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A Strategy for Success in Libya

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A Strategy for Success in Libya A Strategy for Success in Libya Emily Estelle NOVEMBER 2017 A Strategy for Success in Libya Emily Estelle NOVEMBER 2017 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE © 2017 by the American Enterprise Institute. All rights reserved. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, 501(c)(3) educational organization and does not take institutional positions on any issues. The views expressed here are those of the author(s). Contents Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................1 Why the US Must Act in Libya Now ............................................................................................................................1 Wrong Problem, Wrong Strategy ............................................................................................................................... 2 What to Do ........................................................................................................................................................................ 2 Reframing US Policy in Libya .................................................................................................. 5 America’s Opportunity in Libya ................................................................................................................................. 6 The US Approach in Libya ............................................................................................................................................ 6 The Current Situation ................................................................................................................................................... 8 A Call to Action ...............................................................................................................................................................13 A Strategy for Success in Libya ........................................................................................... 14 Weakening the Salafi-Jihadi Base ..............................................................................................................................14 Recommended Strategy for Libya .............................................................................................................................15 Sequencing and Phasing ..............................................................................................................................................21 Interim Objectives ........................................................................................................................................................ 22 Enemy Responses ......................................................................................................................................................... 22 Supporting Efforts ........................................................................................................................................................ 23 Assumptions ................................................................................................................................................................... 23 Forces Required .............................................................................................................................................................24 The Approach: Partners, Adversaries, Challenges, and Risks ................................ 25 Partners and Adversaries ............................................................................................................................................ 25 Risks and Challenges ................................................................................................................................................... 25 Costs of Success and Failure .....................................................................................................................................26 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................27 Notes ...............................................................................................................................................28 iii A STRATEGY FOR SUCCESS IN LIBYA Appendix A: Situation Assessment....................................................................................... 35 The Libyan Theater .......................................................................................................................................................35 The Players ..................................................................................................................................................................... 38 State of Play ....................................................................................................................................................................47 Notes ..................................................................................................................................................................................55 Appendix B. The Libyan Salafi-Jihadi Base: A Center of Gravity Analysis .......... 71 The Libyan Salafi-Jihadi Base .....................................................................................................................................71 The Salafi-Jihadi Base’s Elements of Strategic Power ........................................................................................ 72 Analysis: The al Qaeda Network in Libya ...............................................................................................................76 Analysis: ISIS in Libya...................................................................................................................................................81 Notes ................................................................................................................................................................................. 85 Glossary .........................................................................................................................................93 Notes ................................................................................................................................................................................98 About the Author .................................................................................................................... 101 Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................... 101 About AEI’s Critical Threats Project ............................................................................102 About Our Technology Partners ......................................................................................102 iv Executive Summary merica needs a new policy in Libya. The current Why the US Must Act in Libya Now A approach is failing and will likely leave a per- manent safe haven for ISIS and al Qaeda on Europe’s There is no Libyan state today. The country has been southern border. This future will strengthen the trapped in a cycle of instability since revolution and global Salafi-jihadi movement, facilitate future NATO intervention ended Muammar al Qaddafi’s four- attacks against the US homeland and Europe, and decade rule in 2011. Qaddafi’s fall unleashed destabi- require a perpetual American counterterrorism cam- lizing currents that his manipulation of Libyan soci- paign in Libya. ety had fostered and repressed. Peace agreements The cost of continuing targeted strikes in Libya and transitional governments failed repeatedly, and indefinitely is significant. Drones, manned aircraft, the country descended into civil war. Libya now has surveillance and reconnaissance, analysts and opera- three rival governments and an ever-growing web of tors, and smart munitions are expensive. Allocating militias that compete for control of its cities and oil. them to Libya deprives other theaters of their sup- An oft-revived UN peace process is unlikely to resolve port. Relying on such a strategy, even if it were suc- the conflict. ceeding, is cheaper than a more active intervention Libya’s collapse was a prime opportunity for Salafi- only in the short term. Decades of such a strategy jihadi groups such as al Qaeda and ISIS. Weapons from have shown how unlikely it is to succeed and that the Qaddafi’s arsenal flowed to militants across Africa likely costs of pursuing it are even greater. and the Middle East.1 Al Qaeda and later ISIS estab- The Libyan crisis is not confined to Libya. The lished branches in Libya, where they recruit and train breakdown of the Libyan state since 2011 has desta- fighters, profit from trafficking, base leadership, and bilized US allies and partners throughout Northern prepare attacks on neighboring states and Europe. Lib- Africa, fueled geopolitical competitions, and exacer- yan governance gaps and security vacuums also allow bated the European migrant crisis. Salafi-jihadi groups to control and govern populations Yet the US faces an opportunity in Libya today as in support of their long-term goal of transforming Mus- well as a challenge. Libya is a large territory but has a lim societies. Libya is one of a very few places world- small population of around six million people, mostly wide where the global Salafi-jihadi movement can concentrated along a narrow coastal strip. Security is perform these core functions on a meaningful
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