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Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring in Context

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Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring in Context Andrew Sangster Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy University of East Anglia History School August 2014 Word Count: 99,919 © This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that use of any information derived there from must be in accordance with current UK Copyright Law. In addition, any quotation or abstract must include full attribution. Abstract This thesis explores the life and context of Kesselring the last living German Field Marshal. It examines his background, military experience during the Great War, his involvement in the Freikorps, in order to understand what moulded his attitudes. Kesselring's role in the clandestine re-organisation of the German war machine is studied; his role in the development of the Blitzkrieg; the growth of the Luftwaffe is looked at along with his command of Air Fleets from Poland to Barbarossa. His appointment to Southern Command is explored indicating his limited authority. His command in North Africa and Italy is examined to ascertain whether he deserved the accolade of being one of the finest defence generals of the war; the thesis suggests that the Allies found this an expedient description of him which in turn masked their own inadequacies. During the final months on the Western Front, the thesis asks why he fought so ruthlessly to the bitter end. His imprisonment and trial are examined from the legal and historical/political point of view, and the contentions which arose regarding his early release. The thesis will confirm that Kesselring was guilty of war crimes, and offers new evidence that he was aware of his guilt, and explains why he committed perjury. His postwar activities are explored, and illustrate that he failed to come to terms with the new West Germany. During and after the war Kesselring was frequently regarded as a non-party, decent man considered by some a possible candidate for the presidency of West Germany. This thesis challenges these long held views; he simply stayed in the limelight for a brief time due to the politics of the Cold War. 2 Contents Abstract 2 Acknowledgements 7 Abbreviations 8 Photographs of Kesselring 9 Maps 10 Preface 14 Introduction 15 Why this Thesis …p.15 Current Research…p. 16 Context of General Consensus…p.17 Kesselring’s background…p.18 Context as Military Commander…p.21 The Context of Guilt…p.25 Context of Postwar Politics…p.28 Chapter 1: Early Life (1885-1922) 32 Early Influences…p.32 World War I…p.41 World War I Aftermath 1918-22…p.48 Chapter 2: The Reichswehr (1922-1937) 55 Introduction…p.55 Versailles Reaction…p.56 Clandestine Activity…p.58 Seeckt, Politics and Blitzkrieg…p.60 Planning War…p.65 Arrival of Hitler…p.67 Emergence of the Luftwaffe…p.71 Chapter 3: Luftwaffe Command (1937-1941) 81 Introduction…p.81 Kesselring’s claimed ignorance of Aggressive War…p.82 Strategic Bombing…p.86 Poland …p.90 Western Europe …p.92 Battle of Britain…p.95 Barbarossa…p.101 Did Kesselring know of the Atrocities?...p.106 3 Chapter 4: Southern Command (1941-1943 (45)) 110 Introduction…p.110 Backdrop to Italy ...p.111 The Appointment…p.112 Kesselring’s Views of Italian situation…p.114 Military situation and Intelligence Failure…p.116 Rommel…p.118 Malta…p.120 North Africa – Supply Problems…p.123 Torch and understanding France…p.125 Defence in Africa…p.128 The Opposition…p.130 Defeat…p.132 A Clean War…p.133 Concluding Notes…p.135 Chapter 5: Sicily to Salerno (1943) 138 Introduction…p.138 The Nature of Kesselring’s Command…p.139 Kesselring and the Italians…p.145 Kesselring Master of Defence...p.155 Chapter 6: Italy (1943-1944) 167 Introduction…p.167 The Backdrop…p.168 Kesselring’s Command and the SS…p.169 Military Intelligence…p.172 The Policy of Plunder…p.173 The Four Battles – Bari…p.176 Gustav Line/Monte Cassino…p.177 Anzio…p.184 Rome…p.188 Conclusion to Mediterranean Campaigns…p.191 Chapter 7: North Italy and Partisan War (1944-1945) 19 Introduction…p.194 Kesselring’s Loyalty…p.194 Retreat North…p.195 Introduction to Partisan War…p.197 Partisan or Terrorist…p.197 International Laws and Attitudes…p.198 The Italian Partisan…p.200 The Allies and the Partisans…p.204 Kesselring’s reactions to Partisans…p.206 4 Chapter 8: Commander to Prisoner (1945-1947) 215 Introduction…p.215 Western Command…p.215 Surrender and Prison…p.225 Did Kesselring know?...p.226 Early Interrogations and Victor’s justice…p.231 Kesselring’s Charm…233 Chapter 9: The Trial (1947) 235 Introduction…p.235 Authority, Nature, Legal Issues and Venue of Trial…p.235 Nuremberg and Subsequent Proceedings…p.235 The Legal Issues…p237 Competency of Officials…p.238 Siegerjustiz, Victor's Justice…p.239 Not all Culprits Indicted…p.241 Trial in Italy…p.241 Prosecution and Defence on the First Charge…p.243 Charge of Ardeatine Massacre…p.243 Defence – the Alibi…p.244 Defence – Hitler ordered SD…p.245 Defence – Was Kesselring humane?...p.246 Prosecution and Defence of the Second Charge…p.248 Prosecution Evidence…p.248 Defence – not the Wehrmacht…p.250 Defence – Legality of Hostages/Reprisals…p.251 Defence –Illegality of Partisans…p.255 Defence – Kesselring, Saviour of Italian Culture…p.255 Perjury…p.259 Raiber’s case…p.260 Verdict in Court…p.262 Trial in long term context…p.263 Chapter 10: Prison (1947-1952) 266 Introduction…p.266 Commutation of Death Sentence…p.266 Life in Prison…p.269 The Politics of Release –Introduction…p.271 Entnazifizierung, de-Nazification…p.273 Kesselring’s Lobby Group…p.275 Kesselring’s British Lobby…p.275 German Reaction…p.279 Into the Political Forum…p.281 Cold War and Politics of Memory…p.283 Resolution…p.285 5 Chapter 11: Post Prison Politics (1952-1960) 288 Introduction…p.288 Germany post-1945…p.289 Rearmament Issue…p.294 Veteran Associations…p.295 Kesselring Misjudges the Times…p.299 Returning Criminal POWs…p.301 Kesselring’s Failure…p.304 Concluding Remarks 306 Introduction….p.306 Kesselring, A National Product…p.307 Kesselring prepared for War…p.308 Kesselring supported an Iniquitous Regime…p.309 Kesselring knew war was planned…p.310 Kesselring’s ruthless tactical bombing…p.311 Kesselring as Luftwaffe Commander…p.311 Kesselring as Commander in Chief South…p.312 Kesselring’s failure with Rommel and Malta…p.314 Kesselring’s failure in North Africa…p.315 Kesselring the Master of Defence…p.316 Kesselring was Ruthless…p.317 Kesselring becomes Politics…p.318 Appendices 325 1. Sea Lion…p.320 2. Kesselring’s orders ref Partisans…p.328 3. Kesselring’s orders ref Partisans…p.323 4. Subordinate’s orders ref Partisans…p.334 5. Rules of Land Warfare USA…p.325 6. Trial Transcript ref Hostage/Reprisals…p.327 7. Raid on Bari…p.331 8. Perceptive 1919 Versailles Cartoon…p.336 9. The Führerbefehl, 18th October 1942…p.337 10. Kesselring’s Instructions for Italy…p.339 Bibliography 348 Primary Sources…p340 Biographies, Speeches, Diaries…p343 Published works…p.347 Pamphlets, Magazines, Articles…p.354 6 Acknowledgments I would like to thank Dr Richard Maguire for having the courage to take on an OAP studying a subject not to everyone's interest, and for having the patience to stay with me as I changed my mind every time new evidence surfaced, as well as the persistence to make me think about what I was actually trying to say. I have appreciated his tough application of criticism. I am very grateful to the kind help of the UEA library staff and those in the National Archives at Kew. I have made many contacts during this research with historians overseas, and am especially grateful for the various discussions with Pier Paolo Battistelli in Rome. I am indebted to my wife and sister for encouraging me to continue my studies, and my wife in particular for accompanying me on research trips and helping check my English. 7 Abbreviations BA-MA Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg BA-BL Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde BHMK Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv, München CLNAI Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy IMCC Inter-allied Military Control Commission KNA Kew National Archives LRWC Law Reports War Crimes -The UN War Crimes Commission, NA-AMP National Archives- Air Ministry Pamphlets NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei National Socialists German Workers' Party PAC USA Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality SIB Special Investigation Branch SNP Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings USAHD United States America Historical Division USDS US Department of State, Publication 3556 USFR US Final Reports to Secretary of Army on Nuremberg War Crimes Trials under Control Council Law No. 10 VdS Verband deutscher Soldaten 8 ALBERT KONRAD KESSELRING Uniform als Oberleutnant der kaiserlichen Armee 9 NORTH AFRICA – Main elements TANGIER BIZERTA MEDITERRANEAN SEA EL ALAMEIN BENGHAZI TUNIS FRENCH MOROCCO TUNISIA ALGIERS ORAN ALEXANDRIA TRIPOLI TOBRUK CASABLANCA ALGERIA LIBYA EGYPT 10 TUNISIA Bizerta Bône Tunis Enfidaville defence Kasserine Pass Mareth Line Land over 1,000 metres SALT LAKE/ MARSHES 11 INVASION of SICILY 11 July – Livorno Div & Herman Göring Div converge towards Gela. XIII Corps take Syracuse. 12 July – H Göring tanks retreat north. Americans taken 18,000 prisoners but lost 1000 men. Brit XIII Corps repulse Schmalz Group and head towards Augusta. 13 July – Augusta falls. XXX Corps, 51st Div engaged by Herman Göring Div. At night Schmalz attacked by Brit to enter Catania plain; airborne troops dropped.
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