Airpower and Ground Armies : Essays on the Evolution of Anglo-American Air Doctrine

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Airpower and Ground Armies : Essays on the Evolution of Anglo-American Air Doctrine Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Airpower and ground armies : essays on the evolution of Anglo-American air doctrine. 1940- 1943/ editor, Daniel R Mortensen. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. Air power-Great Britain-History. 2. Air power-United States-History. 3. World War, 1939-1945- Aerial operations, British, 4. World War, 1939-1945-Aerial operations, American. 5. World War, 1939-1945-Campaigns-Africa, North. 6. Operation Torch. I. Mortensen, Daniel R. UG635.G7A89 1998 358.4’03-dc21 97-46744 CIP Digitize December 2002 from 1998 Printing NOTE: Pagination changed Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. Table of Contents Page DISCLAIMER ..................................................................................................................... i FORWARD........................................................................................................................ iii ABOUT THE EDITOR .......................................................................................................v INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. vi GETTING TOGETHER ......................................................................................................1 Vincent Orange A GLIDER IN THE PROPWASH OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE?...............................30 David R. Mets THE LEGEND OF LAURENCE KUTER........................................................................64 Daniel R. Mortensen PATTON AND WEYLAND...........................................................................................100 David Spires APPENDIX......................................................................................................................108 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................124 ii Forward It was inevitable that the airman’s perspective regarding the employment of airpower in an operational theater would surface in North Africa, the first major American offensive of World War II. The publication of Field Manuals (FM) 31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, and 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, was a manifestation of how airmen looked at the command of airpower, the selection of missions, and the assignment of priorities. The institutionalized conflict between soldiers and airmen over air employment that raised its head in Africa continues, regardless of the recorded combat experiences of, and the individual rapport among, field commanders. North Africa provided a stage to expose these deep-seated conflicting views of airpower. The soldier viewed the war in terms of brigades, divisions, corps, and armies; some saw the application of airpower as being in direct support of their own combat formations. The airman, on the other hand, saw the application of airpower in terms of the entire theater of operations; therefore, he saw it employed in situations and against enemy forces presenting the greatest threat in the theater. The establishment of three priorities for air missions-superiority, interdiction, and close air support- was a focus of his perspective of theater air operations. Historical experience greatly affected the advocacy of this theater-wide operational scheme, particularly the way airpower was initially commanded and employed in North Africa. As commander of the 33d Fighter Group throughout the campaign, I participated in the testing of Air Force doctrine. A number of circumstances suggested that using the African experience as a model for doctrinal change was not appropriate. Among these were insufficient aircraft, lack of replacements, untrained personnel, inadequate all-weather airfields, and a lack of radar with extensive communications systems. Moreover, the command and employment of the available airpower in North Africa was flawed. Like other fighter groups, the fighter group I commanded was committed piecemeal, with insufficient forces. from one mission assignment to another-all with predictable results, including high losses and unsatisfactory effect on the German air and ground forces facing us at that time. The commanding general of II Corps considered the XII Air Support Command part of his command and therefore subject to the mission of II Corps. In addition, the 33d Fighter Group initially provided umbrella cover over the ground commander's deployed troops and directly attacked targets in front of these units. In the north, Royal Air Force (RAF) 242 Group was being employed in the same manner in support of the British army. Between the First Army in the north and II Corps in the south was the French XIX Corps, which considered the 33d as its support group via the XII Air Support Command. No single air command was responsible for gaining air superiority and interdicting German ground forces that were moving into and within the area of combat, even though the XII Bomber Command under Gen James H. “Jimmy” Doolittle was bombing German airfields in North Africa and Italy. Along with an air campaign needing a focus to gain control of the air and interdict the battlefield, there was a need to reorganize the command structure. This need was apparent even iii before Casablanca and the debacle at Kasserine Pass. In addition, with the British Eighth Army and Desert Air Force moving into Tunisia, Allied actions had to be closely coordinated to prevent mutual interference. Even without a Casablanca Conference, a reorganization would have occurred. Although the Casablanca Conference of January 1943 was renowned for the decision made there to continue the daylight bombing of Germany, its effect on the command and employment of theater airpower was even more profound. In essence, the decision to establish a tactical and strategic air force under a single air commander (Northwest African Air Forces under Gen Carl A Spaatz) created a theater command structure with coequal air and ground commanders under Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower. By this arrangement, the air and ground component commanders received equal footing. Previously, tactical airpower was subordinated, thus limiting the ability of XII Air Support Command and RAF 242 Group to influence the determination of theater strategy, the employment of forces, and the assignment of priority in application. It is against this background that the long-standing ideas of airmen brightened, leading to the development and publication of FM 100-20 and, later, to revisions of the basic tactical doctrinal manual (FM 31- 35). These manuals served the purpose, perhaps too shrilly in retrospect, of articulating what airmen believed about airpower and how their perspectives on its use related to the views of ground forces. These manuals continue even today to be the foundation of what airmen believe about airpower and its relationship to the other services in a combat theater. The North Africa experience provided a model for the organization and employment of tactical airpower in subsequent campaigns in Europe, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. In each of these campaigns, planners have continued to refine, expand, and improve the effectiveness of tactical air support for all forces in a theater. The priorities for employment are a function of the most pressing threat and the greatest opportunity for imposing a major effect on the fighting ability of the opposing forces. The flexibility of tactical air (its greatest asset) permits a shifting focus between air superiority, interdiction, and close air support in accordance with the priority established by the overall commander. Differences in opinion on the employment of forces will continue among air, ground, and sea commanders in combat situations. However, when the overall commander in the theater makes a decision on the strategy and priority of operations, the air component commander must and will apply his forces in accordance with that decision. WILLIAM W. MOMYER, Gen, USAF, Retired iv About the Editor Daniel R. Mortensen has been associated with US Air Force history programs since 1978. He is currently affiliated with the Air Staff History Office, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Dr. Mortensen's publications include a US Air Force manuscript on the doctrine and practices of tactical airpower and the US Army Center of Military History's World War II Close Air Support Joint Operations: North Africa. He is a frequent presenter at historical association meetings and has taught numerous classes on the history of airpower. v Introduction Long before the current struggle between the Army and Air Force over the deep attack mission, the services debated employment of air resources. Among the earliest roles and missions issues of the 1930s, the Army argued that ground commanders needed to control air resources for “unity of command” principles. Airmen countered by citing “centralized control” principles. Historians have often suggested that the issue of centralized command was settled by the Battle of Kasserine Pass early in World War II. Continued research has shown that the centralized air command, as well as air superiority, was well established in published doctrine several years before World War II. Nevertheless, Africa was argued to be an effective
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