading

to the USA bombing Libya in 1986, which was a response to

a bombing on a West Berlin discotheque (frequented by US

soldiers) in the same year, which was blamed on Libya.

These retaliatory bombings by the USA, ordered by Reagan

on Tripoli and Benghazi were not only condemned in the

General Assembly, but were seen as an assassination attempt on Gaddafi himself.

Throughout this period, Libya was receiving much support in aid and assistance from the USSR and its allies. Despite this, Gaddafi maintained closer bonds with pro-American governments in Western Europe, through incentivization of oil companies in this region with promises of access to the lucrative energy sectors in Libya.

The events leading up to the 16th January 2011

August 2009 brought protests to Libya, beginning in Zawiya, and leading to the

Benghazi protests beginning on the 15th of February, 2011; the latter saw security forces fire on the crowds. These moments sparked the revolt that would lead to the Libyan Revolution, a 2011 armed conflict fought between forces loyal to

Gaddafi, those who would seek to oust his government.

When the protests erupted in Benghazi, few could have predicted that Libya was

about to experience a similar phenomenon to that experienced in or

Egypt in the previous months. Western media outlets quickly labelled this

!10 period the ‘’, branding it a revolution against authoritarianism.

European states were taken by surprise, since Libya was seen as one of the

more stable states in the region with good prosperity. This led to the

ambiguous and confused messages from European heads of state.

The unrest began in the eastern region of

Cyrenaica, and was more than a

revolt: with a wide availability of

weapons and ammunition, it

seemed to be planned and was too

quickly supported by certain

European governments ( and

Great Britain) to have been purely spontaneous.

Global media outlets disseminated a narrative that the Libyan crisis was the

result of a violent government reaction to a peaceful protest. Al-Jazeera

notably broadcast images of violence and destruction systematically, stirring

Europe’s public to believe that Gaddafi had perpetrated a massacre, and

that Western governments needed to act to remove him.

There were many conflicting interests leading up to the Libyan Revolution: while

European publics were speaking of ending the massacre of innocents,

European premiers were discussing

the financial ramifications of

intervening in Libya: Sarkozy in

particular was being persuaded of a

window of opportunity to topple

Gaddafi, opening up a rich new

!11 market for energy and defence. For this economic reason, France and ,

with support from the UK, combined forces to provoke a major popular

protest in Libya. This action was ultimately a failure, and allowed Gaddafi’s

troops to reconquer most of the country within weeks, before he marched

on Benghazi. Critics believe that Libya was essentially the subject of a

political experiment led by Qatar and managed by France, driven by Al-

Jazeera’s narrative and resulting in misled Western intervention.

The conflicting international and national narratives speak loudly: while European

nations saw heinous war crimes by Gaddafi against citizens, local people

saw a war between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries, where a

huge number of ideological positions created a complex mosaic of strategic

and economic interests in Libya for years to come.

!12 Society, Politics, and

Politics of Qaddafi’s Libya

A history of Qaddafi’s government and its opposition:

On September 1st 1969 the ‘Free Officers Movement’ within the staged a nation wide coup d'etat, the beginnings of which where be founded in

Benghazi. These men rose up with the intention to depose the ruling monarch, King

Idris. The discovery of oil within the Kingdom allowed huge proportions of extreme wealth to become concentrated in the pockets of the King and his immediate circle of advisors. This wealth disparity is what many believe caused the initial spark of Arab nationalism within the country, which in turn caused the Coup of

1969.

The Coup was a complete success and King Idris was expelled from the country.

The Free Officers, now renamed the ‘Revolutionary Command Council’ or the RCC was firmly in control of both the state and all the countries oil revenue. This meant that the country was now extremely volatile and an incredibly tantalising target for new opposition of the RCC. With this in mind Col. Muammar Qaddafi took direct control of the RCC as chairman and demanded that King Idris’ heir,

Hasan ar Rida, publicly denounce any and all legitimacy as heir to the throne to

Libya. Following the removal of any immediate threats to complete power the RCC reaffirmed that the country was now an Arab nation, greatly pleasing the Egyptian president Gabel Abdel Nasser, who came to power in similar circumstances in 1952

(See International relations of Libya under Muammar Qaddafi).

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It was stressed by the RCC that the decision making of the country would not fall on the shoulders of one single man, but that decisions would instead be made by the entire cabinet and would always reflect the ideals of the party. Despite these words of security in December of 1969 the minister of defense and the minister of interior (Adam Said Hawwaz and Musa Ahmad respectively) where accused by the remainder of the RCC of plotting a coup to overturn the new government. After this alleged coup was suppressed and dissidents were shot the cabinet saw a reshuffle. During this new allocation of powers Col. Muammar Qaddafi not only managed to successfully keep his post of Chairman, but gain the powers of both

Prime Minister and defence Minister. This was the birth of the dictatorship.

Initially opposition took the form of Royalists who were staunch supporters of King

Idris and his heir Hasan ar Rida. Though at first rebel sentiment was strong, after

Rida’s public denouncement of his royal blood and of legitimacy royalist rebel moral dropped and much overt opposition was squashed.

!14 It was however, not only royalists who took issue with the rise of the RCC into power. Seeing as Qaddafi’s new government took a strong Islamic, arab national approach to politics many non sunni and atheist libyans felt excluded and unrepresented by the regime.

This problem was further exaggerated by government’s claims of transition into a

Jamahiriya, meaning a ‘peopledom’ or a state of the masses, which officially included any and all Libyans yet despite this showed massive preference for the

Sunni muslim population of Libya. In an effort to flood the country with pro-

Jamahiriya propaganda in 1976 the ‘Green Book’ was published and became a fundamental part of the Libyan curriculum. This book explained how the

Jamahiriya was a step beyond democracy and how power and resources should be in the hands of the people. With this came the development of hundreds of new congress halls and government buildings where the Libyan people had the right to voice their concerns. This book did much to dissuade public displays of discontent with the Jamahiriya and the RCC as in many ways it was giving the Libyan people a platform for change they had never had before. But as could only be expected, many people who could be considered not a part of the Arab state, namely Atheists were afraid to voice their concerns as it was in direct violation of Qaddafi’s rule.

!15 In an effort to further crush rebel sentiment Qaddafi issued a speech announcing that time for a cultural revolution had come. This was a result of growing pressures from the rest of the RCC to stand down from his positions, leaving space new prospective Libyan leaders. Initially Qaddafi agreed to this and claimed he would announce this in a speech in the coastal city Zuwara on the 15th of April

1973. As he stood to announce his resignation as leader, he in its place announced a new cultural revolution. This revolution saw the direct targeting of perceived enemies of Qaddafi’s Libya. There where 5 ‘evils’ which were to be suppressed and eradicated in the time of the cultural revolution. The first point of action was to dissolve all existing laws and replace them with Sharia law. In addition to this the government oversaw…

• The repression of conservatism, atheists, and capitalism.

• The distribution of arms to the people

• Administrative reform and a purge of the administration itself

• The promotion of Islamic thought and rejection of un-Islamic ideas from other

countries and cultures.

This period of Libyan history is what many have come to call the ‘Green Terror’.

Eventually when the revolution came to an end in September 1974 Qaddafi was the uncontested leader of Libya.

In this time Qaddafi’s government was beginning to distance itself from the west and its extreme nationalism led to wars with many of their neighbours (see Libyan

International relations)

Though the Green Terror had done much to stamp out disloyalties of Libyans within the countries borders it had not taken those who had been exiled into consideration. By the late 1970s large groups of asylum seekers, exiled politicians

!16 and other dissidents stationed abroad had formed significant large groups of opposition. Qaddafi threatened these groups with “liquefaction” should they continue to ‘distort’ Libya’s image abroad. By 1982 Qaddafi had countless spy rings throughout the developed world, with the aim of bringing down enemies of the state spreading ‘lies’ about Qaddafi’s regime. This is what led to the extrajudicial killing of a british policewoman when a libyan diplomat fired at a crowd of anti-

Qaddafi demonstrators from the libyan embassy in London.

These merciless killings continued throughout the 1980s, Qaddafi even authorised the execution of dissidents on pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca.

This continued killing eventually led to an assassination attempt of the leader in

October 1993 which was believed to be orchestrated by officials within the Libyan

Army. This led to massive instability among the ranks of the military, this was exaggerated and worsened by soldiers’ loyalty to the many tribes of Libya leading to failures of cohesion and cooperation regarding potential coups.

In recent years the country has been unstable and the people have been growing increasingly tired of the mindless violence of Qaddafi’s regime. Despite this it has been quiet, there have been no notable attempts by opposition to seize power.

Some believe this period of silence leading to the current year of 2011 marks the end of opposition to the Jamahiriya, others believe it is the calm before the storm.

International relations of Libya under Muammar Qaddafi:

Following the successful Coup of 1969 orchestrated by Col. Muammar Qaddafi, leading the Free Officers movement King Idris was deposed and exiled from Libya, never to return under threat of death should he do so. This anti-monarchical sentiment resonated throughout the islamic world and the world as a whole. Yet

!17 another Monarchy had fallen to the hands of the people. Though this deposition spoke out not only against monarchy, but was a call for a radically islamised state and a state against imperialism. This sentiment reached the attention of Gabel

Abdel Nasser, the president of Egypt who came to power by leading a revolution to fight for independence from the british empire. Nasser’s political views where what he saw being instituted in Libya following Qaddafi’s rise to power. Policies of anti-monarchy, anti-western intervention and the promotion of a pan-arabism and socialism. This ensured that the two were close allies, at least initially.

Qaddafi wasted no time in beginning military campaigns against his neighbours. He set his eyes on the neighbouring state of Chad, his reason for this being the liberation of Arab Muslims from a christian leader. It was not until 1973 when the

Libyan forces took control of the Aouzou strip in northern Chad. After much fighting these forces were repulsed by Chadian defenders aided by American and

French forces, this was not the last time Libya would come under both diplomatic and literal fire from the west, particularly from the .

It had become clear that the United States had now officially taken a stance against Libya and Libyan expansion. The States had a particular interest in the geographical location of Libya as it was located upon large oil reserves, and could

!18 act as a potential base of operations as a US ally in . It was made apparent that the US could not forge an alliance with Libya as a result of the type of government that was the Jamahiriya. The ‘state of the masses’ too closely resembled communism, making it too dangerous a threat for the US to allow to expand.

This did not however leave Qaddafi without allies. Despite differences on the subject of religion Libya and the had much in common. Both at least made claims that the power of the state was in the hands of people but most importantly both viewed ‘Westerners’ namely the Americans to be a threat to their regimes and their countries survival. This allowed the two countries to share cordial relations, the soviet union even supplied countless military advisors and weapons to further the Libyan cause.

The alliance between Libya and Egypt had burned bright but fast, as after only 8 years the first shots of the Libyan-Egyptian war were fired. The reason for war can be best explained as opposition to the peace treaty signed by Egypt’s newly elected president Anwar Sadat, ending the . In the eyes of the offending forces in the Yom Kippur war the existence of Israel signified that there was no possibility of complete Arab unity as Israel was viewed as an occupying power. This particularly concerned the governments of Egypt and Libya who both staunchly supported the development of a Pan-Arab power. It was agreed, complete Pan-Arab power was mutually exclusive with the existence of the State of Israel. One could not exist with the other, war was inevitable. After 4 days of fighting in the Sinai peninsula it became obvious to the Egyptians that they had sorely underestimated the power of the IDF (Israeli Defence Force) and the

!19 Egyptian forces were locked into a war of attrition in the scorching desert. On the fourth day of fighting Gabel Abdel Nasser made an appearance on national television in Egypt and announced his resignation. This seriously worsened the morale of the offending armies which were already suffering massive losses due to lack of preparedness and the harsh desert weather of the Sinai. The war was brought to an end when Sadat signed a peace treaty with very generous terms for the Israelis.

This not only caused massive unrest in Egypt, but Libya felt betrayed as they felt there was more to fight for, namely securing the future of an Arab world power. By signing the peace treaty ending the 6 Day War Sadat had effectively broken all treaties with Libya and had broken their trust. From the perspective of Qaddafi,

Egypt had not only doomed plans for a Pan-Arab world power but had also began to appease the west. This was done by a series of purges of Soviet generals, advisors and government officials from the ranks of the Egyptian government and armed

!20 forces. This greatly angered both the soviets and the Libyans. This anger led to the second war of Libyan aggression against one of its neighbours, this time its old friend the Egyptians.

The Libyan-Egyptian war was a short lived conflict which took place all along the

Libyan-Egyptian border and only lasted 3 days between July 21st 1977 and July

24th of the same year. While the war itself had little impact on the politics of the region it marked the complete end of the Libyan-Egyptian alliance. Peace Talks separated the islamic world into the socialist, ‘leftist’ Libyan sympathisers and the conservative arab Egyptian sympathisers.

Throughout the 70’s and 80’s Qaddafi openly supported leftist and anti-western terrorists in Europe, Eastern Asia and the united states. Most notably airport attacks in Rome and Vienna, supplying arms to the IRA (Irish Republican Army) along with alleged connections to the assassination of his rival, the ‘western’ president of Egypt Anwar Sadat in 1981.

In 2011 Qaddafi’s government is left with few prospective allies. The Soviet Union has collapsed and the west is more involved in the Middle East than ever.

Diplomatic channels of communication between the US and Libya are open, whether this expected to remain this way is yet to be seen.

The Libyan Economy:

The Libyan economy relies mostly on the hydrocarbon industry. In 2007, according to the , the country’s hydrocarbon exports account for over 95 percent of total merchandise exports and revenues. Attached, you can find a graphic of the evolution of the Libyan GDP from 1999 to 2010 in constant 2010 USD.

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Until 1911, the natural resources of the Libyan were under the control of the Ottoman Empire. From 1911 to 1942, an Italian colonist drove geological explorations of Libya and then, from 1942 to 1951, a British administration took over his activity. Before the discovery of oil, Libya had very low economical prospect since it has been a major battle field during both World War I and II.

Libya had to deal with a series of economic sanctions set by the United Nations

(UN):

On 11 November 1993, Resolution 883 of the United Nations Security Council

(UNSC) approved the freezing of Libyan funds and financial resources in other countries and banned the provision to Libya of equipment for oil refining and transportation.

!22 On 27 August 1998, Resolution 1192 of the UNSC reaffirmed the binding of the measures previously stated.

On 8 April 1999, the UNSC declares that the conditions for the suspending the wide range of measures against Libya had been fulfilled as of 5 April.

After the suspension of UN economic sanctions in 1999, there was a general expectation that a significant increase in international investment in the mineral industry of Libya would be forthcoming.

In 2007, mining and hydrocarbon industries accounted for well over 95% of the

Libyan economy. Diversification of the economy into manufacturing industries remains a long-term issue yet not achieved.

Oil

!23

Active exploration in Libya started in 1953 after oil was discovered in neighbouring

Algeria. The first well was drilled in 1956 in western Fezzan, and the first oil was struck in 1957. In 1959 Esso (ExxonMobil) made the first commercial discovery.

Libya's (NOC) was established in 1968 and by 1973 had assumed control of oil exploration and development, production, refining, processing and marketing.

In October 1997, a consortium led by British company Lasmo, along with and a group of five South Korean companies, announced that it had discovered large recoverable crude reserves about 800 kilometres (500 mi) south of Tripoli.

Elephant began production in February 2004.

!24 Libya is an OPEC member and holds the largest proven oil reserves in Africa. About

80% of Libya’s proven oil reserves are located in the , which is responsible for 90% of the country’s oil output. You can find attached a map of oil resources locations in Libya.

In addition to its domestic refineries, Libya has operations in Europe through its overseas oil retail arm, Tamoil. Through Tamoil, Libya is a direct producer and distributor of refined products in , Germany, Switzerland, and Egypt. Libya's ability to increase the supply of oil products to European markets has been constrained by the fact that Libya's refineries are in need of upgrading, specifically in order to meet stricter EU environmental standards in place since 1996.

Falling world oil prices in the early 1980s and economic sanctions caused a serious decline in economic activity, eventually leading to a slow private sector rehabilitation. However, the private sector still plays a minor role in the country’s economy.

Natural gas

In 1971, Libya became the second country in the world (after Algeria in 1964) to export liquefied (LNG). Since then, Libya's LNG exports have remained low, largely due to technical limitations which do not allow Libya to extract liquefied gas (LPG) from the natural gas. Libya's gas reserves were estimated at between 54 and 70 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), and it is thought that there are substantial reserves both onshore and offshore.

!25 The expansion of natural gas production remains a high priority for Libya. Indeed, the country aims to use natural gas instead of oil domestically for power generation in order to export more oil. Furthermore, Libya has vast gas reserves and is looking to increase its natural gas exports, particularly to Europe.

The Libyan Tribes

An understanding of Libyan politics is incomplete without at least a brief understanding of the importance the tribes in Libya play in the political climate.

Like much of north Africa as well as the continent as a whole, tribal allegiances and feuds are deeply embedded in the actions of politicians and the reactions of the people affected by these actions. This is particularly prevalent in the Islamic and Arab members of the African continent. This omnipresence of tribal thinking means they play a vital role in the maintenance of stability in a nation and the appeasement of the people.

This can be seen clearly in Col. Muammar Qaddafi’s inner circle, the people most trusted with decision making and allocated huge swathes of power. Within this circle of influence the majority of its makeup have direct familial ties with

Qaddafi, for example his 8 children are all kept close to him with different

‘expertise’ which are apparently sufficient reason to have been given positions of great power. Ranging from diplomacy to generalship and from marine command to football positions. While this nepotistic allocation of power within families is not uncommon throughout the rest of the world, the tribes add an extra dimension which makes the maintenance of power far more complicated.

!26 An example of this is the role the Qadhadhfa tribe played in the coup of 1969

(refer to a history of Qaddafi’s government and its opposition). During the coup the tribe supplied not only manpower but also diverted vital resources and weaponry to the offending parties under Muammar Qaddafi. The reason for this unflinching support was that this was in fact Col. Muammar Qaddafi’s tribe, his ideologies and politics had been influenced by his tribe. The very policies of support for a Pan-Arab world power and the Jamahiriya stemmed from the traditional beliefs and practices of this tribe.

This type of tribal support has been ingrained through hundreds of years of familial tradition and unity and is effectively undying. While this has supplied much needed support in times of crisis for Qaddafi’s regime, the same tribal unity has supplied a reason for the difficulty to completely remove opposition against his regime.

After the brutal green terror imposed in 1973 (refer to a history of Qaddafi’s government and its opposition) Qaddafi imposed strict regulations on the people of

Libya, many of these greatly upsetting neighbouring tribes giving more justification for inter-tribal conflict within the country.

This same issue of tribal conflict between tribes such as the Qadhadhfa and

Zuwaya are even more prominant between the ‘traditionally african’ tribes of the south. Conflict has existed between the ‘Arab-Berber’ tribes of the North and the

Tuaregs and Toubou tribes of Libya’s south.

Peace and Stability in the region would be completely impossible without tribal cooperation dividing the many tribes of Libya

!27

!28 Geography and Politics of Libya

Libyan geography: traditional identities and modern trade.

all rights reserved

Red circles indicate cities later mentioned. Plus Zliten between Al Khums and Misratah.

Libya, since its independence in 1953, has known a demographic revolution

(5 143 000 inhabitants in 2016), so the fertility rate fell into the line with European countries. Cities grew exponentially fast, and its population younger and properly educated (96,1 % men and 83,7 % women aged 15 and more can read and write in

!29 2012) when countryside was slowly losing its demographic stock (78,4 % of the population lives in urban areas in 2014 for there is 21,6 % of the population living in rural areas). Libya is still surrounded by issues that came up with all the changes induced by the independence. How is the power shared between all the actors involved in the governance and security of the country? Who controls the natural resources, one of the most important wealth of the country, and what kind of power an actor can pull out of it? The Berber world is confined in an infinite crisis made of numerous different local outbreaks linked by various political players trying to bring up chaos to serve their own interests. The first characteristic of conflicts in this area is the connection of natural resources and local actors demands.

Libya is a vast country (1 676 198 km²) made of a small coast running alongside mountains and steppes.1 It has a long access on the Mediterranean Sea. During the

Italian colonisation, it was divided in three regions2 : Tripolitania (North), Fezzan

(South) and Cyrenaica (East). We will keep these designations for it is easier to study the battle of influence within the country. The northern part of the country shares the history of Mediterranean political culture. Therefore, there is an intense rivalry between the biggest cities. The capital is Tripoli. But it is important to take in account influential cities as Khoms (known as Al Khums), Sirte or Misratah. All cities are based on trade to profit from a solid development in order to strengthen their independence both military and political to become the new heart of the country. Moreover there are borders with Egypt on the East, Tunisia and Algeria on

1Appendix 1

2Appendix 2 !30 the West. The Sahara makes a natural but sensitive frontier with the Sahel. The country is the junction of two of the most important trade routes. It can be an opportunity but can also brings troubles. Arms dealers, drug runner, migrants, etc.

The large frontiers makes it easy to convey men and supplies from one country to another.

Libya is surrounded and impregnated by various ethnic groups.3 Consequently, locals and internationals non-governmental actors are legions. They are challenging the stability of the area where State may already suffer from a lack of legitimacy. Indeed, acknowledging regionals militias may be efficient to maintain order but shows the weakness of a State to its neighbours or even to the nearby cities. It is said local militias protect the interests of their own city more than any ideology.

Two main flows in Libya: goods and people

The long-term objective for every actor in the region is to have control over the various sources of wealth. First of all is oil. At the border between Cyrenaic and

Tripolitania are located the major commercial ports and refineries of the country.

The competition between all actors is resource based. The Gulf of Sirte holds important harbors and oil refineries. The city of Sirte became one of the most important under Gaddafi thanks to its oil wells. For example, oil extraction facilities in El Sharara oil field, located in Murzuq Desert, is very profitable for the city.4 This field produces 283 000 barrels a day and supplies the main refinery,

3Appendix 3

4Appendix 4 ( circle). !31 implanted in Zawiya (Zuwarah on the map, 27 miles on the West of the capital).

Libya produced 1,6 million barrels a day before the fall of Gaddafi's government.

The country possesses the biggest oil reserves of Africa in front of and

Algeria.

This is why the pipeline network which binds the oil fields of the southwest with the capital is of the very valuable. The fortune at stake creates constant frictions between militias of Zintan and Tuareg defending their city's interests. It is the same scheme when it comes to the Saharan corridor in the direction of Niger. Each and every political entity: Tubus trafficker, Abu Suleiman an Iraqi warlord, or even the city of , claims its right on a portion of this trade route. In 2014, the war took place in the city of Misrhata, the third largest city in Libya, the aim is to control oil infrastructures and communication channels. Which are, in the end, the two most valuable resources of the country. As understood Ibrahim Jadhran, leader of the Libyan militia from , as he took control of Ras Lanuf and Zueitina5

(Zueitina was in the former Ajdabiya District until 2007) : two Mediterranean coastal towns and oil-exporting ports in northern Libya, housing major oils terminals and pipelines. Jadhran sold contraband crude oil to the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea. Then he fought against the city of Misrata from the west. But in the end they both fight against the Islamic State.

Goods and economical influence

Black market

If the northern part of the country is oil rich, Fezzan, the southwestern region of modern Libya, is the poorest region. But because it's mostly desert, it does not

5Appendix 4 (purple cercles). !32 mean the region has no wealth. The Mediterranean coast and Sahel are connected by a trade road passing through Libya. Ethnics groups share the sovereignty over the different routes because of the incapacity of the States to control their borders, the clans take their legitimacy within the Islamic laws for trade justice.

Moreover, in the 1990s, the Algerian civil war led to a rise of subventions to develop locals economies. It increased the number of trade routes and strengthens networks for arms and drug trafficking in the region. Creating new powerful actors very important in the understanding of regional powers. If the Quran forbid the use of drugs, it is more ambiguous about its trade: in 2010, AQMI gained influence and stable incomes through the continent thanks to traffickers in Guinea-Bissau, and then developed contacts with several regional networks.

The explosion of migrant smuggling

Until the beginning of the civil war (2001), Libya hosted hope for a better life far away from war for a lot of migrants. In 2013, 10 000 persons per month were coming from East (Eritrea and Somalia) using Tubus' smuggler network walking over more than 1242 miles in the desert. This type of cross-border flow is not conflict free. It is still a strategic issue as in the District, the main stage of clashes between the Tubu militias and the Zwai Arab tribe.

Ethnic groups and political power

For many, controlling the borders means monopolizing the illicit cross-border flows. Military leaders eager to expand their influence have to build alliances with ethnic group. Libya is historically known for the conflicts between Arabic and

Desert tribes. Gaddafi stayed in power for 42 years using those divisions at his profit. Oil-trade money bought security in the country and control of trans-national

!33 trafficking. Moreover, tribes are playing a very important role in the coherence of the national social tissue creating link between individuals from differents social classes and taking care of the most vulnerable populations.

Tribes in an urban environment are mostly integrated as security forces. For example, the Sirte region was held by the Qadadfa tribe, fierce defensor of

Gaddhafi who promised them the Libyan nationality and profit-sharing on petrodollars. This is why there were no insurrections at the beginning of the civil war. Furthermore, Misrata population is reluctant to fight for such an abstract idea as democracy for another city even though it is only a few miles away consciously knowing they might find enemies instead of supporters because each city has its proud and is not willing to be told how to govern. Banghazi's population won't go fight for Tripoli, Misrata's population won't go fight for Zliten.

There are two mains factions in the ethnic landscape in southern Libya: Tuareg and

Tubu. They both were recruited to Gaddafi’s ‘Islamic Legion’. The major concern of these tribes was their position within the society. After regime's collapse they lost their privileged position in the social hierarchy and were politically marginalized.

Tuareg factions

Tuareg were sent to fight in Lebanon (1981–82) and Chad (1986–87). Gaddafi used them first as task forces. Tuareg recruits were spread across the country in brigades (military units) until 2004, when the Maghawir Brigade was established in

Ubari (Awbari on the map). The city became the center of their influence. Smaller brigades led by Libyan Tuareg hold the town of Ghat. Plus, Tuaregs tribes form the

!34 main military force between Ubari and Niger. Over the course of 2013, Tuareg factions consolidated their hold over the southwestern part of the country to ensure some political influence and incomes.

Tubu factions

Unlike Tuareg, Tubu tribes were poorly involved in the defense of the territory.

Despite this, Gaddafi contacted Tubu rebel groups in northern Chad and Niger. He's objective was to enlist Tubu military leaders. There are two types of reaction subsequent to this operation: Some, as Barka Sidimi, accepted Gaddafi's offer but deserted few times after receiving the supplies. Others, as Barka Wardagou, refused it which did not prevent him to become one of the most powerful Tubu military leaders.

International oil companies pay Tubu armed group to insure their security because of their independence vis-à-vis the State which cannot guarantee the total control of its territory. Tubu armed groups control much of the southern border and oilfields from Sarir to the south of Ubari. Since 2012, their influence and fund rose as their forces fragmented into smaller armed and more mobile groups. Their political strength gave them the capacity to challenge governments or the northern part of the country. A very good example of the complexity of the situation is the Saharan passageway to Nigeria. An ever more dangerous zone since

2012 because of the conflicts between Tubus and warlords for the income of legal and illegal trafficking. It got worst when the State sent buffer force in 2014 then city of Misrata added fuel to the fire and claimed the sovereignty over the trade route from Fezzan to the mediterranean sea.

!35 Geopolitical considerations

The Green Book sums up the political philosophy of Gaddafi: the necessity of a centralized government to build a modern country in symbiosis with ancient traditions. Some authors think that there is no real State but a centralization of powers within the Gaddafi's clan through specialized institutions. Security forces are the main tools to control the entire population through violence. Revolutionary comities frame and oversee the spreading of the ideology even punish the deviants. The Libyan National Oil Company is to supervise the use and exploitation of oil. Finally, the Libyan Investment Authority has to diversify the nature of public incomes: the finance of the State must not be energy dependent. In addition, it is also a strong lever for the Libyan foreign policy.

Key Areas of Contestation

Territorial control

Fezzan is now made of local spheres of influence under control of a single or multiple armed groups. For example, in the Murzuq area, tensions oppose Tubu

(dominant in the area) and smaller Arab communities. But, Tubu's control of routes to Chad or Niger is unquestioned as is the control of Tuareg over Ubari.

Borders, routes and checkpoints, airports, oilfields, and army bases are the most resourceful and important places because it gives money and strategical advantages. As for an example, airports can generate profit from trade or tourism and allow the possibility of air strikes to one of the protagonists. Many actors are fighting one another in order to expand their sway and maximise their profits. In

June 2013, Tubu guards blocked the Elephant Field and demanded to be the ones

!36 in charge of protecting the oil installations. Meanwhile Zintan guards, the tribe in charge of securing the oilfield did not succeed in breaking the blockade. So Tubu tribe became in charge of the oilfield. The Libyan state is just like another tribe.

Demands for regional autonomy

It is very difficult to think of a true centralized government. It would be easier to think of a federation of local community members officially put in charge by the

State which would become a source of political legitimacy. The European kings during the Middle Ages and most part of the Renaissance were to do the same thing with barons and lords and it was all but stable.

This last point is a good opportunity, well assimilated by local leaders. As demands for Fezzan’s autonomy became louder. Federalisation would be a good compromise for everyone to have their part of sovereignty and domination in the area. But federalism is seen as a way for the old regime to detach Fezzan from the new political order. Politicians who had influence under the Gaddafi regime sought to contact Tuaregs of Sahelian origin for the federalist cause. But in the end, the project has been largely inconsequential. It underlines the fractures among and between different communities.

!37 Appendix 1: Natural and topographic map of Libya.

all rights reserved Appendix 2: Former provinces of Modern Libya.

!38

Appendix 3: Libya, an international exchange terminal.

all rights reserved Appendix 4: Oil network and wealth belongings in Libya.

!39 all rights reserved

Libyan Military: belligerents and military intervention

Libya’s unconventional weapons stockpile current situation

The quantity of Libya’s nuclear fuel stockpile is unknown. However, by not removing the “5.2kg of highly enriched uranium” could have “dire consequences”, due to the inevitable changes to the composition of the material as it matures

(Schmitt, 2010). Specifically speaking, the absence of removing the uranium casks

“within three months” would cause undesired consequences such as the leakage of the radioactive nuclear material (Ibid.). The fear here within the international community regarding this ‘5.2kg’ of uranium is not in relation to its capability of creating a conventional weapon, but rather its potential to create a “dirty bomb” (Fisher, 2010).

Military-related tensions with the international community

!40 Tensions have mounted in recent weeks between Colonel Qaddafi and the international community following on from the Libyan government suddenly ordering a team of American and Russian scientists to stop their arrangements vis-

à-vis shipping spent nuclear fuel to Russia. This development has come despite the previous agreements between the US, Russia, and Libya – with Libya agreeing to pay $30,000 to have Russia securely dispose of the material (Fisher, 2010).

In regard to Libya’s recent unconventional military history, they had agreed in 2003 to disassemble their programs that produced such weapons in order to gain greater security, economic, and military cooperation with the international community

(Sanger and Miller, 2003). This agreement had taken place in light of a number of secret meetings held between Colonel Qaddafi and his state leader counterparts in

London and Washington DC (Ibid.).

But recently Colonel Qaddafi has voiced his discontent with regards to how he was not allowed to establish his team in Manhattan or visit ground zero during a recent

UN session.

Indeed, this has contributed somewhat to the recoiling of Libya’s promise to ship the last of its enriched uranium stockpile, with Colonel Qaddafi’s son – Seif al-Islam el-Qaddafi – explaining that they are “fed up” with the “slow pace of improved relations with Washington” (Schmitt, 2010). Moreover, this halting of the previously agreed proceedings was announced just one day before the scheduled date of transportation to Russia (20th November).

Specific risks at stake in relation to the exposure of the unguarded remnants of the

!41 uranium – in which the international community should pay particular attention too

- included:

1. The strong possibility for any armed group to overpower the single guard

watching over the facility and drive off into the considerable

a. The leaving of the uranium casks besides a loading crane

demonstrates Libya’s particular irresponsibility

b. Physical protection of the casks themselves merely included the

International Atomic Energy Agency seals, which were only there to

show whether tampering had taken place

2. Radiation leakage risks, with the potential to cause a biological and

environmental catastrophe

a. The casks in which the uranium was placed within was only supposed

to be a short-term storage solution before the Russians disposed of it

b. This crisis caused by the Libyan government instigated a rapid

response from Russian engineers, whom rapidly developed a remote-

controlled device to handle the growingly unstable casks of uranium

(Fisher, 2010)

December 20-21, 2010 saw the effective loading of the casks onto a Russian aircraft, and the successful arrival of the ‘secret cargo’ into Russia. Furthermore, despite this month-long crisis, it must be noted that a US State Department spokesman has recently stated that Libya “did meet their commitment” in regard to the dismantling of their nuclear weapons program (Fisher, 2010).

US-Libyan troubled past

!42 Since Muammar al-Qaddafi seized power in 1969, there have been a number of state-sponsored terrorist acts that have murdered many civilians. And during the

1980s, the military of Libya’s government launched attacks on US navy ships and fighter jets in the surrounding areas, specifically in the Mediterranean. The international community - and particularly the US – have acted decisively in response to the atrocities. The crippling economic sanctions and numerous US- operated airstrikes within Libyan airspace both demonstrate this fact.

US-Libyan relations have however improved of late. Following on from Qaddafi’s pledge to dismantle its nuclear program in 2003, the Bush Administration sent the first US ambassador to Libya in 35 years (Fisher, 2010).

Potential future risks

Libya’s method of expressing their perceived problems here hence caused a potentially risky path with regards to Russia and how they may decide to proceed with the final extracting of the enriched uranium. According to recent reports from

WikiLeaks, “extra security guards” have been sent to the site of extracting – located in Tajoura - with diplomats from Russia and the US prevailing upon Libya with disrupting the site’s loading crane to avoid the chance of intruders from moving the casks (Ibid.).

Particular potential intruders here may have included al-Qaeda factions, which

“still operate in the region”, or even by any other “rogue government” that may obtain the knowledge of the casks’ presence (Fisher, 2010). For this reason, US officials in Libya had expressed their concerns in regard to ensuring that the global

!43 community found a “timely solution” and kept “any mention of it out of the press”

(Schmitt, 2010).

Conclusions on Libya’s current unconventional military situation

With regard to the situation of Libya’s unconventional military capabilities, the

African state has certainly acted irresponsibly in terms of how they temporarily disrupted this month-long, sensitive diplomatic negotiation between the US,

Russia, and themselves. Despite the fact that the uranium did indeed safely arrive in Russia – on December 21st - the act of nuclear blackmail from the Qaddafi regime must certainly not go unnoticed within the international community.

Indeed, the fact that the Obama administration has never publicly revealed this skilful level of diplomatic manoeuvring demonstrates to us the potential fallout at stake here during this month-long crisis. We must therefore appreciate this positive example of diplomatic courtship between the US and Russia in relation to the defusal of this particular recent crisis in Libya.

!44 Cabinets

Cabinet of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

The Libyan Government is currently in the hands of Colonel Muammar Qaddaffi as the First citizen of the Jamahiriya. He rules with his family close-by. His family include his daughter Ayesha Qaddaffi and his sons Khamis, Saif al-Arab, Hannibal

Muammar, Mutassim, Al-Saadi, Saif al-Islam, and Muhammed. He also keeps his cousin Sayyid Mohamed Qadaf al-Dam close by in a position of power. His main ministers include his Prime Minister Dr. Baghdadi Mahmudi, Minister of the Interior

Abdul Fatah Younis, his Minister of Defence Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabr, and his Utilities

Minister Matuq Muhammed Matuq. Furthermore on the intelligence side he works with the Head of the National Intelligence Service Ahuza Omar Dorda, his head of

Personal Security Abdulqader Yusuf Dibri, and Abdullah al-Senussi his Head of

Military Intelligence. Finally outside government there are several contacts loyal to the Jamahiriya such as Fares Mana’a a Yemeni arms dealer who has helped in tight situations, Mokhtar Belmokhtar the commander of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic

Maghreb, Mohammed el-Mansouri who represents Berber tribes in the Zawarah area, and Ahmed Ibrahim who holds sway over the Gaddaffa Tribe. Together you must maintain power within Libya

National Transitional Council

The main opposition to Gaddaffi has centralised in the National Transitional

Council who is led by . Their goal is to become the government of Libya and defeat the Jamahiriya. Working with Jalil is the council spokesman

Abdul Hafiz Ghoga and his Vice-chair Ali Al-Issawi. The Council is trying to get UN

!45 recognition and its ambassadors there are Ali Suleiman Aujali and Ibrahim Omar

Al Dabashi. Other leading council members include the elder Mohammed Ali

Salim, Prince Ahmed al-Zubair al-Senussi, the great-nephew of the deposed king who wishes to represent political prisoners, Jalal al-Digheily the Minister of

Defence, Ahmed Hussein al-Darrat who is the Interior Minister, Mahmoud

Shammam who is Media Minister, Ali Tarhouni who runs the Financial Ministry,

Abulgassim Nimr the Environment Minister, Abdullah Sharmia who is responsible for Economic Development, Abdulsalam al-Shikhy who is responsible for Religious

Affairs, Suliman el-Sahli who is Education Minister, and Mohammed Al-Allagi who runs Justice and Human Rights. On the military front the forces are commanded by Omar el-Hairiri. Under him are several other commanders like Suleiman

Mahmoud who commands forces near , Hussain Darbouk who is in charge of forces in Zawiya, Mohammed Ali Madani who is responsible for special forces, and exiled commander . These together must attempt to lead Libya into a new direction.

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!49