DOCSLIB.ORG

Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) Type Of

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) Type Of Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) Type of Organization: insurgent, non-state actor, religious, social services provider, terrorist, violent Ideologies and Affiliations: Islamist, jihadist, Qutbist, Salafist, Sunni, Takfiri Place(s) of Origin: Libya Year of Origin: 2012 Founder(s): Abu Sufyan Bin Qumu (founder of Ansar al-Sharia in Derna);1 Mohamed al-Zahawi, Nasser al-Tarshani, and other Libyan Islamists (founders of Ansar al-Sharia Benghazi) Place(s) of Operation: Libya Also Known As: • Ansar al-Charia in Libya 2 • Katibat Ansar al-Charia 3 • Katibat Ansar al-Sharia 4 • Partisans of Islamic Law in Libya5 • Partisans of Sharia in Libya 6 • Supporters of Islamic Law in Libya7 • Supporters of Sharia in Libya 8 Executive Summary: Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) is a violent jihadist group that seeks to implement sharia (Islamic law) in Libya. ASL is the union of two smaller groups, the Ansar al-Sharia Brigade in Benghazi (ASB) and Ansar al-Sharia Derna (ASD), each formed in 2011 after the fall of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. In 2012, ASB and ASD, 1 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Know Your Ansar Al-Sharia,” Foreign Policy, September 21, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/21/know_your_ansar_al_sharia. 2 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United Nations, November 19, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11659.doc.htm. 3 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United Nations, November 19, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11659.doc.htm. 4 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United Nations, November 19, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11659.doc.htm. 5 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United Nations, November 19, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11659.doc.htm. 6 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United Nations, November 19, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11659.doc.htm. 7 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United Nations, November 19, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11659.doc.htm. 8 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United Nations, November 19, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11659.doc.htm. alongside other Islamist militant groups, attacked the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, killing four Americans, including U.S. Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens. The 2012 Benghazi attack was a major turning point for the two groups. Following widespread backlash in Libya and abroad, ASB was forced out of Benghazi and ASD disbanded. ASB then underwent a major rebranding effort, changing its name to Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (removing from its name the word “brigade”) and publicly denouncing violence. The group also denied its connections to the consulate attack and to al-Qaeda. Under its new name, ASL launched a dawa (proselytizing) campaign, under which it provided social services and charity in Benghazi. Through this campaign, ASL was able to win back the trust of many Libyans, and in 2013 ASL opened new branches in Derna, Sirte, and Ajdabiya.9 However, while ASL had publicly embraced peace, many remained skeptical of the group’s intentions. Foreign and local intelligence has revealed that since 2012, ASL has increased ties with international violent jihadist groups, including by holding clandestine meetings with al-Qaeda affiliates in North Africa and training and exporting fighters to conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Mali. 10 In the past, ASL’s former leader, Mohamed al- Zahawi, had openly declared his support for al-Qaeda.11 On May 16, 2014, former Libyan army general Khalifa Haftar launched a massive assault—codenamed “Operation Dignity”—on Islamist groups in Benghazi. Although ASL initially maintained control of Benghazi, civilian uprisings within the city and offensives launched by General Haftar have gradually eroded ASL’s control. In February 2015, General Haftar’s forces retook the port area of Benghazi, considered to be the last major area of the city left under ASL’s domain. As of February 2015, estimates indicate ASL controls less than 10% of Benghazi. 12 ASL suffered another major setback when Mohamed al-Zahawi, the group’s emir, died in January 2015 of wounds from an October 2014 airstrike.13 ISIS also poses a major threat to ASL. Although the two groups do appear to cooperate to an extent, ASL has not sworn allegiance to ISIS’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. As of April 2015, ISIS controls the previously ASL-dominated cities of Derna and Sirte but 9 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Libya’s Jihadists Beyond Benghazi,” Foreign Policy, August 12, 2013, http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/12/libyas_jihadists_beyond_benghazi; Aya Elbrqawi, “Slow Death of Derna,” AllAfrica, February 28, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201403031054.html; Aaron Y. Zelin, “Libya’s Jihadists Beyond Benghazi,” Foreign Policy, August 12, 2013, http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/12/libyas_jihadists_beyond_benghazi. 10 Thomas Joscelyn, “UN recognizes ties between Ansar al Sharia in Libya, al Qaeda,” Long War Journal, November 19, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/11/un_designates_ansar.php; Aaron Y. Zelin, “New Evidence on Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya Training Camps,” Al-Wasat, August 8, 2013. https://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/08/08/new-evidence-on-ansar-al-sharia-in-libya-training-camps/. 11 Faisal Irshaid, “Profile: Libya’s Ansar Al-Sharia,” BBC News, June 13, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27732589. 12 Lucy Westcott, “Libyan Army Reportedly Has Taken Back Benghazi Port,” Newsweek, February 6, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/libyan-army-reported-have-taken-back-benghazi-port-305113. 13 Nadia Radwan, “Libya: Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya Leader Dead,” AllAfrica, January 26, 2015, http://allafrica.com/stories/201501270208.html. ASL has been able to maintain a presence in those municipalities.14 Further, ASL has suffered numerous prominent defections to ISIS. Finally, ISIS’s attacks within Libya, including the beheading of 21 Egyptian Christians, have triggered renewed international support for eradicating extremism within Libya. Some analysts, including Michael Horowitz of Max Security Solutions, think ASL will likely pledge allegiance to ISIS in the near future.15 Doctrine: ASL’s primary objective is to institute sharia (Islamic law) in Libya. As the group’s former leader, Mohamed al-Zahawi, said, “Our brave youths will continue their struggle until they impose [sharia].”16 Like Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, ASL advances its agenda through dawa (proselytizing), hisba (commanding right and forbidding wrong through sharia, which can include enforcement of modesty laws through violence), and jihad (in this case, armed struggle).17 Like many other Islamist groups, ASL opposes achieving change through, the democratic system. The group believes democracy subverts sharia by giving man the power to make law—a power ASL considers reserved to God alone. This belief separates ASL from other Islamist groups in Libya, including Libya Dawn, that support exploiting democracy in order to achieve implementation of sharia.18 ASL’s hisba enforcement has included destroying Sufi shrines that the group considers idolatry. Al-Zahawi described removal these shrines as “a religious duty” because “people worship the deceased and this is prohibited. It is not me who says so but rather our religion.”19 The group also confiscated anatomy books from the European School in Benghazi after deeming that they were “pornographic” in nature.20 Similarly, in February 2015, gunmen from an “al-Qaeda inspired militia” seized radio and television stations in Sirte after ASL “warned the station to stop broadcasting music.”21 14 Thomas Joscelyn, “Ansar Al Sharia Libya Relaunches Social Media Sites,” Long War Journal, April 9, 2015, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/04/ansar-al-sharia-libya-relaunches-social-media- sites.php. 15 Thomas Joscelyn, “Spiritual Leader of Libya’s Biggest Jihadi Group Pledges Allegiance to ISIS,” Newsweek, April 8, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/top-judge-libyas-biggest-jihadi-group-pledges- allegiance-isis-320408. 16 Ahmed Maher, “Meeting Mohammad Ali Al-Zahawi of Libyan Ansar Al-Sharia,” BBC News, September 18, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19638582. 17 Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Terrorist Threat in North Africa,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 10, 2013, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/testimony/ZelinTestimony20130710- v2.pdf. 18 Ahmed Maher, “Meeting Mohammad Ali Al-Zahawi of Libyan Ansar Al-Sharia,” BBC News, September 18, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19638582. 19 Ahmed Maher, “Meeting Mohammad Ali Al-Zahawi of Libyan Ansar Al-Sharia,” BBC News, September 18, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19638582. 20 Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Terrorist Threat in North Africa,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 10, 2013, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/testimony/ZelinTestimony20130710- v2.pdf. 21 “Islamic Militants Seize Radio, TV Stations in Central Libya,” New York Times, February 14, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/02/14/world/middleeast/ap-ml-libya.html. Aaron Zelin, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, wrote that the creation of ASL, as well as Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, emerged from the ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who “has attempted to steer the jihadi community to a more ‘pure’ jihad” in order to offset the brutal image of jihad as popularized by deceased al- Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.22 According to Zelin, Maqdisi has tried to draw a distinction between the idea of qital al- nikayya (fighting to hurt or damage the enemy) and qital al-tamkin (fighting to consolidate one’s power).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Libya's Fight for Survival
    LIBYA’S FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL DEFEATING JIHADIST NETWORKS September 2015 ! ! ! TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD 3 ESSAY ONE COMPETING JIHADIST ORGANISATIONS AND NETWORKS 6 Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya Stefano Torelli and Arturo Varvelli ESSAY TWO POLITICAL PARTY OR ARMED FACTION? 31 The Future of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Valentina Colombo, Giuseppe Dentice and Arturo Varvelli ESSAY THREE MAPPING RADICAL ISLAMIST MILITIAS IN LIBYA 53 Wolfgang Pusztai and Arturo Varvelli ESSAY FOUR THE EXPLOITATION OF MIGRATION ROUTES TO EUROPE 73 Human Trafficking Through Areas of Libya Affected by Fundamentalism Nancy Porsia ABOUT THE AUTHORS 87 BIBLIOGRAPHY 89 2 LIBYA’S FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL DEFEATING JIHADIST NETWORKS LIBYA’S FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL 3 DEFEATING JIHADIST NETWORKS FOREWORD ! ! This publication is a compilation of four different essays, edited by Dr. Arturo Varvelli PhD, which from part of a series of studies undertaken by EFD to analyse the nature and spread of the phenomenon of radicalisation in the European Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods. It focuses on Libya and assesses the current situation on the ground through a number of diverse and varied prisms. It identifies patterns and trends as well as specific local and regional developments in order to provide a comprehensive overview of the situation of radicalisation in post-Ghadaffi Libya and the extent to which this may be contributing to regional as well as international instability Months of acute political turmoil in Libya following the fall of the Qaddafi regime, compounded by a weak national identity as well as legacies from the civil war in 2011 which ended Qaddafi’s 42-year rule, have resulted in Libya becoming a failed state with a strong radical Islamist presence.
    [Show full text]
  • Libya: Conflict, Transition, and U.S
    Libya: Conflict, Transition, and U.S. Policy Updated April 13, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL33142 SUMMARY RL33142 Libya: Conflict, Transition, and U.S. Policy April 13, 2020 Libya’s political transition has been disrupted by armed non-state groups and threatened by the indecision and infighting of interim leaders. After a uprising ended the 40-plus-year rule of Christopher M. Blanchard Muammar al Qadhafi in 2011, interim authorities proved unable to form a stable government, Specialist in Middle address security issues, reshape the country’s finances, or create a viable framework for post- Eastern Affairs conflict justice and reconciliation. Insecurity spread as local armed groups competed for influence and resources. Qadhafi compounded stabilization challenges by depriving Libyans of experience in self-government, stifling civil society, and leaving state institutions weak. Militias, local leaders, and coalitions of national figures with competing foreign patrons remain the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. An atmosphere of persistent lawlessness has enabled militias, criminals, and Islamist terrorist groups to operate with impunity, while recurrent conflict has endangered civilians’ rights and safety. Issues of dispute have included governance, military command, national finances, and control of oil infrastructure. Key Issues and Actors in Libya. After a previous round of conflict in 2014, the country’s transitional institutions fragmented. A Government of National Accord (GNA) based in the capital, Tripoli, took power under the 2015 U.N.- brokered Libyan Political Agreement. Leaders of the House of Representatives (HOR) that were elected in 2014 declined to endorse the GNA, and they and a rival interim government based in eastern Libya have challenged the GNA’s authority with support from the Libyan National Army/Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LNA/LAAF) movement.
    [Show full text]
  • A Strategy for Success in Libya
    A Strategy for Success in Libya Emily Estelle NOVEMBER 2017 A Strategy for Success in Libya Emily Estelle NOVEMBER 2017 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE © 2017 by the American Enterprise Institute. All rights reserved. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, 501(c)(3) educational organization and does not take institutional positions on any issues. The views expressed here are those of the author(s). Contents Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................1 Why the US Must Act in Libya Now ............................................................................................................................1 Wrong Problem, Wrong Strategy ............................................................................................................................... 2 What to Do ........................................................................................................................................................................ 2 Reframing US Policy in Libya .................................................................................................. 5 America’s Opportunity in Libya ................................................................................................................................. 6 The US Approach in Libya ............................................................................................................................................ 6 The Current Situation
    [Show full text]
  • Jihadism in Africa Local Causes, Regional Expansion, International Alliances
    SWP Research Paper Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber (Eds.) Jihadism in Africa Local Causes, Regional Expansion, International Alliances RP 5 June 2015 Berlin All rights reserved. © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2015 SWP Research Papers are peer reviewed by senior researchers and the execu- tive board of the Institute. They express exclusively the personal views of the authors. SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 10719 Berlin Germany Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] ISSN 1863-1053 Translation by Meredith Dale (Updated English version of SWP-Studie 7/2015) Table of Contents 5 Problems and Recommendations 7 Jihadism in Africa: An Introduction Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber 13 Al-Shabaab: Youth without God Annette Weber 31 Libya: A Jihadist Growth Market Wolfram Lacher 51 Going “Glocal”: Jihadism in Algeria and Tunisia Isabelle Werenfels 69 Spreading Local Roots: AQIM and Its Offshoots in the Sahara Wolfram Lacher and Guido Steinberg 85 Boko Haram: Threat to Nigeria and Its Northern Neighbours Moritz Hütte, Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber 99 Conclusions and Recommendations Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber 103 Appendix 103 Abbreviations 104 The Authors Problems and Recommendations Jihadism in Africa: Local Causes, Regional Expansion, International Alliances The transnational terrorism of the twenty-first century feeds on local and regional conflicts, without which most terrorist groups would never have appeared in the first place. That is the case in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Syria and Iraq, as well as in North and West Africa and the Horn of Africa.
    [Show full text]
  • Libya's Fight for Survival
    LIBYIA’S FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL DEFEATING JIHADIST NETWORKS September 2015 About the European Foundation for Democracy The European Foundation for Democracy is a Brussels-based policy institute dedicated to upholding Europe’s fundamental values of freedom and equality, regardless of gender, ethnicity or religion. Today these principles are being challenged by a number of factors, among them rapid social change as a result of high levels of immigration from cultures with different customs, a rise in intolerance on all sides, an increasing sense of a conflict of civilisations and the growing influence of radical, extremist ideologies worldwide. We work with grassroots activists, media, policy experts and government officials throughout Europe to identify constructive approaches to addressing these challenges. Our goal is to ensure that the universal values of the Enlightenment –religious tolerance, political pluralism, individual liberty and government by demo- cracy – remain the core foundation of Europe’s prosperity and welfare, and the basis on which diverse cultures and opinions can interact peacefully. About the Counter Extremism Project The Counter Extremism Project (CEP) is a not-for-profit, non-partisan, international policy organization formed to address the threat from extremist ideology. It does so by pressuring financial support networks, countering the narrative of extremists and their online recruitment, and advocating for effective laws, policies and regula- tions. CEP uses its research and analytical expertise to build a global movement against the threat to pluralism, peace and tolerance posed by extremism of all types. In the United States, CEP is based in New York City with a team in Washington, D.C.
    [Show full text]
  • The 2016 U.S. Election
    April 2017, Volume 28, Number 2 $14.00 The 2016 U.S. Election William Galston John Sides, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck James Ceaser Nathaniel Persily Charles Stewart III The Modernization Trap Jack Snyder The Freedom House Survey for 2016 Arch Puddington and Tyler Roylance Sheriff Kora and Momodou Darboe on the Gambia Thomas Pepinsky on Southeast Asia Nic Cheeseman, Gabrielle Lynch, and Justin Willis on Ghana’s Elections Kai M. Thaler on Nicaragua Sean Yom on Jordan and Morocco The End of the Postnational Illusion Ghia Nodia The 2016 U.S. Election Longtime readers will be aware that this is the first time the Journal of Democracy has ever devoted a set of articles to the situation of democracy in the United States. Our traditional focus has been on the problems and prospects of democracy in developing and postcommunist countries. In the introduction to the group of essays in our October 2016 issue entitled “The Specter Haunting Europe,” we explained why we felt we had to redirect some of our attention to the growing vulnerability of democracy in the West, and promised that we would not refrain from examining the United States as well. This is an especially delicate task for us because our parent organization, the National Endowment for Democracy, is a reso- lutely bipartisan institution that seeks to steer clear of the controversies of U.S. domestic politics. We hope we have succeeded in avoiding the pitfalls of partisanship; but in an era when the trends that are weakening liberal democracy are increasingly global, an editorial version of “Ameri- can isolationism” no longer seemed a defensible policy.
    [Show full text]
  • Successes and Failures in the Enactment of Humanitarian Intervention During the Obama Administration
    “THE ROAD TO HELL AND BACK”: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN THE ENACTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION A Thesis submitted to the FaCulty of the Graduate SChool of Arts and SCiences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in ConfliCt Resolution By Justine T. Robinson, B.A. Washington, DC DeCember 10, 2020 Copyright 2020 by Justine T. Robinson All Rights Reserved ii “THE ROAD TO HELL AND BACK”: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN THE ENACTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION Justine T. Robinson, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Andrew Bennett, Ph.D. ABSTRACT This thesis examines how United States presidential administrations change over time in their poliCies on humanitarian intervention. More speCifiCally, how and why do AmeriCan presidential administrations (and the offiCials in those administrations) fail in some cases and sucCeed in others in enaCting ConfliCt resolution and genocide preventative measures? This thesis will focus on why offiCials in the two Obama administration sometimes used ambitious means of humanitarian intervention to prevent or mitigate genocide and other mass atrocities, as in the Cases of Libya and the Yazidis in Iraq, and sometimes took only limited steps to aChieve humanitarian goals, as in the case of the Syrian Civil War and Syrian refugees. This thesis is partiCularly interested in cases where earlier Obama administration aCtions and outComes forced the president and his advisors to rethink their approaCh to potential humanitarian intervention cases. The central hypothesis of this thesis is that poliCy changes on humanitarian intervention over time within U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Failures of Intelligence Reform
    Coastal Carolina University CCU Digital Commons Honors College and Center for Interdisciplinary Honors Theses Studies Fall 12-15-2012 The aiF lures of Intelligence Reform Amber Ciemniewski Coastal Carolina University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/honors-theses Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Ciemniewski, Amber, "The aiF lures of Intelligence Reform" (2012). Honors Theses. 52. https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/honors-theses/52 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College and Center for Interdisciplinary Studies at CCU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of CCU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 were a devastating shock to the United States. They alerted Americans to the new threat of non-state actors. National Security had been severely damaged, and the new threat provoked the U.S. to enter into a problematic war in the Middle East region. Immediately after the attacks, the “blame game” began. Though there are seventeen organizations in the United States intelligence community, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) suffered the worst criticism for their roles in failing to prevent the attacks. The Bush administration established the 9/11 Commission in order to investigate what went wrong and to determine how to fix it. Based on the recommendations provided by the Commission, various organizations were changed and/or created in the intelligence community. Out of many changes, two were the most significant.
    [Show full text]
  • Making Islam an American Religion
    Religions 2014, 5, 477–501; doi:10.3390/rel5020477 OPEN ACCESS religions ISSN 2077-1444 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions Article Post-9/11: Making Islam an American Religion Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad 1,* and Nazir Nader Harb 2 1 The Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University, 37th and O Streets, N.W., Washington, DC 20057, USA 2 Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, Georgetown University, 1437 37th St, N.W., Washington, DC 20057, USA; E-Mail: [email protected] * Author to whom correspondence should be addressed; E-Mail: [email protected]; Tel.: +1-202-687-2575; Fax: +1-202-687-8376. Received: 3 January 2014; in revised form: 19 May 2014 / Accepted: 20 May 2014 / Published: 1210 June 2014 Abstract: This article explores several key events in the last 12 years that led to periods of heightened suspicion about Islam and Muslims in the United States. It provides a brief overview of the rise of anti-Muslim and anti-Islam sentiment known as “Islamophobia”, and it investigates claims that American Muslims cannot be trusted to be loyal to the United States because of their religion. This research examines American Muslim perspectives on national security discourse regarding terrorism and radicalization, both domestic and foreign, after 9/11. The article argues that it is important to highlight developments, both progressive and conservative, in Muslim communities in the United States over the last 12 years that belie suspicions of widespread anti-American sentiment among Muslims or questions about the loyalty of American Muslims. The article concludes with a discussion of important shifts from a Muslim identity politics that disassociated from American identity and ‘American exceptionalism’ to a position of integration and cultural assimilation.
    [Show full text]
  • Libya's Fight for Survival
    LIBYA’S FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL DEFEATING JIHADIST NETWORKS September 2015 LIBYA’S FIGHTLIBYA’S FOR SURVIVAL: DEFEATING JIHADIST NETWORKS About the European Foundation for Democracy The European Foundation for Democracy is a Brussels-based policy institute dedicated to upholding Europe’s fundamental values of freedom and equality, regardless of gender, ethnicity or religion. We work with grassroots activists, media, policy experts and government officials throughout Europe to identify constructive approaches to addressing these challenges. Our goal is to ensure that the universal values of the Enlightenment – political pluralism, individual liberty and government by democracy and religious tolerance – remain the core foundation of Europe’s prosperity and welfare, and the basis on which diverse cultures and opinions can interact peacefully. About the Counter Extremism Project The Counter Extremism Project is a not-for-profit, non-partisan, international policy organi- sation formed to address the threat from extremist ideology. It does so by pressuring financial support networks, countering the narrative of extremists and their online recruitment, and advo- cating for effective laws, policies and regulations. CEP uses its research and analytical expertise to build a global movement against the threat to pluralism, peace and tolerance posed by extremism of all types. In the United States, CEP is based in New York City with a team in Washington, D.C. LIBYA’S FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL DEFEATING JIHADIST NETWORKS September 2015 Edited by Arturo Varvelli
    [Show full text]
  • Bee Round 3 Bee Round 3 Regulation Questions
    National Political Science Bee 2019-2020 Bee Round 3 Bee Round 3 Regulation Questions (1) This man assisted a black man in Detroit who was harassed for moving into an all-white neighborhood named Ossian Sweet. After the murder of Joseph Kahahawai, this man obtained a commutation for Socialite Grace Fortescue in the Massie Trial. This man defended two University of Chicago students who believed themselves to be the Ubermensch by having them plead guilty to the murder of Bobby Franks. He defended a teacher accused of violating the Butler Act against William Jennings Bryan. For the point, name this lawyer who defended Leopold and Loeb and John Scopes. ANSWER: Clarence Darrow (or Clarence Seward Darrow) (2) This agency's commissioner under FDR, John Collier, drew from his findings in the Meriam Report to advocate for legislation like the JohnsonO'Malley Act. This agency controversially administered boarding schools based on Richard Henry Pratt's Carlisle model. In 1972, 500 AIM protestors took over this agency's building in the culmination of their Trail of Broken Treaties walk. This agency within the U.S. Department of the Interior faced criticism for supporting Dick Wilson of the Oglala Dakota. For the point, name this agency that oversees 573 federally recognized American Indian and Alaska Native tribes. ANSWER: Bureau of Indian Affairs (or BIA) (3) The Paradise Papers implicated Odebrecht in paying bribes that were uncovered during this investigation. Lula da Silva was arrested as part of this investigation, and Gilmar Mendes ruled Lula couldn't become Chief of Staff to avoid prosecution.
    [Show full text]
  • The Nature of Political Satire Under Different Types of Political
    Rollins College Rollins Scholarship Online Honors Program Theses Spring 2017 Laughing in the Face of Oppression: The aN ture of Political Satire Under Different Types of Political Regimes Victoria Villavicencio Pérez Rollins College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.rollins.edu/honors Part of the Communication Commons, International Relations Commons, and the Latin American Studies Commons Recommended Citation Villavicencio Pérez, Victoria, "Laughing in the Face of Oppression: The aN ture of Political Satire Under Different Types of Political Regimes" (2017). Honors Program Theses. 55. http://scholarship.rollins.edu/honors/55 This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by Rollins Scholarship Online. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Program Theses by an authorized administrator of Rollins Scholarship Online. For more information, please contact [email protected]. POLITICAL SATIRE UNDER DIFFERENT POLITICAL REGIMES 1 Laughing in the Face of Oppression: The Nature of Political Satire Under Different Types of Political Regimes Victoria Villavicencio Honors Degree Program POLITICAL SATIRE UNDER DIFFERENT POLITICAL REGIMES 2 Table of Contents ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................................3 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................4 SIGNIFICANCE ............................................................................................................................................6
    [Show full text]