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Joint Air Power Following the 2016 Warsaw Summit-Urgent Priorities NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED ING TH LOW E 20 OL 16 F W R A E R W S O A W P R I S U A M T M N I I T O J URGENT PRIORITIES PRIORITIES URGENT UR ES GENT PRIORITI JOINT AIR POWER FOLLOWING THE 2016 WARSAW SUMMIT URGENT PRIORITIES Joint Air Power Competence Centre JOINT AIR POWER NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED Joint Air Power Following the 2016 Warsaw Summit – Urgent Priorities An Allied Command Transformation Headquarters Study Conducted by the Joint Air Power Competence Centre NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED Joint Air Power Following the 2016 Warsaw Summit Urgent Priorities An Allied Command Transformation Headquarters Study Conducted by the Joint Air Power Competence Centre NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED © This work is copyrighted. No part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission. Inquiries should be made to: The Editor, Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC), [email protected] Disclaimer This publication is a Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) HQ commis- sioned study conducted by the Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC). All copyright and intellectual property rights reside with HQ ACT, unless otherwise licensed. The views expressed in this work do not necessarily represent the position of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but are offered to foster dialogue and discussion re- garding urgent priorities in the field of air power capabilities and competencies. Though NATO classified documents may have informed the work of the authors, no clas- sified information has been directly quoted in this study, nor were any parts of classified information re-used in any form without prior sanitization. Release This document is approved for public release. Portions of the document may be quoted or reproduced without permission, provided a standard source credit is included. Published and distributed by The Joint Air Power Competence Centre von-Seydlitz-Kaserne Römerstraße 140 47546 Kalkar Germany NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED ‘We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities and competencies necessary to deter and defend against potential adversaries and the full spectrum of threats that could confront the Alliance from any direction.’ NATO Heads of State and Government, 2016 Warsaw Summit Communiqué Foreword NATO is facing an increasingly diverse, unpredictable and demanding security environment, ‘an arc of insecurity and instability along NATO’s periphery and beyond’.1 In recent times this has led to a range of steps by NATO to reinforce its collective defence, enhance its capabilities, and strengthen its resilience. NATO has committed itself to provide its armed forces with sufficient and sustained resources, thereby underlining its stat- ed strategic intent that ‘NATO’s essential mission is unchanged and that NATO will ensure that it has the full range of capabilities necessary to fulfil the whole range of Alliance missions, including to deter and defend against potential adversaries, and the full spectrum of threats that could confront the Alliance from any direction’. NATO’s Joint Air Power forms an essential part of this set of necessary capabilities and competencies. Since the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed an increase in NATO’s use of Joint Air Power, providing NATO and national leaders with a tool of unmatched responsiveness and flexibility. NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED V NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED Despite the strategic and operational importance of Joint Air Power, NATO nations, unfortunately, have drastically reduced their air power ca- pabilities in recent years to the extent that there is a sincere risk that NATO will not have the required Joint Air Power capabilities and competencies to support the whole spectrum of Alliance operations and missions. This existing Joint Air Power problem, in conjunction with the changing inter- national security situation on the periphery of NATO, has reinforced the need for the Alliance and its Member States to urgently address the short- falls in the field of NATO Joint Air Power capabilities and competencies. In 2014, the JAPCC completed the Future Vector Project, identifying viable options and realistic solutions to chart the path to guarantee that both Joint Air Power and assured access to relevant space-based data and in- formation continues to contribute to the success of NATO and its Mem- ber States. Through a series of essays, a team of acknowledged experts in security and defence policy provided an extensive and balanced per- spective including a broad range of recommendations. During the 2014 Wales Summit, Heads of State and Government (HOS / G) stated that ‘… NATO joint air power capabilities require longer-term consideration’. Since then, NATO has taken specific steps to address this issue. One of the steps taken was a specific task to the Strategic Com- mands (SCs), with ACT in the lead, to provide recommendations for a long-term approach that will inform the future development of joint air power while also identifying the medium to long term Joint Air Power capability requirements that could be included in the context of the NATO Defence Planning Process. The Bilateral Strategic Command (BI-SC) final report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (JAPC), encompassing a broad range of recommendations, was presented to NATO in Brussels in December 2015. The report concluded that ‘Joint Air Power will continue to be a vital, often first called upon capability for the Alliance’2 to achieve its desired aims. VI NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED The Warsaw Summit Communiqué is the most current expression by the HOS / G of NATO of key security concerns and focus areas. It re-emphasized the need for the Alliance and its Member States to address shortfalls in essential capabilities and competencies. It is critical not to lose the mo- mentum, and to further bring into focus the essence and intent of both the Communiqué and the outcome of other recent Joint Air Power studies. Therefore, HQ SACT commissioned JAPCC to conduct the study ‘Joint Air Power following the 2016 Warsaw Summit – Urgent Priorities’ to provide a coherent set of urgent strategic, short to medium term priorities in the field of Joint Air Power capabilities and competencies, linked to the main areas of interest and concern as expressed in the 2016 Warsaw Summit Communiqué. This study will contribute to the discussion of required ca- pabilities and competencies as part of the NATO Joint Air Power Strategy currently being drafted under the leadership of ACT. I strongly encourage you to read this publication as it offers ideas and po- tential solutions to enhance NATO’s Joint Air Power. Considering the cur- rent security challenges and threats, it’s now time to act to guarantee that Joint Air Power in NATO is sufficiently available and fit for purpose when most needed in NATO, anywhere, anytime. Joachim Wundrak Lieutenant General, DEU AF / Executive Director, JAPCC / Project Leader Endnotes 1. Warsaw Summit Communiqué, 9 Jul. 2016, para 5. 2. BI-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power capabilities, SH/PLANS/JCAP/FT/15-311417, 7 Dec. 2015. NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED VII NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED Quotes The study shows the crucial importance of NATO Joint Air Power for Deterrence and Defence. Precisely and without any sugar-coating it shows ‘present shortfalls and future requirements. Of special importance are Hybrid Air Threats and Alliance and Partnership cooperation and capability and competency development with immediate attention to enhancing cooperation in the operation domain. Volker Rühe, former German’ Minister of Defence (1992–1998) NATO is currently developing a new Airpower strategy to meet the formidable challenges facing the Alliance in the 21st Century. This important ‘volume will provide vital input for that new NATO strategy. This study recommends multiple ways to improve NATO airpower to strengthen both deterrence and defense of Alliance territory. A must read for all those interested in NATO affairs. Admiral (ret.) James Stavridis, former Supreme’ Allied Commander Europe (2009–2013) NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit took important steps to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence posture against an aggressive Russia. This study ‘highlights the critical role of air power to the credibility of deterrence. It offers timely recommendations on the capabilities and robust command- and-control arrangements needed to ensure NATO air supremacy in the 21st century. Alexander Vershbow, ’ former NATO Deputy Secretary General (2012–2016) VIII NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED In light of the fiscal balance challenges present across the alliance, we must both maximize the interoperability of our people and systems, as well ‘as the integration across the priorities highlighted in this study. As we develop new capabilities to address future challenges, this paper will inform member nations and contribute to the discussions in shaping the refreshed Joint Air Power Strategy. David L. Goldfein, ’ General US AF, Chief of Staff Today’s security situation challenges the air forces across the entire spectrum of their capabilities. Well-equipped, adjustable and interoperable ‘air forces with their particular range, precision and flexibility provide
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