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Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies

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Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies May 21, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46796 SUMMARY R46796 Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: May 21, 2021 Selected Case Studies Christopher M. Blanchard, Congress shaped U.S. national security policy toward several critical crises and contingencies in Coordinator the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) during the decade from 2011 through 2020—a period Specialist in Middle of upheaval, conflict, and change in that region. Eastern Affairs Under the U.S. Constitution, the legislative and executive branches of government use a range of tools in exercising their respective foreign policy powers. The President and the executive branch provide leadership in the development of U.S. foreign policy and are principally responsible for its implementation. Members of Congress may issue legislative directives, make policy statements, offer advice, and use authorization, appropriations, and oversight powers to influence U.S. approaches. In response to emerging contingencies and conflicts in the MENA region over the last decade, Congress created and modified foreign aid and security assistance authorities; provided funding for humanitarian aid, stabilization efforts, transition support, and some military interventions; imposed limitations on U.S. military operations and cooperation with foreign partners; and mandated that the President implement stringent sanctions against U.S. adversaries. Reflecting the unique circumstances created by regional events and the innovative executive branch approaches those events required, Congress enacted new oversight requirements to ensure its consultation. Congress may examine the experiences over the decade to assess the results of its use of legislative tools to influence U.S. foreign policy. Analysis of case studies of various specific legislative interventions in specific events and countries shows use of a range of congressional policy tools with varied outcomes. Key considerations include how chosen congressional policy tools relate to executive branch-led foreign relations initiatives and the effects that country- and context- specific factors may have on policy results. Among the tools that Congress used to shape U.S. policy responses in the MENA region from 2011 through 2020, the most direct and tangible were its appropriation and authorization powers. Congress expanded U.S. assistance to Tunisia’s emerging democratic government and to Jordan’s monarchy to help it cope with a range of challenges. Congress placed conditions on U.S. assistance to longtime partner Egypt amid its various transitions. Congress authorized and funded novel security assistance programs in Iraq and Syria. Reflecting changing congressional views, Congress acted to end U.S. assistance to the Palestinian Authority, but later enacted revisions to allow for the possibility of resuming some types of aid. Congress also provided for extensive U.S. sanctions targeting Iran for its nuclear program, weapons proliferation, restrictions on human rights and democracy, and support to armed groups and U.S.-designated terrorists. Congress pressed the executive branch to take a stringent approach to U.S. nuclear negotiations with Iran, made legislative proposals that shaped the international context for negotiations, and enacted measures that allowed it to review related agreements. Congressional consensus about U.S. military operations and other security programs in the region proved more elusive. Congress considered, but did not enact, proposals that alternatively would have authorized and funded or prohibited and constrained the 2011 U.S. military intervention in Libya. Congressional oversight of U.S. support to some Arab Gulf partners’ 2015 intervention in Yemen influenced efforts to limit U.S. involvement by invoking provisions in the War Powers Resolution, rejecting certain arms sales, and imposing conditions on some forms of U.S. assistance. Vetoes of measures and unresolved policy debates underscored deep differences between some Members and successive Administrations. Costly military operations in Iraq from 2003 through 2011 and perceived domestic budget constraints led Members to scrutinize funding requests and to direct the Administration to secure partner contributions as a condition of some U.S. assistance. Congress also structured some U.S. aid as loans or loan guarantees. The United States did not engage in new large-scale military ground operations in the region during the decade and instead led or participated in multilateral responses. Nevertheless, the United States allocated more than $85 billion dollars (current dollars) from 2011 to 2020 to support U.S. military operations in the region, provide foreign military financing assistance to Arab governments, and alleviate humanitarian suffering, among other aid. Over the decade in question, shared views about the gravity of unfolding changes in the MENA region did not always lead Members of Congress to shared conclusions about the implications of regional transformation for U.S. interests or what steps, if any, Congress should take independently or to support or constrain related executive branch policies. Advocates for greater U.S. support for regional change or U.S. intervention in the region’s conflicts often faced opposition from skeptics concerned about the wisdom or sustainability of greater U.S. involvement, particularly in light of competing domestic or other priorities. These dynamics continue to characterize debate in Congress over U.S. policy toward the region. Congressional Research Service Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies Contents Overview ....................................................................................................................... 1 Context and Congressional Approaches .............................................................................. 3 Prologue to Change.................................................................................................... 3 Revisiting Resources: Appropriations and the “Arab Spring”............................................ 5 Responding to Adversaries and Rivals .......................................................................... 7 Reexamining Assumptions: Regional Partnerships .......................................................... 9 Seeking Consensus?................................................................................................... 9 Selected Case Studies .................................................................................................... 10 Tunisia: Transition Assistance and Oversight ............................................................... 10 Congress and Tunisia’s Transition......................................................................... 12 Observations ..................................................................................................... 14 Libya: Military Intervention and its Aftermath ............................................................. 15 Congress and Conflict in Libya ............................................................................ 16 Observations ..................................................................................................... 20 Egypt: Aid Conditionality and Human Rights............................................................... 23 Mubarak’s Resignation and Military Rule: 2011-2012.............................................. 24 The Morsi Presidency: 2012-2013......................................................................... 26 President Sisi: 2014-Present ................................................................................. 28 Observations ..................................................................................................... 31 Syria and Iraq: Security Assistance in Complex Conflicts .............................................. 31 Training and Equipping Partners in Syria and Iraq ................................................... 33 Observations ..................................................................................................... 42 Yemen: Arms Sales and Security Cooperation .............................................................. 48 Congressional Tools for Shaping Partner Behavior in Conflict................................... 50 Observations ..................................................................................................... 53 Jordan: Comprehensive Partnership ............................................................................ 55 Congress Expands U.S. Assistance ........................................................................ 57 Observations ..................................................................................................... 60 The Palestinians: Changes to U.S. Foreign Assistance ................................................... 61 Congress and Ending Aid .................................................................................... 62 Observations ..................................................................................................... 67 Iran: Sanctions, the JCPOA, and ‘Maximum Pressure’ .................................................. 68 Congress and U.S. Sanctions Policy ...................................................................... 69 Observations ..................................................................................................... 74 Conclusion..................................................................................................................
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