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«Libya Al-Mostakbal»
TUNISIA Tripoli Derna Zawiya Misrata Tobruk Zintan Zliten Marj Bayda Gherian Benghazi Bani Walid Sirte The West The East LIBYA Mapping Libya’s Factions A project by the Middle East and North Africa Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations EGYPT Author: Mary Fitzgerald ALGERIA Design maps: Laura Canali NIGER CHAD SUDAN Designed by Laura Canali www.lauracanali.com POLITICOS 1. Two camps, two governments, two parliaments TUNISIA Tripoli Derna Zawiya 2. Who is in charge? Misrata Tobruk Zintan Zliten Marj Bayda Gherian Benghazi 3. Islamists and anti-Islamists Bani Walid Sirte ARMED GROUPS The West The East 1. Benghazi LIBYA 2. The East Understanding the fault lines of Libya’s turmoil requires moving beyond the one-dimensional narratives peddled by various actors in the conict. All have an interest in spinning certain 3. The West tropes about the crisis, painting it either as Islamists versus “liberals” or self-proclaimed “revolutionaries” versus former regime elements trying to stage a comeback. Others hold that 4. Derna & ISIS the ghting is primarily driven by tribal rivalries or regional power plays like that between Zintan and Misrata in the west and federalists and their opponents in the east. In fact, all of these EGYPT elements are present to various degrees in Libya’s unraveling, but none overrides the others as a dominant narrative. Power is diuse in Libya, and the two broad camps in the current crisis are built on loose and often shifting alliances of convenience drawn from a constellation of political and armed factions. The inuence of individual players, particularly political gures, ALGERIA can shift dramatically depending on the actions of armed groups on the ground. -
FORUM: Security Council QUESTION OF: Finding a Long-Term Solution
FORUM: Security Council QUESTION OF: Finding a Long-Term Solution to the Libyan Conflict STUDENT OFFICER: Anna Hatzius Sarramona POSITION: President INTRODUCTION “The whole Arab world will move quickly for freedom […] in one year you will have another Arab world.” 1 - Abdel Rahman Shalgham This was the hope of revolutionaries fighting against the Gaddafi government in 2011, another world. A democratic Libya with a right to free speech and security. But instead of achieving those things the Libyan Revolution 2011 led to chaos and multiple rebel groups turning against each other. Two governments were established, which both claimed to have complete power over Libya. The conflict was followed by the First Civil War in 2011/12 and the Second Civil War still enduring today. Today Libya is in strong need of sovereignty and unity in order to being able to manage wealth, security and public services for the benefit of all its citizens. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS Sovereignty the quality of having a “supreme rank, power or authority” 2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION In August 2009 the Arab Spring arrived in Libya. Thousands of people joined protests against the governance of Muammar Gaddafi, who had been leading the country since 1969. The number of protests increased through the next years leading to an escalation in Benghazi on 15 February 2011. Security forces attacked anti-Gaddafi protesters during a protest demonstration. 1 https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/2011_Libyan_civil_war 2 https://www.dictionary.com/browse/sovereign Page 1 of 4 AMUN 2019 – Research Report for the Security Council This event led to a UN resolution on “freezing the assets of Gaddafi and his inner circle” 3 and shortly afterwards to an intervention of NATO into the conflict. -
A Strategy for Success in Libya
A Strategy for Success in Libya Emily Estelle NOVEMBER 2017 A Strategy for Success in Libya Emily Estelle NOVEMBER 2017 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE © 2017 by the American Enterprise Institute. All rights reserved. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, 501(c)(3) educational organization and does not take institutional positions on any issues. The views expressed here are those of the author(s). Contents Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................1 Why the US Must Act in Libya Now ............................................................................................................................1 Wrong Problem, Wrong Strategy ............................................................................................................................... 2 What to Do ........................................................................................................................................................................ 2 Reframing US Policy in Libya .................................................................................................. 5 America’s Opportunity in Libya ................................................................................................................................. 6 The US Approach in Libya ............................................................................................................................................ 6 The Current Situation -
Amateur Computerist Newsletter
The Amateur Computerist Webpage: http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/ Winter 2012 Libya, The UN, and Netizen Journalism Volume 21 No. 1 Table of Contents by the UN in making possible the aggression against Libya. The actions taken by the Security Council and Introduction.. Page 1 other United Nations bodies like the Human Rights Int’l Media: 16th Member of the Security Council. Page 2 Council were contrary to the obligations of the UN Security Council Libya Mtg: Smoke and Mirrors. Page 5 charter and other principles of international law. The UN SC on Libya: Killing the International Law. Page 11 articles in this issue document the process by which Abuse of UN Processes by Security Council. Page 12 the UN became an accomplice in a NATO war against U.S. Uses UN to Bypass Congress to Go to War.Page 21 a sovereign nation that is a member of the United Journalism as a Weapon of War in Libya . Page 22 Nations. Open Letter From Concerned Africans on Libya.Page 23 These articles serve to argue that starting in What Does Gaddafi’s Fall Mean For Africa?. Page 26 February 2011 there was a media blitz supporting the ALBA Declaration on Libya and Syria. Page 27 NATO actions, largely based on unverifiable claims UNGA Debates NATO Attack on Libya. Page 29 by the opposition against the government of Libya. Lies of the Mainstream Media: TeleSUR. Page 30 The story that emerged is based on broadly circulated Munich to Tripoli: Aiding Aggression.. Page 32 falsifications of what was happening on the ground. -
LIBYA CONFLICT: SITUATION UPDATE March 2011
Opposition Movements and Statements LIBYA CONFLICT: SITUATION UPDATE March 2011 MARCH 31: Two Obama administration officials have reported that the U.S. is unlikely to provide arms to opposition forces. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have both stated their caution on issuing weapons, due to a lack of information on the dynamics and make-up of the rebel forces. Secretary Gates has suggested that, “the United States should stick to offering communications, surveillance and other support, but suggested that the administration had no problem with other countries sending weapons to help the rebels.” Secretary Gates additionally told members of the House Armed Services Committee that, “What the opposition needs as much as anything right now is some training, some command and control, and some organization.” (New York Times) MARCH 31: Rebels have begun deploying fishing boats to carry medicine and supplies from Benghazi to Misrata in the west. (LA Times) MARCH 31: The LA Times reports that the rebel effort has begun to fray due to ineffective leadership, a lack of weaponry, decreased morale, and the continued ambush by pro-Qaddafi forces. Some rebels have retreated over 200 miles to Benghazi to regroup, while others have remained at points outside of Ajdabiya. (LA Times) MARCH 30: A statement on counter-terrorism has been published to the Transitional National Council website, affirming the rebels,’ “commitment to the moderate Islamic values, its full rejection to the extremist ideas and its commitment -
Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism
i n s t i t u t e f o r i n t e g r at e d t r a n s i t i o n s Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism September 2020 About IFIT The Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT) aims to help fragile and conflict-affected states achieve more sustainable transitions out of war or authoritarianism by serving as an inde- pendent expert resource for locally-led efforts to improve political, economic, social and security conditions. IFIT seeks to transform current practice away from fragmented inter- ventions and toward more integrated solutions that strengthen peace, democracy and human rights in countries attempting to break cycles of conflict or repression. The ideas in this publication are informed by the diverse global experiences of IFIT’s Law and Peace Practice Group, whose members have had direct involvement in the negotia- tion of amnesty and accountability issues in over 20 countries. About the Project This publication is part of a project that aims to fill a major gap in policy making: the fail- ure to integrate lessons learnt and best practices from the field of transitional justice in relation to conflict resolution strategies with two kinds of unconventional armed actors: 1) “violent extremist” groups, such as jihadists; and 2) organised crime groups, such as mafia, gang networks and drug cartels. IFIT’s work on the former began in 2017 with the UN University Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR). The project was concerned with the fact that, to date, what has reigned is an overwhelmingly punitive and dragnet approach which, rather than helping address root causes and break cycles of resentment and vio- lence, instead risks renewing or reinforcing them. -
Download Clinton Email May Release/C05739890.Pdf
UNCLASSIFIED STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. U.S. Department of State SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739890 Date: 05/13/2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: Sidney Blumenthal B6 Sent Monday, August 27, 2012 6:36 PM To: Subject H: Intel, Libyan President, Sid Attachments: lirc memo Libya President 082711.dorx CONFIDENTIAL August 27, 2012 For: Hillary From: Ski Re: New President of Libya SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services. 1. (Source Comment: As the new interim President of Libya Mohammed Yussef el Magariaf is determined to establish a democratic state based on Islamic principles. In the opinion of an extremely sensitive source, Magariaf sees this moment as the climax his entire life's work. Having first served deposed dictator Muammar al Qaddafi as a policy advisor and diplomat, in 1979 Magariaf became disenchanted with what he saw as the cult of personality that Qaddafi was building for himself while turning against the basic beliefs of the Islamist movement. Magariaf was member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in his student days and remains a devout Islamist intellectual, albeit one who believes that Islam can coexist and even work with the non-Muslim world, particularly the United States and Western Europe. This source also believes that Magariaf is convinced that Libya, with its great natural wealth, can become a leading player in North Africa, as well as the rest of the Islamic world. -
Although the Use of the Term Al Qaeda Remains Dubious and As I've Stated
KC & Associates Investigations Research Associates Quinault Valley Guns & Blades / Urban Escape & Evasion Course International Relations * Military * Terrorism * Business * Security www.kcandassociates.org [email protected] Kathleen Louise dePass Press Agent/Publicist .360.288.2652 Triste cosa es no tener amigos, pero más triste ha de ser no tener enemigos porque quién no tenga enemigos señal es de que no tiene talento que haga sombra, ni carácter que impresione, ni valor temido, ni honra de la que se murmure, ni bienes que se le codicien, ni cosa alguna que se le envidie. A sad thing it is to not have friends, but even sadder must it be not having any enemies; that a man should have no enemies is a sign that he has no talent to outshine others, nor character that inspires, nor valor that is feared, nor honor to be rumored, nor goods to be coveted, nor anything to be envied. -Jose Marti Briefing Paper Saudi Arabian nation-state involvement in 9/11 Attacks on WTC From the desk of Craig B Hulet? September 12, 2011 Saudi Arabian nation-state involvement in 9/11 Attacks on WTC/WTO By Craig B Hulet? Although the use of the term al Qaeda remains dubious and as I’ve stated many times it was never used prior to the 9/11 attacks in any diplomatic cable, declassified documents, state department travel warnings, nor anywhere else for that matter, one is forced into this paradigmatically useful term after ten years of that forced usage. And bearing this in mind and that it was not Ussamah Bin Laden who orchestrated 9/11, please allow the point to be taken here for making my argument, which is all we can do these days. -
Alternatif Politika Is Devoted to the Arab Revolts of 2011 –The Series of Dynamic Social and Political Developments Not Seen in the Arab World for Over Fifty Years
alternatif politika Cilt 3, Sayı 3, Kasım 2011 Misafir Editör: Prof. Bogdan SZAJKOWSKİ Timeline of the Arab Revolt: December 2010-June 2011 Bogdan SZAJKOWSKİ Social Media Tools and the Arab Revolts Bogdan SZAJKOWSKİ The Social Opposition Movement in Syria: The Assad Regime in the Context of Reform and Revolution Veysel AYHAN European Union’s Ineffective Middle East Policy Revealed after Revolution in Tunisia Bahar Turhan HURMİ Libyan Uprising And International Intervention: NATO’s Mission and Libya’s Gridlock Veysel AYHAN Arab Spring and Israeli Security: The New Threats Dünya BAŞOL Background of the Tunisian Revolution Nebahat TANRIVERDİ alternatif politika Cilt 3, Sayı 3, Kasım 2011 Introduction- Bogdan SZAJKOWSKİ, i-ii. Timeline of the Arab Revolt: December 2010 – June 2011- Bogdan SZAJKOWSKİ, 256-419. Social Media Tools and the Arab Revolts-Bogdan SZAJKOWSKİ, 420-432. The Social Opposition Movement in Syria: The Assad Regime in the Context of Reform and Revolution-Veysel AYHAN, 433- 454. European Union’s Ineffective Middle East Policy Revealed after Revolution in Tunisia-Bahar Turhan HURMİ, 455-489. Libyan Uprising And International Intervention: NATO’s Mission and Libya’s Gridlock-Veysel AYHAN, 490-508. Arab Spring and Israeli Security: The New Threats-Dünya BAŞOL, 509-546. Background of the Tunisian Revolution-Nebahat TANRIVERDİ, 547-570. INTRODUCTION Guest Editor: Prof. Bogdan Szajkowski This special issue of Alternatif Politika is devoted to the Arab revolts of 2011 –the series of dynamic social and political developments not seen in the Arab world for over fifty years. Throughout 2011 the Middle East, the Gulf region, Arab Peninsula and North Africa have witnessed social and political turmoil that has fundamentally impacted not only on these regions but also on the rest of the world. -