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Home , Airpower, Albert Kesselring, Battle of Britain, Battle of Britain Day, Hugh Dowding, Hugo Sperrle

How the Lost the of Britain British courage and capability might not have been enough to win; German mistakes were also key. By John T. Correll

n , the situation looked “We shall fight on the beaches, we shall can do more than delay the result.” Gen. dire for . It had taken fight on the landing grounds, we shall , commander in chief less than two months to fight in the fields and in the streets, we of French forces until ’s invade and conquer most of Western shall fight in the hills; we shall never , predicted, “In three weeks, IEurope. The fast-moving German Army, surrender.” will have her neck wrung like supported by panzers and Stuka dive Not everyone agreed with Churchill. a chicken.” , overwhelmed the and defeatism were rife in Thus it was that the events of and in a matter of days. France, the British Foreign Office. The Foreign through Oct. 31—known to history as the which had 114 divisions and outnumbered Secretary, Lord Halifax, believed that —came as a surprise to the Germany in tanks and , held out a Britain had lost already. To Churchill’s prophets of doom. Britain won. The RAF little longer but surrendered on June 22. fury, the undersecretary of state for for- proved to be a better combat force than Britain was fortunate to have extracted its eign affairs, Richard A. “Rab” Butler, told the Luftwaffe in almost every respect. The retreating expeditionary forces from the Swedish diplomats in that “no decisive factors were British capability beaches at . opportunity would be neglected for con- and determination, but German mistakes, Britain itself was next. The first objec- cluding a compromise peace” if it could before and during the battle, contributed tive for the Germans was to establish air be had “on reasonable conditions.” significantly to the outcome. superiority as a precondition for invasion. Joseph P. Kennedy, US ambassador to was forbidden The Luftwaffe estimated haughtily that Britain, informed the State Department by the at the end it would be able to defeat the Royal Air July 31 that the German Luftwaffe had of , but develop- Force’s Fighter Command in southern the power to put the RAF “out of com- ment continued under the guise of civil England in four days and destroy the rest mission.” In a press statement, Sen. Key aviation. When Hitler came to power in of the RAF in four weeks. Pittman (D-Nev.), chairman of the Senate 1933, he pursued militarization openly. , who on May 10 Foreign Relations Committee, declared, The Luftwaffe, formally established as a had succeeded as “It is no secret that Great Britain is separate branch of service in 1935, was Prime Minister, was resolute. In a ring- totally unprepared for defense and that soon the largest in and, ing speech to Parliament, he declared, nothing the has to give in the opinion of many, the best. 62 AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2008 first-line fighters of RAF Fighter Com- The officer was infatuated with mand against the fighters, bombers, and the dive . It had worked well for dive bombers of two German air fleets. In the in , where pilots that matchup, the German advantage was had difficulty hitting targets from high significantly greater. altitude. The was accurate in How the Luftwaffe Lost , putting bombs directly on compact targets, commander of Fighter Command, said, which predominated in Spain. “Our young men will have to shoot The foremost advocate of the dive down their young men at the rate of bomber was , another flam- five to one.” boyant flying ace from World War I. The Luftwaffe was not as invincible as it His friend Goering appointed him to be looked. One of its fundamental weaknesses technical chief of the Luftwaffe, a position was unstable leadership. The commander for which he was utterly unsuited. Udet in chief was Hermann W. insisted that every bomber have a dive Goering, a World War I ace and the succes- bombing capability, which added weight sor, in 1918, to in and subtracted speed from numerous command of 1, the Flying aircraft in development. Circus. He had become a fat, blustering The Luftwaffe’s signature dive bomber caricature of himself. He had not kept up was the Ju 87 Stuka, instantly recognizable with changes in airpower and had little with its inverted gull , sturdy fixed knowledge of strategy. Goering was prone undercarriage, and wheel spats. It was to impulsive and erratic decisions. When enormously successful as a terror Hitler intervened in the decision-making, in the . A wind-powered siren, which he did regularly, the results were used in diving attacks, contributed to the even worse. psychological effect. However, the Luftwaffe’s immediate Germany had no long-range bomb- problem in 1940 was that the subjugation ers and would not field its first strategic of Britain was not the kind of mission it bomber, the 177, until 1944. was prepared to perform. Its strength was What it had in 1940 was an assortment of Blitzkrieg, the short, fast “lightning war” twin-engine medium bombers, notably the in which the German Army, supported by slow-moving He 111 and Do 17. They had Stuka air strikes, swept through in been adequate to supplement the Stuka on 1939 and in 1940. In both the continent, but they were out of their the Blitzkrieg and the war in Spain, the league in the Battle of Britain. The best Luftwaffe’s forte was of of the German medium bombers was the ground forces. Ju 88, which had better range and speed,

German pilots honed their skills in the . Between 1936 and 1939, they were rotated as “volunteers” through the Condor Legion, supporting Opposite: Pilots from and the Nationalists. the RAF’s 601st Squad- They perfected techniques, tested their ron scramble to their —including the Ju 87 Stuka Hurricanes in August dive bomber and the Bf 109 fighter—and 1940. Left: A World War II gained experience. era British propaganda poster shows a of America’s most famous aviator, Spitfires shooting down Charles A. Lindbergh, toured German German Heinkel 177s. bases and factories in 1938. “Germany now has the means of destroy- ing London, , and if she wishes to do so,” Lindbergh wrote in a report to Kennedy in London. “England and France together have not enough modern war planes for effective defense or counterattack.” The Luftwaffe’s fearsome reputation was enhanced by the pushover German victories in Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. In July 1940, it was about twice the size of the RAF, but the critical measure was not gross numbers. Essentially, the Battle of Britain pitted the AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2008 63 Critical Matchup, July 1940 more than 100 miles out. Once Luft- waffe formations crossed England’s coastline, the RAF Luftwaffe began tracking them. The RAF knew when and where to respond, and could 754 single seat fighters 1,107 single seat fighters delay scrambling its fighters until the last moment. 149 two seat fighters 357 two seat fighters Unbeknownst to , Britain had 560 bombers 1,380 bombers cracked the high-level German “Enigma” code. The intelligence product derived 0 dive bombers 428 dive bombers from these intercepts was called “.” It provided useful information about the 500 coastal 233 coastal Luftwaffe’s overall moves, but it did not N/A reconnaissance 569 reconnaissance add greatly to the day-to-day intelligence from other sources. 1,963 Total 4,074 Total Yet another RAF force multiplier was Aircraft numbers attributed to the two sides vary and changed constantly high-octane fuel. When the war began, in 1940 because of losses and replacements. Counts also differ in how both the Luftwaffe and the RAF were many aircraft were judged to be in service. using 87 octane aviation fuel. Beginning in , the RAF obtained 100 octane fuel from the United States and but it was just coming into production at of Britain. The Hurricane was larger and used it throughout the battle. It boosted that time. slower, but like the Spitfire, it could turn the performance of the Merlin engines in The Luftwaffe also had the Bf 110, inside the Bf 109. Bf 109 pilots, if they the Hurricanes and Spitfires from 1,000 nominally a twin-engine fighter. It had could, attacked from altitude, which gave to about 1,300 horsepower. good speed and range, but it was not agile them an advantage. Dowding—known as “Stuffy”—had enough to take on RAF fighters. Germany The RAF had several force multipli- been commander of Fighter Command might have done well to use it instead as ers, the most important of which was since its founding in 1936. He was the a fighter-bomber—which it did later in . The official British term for it was oldest of the RAF senior commanders—in- the war—but it was rarely employed in “RDF,” for radio direction finding, before a tensely private, eccentric and obstinate, that role in 1940. changeover in 1943 to match the American but a leader of exceptional ability. It Germany’s best , and argu- usage of “radar.” Britain had no monopoly. was on his authority that the first British ably the best airplane on either side, The German Navy made limited use of radar experiments with aircraft had been was Willy ’s masterpiece, radar. However, the incompetent Udet had carried out. Dowding was unbending and the Bf 109 fighter. It packed a powerful rejected radar for the Luftwaffe in 1938 thus not favored by the politicians in the engine into a small, sleek and because it did not fit with his notions of . was the world’s most advanced fighter air combat. Fighter Command, headquartered at when it first flew in 1935. It went on in the London suburbs, was to score more victories than any other What the RAF Knew organized to fight in four groups. The larg- aircraft in World War II. Its problem in Dowding was an early champion of est was 11 Group, covering southeastern 1940 was limited range. Flying from radar. Britain had a chain of 29 RDF England and the approaches to London. bases in France, it had only about 10 stations along its southern and eastern Its commander was Air Vice Marshal minutes of fighting time over London. coastlines. The radar was effective for Keith R. Park, an excellent officer but, It could not escort the bombers on deep penetration missions in Britain. For the first time, the Luftwaffe faced a first-class opponent. The RAF had been established in 1918 as a separate military service and was reorganized in 1936 into Bomber, Fighter, Coastal, and Training Commands. Two superb fighters would bear the brunt of the coming battle. The Hawk- er Hurricane was regarded as Fighter Command’s “workhorse.” It was teamed with a “thoroughbred,” the Spitfire. In July 1940, the RAF had 29 squadrons of Hurricanes and 19 squadrons of Spitfires. The Spitfire was one of the greatest fighters of all time. It had been introduced in 1936 but was still around to shoot down a German Me 262 in 1944. It became the symbol of the Battle German officers gaze across the at the white cliffs of . 64 AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2008 more than 2,000 that day, the most of any day during the Battle of Britain. The German high command claimed 99 RAF fighters destroyed in the air. In actuality, the RAF lost 34 fighters while shooting down 75 German airplanes. The fighting on Aug.

Photo courtesy National Archives 19 was only slightly less intense. RAF regularly at- tacked targets on the Continent, flying 9,180 sorties between July and October. This had the effect of freezing some Ger- man fighters in place for air base defense, limiting the number that could be com- mitted to the attack on Britain. Bad weather caused a lull in the fight- ing Aug. 19 to 23. It was a much-needed respite for both sides. When the battle resumed Aug. 24, the Luftwaffe changed tactics and concentrated its force on 11 Group airfields. A civilian aircraft “spotter” scans the skies around St. Paul’s Cathedral in London, What the Germans really wanted was searching for incoming German airplanes. to lure the RAF fighters up for air , which the Bf 109 pilots believed they like Dowding, not attuned and responsive sion of Britain. The German Navy said would win. Park and Dowding, however, to the politicians. Sept. 15 was the earliest possible date it refused to respond to Luftwaffe fighter To the immediate north was the area could be ready. On Aug. 1, Hitler ordered sweeps. They went after the German of 12 Group, covering the Midlands and the Luftwaffe to “overpower the English bombers instead. East Anglia and commanded by Air Vice Air Force,” which stood in the way of The Stuka had made its reputation in the Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory. The other the invasion. Blitzkrieg under conditions of German air two groups had lesser roles—southwest- Goering assured Hitler, “The RAF will supremacy. It was far less fearsome with ern England was covered by 10 Group, be destroyed in time for Spitfires and Hurricanes on its tail. The and and by to be launched by Sept. 15.” At first, the Stuka’s top speed was 230 mph (compared 13 Group. Luftwaffe regarded the entire RAF as the to more than 350 for the Spitfire), and it Germany would employ two main air target and scattered its efforts for weeks was even slower and more vulnerable fleets. Luftflotte 2, with headquarters in before focusing on Fighter Command. when diving to deliver bombs. , was commanded by Field Mar- Finally recognizing the value of the “Due to the speed-reducing effect of shal . Its Bf 109 fighters radar sites, the Luftwaffe tried to destroy were concentrated in Pas de , across them, but did so by aiming bombs at the from Dover at the narrowest point of the radar towers, which were easy to replace English Channel. Luftflotte 2 also had and almost impossible to hit. The radar Aircraft Losses: Churchill’s Count bombers and fighters elsewhere in northern site buildings where the trained operators France and Belgium. Luftflotte 3, com- worked would have been easier targets manded by but were seldom attacked. In yet another British Enemy from his headquarters in Paris, flew from mistake, Goering told the Luftwaffe to fighters aircraft bases in and . ignore the radar sites and strike at other lost destroyed Goering and his consistently targets. underestimated the RAF. In early August July 58 164 1940, Goering insisted that the British Faithless Kennedy (from July 10) had no more than 400 to 500 fighters. In The RAF lost 58 airplanes in July, but fact, Fighter Command on Aug. 9 had 715 the full fury of the battle was yet to come. August 360 662 ready to go and another 424 in storage, With great fanfare, Goering declared Aug. available for use within a day. 13 to be Adler Tag (Eagle Day), on which September 361 582 When France fell, Hitler ordered a stra- he launched 1,485 sorties against Britain. tegic pause, believing the British would “Within a short period you will wipe the October 136 325 accept a dictated peace on his terms. British air force from the sky. Heil Hitler,” Total 915 1,733 The Luftwaffe mounted sporadic bomb he said in a message to the air fleets. raids on southern England and shipping Among those impressed by the German Accounts of aircraft losses in the Battle in the Channel. However, in the official claims was Kennedy, who wired President of Britain vary. This one was compiled reckoning, the Battle of Britain began Roosevelt, “England will go down fight- by Winston Churchill and published in July 10 with a fighter engagement over ing. Unfortunately, I am one who does not his book Their Finest Hour. Of the RAF the channel; the Luftwaffe lost 13 aircraft believe that it is going to do the slightest fighter losses, about 770 were Hurri- canes and Spitfires, and of the German and the RAF 10. bit of good.” losses, about 50 were Bf 109s. On , Hitler ordered preparations On Aug. 15, Goering ordered a maxi- started for Operation Sea Lion, an inva- mum effort from his air fleets. They flew AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2008 65 the externally suspended bomb load, she only reached 150 mph when diving,” said German ace , who was no admirer of the Stuka. The RAF laid such punishment on the Stuka that Goering on Aug. 19 withdrew it “until the enemy fighter force has been broken.” The attacks continued relentlessly. On average, the Luftwaffe sent 1,000 airplanes a day, and seldom fewer than 600. On Aug. 30 to 31, more than 1,600 came. The worst day for Fighter Command was Aug. 31 when it lost 39 aircraft and 14 pilots. Most days the Luftwaffe’s losses were even heavier than the RAF’s, but the production of Hurricanes and Spitfires was no longer keeping up with losses, and there were not enough replacements for the experienced Rescue workers search frantically for victims amid the wreckage of a London street during , which began as the Battle of Britain came to an end. pilots who had been killed. Some pilots scrambled six times a with damage or went down in the More than half of the German aircraft day. Civilian teams from Hawker and Channel. The RAF lost 28. Never again destroyed were shot down by Hurricanes. Supermarine joined RAF ground crews, would the Luftwaffe come against Fighter Whenever possible, the RAF had sent working to get damaged Hurricanes and Command in such strength. Spitfires to fight the Bf 109s and used Spitfires ready to fly again. Today, the nation celebrates Sept. 15 Hurricanes against German bombers—but The British people look back on this as “.” the Hurricanes had downed their share of part of the battle as “the desperate days.” fighters, too. Looking back later, Churchill said, “In Losses All Around At the end of the Battle of Britain, the fighting between Aug. 24 and Sept. Both sides gradually came to the Fighter Command had slightly more 6, the scales had tilted against Fighter realization that the Luftwaffe’s attempt airplanes than it did at the start. Surging Command.” to destroy the RAF had failed. On Sept. British industry produced replacements Just as things were looking grim, Hitler 17, Hitler postponed Operation Sea Lion at an encouraging rate. Fighter Command made a critical mistake. He changed Luft- until further notice. This was no doubt a also had more pilots than in July, but had waffe targeting. In August, two German great relief to the German Navy, which taken terrible losses in its most experienced pilots who had flown off course on a night was not prepared to carry out an invasion. airmen. The German aircraft industry was mission dropped their bombs on London. On Oct. 31, the British Defense Com- unable to surge its production, and between The RAF bombed the Berlin suburbs mittee agreed that the danger of invasion August and December 1940, Luftwaffe in reprisal. Germans were shocked and had become “relatively remote.” fighter strength fell by 30 percent and outraged, having been assured by Hitler That date is commemorated as the end bomber strength by 25 percent. and Goering that their capital was safe of the Battle of Britain. Later, in a speech to the Canadian from British bombers. An enraged Hitler However, it was not yet clear to all that Parliament, Churchill recalled Weygand’s on Sept. 5 ordered a change in basic the Luftwaffe had failed. The Nov. 10 Bos- prediction from June 1940 that England strategy, shifting the Luftwaffe’s focus ton Sunday Globe published its version of would “have her neck wrung like a chicken” of attack from British airfields to the city an interview with Kennedy, quoting him as in three weeks. “Some chicken,” Churchill of London. having declared, “Democracy is finished said. “Some neck.” That took the off Fighter Com- in England.” Kennedy denied having said The Battle of Britain was over, but the mand at a critical time. RAF fighter losses it, but the reporter, Louis Lyons, had a sustained bombing of British cities—“the fell below the output of replacements. In witness to back him up. Kennedy was Blitz”—was just beginning. Hitler’s mo- diverting the offensive from the RAF, finished as ambassador and as a player in tives for the Blitz are not clear. It killed the Germans had lost sight of the valid the Roosevelt Administration. He submit- more than 40,000 civilians and destroyed assumption with which they had begun: ted his resignation that month. a vast number of buildings, to no strategic The key objective was destruction of the Both sides had taken heavy losses, al- purpose. RAF. Otherwise, the Sea Lion invasion though claims during the battle of enemy Meanwhile, Berlin turned to a new would not be possible. aircraft shot down were later shown to objective. Hitler in December ordered his The Luftwaffe had one massive shot be excessive. In all, the RAF lost 1,547 forces to prepare for , left. On Sept. 15, Germany threw about airplanes—1,023 from Fighter Command, the invasion and destruction of Russia. 400 bombers and 700 fighters into an 376 from Bomber Command, and 148 from Goering was once again optimistic. The all-out attack on Britain. In the middle of Coastal Command. German losses were Luftwaffe, he promised, would shoot down the afternoon, Park committed the last of even higher—a total of 1,887, of which 650 the Red Air Force “like clay pigeons.” The his reserves. Every airplane that 11 Group were Bf 109s and 223 were Bf 110s. rest is history. ■ could put in the air was engaged. It was enough. RAF pilots shot down John T. Correll was editor in chief of Air Force Magazine for 18 years and is now a 56 Luftwaffe aircraft, and many others contributing editor. His most recent article, “Billy Mitchell and the Battleships,” ap- limped back to their bases in France peared in the June issue. 66 AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2008