“THE ROAD TO HELL AND BACK”: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN THE ENACTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION A Thesis submitted to the FaCulty of the Graduate SChool of Arts and SCiences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in ConfliCt Resolution By Justine T. Robinson, B.A. Washington, DC DeCember 10, 2020 Copyright 2020 by Justine T. Robinson All Rights Reserved ii “THE ROAD TO HELL AND BACK”: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN THE ENACTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION Justine T. Robinson, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Andrew Bennett, Ph.D. ABSTRACT This thesis examines how United States presidential administrations change over time in their poliCies on humanitarian intervention. More speCifiCally, how and why do AmeriCan presidential administrations (and the offiCials in those administrations) fail in some cases and sucCeed in others in enaCting ConfliCt resolution and genocide preventative measures? This thesis will focus on why offiCials in the two Obama administration sometimes used ambitious means of humanitarian intervention to prevent or mitigate genocide and other mass atrocities, as in the Cases of Libya and the Yazidis in Iraq, and sometimes took only limited steps to aChieve humanitarian goals, as in the case of the Syrian Civil War and Syrian refugees. This thesis is partiCularly interested in cases where earlier Obama administration aCtions and outComes forced the president and his advisors to rethink their approaCh to potential humanitarian intervention cases. The central hypothesis of this thesis is that poliCy changes on humanitarian intervention over time within U.S. presidential administrations depend on whether the politiCal and professional reputations of government offiCials who advocated or opposed earlier interventions have strengthened or weakened as a result of the outComes of those earlier (non)-interventions. This thesis will focus on the Obama administration from January 2009 to January 2017, the administration's deCision-making processes into deCiding how and why to intervene or not intervene in a foreign crisis, and the sucCesses and failures in preventing genocide and other mass atrocities through the enaCtment of those foreign poliCy deCisions and interventions. iii Moreover, the thesis examines the history of humanitarian interventions, the eFFeCt of AmeriCan foreign poliCy deCision-making in presidential administrations, and evolving views of key offiCials on whether humanitarian interventions do more harm than good to prevent and stop further mass atrocities. This thesis will provide timelines of and analyze three qualitative case studies of humanitarian crises the Obama administration was involved in Libya, Iraq, and Syria. The thesis concludes its final seCtion with a set of reCommendations on praCtiCal and theoretiCal guidelines to follow to win poliCymaking battles on future issues surrounding humanitarian interventionism and mass atrocity prevention. iv I would like to thank everyone who has helped me throughout this thesis writing process and given me invaluable knowledge along the way. I would first like to thank Dr. Andrew Bennett for being an excellent thesis advisor to me as a student in the Georgetown University Department of Government. His feedbaCk and encouragement has been productive and encouraging throughout this semester long process. I would like to thank Dr. Lise Morjé Howard for agreeing to be a part of my thesis committee and taking the time to read and review my drafts. I would like to thank my family for helping me with topiC possibilities and encouraging me throughout this process. Finally, I would like to thank the Georgetown University M.A. in ConfliCt Resolution program, the Department of Government, and the Graduate SChool of Arts and SCiences, as a whole, for giving me the opportunity and tools as a Georgetown student to sucCeed as a student and community member. Many thanks, Justine T. Robinson v TABLE OF CONTENTS SeCtion I: Introduction ................................................................................................................1 SeCtion II: Research Question….................................................................................................2 SeCtion III: Examination of Hypothesis......................................................................................3 SeCtion IV: Timeline of Cases .................................................................................................14 SeCtion V: Methodology: Case Studies ...................................................................................20 SeCtion VI: Conclusion.............................................................................................................62 SeCtion VII: Results: ReCommendations and Solutions ..........................................................65 Appendices: Methodology: Qualitative Interviews..................................................................69 Bibliography.............................................................................................................................83 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Map of Violent ConfliCt in Libya (March 2011)...................................................23 Figure 2. Transformational Map of the Syrian Civil War (March 2014 to September 2015).....................................................................................................................................38 Figure 3. Map of Mount Sinjar and Yazidi Genocide Timeline (August 2014)...................57 vii LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Key Obama Administration OffiCials.......................................................................15 viii SECTION I: INTRODUCTION If you ask the average person what appears in their mind when they hear the words “genocide” “mass atrocity prevention” or “humanitarian intervention” they would likely think of soldiers of different ethniCities wearing blue helmets; gathering frightened townspeople from a village that will be swarming with enemy soldiers looking for blood and destruction. However, if asked to think of those words again, would they imagine the President of the United States, late at night, huddled in the Oval OffiCe, swarmed with advisors, as he (or she) painstakingly think of every non-military, pro-military, joint-partnership/Coalition plan available to them, as they deCide whether to aCt and initiate a plan of humanitarian proteCtion or standby and let defenseless human lives be slaughtered? The topiC of humanitarian intervention and genocide and mass atrocity prevention has been analyzed and explored continuously by confliCt resolution, international relations, and human rights experts and sCholars. However, it is rare to see these topiCs explored from the exeCutive branch’s viewpoint, partiCularly from the President of the United States and his politiCal cabinet. Understanding how and why a United States (U.S.) presidential administration will reaCt and send humanitarian aid and military forces to speCifiC humanitarian crises, while they deCide to stand baCk and watCh others deteriorate before their eyes, is Crucial to help international relations, human rights, and confliCt resolution advocates, praCtitioners and sCholars understand what is keeping their country’s highest offiCe from preventing and/or stopping a mass atrocity, and to enable them to use that to their advantage in preventing and stopping those Crimes. Moreover, by exploring this subjeCt, exeCutive branch members and presidential sCholars will examine a presidential administration through domestiC and international lenses, giving 1 them insight into exeCutive branch foreign poliCy, making deCisions they had never thought about before or had been privy to. This thesis will make the Central argument/hypothesis that poliCy changes on humanitarian intervention over time within U.S. presidential administrations depend on whether the politiCal and professional reputations of government offiCials who advocated or opposed earlier interventions have strengthened or weakened as a result of the outComes of those earlier (non)-interventions; thus showing why this thesis topiC is crucial for understanding how U.S. presidential administrations aCt or not reaCt in the faCe of a humanitarian Crisis. SECTION II: RESEARCH QUESTION This thesis's primary research question is: how do United States presidential administrations Change over time in their poliCies on humanitarian intervention? More speCifiCally, how and why do AmeriCan presidential administrations (and the offiCials in those administrations) fail in some Cases and sucCeed in others in enaCting ConfliCt resolution and genocide preventative measures? Going more in-depth, this thesis will focus on why offiCials in the Obama administration sometimes used ambitious means of humanitarian intervention to prevent or mitigate genocide and other mass atrocities, as in the cases of Libya and the Yazidis in Iraq, and sometimes took only limited steps to aChieve humanitarian goals, as in the case of the Syrian civil war and Syrian refugees. This thesis is partiCularly interested in cases where earlier Obama administration aCtions and outComes forced the President and his advisors to rethink their approaCh to potential humanitarian intervention cases. 2 SECTION III: EXAMINATION OF HYPOTHESES The thesis statement (and hypothesis) to the central question (theory) posed in the previous seCtion is that poliCy changes on humanitarian intervention