Middle East Council

Inside Chaos in the mediterranean

Kwasi Kwarteng MP Leo Docherty

March 2017 Conservative Middle East Council INSIDE LIBYA: CHAOS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN Conservative Middle East Council INSIDE LIBYA: CHAOS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

KEY FINDINGS

• Haftar sees his mission as fighting jihadist terrorism.

• A large degree of order and governance exists in Eastern Libya.

• Despite being under pressure, the East remains stable while the West is plagued by disorder and insecurity.

• The House of Representatives is a nucleus for the development of a Libyan Parliamentary system, and has a geographical reach across Libya.

• Western Libya, particularly itself, is dominated by warlords and criminal gangs; they all have an interest in prolonging the relative confusion in the West.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

• The UK should urgently engage with Haftar, the LNA and the HoR

• The UK should support the LNA to secure Libya’s borders and bring an end to the illegal trafficking of people from Libya’s sea ports.

• The UK should reconsider its view of the GNA and acknowledge its limited capacity to deliver any kind of governance or security for Libya.

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DELEGATION TO LIBYA – MARCH 2017

OVERVIEW

In the first week of March 2017 CMEC Vice Chairman Kwasi Kwarteng MP, and CMEC Director Leo Docherty, travelled to Libya to meet the Commander of the (LNA) Field Marshal . They also met the Speaker of the House of Representatives (HoR), Aguila Saleh, and members of the House of Representatives.

The purpose of the delegation was to gain a deeper understanding of the situation inside Libya itself. Since the revolution and overthrow of in 2011 the political and economic conditions of that country remain extremely fluid. The enthusiastic optimism associated with the visit of Prime Minister to Tripoli and in September 2011, accompanied by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, has not been sustained. For the British government, Libya became less of a priority, while responsibility for fixing Libya’s many intractable problems, mostly regarding security and political governance, were left to the UN and EU.

Despite the best efforts of these organisations, Libya appears to many observers as nothing other than a failed state. Riven by militias, home to ISIS and Al Qaeda, and with unguarded borders, Libya appears simply incapable of constraining the movement of tens of thousands of migrants who travel through Africa to Europe every year. It has been plausibly argued that the UK, despite its central role in the toppling of Gaddafi, has simply not paid enough attention to Libya since 2011.

The delegation travelled to Libya on a flight from Alexandria to Al Bayda. From Al Bayda the CMEC team travelled by road to Al Rajma (near Benghazi), Al Marj and , from where a flight was eventually taken back to Alexandria. The meetings took place in Field Marshal Haftar’s Military Camp in Al Rajma, in and around the city of Al Bayda and in Tobruk. The circuitous route afforded ample opportunity to closely observe the situation on the ground.

The visit took place against the background of attacks against the LNA-held oil terminals of Al Sider and Ras Lanuf, on the western edge of Libya’s oil crescent, by militias aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli but reportedly containing jihadist elements. The loss of the oil terminal is a significant operational setback for the LNA. A counter attack is now underway and the battle continues as this report goes to press.

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KEY FINDINGS

1. Field Marshal Haftar sees his mission as fighting jihadist terrorism.

Field Marshal Haftar has a very clear focus on the operational challenge of defeating the jihadist militias in the west of Libya. He struck the delegation very much as an operational solider, a ‘soldiers’s soldier’, who did not concern himself with grand political strategy. Despite the ongoing attacks in the oil crescent, Haftar appeared composed and confident when the delegation met him. He sees himself as a Libyan nationalist and describes his mission as ridding Libya of the multitude of militias - both Islamist and criminal - that dominate the western half of the country. Although an observant Muslim, he appears to be largely secular in his world view.

Haftar appears to be a self-confident military man, who is proud of his achievements. He described to the delegation a series of military operations over the last three years, often in minute detail. He spoke about the worsening security situation in Libya and the rise of jihadist militias that encouraged him to lead a military offensive against them. This became known as Operation Karama - Dignity.

In 2014 I called for people to gather in Rajma with their own weapons…300 people came. We attacked the headquarters of the Islamists in Hawari, west of Benghazi and killed their leaders…after this 3,000 people joined us. Now we have 60,000.

Benghazi is now free of jihadists, only a few remain on the western edge.

Haftar points out that the LNA, since taking control of the oil crescent in September 2016, has allowed the oil to flow and the revenues to continue to be paid unhindered to the National Oil Company (NOC).

…the funds go to the NOC and then to the Central Bank…but they are in the hands of the militias – the militias call the shots and Libyans are still poor…

Haftar described his determination to secure the oil crescent and re-take the lost terminals. He also outlined his belief in the LNA’s ability – if enhanced militarily - to pacify the Jufra region in Southern Libya. Haftar sees his mission as a national project covering all of Libya.

Both Haftar and the Speaker of the HoR described their desire for close relations with the United Kingdom. Haftar appealed for British help:

We can end this chaos but we call on your government to help us…

One of Haftar’s senior advisers described the suspicions many Libyans have about the presence of UK Special Forces in Libya who, while they are known to be present in the East, are not actively engaging with the LNA. There is a large degree of scepticism over UK’s role and intentions given the discreet supported currently given by other major powers. The adviser stated:

People are asking – the Egyptians are backing us, the UAE, France and the Russians are backing us…the Americans probably will do…what are the British waiting for?

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2. A large degree of order and governance exists in Eastern Libya.

During the long road trips between Al Bayda, Al Rajma and Tobruk many well organised police and military check points could be seen. Traffic police were also visible. In the urban centres normal civilian life appeared to be going ahead unhindered by any security concern. Shops and restaurants were busy with customers. It was striking to the delegation that every soldier we saw appeared well equipped, and dressed in a distinctive military uniform.

One unusual sight the delegation witnessed was a queue of around two hundred people outside the Wahda Bank in Al Marj. These people were waiting to take cash from their bank accounts. Such withdrawals have been severely restricted due to the withholding of funds from the East of Libya by the Central Bank of Libya in Tripoli. This is set against an economic backdrop in which Libya’s GDP has, according to some measures, roughly halved since the revolution of 2011.

3. Despite being under pressure, the East remains stable while the West is plagued by disorder and insecurity.

Field Marshal Haftar and the LNA complain about a lack of money.

The recent successful attacks by militias against LNA forces in the oil crescent show that the LNA is militarily vulnerable. Despite the LNA reportedly receiving some military support from the UAE, , and Russia, it is by all accounts under-trained and under-equipped.

Despite controlling the oil crescent since September 2016, Haftar has not stopped the flow of oil from Libya’s oil crescent. Revenues from sales of oil to the international market are still flowing to the National Oil company and the Libyan Central Bank.

The LNA continues to be adversely affected by the reported failure of the Libyan Central Bank to honour its agreement to send 40% of oil revenues to Benghazi, while 60% is reportedly received by Tripoli.

Meanwhile, in the west a large number of different militias – some criminal, some jihadist – prevail. These include ISIS, Ansar Al Sharia, the Derna Mujahidin Shura Council, the Islamist Revolutionaries Shura Council, Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade, Special Deterrent Force (Tripoli) and the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (a coalition of Islamist militias, including Ansar Al Sharia, the 17 February Brigade and the Rafallah Al Sahati Brigade).*

In the west many of the militia leaders, such as Abdelhakim Belhadj and Khaled Al Sharif, were involved with the Libya Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), an organisation with loose links to Al Qaeda. Other leaders, such as Salah Badi and Ali Al Sallabi, were imprisoned under the Gaddafi regime. The political motivations of these different agents remain unclear. They do not have any organised political programmes, nor do they operate under party political labels. On the other hand, they have been effective at creating militias on the ground, and carving themselves positions of power and influence.

* A full list of militias can be found in the Appendix on Page 11

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The commitment of such people to a strong, functioning central government in Libya is doubtful. Many people feel that these militia leaders are direct beneficiaries of the ongoing political instability in Libya. The militia men have a vested interest in prolonging the chaos.

These militias reportedly derive significant income from the trafficking of migrants through Libya towards sea ports in Western Libya where they embark for Italy and Europe - in many cases perishing at sea.

It is reported that the GNA and President Serraj have absolutely no control over any geographical area of Western Libya. Their means of confronting the jihadist militant groups are negligible. The GNA has conspicuously failed to secure Libya’s borders with the neighbouring countries of , Niger, Algeria and Tunisia. They have consequently done little to stem the flow of illegally trafficked migrants towards the Mediterranean coast.

The President of the GNA, Fayez Serraj, is derided in the East as an ineffectual figurehead who remains at the mercy of militias in and around Tripoli. The GNA has no military capability of its own, while President Serraj was dismissed to us as a foreigner of indiscriminate Levantine origin – his father was described as being a Palestinian immigrant who worked for the British Army during the Second World War. Serraj was also derided for having been an unimpressive performer in the HoR before he was selected as president; he reportedly never made a speech.

Putting these statements and suggestions together, it would appear that much of Serraj’s support is derived from militia leaders, who naturally benefit from the disorder and lack of central government in the West. Militia leaders, such , are directly benefiting from the traffic in migrants. Each migrant has to pay up to US$1,000 to be trafficked to Europe. A strong central government in Libya would naturally be a threat to this nefarious line of business. The point which cannot be stressed enough is that many are benefitting financially, and in terms of status and prestige, from the continuing political chaos in the west of Libya.

Security within Tripoli itself was described as “very poor”. A member of the HoR, elected to a constituency in Libya’s Southern region and former resident of Tripoli said:

Tripoli is like by day, like Kandahar by night

Another important centre of power in the West is the city of . It is a prosperous sea port, and a significant economic centre with a large presence of various militia. Misrata is reportedly backed financially and militarily by Qatar, Turkey and Sudan. It is perhaps the largest obstacle to the LNA’s attempt to unify Libya under one command.

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4. The House of Representatives is a nucleus for the development of a Libyan Parliamentary system, and has a geographical reach across Libya.

The House of Representatives (HoR) – now sitting in Tobruk after its flight from Tripoli in the summer of 2014 - is composed of 188 Members of whom around 130-150 reportedly still attend meetings. Significantly, 32 Members are women, and the HoR apparently has a broad reach across the whole of Libya. On the day the delegation visited 114 Members were reported to be sitting.

Members of the HoR are a varied collection of political activists; they do not necessarily all support Haftar and the LNA. Most of the Members that the delegation met expressed gratitude that the LNA had provided the security to allow the HoR to continue sitting in Tobruk.

The delegation met two female MPs, one of whom, as a representative for the Tebu tribe in Murzuq, Southern Libya, voiced her complete support for the LNA. Murzuq is roughly 1,500 km from Tobruk.

Members of the HoR expressed dismay that their assembly was no longer supported by the international community. A Member representing a constituency in Libya’s Western Mountains said:

We are baffled by the position of Britain…and the support given to the GNA…which is reliant on the Islamist militias…it is not democratic.

The HoR, having been elected in 2014, is a flawed and somewhat disorganised body. It does, however, offer a starting point for Libya’s democratic development if the country can achieve a measure of political stability in the near future.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The UK should urgently engage with Haftar, the LNA and the HoR and support their efforts to defeat the Islamist militias in Western Libya. A united, democratic Libya can only progress if the country is pacified. The LNA is the only means of achieving this.

2. The UK should support the LNA to secure Libya’s borders bring an end to the illegal trafficking of people from Libya’s sea ports. This is urgent on both humanitarian and security grounds.

3. The UK should reconsider its view of the GNA and acknowledge its limited capacity to deliver any kind of governance or security for Libya.

“I decline utterly to be impartial between the fire brigade and the fire.”

SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL

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LIBYA TIMELINE 2011-17

2011 January/February The spreads to Libya and violence breaks out between security forces and anti-Gaddafi rebels.

2011 March UN Security Council authorises a no-fly zone over Libya and NATO launch air strikes.

2011 August The main opposition group the National Transitional Council (NTC) announce a ‘Constitutional Declaration’ to form a General National Congress (GNC) after the fall of Gaddafi.

2011 October 20 Gaddafi is apprehended and killed in Sirte.

2012 August The NTC transfers power to the GNC which was elected in July. A schism emerges over the direction of the new state: the role of Islam in politics and the role of the ‘revolutionary’ militias.

2012 September The US Ambassador is killed in Benghazi after a wave of Islamist attacks.

2013 Islamists ( and their allies) control the GNC and push through a law expelling Gaddafi-era officials from public life. Prime Minister is temporarily kidnapped.

2014 February Unrest and violence explodes after the GNC refuse to step-down after its mandate expires. In response, General Khalifa Haftar a former Gaddafi officer, who had returned to Libya in 2011, announces a failed coup on television. GNC concede to hold elections by the summer.

2014 May PM Zeidan is forced from office and is replaced by Minister of Defence Abdullah AlThinni.

Despite failing in his coup, General Haftar launches a military campaign (Operation Dignity) in Benghazi against Islamists responsible for assassinating liberals and security personnel.

2014 June A new parliament, the House of Representatives (HoR) is elected to replace the GNC. Islamist factions are marginalised in the HoR. In response, militias aligned to the GNC launch Operation Libya Dawn to purge the capital of liberals and Haftar supporters.

2014 August The campaign is successful and Islamists seize control of Tripoli and western Libya. The HoR and the government of PM AlThinni are forced to relocate to the eastern city of Tobruk and AlBayda respectively.

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2014 September Back in the capital, the Islamists reconvene the GNC and appoint the Government of National Salvation under the premiership of Omar al Hassi. Libya’s political system is divided between two rival authorities in the east and west and the country descends into civil war.

2015 January The UN brokers peace talks between representatives of the GNC and HoR.

2015 February Islamic State extend their influence to the western city of Sirte.

2015 March HoR appoint Haftar leader of the Libyan National Army.

2015 December UN Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) is signed creating a Presidency Council, Government of National Accord (GNA) under the leadership of Faiez al-Serraj and High State Council.

2016 January The HoR refuses to endorse the GNA cabinet, primarily because a provision in the LPA would side-line General Haftar and place him under the control of the GNA.

2016 March The GNA arrives in Tripoli by boat from Tunisia despite the threat of arrest by Khalifa Ghwell, the Prime Minister of the Government of National Salvation.

2016 August The HoR vetoes the GNA cabinet for a second time.

2016 September Haftar captures the Gulf of Sirte’s ‘oil crescent’ from GNA aligned militias and is promoted to Field Marshal by HoR speaker Agilah Saleh.

2016 October Khalifa Ghwell of the Government of National Salvation attempts a coup against the GNA but fails due to a lack of support.

2016 November Haftar meets Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow for the second time since July to secure military support. Haftar claims that Russia will help to end the UN arms embargo.

The GNA exerts little authority with the country facing an economic crisis with shortages in fuel, electricity, and medical supplies; a rise in food prices and the devaluation of the dinar.

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2016 December Militias from Misrata, aligned to the GNA, force Islamic State from Sirte.

2017 January GNA deputy leader Musa Al Koni resigns citing government failure, this is followed by the resignation of Labour Minister, Ali Qalma.

Oil exports hit a three-year high of 708,000bpd (output in 2010 was 1.6m bpd)

Haftar tours a Russian aircraft carrier and speaks to Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu. Russia previously endorsed Haftar as a future member of the Libyan leadership.

Militias loyal to Al-Ghwell of the Government of National Salvation attempt another failed coup, separately, violence erupts with Haftar forces and GNA Misrata forces in the south.

Egypt holds the latest in a series of meetings with Libyan and regional actors and UN envoy Martin Kobler to discuss revising the LPA to include Haftar.

2017 February EU leaders in Malta discuss proposals to stem the flow of migrants, one of which is migrant camps funded by Italy. 181,000 refugees arrived in Italy in 2016 – this is a 20% increase since 2015. Of the 181,000, 90% set off from Libya.

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APPENDIX - LIBYAN MILITIAS AND ISLAMIST GROUPS

Ansar Al Sharia Ansar Al Sharia is a radical Islamist group formed by revolutionary fighters in 2012. The group came to prominence in Benghazi after its members led a demonstration demanding the imposition of sharia law. The group was widely believed to have been involved in the 2012 attack on the US embassy in Benghazi which resulted in the death of US Ambassador, Christopher Stevens and three of his colleagues. Ansar Al Sharia was later designated a terrorist organisation by the US. Its members are comprised of fighters who participated in the conflicts in Iraq and Syria and the group has a presence throughout Libya. The group has strong ties to Al Qaeda and has made several public statements supporting them. In 2014, Ansar Al Sharia’s Benghazi division amalgamated with other groups to form the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council. The group has been targeted by Field Marshal Haftar’s forces.

Ahmed Abu Khattala Ahmed Abu Khattala is a Benghazi native and former Abu Slim prisoner who participated in the anti-Gaddafi rebellion in 2011. He commanded the Abu Ubaida bin al Jarrah Battalion and was accused of assassinating prominent military officer, Abd Al Fattah Yunis in July 2011. His group joined Ansar Al Sharia and participated in the 2012 assault on the US embassy in Benghazi. Khattala was accused of being a ringleader in the attack and was subsequently captured by US Special Forces in June 2014 and transferred to the United States. He is currently awaiting trial.

Islamic State (ISIS) In 2014, ISIS established a presence in the east of Libya as jihadists who had fought in Iraq and Syria returned home. But it was not until 2015 that ISIS, capitalising on the civil war, extended their influence to the western city of Sirte. The group perpetrated attacks in several Libyan cities and maintained a presence in Derna, and Benghazi. While comprising native Libyans, the majority of ISIS’s forces came from Iraq, Syria, and Yemen among others. In May 2016, a Government of National Accord (GNA) aligned militia launched an offensive – Al Bunyan al Marsus (solid structure) - to recapture Sirte. The heavily dominated Misrata militia was supplemented with fighters from Tripoli and western Libya. The operation in Sirte was supported by American airstrikes and British Special Forces. In Benghazi, Field Marshal Haftar and his Libyan National Army, launched an offensive against ISIS with strategic support from French Special Forces. On 7 December 2016, the GNA announced that ISIS had been driven from Sirte.

Former Libya Dawn Alliance In the summer of 2014, a coalition of disparate Islamist and non-Islamist militias from Misrata, Zawiya, and Tripoli formed ‘Operation Libya Dawn’ to counter Field Marshal Haftar’s ‘Operation Dignity’. The General National Congress (GNC) backed Libya Dawn alliance included the Libya Shield Force, Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room (whose members where accused of kidnapping Prime Minister Ali Zeidan in 2013), Muslim Brotherhood, and the Amazigh tribe. Backed by Turkey, the alliance successfully drove the Zintan brigades from the capital and western Libya fell under Islamist control. In 2015, the alliance disbanded because of tensions between the Misrata and Tripoli factions.

Salah Badi Salah Badi is a militia leader from Misrata commanding the Jabhat al Samud (Steadfast Front). Badi is a former Gaddafi military officer who was later imprisoned as a regime opponent. Upon his release, Badi led forces from Misrata in the anti-Gaddafi revolution. In 2012, he successfully contested the GNC elections but resigned his post in 2014. He was a key figure in the Libya Dawn alliance and supports Khalifa Ghwell. Badi is opposed to both the GNA and Field Marshal Haftar. He was credited with disrupting the arrival of the GNA to Tripoli in March 2016. Badi is a central figure in the newly formed Libyan National Guard designed to maintain Islamists in Tripoli.

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Sadiq Al Ghariani Sheikh Sadiq Al Ghariani, the grand mufti, is Libya’s highest spiritual leader. Born in Al Bayda, Ghariani is an outspoken Salafist-oriented leader, who supported the anti-Gaddafi uprising as legitimate and was later appointed to the Dar Al Ifta, Libya’s leading religious authority. He argued that voting for parties that wanted to restrict sharia to be ‘un-Islamic’. In 2013, Gharianai issued a fatwa banning unaccompanied women from travelling. The following year, Ghariani issued inflammatory statements in support of Libya Dawn and was accused of directing operations from London. Ghariani is strongly opposed to the GNA and is an ally of Khalifa Ghwell. He has also called for a jihad against Field Marshal Haftar.

Khalifa Ghwell Khalifa Ghwell is the Prime Minister of the defunct Government of National Salvation, which rests on the rump of the dissolved GNC. A former engineer from the city of Misrata, Ghwell was appointed Prime Minister after Omar Al Hassi’s dismissal in March 2015. Ghwell is openly hostile to the GNA and has refused to accept their authority. In October 2016 and January 2017, militias aligned to Ghwell launched two unsuccessful coups against the GNA. The newly formed LNG - comprising of militias from Misrata and Amazigh – has backed the Government of National Salvation. In February 2017, forces aligned to Ghwell launched an unsuccessful assassination attempt on GNA Prime Minister, Fayez Serraj.

Ali Al Sallabi Ali Al Sallabi is a member of the International Union of Muslim Scholars and Al Watan (Homeland) Party. The son of a founding member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Benghazi, Sallabi spent eight years in the Abu Slim prison under Gaddafi. After which he lived in exile in Qatar and later negotiated with the Gaddafi regime on behalf of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. Sallabi is closely tied to Abdul hakim Belhadj and was influential during the 2011 revolution, supporting the Tripoli Military Council and criticising the National Transitional Council (NTC) as ‘secular’. He is connected to controversial Muslim Brotherhood leader, Yusuf Al Qaradawi who has been accused of having links to terrorist groups. Sallabi is considered to be an important Islamist power broker and has been consulted by UN Special Representative Martin Kobler.

Former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) The LIFG is a defunct Islamist group formed in the 1990s with the aim of overthrowing the Gaddafi regime. Many of its fighters joined the Afghan Mujahidin against the in the 1980s. On return to Libya, the group launched an insurgency campaign and attempted to assassinate Gaddafi on three occasions. In retaliation, the regime killed and imprisoned many of its fighters in Abu Slim. Several LIFG leaders escaped to where they formed ties with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. During the late 2000s, the regime released many of the LIFG’s leadership after negotiations Ali Al Sallabi. Many of these figures rose to prominence in the 2011 revolution and later became involved in Libya’s political transition participating in elections and serving in the government. The LIFG was, at the very least, loosely connected to Al Qaeda. While the leadership never publically supported Al Qaeda’s campaign against the West, and in fact, denounced a suggestion that the LIFG joined Al Qaeda in 2007, numerous LIFG members did join Al Qaeda’s ranks. One of whom, Abu Yahya Al Libi was Al Qaeda’s deputy leader.

Abdel hakim Belhadj aka Abu Abdullah Al Sadiq Abdel hakim Belhadj is a former Islamist commander and current leader of the Al Watan Party. The Tripolitan participated in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union and later developed ties to both the Taliban and Al Qaeda. He was emir of the now defunct LIFG whose aim was to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. In 2004, Belhadj was arrested in a joint CIA-MI6 operation in Thailand and rendered back to Libya. He spent seven years in the Abu Slim prison. After the fall of the regime, Belhadj left the Tripoli Military Council to unsuccessfully contest the GNC elections in 2012. He took part in the dialogue that resulted in the United Nations backed Libyan Political Agreement in 2015. Belhadj is reported to have vast business interests including: health care, property, air transport and media. In January 2017, the British Supreme Court ruled that Belhadj was entitled to pursue legal action against the Government for authorising his rendition to Libya.

12 Sami Al Saadi Sami Al Saadi is a former high ranking member of the LIFG and founder of the Umma al Wasat (Moderate nation) party. In 1988, the Tripolitan left for Afghanistan where he participated in the war against the Soviet Union. He was described as the LIFG’s ‘key ideologue’ and was reportedly christened the ‘sheikh of the Arabs’ by former Taliban commander Mullah Omar. In 2004, Saadi was arrested in a joint UK-US operation and rendered to Libya where he subsequently tortured at the hands of the regime. Saadi spent the next six years in prison before his release in 2010. In December 2012, the UK government paid Saadi £2.2 million in compensation but did not accept liability for his rendition. When Abdel hakim Belhadj formed the Al Watan party, Saad formed a rival more ‘Islamic’ Umma al Wasat party. In 2012 elections, his party came third in the capital. He joined Prime Minister Zeidan’s cabinet but resigned months later.

Khaled Al Sharif A noted Islamist from Tripoli, Khaled Al Sharif was the deputy emir of the LIFG and spent time in Afghanistan until the United States’ intervention in 2001. In April 2003, Al Sharif was captured in Pakistan and returned to Afghanistan accused of having ties to Al Qaeda. After spending two years in a detention centre in Afghanistan, Sharif was rendered to Libya in 2005 where he spent the next five years in prison. During the revolution, Sharif formed the National Guard militia, which aimed to prevent the escape of Gaddafi loyalists and imprisoned them in its own detention centres. In early 2013, Al Sharif was appointed Deputy Defence Minister in charge of borders and protection of key facilities. He was later sacked after reportedly being involved with arming militia groups. In 2014, forces under his command participated in the Libya Dawn operation in Tripoli.

Mohammed Abu Sidra Mohammed Abu Sidra is an Islamist leader from Benghazi was a GNC Member of Parliament. He was imprisoned as a regime opponent under Colonel Gaddafi. Field Marshal Haftar accused Sidra of supporting Islamic terrorism.

Abdel Wahab Mohamed Qaid aka Abu Idris Al Libi Abdel Wahab Mohamed Qaid was the sixth highest ranking member of the LIFG, (and brother of late Abu Yahya Libi, the deputy leader of Al Qaeda). After spells in Tunisia, Pakistan and other Islamists training grounds, Qaid returned to Libya in 1995 where he was arrested by the Gaddafi regime and spent the next 16 years in the Abu Slim prison. In 2011, he participated in the anti-Gaddafi uprising. Qaid joined the Umma al Wasat party and in 2012 was elected to the GNC representing his home city of Murzuq. In Congress he led the hard-line Islamic and Salafist political bloc, Al Wafa (the Blood of the Martyrs).

Other prominent militia groups • Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (a coalition of Islamist militias operating largely in eastern Libya, including Ansar Al Sharia, the 17 February Brigade and the Rafallah Al Sahati Brigade) • Derna Mujahidin Shura Council (Derna, eastern Libya) • Islamist Ajdabiya Revolutionaries Shura Council (Ajdabiya, north-eastern Libya) • Tripoli Revolutionaries’ Brigade (Tripoli) • Special Deterrent Force (Tripoli)

It should be noted that many of the groups which started in the East, such as the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, now operate in the west of Libya. Most of the militia leaders mentioned in this survey are now based in Tripoli, Misrata and the west of the country. Middle East Council

KWASI KWARTENG MP Kwasi Kwarteng is the Member of Parliament for Spelthorne in Surrey. He is the succesful author of a number of books including Ghosts of Empire: Britain’s Legacies in the Modern World.

LEO DOCHERTY Leo Docherty is the Director of the Conservative Middle East Council (CMEC). He is the author of Desert of Death: A Soldier’s Journey From Iraq to Afghanistan.

Conservative Middle East Council 55 Tufton Street, London, SW1P 3QL t: +44 (0) 20 7340 6007 e: [email protected] w: www.cmec.org.uk @CMECnews

The views expressed herein are those of the authors not of the Conservative Middle East Council or the Conservative Party.