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The greatest lesson of this war has been the extent to which air, land, and sea operations can and must be coordinated by joint planning and unified command. —General Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold Report to the Secretary of War

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CONTENTS

A Word from the Chairman 4 by John M. Shalikashvili

In This Issue 6 by the Editor-in-Chief

Living Jointness 7 by William A. Owens

Taking Stock of the New Joint Age 15 by JFQ

Assessing the Bottom-Up Review 22 by Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

Living Jointness JFQ FORUM Bottom-Up Review

Standing Up JFQ Joint Education Coalitions Theater Missle Vietnam Defense as Military History Standing Up Coalitions Atkinson‘s Crusade

Defense Transportation 25

The Whats and Whys of Coalitions 26 by Anne M. Dixon 94 W93inter Implications for U.N.

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL 29 by John O.B. Sewall PHOTO CREDITS The cover features an Abrams main battle at National Training Center (Military The Cutting Edge of Unified Actions Photography/Greg Stewart). Insets: [top left] 34 by Thomas C. Linn Operation Desert Storm coalition officers reviewing forces in City (DOD), [bottom left] infantrymen fording a stream in Vietnam Preparing Future Coalition Commanders (DOD), [top right] students at the Armed Forces Staff College (DOD), and [bottom right] a test 40 by Terry J. Pudas launch from USS Bunker Hill (U.S. Navy). The front inside cover and cross-over page capture Boeing B–17Gs of the 8th ’s 91st (Heavy)—known as “The Ragged Irregulars”—over England during , Forward Presence, World War II (National Air and Space 47 and the Future Museum/USAF Collection). The background illustration for the table by James P. Stanton of contents depicts a C–5 Galaxy transport during Operation Able Sentry (Combat Camera Imagery/Efrain Gonzalez). Insets [from top A Soldier Is a Soldier left]: 6/502d Infantry arriving in Macedonia by Rosemary Bryant Mariner (Combat Camera Imagery/Efrain Gonzalez), 54 F/A–18 Hornet being readied for takeoff from USS America during Operation Deny Flight (Combat Camera Imagery/Raymond T. Conway), EOD officer putting on parachute (U.S. Navy/Carolyn Harris), Scud missile being recovered during the Persian (U.S. Air Force/Pedro Ybanez), and troopers of the 1st Air Cavalry Division moving into Bong Son District in during Operation White Wing (U.S. Army/Gilbert L. Meyers). The back inside cover shows a Sea King over USS Hammerhead (U.S. Navy/ John K. Sokolowski).

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WINTER 1993–94 / NUMBER 3

Joint Force Quarterly Joint Education: Where Do We Go From Here? A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL 63 by William M. Steele and Robert B. Kupiszewski Editor-in-Chief OUT OF JOINT Stuart E. Johnson Executive Editor Jointness, Service Culture, and the Gulf War Patrick M. Cronin 71 by Bernard E. Trainor Managing Editor Robert A. Silano Associate Editors Reengineering Defense Transportation Martin J. Peters, Jr. 75 by Ronald R. Fogleman Calvin B. Kelley Editorial Assistant Florence P. Williams Theater : 80 A Joint Enterprise Art Direction Typography and Design Division by Dennis McDowell Government Printing Office

The Single Manager Joint Force Quarterly is published by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, 88 for Air in Vietnam National Defense University, to promote by Willard J. Webb understanding of the integrated employ- ment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces. The journal focuses on Of Chiefs and Chairmen: Arthur William Radford joint doctrine, coalition warfare, con- 99 tingency planning, combat operations conducted by the unified commands, and joint force development. FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint warfighting, inter- 100 Letters to the Editor service issues that support jointness, and topics of common interest to the Armed Forces. Please direct manuscripts, letters, THE JOINT WORLD and editorial communications to: Managing Editor 101 Doctrine, Education, and Documentation Joint Force Quarterly National Defense University Fort Lesley J. McNair 108 A Quarterly Review of Joint Literature , D.C. 20319–6000 Commercial Telephone: (202) 475–1013 Defense Switched Network OFF THE SHELF (DSN): 335–1013 FAX: (202) 475–1012 / DSN 335–1012 110 Vietnam as Military History: The opinions, conclusions, and recom- A Book Essay mendations expressed or implied within by Mackubin Thomas Owens are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the De- partment of Defense or any other agency 119 A Reflection on Once...And Young of the Federal Government. Copyrighted by David J. Andre portions of this journal may not be re- produced or extracted without permis- sion of copyright proprietors. An ac- 123 Managing the Schwarzkopf Account: knowledgment to Joint Force Quarterly Atkinson as Crusader—Two Book Reviews should be made whenever material is quoted from or based on its contents. by Paul D. Wolfowitz and Ronald H. Cole This publication has been approved by the Secretary of Defense. POSTSCRIPT January 1994

128 A Note to Readers and Contributors ISSN 1070–0692

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Publisher GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA Chairman of the AWordfrom Chairman of the Advisory Committee LTG Paul G. Cerjan, USA National Defense University am pleased to offer a few thoughts to the Members of the Advisory Committee BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) readers of Joint Force Quarterly in this, the Office of the Chairman Col William R. Donnelly, USMC third issue. JFQ fills a longstanding gap. Marine Corps War College It offers a professional forum to trade Brig Gen Marvin R. Esmond, USAF I Armed Forces Staff College views and opinions, discuss ideas, and edu- Maj Gen John C. Fryer, Jr., USAF cate ourselves on jointness. National War College Brig Gen Hal M. Hornburg, USAF As General Powell did in the inaugural The Joint Staff BG Randolph W. House, USA issue, I invite any and all to participate, to U.S. Army Command and General Staff College submit articles, or at the very least to read VADM R.C. Macke, USN The Joint Staff and mull over what others are thinking. Col Andrew Nichols Pratt, USMC There are no boundaries on who should be Marine Corps Command and Staff College Maj Gen Peter D. Robinson, USAF writing for this journal. Napoleon was a Air War College RADM Jerome F. Smith, Jr., USN young and relatively unseasoned officer Industrial College of the Armed Forces when his brain was forming the electrifying MG William A. Stofft, USA U.S. Army War College ideas that would revolutionize warfare and RADM Joseph C. Strasser, USN overpower nearly every army in Europe. A Naval War College Col John A. Warden III, USAF little over a century later, a young, medically Air Command and Staff College discharged captain named Liddell-Hart was Chairman of the Editorial Board struggling to get Britain’s senior military Stuart E. Johnson Institute for National Strategic Studies leaders to hear his controversial views on Members of the Editorial Board warfare. Unfortunately, his own military Richard K. Betts wouldn’t listen, but its future enemy did. Columbia University Eliot A. Cohen When it comes to good ideas, neither rank The Johns Hopkins University COL Robert A. Doughty, USA nor age confers a monopoly. U.S. Military Academy JFQ is intended to stay at the vanguard, CAPT George L. Drummond, USN to raise and air controversies, to tell us what Armed Forces Staff College The White House LtCol Robert C. Figlock, USMC we don’t understand. Since World War II we Marine Corps War College General John M. Shalikashvili, Aaron L. Friedberg have moved a long way toward jointness. It USA (center), speaking in the Rose Princeton University Garden at the White House, after COL Robert A. Gimbert, USA has been a prolonged march, punctuated by U.S. Army Command and General Staff College occasional disagreements, but ushered by a being nominated to become 13th Alan L. Gropman recognition that unity is dangerous as a bat- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Industrial College of the Armed Forces Staff on August 11, 1993. General COL Peter F. Herrly, USA tlefield advantage over disunited opponents. National War College Shalikashvili is seen (from left to Col Douglas N. Hime, USAF But jointness is not a science, it is surely not right) with General , Naval War College President , Vice President William T. Hodson static, and the march is by no means over. Information Resources Management College We need this journal, we need it to be , and Secretary of Defense COL Richard L. Irby, Jr., USA . U.S. Army War College open-minded, and above all it must be acces- Mark H. Jacobsen sible. When you think back to General Billy Marine Corps Command and Staff College Thomas L. McNaugher Mitchell’s frustrating crusade to educate the Brookings Institution John J. Mearsheimer Armed Forces about the dawn of airpower, University of Chicago General George Marshall’s tireless efforts to Col Philip S. Meilinger, USAF Air Command and Staff College form a unified military establishment, or the LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) more recent efforts by our own Congress—in Hudson Institute Stephen Peter Rosen the face of considerable military stubborn- Harvard University James H. Toner ness—to formulate and pass the Goldwater- Air War College Nichols Act, it only emphasizes why we need LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) Harvard University JFQ. There is always room for improvement LTG C.A.H. Waller, USA (Ret.) and there is a ceaseless challenge to adjust to RKK, Limited new developments.

4 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 the Chairman

In the past four years alone, our Armed At the same time, literally hundreds of Forces participated in 29 major joint opera- possible reforms, criticisms, and suggestions tions. Each and every one are percolating inside the think that when it comes to good has been different. They ring Washington, within our own Congress, ideas, neither rank nor age have ranged from a large- and between ourselves. They need to be ex- scale conventional war in plored, their strengths assessed, and their confers a monopoly the Gulf through the em- warts exposed. We have to distinguish be- bargo pressures we are even tween those worth embracing and those that now applying against the dictators holding are dysfunctional or risky. in their grip. Withal there are countless JFQ must contribute to this exchange new lessons and observations which impact and, based on these first three issues, I think on the future of jointness. we are right on the mark. I encourage both the editors and contributors to keep it up. To those of you who have worked hard to give JFQ this good start, all of us are very appre- General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, assumed his duties as Chairman of ciative. Thank you. the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 25, 1993. He previously served as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and as Commander in Chief, European Command. In the wake of the War he JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI commanded Operation Provide Comfort which aided and relocated Chairman hundreds of thousands of Kurds in northern . of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 5 In This Issue

he readers of this issue of JFQ will of all major conflicts waged in this century, find a diverse range of contribu- including the ; it also promises to be tions, from a critique of the Bot- axiomatic in the dawn of the next century. tom-Up Review to the lessons of The contributions in JFQ Forum focus on T the implications for joint and combined the . But one particular topic that emerges from among the articles, warfare of standing up coalitions. From this namely, coalition warfare, deserves special series of articles a number of pressing con- mention. In the current transitional era—be- cerns come to the fore, among them that: tween the end of the Cold War and an un- ▼ clearly defined national objectives may be certain new world order—the more difficult to reach today, but they are partic- faces the prospect of forging and leading ad ularly vital for coalitions to avoid interest and mis- hoc multinational coalitions to quell re- sion creep (as illustrated by policy on ) ▼ gional unrest abroad and to meet a myriad efforts must be made to improve U.S. par- of other challenges to national security. ticipation in U.N. operations by centralizing DOD support, raising the level of defense advice given Today many people who think or write to the U.S. Mission to the , and about coalitions are of two minds about harmonizing U.S. doctrine with the traditional their utility. One view is that coalitions are tenets of U.N. operations strategic force multipliers, indispensable ve- ▼ joint task forces will form the nuclei of hicles for bolstering both political and mili- international coalitions because the United States tary power. As the support for the Gulf War alone possesses the wherewithal to conduct large- evidenced, multinational coalitions afford scale, unified actions international legitimacy while providing ▼ future coalition commanders must learn enormous resources in human and material to achieve unity of purpose and effort, maximize terms. The other view of coalitions is that interoperability, and minimize the risks to Ameri- they seldom equal the sum of their parts (or, can members of coalitions. more precisely, their partners). Systemic im- Above all, one idea clearly flows from pediments prevent coalitions from achieving the articles in JFQ Forum: whether or not their potential. Napoleon once remarked coalitions are effective largely depends on that “If I must make war, I prefer it to be the strength and capacity of their leaders. As against a coalition” and Churchill mused Eliot Cohen has observed, “only the greatest that “The history of all coalitions is a tale of efforts by statesmen...[can] secure unity the reciprocal complaints of allies.” Such and celerity in a coalition of states.” skepticism on the subject of coalition war- fare is deeply rooted in Western history and STUART E. JOHNSON the profession of arms. Editor-in-Chief Perhaps there is another way to view coalitions that refrains from both undue opti- mism and excessive skepticism, but instead is grounded in an understanding of national limitations. “There is no state so powerful,” said the renowned Swiss jurist Hugo Grotius, “that it may not some time need the help of others outside itself. . . .” This has been true

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USS Iowa firing LIVING 16–inch guns. JOINTNESS U.S. Navy (Jeff Elliott) by WILLIAM A. OWENS

U.S. Navy Summary There are two competing views of jointness in vogue. One is specialization which argues that the services should stick to the roles for which they were established. The other is synergism which holds that military capabilities of various services should be blended in response to a given crisis or contingency. In the former view the capabilities preexist while in the latter they must be cobbled together on an ad hoc basis. Neither view has gained ascendancy thus far, but the Armed Forces must define the practical meaning of joint operations and then adopt it as second nature. The Navy and Marine Corps should embrace synergism because it enshrines enabling, a concept advanced in “. . . From the Sea.” If tested synergism is the most compelling view since it draws on common ground which the services have developed through joint exercises, operations, and war games.

oint operations are taken almost as a Competing Views given in Pentagon pronouncements Beneath these common understandings, and it is virtually impossible to find however, there are at least two competing Janyone who professes to be against views of how different force components them. The unanimity with which they are should be used to increase combat effective- endorsed, however, is not supported by an ness. One view argues in favor of using the in-depth, well-articulated grasp of what joint best qualified force component for a given operations are or how to conduct them. mission which implies that overall combat There are some areas of agreement. By defini- effectiveness can be best enhanced by fit- tion, joint operations involve more than one ting forces to missions for which they are service component, and most professional of- specialized. Let’s call this view the special- ficers would argue, I think, that the funda- ization argument. The other claims that mental reason for having joint operations is higher combat effectiveness is made possi- to increase overall combat effectiveness. ble by combining forces in such a way that

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higher outputs result than could be specialization is to clearly differentiate com- achieved by simply adding the outputs of bat responsibilities along force specialty lines different forces. Let’s call this the synergism and break out missions by service compo- argument. These views don’t really repre- nents while that of synergism is almost the sent two sides of the same jointness coin, opposite, at least with respect to mission as- and accepting one or the other ultimately signments. Specialization takes advantage of leads to differing operational behavior and inherent efficiencies in the integrated tradi- force structures. tions, doctrines, discipline, and procedures Discussions of joint operations often of a single service; synergism blends particu- refer to a toolbox analogy which entails an lar service strengths on a mission basis to admonition to consider all the forces avail- provide higher combat output than either able to a joint commander as if they were any single service or the sum of individual the contents of a toolbox. In this analogy a service contributions could produce. joint force commander can pull the forces Each view leads down a separate path of needed to do the job from the toolbox, re- logic and to a different practical understand- gardless of whether ing of joint operations. Specialization, for ex- the tools bear the ample, ultimately argues in favor of a com- markings of the mand and control system that keeps the Army, Navy, Marine responsibilities and operations of various ser- Corps, or Air Force. vice components distinct and separate. Inter- An advocate of action among service components, according what I called the to this view, should be concerned with main- specialization view taining distinctions and keeping lines of re- of joint operations sponsibility from overlapping, for opera- would say that the tional clarity will keep components from toolbox analogy is getting in each other’s way and allow them exactly right and ex- to carry out their particular specialty with U.S. Army 101st Airborne Division plain that a joint greatest effectiveness. There is synergism also convoy during Desert commander turns to the box and chooses the in this approach, for if each service compo- Storm. right tool for the job. For instance, if required nent meets the demands of its particular mis- to plan and conduct a strategic bombard- sion, the result will be an effective, smoothly ment campaign, the joint commander would conducted war or operation. That is, if Air assign the missions to the force component Force, Navy, and Army components focus on that knows the most about strategic bom- air, sea, and ground campaigns respectively, bardment campaigns—perhaps to the Air the overall operation will benefit. Air Force Force. An advocate of what I termed syner- resources will not be diluted by allocating gism would also say the toolbox analogy was sorties to support Army ground operations, exactly right. But he would explain that a Navy resources will not be stretched between joint commander would put together the providing gunfire support to the ground right tool out of various force components. campaign and destroying an opponent’s Then if a job required strategic bombardment naval forces, and Army resources will not be the air assets available from all services diverted to protect Navy or Air Force bases. Is would be combined in the most productive this an exaggerated extension of the inherent way by a joint commander. logic of this view? Yes. But it is essentially the The operational implications of these logic that girds spirited defenses which each two views, I suggest, vary greatly so far as service makes in justifying its own aircraft, the use of force is concerned. The essence of communications, and logistics systems. The logical extension of synergism gen- erates similar problems of unreasonableness. William A. Owens, USN, has been nomi- When pushed to the extreme, for example, it nated to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of not only erodes individual service traditions, Staff. He has most recently served as Deputy doctrines, and procedures, but ultimately Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare argues in favor of unification and differenti- Requirements and Assessments. Previously he commanded the Sixth Fleet and NATO Naval ating among forces strictly in terms of func- Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe. tional capabilities. However rational such a

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F–117 Stealth Fighter. and in defining where the right balance really lies be- tween specialization and synergism. In short, we must step beyond the idea of joint exercises toward operating jointly on a continual basis. This goal challenges both the current joint command structure and the peacetime activities of all services other than participation in joint exercises. It challenges the existing joint command structure because it argues for creating standing joint Lockheed (Schulzinger and Lombard) commands (as opposed to joint task forces) at the tacti- conclusion might be, of course, going too far cal level, the level of command most often could undercut recruiting, training, and engaged in actual war fighting—that is at preparing men and women who make up the corps, numbered fleet, and numbered air force as suggested by the Canadian experi- force level. Currently joint commands do ence with unification. not extend to this level. While joint task I have exaggerated both arguments to force commands do, they are almost always point out the differences between them. In formed for specific operations. What I am the real world the contrast is not as dra- suggesting here, however, is what might be matic, and as Operation Desert Storm called standing joint force commands at the demonstrated the use of force regional three-star level, maintaining direct we must step beyond the in an actual conflict is likely operational command over units of each ser- idea of joint exercises to involve aspects of special- vice that normally would only be part of an ization and synergism. But it identifiable joint command in a particular toward operating jointly is important to note that two operation or crisis. potentially divergent views of on a continual basis An Interim Understanding joint operations underlie the The practical meaning of jointness is de- discussion. Neither has as yet rived essentially from promoting joint exer- prevailed, though both have legitimate cises and joint operations, and will emerge claims on our understanding of jointness. as operational forces work out the myriad as- This leads me to make two suggestions. pects of what joint operations entail. The Practical Meaning military does not, however, have the luxury My first suggestion is to promote day-to- of not thinking about what joint operations day activities by the forces of all services should be until all the details are worked which will work out a practical balance be- out. We in the Navy, in particular, are in tween the two views of jointness. The Armed need of a non-rhetorical definition of what Forces, in large measure due to the active in- joint operations imply, because we have terest of General Colin Powell in developing committed ourselves to them both in the an in-depth understanding of joint opera- way we expect to use naval forces and in the tions, has come a long way in this regard designing, structuring, and sizing of naval over the last several years. There are more forces for the future. We have stated for- joint exercises being conducted today than at mally in documents such as “. . . From the any other time since the end of World War II. Sea” that the primary role of naval forces is It’s hard to argue, however, that there to “enable joint operations in littoral areas,” will ever be too many. More importantly, I and we have informed Congress and the think we have to go further in trying to work out the practical meaning of jointness

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American people that we will build a Navy planners are wrestling with as the Army de- that is better able to do this. velops its expeditionary force concept and To return to the distinction between the that for the Air Force deals with something two notions of jointness, the Navy ought to long near and dear to air power theorists— line up behind synergism because this view strategic bombardment. is far more compatible with the concept of Building Ground Power enabling. Recognizing changes in the world, and Enabling Joint Operations particularly the likelihood of fighting where Some have argued that enabling is there are no prior overseas deployments, the something temporal in character, referring Army has been developing an understanding primarily to the ability of forward deployed of expeditionary warfare. This is not the U.S. Navy (Franklin P. Call) naval forces to be the first on the scene in a place to discuss the emerging concept in any crisis; and if the crisis cannot be contained, detail,1 but one key aspect is the need for a to secure beach heads and prepare for the ar- sequential, rapid build-up of power in the re- rival of ground and ground-based air power. gion in which conflicts will occur. Briefly, Once accomplished, according to this argu- the Army’s answer to the problem of fielding ment, naval forces fight alongside the other overwhelming, combined arms force rapidly forces and—after the objectives of the opera- in a potentially hostile environment focuses tion are achieved and the ground and on deploying units in a logical sequence; ground-based air power withdraw—cover those arriving early would be charged with the post-conflict period. I think this is an and capable of both preparing for the arrival important part of what the Navy of larger, heavier units logistically and pro- the Air Force and ought to mean by enabling. tecting their arrival. Thus, the Army nor- But there is more to it. I believe mally plans for the early deployment of Army also ought to the concept of enabling ought to ex- units that can protect themselves and pro- add this concept of tend throughout these stages, and vide air and ballistic missile defenses. enabling to their that naval forces ought to operate The sequential approach to the buildup continually with the purpose of aid- of power has long been a central tenant of operations ing and facilitating operations of the the Army view of expeditionary warfare, and other service components that will the Army has long recognized the inherent be involved in conflict. We ought to operate tension between building its strength se- naturally in such a way that we help the quentially and in a defensible manner, and Army do what armies must do, and assist the doing this rapidly. It takes time for units that Air Force in doing what it must do. This does arrive initially to get in place, and the rate at not posit a subordinate or unique role for which following units can arrive and take up naval forces. The Air Force and Army also their places is a function of available lift and ought to add this concept of enabling to reception capabilities. Airlift, the fastest way their operations. And it does not mean the to deliver forces, will always be constrained Navy can or should abandon its classical by the capacity to provide all the things ev- conflict focus on control of the seas, even if eryone wants in the theater of operations the seas are most likely to be the littorals of early. And such constraints delay the rate of the world for the foreseeable future. But, for building ground power. the Navy, it means coming to appreciate the The Navy’s role in assisting the build-up priorities of conflict and peacetime opera- of Army power has traditionally been re- tions from the perspectives of the other ser- flected in terms of how fast weapons and vices and acting accordingly. materiel can be delivered to the intended de- To illustrate this point, I would like to barkation points by sea. But there are other suggest how naval forces could enable some ways in which the Navy can cooperate to in- basic concerns of the Army and Air Force, re- crease the rate of building up Army strength spectively, in littoral warfare. My example abroad. One is to provide or to cooperate in for the Army is taken from what military establishing air defense and ballistic missile defense screens that are a key early step in the Army build-up sequence. Another is to hold up the advance of enemy land forces

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Guided missile USS Kidd.

EP–E3 Orion (center) and EA–3B Skywarriors from Fleet Air. U.S. Navy (Franklin P. Call)

U.S. Navy

by focused surveillance, intelligence, and against it as the first step of a deployment, fires from tactical aircraft, naval guns, and airlifting a land-based system would eat up sea-based missiles, including lift capabilities precisely when competing land attack missiles and seaborne versions of transport demands would be highest. the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). The sea-based system could ease compe- The agility of sea-based systems allows tition for airlift in one of two ways: by pro- them to be deployed in such a way as to pro- viding a defensive umbrella to allow later in- vide for the air and ballistic missile defense of troduction of a land-based system or by any coastal area. Operationally, this can mean obviating the very need to deploy a land extending a defense umbrella over systems based system at all. like the Patriot or Theater High Altitude Area Cooperative Engagement and Defense (THAAD), by protecting areas where Forward Passes land-based air and ballistic missile defense systems are established. In a regional conflict But a more synergistic approach would in which there is a premium on the rapid be to deploy the fire control radar of the land build-up of land-based forces, sea-based the- based system and link them with the Aegis ater defenses could be of particular benefit. missiles off shore. The demanding airlift re- This is because of the airlift required to trans- quirements to establish a land-based ballistic port a land-based defense system. Getting a missile defense system are generated largely THAAD battery in position to protect against by what it takes to transport the missile and missile attacks eats up airlift. And since a re- missile support components of systems like gional commander faced with a possible mis- THAAD. Accordingly, transporting only the sile attack would want to establish a defense

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radar initially would ease that can result from melding this argument the demands on airlift to advanced military technology is an exam- greatly when competi- ple of decisive force, as opposed to over- tion for it would be high. whelming force, since it attains war goals The basic idea would be quickly without annihilating enemy forces. to deploy an air and bal- The potential success of strategic bomb- listic missile defense sys- ing campaigns and validity of the theory tem that could use land- supporting them are contentious, largely be- based radars to detect, cause many consider them an argument for track, and control mis- shifting resources to the Air Force. While I siles from the sea for the believe such concerns are unwarranted, this intercept. is not the occasion to debate them. It is im- Cuing and commu- portant, however, to note three fundamental U.S. Navy (Franklin P. Call) F–16As taking off for nications to support this points about strategic bombardment cam- Iraqi targets. forward pass concept are technically feasible. paigns. First, whether called strategic bom- They would allow land-based acquisition bardment campaigns or not, interest in and fire control radar, perhaps located at the bringing force to bear in the manner of extremities of the land coverage provided is a key and integral part from the sea-based defense system (which is of the U.S. approach to conflict. Second, and a function primarily of the range of fire con- because of this, the issue facing naval forces trol line-of-sight radar aboard the Aegis is not whether strategic bombing theory is ship), to identify the “basket” into which totally correct but the sea-based interceptors would be fired, rather how best to the issue facing and then to assume control of those missiles contribute to success- and direct destruction of incoming ballistic ful strategic bombard- naval forces is missiles or aircraft. In effect, this cooperative ment campaigns. how best to arrangement would extend the range at Third, the answer to contribute to suc- which the sea-based missile launching plat- this question revolves form could destroy ballistic missiles while around how the ser- cessful strategic easing the early demands on airlift, thus al- vices operate together bombardment lowing a more rapid introduction of other in conducting cam- campaigns land and land-based air forces. paigns. Successful strategic bombing Enabling Strategic Bombing campaigns will be the product of joint oper- The concept of strategic bombardment ations—they will not be the purview of a grew out of the search for ways to avoid the single service. bloody horror of ground force attrition war- Moreover, what does it mean to say that fare. In its modern form, it is an intellectu- naval forces ought to enable a strategic ally compelling, well-articulated expression bombing campaign, and in particular what of the difference between decisive and over- should their relationship be with the Air whelming force. That is, one of the argu- Force? The answer in part lies in the keys to a ments running through the growing body of successful strategic bombing campaign. Two literature about strategic bombardment the- of the most important are accurate, timely ory is that it is possible to defeat an oppo- intelligence on an opponent’s operational nent by focusing air power on the com- scheme as well as the key command and con- mand, control, and logistics links between trol nodes and links through which an opera- enemy leaders and their forces. Near simul- tional scheme can be implemented, and a ju- taneous, relatively quick, and sustained de- dicious, efficient use of all the military assets struction of such links, the argument goes, that can attack those potential targets. leads to the disintegration and paralysis of Accurate, timely, and complete intelli- an opponent’s operations. And precision gence is the essential precondition of a suc- guided munitions, coupled with rapid, com- cessful strategic bombardment campaign, for prehensive, systematic, and accurate target if the wrong targets are struck and the nodes acquisition and battle damage assessment make this possible.2 The bombing campaign

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that are truly critical to an opponent’s mili- tary operations are missed, then the tremen- dous potential leverage of precision guided munitions is nullified. As one Air Force man- ual states: “Air power is targeting, and target- ing is intelligence.” Many targets that be- come key to strategic bombing are discernible long before an opponent embarks on aggression. They are embedded in the na- tional infrastructure, and many of them— roads, bridges, and communications towers relied upon to conduct military operations— U.S. Navy (Chad Vann) are truly fixed targets. They don’t change or move during the bombing campaign. But ef- Stealthy B–2 bombers and F–117 attack fective targeting depends on knowing which aircraft are effective, deadly, and efficient as- potential targets are important and where sets. Their stealth enables them to be used in nodes critical to an opponent are when oper- areas where an opponent has heavy anti-air- ations begin. That’s harder. Knowledge de- craft defenses and, since they are highly sur- pends profoundly on surveillance and intelli- vivable, the aircraft and their pilots can be gence generated before a conflict, and on the employed again and again. With precision capacity, once hostilities start, to keep track guided munitions, they can destroy virtually of both efforts to destroy vital nodes and an any target in a single sortie. But their effec- opponent’s efforts to overcome or circum- tiveness is even greater when they are em- vent our bombardment. ployed with diversionary attacks by aircraft No single service can do this alone. The which can be provided by naval forces, when problem is too complex and demanding. It air defenses are suppressed by manned or un- manned assets such as naval attack or elec- - can be done jointly, however, by all force components working together to collect, pro- tronic warfare aircraft and cruise missiles, cess, analyze, and disseminate the necessary when provided with real-time target updat- information. And the contribution of naval ing from naval manned and unmanned air- forces will be essential, for they are the most craft, and when it is necessary to rescue pi- likely to be on the scene providing surveil- lots which in some cases may only be lance and intelligence before, during, and possible by using naval forces in the theater. after strategic bombing campaigns. They can The efficient use of attack assets also do this with a broad range of platforms avail- means that the strategic bombing campaign able to them, from which gather should not be limited by the vagaries of information covertly, to surface platforms weather or by the fact that daylight erodes which gather the entire spectrum of signals the stealth characteristics of aircraft like the intelligence, to aircraft (manned and un- B–2 or F–117. That is, the success of a strate- manned), and to personnel on the ground. gic bombing campaign depends on severing And, tied into the nets through which other many links in an opponent’s command and sources of information flow, they can provide control system more or less simultaneously, on-scene intelligence and assessments which and keeping them severed for an extended are key to effective targeting. period. This simply cannot be done by at- Judicious and efficient use of attack as- tacking only at night and, given that the sets is another necessary component of suc- leverage offered by stealth is greatest at cessful strategic bombardment. Efficiency night, it means other aircraft must conduct stems in part from good targeting—picking the campaign during the day. Against heav- the key targets and destroying them when it ily defended targets the most effective will have the greatest effect. But this also in- weapon in daylight is likely to be the sea- volves getting the destructive output needed based Tomahawk land attack missile. from each of the attack assets committed to Finally, efficient use of attack assets in the campaign. And that is a function of close some cases means that they should not be coordination with supporting and participat- ing forces.

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LIVING JOINTNESS

diverted to air defense missions and that they increase the efficiency by which the Na- their overall efficiency depends on the air tion uses military power. The outstanding defense security. In the aftermath of Desert question is what jointness means in a practi- Storm there was considerable debate over cal sense which can be resolved only though the extent to which naval aviation con- experience—by experimentation, doctrinal tributed to the success of the strategic bom- development, and military exercises. But we bardment campaign against Iraq. A great should not kid ourselves. While the trends deal of the discussion was narrow-minded are favorable, we have a way to go before we because it focused on how many precision can claim to have made the transition from guided munitions were used by Air Force rhetoric to reality insofar as jointness is con- and Navy aircraft respectively, along with cerned. To complete this important transi- similar bean counts which missed the bigger tion we will have to keep pushing, for mak- picture. One reason Air Force tactical fighters ing joint operations second nature to the were so effective in bombing missions, for Armed Forces means continued innovation, instance, was because the Navy controlled probable organizational changes, and a deep the air space over the Gulf. If this had not sense that operating jointly is the way things been the case the Air Force would have had ought to be. JFQ to divert aircraft from striking targets to air defense missions. This is the kind of syner- NOTES gism that often gets overlooked. It is, how- 1 The Army provides ample references. See, for exam- ever, a prime example of how naval aircraft ple, Gordon R. Sullivan, “Moving into the 21st Century: enabled Air Force aircraft to contribute to America’s Army and Modernization,” Military Review, the air campaign in the Persian Gulf War. vol. 73, no. 7 (July 1993), and “Projecting Strategic Land The key to success in strategic bombard- Combat Power,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 1 (Summer ment campaigns is the effective use of preci- 1993). 2 sion guided munitions, which depends in See Buster C. Glossen, “The Impact of Precision Weapons on Air Combat Operations,” Aipower Journal, the first instance on coordinated, focused vol. 7, no. 2 (Summer 1993). surveillance and intelligence. And that is best achieved by blending capabilities from all service components with the special per- spective of national space-based as- the outstanding sets. It means practical, operational links between Air Force assets like question is what Rivet Joint RC–135s that provide jointness means in electronic surveillance and recon- a practical sense naissance with similar platforms pro- vided by naval forces like the EP–3s and ES–3s. Together, these assets can provide a better electronic map of an oppo- nent and his forces than either can do sepa- rately. It also means tying together the tacti- cal assets of two force components. Air Force and Navy manned and unmanned vehicles can provide a far better, more comprehen- sive picture of the campaign than either one operating on its own. This means coordi- nated planning which brings people to- gether in the same way they do for joint war games, seminars, and day-to-day operations by second nature. Which brings me back to the central point. The question of whether joint opera- tions are desirable has been resolved for some time. Everyone agrees that they are here to stay and should stay fundamentally because

14 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 TAKING STOCK Joint Combat Camera Center U.S. Navy (Donald W. Hanselman) OF THE NEW he American military came out of Vietnam demoralized if not broken by the experience. The services all Thad serious problems, including racial friction and drug abuse. Toward the close of the conflict in Indochina the Armed Forces instituted various far-reaching Joint Combat Camera ( H.H. Deffner) U.S. Army changes. Some of them were forced on the services, others were initiated from within the military. These changes included the end of conscription and the introduction of the JOINT ERA All Volunteer Force as well as the Total Force concept, plus a renewed emphasis on profes- By IKE SKELTON sional education for officers. Decline and Rise Summary Change is never easy. The collapse of the Republic of Vietnam in April 1975 ended Events following Vietnam reinvigorated the military and led to the prominence of a long national nightmare. As the military jointness: the end of the draft, the All sought to reconstitute itself from inside out, Volunteer Force, the Total Force, and it also had to deal with a nation that wanted improved military education all helped to to turn away from things military. At the pave the way. The credibility of the Armed same time the Armed Forces confronted con- Forces ebbed with Desert One which tinuing challenges posed by the Warsaw Pact prompted the Reagan administration to while maintaining a substantial force struc- vow to restore American military strength. ture but at the expense of readiness. The Goldwater-Nichols Act redistributed By 1980, however, defense spending was institutional power across the defense simply inadequate. The military had become establishment—under the rubric of a fundamentally hollow, unprepared force jointness—and made possible the unified command structure which performed so with ships that were unable to sail, aircraft effectively in the Gulf War. Jointness was that could not fly, weapons disabled by recently given another boost by the Report shortages of spare parts, personnel unsuited on the Bottom-Up Review. But the force for service in the force, and inadequate oper- structure proposed in the review may not ational training. The tragedy of Desert One, be adequate to cope with simultaneous the unsuccessful attempt to rescue our regional conflicts as envisioned. We must hostages from Teheran that resulted in the not endanger our security in a frenzy of death of eight Marines, symbolized the state cost cutting only to find ourselves faced of disrepair to which the Armed Forces had once again with a hollow force. been reduced in the post-Vietnam period.

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 15 NEW JOINT ERA

When he entered office in 1981, Presi- ground war in South Vietnam, the Navy ran its dent Reagan convinced Congress that de- own air operations over the North as did Air fense cuts in the 1970s under Presidents Force. And while the Air Force ran tactical Nixon, Ford, and Carter had left the Nation aircraft from headquarters in Vietnam, the exposed. The humiliation of holding maintained its own Americans hostage for 444 days, along with chain of command through the Joint Chiefs of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, con- Staff in Washington for B–52 missions against vinced the public that change was required. targets in the North. In other words, opera- Defense spending which increased during tional coordination was a nightmare. Ameri- the final years of the Carter administration can military leaders violated one of the funda- was raised substantially by the incoming mental principles of war, unity of command. Reagan administration. Goldwater-Nichols corrected the prob- lems of Vietnam by strengthening the au- Goldwater-Nichols thority of the theater commander. Thus in Early in the Reagan years other changes the war in the Gulf, affecting the military were also taking place. the Commander in the military buzz Two articles published in 1982—by General Chief of Central Com- David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, word for this mand, General Nor- and by General Edward “Shy” Meyer, Army man Schwarzkopf, ability to fight Chief of Staff—made the same point. The commanded all forces together in a defense establishment was in need of sub- in the theater whether stantial changes to improve the way it did unified fashion Army, Navy, Marine business. So was born what came to be Corps, or Air Force. is jointness known as defense reorganization which cul- The military buzz minated four years later with passage of the word for this ability to fight together in a Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense unified fashion is jointness. Unlike the expe- Reorganization Act of 1986. rience in Vietnam, the effort was coordi- Goldwater-Nichols was fundamentally nated by a single commander in the theater about rearranging power among institutions running the entire show. Goldwater-Nichols within the Department of Defense—namely, made this unity of effort possible. the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, and the unified commands. It Professional Military Education reduced the influence of the service chiefs The House Armed Services Committee and increased the power of the Chairman Panel on Professional Military Education and commanders in chief (CINCs), the com- (PME) was established in the wake of Gold- manders with responsibility for employing water-Nichols 1 and undertook the first com- U.S. forces in given theaters of combat. prehensive review of PME by Congress. Its It also helped simplify the chain of com- charter was to assess the military’s ability to mand. This occurred as a result of the 1983 develop strategists and to review joint educa- House Armed Services Committee investiga- tion requirements under the Goldwater- tion of the bombing of the Marine barracks in Nichols legislation. The panel’s findings ap- Beirut. Among other problems, the committee peared in a 206-page report which had two found fault with a complicated chain of com- major thrusts. One established a conceptual mand. An example of how business was con- model in which each level of schooling ducted before and after Goldwater-Nichols builds on previous levels and each college helps to illustrate this finding. The chain of has a clear, fundamental teaching focus. The command during the Vietnam war was any- other urged resurrecting two joint colleges— thing but clear and simple. While Generals the National War College (NWC) at the se- Westmoreland and later Abrams ran the nior level and the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) at the intermediate level—to the prominence they enjoyed in the early post- The Honorable Ike Skelton has represented World War II period. Under this scheme ’s 4th Congressional District since 1977. A former and state senator, he is chairman of the House Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel.

16 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Skelton

schooling at service colleges would The Navy—regarded as the service tradi- precede joint education. tionally most resistant to change—also re- The principal recommendations sponded to the end of the Cold War and the focused on joint institutions, a pro- Persian Gulf War in dramatic fashion by is- posed National Center for Strategic suing a white paper in 1992, “. . . From the Studies (as a reconstituted NWC was Sea.” 5 The result of a year-long study, it in- referred to) and AFSC. Numerous sug- corporated two assumptions: America and its gestions sought to strengthen these in- allies would control the seas and most future stitutions by combining greater opera- military operations would be joint. This tional competence at the military level strategy symbolized a new way of thinking. with sound, imaginative strategic The focus of future operations shifted from U.S. Air Force thinking at the national level. open seas to coastlines. In concert with the General David C. Jones. Marine Corps, the emphasis on littoral war- End of the Cold War fare marries naval forces and the priorities of The Berlin Wall fell a few months after both services. “The Navy and Marine Corps the House report on military education was will now respond to crises and can provide issued and shortly after that, the Secretary of the initial, ‘enabling’ capability for joint Defense, , and Chairman of the operations....”6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, In many respects the Army instituted a crafted a new “national military strategy” 2 number of far-reaching changes twenty years which envisioned the end of the Cold War. ago. The bitter outcome of Vietnam was re- It differed from Cold War strategy in a num- flected in three crucial decisions which af- ber of ways. First, it envisioned the primary fected this service more than any other: the threat as regional rather than global. Second, end of the draft and beginning of the All Vol- it emphasized conventional forces instead of unteer Force, the creation of the Total Force nuclear weapons. Third, forward presence re- concept, and the establishment of the Train- placed forward deployment as the key to ing and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at protecting U.S. interests around the globe. Fortress Monroe, Virginia. Recruiting high The military would be primarily U.S.-based, school graduates and adequately paying especially the Army and the Air Force. Subse- them built an Army of high-quality people. quently, the Base Force, articulated by DOD, TRADOC yielded great dividends. First-rate spelled out the new military strategy.3 It en- training programs, as symbolized by the Na- visioned a 25 percent reduction in both tional Training Center at Fort Irwin in Cali- forces and funding by the mid-1990s. fornia, and a renewed emphasis on PME Service and Joint Reorganization helped produce combat leaders who had In the midst of these momentous devel- studied war and were well prepared when opments each military department began ef- called to action. Those officers responded forts to reorganize for the future as did DOD magnificently in Panama and in the Gulf as a whole. The Air Force, for one, published with campaign plans that produced quick a white paper entitled “Global Reach, Global victories with few casualties. Although less Power” in 1990, a visionary document which prone to white papers than other services, outlined a strategic planning framework for the Army is indeed undergoing fundamental the post-Cold War world.4 Venerable institu- change as it becomes “A Strategic Force for tions such as the Strategic Air Command, the 21st Century.” The Army is coming Tactical Air Command, and Military Airlift home; it will be primarily based in the Command passed into history. In their place United States rather than forward deployed the Air Combat Command incorporated all as in the Cold War. Substantial force reduc- winged firepower—fighter, bomber, recon- tions have led to inactivating four divisions naissance, command and control, tactical air- and one corps along with consolidating fifty- lift, and rescue—in one organization. The Air one war reserve stocks to five. Mobility Command acquired most mobility As all the services reorganize for the post- and refueling assets: strategic transport, Cold War era, each understands that most fu- tanker, and medical evacuation aircraft. The ture operations will be joint or multiservice. number of major commands was reduced from 13 to 8.

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 17 NEW JOINT ERA

Flight over USS George Washington. U.S. Navy U.S. Navy Marines during Operation Red Reef III in Ecuador. This view was underscored in 1991 by Joint report, improving the way the Armed Forces Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces. fight and saving money in the process.7 The That document and the related effort to de- report noted the dramatic changes that velop joint doctrinal publications will help have taken place already: the creation of the services to work more closely together in Strategic Command, the elimination of nu- a period of declining budgets and force struc- clear weapons in the Army and the Marine ture. Leading thinkers in each service can Corps, and the end of the need to maintain offer their creative talents toward integrating chemical weapons brought about by the the disparate ways the military thinks about signing of the Chemical Weapons Conven- employing forces. The publica- tion in January 1993. The report also high- as all the services tion in 1993 of the first issue of lighted savings from further consolidation reorganize for the post- JFQ was another tangible indica- among the services of depot maintenance tion that jointness had finally and flight training. Cold War era, each come of age. Testifying before the House Armed Ser- understands that most While the services were vices Committee in March 1993, General future operations will busy adjusting to the changed Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, political circumstances in the described the roles and missions report as be multiservice world, the Chairman was also “simply a snapshot of a continuous process busy reviewing defense policy. of self-evaluation that occurs every day. The As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of Joint Staff will continue to examine other 1986, General Powell issued a report on roles, missions, and functions of the services in 1993. Two considerations dominated the

18 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Skelton

areas for possible consolidation or elimina- tion.” 8 The Joint Staff will soon get more help. The DOD Authorization Act for FY 94 included a provision calling for the estab- lishment of a commission on roles and mis- sions of the Armed Forces. It will have seven members appointed by the Secretary of De- fense and will issue a report within a year of its first meeting. Jointness in the Post-Cold War Era In September 1993 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin reported the results of the long- awaited Bottom-Up Review. The review envi- sions a force designed to fight two major re- gional conflicts nearly simultaneously, one that is smaller than the Base the Bottom-Up force Force and appears to cost 10 per- cent less. Overall active duty is underfunded, strength will decline from 1.6 overstretched, and million to 1.4 million. The force DOD (Helene Stikkel) General Colin L. Powell. verging on hollowness level will allow for the perma- nent stationing of 100,000 mili- tary personnel in Europe and cooperation in the field and fleet among 98,000 in the Pacific. To bolster the capabil- each service’s respective combat forces and ity of a smaller force plans to greater attention to matters that concern add airlift and sealift, preposition Army two or more services in the planning, re- equipment in both the Persian Gulf and search, and development phases of the ac- Northeast Asia, develop and procure more quisition process. The former is the primary precision guided weapons (especially anti- responsibility of the CINCs and the latter tank munitions), and improve Reserve com- that of the Joint Chiefs working with the ponent forces. services. Airlift, prepositioning, sealift; com- If truth be told, I have serious reserva- mand, control, communication, and intelli- tions about the Bottom-Up Review. Peace- gence (C3I); space, ballistic missile defense, keeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcement, and advanced munitions are just some of and other peacetime contingencies have in- the cross-cutting issues that must be ad- creased dramatically in the brief period since dressed from a joint perspective early in the end of the Cold War. Such operations planning and R&D. impinge on the military’s ability to carry out the national military strategy to fight two Atlantic Command major regional conflicts. In addition, I ques- The return of units formerly deployed tion that the force described in the review overseas to bases in this country means that can fight two regional conflicts even if all a larger and more important segment of the U.S. involvement in peacekeeping opera- overall defense establishment will be sta- tions was terminated: the overall force is too tioned at home. Except for those forces at- small. The Bottom-Up force is underfunded, tached to Pacific Command, all other forces overstretched, and verging on hollowness in the United States now come under U.S. while a declining defense budget pays for Atlantic Command (ACOM) which was es- nondefense functions such as industrial con- tablished on October 1, 1993. version, drug interdiction, and environmen- This was recommended in the Chair- tal cleanup. man’s 1992 “Report on Roles, Missions, and As the size of the force decreases so does Functions of Armed Forces of the United our margin of error. As a result, the require- States” and is the fourth such effort. There ment for greater jointness increases as a way to compensate for smaller forces. This growth in jointness takes two forms, greater

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 19 NEW JOINT ERA

was Strike Command in 1961, Readiness some of the activities that require joint Command in 1971, and the Rapid Deploy- training exercises among the services. ment Joint Task Force in 1980 (which is now At the same time, regional unified com- Central Command). While service parochial- mands must also conduct joint training ex- ism undermined the first two efforts, ACOM ercises in theater. And forces deployed from should succeed for two reasons: first, Gold- the United States in the future will have to water-Nichols gave unified commanders au- be well grounded in joint warfare fundamen- thority over component commanders which tals and better prepared to conduct combat they previously lacked and, second, since operations on arrival in theater. If we fail to 1986—especially after the Gulf War—joint- train in peacetime we will have to learn in ness has not only become fashionable but wartime at the high price of American lives. has also proven itself. Joint Doctrine, Training, and Education Joint Exercises Each service has come to understand the Prominent among the activities of the importance of doctrine, the prescribed pro- trend toward greater jointness are training cedures and fundamental principles for con- exercises. ACOM is charged with the joint ducting combat operations. The Army estab- training of forces based in the United lished TRADOC twenty-one years ago. In as the importance States. Reductions in forces stationed 1993 the Navy and the Air Force established of joint training abroad makes it crucial that the forces doctrine centers at Norfolk Naval Base and which reinforce regional commanders Langley Air Force Base, respectively. increases, so does arrive fully capable of operating as a As the importance of joint training in- that of joint joint team. The services had five creases in the post-Cold War era, so does doctrine months to prepare for the Gulf War that of joint doctrine. The newly established and we must assume that any poten- Joint Warfighting Center (JWC) will pro- tial opponent learned from that expe- mote both joint doctrine and training. It rience not to give the American military consolidates activities of the Joint Warfare time to prepare for combat. Center at Hurlburt Field, Florida, and the This is not an easy matter to work out. Joint Doctrine Center (JDC) already in Nor- Service expertise comes first. Service person- folk. Situated at Fortress Monroe, Virginia, nel—both officer and enlisted alike—must JWC is responsible to the Chairman through first become skilled as soldiers, sailors, J–7 (Operational Plans and Interoperability). marines, and airmen. Service skills progress ACOM will also play an important role in from the individual to the unit. Much time, evaluating, testing, and sequencing the de- effort, and training is needed to become velopment of joint doctrine by working combat ready, be it an infantry battalion, closely with JWC. ship, or fighter squadron. Finding time for Yet, if current efforts to improve joint both service and joint training is difficult. training and doctrine are to be institutional- Balancing service and joint needs may re- ized and have a permanent impact, more quire emphasis on service training with field needs to be done. At present JDC reviews rec- exercises and joint training with computer- ommendations for joint doctrine but doesn’t aided staff exercises. Advanced simulation formulate it. The time has come to increase technologies now exist that allow service the stature and responsibility of JDC by re- and joint staffs to participate in staff exer- making it into a Joint Doctrine Command cises from remote locations. This will result with a major role in formulating doctrine. in improved joint interoperability. Careful consideration must also be given There is still a requirement to conduct to where JWC is located in the Norfolk area. field exercises for forces that normally do JDC is already there as are TRADOC and the not work together: Army armor units sup- Naval Doctrine Command, ACOM, and porting Marine Corps infantry units, naval AFSC, while the Air Force Doctrine Center is gunfire support for Army forces, Air Force near by at Langley Air Force Base. tankers refueling Navy fighters, Army heli- copters working with Navy ships, and Navy providing to Army and Marine Corps units. These are just

20 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Skelton

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower got it the President, National Defense University, right more than thirty years ago when he need to focus attention on the role of AFSC observed in a message to Congress that: in this whole effort towards greater joint- Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone for- ness. The purpose of the college is to prepare ever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we students for immediate assignment to the will fight in all elements, with all services, as one unified commands or to the Joint Staff. single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparation and AFSC is intended to be a hands-on school, organizational activity must conform to this fact. teaching students to cope with the kinds of Those thoughts of a former President and problems faced in joint assignments. The ab- five-star general should guide both civilian sence of adequate wargaming facilities hin- and military leaders responsible for shaping ders AFSC in accomplishing its mission. the Armed Forces of today for the missions Placing JWC at the college would resolve of tomorrow. JFQ this inadequacy. At the same time, AFSC of- fers JWC a source of expertise for evaluating NOTES and developing joint doctrine. Such a move 1 Panel members included Joseph E. Brennan, George would have a mutually reinforcing effect. Darden, Jack Davis, Jon Kyl, Solomon P. Ortiz, Owen B. In 1923 Major George C. Marshall, the Pickett, John G. Rowland, and Ike Skelton (Chairman). future Army Chief of Staff, described the reg- 2 John M. Collins, National Military Strategy, the DOD ular cycle in the doing and the undoing of Base Force, and U.S. Unified Command Plan: An Assess- ment (Washington: Congressional Research Service, Li- measures for the national defense. He noted brary of Congress, June 11, 1992). in a speech to the Military Schools and Col- 3 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The Base leges Association that “we start in the mak- Force: A Total Force Presentation,” Subcommittee on De- ing of adequate provisions and then turn fense, House Appropriations Committee (September 25, abruptly in the opposite direction and abol- 1991). 4 Department of the Air Force, “The Air Force and U.S. ish what has just been done.” Today we are National Security Policy: Global Reach-Global Power” in the midst of making one of those changes (June 1990). in direction. 5 Department of the Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps, World conditions have changed. Both “. . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the st forces and defense budgets should be re- 21 Century” (1992), p. 12. 6 Ibid., p. 2. duced. But President Clinton remarked at 7 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Report on West Point in May 1993 that while “(de- the Roles, Mission, and Functions of the Armed Forces fense) budget cuts...at the end of the Cold of the United States” (February 1993). War were necessary . . . there is a limit be- 8 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, statement be- yond which we must not go.” 9 He under- fore the Committee of Armed Service, House of Repre- sentatives (February 1993), p. 10. scored that concern in an interview on the 9 Bill Clinton, remarks at the U.S. Military Academy same occasion indicating that he wanted “to commencement ceremony at West Point, send a cautionary note to the House and (May 23, 1993), in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Senate...that we have cut all we should Documents, vol. 29, no. 22 (June 7, 1993), p. 997. 10 right now.” 10 , May 30, 1993, p. A6. The challenge now is to reduce the size of our military without putting our national se- curity at risk. There are still threats to Ameri- can interests in the world that cannot be ig- nored. Military power still counts in the late twentieth century and will in the twenty-first as well. The United States must maintain a ready, modern, and sufficiently powerful mili- tary to meet any contingency. As the military gets smaller, the necessity for the services to fight as an integrated force increases.

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 21 F–16 Falcon from the 187th Fighter Group in Tandem Thrust ’93. commentary U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis)

Assessing the Bottom-Up Review By ANDREW F.KREPINEVICH, JR.

TRAP team aboard USS Austin training to rescue airmen during covert operations.

U.S. Navy (Johnny Bivera)

22 Krepinevich

he recent Bottom-Up Review of to exploit this situation by initiating aggres- defense requirements for the sion in another region of the world. Nor did post-Cold War era offers us an in- Moscow pressure one of its client states to T surance policy to minimize secu- do so. rity risks to the United States. Like other in- Furthermore, while force is important in surance policies it is accompanied by a deterring aggression, the Nation’s political blizzard of data, underwritten by the best leaders can play a crucial if not decisive role minds in the field, and brings with it a hefty in deterrence. The Korean and Gulf Wars price tag at $1.2 trillion for five years of cov- themselves might have been averted alto- erage. While it has attractive features, overall gether had the United States clearly stated its the plan offers insurance we intention to fight in the event of aggression. probably do not need, at a cost One should recall Dean Acheson’s speech in the Clinton defense budget which he placed outside of the likely can’t afford. Equally dis- U.S. security perimeter in the Far East, and turbing, it may not insure us the ambiguous message transmitted by against the security challenges Washington to on the eve that we are most likely to face of his . Force is no substi- beyond the five-year coverage tute for a clear sense of national interests and U.S. Army (Jesse Seigal) period. a strategy to preserve them. For deterrence to 1st Cavalry Division We buy insurance to cover work, our resolve must be both clearly com- troopers during risks. Against what risks is this new plan de- municated and credible. Unfortunately, the infantry training. signed to insure? This is difficult to discern current administration’s track record thus far since the administration has yet to reveal its in crises such as Bosnia and Somalia leaves a national security strategy. In the absence of good deal of room for improvement. that guidance, the review assumes the United In any event, given President Clinton’s States must be able to act unilaterally in fight- early focus on peacekeeping, peacemaking, ing and quickly winning two nearly simulta- nation building, and humanitarian assis- neous major regional conflicts (for planning tance operations, meeting two regional con- purposes, another Gulf War and a war on the tingency requirements Korean peninsula). It argues that, in the event may prove to be an the review we deploy forces to fight in one region, an- elusive goal, especially asserts that U.S. other hostile state might initiate aggression considering shortfalls forces must be elsewhere if we are unprepared to fight and in strategic airlift. Pre- quickly win there as well. Interestingly, this sumably, part of the sized and planning requirement was originally estab- requisite combat capa- structured to act lished during the Bush administration. bility could be made unilaterally Insuring quick success in two simultane- up by our allies. But ous regional wars is expensive. But what are the review asserts that the odds of such an event occurring? Since U.S. forces must be sized and structured to America became an active global power fol- act unilaterally. In some ways that begs the lowing World War II, it has fought regional question of what constitutes President Clin- wars in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian ton’s national security strategy. Are we buy- Gulf. The United States committed the ma- ing an insurance policy to meet the Pen- jority of its combat power to each of these tagon’s regional contingencies? To meet the contingencies, a point worth noting since administration’s peacemaking objectives? the was the other major re- The review concluded that we will not have gional contingency during two of the con- the forces to conduct operations in places flicts. Yet the Soviet Union never attempted such as Somalia and Bosnia and, at the same time, meet the regional conflict contingency requirements. More worrisome, amid debate over Colonel Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., short-term requirements we run the great risk USA (Ret.), is director of the Defense Budget of failing to realize that unlike the Cold War Project, a Washington-based, nonprofit research organization. He is the author of The Army and the greatest challenges to our security lie be- Vietnam (reviewed in this issue of JFQ). yond the review’s five-year coverage period.

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 23 BOTTOM-UP REVIEW

It is in the so-called out years that we will target mandated by Clinton over the Bush likely face the consequences of military tech- plan. And with Congress rejecting the ad- nology diffusion and weapons prolifera- ministration’s call for a one-year freeze on tion—including those of mass destruction— military pay, the Pentagon is very likely to in the Third World, and possibly a new great be more than $30 billion short. Moreover, power challenge. Secretary of Defense Aspin the ends-means gap is likely to widen over himself cited these two challenges in identi- the next five years unless military operations fying his “four dangers” to U.S. security. and support accounts are reduced substan- But with a few notable exceptions—the- tially more than in past efforts. ater ballistic missile defenses, for one—the A force structure that is too big for the review is focused on near-term threats. Why budget may suffer in numerous ways. Si- does the review accord relatively little em- phoning money from research and develop- phasis to longer term dangers? If (more ment can beggar capabilities and our insur- likely when) Third World countries ance against long-term acquire nuclear weapons, late- the ends-means gap risks, cutting operations model cruise and ballistic missiles, is likely to widen over and maintenance can and access to photography, erode readiness, and re-

commentary the Armed Forces will have to oper- the next five years ducing procurement can ate in very different ways to retain lead to a lag in modern- the freedom of action—and success—that ization and eventually to a procurement bal- they enjoyed in the past. Yet the review calls loon payment in the out years when equip- for a force for the next century that is essen- ment must be replaced. In essence, we are tially a slimmed-down version of the Bush mortgaging our future security. When we administration’s base force which was may need insurance most, we could well be crafted when the Soviet Union existed. This financially strapped by an insurance plan is hardly surprising since the review that has expired. wargamed U.S. forces fighting the kind of It also makes sense to take out a group tank-heavy forces that characterized the insurance policy against common risks and Cold War. In a sense, the military is thereby reduce individual premiums. The falling into the same trap as other Bottom-Up Review presumes that the Armed successful military organiza- Forces must be prepared to act alone in re- Report on the tions: it is preparing to gional conflicts. But it seems reasonable to Bottom-Up Review fight the last war better assume that regional states that are most instead of the next war. threatened would join us to defend them- For an account of the method- Furthermore, history selves. It is also encouraging that in many rarely presents cases where one areas of potential instability our prospective ology used to develop the military organization has domi- allies are wealthier than our potential adver- force structure options ana- nated for a protracted period. Typ- saries, and they can well afford to pay their lyzed in the Bottom-Up Re- ically another challenger (or coali- share of the premiums to insure against risks tion) arises relatively quickly. If to our common interests. view, see the special summary the United States dissuades or de- The Aspin team must be commended for of the Report on the Bottom- ters the rise of a major chal- providing a point of departure for a long over- Up Review in The Joint World lenger—and the prospect of an- due debate over defense needs. But we can’t other arms race—it will be due in afford a rich man’s approach when purchasing on pages 103–09 of this issue large part to an effective, long- insurance for defense. Nor are we likely to be of JFQ. term national security strategy and able to buy our way out of future mistakes as the force structure to support it. easily or as painlessly as in the past. JFQ Unfortunately, that is not the kind of insurance policy the Pentagon is propos- ing. The Clinton budget cannot pay the pre- mium on this five-year, short-term insurance policy. Secretary Aspin admitted to being $13 billion short of the $104 billion savings

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JFQ FORUM: Standing Up Coalitions DOD

ince the end of the Persian Gulf War—if not the Cold War—coalition warfare has become a catchword. SPundits and practitioners alike support the notion of harnessing multinational forces to respond to regional contingencies. But few have clearly outlined the terms of coalition warfare, and detailed doctrine has yet to be articulated. The four articles which comprise JFQ Forum do not proffer a ready-made formula for conducting coalition war, but they do provide a basis for mulling a wide range of issues on joint and combined task forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The first article reminds us that coalitions often lead decision- makers to lose sight of national interests and enlarge military mis- sions; it also spells out guidelines for balancing the advantages of combined versus unilateral control of forces. The second suggests ways to minimize the existing tensions between U.S. and U.N. military culture. Then a third article reviews some of the salient aspects of forming joint and combined task forces. And a final piece rehearses recognized principles for planning and executing coalition warfare that may benefit future coalition commanders.

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JFQ▼ FORUM THE WHATS AND WHYS OF COALITIONS By ANNE M. DIXON

he rules of the coalition game ▼ Americans believed in Cold War ortho- have changed. The high hopes for doxy, and since the United States had deep pock- multinational coalitions as re- ets its leaders had the leave of the people to use Tsponses to crises in the wake of national treasure to project ideals abroad. Operation Desert Storm are threatened by These Realities Died Along with disillusionment and disorientation. Sud- the Cold War denly problems of interest creep and mission But to a large extent we still want to plan creep have arisen.1 We do not seem capable for coalitions and to sometimes, at least, set of containing political interests and military our objectives according to the old rules even objectives any longer. though we know the rules have changed and It has now become commonplace to say as much while discussing the problems of view Desert Storm as a post-Cold War excep- U.N. incrementalism. tion that proves the new post-Cold War rule. Interest creep, mission creep, and incre- We have even surveyed the world and de- mentalism—these phrases describe real diffi- scribed the kind of situation that will be the culties, but they are not post-Cold War co- rule: internal conflicts involving breakdowns nundrums. We’ve seen them before in of civil order. But we have not looked at how Vietnam and . Our preoccupation the rules for our proposed response to these with them suggests a larger sense of loss of situations—multinational coalitions—have control, of unclear goals. But do these seem- changed. Nor have we thought about the ingly prevalent problems in post-Cold War, implications of these changes in setting U.N.-sponsored coalitions have solutions? American political and military objectives. To better understand these problems, we Let’s first review the old rules. need to explore two important questions: ▼ America was the head honcho—and set Why do we hold onto the the agenda which others followed. old set of rules (with some ▼ The West accepted the U.S. lead because we prefer modifications)? How can of a shared vision. the old rules ▼ holding onto them frustrate America did the big ones—from Korea to because we Kuwait—which were the real coalition wars and our efforts to define viable, the United Nations got smaller countries to do limited objectives for in- liked calling the noncombat peacekeeping operations. volvement with coalitions? the shots ▼ In American-led coalitions, the U.N. role Examining these questions was limited to providing the seal of legitimacy. will not yield clear-cut an- ▼ U.S.-led military coalitions were against swers to the dilemmas confronted in Bosnia, clear adversaries. Somalia, or Haiti. But it will provide insights ▼ Soviet vetoes in the Security Council lim- into implications for setting political and ited what the United Nations did and where. military objectives as well as into the prospects for the kind of coalitions currently envisioned. The Old Rules Anne M. Dixon is an analyst with the Center for First, we prefer the old rules because we Naval Analyses where she is engaged in studies liked calling the shots. We set overall coali- on defense conversion, naval cooperation in the tion objectives or at least sat at the head of Mediterranean, aid to Russia, and U.S. military the table. Thus national goals coalesced with intervention.

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Dixon

coalition goals. Furthermore, because we it took a lot of work to build a Cold War vi- provided and controlled most coalition forces, sion, to create institutions and processes that we could tailor missions to our political ob- buttressed it. Now that the foundation upon jectives, or reevaluate the ends if the avail- which that vision rested—the able military means seemed insufficient or bipolar world—is gone, we when things ill-suited. Because we could be vigilant about are trying to simply slide a get dicey, both political ends and military missions, looser foundation, the new our partners any interest or mission creep would have international order, under- been of our own making. neath the old buttresses. But expect the Second, the old script for coalition war- the result is shaky: there is U.S. cavalry fare was relatively simple. There was an no new shared orthodoxy to ride over identified villain, like Saddam Hussein in the built upon this less firm Gulf War. For the most part, U.S. forces foundation. played the role they knew best, a combat Since most of us recog- role. And when the enemy was beaten in the nize this deficiency, we and field we knew who had won. This is the the- our former Cold War allies tinker a bit with ater that grabs and holds public attention. the ideals of the old vision and make a few modifications to fit the new world in which we want to live. This is our dream of a world of cooperation, of burden-sharing, of a com- bined police force rather than a world police- man.2 Like jointness,3 combinedness is a peacetime ideal that tells us we can’t invest as much in force structure as we did in the past, but working together perhaps it won’t be necessary. The world is less dangerous: there may be ugly scraps, but no Evil Empire. Past and Future How does holding onto the modified past affect how we choose our objectives? How can it result in interest or mission creep? First, the Washington foreign policy establishment still wants to lead. It’s like having a leadership reflex, and it will make

Joint Combat Camera Center ( Melvin C. Farrington) choosing our battles harder in a world where U.S. and Korean choice is less clear-cut. Although few con- s marines during Team flicts pose direct threats to U.S. security, By contrast, post-Cold War peace-en- Spirit ’93. there are a lot of troubles in the world with forcers can’t demonize one of the parties to strong moral appeal. And many voices will an internal conflict. For starters, taking sides call out to us for help including some Ameri- is now seen as a violation of the internal po- cans who are linked by satellite to countless litical process of the conflict-torn country tragedies. Ironically, some may pine for the which is to be restored with the resolution old constraints of a bipolar world and Soviet of the conflict. Furthermore, more inclusive vetoes in the U.N. Security Council. post-Cold War coalitions are likely to have Second, it is unlikely our coalition part- partners who differ in their sympathies for ners and the United Nations will allow us to the parties to a conflict. Choosing a side lead in the old-fashioned way. But they too may mean turning one part of the coalition are used to our leadership; many Europeans against another. admit they await an American initiative on Third, we see the past as a system that Bosnia, despite the talk about European solu- worked. We won the Cold War, after all. And tions to European problems including some outside Europe’s borders. And, when things get dicey in ongoing operations, our partners

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JFQ▼ FORUM expect the U.S. cavalry to ride over the hill. Such costly dilemmas may engender not Their reflexes complement our own. only case-by-case popular rejection of new Third, we are bio-engineering a hybrid types of coalitions but opposition to them in type of coalition which blends the two tradi- principle. And the aversion to global com- tional varieties of multinational coalitions: binedness would not be confined to Amer- peacekeeping operations and coalition war- ica. People in other societies would respond fare. But we are not observing this process in similar ways. with the scientific detachment of Mendel: So what does this mean for coalitions? we are the hybrid. The American military Remember, all wars—even tribal wars—are knows the characteristics of coalition war- made up of coalitions of directly interested fare better than it knows the traits of a pure groups. So the reaction to failed global com- blue-helmeted force. These traits are better- binedness would not mean a rejection of understood by the United Nations and its coalitions. But it would mean that coalitions smaller members. So the hybridization is not would look different from what we expect at complete. present. The new coalitions might be more: Incomplete integration means partial un- ▼ situation-specific, with objectives tailored derstanding. We probably see the risks and to a conflict rather than to broad global norms costs of fighting more clearly (although we ▼ regionally-based, as most countries di- have lessons to learn when it comes to urban rectly interested are likely to be proximate guerrilla warfare) while others will be better pre- ▼ ad hoc, not within an existing frame- pared for long-term peacekeeping operations. work—though U.N. legitimacy might be sought. Almost 1,500 troops are assigned to the U.N. Would this spell an end to the pursuit of Peacekeeping Force in (UNFICYP), moral and humanitarian objectives? Proba- which has been there since 1964, and some bly not, for it is too natural a trend to only 5,200 troops make up the U.N. Interim Force in be pushed or stalled at the margins. What it Lebanon (UNIFIL), which was formed in 1978. may mean is more of a free market approach So hybrid coalitions may have shorter life spans which seems slower and more uneven, but than peacekeeping operations. Some are appre- which may be more enduring and effective hensive about the magnitude of forces which as a means of response. For political deci- coalitions might eventually require. The bot- sionmakers and military planners it may tom line is that both interest and mission creep mean that future coalitions could be very are likely due to a poor understanding of what different from what we now expect. JFQ is needed to achieve objectives. Finally, military planning does not fit the NOTES new idea of coalition operations. Conditions 1 Interest creep describes situations in which original for committing forces include limited objec- national interests in resolving a crisis or conflict—that tives with clear exit strategies based on an at- determine political objectives or the ends sought by tainable notion of victory, overwhelming or American leaders—widen in the absence of conscious 4 decisionmaking. This can happen in coalitions when decisive force, and a clear U.S. interest. U.S. objectives fall short of those of our coalition part- The criteria will be hard to pin down. But ners or of the United Nations. Mission creep is its mili- the Armed Forces, Congress, and the Ameri- tary counterpart and occurs when the Armed Forces can people still expect them to be met. Ini- take on broader missions than initially planned. tially supportive public opinion could prove 2 This might imply that strengthening the United Nations as a world police headquarters could become an fickle as the cost of operations rises above ex- interest in and of itself, with all manner of possibilities pected levels. When no longer trans- for interest creep. mit images of our troops helping hungry peo- 3 See “By Our Orthodoxies Shall Ye Know Us,” Joint ple but instead show American casualties, this Force Quarterly, no. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 108–10. reversal will limit involvement. On the other 4 As found in former Secretary of Defense ’s “six major tests” for using U.S. forces hand, leaders will have no victory to declare abroad in combat. and no compelling justification to commit re- sources if we leave too soon and a pasted-to- gether situation unravels again.

28 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 JFQ▼ FORUM

Security police patrolling the U.N. facility at Camp Pleso in .

Implications for Joint Combat Camera Center (James Bowman) U.N. PEACEKEEPING By JOHN O.B. SEWALL

he Clinton administration is cur- U.N. operations in Somalia and prospective rently in the process of determin- plans for Bosnia-Herzegovina. ing what role the United Nations This article does not predict, nor depend Twill play in achieving U.S. national on, the ultimate PDD. Whether the United interests, and how that role relates to multi- States elects to participate exclusively in lateralism. A Presidential Decision Directive peacekeeping observer missions, as in the (PDD) on multilateral peace operations has past, or moves more forcefully by putting lo- not yet appeared, and the document will un- gistic or combat units under U.N. opera- doubtedly be influenced by current U.S. and tional control in peace-enforcement or peace-building operations remains to be seen. The proposals contained herein are de- signed to better support the United Nations, Major General John O.B. Sewall, USA (Ret.), is a whatever the mission or degree of participa- senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic tion. The focus will be on organizational Studies at the National Defense University. support, the enduring definitional problems Previously he served as Vice Director, Strategic associated with peace operations, and the Plans and Policy (J–5), on the Joint Staff. importance of doctrinal harmonization.

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 29 JFQ▼ FORUM fected, on the one hand, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Department of State as well as the United Nations and, on the other, with combatant CINCs. While the precise role of regional CINCs will de- pend on the nature and scale of U.S. in- volvement, the time has come for a central- ized Joint Staff role. In this regard, J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy) on the Joint Staff has an authorized U.N. Division with 7 professionals, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans on the Army Staff—the executive agency—is in the game with 13 professionals in the U.S. Military Observer Group, Washington Branch. My point here is not to propose a precise orga-

Joint Combat Camera Center (Ken Wright) nization, but rather to promote centraliza- Peacekeepers passing tion and rationalization across the Joint through the gates of Organizational Support Camp Pleso, . Staff and service staffs in order to better As long as American participation in plan and execute joint peace operations. U.N. operations was limited to observers— Like U.N. Headquarters itself, which is such as those with the U.N. Truce Supervi- undergoing reorganization and professional- sion Organization (UNTSO) observers in ization, the U.S. Mission to the United Na- , , Syria, and Lebanon—it was ap- tions (USUN) must shake loose from its Cold propriate that support of U.N. observers re- War moorings and restructure for more mus- side in a DOD executive agent. The limited cular U.N. operations. The lack of a defense number of observers and preponderance of advisor’s office which reports to and pro- ground force personnel clearly supported vides the best possible military advice to the designating the Department of the Army as ambassador reflects both the historic tie to the agent. In fact, the Army has steadily im- the moribund Military Staff Committee and proved its support role in terms of planning, to the traditional U.N. peacekeeping culture, personnel acquisition, area-specific pre-de- that is, impartial, nonprovocative, minimum ployment training, and liaison with U.N. force levels operating with restrictive rules of Headquarters in New York. engagement. Nonetheless, while giving credit to the USUN does not have an integrated de- Army, times have changed and a reexamina- fense advisor’s office, but instead has a lim- tion of how DOD organizes to support U.N. ited military advisor’s office with a colonel operations is required. We are and two enlisted members, augmented by U.N. support matters moving into multiservice or two other military professionals. Out of the should logically reside joint operations in support of, USUN strength of 75 professional and sup- or under actual operational con- with the Joint Staff and port personnel, the military advisor’s office trol of, the United Nations. So- has only 7 percent of the assets available to with combatant CINCs malia exemplifies the latter and the ambassador. In fact, the assigned colonel Sharp Guard in the Adriatic, is a J-5 asset who, among other duties, is des- Provide Comfort in northern ignated as U.S. Representative to the Military Iraq, Southern Watch over southern Iraq, Staff Committee. As a result there is pre- and Deny Flight in Bosnia attest to the fact dictable competition between J-5 taskings that U.N. operations and American partici- emanating from the Joint Staff in the Pen- pation in them are now a joint enterprise for tagon and the needs of the ambassador and the Armed Forces. her deputies in New York. This would suggest that U.N. support It is helpful to compare USUN with the matters should logically reside with the U.S. Mission to NATO (USNATO). This is Joint Staff where coordination is best ef- not to suggest replicating the organization of NATO Headquarters in at U.N. Headquarters in New York. But the relative

30 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Sewall

Bottom, at the Pentagon, and within the White House. Sec- ond, a more robust defense advisor’s office would be bet- ter suited to deal with de- ployment, force structure, lo- gistics, and cost estimates for USUN and the U.N. Secre- tariat. A better in-house capa- bility would obviate a lot of current TDY presence in New York, to include the J-5, who is better situated in Washing- ton to work problems from inside the Pentagon. Finally, and perhaps more symboli- cally than substantively, a ro- bust defense advisor’s office Boarding officer from with a general or flag officer USS Normandy inspecting Bulgarian would project a more serious ship during Operation image of American interest Sharp Guard in the in the United Nations as a Adriatic. vehicle for meeting our secu- rity interests. Joint Combat Camera Center ( David W. Hanselman) The organizational refine- ments addressed above pre- scale of effort and resources suggests that suppose a better interagency process to de- we do not have it quite right on the East velop and refine American policy. The fact River. Excluding administrative staff, half of that humanitarian and peace-building opera- the 92 professional and support personnel tions do not comprise just U.N. civilian and in the U.S. mission in Brussels work in the military personnel but nongovernmental or- defense advisor’s office. Thus, whereas US- ganizations (NGOs) and private voluntary or- NATO has a defense advisor’s office of 30 ganizations (PVOs) as well suggests a complex professional and 17 support staff members, process of consultation and coordination USUN has a military advisor’s with a stronger National Security Council not that long ago the office with only 3 professional Staff focal point. There are indications that United States and NATO and support staff members. point to just such an improved process com- The ability to provide appro- ing out of the yet to be published PDD. used peacemaking and priate defense advice is un- Whether this administration realignment will peace-enforcement doubtedly a reflection of this be matched by Congress remains to be seen. allocation of resources. almost interchangeably Definitional Problems Again, this is not to sug- Although both the defense establishment gest a particular organization and international security community have to solve perceived problems at USUN in New moved beyond the generic term peacekeeping York. Whether or not the PDD in fact en- to more sophisticated terminology, there are dorses what our ambassador, Madeleine Al- still definitional problems between Pentagon bright, calls assertive multilateralism—imply- (Joint Pub 3–0) and U.N. (An Agenda for Peace) ing selective participation in more muscular usage—not to mention in the press. For exam- peace operations—remains to be seen. In ple, the term peacemaking has achieved com- any event, some broad conclusions seem to mon understanding in both Secretary General be emerging. Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace and Joint First, an integrated defense advisor’s of- Pub 3–0. It is understood to mean a diplomatic fice would provide the ambassador better military advice so that New York would have greater weight in developing policy in Foggy

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 31 JFQ▼ FORUM sponds to aggravated peacekeeping in Joint Pub 3–0. Unfortunately the problem is com- pounded in Joint Pub 3–0 by using peace operations to mean, among other things, tra- ditional peacekeeping, aggravated peace- keeping, and low-intensity—but not high- intensity—peace-enforcement; however, peace-building, a U.N. term, is not included. This discussion shows that there is still considerable terminological confusion among the United States, United Nations, Joint Combat Camera Center (Marv Lynchard) and NATO. It is beyond the scope of this ar- Pakistanis boarding an Air Force C–130 ticle to solve the debate over terminology. for Somalia. Nonetheless, as a rule, it seems logical to take the lead from the United Nations as the world organization involved in peace opera- process in the main, es- tions. Hence all regional organizations al- sentially through such luded to in chapter VIII—for example, peaceful means as enu- NATO, the Conference on Security and Co- merated in chapter VI of operation in Europe, and Western European the U.N. Charter. But it Union—and individual nations should was not that long ago adopt similar or at least complementary that the United States rather than competitive usage. and NATO used peace- making and peace-enforce- Doctrinal Harmonization ment almost interchange- As with terminology there is a corre- ably, a confusion which sponding debate over the doctrinal under- continues to exist in both pinning of peace operations. Doctrine is Joint Combat Camera Center (Efrain Gonzalez) Laying concertina wire the media and public more important and pervasive in its impact in Macedonia during speeches. on how nations undertake a specific mission Operation Able Sentry. Peace-enforcement is another term with than terminology. Cross referencing appro- multiple interpretations. In An Agenda for priate dictionaries, although perhaps not the Peace Boutros-Ghali uses peace-enforcement best approach, can solve terminological prob- in a specific sense—that is, in cases where an lems. Doctrine, however, sets the framework established cease-fire has been agreed to, but for how a coalition will conduct operations not complied with, and peace-enforcement to achieve the objectives of a U.N. mandate. units are called in to restore and maintain Doctrine, in effect, is the capstone from the cease-fire. But peace-enforcement as used which organization, equipment, training, ex- in Joint Pub 3–0 describes a chapter VII re- ercises, and rules of engagement are derived. sponse to breaches of the peace or acts of ag- The problem, in brief, is that the United gression such as that authorized by U.N. Se- Nations has grown comfortable with tradi- curity Council Resolution 678 during Desert tional peacekeeping doctrine, emphasizing Shield/Desert Storm. Similar military action low force levels, restrictive rules of engage- in An Agenda for Peace is described as “mili- ment, use of force only in self defense, com- tary action to maintain or restore interna- promise, and impartiality. Peace operations, tional peace and security” under article 42 of however, as exemplified in Somalia and chapter VII, using forces preferably provided Bosnia, have moved far beyond traditional under article 43, and under the strategic di- peacekeeping to something short of a chap- rection of the Military Staff Committee ter VII response and clearly require a doctri- under article 47. Boutros-Ghali’s use of nal basis different from that used in Desert peace-enforcement as found above corre- Storm (namely, massive firepower and over- whelming force). Traditional peacekeeping is fairly well documented in U.N. publications and the Scandinavian regional training

32 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Sewall

schools, but the same is not true for the grey ticipated peace operations in Bosnia are area of peace operations which falls between bringing assertive multilateralism into clear chapters VI and VII. focus. If they also better focus the doctrinal This is not to say that no one is working debate, we could enjoy an unanticipated but the problem. In fact, many bright, energetic welcome benefit. staff officers are engulfed in the process. The The matters of organization and process problem, once again, is central direction and discussed above—involving DOD, intera- guidance. The military chain of guidance gency, and USUN activities—also highlight should ideally go from the United Nations the need for both definitional and doctrinal to J-7 on the Joint Staff, and then to Atlantic harmonization. The proposals are relatively Command (ACOM), the unified command modest and low cost, and they will be ap- responsible for preparing joint forces for propriate regardless of the final version of peace operations. What one finds, however, the PDD on support to the United Nations. are centers of doctrinal development—or is- There are obviously other initiatives in train lands of excellence—with little har- or being considered under the general rubric peace operations monization. The U.S. Army Training of support to the United Nations including: and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) ▼ require a doctrinal removing legal constraints (the War Pow- is currently developing a new field ers Act and U.N. Participation Act) basis different from manual, FM 100–23, Peace Support ▼ improving funding responsibilities; elimi- that used in Desert Operations, with assistance from the nating arrearages to the United Nations Center for Low Intensity Conflict. ▼ enhancing planning for peace operations Storm TRADOC is also providing scenario (including training, education, and materiel, and support for peace operations at the also identifying lift, logistics, C3I, and equipment capabilities) Joint Readiness Training Center. The Air ▼ Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center is devel- supporting U.N. training for peace opera- tions (through political-military simulations and oping a joint tactics, techniques, and proce- provision of training facilities). dures document on humanitarian assistance. Undoubtedly a lot more is being done across The extent to which the U.S. Govern- the individual services, not to mention the ment engages in higher cost activities will combined doctrine being developed at directly reflect the importance attached to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe U.N. peace operations as a vehicle for (SHAPE) and by the peacekeeping workshop achieving U.S. security interests and the bal- at the George C. Marshall European Center ance between unilateral and multilateral so- for Security Studies in Garmisch. In addi- lutions. Irrespective of this balance, how- tion, the North Atlantic Cooperation Coun- ever, the United States, as a Permanent Five cil Ad Hoc Group on Peacekeeping has member of the Security Council, bears a di- charged combined conferences and work- rect responsibility to become actively in- shops, with various individual nations tak- volved in both U.N. internal reform and the ing the lead, to develop doctrine in this area. professionalization of U.N. peace operations. In sum, there is a lot of activity in the JFQ field, but its coherence is questionable, and both J-7 and ACOM have yet to fully assert themselves in the processes. What is worri- some, moreover, is the political imperative to move quickly toward conducting combined training and exercises with North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) members under the program, using peace operations as the scenario, before we have the doctrinal foundation fully in place. We risk putting the cart before the horse and possibly learning the wrong lessons by embracing this form of coopera- tive security activity prematurely. It may well be that recent events in Somalia and the an-

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 33 JFQ▼ FORUM Colors on parade during opening ceremonies for Cobra Gold ’93.

The Cutting Edge of Unified Actions U.S. Air Force ( Marvin Krause) By THOMAS C.LINN

uring the Cold War joint opera- transformation as the nature of operations tions were primarily seen as set- changes and they become the focus of coali- piece battles to be fought by uni- tion efforts or part of combined task forces. Dfied commanders against known To make things even more complicated, threats in Europe or Korea. But in the new joint and combined task forces in operations world disorder greater emphasis is being such as humanitarian assistance, disaster re- placed on an operational concept reminis- lief, and counternarcotics may encompass cent of World War II: joint and com- various governmental and nongovernmental bined task forces. Like Task Force 61, agencies functioning as either integral parts JTFs are temporary the joint expeditionary force assem- or close partners in order to achieve national means for unified bled for Operation Watchtower at objectives. Despite a seeming multitude of commanders to Guadalcanal, joint task forces (JTFs) variables, planners can count on one con- are seen today as a means of tailoring stant: each JTF differs with the situation. accomplish specific military responses to a growing num- The Nucleus tasks ber of crises. As Rear Admiral David Clearly the trend in the Armed Forces is E. Frost, the operations officer at Eu- toward joint operations. However, it should ropean Command, has remarked: “[JTFs are] be remembered from experience in the the biggest growth industry in the military.” and Desert One rescue op- The challenges facing JTFs are likely to eration that joint organizations don’t ensure be greater than in the past. These mission- success in and of themselves. Coordinated specific organizations must achieve unity of employment of forces with different service effort among disparate forces in shorter peri- orientations requires special consideration. ods of time. JTFs may undergo a significant JTFs are temporary means for unified com- manders to accomplish specific tasks but re- quire coordinating capabilities from more than one service, except when Navy and Ma- Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Linn, USMC, is rine Corps forces are employed together. Ide- assigned to the Plans Division at Headquarters, ally, the nature of a task should determine U.S. Marine Corps, and has taught at the the service of the JTF commander and the Amphibious Warfare School. He participated in the Kurdish relief effort in northern Iraq.

34 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Linn identification of the right forces with the req- who took part in JTF Restore Hope, for in- uisite capabilities for a given mission. stance, published operations orders in a five- The predominant maritime nature of paragraph/rapid response planning format, Earnest Will (protecting Kuwaiti tankers but the Army used a decision matrix format. transiting the Persian Gulf), for example, ne- Service differences regarding Joint Forces Air cessitated that naval forces form the core of Component Commander (JFACC) proce- the JTF and a naval staff act as the nuclear dures in Desert Storm are well known. Much command element. Since Proven Force con- is also made of the need for joint doctrine sisted largely of air attacks launched from which certainly plays a role in reducing dif- Turkish bases against Iraqi targets in Desert ferences. Yet interservice doctrine today ex- Storm, the Air Force provided the JTF nu- ceeds what was available to the architects of cleus. Because of inherent expeditionary ca- joint success during World War II. Inherent pabilities and expertise in transitioning differences must be minimized to avoid their ashore from sea bases, Marine units were the divisive effects, something which is largely force of choice for JTFs during Sea Angel in up to a JTF commander’s leadership skills Bangladesh and Restore Hope in Somalia. and ability to build a cohesive team. The fundamental challenge facing JTF com- No precise formula exists for organizing mand elements is achieving unity of effort JTFs, and specifics vary with given situations. among diverse service forces in a relatively Joint Pub 5–00.2, Joint Task Force Planning short period of time. As Joint Pub 1, Joint Guidance and Procedures, proposes JTFs built Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, points out: upon Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air “Effectively integrated joint forces expose no Force components as in Restore Hope and weak points or seams.” The more demand- similarly the U.S. Central Command organi- ing a mission the more stress it places on a zation for Desert Storm. Others in the after- JTF, and structural seams may be subject to math of the Gulf conflict have proposed fracture. It is possible that ad hoc JTFs more functional ap- can be formed as in the case of Provide no precise formula proaches to using Comfort which furnished relief to ground, sea, and air Kurds in northern Iraq. Service compo- exists for organizing components. JTFs may nents such as Central Air Force pro- JTFs, and specifics be structured for spe- vided the nucleus for Southern Watch vary with given cific operations in a to enforce no-fly zones over southern given geographic area, Iraq. But the merits of forming JTFs situations such as in Provide around service organizations such as an Comfort when JTF Army corps, numbered fleet, Marine Expedi- Alpha was created for Special Operations tionary Force, or numbered Air Force lies in Forces at Kurdish camps in the Turkish moun- unity of effort and in the efficiency of an ex- tains and JTF B was established to secure and isting staff with established operating proce- resettle Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq. dures, previous training, and common doc- Conceivably, JTFs may also be formed using a trine. Service headquarters provide nuclei for combination of geographic–oriented and JTFs around which augmenting forces can functional organizations. rapidly form. JTFs may undergo a metamorphosis as a The building blocks of JTFs are service situation changes. The nucleus provided by capabilities. Every effort must be made to U.S. Air Forces Europe for Proven Force first preserve the integrity of tactical level units, served to form Provide Comfort. The latter those within JTFs being more joint at the transitioned from an air-heavy organization top than at the bottom. As Lieutenant Gen- dropping supplies for refugees to a predomi- eral John H. Cushman, USA (Ret.), noted in nantly ground effort. Also, when sea-based Thoughts for Joint Commanders, a JTF can be operations move ashore, as may happen in seen as a system of systems, wherein each Provide Promise if troops are committed to system represents a service organization or Bosnia, the naval character of a JTF can be- capability. JTF commanders are responsible come more continental. Thus a nuclear ser- for harmonizing systems in pursuit of objec- vice component may transition into an ad tives. But inevitably procedural differences arise among service organizations. Marines

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 35 JFQ▼ FORUM hoc joint and combined task force com- Without significant augmentation and plan- mand element as the First Marine Expedi- ning, operational bottlenecks are likely to tionary Force in Somalia for Provide Hope occur. To handle such circumstances U.S. Pa- did with UNISOM II. cific Command and U.S. Atlantic Command Headquarters functions of JTFs are far provide command elements of JTFs with more complex than service headquarters. In joint force augmentation cells consisting of many cases service organizations designated 33 predesignated augmentees. Also, JTFs may JTF command elements will be responsible be augmented by joint communication sup- for deploying, employing, and sustaining port elements to provide connectivity with much larger and diverse forces than they had unified commanders and National Com- previously. Their span of control is likely to mand Authorities through the National Mili- encompass land, sea, air, and special opera- tary Command Center. tions forces. J-3s must be cognizant of cur- The Coalition Symbol rent operations and long-term planning. Prior to Desert Storm coalitions were pri- Even if logistics is a service responsibility, J-4s marily viewed as means of maintaining re- may have to allocate such sought-after re- gional balances of power. Since then the in- sources as petroleum, blood supplies, trans- ternational community and, in particular, the portation, engineer support, and common United Nations have come to regard coali- usage facilities. JTF command elements must tions as the paradigm in responding to world communicate directly with U.S. Transporta- problems. Collective action has created the tion Command to ensure the flow of person- appearance of legitimacy and burden-sharing nel and equipment in accordance with in dealing with crises, and even Japan has OPLANS, and if necessary alter the sequenc- ing of deploying forces to meet the situation.

Joint Task Forces, 1983–1993

Urgent Fury Just Cause Provide Comfort Grenada Panama -Northern Iraq (October 1983) (December 1989–January 1990) (April 1991 to date) Noncombatant Evacuation Foreign Internal Defense Relief JTF–L Poplar Tree Sea Angel Lebanon San Salvador Bangladesh (February 1984) (November 1989) (May 1991) Foreign Internal Defense Rescue Disaster Relief Earnest Will JTF– Fiery Vigil Persian Gulf (November–December 1989) Philippines (1987–1988) Foreign Internal Defense (June 1991) Protect Sea Lines of Communication Noncombatant Evacuation Disaster / Noncombatant Evacuation Alpine Bandit Sharp Edge Quick Lift Haiti Zaire (January 1988) (May 1990–January 1991) (September 1991) Noncombatant Evacuation Noncombatant Evacuation Noncombatant Evacuation Golden Pheasant Patriot Defender Victor Squared Honduras Israel Haiti (March 1988) (January–February 1991) (September 1991) Border Security Missile Defense Noncombatant Evacuation JTF–Alaska Oil Spill Proven Force GTMO (April-September 1989) Turkey Cuba Environmental Cleanup (January–February 1991) (October 1991) (Exxon Valdez) Offensive Operations Relief (Haitian Refugees)

36 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Linn

committed elements of its Self Defense Force consensus among the participating member to multinational peace operations. nations. While the trend has been toward collec- Common objectives as well as decision- tive responses, the burden for their success making processes ensure coordinated efforts in major military endeavors falls in many within coalitions as well as restricting ac- cases to the United States. Only this Nation tions by participants. For example, the coali- has the resources to conduct large-scale, uni- tion in the Gulf War accomplished the ob- fied actions in distant regions. U.S.-led jective of ejecting the Iraqis from Kuwait but the Vietnam War operations such as Restore Hope testify constrained U.S. commanders who may offers an example to this fact, while U.N.-led operations have desired the total defeat of Iraq. Deci- in both Somalia and Bosnia stand in sionmaking processes vary with coalitions of an incoherent stark contrast. As a result, U.S. military and are time-consuming and highly struc- coalition commitments have become prerequi- tured relative to unilateral actions. Success sites and catalysts for many coalition in combined efforts relies on patience, un- efforts. Combined joint task forces are derstanding the decisionmaking and plan- manifestations and symbols of these coali- ning process, and recognizing and ameliorat- tion efforts. ing differences among coalition partners The context in which combined JTFs op- Unity of effort in combined operations erate must be understood. First and foremost demands that coalitions accept unity of com- coalitions are political arrangements among mand. While this seems self-evident, some nations with recognized common interests. nations may be unwilling to subordinate While decisions in U.S. unilateral actions re- their forces to another nation’s command garding political and military objectives are and instead prefer parallel commands. The determined by the President as commander in chief, in coalitions they are reached by a

Provide Hope Provide Transition Provide Refuge Former Soviet Union Angola (February 1992) (August 1992) Marshall Islands Relief Foreign Internal Defense (January 1993) Relief JTF–LA Hurricane Andrew Los Angeles Florida- Provide Promise (May 1992) (August–September 1992) Bosnia Civil Disturbance Disaster Relief (February 1993 to date) Medical / Relief Military Support to Typhoon Omar U.S. Embassy, Freetown JTF—120 Sierra Leone (August–September 1992) Haiti (May 1992) Disaster Relief (September 1993) Noncombatant Evacuation Interdict Sea Lines Typhoon Iniki of Communication Provide Relief Hawaii Kenya-Somalia (September–October 1992) JFT—Somalia (August 1992–February 1993) Disaster Relief (October 1993) Relief Internal Security Sea Angel II Southern Watch Bangladesh Iraq (November 1992) (August 1992 to date) Disaster Relief No-fly Zone Enforcement Restore Hope Source: Adam B. Siegel and Scott M. Fabbri, “Overview of Selected Joint Task Forces, Somalia 1960–1993,” CNA 37 93–0007 (Alexandria, (December 1992–May 1993) Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, Relief / Foreign Internal Defense September 1993).

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 37 JFQ▼ FORUM F–117 stealth fighter UNISOM II. Trust and confidence must be being readied during fostered from the top. No matter what the Team Spirit ’93. JTF organization, national components should be established which report to the overall combined commander to facilitate the employment and support of allied forces in the field. Allied staff representation should also reflect the composition of joint and combined task forces. Organizational Cooperation

U.S. Air Force ( Scott Stewart) In the new world disorder many opera- tional situations facing U.S. and allied forces have become increasingly complicated by Vietnam War offers an example of an inco- domestic, economic, and environmental—as herent coalition. Unlike the , no well as military—considerations. Unified ac- combined command was created to attempt tions in these situations require military to effect unity among American and South forces to coordinate efforts at the operational Vietnamese as well as Free World Military and tactical levels with both governmental Forces. On the other hand, then Lieutenant and nongovernmental agencies. In many in- General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, made it stances, relationships among joint and com- clear to allied forces in Provide Comfort that bined task forces and these agencies will be they would either operate under his tactical ill-defined until liaison is effected. Moreover control or not participate at all. Their accep- relationships are likely to vary with each tance of a single command structure was a agency. Nevertheless, involvement by gov- key factor in that operation’s success. ernmental and nongovernmental agencies, In major coalition efforts, JTFs are likely in coordination with military action, is likely to be nuclei around which combined task to be integral to crisis resolution. forces will form, as in Restore Hope. Unity of The kind of the crisis at hand will deter- effort in combined commands will be facili- mine the nature of the involvement of the tated if forces come from existing coalitions agencies. In Sea Angel, which provided dis- with established operating procedures. In aster relief in the aftermath of a cyclone in Desert Storm coordinated action by allied Bangladesh, the JTF coordinated its efforts navies was possible because most subscribed with the Department of State and the to NATO standardization agreements for Agency for International Development with naval operations. The differences which which memoranda of agreement existed. It must be overcome in forming a joint and also developed ad hoc relationships and a di- combined task force are usually profound vision of labor among the International Red and require considerable time and effort. Cross, Red Crescent, CARE, Save the Chil- Participants must contend with linguistic, dren, and other relief agencies. While many cultural, and operational differences. Issues nongovernmental humanitarian organiza- like rules of engagement are subject to vary- tions eschew the appearance of formal rela- ing interpretations but must be clear. Major tionships with military forces, they have differences may also exist between the capa- nevertheless become dependent on them for bilities of allied and U.S. forces. In some security and even logistical support. cases allied forces may arrive in a crisis re- Similarly, in domestic crises which oc- gion with insufficient tactical mobility or lo- curred as the result of Hurricane Andrew in gistics expecting U.S. forces to compensate Florida and civil unrest in Los Angeles, JTFs for their lack of capabilities. worked with many organizations including Team efforts, particularly in rapidly the Departments of Interior, Commerce, and changing situations, require an existing Health and Human Services; Federal Emer- unity as well as dynamic leadership around gency Management Agency; Federal Deposit which allied forces can form. Such unity is Insurance Corporation, as well as other by no means inherent in multinational ef- Federal, state, and local agencies. And the forts as evidenced by reports of a fragmented complexity of counternarcotics operations

38 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Linn

Coalition forces being USNS Passumpsic channeled through a refueling a French mine field during destroyer and USS Desert Storm. Ranger in the Gulf. U.S. Navy ( Russell Bos)

Unified actions have evolved with the nature of war- fare. Technologies have allowed land, sea, air, and special opera- tions forces to reach beyond their traditional bounds; joint and combined efforts have en- abled the concentration of the power of all these assets. Transnational issues like the en- vironment, domestic unrest, U.S. Air Force ( Dean M. Fox) refugees, and drug traffic have also increased as considerations in crisis reso- while humanitarian requires a very different group of lution, requiring not only joint and combined organizations eschew agencies ranging from the Drug responses but unity of effort with both gov- Enforcement Administration to ernmental and nongovernmental agencies. relationships with various counterdemand programs. There is no formula for unified actions military forces, they No prescribed mechanisms in crises which remain largely situation-de- have become depen- exist for achieving unity of effort pendent. However certain principles are evi- among joint and combined task dent. Joint and combined actions alone do dent on them forces and various governmental not ensure success; rather success is ensured and nongovernmental organiza- by an existing unity of effort and teamwork tions. It is only brought about through ini- built by dynamic leadership. The task at tiative, thoroughness, cooperation, and hand will determine the requisite capabili- communication on the scene. Successful ties and the nucleus of the joint and com- joint and combined task forces have ascer- bined task force. Organizations may vary, tained the involvement of all external agen- but the integrity of tactical units which do cies in a given crisis and sought to embrace the fighting must be preserved with a result agencies in order to achieve a concerted ef- that the force is more joint and combined at fort. JTF Sea Angel established a coordina- the top than at the bottom. JFQ tion cell for military and external agencies, and all concerned were invited to JTF plan- ning sessions. In addition, the JTF and relief agencies followed the lead of the Bangla- deshi government in determining priorities. Finally, the JTF ensured that tactical priori- ties meshed with relief efforts.

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 39 JFQ▼ FORUM

Preparing French commandos during a maritime interdiction mission in the Red Sea.

Future U.S. Navy ( Milton R. Savage) Coalition Commanders By TERRY J.PUDAS

his Nation has fought every con- both the Korean and Persian Gulf Wars, the flict since World War II either forces that fought in those conflicts operated unilaterally or as a member of an as ad hoc coalitions under U.N. authoriza- ad hoc coalition. No military ac- tion. There have been many other opera- T tions carried out by the United States as part tion has been conducted as the combined ef- fort of a standing alliance in which the of an ad hoc organization. Even the war on United States was a member. Even though drugs has been prosecuted by a coalition. the United Nations played a major role in When America has been involved in multi- national operations it has been as a member of ad hoc coalitions. What follows are some considerations intended to help coalition commanders of the future plan and execute This article is adapted from a distinguished individual entry in the 1993 CJCS Essay Competition which the author completed while attending the Naval War College. operations in support of such coalitions.

40 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Pudas

Planning Coalition Warfare objectives and reach agreement on their com- Ad hoc coalitions are unique in that mon interests and objectives. Dealing with al- they are based on temporary agreements and lies must be accomplished with patience and normally are less formal than standing al- respect. Commanders must establish and liances. The psychological and sociological maintain trust among coalition forces. Both problems generated by differences among coordination and cooperation are key ingredi- coalition partners in culture, customs, reli- ents to successful coalition command. Har- gion, and standards of living require a nessing the personalities of allied military unique mental approach to planning mili- leaders and coping with problems associated tary operations.1 The experience of com- with interpersonal relations can be among bined operations reveals that integrating the greatest challenges.4 multinational forces is complex and requires Effective use of coalition combat a great deal of understanding and skill on strength is achieved when operational plan- the part of commanders. An awareness of ning is carried out by a combined staff the unique aspects of coalition warfare can which includes equitable representation enable commanders to plan intelligently from each coalition nation. This coordinated and avoid problems which arise through in- planning is essential to ensuring unity of ef- sensitivity and ignorance.2 Creating this fort. In Operation Desert Storm this was awareness among com- done through a Coalition Coordination unity of effort cannot be mand and staff personnel Communications and Integration Center 3 realized unless commanders is essential to preparing (C IC). Even though planning must always for coalition operations. be coordinated, overall planning responsibil- understand allied political The mission of comman- ity for specific operations should be vested and military objectives ders is to plan and direct in commanders responsible for execution. the combat power of The responsibility for planning and execu- coalition members to ac- tion must not be separated.5 complish common objectives. Key planning Several general considerations should considerations for combined operations guide coalition planning. A combined plan must include proposed command relation- should reflect an appreciation of the unique ships, interoperability, logistical support, capabilities of each national contingent in and the risk to U.S. Armed Forces. assigning missions. Multinational forces The most important element in prepar- should optimize their strengths and avoid ing for combined operations is developing duplication or degradation of unique capa- sound and effective coalition command rela- bilities. Likewise, planning must compensate tionships. One report on the Gulf War noted for comparative vulnerabilities among coali- that relationships “met with difficulties, were tion partners. Forces are normally more ef- complex, but workable.” 3 When unity of fective if employed under military comman- command is not achievable, then unity of ef- ders from their respective nations. Other fort and an agreed upon strategy must be considerations which affect planning and achieved through the coordination and coop- mission assignment of forces are common erative efforts of allied commanders. Opera- doctrine, logistic sustainment capabilities, tional commanders can prepare for this even- and systems interoperability. One principle tuality by understanding the various factors of war with significant applicability in plan- which influence a coalition’s ability to coordi- ning coalition operations is simplicity. It is nate forces and achieve unity of effort. Unity essential that the plan be capable of being of effort cannot be realized unless comman- understood and executed by all combat ders understand allied political and military forces in a coalition. Another important consideration in coalition planning is interoperability. Mili- tary success in coalition warfare depends on Captain Terry J. Pudas, USN, commands Training Air the ability of American commanders to har- Wing One and flew as an exchange pilot with the monize the capabilities, doctrines, and logis- German navy earlier in his career. Immediately tics of forces from varied cultures. In an ad prior to assuming his current assignment he taught hoc coalition such as Desert Storm where at the Naval War College. nearly forty different nations contributed to

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 41 JFQ▼ FORUM U.N. vehicles aboard Gathering and disseminating intelli- USS Harlan County en gence can have a major impact on successful route to Haiti. coalitions. Planning and preparations must provide timely military intelligence to all partners.6 The degree of dissemination will undoubtedly vary depending on the individ- ual member. In ad hoc coalitions the United States may be operating with partners with whom there is a reluctance to share intelli- gence, especially when it might reveal sensi- tive sources or collection methods. In Desert

Fleet Imaging Command Atlantic ( Alexander C. Hicks, Jr.) Storm there was no preplanned system or mechanism to govern the release of essential the effort, this was a military intelligence to other than our tradi- monumental task. There tional allies. are, however, some gen- Logistics affects success in every military eral principles and plan- operation. Logistical support and sustainment ning factors which can needs of multinational forces vary signifi- contribute to overcom- cantly and are influenced by tactical doctrine ing interoperability prob- or individual dietary requirements. Coalition lems. Unity of effort re- experience confirms the desirability of mak- quires coordinating air ing logistical support a national responsibil- defense, intelligence, ity. The combined staff must, however, ensure electronic warfare, and the coordination of host nation support in- operational timing. A cluding transportation networks and major communications net- facilities such as ports and airfields.

Joint Combat Camera Center ( Scott Stewart ) work and interoperable American coalition commanders must F–16 fighters flying connectivity also are key always consider the risks to U.S. forces in- over South Korea ingredients in effectively coordinating the volved in combined operations. Assessments during Team Spirit ’93. capabilities of multinational forces. must concentrate on the reliability of other Liaison officers provide one of the most coalition forces, as well as on combat effective ways of coordinating coalition ef- strength and capabilities. Rules of engage- forts as the Gulf War con- ment (ROE) also figure in planning coalition in many instances the firmed. Nearly all our partners operations. U.S. forces are governed by spe- had American liaison officers cific ROE during peacetime and the Law of common political objec- drawn from Special Operations Armed Conflict in war. Different rules tives that bind members Forces with them. The officers within a coalition—particularly in opera- together become the were language qualified and tions short of war—can provoke responses served as communication links that put the forces of certain members at center of gravity to coordinate with the military risk. Coordination must ensure that ROE are forces of diverse nations. consistent in a coalition. In the Gulf War, In ad hoc coalitions, interoperability coordination among commanders and liai- problems are usually managed but rarely son teams ensured the effectiveness and con- solved. One method of minimizing problems sistency of such rules.7 which usually proves effective is to allocate In addition, the vulnerability of a coali- discrete geographical or functional areas of tion’s center of gravity must be evaluated. In responsibility to national forces. This pre- many instances common political objectives serves unique capabilities and prevents dilut- that bind members become the center of ing combat strength which may occur if at- gravity. Plans must minimize risk by includ- tempts are made to combine incompatible ing appropriate defensive measures, even forces. It also helps to minimize blue-on-blue when the measures do not directly defend a fratricide or friendly fire incidents. coalition partner. This situation existed in the Gulf War when exhaustive efforts were made to protect Israel against Scud missile attacks. Had Israel retaliated against Iraq the

42 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Pudas

focus the language training on specific re- gions and countries most likely to be future coalition allies. Sales of U.S. equipment to potential coalition partners and training for- eign military personnel are also ways of en- hancing interoperability for coalitions. Secu- rity assistance for critical infrastructure as well as International Military Education and Training can be particularly helpful. Ad hoc coalitions will continue to be unique in terms of their membership and the obstacles encountered in attempting to achieve unity of effort. The planning consid- erations discussed above are intended to heighten awareness of potential difficulties and provide a framework for thinking about

U.S. Navy ( April Hatton) coalition operations. The success of com- Coalition ships at manders of ad hoc coalitions will depend Mina Salman during upon their ability to correctly apply coali- Operation Southern cohesion of the coalition and willingness of Watch. some members to contribute militarily may tion warfare planning considerations. have been jeopardized. This potential Executing Coalition Warfare breakup might have resulted in an increased Understanding the complexities of risk to U.S. forces. coalitions and successfully executing coali- The next coalition war or the members tion warfare requires a unique combination of the alliance cannot be predicted. There of political and military prowess. As Clause- are steps, however, that the Armed Forces witz noted: “Everything in war is very sim- can undertake to prepare and enhance capa- ple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” 10 His bilities for coalition operations. Education in observation is especially relevant in the case coalition warfighting for senior officers is a of ad hoc coalitions. prerequisite. Increased study emphasizing The key element in successfully execut- planning considerations and execution deci- ing coalition warfare is the ability of com- sions for ad hoc combined operations must manders to achieve unity of effort among be a central part of all war college curricula. their forces. In ad hoc coalitions like Desert Preparation for coalition efforts must be Storm this will normally be accomplished focused on the most probable planning sce- through cooperation rather than by appoint- narios for future conflicts such ing supreme coalition commanders. The pre- the assignment of forces as hypothetical Pentagon plan- requisite for unity of effort is unity of pur- 8 and missions in ad hoc ning scenarios. It is essential pose which involves reaching a consensus in planning for future regional on military objectives and coalition strategy. coalitions must reflect contingencies that all ramifica- War-fighting commanders must be assured the unique capabilities tions of coalition operations that there is a consensus prior to commit- of each partner are considered. The United ting military forces to combined operations. States should increase the Both the planning and the execution number of multinational train- phases should be accomplished as a coordi- ing exercises in each theater with potential nated effort. Combined staffs are an ideal coalition partners. Combined exercises, re- means of ensuring that multinational forces gardless of their size, are productive because are utilized in compliance with national polit- they create a spirit of cooperation and en- ical and military restrictions. In execution, hance awareness of interoperability.9 Addi- multidimensional battlefields require special tional language training for liaison officers consideration when fighting coalition wars can provide significant advantages in com- which involve land, naval, and air forces from bined operations. Planning scenarios can a wide variety of coalition partners. Many of the concepts discussed here as planning fac- tors were actually applied in executing the

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 43 JFQ▼ FORUM Persian Gulf War. Unity of effort was achieved by establishing a multinational coordination center. Continuous liaison and collaboration by all partners through the C3IC provided a mechanism to achieve unity of effort. Coali- tion forces were assigned missions consistent with political restrictions, military require- ments, and force capabilities.11 Politically and militarily it is important that the United States and its allies fight side by side against a common enemy. This is particularly desirable from the perspective of Joint Combat Camera Center national prestige. In the Gulf it was impor- British explosive tant to ensure that each coalition member ordnance unit providing was provided an opportunity to contribute security in Kuwait Harbor. to the effort. The assignment of forces and missions in ad hoc coalitions must reflect the unique capabilities of each partner and create organizations whose combat potential Enemy prisoners of war will undoubt- is not degraded by a lack of interoperability. edly always be a sensitive issue and the As previously mentioned, the options which United States will bear responsibility for their best satisfy requirements may be function- welfare since we traditionally contribute ally or geographically oriented. Specifically, more to coalitions in terms of political power options should include assigning: and military strength. Regardless of the ar- ▼ a national single service or joint force to a rangements, the Armed Forces must retain specific area of responsibility sufficient oversight and control to ensure ap- ▼ a national single service or joint force to a propriate treatment of prisoners and compli- specific function ance with international conventions and also ▼ a combined single service force to a spe- should ensure compliance with the provi- cific area of responsibility sions and intent of the International Law of ▼ a combined joint force to a specific area Armed Conflict by all coalition partners. 12 of responsibility. Another major consideration for Ameri- Each option was utilized in Operation can commanders is the risk to U.S. Armed Desert Storm. Specific geographical areas of Forces. This means balancing the sometimes responsibility were assigned to both ground sensitive subject of burden sharing with con- and naval units operating in the Gulf. Other sideration of risks which could result from units were assigned functions consistent with the desertion of coalition partners or the their capabilities, such as anti-mine warfare failure to achieve unity of effort. In Desert or air defense missions. The air war com- Storm there were partners who saw their bined single service forces which were re- roles strictly in terms of defending Saudi sponsible for a specific functional area of the Arabia or liberating Kuwait and others who overall campaign. The Arab coalition func- committed forces in Iraq to neutralize tioned as a combined joint force with a geo- enemy military power. As history has borne graphical area of responsibility. Each option out, the closer a coalition is to victory, the has utility by providing a mechanism for more individual partners diverge from com- matching ends and means in coalition wars. mon objectives to pursue their own aims. The responsibility for logistical support This phenomenon in the war-termination in ad hoc coalitions is best retained by each phase introduces an increased element of nation. Key transport facilities and host na- risk to U.S. forces. Commanders must be tion support (such as water and petroleum, aware of this issue and execute in a manner oil, and lubricants) should be coordinated by that enables risk-reducing alternatives or a multinational combined staff. Policies re- unilateral options to protect both our inter- lating to medical treatment and evacuation ests and forces. of casualties are also best left to individual national forces.

44 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Pudas

the closer a coalition is to victory, the more individual partners diverge from common objectives to pursue U.S. Air Force Coalition forces con- their own aims ducting daily situation evaluations during Desert Storm.

Royal Navy ( Ian Arthur) British HMS Penelope leading Principles for Coalition Commanders dled by cooperative planning and coordination. ships of NATO On-Call Although interoperability is often the major ob- Force Mediterranean. Historical evidence and the lessons of Desert Storm reveal four enduring principles stacle to achieving unity of effort, there are mea- which commanders must consider in plan- sures which can be undertaken to minimize prob- ning and conducting coalition operations: lems. Language training for liaison officers, targeted military sales and security assistance, and ▼ Unity of purpose is the political glue that combined exercises can promote interoperability binds coalition members together. Operational with potential coalition partners. commanders must understand ultimate political ▼ Minimizing and preventing risks to personnel objectives and create military conditions which in combined operations with nontraditional allies will achieve strategic goals in theater. and without formal treaties may lead to situations ▼ Unity of effort is necessary to achieve suc- in which changing political events influence the cess in combined and coalition operations. If unity military contribution of each partner. This may of command is not possible, then cooperation and mean increased risk to American forces. Also, di- coordination are the keys to unity of effort. Coor- verging national aims in the war-termination dinated planning staffs and assignment of liaison phase—or a vulnerability to the coalition’s center officers significantly enhance the process. of gravity—may be sources of risk for U.S. forces. ▼ Interoperability is best managed by appro- priate force assignments and the retention of re- sponsibility for logistical support by individual nations. Intelligence sharing, the treatment of prisoners, and rules of engagement are best han-

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 45 JFQ▼ FORUM ing its own national objectives. Notwith- U.S. peacekeepers training for Operation standing such shortcomings, coalitions are Able Sentry in here to stay. Commanders and their staffs Macedonia. must prepare for the eventualities of future ad hoc coalitions. Success in achieving na- tional objectives with minimum risk to American lives may depend less on warfight- ing skills and more on understanding the complexities of coalitions JFQ

NOTES

1 Armed Forces Staff College, The Joint Staff Officers Guide 1991, AFSC Pub 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 2–43. 2 John Hixson and Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Combined Operations in Peace and War (Carlisle Barracks, Joint Combat Camera Center ( Efrain Gonzalez) Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1982), p. ii. 3 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: An Interim Report (Washington: Government Print- ing Office, 1991), p. 20-4. 4 Jacob L. Deavers, “Major Problems Confronting a Theater Commander in Combined Operations,” Military Review, vol. 27, no. 10 (October 1947), p. 14. 5 U.S. Army War College, Warfighting: Its Planning and Conduct, vol. 1 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1988), p. I–86. 6 Department of the Army, Operations, FM 100–5 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 166. 7 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 16–1. 8 Patrick E.Tyler, “7 Hypothetical Conflicts Foreseen by the Pentagon,” , February 17, 1992, p. A7. 9 Hixson and Cooling, Combined Operations, p. 363. 10 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and trans- lated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 119. 11 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 20–2. 12 U.S. Army War College, Warfighting: Its Planning

U.S. Army (José D. Trejo) and Conduct, p. I–85. Coalition commanders discussing cease-fire terms with Iraqis on While coalition warfare is being touted March 3, 1991. as a silver bullet for the future of the Armed Forces, its utility may be questionable in op- erations where unique national interests are at stake. Political and military benefits de- rived from coalition operations will vary across the entire conflict spectrum. In sce- narios when the United States is able to con- duct unilateral operations the potential ad- vantages of coalitions must be weighed against the disadvantages. In more fragile and less enduring ad hoc relationships the urgency to act may influence operational timing. More importantly, in order to achieve consensus on unity of purpose, the United States may be restricted from pursu-

46 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Europe, Forward Presence, and the Future By JAMES P. STANTON

hange, life’s only true constant, reduce forward-based forces. But the chal- still buffets the European security lenges and responsibilities of a new Euro- environment like wind. The fall of pean environment still loom large. Revolu- C the Wall, the dissolution of the tions in recent years have been largely Warsaw Pact, and the collapse of the Soviet bloodless yet revolutions nonetheless. More Union have eliminated any immediate new nations, borders, and expectations have threat of large-scale attack against Western been created by these events than by any Europe. These changes have allowed U.S. Eu- others since World War II. ropean Command (EUCOM) to judiciously

Allied briefing at Vencenza Air Base, , during Operation Deny Flight. Joint Combat Camera Center (Bob Simons)

Summary

A new security environment has enabled European Command (EUCOM) to carefully draw down American forward presence on the Continent. Since the dust has not settled on the momentous events of the last few years, continued U.S. engagement remains imperative. Cooperative security arrangements which guided the allies through the Cold War have unique capabilities that could not be replicated if NATO ceased to exist. Therefore the status of the Atlantic Alliance as the protector of Europe—a region with immense cultural, political, and economic claims on our national interests—seems assured for at least another half century. With the flexibility to adjust in changing times, and American resolve to support the Alliance through continued forward presence, NATO will remain the vehicle for meeting security challenges in EUCOM’s area of responsibility.

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 47 EUROPE AND THE FUTURE

That post-war era, in Unloading C–5 Galaxy fact, offers clues to our at Skopje, Macedonia, mandate for a new Euro- during Operation Able pean security identity— Sentry. in many ways a task as challenging as that faced by our predecessors in 1945. Looking out on a bleak, war-scarred land- scape with economies in ruin and populations dis- placed, who would have

imagined the vibrant, co- Joint Combat Camera Center (Efrain Gonzalez) operative Western Eu- rope of today? In fact, we can empathize with the difficulty that they had in making their decisions while facing down the de- clared Soviet intent to export a bankrupt ide- ology and expand hegemony over war-rav- aged countries to the west. The critical structure needed to meet the Cold War’s gru- eling challenges—a nuclear-backed deterrent alliance incorporating all concerned democ- racies and even former adversaries—took ten years to contrive.1 Similarly, one cannot ex- pect instant solutions to today’s challenges nor exclude any nation as an unlikely actor from a future, unknown stage. Hopefully, the answers we arrive at will, interest in EUCOM’s through cooperative action, en- area of responsibility sure European peace and stability for at least another half century. is not based on Stability in Europe—as well as humanitarian con- in neighboring adjacent areas of cerns—but rather on Africa—is important. Since it was founded, this Nation has been what is good for us strengthened through commerce. Stability and peace allow an open international economic system to benefit all participants. In addition, a stable environ- ment creates a climate where American ide- als and values prosper. Only economic well- being and security from aggression can allow us to enjoy democracy’s healthy insti- tutions and unlock the creative endeavors of a free people. Liberty is a value that the founding fathers enshrined in a new politi- cal union which in part was a rejection of connected to that old world for cultural, the old world. Yet most Americans still feel ethnic, or far more pragmatic reasons. Many of us feel a strong connection to foreign shores in a visceral way. In the last na- Major James P. Stanton, USAF, is assigned to the Plans and Policy tional census only one in twenty Americans Directorate at Headquarters, European Command. He has operational did not claim some cultural, racial, or na- experience in tactical fighters and strategic bombers to include eleven tional identification. Three-quarters of them combat missions flown in B–52s during the Gulf War. cited a European heritage, while one in ten

48 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Stanton

A–10 Buzzards arriving at Avian Air Base, Italy, during Operation Deny Flight.

P–3 Orion at Sigonella, Italy, during Operation Sharp Guard. U.S. Navy (David W. Hanselman) Joint Combat Camera Center (Robert Stuart) Transporting commu- nications equipment during Operation Deny Flight. Joint Combat Camera Center (Steve Thurow)

claimed to be African-American.2 We have a African-American influences on our culture rich, varied culture, formed not in a melting are clearly visible in our music, foods, reli- pot but in a crucible, building strength from gions, and even the dialects we speak. These the contributions of individuals who retain influences form a strong cultural bond with their unique ethnic identities. The individuals the EUCOM area of responsibility. are, without a doubt, American—yet their ties America is part of a global economy to their origins are real. European and with worldwide systems of banking and commerce. While one can argue that we

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 49 EUROPE AND THE FUTURE U.S. Navy (Michael Gallagher) USS Hawes participat- ing with Danish, German, and Dutch ships in Baltops ’92. should focus more closely on domestic prior- Interest in maintaining stability and ities, no one would argue that we should peace in EUCOM’s area of responsibility is conduct a global economic retreat. An invisi- not based on humanitarian concerns for the ble web of economic interconnectivity guar- good of mankind, Europe, or Africa—but antees that there is no possibility of a rather on what is good for us. The United healthy, prosperous U.S. economy without a States has fought two world wars in this cen- healthy, prosperous European economy. tury, despite concerted efforts to remain dis- While recognition of political and demo- engaged. The globe is too small and violent graphic ties to EUCOM’s area of responsibil- for disengagement. The over half million ity depend largely on experience and obser- American soldiers, sailors, marines, and air- vation, economic ties can be readily men who died in the world wars bear silent quantified. Recognizing that statistics are the testimony to our historical connections with best tool of propaganda since the warm a dangerous world.4 smile, they nevertheless indicate how Euro- In fact, stability is at risk throughout the pean trade is vital to U.S. prosperity. world. While arms control implementation Europe imports more American goods and efforts to further regional economic in- than , Japan, or Australia, even more tegration tend to level the rolling deck, seas than Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, beneath are not calm. A geographic survey and combined. Trade with Eastern of EUCOM’s area of responsibility reveals European and former Soviet states in 1992 top-to-bottom upheaval—rough seas where increased 13 percent over the previous year. in former times of bipolar confrontation These are expanding markets with untapped there was a troubling though predictable sta- potential. Annual trade between Europe and sis. The days of easy analysis, a known the United States is more than $235 billion.3 threat, and more simple but painful choices Trade equates to U.S. products sold overseas, are gone. The dynamics of the revolutions of and that means American jobs. 1989 are not yet completely understood or over. Civil war and conflict are a daily reality

50 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Stanton

which serve as humbling reminders of our turmoil may have unwelcome results. Will inability to predict political events. Centrifu- ethnic strife, religious militancy, and nation- gal political trends follow ethnic, religious, alistic fervor lead to another era of European and nationalistic fault lines. Fears of the pro- conflict? liferation of nuclear, biological, and chemi- Today the answer to European security cal weapons are exacerbated by the demon- remains a vibrant, capable North Atlantic strated will to use them. The World Trade Treaty Organization (NATO) which served as Center bombing in has put the pillar of transatlantic security through- an exclamation point on the assertion that out the long dark years of the Cold War. It is America is no longer an inviolate island. still the hope for the future because of its Indeed, there are some growing dangers. unique structure, capability, and flexibility. Real tension from economic disparity can be The transatlantic linkages between the felt from north to south and from east to United States and Canada on one shore and west. While an affluent Western Europe Western Europe on the other are not acci- looks out over the to an dental. While the Alliance has been long rec- impoverished African continent, the strug- ognized as the linchpin of North American gling former Soviet Union and nations of and Western European security interests, it Eastern and Central Europe see prosperity now looks hopefully to the east. Within over walls erected to discourage immigration NATO the North Atlantic Cooperation where walls of oppression once stood. Eco- Council (NACC) has emerged as a forum for nomic disparity heightens differences be- peacekeeping, security cooperation, and tween lucky oil-rich states of the Middle East consultation with members of the former and their less fortunate neighbors on all Warsaw Pact. NATO is an extremely valuable sides. The tectonic plate formed by a rise in organization because of its capabilities in Islamic fundamentalism also is centered in command and control, infrastructure, stan- the Middle East. Radical elements fill a vac- dardization, and multinational force struc- uum of political and economic disenfran- ture with shared training experience. No chisement which then can spread other organization has such military poten- the North Atlantic to other regions through migration tial, a legacy of bipolar confrontation that causing even greater tension be- could not be reinvented. There is no imagin- Cooperation Council tween east and west. able set of bilateral agreements or system of (NACC) has emerged brought a violent alliances that could approach the current ca- as a forum for peace- end to the house of cards created pabilities of NATO. by the Congress of Vienna after the The Alliance has the flexibility to han- keeping, security Napoleonic wars. The turmoil fol- dle new challenges. NATO’s mission is ex- cooperation, and lowing that collapse of imperial panding. Article 5 of its treaty—“[that] an consultation power allowed the twin totalitari- armed attack on one or more...shall be anisms of fascism and considered an attack on them all”—remains to eventually bloom. World War II the central security provision while article 4 dealt a fatal blow to fascism but the post-war offers flexibility for future crises.5 Taken to- political turmoil that followed led to the So- gether the 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept viet subjugation of Central and Eastern Eu- and article 4 provide for consultation among rope. For over forty years America led the the allies and “where appropriate, coordina- free world struggle against a political, eco- tion of their efforts including their responses nomic, and military threat. It ended with a to such risks...whenever, in the opinion of victory of democracy over imperialistic com- any of them, the territorial integrity, politi- munism and took a high toll in human lives cal independence, or security of any of the and resources. But the strategies of deter- parties is threatened.” 6 The Alliance recog- rence and containment succeeded. The Iron nizes that the new security environment re- Curtain fell and the Soviet empire dissolved. quires political engagement as well as the Unfortunately, despite the cost of past sacri- “indispensable defense dimension.” 7 The fices, there is a chance that post-Cold War task for the foreseeable future is understand- ing complex social, political, and economic difficulties. NACC can serve as a conduit for cooperation as emerging democracies to the

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 51 EUROPE AND THE FUTURE

SEALs practicing aboard USS during Operation Deny Flight. Joint Combat Camera Center (David McLeod)

east confront these difficulties. But NACC role of honest broker. The baggage of Eu- membership does not provide insurance rope’s past struggles for liberation, unifica- under article 5, only assurance derived from tion, and conquest prevent other powers consultation. NACC offers a vehicle for act- from assuming this leadership role. Few have ing in concert to conduct peacekeeping op- the will, and none have the resources. erations and defuse crises in a new environ- American defense dollars have been well ment through common goals, tools, and spent. Over the years we have continually openness in communication. Eastern and honed our fighting forces and technology. Central European nations are eagerly look- No other nation can project and sustain ing to the west for a means to enhance secu- combat power as well. Strategic lift, tactical rity in troubled, unpredictable times. NATO aviation, amphibious capability, and aircraft is listening and will step forward as the sin- carrier battle groups are just a few examples gle most important forum for an emerging of the sustainable combat power that we can security architecture. provide in a short period of time. Also, America has a leadership role in this America’s lead in theater ballistic missile de- landscape just as it has since the end of fense will help protect vital regions and World War II. We will continue to lead be- forces in both crises and conflicts. Weapons cause it is impossible to shun the challenges of mass destruction are proliferating and bal- and unknown dangers that accompany listic missiles have the potential to deliver today’s unparalleled opportunities. The U.S. them. Operation Desert Storm dramatically role in the Alliance is shaped by common demonstrated that such weapons are politi- national interests, the accident of geography, cal as well as military threats. We need to de- and the reality that our treaty commitment velop a capable defense against them. is a political bond not only to security, but Technological advantage is valuable, but to a system of procedure. America is trusted it is only part of the story. American fighting as a European power: it is a cultural, politi- men and women are unique and respected cal, and economic force as well as a partici- because they have demonstrated their ability pant in the area’s security institutions. Geo- to combine land, sea, and air power in a dra- graphic separation ensures that we play the matic synergy. Only our Armed Forces can field the finest men and women with the

52 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Stanton

best training and equipment. Preparing for neighbor’s house is of great concern to us for war at the operational level where the great- the obvious reasons. Our cultural affinity, est combat power can be brought to bear on political connectivity, and vital participation an enemy at the decisive moment and loca- in international commerce are ties that can- tion to achieve strategic and policy objec- not be broken. Thus a peaceful Europe is of tives is a tall order, but one for which the particular importance. NATO is key to con- United States is well prepared. tinued transatlantic security and the means Synchronized land, sea, and air forces of coping with a new environment and its can realize economies of scale. Greater ef- unpredictability. Forward presence enables fects with a smaller force can be achieved by us to affirm our commitment to the Alliance melding preparation, skill, and technology. while enhancing regional stability. The As we reduce our forward-based forces in Eu- United States maintains its security by en- rope to approximately 100,000 military per- gaging in collective defense. In sum, collec- sonnel by FY96, we must ensure that we re- tive defense is America’s defense. JFQ tain the right balance of combat and support forces. Despite the smaller forward-based NOTES presence we must plan and train for a full 1 John A. Reed, Jr., and NATO (Washington: spectrum of missions. U.S. forces will con- National Defense University Press, 1987), pp. xxii, 44. tinue to be called upon to act in concert 2 U.S. Bureau of the Census Release, 1991. 3 U.S. Department of Commerce, ”U.S. Trade with with allies and friends or alone. According to Major Countries and Regions of the World—Revised Secretary of Defense Aspin’s comments on Data” (Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce, the Bottom-Up Review: 1993). 4 The U.S. will maintain a corps headquarters, John W. Wright, editor, The Universal Almanac (Kansas City: Universal Press Syndicate, 1993), p. 121. with support units, and two heavy Army divisions 5 Organization, NATO Hand- consisting of two brigades each, as well as approxi- book (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, mately two and one- fighter wings in 1992), p. 144. the European theater. In addition, there will be five 6 Ibid, p. 143. brigade-sized sets of Army prepositioned equipment 7 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Alliance’s and one set of forward deployed Marine Corps equip- Strategic Concept (Brussels: NATO Office of Information ment. The Navy Sixth Fleet will continue to routinely and Press, 1991), p. 7. patrol the Mediterranean. 8 Announcement of Bottom-Up Review Results, Joint State/DOD Message, September 1, 1993. Aspin also stressed that our “troops sta- tioned in Europe will remain there primarily to reinforce European security, [and] they will also be available to de- forward presence enables ploy on relatively short no- us to affirm our commit- tice for other missions such as peacekeeping or peace-en- ment to the Alliance forcement.” 8 American for- while enhancing regional ward-based forces can meet stability the challenge posed by an emerging security landscape. Flexibility and sustainability guarantee that EUCOM’s forces will con- tinue to be relevant. These forces are funda- mental to a national strategy which merges political and economic realities in an unpre- dictable climate with security concerns. U.S. interests are linked to global stabil- ity, and Europe and Africa are among the re- gions of importance to all Americans. We live in a global village where a fire in our

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 53 Quartermaster aboard USS Cimarron taking a reading during RimPac ’90.

A SOLDIER U.S. Navy ( Lisa Petrillo) IS A SOLDIER By ROSEMARY BRYANT MARINER

Summary

From Desert Storm to Tailhook, prevailing attitudes about military women are being reformulated and tested in myriad ways. How smoothly or quickly a shift in attitudes occurs is chiefly a matter of leadership. Commanders must give women equal access to a level playing field on which each competitor either succeeds or fails based on individual merit. If you put points on the scoreboard, you play. Tough standards outlawing fraternization, shunning paternalism, and minimizing segregation must be accompanied by realistic assessments of pregnancy, privacy, and harassment. As the result of recent statutory and policy changes, the hard fact is that women will fight as well as die in our next war. While a gender-neutral meritocracy may be difficult to achieve, an initial step is to promote a shared common identity and purpose: man or woman, a soldier is a soldier first.

This article is based on the winning entry in the 1992 LtCol Richard Higgins, USMC, memorial essay contest sponsored by the National War College class of 1985.

54 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Mariner

hree years ago hundreds of thou- Now the debate has shifted to the exclusion sands of men and women were of women from ground combat. Despite the preparing for combat. Faced with fact that women serve in combat ships and the potential of chemical and bio- aircraft, it is still common to hear senior T people in uniform openly express opin- logical weapons, Scud missiles, and Iraq’s large army, these service members left their ions—even in front of subordinates—that families for an unknown fate in a distant women do not belong in combat units. After place. Fortunately, their fate was victory over Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced the enemy and the vast majority of them re- his decision regarding women in combat turned home safely. In the greatest display of aviation, the hard reality is that women will military prowess since World War II, the fight and die in the next war. Gulf War was a resounding affirmation of The same principles that military leaders the All Volunteer Force as well as national have used for centuries to forge effective leadership which allowed the Armed Forces fighting forces, namely, discipline and ac- to fight to win. It also impressed on America countability, underpin gender integration. that more than 41,000 women in the mili- Successful integration is dependent on a tary went to war alongside men. Desert common identity and purpose: a soldier is a Storm fundamentally altered the debate over soldier. The initial step, both for those doing women in combat by demonstrating— the integration and those undergoing inte- under any accepted meaning of the phrase— gration, is to regard themselves and each that women had been in combat. other first and foremost as officers or as sol- In a televised war, the Nation watched diers, sailors, marines, and airmen. women serve on ships in the Gulf, fly troops Mythology deep into Iraq, and cross occupied Kuwait Many commonly held axiomatic beliefs, with ground forces. They also often accepted uncritically, fall into the cate- three prevalent myths learned that combat exclusion gory of myth. According to one political sci- about women and war: laws and policies did not protect entist the sure sign of a myth “is the accep- women from becoming prison- tance of the logically and empirically war is manly, soldiers ers of war or coming home in dubious.” 1 Judith Stiehm identifies three are substitutable, and body bags. Yet instead of the prevalent myths about women and war warriors protect predicted hue and cry, Ameri- which she reduces to: war is manly, soldiers cans accepted with both re- are substitutable, and warriors protect. These morse and respect the sacrifices myths are the rationale for arguments of its sons and daughters. female against women in combat. The best way for prisoners and fatalities perhaps provided a skeptical male soldiers to accept that women tougher test than if many women had been can fight is by observing competent women captured or killed. Unlike the high, imper- performing successfully and being integrated sonal casualty statistics of the protracted into military operations—they must see with conflict in Vietnam, the small number of their own eyes to believe. There is also a losses made it difficult for the public to be generation gap between senior military men indifferent to the perilous effects of war on who have not served with women in an op- any man or woman. erational environment and younger men After that experience, and prior to the who have competed with women in civil infamous Tailhook convention, Congress re- and military professional settings. Desert pealed all restrictions barring women avia- Storm demonstrated dramatically that, con- tors from combat thereby demonstrating the trary to myth, the domain of war is shared popular support which the measure enjoyed. by men and women. The second myth, known as substitution, is illustrated by the notion that all soldiers— Captain (Select) Rosemary Bryant Mariner, USN, from Air Force data processors in Omaha to is a naval aviator assigned to the Joint Staff and Navy fighter pilots at sea—are equally subject a member of the editorial board of the U.S. to combat duty. It was also exploded in the Naval Institute Proceedings. She commanded Gulf War. Despite the old refrain that “we’re Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 34 during all in this together,” the reality is that the the Gulf War.

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 55 A SOLDIER IS A SOLDIER

danger of combat can be minimized by seek- The history of racial integration in the ing rear-area or support positions. Most haz- Armed Forces serves as a useful road map for ardous duties, such as flying combat missions gender integration since it involves the same or serving with Special Operations Forces, in- institution and value system. Also, the perni- volve elite specialties that are voluntary, cious belief that was manifest throughout highly selective assignments with rigorous much of American history that Negroes were training. But in Desert Storm universal risk inherently inferior to whites is similar to the was also evidenced by the Scud missile attack visceral belief that women are inherently in- on Dhahran in which Reservists as well as ferior to men as warriors. Both beliefs resulted noncombatants died. Men and women in the in professional segregation. While the myths military volunteer for combat by virtue of join- differ for race and gender, how the military ing the All Volunteer Force, something driven overcame institutional and individual racial home to everyone by the Gulf War. prejudices to become a meritocracy is relevant The third myth about women and war is to gender integration. Though at times associ- that of the warrior-protector: men protect ated with affirmative action, which is contro- women, women don’t protect men. This versial because it makes race—rather than in- myth is perhaps the most pervasive, contra- dividual ability—a determining factor, the dictory, and damaging. For the myth to services have pursued racial integration with function women are not seen as individuals the noble goal of color-blindness. However, who may or may not need protection, but as the military must still keep the ever present a group requiring protection by definition. It fact of racism in check. is commonly conveyed by what have been Being black or female in the military has called the feminine images of what men several important similarities. Both are mi- fight for—peace, home, family. Men do not norities: women comprise 11 percent of the want women to fight because sharing the military, blacks 20 percent. Described as the province of war makes it difficult to retain visual invocation of the problem, there is no the illusion of protector. But the need for way either blacks or females can avoid some men to see themselves as female pro- stereotyping in an institution that is over- tectors does not justify discriminating whelmingly composed of “average white against women who neither need nor want guys.” The stereotypes suggest some funda- protection. Both men and women protect: mental perceptions: in the case of black men the strong protect the weak. it is intellectual inferiority, for women physi- cal weakness and lack of warrior characteris- From Prejudice to Integration tics. The notion of feminine frailty is so em- The problem of gender integration in bodied in male culture that weakness is the Armed Forces is not attributable to synonymous with being female as evidenced women or men but to prejudice. For com- by the frequent resort to derisive female ad- manders to deal with this prejudice, they jectives to insult weak males. must understand its nature and root causes. Such prejudice influences ideas about in- What is someone who believes that he or dividual ability. A white male entering a she is superior, not because of individual physically or mentally challenging program achievement but by virtue of gender? The such as flight training is presumed qualified common term for such a person is sexist, but and likely to succeed. He must be proven un- something other than simply not recogniz- qualified by poor performance. But a black ing women is at work here. To feel superior a man or a woman is presumed unqualified by sexist must “keep” women in their place. A fact of race or gender. This is especially a belief in natural superiority is the desire for problem for blacks, due to false notions unearned recognition. The military is an about lowered selection standards based on ideal institution in which to control conduct quotas. Blacks and women thus find them- without changing attitudes. Because the ser- selves in a no-win situation: performing vices emphasize professionalism as well as poorly proves a negative stereotype, doing objective and superior achievement, com- manders have a perfect remedy for redress- ing the prejudice of hard core bigotry—disci- plinary proceedings.

56 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Mariner

Transgressions The perception of women as problems is indicative of not recognizing them as indi- viduals. Discerning people by class rather than individual attributes suggests superior and inferior classes, and leads to differential treatment. For instance, if all women are ex- cluded from direct ground combat, vice un- qualified individuals, the natural conclusion is that women are inferior to men. Women aren’t good enough for real combat. Dis- parate treatment also results in perceptions of discriminatory or preferential treatment of one class over the other. Therein lies the genesis of many conflicts over gender inte- gration within the Armed Forces. A com- U.S. Air Force ( Alan Wycheck ) Treating wounded mander who stereotypes people runs the risk marine during Gallant of ruling by emotion instead of reason Eagle. well indicates preferential or unfair treat- which can lead to paternalism, with its in- ment. Both bear the burden of proof for class herent discrimination, and fraternization. and individual ability. Paternalism. An extension of the protec- It was not until racial incidents occurred tor myth, paternalism is a common and de- in Vietnam that the Armed Forces acknowl- structive offense. It is insipid because it is edged the existence of institutional racism. often committed for a benevolent reason, Faced with large numbers of poorly educated such as affirmative action or concern for a black draftees and racial violence at home, woman’s safety. Emotionally, it is easier for the military had to admit that racism went some men to view women as they would beyond individual actions. A lesson of racial their daughters, instead of soldiers, and thus integration is that prejudice does not consti- become protective. This ignores the fact that tute grounds for discrimination. The success female soldiers are responsible and capable of the All Volunteer Force disproved the so- individuals who have chosen to serve their called tipping point theory that an Army country and accept the same risks as men. made up of over 30 percent blacks might fail Paternalism also forms a basis for segrega- to attract white volunteers, thereby risking tionist policies that justify separate treat- support from a predominant white society.2 ment of the sexes to protect women; for ex- The opinions of a minority or a majority are ample, billeting emphasizing privacy or irrelevant, but there are grounds for remov- security for females over unit integrity or ing racists from the military. policies requiring women to deploy in pairs. One significant aspect of the success of Fraternization. Clearly defined and rig- racial integration is the fact that stereotyped idly enforced fraternization policies are fun- class characteristics are not used in recruit- damental to gender integration. Traditional ing and assignment policies. If individual mores prohibiting undue familiarity among ability was ignored, a case based on average personnel of different ranks are held as con- numbers could be made that blacks should ducive to good order and discipline. The po- be restricted to nontechnical fields. For rea- tential for undue consideration is greater sons that are unrelated to race, blacks get when men and women, accustomed to unre- lower scores than whites on aptitude tests stricted sexual and romantic relationships in and roughly 60 percent of enlisted African civilian life, must live and fight together in Americans are found in clerical and support uniform. Another reason that relationships specialties. They have also been represented between juniors and seniors are restricted is in other positions, from commanders of nu- the possibility of personal attachments over- clear submarines to the Chairman of the coming professional detachment. In organi- Joint Chiefs of Staff. zations which require personal risk and sac- rifice, seniors must give orders that may get juniors killed. The seniors must do so with

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 57 A SOLDIER IS A SOLDIER

KC–135 at Moron AFB, , undergoing maintenance during Restore Hope. U.S. Air Force (Janel Schroeder)

full objectivity and juniors must have confi- them a cohesive team. Cohesion is a function dence that orders issued to them are neces- of leadership, of shared experiences and pur- sary and fair. For women in uniform frater- pose, not homogeneity. Reason must over- nization is often associated with dating come emotion, and gender is not an accept- between officers and enlisted. However, frat- able excuse for misconduct. Nonjudicial ernization is defined by junior to senior rela- punishment is based on the need to establish tionships, not by gender. Some commanders a clear causal link between youthful misdeeds are confused when it comes to and their consequences, while not destroying the services are expert enforcing antifraternization stan- the careers of junior soldiers who are prone to dards since they assume that, as act before thinking. Seniors have no excuse in taking diverse sexual and romantic relation- for misconduct. The most natural yet danger- groups of young ships are natural, such conduct ous emotion in our profession is fear: control- people and making transcends the divisions of rank ling fear under fire is courage. which define appropriate junior them a cohesive team Gender Differences to senior relations. In this case fe- Two oft cited reasons for dissimilar treat- males are not seen as soldiers or ment of men and women are physical officers first, but as women. And if men and strength and pregnancy. But like racial char- women engage in personal rather than pro- acteristics, these differences are negated by fessional relationships, commanders may individual abilities that transcend class dis- adopt “an anything goes outside of work” tinctions. Claims that the average woman is attitude. This not only departs from the rule weaker, better coordinated, or shorter than that military members are accountable for the average man are fallacies of the undis- their actions regardless of duty status, it is an tributed middle. Some women are stronger, “anti-unit morale” time bomb. more clumsy, and taller than some men. The profession of arms has always em- Character traits that distinguish great war- phasized controlling emotions and divisive riors are not gender determined. The major conduct. The services are expert in taking di- verse groups of young people, with their ado- lescent hormones and prejudices, and making

58 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Mariner

difference is that most women can bear chil- invidious policy is mandatory pregnancy test- dren. But pregnancy, a temporary medical ing for Navy women officers and enlisted re- condition, must be distinguished from par- porting for sea duty aboard ships or aviation enthood which is a class common to both squadrons.3 The policy reduces a commander men and women. with many years of experience and responsi- Physical Strength. Professional athletes do bility for hundreds of lives to the level of a re- not have to take strength tests or meet spe- cruit. It treats pregnancy not as a normal cial physical standards prior to being al- medical condition, but as if it was symp- lowed to play. This is because selection for tomatic of HIV or illegal substance abuse, for competitive teams is predicated on demon- which we only conduct universal random uri- strated performance. In those activities re- nanalysis to prosecute identified offenders. quiring more fitness and skill than strength The idea that pregnancy is a major readiness women and men compete on an equal basis. problem is not grounded in fact. The vast ma- There is no need for an occupational physi- jority of unplanned personnel losses, which cal standard since the standard is outscoring are the tie-in to readiness, result from medical the competition. The other critical trait that causes such as sport-related injuries, disci- distinguishes great athletes from merely tal- plinary status, or dependent-related issues. ented ones is spirit. No test exists for spirit. Pregnancy must be viewed in terms of in- The only way it can be measured is on the dividual accountability. Military women, playing field when the pressure to perform is pregnant or not, are adults and fully responsi- greatest. Sports fans might cry foul because ble for their actions. Current policies that in the military physical fitness tests are gen- allow the temporary status of pregnancy to der-normed which means women are not re- become a reason for discharge are paternalis- quired to run as fast as men. That such tests tic and establish motherhood as a class differ- are also age-normed is seldom mentioned. ent from fatherhood. The pregnancy rate This is because physical fitness testing does among junior enlisted personnel is a visible not measure combat readiness, strength, or barometer of morale; high rates can imply job performance. fraternization, harassment, or other disci- Fitness standards ensure an individual’s plinary problems. Just as a high rate of drug health and are appropriately determined by infractions signals commanders that some- gender and age. Physical strength is a sepa- thing is wrong, pregnancies suggest that rate issue from fitness; it is related to per- young women are opting to escape. In a forming a given task, independent of gender. much publicized incident of high pregnancy Standards involve two questions: what is rates aboard USS Acadia during Desert Storm, strength and what is skill? If the for example, female sailors complained of ex- women in the military concern is that women would be tensive sexism and hostility within their com- 4 with children are still arbitrarily excluded, then the mand during the eight-month deployment. objective standard must be re- Family individual soldiers first viewed vis-á-vis the performance Unlike pregnancy, concerns over single requirement. This is best done parents and dual-service marriages are com- by those with operational experience and a mon to both sexes. The services have long realistic perspective on correlations among emphasized the importance of family to factors such as strength, skill, and motiva- morale by providing a large dependent sup- tion. Where doing it is the fundamental crite- port structure. It is unreasonable to expect rion, however, an individual man or woman service women to forgo marriage and family who completes military flight training or just as it is for service men. Military fathers Ranger school is strong and skilled enough who find themselves incapable of matching by virtue of successfully completing the professional and parental responsibilities course. These difficult programs also provide have traditionally received hardship dis- the important gut checks which measure charges. Military mothers must be held to spirit and commitment. the same standard. Women in the military Pregnancy. Perhaps the one gender differ- with children are still individual soldiers ence that evokes the most emotion, paternal- ism, and stereotyping is pregnancy. The clas- sic example of a seemingly benign yet

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 59 A SOLDIER IS A SOLDIER

first. Motherhood does not override profes- issue. Responsibility, accountability, and sional integrity nor does wearing the uni- commensurate authority are traits that de- form equate to poor parenthood. The appli- fine command in the profession of arms. cation of equal standards to mothers, They are as essential to successful gender in- including combat duty, will force a difficult tegration as they are to running an effective choice for those women who desire pro- battalion, ship, or squadron. The basic tected status to facilitate the demands of par- lessons of Tailhook involve a difficult pre- enthood over military service. A return to cept of leadership: sins of omission. Tailhook the draft need not alter this perspective since became a national scandal, instead of an em- family deferments were granted to fathers barrassing incident, because of what didn’t during past periods of conscription. As with happen after alleged assaults were reported. men, those women who cannot resolve this The principle that commanders are re- dilemma should be civilians. sponsible for everyone and everything under their command is central to preventing small Harassment and Discrimination problems from becoming mission-threaten- It is odd that a range of problems associ- ing conflicts. It is also the reason gender inte- ated with military women are identified with gration problems cannot be treated differ- sexual harassment because few everyday prob- ently from other issues of military discipline. lems have anything to do with sexual attrac- Because commanders must retain the author- tion. This is not to minimize the issue of un- ity to execute their responsibilities, the Uni- wanted sexual advances which tends to form Code of Military Justice and judicial pro- receive a disproportional amount of media at- cess should not be altered to create separate tention. In the military a senior’s sexual ex- categories or procedures for gender harass- ploitation of a junior amounts to professional ment and discrimination complaints. A incest. The fact that it is seldom viewed in judge advocate general investigation is the such harsh terms bespeaks a larger problem of traditional means to ascertain facts, establish sexism. Like racism, sexism underscores overt, accountability, and make recommendations subtle discrimination that makes gender inte- for disciplinary action. Such investigations gration very difficult to achieve. Gender har- should also reveal false accusations and help assment is better understood as a form of big- to avoid paternalistic over reactions. Inspec- otry, analogous to the maliciousness of tor general avenues are open if the chain of racism. Its purpose is to drive unwanted in- command fails. Under strict codes of individ- truders out of an institution. ual accountability, commanders can’t dismiss Soldiers subjected to this type of bigotry gender discrimination or harassment com- also have a professional duty to confront it. plaints as social or equal employment oppor- They must distinguish between imagined and tunity problems. Commanders must be held real slights, maintain perspective and objec- personally accountable. tivity under difficult circumstances, and at- Leading by example is a basic axiom of tempt to deal with problems at the lowest command. No one is more essential to suc- level possible. But if faced with gross discrimi- cessful gender integration than the unit com- natory acts by hard core bigots, one cannot mander whose example sets the tone turn away. Action must be taken through the throughout the ranks. If a commander truly chain of command for the same reason that wants to avoid problems brought on by gen- any serious violation of the trust placed in der integration, the most effective action is one’s rank and position cannot be ignored. to tell the unit’s assembled officers and en- While confrontation may cause an immediate listed personnel that women are here to stay backlash of resentment, victims must respond and that their military status is not open to to acts of bigotry. Failing to do so means as- debate. Anyone who has a problem with that suming some of the responsibility for future position can either get over it or get out. infractions. Such behavior exists not because Women have served in the defense es- most men are sexist, but because a majority tablishment for almost one hundred years. tolerates the transgressions of a minority. Tens of thousands of women saw service in Leadership World War I, some years before they gained For gender integration to succeed, big- the right to vote, and hundreds of thousands otry must be seen foremost as a leadership

60 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Mariner

of women held traditional as well as Military police patrol previously unimaginable positions dur- in a Kurdish village. ing World War II. Both conflicts were followed by brief periods of recognition for such distaff contributions, then the wartime achievements of women were forgotten. Ironically, significant institu- tional change for military women did not result from their participation in two world wars, but from the All Vol- unteer Force which required their per- manent participation in the Armed DOD Forces. Previously women had donned uniforms to free men for combat; but with readiness and are consistent with the princi- the All Volunteer Force they entered the mil- ples of our Nation. In the American military itary in progressively greater numbers in the tradition, what we fight for and how we place of men who chose to remain civilians. fight for it matters. Unlike Roman legionar- The number of qualified female volunteers ies or Prussian officers, our purpose is higher exceeded ceilings placed on their enlistment than simply killing for the state. We swear by personnel planners. allegiance not to emperor or fatherland, but During the military buildup of the to the Constitution of the United States. 1980s, the increased utilization of female re- Gender integration is about integrating cruits was essential to maintaining the edu- individuals. In a certain sense every American cational and technical quality of the enlisted is a minority of one. A gender-neutral meri- force. When the Gulf War ended, over 11 tocracy creates a level playing field where percent of the Total Force was female, membership on the team and the position the Armed Forces including 21 percent of the Army Re- played is predicated on individual ability. A servists who participated in Desert person’s sex is irrelevant. If you put points on that won the Gulf Shield. A significant sector of the the scoreboard, you play—no quotas, ceilings, War had been Armed Forces that won the Gulf War restrictions, or special treatment. Any player, gender–integrated had been gender-integrated for almost man or woman, who cannot perform or get twenty years. along with his or her teammates gets cut for almost twenty The next war will also be fought from the squad. It is the common identity of years with a gender-integrated force. A re- being a soldier first that transcends the differ- turn to conscription would not alter ences of gender and unites highly competi- this reality. With unrestricted participation tive people to serve a common purpose. Par- by women in the civilian work force, it ticipation based upon individual ability also would be politically difficult to implement a ensures the strongest possible national de- draft that impressed marginally qualified fense. Not only does it increase the size of the male citizens for combat duty but excluded pool from which to draw the best qualified better qualified female volunteers. Those soldiers but, as Clausewitz noted, it reminds who oppose extending the draft to women us that the support of all the people is funda- should be among the strongest advocates of mental to victory. JFQ a volunteer force. Would the conduct of mil- itary affairs be easier without women? Per- NOTES haps, but it would also be easier to dispense 1 Judith Hicks Stiehm, Arms and the Enlisted Woman with military justice, prohibit marriages, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), p. 32. maintain a force of “average white guys,” 2 Morris Janowitz and , “Racial Com- and do other things that occur in authoritar- position in the All Volunteer Force,” Armed Forces and Society, vol. 1 (Fall 1974), pp. 110–13. ian societies, but this is America. Instead, we 3 Navy Military Personnel Manuals 1820325 and have a complicated system of rights and 1830200. benefits to protect the interests and families 4 Greg Vistica, “Navy Women Report Good, Bad,” of service members. Such considerations, The San Diego Union, January 26, 1991, p. A–1. however inconvenient or costly, are toler- ated because they both enhance combat

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 61 Brigade Commander, USNA, Annapolis. U.S. Naval Academy

First Captain, USMA, West Point. U.S. Military Academy Vice Commander, Cadet Wing, USAFA,

Colorado Springs. U.S. Air Force Academy Students at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

DOD Marine Corps War College.

U.S. Marine Corps Joint Education: Where Do We Go From Here? By WILLIAM M. STEELE AND ROBERT B. KUPISZEWSKI

hen Congress enacted the by redressing the balance between service Goldwater-Nichols DOD Re- and joint educational needs. The accom- organization Act, few could plishments of Goldwater-Nichols in this W have imagined the eventual field are many and varied and include Joint impact it would have on military education. Specialty Officer (JSO) education, joint offi- The act fundamentally changed the way in- cer development goals, joint educational ac- termediate and senior colleges approach creditation, and increased interaction Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) among the service colleges. While the law

Summary

Seven years of reform in the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols Act have energized curricula at intermediate and senior colleges while redressing the balance between service and joint educational needs. The two-phase Program for Joint Education is efficiently moving officers into joint duty billets as faculty and student attitudes toward joint matters undergo a metamorphosis. Overall reform seems to be paying off as evidenced by the performance of the Armed Forces in Desert Storm. But the colleges cannot afford to rest on their laurels. It is time to look beyond Goldwater-Nichols and take steps to expand the use of doctrine in the classroom, streamline the Joint Specialty Officer educational process, institute an automated interlibrary system, create common joint scenarios for teaching, and amend the Joint Duty Assignment List.

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 63 JOINT EDUCATION

has achieved its purpose, a systemic review the ways in which DOD and the services man- of the joint educational process that has aged the careers of officers assigned to joint evolved is called for. This review should en- duty. Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act sure continued progress in developing offi- dealt with joint officer personnel policy and cers with expertise in service capabilities specifically required the Secretary of Defense and joint warfighting. This article docu- “to establish policies, procedures and practices ments the progress made and offers some to develop and manage joint specialty officers suggestions that can increase excellence of who are particularly trained in, and oriented JPME as seen from the intermediate college toward, joint matters.” In addition, it also re- level perspective. quired service colleges to intensify their focus on joint matters and the preparation of offi- Toward Goldwater-Nichols cers for joint duty assignments. The failure of the April 1980 mission to Title IV was originally intended to pro- rescue the American hostages held by Iran vide policy for JSO personnel management. helped set the stage for the Goldwater- But it was extended beyond that purpose Nichols Act. Desert One reinforced doubts through the efforts of Congressman Ike Skel- among many members of the ton, a member of the House Armed Services Goldwater-Nichols Congress, defense establish- Committee. He believed that in order for the ment, and military over the required service colleges services to develop high quality JSOs, a ability of the services to oper- strong joint educational system had to be to intensify their focus ate in a joint environment. At created together with effective personnel on joint matters the heart of the controversy management practices. Due to this interest, was whether an adequate orga- Mr. Skelton was appointed to chair a panel nizational structure existed to on military education to assess the capability carry out joint operations on short notice of the Professional Military Education (PME) around the globe.1 system to produce officers competent in In the aftermath of Desert One two sem- both military strategy and joint matters. inal articles on defense reorganization ap- peared in Armed Forces Journal International. The Skelton Panel One, entitled “Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff The Panel on Military Education of the Must Change,” was by the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee—also Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones. known as the Skelton Panel—began work in The other, “The JCS: How Much Reform is 1987. With the help of the institutions con- Needed?,” was by the Army’s Chief of Staff, cerned, the panel reviewed education at all General Edward C. Meyer. These articles intermediate and senior colleges. The initial called for institutional change and helped visit was to the U.S. Army Command and bring about hearings by the Investigations General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Kansas, where the panel members met with Committee and pave the way for Goldwater- faculty and students and heard testimony Nichols. from the college’s leaders. Repeating this A primary purpose of the Goldwater- process at each college, the panel gathered Nichols legislation was to strengthen the posi- data that led to publication in April 1989 of tion of the Chairman as well as the comman- a comprehensive report on military educa- ders in chief of the unified combatant tion. The report made a number of recom- commands. Congress believed that this would mendations that had a significant impact on eliminate many of the problems identified in PME.2 Among the most radical was a pro- the aftermath of Desert One. The act changed posed two-phase JSO educational process. Phase I would provide students at intermedi- ate and senior service colleges with expertise in multiservice matters which the panel be- Major General William M. Steele, USA, commands lieved officers of all services must under- the 82d Airborne Division and was previously stand. Phase II would provide a hands on Deputy Commandant, U.S. Army Command and course to teach the integrated deployment General Staff College; Robert B. Kupiszewski is and employment of joint forces. This second curricula coordinator at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

64 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Steele and Kupiszewski

Naval War College. U.S. Air Force Students at the Air War College. U.S. Navy

phase would be offered to students on tem- ▼ an accreditation process to assure pro- porary duty at the Armed Forces Staff Col- gram goals to be met by each service. lege (AFSC) in Norfolk, Virginia. Congress re- Using this guidance the service colleges sponded by mandating a two-phase JSO and AFSC set about implementing the two- education process. phase program—or Program for Joint Educa- Implementation tion (PJE)—during academic year 1990–91. Responding to a recommendation of the Initial PJE development and other as- panel, the Chairman created a Director of pects of JPME were closely monitored by the Military Education as a member of the Joint House panel. The General Accounting Office Staff in 1989. One of the first tasks of the (GAO), which reviewed PJE implementation, Military Education Division (J-7), Joint Staff, concluded in a 1991 report that the services was to prepare the documentation to de- were taking positive action to meet the spirit 4 velop and execute a JSO education program. and intent of the panel’s recommendations. A memorandum was issued in May 1990 to Congressman Skelton subsequently held sev- provide that policy.3 It was then revised and eral hearings to follow up on the GAO’s issued as CM–1618–93, Military Education findings which also confirmed that progress Policy Document, in March 1993 which speci- was being achieved in the field of PJE. fied the three elements of a two-phase JSO Joint Progress educational concept: The most important evidence of PJE ▼ an educational development framework progress is the increase and strengthening of with goals for officers of every service, from pre- joint curricula that has occurred across the commissioning to flag rank military educational community. Prior to ▼ specific learning objectives: basic joint Goldwater-Nichols most institutions regarded knowledge taught at intermediate service colleges jointness as a separate discipline normally (phase I) and application of that knowledge at AFSC (phase II)

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 65 JOINT EDUCATION

taught by one department. Today service col- that graduates of both intermediate and se- leges consider joint education as an inte- nior colleges share a basic joint knowledge grated subject area that cuts across every and common understanding of joint opera- warfighting discipline. For example, at the tions. Similarly, phase II at AFSC increases Command and General Staff School (CGSS) the understanding of joint operations. Each which is part of the U.S. Army Command and phase enhances joint planning and coopera- General Staff College, all five of its academic tion in the field and fleet—where theory is departments have joint learning objectives translated into practice. embedded in their courses. The joint lessons Progress has also been made with regard support PJE phase I and constitute about one- to standards. Before 1986 little policy existed third of its core curriculum. In addition, each to guide joint standards at service colleges. end of course after-action review includes an JCS Memorandum 189–84, “Joint Profes- assessment of how the course supports PJE. sional Military Education Policy Document,” Progress also has been made by adjust- offered guidance but lacked focus to meet ing the interservice mix of faculty and stu- the provisions of title IV.5 CM–1618–93 is a dents. Since the start of academic year significant step forward for joint standards. 1993–94, for instance, CGSS has had one air It contains common learning objectives, and one sea service officer in each of its 80 sister service student and faculty mixes, seminars. This is a student-to-faculty ratios, and institutional prior to the Goldwater-Nichols major increase over the standards for measuring program effects. As 40 air and 16 sea ser- aresult the colleges now have uniform Act, colleges taught jointness vice officers who at- benchmarks to plan joint educational pro- based on self-defined service tended the school in grams and requirements which apply to all needs 1986. Similarly, all the service colleges and to the National De- other intermediate ser- fense University (NDU). vice colleges—includ- The PJE accreditation process represents ing the College of Naval Command and Staff another major step forward. It provides a at Newport, Rhode Island; Air Command formal review process that ensures service and Staff College at , colleges are meeting specified standards and Alabama; and Marine Corps Command and achieving program goals and objectives. Staff College at Quantico, Virginia—have in- Modeled after civilian college accreditation creased their overall sister service student programs, PJE accreditation is a peer-review bodies to 55, 90, and 26, respectively. A bet- system that takes place at least once every ter faculty mix has also brought diverse skills four years. A key benefit of accreditation is and experiences to the service colleges. that institutions conduct self-studies of how One important reason for creating a to plan, execute, and evaluate PJE programs. joint culture is to shape new attitudes and This can take up to a year to complete and is perspectives. Through a better joint mix of a challenging and healthy experience. Both both students and faculty members, the edu- self-evaluation and accreditation demand a cational environment at the service colleges comprehensive internal review based on ex- has changed. Learning activities no longer ternal standards. Accreditation is a signifi- have a single service perspective. Seminar cant development for PME because it pro- discussions and college exercises now benefit vides common standards against which all from the ideas and opinions of officers of all the colleges can be measured. services as well as the expertise of civilians Another area of significance is the in- and international officers. This has changed creasing interaction within the PME com- the way graduates think about the profes- munity. The best example is found in the re- sion of arms, their sister services, and joint vitalized Military Education Coordination warfare. Conference (MECC) that meets twice a year. Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, col- These events are chaired by the Director of leges taught jointness based on self-defined the Joint Staff and attended by the presi- service needs. There was no coordinated dents and commandants of the intermediate joint education program that provided all officers with a common understanding of joint matters. But today PJE phase I ensures

66 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Steele and Kupiszewski

and senior colleges. It is a forum for dis- process and curricula. Without a complete cussing important educational issues. In re- body of joint doctrine the service colleges are cent years, the MECC agenda has been handicapped and must teach solely from ex- keyed to subjects related to enhancing joint perience rather than a sound doctrinal foun- education at service colleges, although other dation. A class discussion on joint operations critical topics are featured including aca- without available doctrinal publications is demic freedom, ethics, and technology. In like attending a school that does not have addition to the MECC, J-7 often hosts con- any books—the discussion may be lively but ferences to provide the colleges with a vehi- rarely substantive. Until joint doctrine is pub- cle for discussing problems and developing lished and fully integrated into college curric- common solutions. One such conference ula, JPME will be taught from individual ser- was recently held at NDU to review space vice perspectives and never attain its operations and their role in combat opera- potential. A study of joint operations must be tions. This event was attended by members doctrinally based. The intent of PJE—as well of the colleges, space community, and ser- as that of Mr. Skelton and the other members vices, and provided an opportunity to share of the Panel on Military Education—cannot ideas on how space issues can be integrated be met without publication of a complete edi- into curricula. Other conferences have fo- tion of joint doctrinal manuals. cused on command and control and on li- Feedback from many quarters revealed brary interconnectivity. shortcomings in PJE phases I and II that must be addressed to increase effectiveness and effi- The Payoff ciency. The on-going J-7 review of this impor- PJE improvements are meaningless if tant area is essential to deconflicting curricula graduates cannot perform effectively on the between the two phases. One key problem job. The real proof of progress is whether with a two-phase process is overlap. This is graduates have the skills and knowledge to the case on the intermediate level partly be- work as a joint team in combat. Operation cause the PJE design calls for teaching joint Desert Storm provided our first major test. knowledge in phase I, followed by the applica- The result was a clear validation of the prin- tion of that knowledge in phase II. ciples espoused by Goldwater-Nichols. Vic- Most intermediate service colleges teach tory in the Gulf War demonstrated that the subjects, particularly joint subject matter, at services and joint community were accom- a level of learning beyond knowledge. The plishing their educational mission. We have requirement to integrate and embed joint- come a long way from Desert One to Desert ness in curricula has dictated that the result- Storm. While PJE deserves much of the ing instruction be at a higher level, usually credit, we must continue to improve joint the application level of learning. Most inter- education. How do we sus- mediate colleges believe that every student— tain progress yet take joint not just those going on to phase II—need the key to joint education education to higher levels of more than a basic knowledge of joint opera- excellence? The joint com- is joint doctrine tions. At CGSS, for example, the curriculum munity and services must includes application-level study of deploying work together to answer this and employing a joint task force as the cap- question or progress will atrophy. On-going stone exercise to the academic year. All stu- initiatives focus on joint doctrine, enhance- dents participate because they all require a ments to PJE phases I and II, a Joint School thorough understanding of joint operations. of Advanced Military Studies (JSAMS), inter- This overlaps with phase II curricula which connectivity of library assets, common also teach joint task force operations. teaching scenarios, and the Joint Duty As- This positive aspect of redundancy in signment List (JDAL). These are only a few of joint curricula provides an opportunity to the issues that must be addressed if we are to enhance the learning experience in phases I sustain the gains made to date in PJE. and II and links both curricula. It is, how- The key to joint education is joint doc- ever, important to identify areas of overlap trine. It is the foundation of the educational and sort out curricula to eliminate unneces- sary redundancy. Thorough audits of curric- ula will reveal that we are shortchanging

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 67 JOINT EDUCATION

phase I service colleges on PJE. Audit results To build on this foundation of opera- will show that the length of phase II at AFSC tional art, a JSAMS should be the next logi- can be reduced by simply giving credit to cal step in the education process. There are, service colleges for subjects being taught at however, two problems with this model. phase II standards. The payoff will be a re- First, service-unique programs should not be duction in the time required to meet phase sacrificed or modified to achieve JPME objec- II requirements which will benefit each ser- tives and standards. Existing programs have vice college. This could be done without served the services well and each should forcing additional joint subjects into service maintain a service-unique perspective on op- college core curricula. In any case, improv- erational art. Second, although a JSAMS is ing the JSO two-phase concept is a challenge needed, focusing on the intermediate level that must be resolved. will not yield the greatest payoff. Rather, fo- The first step in reviewing the two-phase cusing on the senior service college level for concept should be a comprehensive audit of JSAMS would enhance joint professional de- PJE learning objectives and curricular over- velopment and provide more experienced lap. This will involve analyses of PJE learn- campaign planners. ing objectives to ensure they focus on skills Along similar lines several senior col- JSOs need to perform. It will also require re- leges are addressing the need for increased viewing where objectives should be taught education related to preparing and executing (in phase I or II, or both) and at what level campaign plans. A JSAMS would be an excel- (knowledge or application). The key is focus lent way to meet that need. Because theater on the desired levels of competence to be campaign planning is inherently joint, a achieved at the intermediate and senior col- JSAMS could create a student and faculty leges as well as the unique differences be- mix to develop and execute plans in a truly tween them. joint learning environment. A senior-level Another timely idea is to create a Joint JSAMS would produce graduates—lieutenant School for Advanced Military Studies or colonels or colonels/commanders or cap- JSAMS. In a journal article Congressman tains—who would be available for repetitive Skelton suggested creating a one-year inter- assignments as joint planners for the bal- mediate level JSAMS course under the aus- ance of their careers. pices of NDU. He pointed out that such a The U.S. Army Command and General course would provide the Chairman and Staff College has begun a curriculum to in- unified commanders with a pool of officers crease campaign planning in its two-year ad- well grounded in the planning and conduct vanced operational studies fellowship, a senior of joint operations.6 As envisioned JSAMS service college program. This enhancement would include 60 officers (20 from each mil- extends the current course 6 months and in- itary department) and be offered in addition cludes 24 to 30 months of regionally focused to similar programs of the Army, Air Force, courses. In the first phase, students receive a and Marine Corps. foundation in military theory, history, and The Army SAMS program has fostered strategy. Regional travel, exercises, and lan- similar curricula in both the Marine Corps guages are also included in the first year. In and Air Force. These service oriented courses the second phase the focus is on campaign have proven their worth over the years. All planning across the range of joint operations, have promoted better understanding of op- going beyond the study of generic campaign erational art in their respective services design to the individual preparation of com- while simultaneously producing exception- prehensive campaign plans (the overall cur- ally well qualified operational level planners. riculum devotes approximately 350 hours to The courses focus on intermediate service planning). End results are turned over to college students in the rank of major/lieu- skilled practitioners assigned to unified com- tenant commander. The curricula approach mands and contribute to our body of knowl- operational art from unique service perspec- edge on joint operations. tives with joint operations a necessary by- Other colleges also recognize that more product of the education. must be done to produce theater campaign planners. The Air University has revised both intermediate and senior curricula to

68 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Steele and Kupiszewski

U.S. Army War College. U.S. Army DOD Students at the Armed Forces Staff College. put a greater emphasis on campaign plan- Through such a coordinated plan libraries can ning; AFSC is doing likewise in phase II. develop ways to share archives and special Desert Storm demonstrated the need for collections as well as other programs. The trained and experienced campaign planners. plan should automate service-unique The senior colleges must continue to empha- archives, expand current library collections, size this important aspect of modern war- fund special collections, use multi-media ap- fare. A JSAMS at the senior level would be a proaches to increase information access, and step in this direction. In ten years its impact create service and joint knowledge networks. on theater campaign planning could be just The payoff for students, faculty, and staff is as significant as the intermediate level SAMS complete access to archives and collections at courses have been to operational art. all colleges through the power of automation Improvements can also be made in col- and personal computers. lege library systems. A coordinated Recently the defense establishment has plan that allows intermediate and senior col- been focusing attention on the use of simu- lege libraries to collaborate in enhancing their lations to train leaders. As simulations prolif- collective assets is technically possible. Such erate, there is a need for the services to work an initiative was taken at a MECC meeting in closer together to develop a common de- December 1992. Seeking to improve library nominator that will not only enhance learn- coordination, the MECC endorsed the con- ing but provide a way to improve joint plan- cept of a joint knowledge network and gave ning. That common denominator should be the Army the lead in studying library inter- connectivity. To share service college library assets a multiservice master plan is needed.

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 69 JOINT EDUCATION

joint doctrine along with the development the list. This causes a double standard at ser- of joint common teaching scenarios. The vice colleges and has an adverse effect on Army has relied on common teaching sce- morale. For example, the Joint Systems Divi- narios for years to standardize curricula and sion at CGSS is composed of eleven faculty: learning across its school system. CGSS has four Army, three Air Force, two Marines, and developed common tactical teaching scenar- two Navy. All the positions except for the ios for use throughout the Army school sys- Army’s are on the JDAL. It is difficult to jus- tem. This not only links the edu- tify such a disparity in the case of Army offi- common teaching cation system together but cers who work side by side with officers from scenarios would en- provides better understanding sister services who get JDAL credit for teach- under field conditions where offi- ing identical courses. And similar situations hance joint learning cers of all ranks must work to- prevail at the other service colleges. The and lead to improved gether to plan and execute com- JDAL problem also extends to the field and teamwork among bat operations. Common teaching fleet. Like some officers at the colleges, not scenarios could be adopted in all positions in joint activities are included the services joint education as well. Service on the list. As a result there are officers serv- colleges could pool their resources ing in various joint billets who do not re- to develop common teaching scenarios to ceive joint duty credit for their assignments. allow students at different colleges to plan The Goldwater-Nichols Act brought combat operations under similar conditions about dramatic changes in joint education. (a scenario for Southwest Asia is a place to In the past seven years it has revitalized joint start). Common teaching scenarios would curricula, established a system to educate enhance joint learning and lead to improved JSOs, and reinforced the attitudes of both teamwork among the services. students and faculty toward joint opera- Policy change is also required in regard tions. Much has been accomplished, and to the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). more remains to be done. We should not be Under current provisions, colleges cannot content with the status quo but instead include faculty positions from their own ser- should go beyond Goldwater-Nichols. Ex- vice on the JDAL. Instead, only officer posi- panding joint doctrine, streamlining JSO ed- tions from other services can be placed on ucation, implementing a senior level JSAMS, automating library resources, developing joint common teaching scenarios, and revis- ing the JDAL policies are all critical initia- tives that can take joint education to higher levels of excellence. The task is to maintain momentum. The initiatives discussed here as well as similar efforts by other service col- leges provide an azimuth. JFQ

NOTES

1 Special Operations Review Group, “Rescue Mission Report” (Washington: Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 1980), also known as the Holloway report. 2 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Panel on Military Education Report, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., April 1989. 3 Office of the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CM 344–90, Military Education Policy Document (Wash- ington, May 1990). 4 U.S. General Accounting Office, Army: Status of Rec- ommendations on Officers’ Professional Military Education, NSIAD–91–121BR (March 1991), p. 2. U.S. Air Force 5 Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, SM– 189–84, “Joint Professional Military Education Policy Document” (Washington, March 1984). 6 Ike Skelton, “JPME: Are We There Yet?,” Military Re- view, vol. 72, no. 5 (May 1992), p. 8.

70 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 he victory in the Gulf War is viewed as a vindication of those who called for military reform in Tthe wake of the disastrous 1980 Ira- nian hostage rescue mission and the flawed invasion of Grenada a few years later. Those clumsy operations were attributed to the fail- ure of the services to work together. Reform- ers charged that the services had exchanged officers and sent students to each other’s schools for years, but that it was not enough to transcend service culture. When it came to operations, land, sea, and air forces tended to operate autonomously, ignoring colleagues in Jointness, differently colored uni- forms. Critics cited numer- ous cases of counterproduc- tive parochialism. A service Service Culture, would develop weap- ons and equipment without regard to their compatibility with that and the Gulf War of the other services. By BERNARD E. TRAINOR Army and Navy com- munications systems couldn’t talk to one an- other, heavy equipment was acquired that could not be loaded into cargo planes, and Air Force F–15s and each service had its own doctrine for employ- F–16s flying over the battlefield. ing air assets, to cite a few impediments to smooth interservice cooperation. There was no intent to erase the differ- ences in service philosophies and cultures, but it was hoped that the unique characteris- tics and strengths of each service could be molded to complement one another so the whole would be greater than the sum of its parts. Jointness became the mantra of the Armed Forces after passage of the Goldwater- Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. Curiously enough, the first military opera- there was no tion in the wake of that intent to erase act was anything but differences in joint. Operation Just Cause, the surprise attack service cultures on Manuel Noriega’s regime in Panama in 1988, was an Army-run show from start to finish. It was planned by the Army, with the other services having lit- tle knowledge of it and less input. The Navy played virtually no role. The Air Force pro-

DOD vided only transport and a few misdirected bombs delivered by stealth bombers. Marines

This essay is drawn from a forthcoming book entitled The Generals’ War which will be published by Little, Brown next summer.

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 71 differing views. In this way he restored the checks and balances that disappeared when Goldwater-Nichols removed other JCS mem- bers from corporate decisionmaking (in their advisory capacity). This technique did not sit well with Powell and, although he never challenged Cheney’s right to solicit advice from others, it angered him. Goldwater-Nichols also increased the au- thority of theater commanders and freed them from service parochialism. Like the Chairman, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command (CINCCENT), Gen- eral Norman Schwarzkopf, understood both the letter and intent of the law and wielded it effectively. As the result of the act, he was king in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. All

U.S. Air Force within his domain had to do his bidding. Abrams tanks of the During the war, no serious attempt was made 24th Infantry Division by any service to go around Schwarzkopf. (A in the Saudi desert. in Panama at the time were given busy work service chief couldn’t visit the theater with- on the periphery of the operation. out the express permission of the CINC, and The first real test of jointness came in then only to interface with personnel of his Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. It own service.) Goldwater-Nichols had drawn showed, as reformers maintain, that much clean and efficient lines of authority. Service had been accomplished in fulfilling the component commanders under Schwarzkopf goals of Goldwater-Nichols. The most communicated only with him and he only demonstrable example was seen in the role communicated with Powell. of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, But the Gulf War shows that there is still General Colin Powell. As a result of Goldwa- a lot to be done if the Armed Forces are to ter-Nichols, he wielded power and influence operate in a truly joint manner. The struc- beyond that exercised by previous Chair- ture for joint operations put in place by the men. He was the politico-military maestro of act had not yet taken root. It was a template the Gulf War. His fellow members on the that did not fully accommodate the cultural Joint Chiefs were relegated to onlookers who differences among the services. For example, simply provided the forces. While Powell a Joint Forces Air Component Commander kept them informed, he made clear the in- (JFACC) was created with interservice agree- tent of the 1986 legislation. He in no way ment to govern the air war over both Kuwait needed their concurrence for his decisions. and Iraq. But JFACC was in the hands of the Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, un- Air Force and reflected that service’s cultural schooled in military affairs, knew that such biases. It believed in centralized control of singular power in the hands of one officer air power and attacks against only the tar- could make the Nation’s civilian leadership gets planners believed critical to the overall hostage to Powell’s advice. Cheney adroitly campaign. These views did not necessarily and informally bypassed Powell for addi- comport with those of other services. The tional military opinions to assure himself of Army, with only attack for air support, complained that its sister service was ignoring its needs. The Marine Corps, Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC also unhappy with Air Force control of the (Ret.), is Director of the National Security Program air war, but with its own air arm, simply sub- at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He verted the Air Force-dominated joint system. served as Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policy, There are no actual villains in this sce- and Operations at Headquarters, Marine Corps, nario: each service sought to accomplish the and has been the military correspondent of mission but was looking at the situation The New York Times. through a lens colored by its own concept of

72 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 T rainor

to draw up his ground offensive strategy. They then invited a British planner to join their supersecret inner circle, but excluded a Marine representative. Yet the Marines, with almost all their combat forces committed to the campaign, had greater call on formulat- ing strategy than the British. It was not a de- liberate slight; it was an unconscious reflec- tion of service culture. For decades the Army had institutionally focused on Europe. It had much more in common with a long-standing NATO ally than it did with a service with which it rarely associated. Even in the Army there were cultural differences which influenced performance. Heavy in armor brought from Germany, VII U.S. Navy (William A. Lipski) Task Force 155— Corps was organized, trained, and equipped USS Saratoga, to fight the Soviet army. Not surprisingly it USS America, and warfighting. The Air Force believed it was planned to fight in the Gulf as though it USS John F. Kennedy— shaping the battlefield for the Army by hitting faced the Soviets. Meticulous planning and in the Red Sea. Iraqi targets within kill boxes it drew on bat- deliberate synchronization of forces are hall- tlefield maps. But the Army had specific tar- marks of NATO procedures. The British 1st gets its commanders wanted hit and, when Armored Division, also from NATO Europe, the Air Force removed targets from the list fit into the VII Corps scheme of things far for reasons it viewed as sensible, the Army more easily than fellow Americans from complained bitterly. In turn, the Air Force XVIII Airborne Corps. Based in the United was frustrated in the last days of the conflict States as a central reserve, XVIII Corps was when the Army’s VII Corps placed the fire not NATO-oriented and was ready to go any- support coordination line so far forward that where in the world against any enemy. In aircraft could not freely attack Iraqi forces that respect there was greater kinship among fleeing toward Basra. its divisions and the Marines than with VII Even the Navy and Marines, conscious Corps. Culturally, battle procedures in the of their status as integrated components of 82d Airborne, 24th Mechanized, and 101st Air the naval service, had differences. The Navy Assault Divisions were different and less for- had little interest in amphibious operations, mal than those in NATO units. the centerpiece of the Marine raison d’ˆetre. Paradoxically, Schwarzkopf recognized The Navy was carrier-oriented and saw itself that jointness didn’t mean his subordinates in competition with the Air Force for laurels would all think or act alike. This was one in the air war. It was having a hard enough reason he adopted a decentralized command time trying to deal with Air Force tasking policy which gave maximum freedom of ac- orders for air strikes to entertain hare- tion within the framework of the overall brained notions from the Marines. The very plan. But having done so, neither he nor his idea of an amphibious assault in Kuwait did staff fully thought through the implications not conform to the Navy’s view of warfare. of executing the plan. Had they done so, The Marines had to dispatch a special team they could have better anticipated how the of amphibious planners from the United battle would unfold and been positioned to States to get the Navy to even understand capitalize on it. As it was the battle got away the possible virtues of an attack from the from the CINC at the outset and he never re- sea against the Iraqis. gained control. From the very outset of the Gulf crisis, The rapid Marine advance on the first Schwarzkopf himself violated the spirit of day of the war knocked the VII Corps jointness as enshrined by Goldwater-Nichols. timetable into a cocked hat. CENTCOM He imported a special team of Army planners planners counted on the Marines holding the enemy in place in southern Iraq so that VII Corps could launch its planned seven- to

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 73 ten-day offensive on the following day to What conclusions can be drawn from envelop the Iraqis further north. But the the Gulf War, the first major enterprise in Iraqis were in retreat. It should not have jointness? At the highest level the goals of been a surprise that the Marines were not the DOD Reorganization Act were largely going to dally at the Kuwaiti border. Their achieved. Throughout the war there were plan, which was known to CENTCOM, and clean lines of authority, direction, and re- the cultural commitment which the Marines sponsibility. But at field level jointness still have to offensive operations, should have has a way to go. Doctrinal differences be- made it clear that they would advance ag- tween the services still exist. As in the past gressively. The only thing Schwarzkopf they are frequently papered over with am- could do to get things on track was to speed biguous language in joint agreements, leav- up the VII Corps attack. But VII Corps was ing commanders in the field to interpret dif- trained to advance in a deliberate, synchro- ferences on a case-by-case basis. Secondly, nized fashion. This was part of its culture, so the degree of jointness is directly propor- well suited to a war in Europe. To tional to the degree of dependence implicit Schwarzkopf’s frustration they didn’t move in any given set of circumstances. The ser- fast enough. But once vice that depends most on support from a the service that depends again he should not have sister service will champion jointness. The most on a sister service will been surprised since he Army is the prime example of dependency. knew the corps comman- Services capable of semi-autonomous action champion jointness der and his style of opera- are inclined to go their own way if circum- tions. Schwarzkopf’s de- stances allow. The Navy and Air Force fall centralized style of leadership undid his into this category. carefully crafted strategy. Finally, joint culture has not yet matured Besides endorsing decentralized opera- sufficiently to take into account and accom- tional planning and execution, the CINC modate the cultural differences among the also elected not to name an overall com- services. And herein lies a danger as we pro- mander of both Army and Marine ground ceed along the path towards greater jointness. forces, which was legitimate given the wide If for its sake conformity is achieved at the ex- separation between service components. But pense of uniqueness, we could end up with a had he done so, more control might have military that is inflexible, uncreative, and been exercised over the offensive from the most importantly, predictable. Both for pre- outset. At very least the land force comman- sent and future planners the task is to recog- der would have seen that the planned rates nize the unquantifiable value that service cul- of advance between the Marine supporting ture plays in warfighting. It is a characteristic attack and the VII Corps main attack were to be exploited, not suppressed. JFQ unbalanced. It was expecting too much of jointness to assume that the Marine Expedi- tionary Force on the southern border of Kuwait would think much about its Army counterpart in the western desert. The same may be said of VII Corps in that desert. It cared little about what the Marines were up to. The force commanders planned to fight the war according to their own style. Gold- water-Nichols may not have intended that they fight the same way, but it did anticipate that a joint command would be knowledge- able of the differences and harmonize them.

74 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Reengineering Defense Transportation By RONALD R. FOGLEMAN

Abrams tank rolling onto Cape Isabel during a deployment exercise.

C–5 Galaxy arriving in Germany to pick up food to be transported to St. Petersburg during Operation Provide Hope. U.S. Army (Jesse Seigal)

he ability of Assyria in the 7th cen- tury B.C. to field 50,000-strong

DOD (John McDowell) armies in deserts and mountains is attributed to smoothly operating Summary T staffs and logistics. Over the centuries the in- Contingency plans often fail to give due consideration to novative commander has mastered the art of transportation and logistics. It is assumed that troops and foraging with two effects: limiting the avenue equipment will get there when needed, and that ports, of attack to those places where sustainment is airheads, roads, and railways will be available and secure found, and muting popular support by the from interdiction. These assumptions are dangerous. Today local inhabitants when their crops are confis- much of the core airlifter fleet is degraded or nonopera- cated or burnt, cities pillaged, and families tional, merchant ships and their crews are dwindling, and separated. General Erwin Rommel said that commercial airlines are pulling out of the Civil Reserve Air- the first condition for armies to endure the lift Fleet. The U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) strain of battle is to have ample stocks of consolidated the efforts of the Military Sealift, Military weapons, ammunition, and fuel. He added Traffic Management, and Air Mobility Commands in times of that battles are decided by quartermasters, for war and peace. Like a single-stop travel agency, TRANSCOM even brave soldiers can do nothing without is endeavoring to provide capabilities to deploy forces by weapons. And weapons can accomplish noth- various modes of transport from anywhere in the United ing without ammunition, and weapons and States and to supply them with the wherewithal to win ammunition are useless in mobile warfare un- the next war. less vehicles have the fuel to haul them. Ad- miral Ernest King echoed a similar point

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 75 DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION

C–17 Globemaster III over the coastline. U.S. Air Force ( David McLeod )

when in frustra- Such assumptions lead to complacency

U.S. Air Force ( Val Gempis) tion he said: “I and sometimes to disaster. Many assumed 6th Infantry Division don’t know what that the C–141 aircraft designed in the 50s, troops arriving by CRAF the hell this logistics is that [General George] built in the 60s, stretched in the 80s, and for Tandem Thrust ’93. Marshall is always talking about, but I want flown hard ever since would be there as our some of it.” Such historical vignettes should core airlifter. They overlooked that the size remind joint planners and commanders of equipment and the amount of supplies to when preparing for war or a contingency to be lifted have grown since the 50s, that we train to get where they are going and to be are not just postured for operations to large sustained when they get there. airfields in Western Europe, and that the ma- jority of our forces will now be predomi- Dangerous Assumptions nantly based in America. Some assumed that Having participated in a variety of the U.S.-flag merchant marine fleet would wargames, exercises, and contingencies, it is still be there in sufficient numbers with the clear to me that we frequently assume diffi- appropriate types of vessels to provide bulk culties of deployment and sustainment, but sustainment for the Armed Forces. They as- bank on infrastructure—at home, en route, sumed there would always be a pool of and in theater—to meet our requirements. trained U.S. merchant mariners to man Fast We assume that we will know the location of Sealift Ships and Ready Reserve Force vessels. every critical piece of equipment at all times Others assumed that railheads, roads, cranes, and that the transportation assets needed to and ports would always be ready to support rapidly mobilize and sustain a force will be surges accompanying major contingencies. there in adequate numbers, ready for battle. Assumptions lull us into thinking that we will always be able to fly and sail to facilities that are well maintained, sized to handle the General Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF, is Commander load, and immune from enemy attack. in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command, and I want to hang out a banner for every- Commander, Air Mobility Command, an Air Force one to read: check your assumptions. Don’t major command. A fighter pilot, he previously conduct wargames with invalid Timed Phase served as Commander, 7th Air Force, and Deputy Force Deployment Data and assume that all Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.

76 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Fogleman

Underway replenish- ment of amphibious assault ship.

Replenishment oiler USS Kansas City with USS Ranger in the Arabian Gulf.

U.S. Navy (J.E. Westfall )

he is actually asking about deployment and sustainment or, in other words, about strate- gic mobility. In the recent past a significant portion of the C–141 core airlifter fleet is grounded, a larger portion restricted from air

U.S. Navy (Gregg Snaza) refueling operations, and each aircraft lim- ited to carrying only 74 percent of its de- signed load capacity. Both U.S.-flagged mer- your forces will be there when needed. Ac- chant marine fleet vessels and the Americans counts of employing forces that don’t con- aboard them are declining in number with sider deploying and sustaining them are no improvement in sight. Commercial air probably suspect. Discussions about long carriers, under pressure to achieve profitabil- arm movements over maps without mention ity, have declined to participate in the Civil of railheads, roads, airports and airlift, sea- Reserve Airlift Fleet (CRAF) program to such ports and sealift, the health of the civil an extent that we are not able to meet all transport sector, and access to key, capable CRAF stage II and III requirements. Today, international transportation facilities should the United States is withdrawing from over- be carefully scrutinized. seas facilities which were once ready and available for global deployment and sustain- The System Today ment operations. When the President, through the Secre- It is fortunate that the President, Secre- tary of Defense and the Chairman, asks if tary of Defense, Joint Chiefs, and CINCs, as ports and airfields are secure, air superiority well as many in the Congress, support strate- has been achieved, a ground offensive is gic mobility programs like the C–17, sealift ready to begin, or victory has been achieved, ship conversion and construction, and Ready Reserve Force expansion and mainte- nance. But there are some who suggest we

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 77 Freighter PVT Franklin J. Phillips delivering supplies to Kismayu, Somalia. Joint Combat Camera (Terry Mitchell)

can’t afford the mix of The Case for Change assets recommended by One learns from a constant stream of ar- the congressionally man- ticles and speeches that change is required, dated Mobility Require- coming, or even here already. I couldn’t

U.S. Army (Jesse Seigal ) ments Study (MRS) agree more. But the distance between the M109 moving which did not meet the United States and other regions of the world onto a rail car at port warfighting requirements of the CINCs. De- hasn’t changed. The speed at which surface, of Beaumont, Texas. ploying forces with a low risk to lives was sea, and airlift assets will travel isn’t likely to too expensive. Thus a compromise was change any time soon. And the need to struck: delay the closure of necessary forces rapidly respond, almost simultaneously, in by giving the enemy more time to lay land many parts of the globe hasn’t changed. mines, seize key terrain, move tanks and What is changing—really happening—is equipment forward, sow harbors with mines, that America is returning to its origins as a and attack U.S. and allied forces that may be militia nation. America has not historically present, and thereby reduce the cost of maintained large standing forces, instead en- transportation. couraging reliance on the Guard and Re- Let me illustrate the importance of serve, and avoiding international entangle- reevaluating planning. MRS assumed that in ments. After major wars, including the Cold FY99 there would be a certain number of War, administrations have sought to radi- fully mission-capable cally downsize the military by shifting re- the speed at which surface, C–141s (which is now sources to domestic priorities on the as- highly unlikely), that there sumption that the remaining force structure sea, and airlift assets will would be a fully sup- is trained, deployable, sustainable, and capa- travel isn’t likely to change ported CRAF program ble of winning future wars—however win- any time soon (which is now in doubt), ning is defined. that there would be a cer- The U.S. Transportation Command tain number of converted (TRANSCOM) was established in 1987 with or constructed sealift ships (which is now de- the idea that unity of effort in mobility is es- layed), and that a badly needed new C–17 sential to ensuring joint combat effectiveness core airlift program would be supported on the battlefield. It was not until Operations (which is now under attack). The study also Desert Shield/Desert Storm that TRANSCOM pointed out that even after an expected 120 really came into its own. While successful, C–17s were built, a shortfall would exist the experience proved what coaches have (which is as yet unaddressed). Today MRS is known for decades: you must practice the undergoing further review. way you are going to play. That realization led to a 1993 DOD Directive which desig- nates TRANSCOM as the single manager for defense transportation in both war and peace

78 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 Fogleman

by placing the Military Sealift, Military Traf- with the Joint Transportation Corporate In- fic Management, and Air Mobility Com- formation Management Center—which was mands under one combatant command and recently chartered by DOD—to further re- assigning strategic mobility (or common fine plans to include detailed procedural, or- user) forces to an operational command. ganizational, and technological reforms. TRANSCOM is taking its newly assigned In retrospect one can see how in part the responsibilities very seriously. The warfight- defense transportation system developed in ing CINCs determine requirements for their both service and functional stovepipes. This respective theaters of operations. We, in has affected the ways in which requirements turn, determine within the constraints of are identified, tasked, contracted, monitored, the existing defense transportation system and billed to customers, and involves various whether these requirements can be met. If automation systems used to run these pro- not, we work with the CINC’s staff to mini- cesses—many of which originated centuries mize shortfalls and maximize opportunities ago (if measured in technological years) and for victory. In concert with the Office of the most of which don’t talk with one another, Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, military ser- even within a single headquarters. vices, Department of Transportation, and Some ask why TRANSCOM is unable to commercial transportation sector, we will provide services like the private sector. Why is strongly advocate the need for and promote it that in the marketplace there are local travel the acquisition of mobility assets to support agents who, upon request, can book a flight to our national military strategy. Florida, a ship for a cruise, a bus tour en route With the current administration’s call at intermediate stops, and a train trip to com- for reduced defense budgets while still main- plete the journey—one agent for air, sea, road, taining the capability to achieve victory and rail, and with only one bill? After sending when the Armed Forces parcels via a delivery service a toll free number the defense transportation are committed, we got a is available to check on where the shipments system developed in both clear, unambiguous mes- are, anytime of day or night. If that can be sage: we can’t continue to done by private enterprise, why can’t critical service and functional conduct business as usual, spare parts destined for a CINC’s area of re- stovepipes we can’t afford it finan- sponsibility be located and arrival times deter- cially nor do the men and mined in the DOD pipeline? women who are asked to go in harm’s way Reengineering the defense transporta- deserve a transportation system that reduces tion system will give customers—the Armed their chance of victory—even of survival. In Forces—the type of quality service offered by sum, a smaller force structure based predom- the private sector, or perhaps better. Soldiers, inantly in the United States which is not de- sailors, marines, airmen, and coastguards- ployable or sustainable in a manner that al- men—active and Reserve—as well as mem- lows us to win with what are considered bers of the civil service and the commercial acceptable losses is a hollow force. transport industries, have ensured a strong and robust defense transportation system Reengineering the System throughout our Nation’s history. For those To ensure military forces are successful who today go in harm’s way, TRANSCOM despite declining defense budgets, pledges to develop a new system that lives TRANSCOM is hard at work charting a up to Winston Churchill’s dictum: “Victory course for the defense transportation system is the beautiful bright coloured flower. into the next century. Change means more Transport is the stem without which it could than total quality management or improv- never have blossomed.” JFQ ing existing processes. It is investing the time and resources to reengineer the defense transportation system. The first task of a re- cently formed TRANSCOM initiatives team is to develop an ought to be defense trans- portation system as well as to provide a framework to get there. The team will work

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 79 Theater Missile Defense: A Joint Enterprise By DENNIS McDOWELL

USS Bunker Hill test firing missile.

U.S. Navy

Summary

When the first Patriot missile rose to meet an incoming Iraqi Scud during the Persian Gulf War, it heralded the age of anti-tactical missile defense. As ballistic missiles proliferate, theater missile defense (TMD) will continue to receive attention and resources while planners and commanders are considering its political and military implications. Proliferation has prompted adapting the Strategic Defense Initiative to protect not only the United States but also our forward-deployed forces. A residual presence abroad is inevitable for the foreseeable future to reassure our allies and maintain a sufficient infrastructure to rapidly expand our force structure if conditions demand. The deterrent value of such capabilities will be threatened without a defense against area ballistic missile threats. That protection will require a variety of TMD options as well as careful coordination among all the services, the NATO Alliance, and ad hoc coalition partners.

80 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 McDowell

hen Patriot air defense batter- missile defense plans provide for more effec- ies modified for an anti-tacti- tive TMD systems to become operational cal ballistic missile (ATBM) during the course of this decade. role were deployed to Israel The following discussion of TMD ad- W dresses its role in national military strategy, and during the Persian Gulf War, history was made as the Armed Forces the status of current programs, and the effec- intercepted an attacking Iraqi Scud in de- tive integration of this new mission into fense of forward-deployed forces and allied joint doctrine, planning, doctrine, opera- territory.1 Patriot’s success inaugurated a joint tions, and organization as well as into com- theater missile defense (TMD) mission when bined warfare. Army batteries rapidly deployed on Air Force U.S. Strategy C–141 Starlifters and the sensor cuing of American strategy has shifted signifi- American missiles against Scuds was carried cantly with the end of the Cold War and out by Air Force space-based assets. While the demise of the Soviet Union. It is no longer debut of Patriot was not perfect, its political based primarily on a global threat to U.S. in- value in underwriting Israeli restraint to en- terests, but instead on unpredictable and sure the solidarity of the coalition was piv- ambiguous regional threats. This shift oc- otal to the overall success of Operation curred as a significant proliferation of ballis- Desert Storm. From tic missiles with ranges that could seriously while the debut of Patriot was now on TMD will be a threaten regional stability spread to a num- critical component of not perfect, its political value ber of potentially hostile states. As a result, joint and combined the significance of TMD requirements in the to ensure the solidarity of warfare as ballistic mis- the coalition was pivotal sile proliferation be- comes an increasingly Patriot missile serious global problem. launcher in Saudi As the United States projects military power Arabia. overseas for crisis response and to protect vital interests, TMD may become a central feature of the politico-military equation. Because of missile proliferation in the post-Cold War world, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program was redirected in early 1991. The new focus was the develop- ment of defenses to protect not only the United States, but also our forces deployed overseas, power-projection forces, and allies and friends against accidental, unautho- rized, or deliberate limited ballistic missile DOD ( Pete Williams) strikes, whatever their source.2 The Gulf War made pursuit of effective TMD a top priority, as manifest in the Missile Defense Act of overall scheme of national military strategy 1991 and renewed in subsequent National has become more urgent than ever. Defense Authorization Acts.3 This increased The relevance of the TMD mission can focus on TMD was sharpened by the Bot- be readily understood in the context of the tom-Up Review which established TMD as Bottom-Up Review which identified four cat- having the highest priority.4 Current ballistic egories of “dangers” to U.S. security interests: ▼ dangers posed by nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, including the proliferation of such weapons and the massive Dennis McDowell is a foreign affairs officer with Russian nuclear arsenal inherited from the former the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He Soviet Union was a delegate to both the Strategic Arms ▼ regional dangers, including aggression by Reduction Talks (1982–88) and the U.S.-Soviet regional powers—some with ballistic missiles— Defense and Space Talks (1989–91). against the security interests of the United States,

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 81 THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE

In the event of a hostile invasion that Defended Footprints of Missile Propulsion Options threatens U.S. security interests, the highest priority of the Clinton administration’s strat- egy will be to halt such an invasion as early as possible in an initial defense. After that is accomplished U.S. forces will be built up in- theater concurrent with efforts to degrade enemy forces; then a counteroffensive to de- cisively defeat the enemy will follow; and fi- nally residual forces will remain to guarantee post-war stability.7 One of the major tasks that must be performed in the critical first- phase initial defense is protection of friendly forces and rear area assets from attack by air- craft and both cruise and ballistic missiles since their loss could be catastrophic for ef- fective combat operations. Appreciation of the quantitative threat from ballistic missiles can be derived from the threat projections for possible regional layered defense protects targets by intercepting ballistic mis- aggressors that were posited for the Bottom- A siles in the boost, assent, midcourse, or terminal stage. This chart illustrates defended footprints for three areas from the Up Review. In the future U.S. forces could be North Atlantic to the Eastern Mediterranean defended by (a) The- faced with hostile forces in a specific region ater High Altitude Area Defense (THADD) system with Kick comprised of as many as 750,000 troops, propulsion option, (b) THADD Block IV booster with Kick, and 4,000 tanks, 5,000 armored vehicles, 3,000 (c) Standard missile-2 Block IV with Kick and Lightweight Exoat- artillery pieces, 1,000 aircraft, a 200-ship mospheric Projectile (LEAP). navy, and anywhere between 100 and 1,000 Source: U.S. Navy Scud-class ballistic missiles (some armed with weapons of mass destruction).8 as well as internal conflict within states of key re- Short of actual hostilities, TMD will be gions that threatens stability important in maintaining regional deter- ▼ dangers to democracy and reform in the rence and stability. While American presence new independent states of Eurasia overseas is being reduced (especially in Eu- ▼ economic dangers—both internal and ex- rope), and there is an ongoing substantial ternal—to the United States.5 downsizing of force structure, it is essential Since U.S. forces are key to deterring or that some presence be retained. It is an im- defending against regional threats, the capa- portant political assurance for our allies and bility to deter or defeat aggressors in major a requisite for preserving our global security regional conflicts (MRCs) interests and regional interests such as a sta- short of actual hostilities, was the primary planning ble supply of oil from the Middle East. More- factor in the methodology over, the infrastructure of bases and daily TMD will be important in used in the Bottom-Up Re- contact with allies would be critical in restor- maintaining regional view. Moreover, a fundamen- ing a major presence if required by a reemer- deterrence and stability tal assumption in sizing our gent or newly emerging threat. Ultimately force structure was that we the deterrent posture of overseas U.S. forces must be able to fight and could be undermined if they became vulner- win two nearly simultaneous MRCs.6 Both able to regional ballistic missile threats. the overseas presence of U.S. forces and U.S.- Given the diverse U.S. interests at risk in based contingency power projection forces various regional security environments, a va- will play major roles in successfully combat- riety of flexible deployment modes will be de- ting regional aggression; and when aggres- sirable. For example, our presence in NATO sors possess ballistic missiles, TMD forces should make fixed ground-based TMD a vi- will also be essential. able option for European defense. TMD in Eu- rope could entail a mix of U.S. and allied as- sets; in addition, sea-based TMD in-theater

82 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 McDowell

would be an excellent complement Guided missile to—if not a partial alternative for— USS Mobile Bay. ground-based TMD. In areas such as the Middle East where U.S. secu- rity presence must be less conspic- uous for obvious political reasons, TMD may have to be positioned ei- ther just over or on the horizon. Sea-based TMD along with rapidly- deployable Army TMD units are well-suited for this situation. In Northeast Asia, flexible TMD plan- ning may be needed to balance the interests of allies and friends alike. Finally, ballistic missile threats could conceivably arise elsewhere with little warning—an event that U.S. Navy could require contingency projec- tion of TMD capabilities in crisis response similar to the initial use of Patriot in elements of the Army candidate system have the Gulf War. included upgrades to Patriot (PAC–2 and In sum, a regionally oriented strategy re- PAC–3) to be fielded over the next six years. quires that all U.S. forces operating in-theater PAC–2/3 upgrades expand the system’s bat- be protected against missile threats. This pre- tlespace for lower tier ATBM area coverage, viously missing dimension of U.S. strategy is increase firepower, and enhance lethality now fully appreciated. For example, the new with possible hit-to-kill technology. Navy TMD program is essential to the “lit- The Army is developing a wide-area, toral” strategy which now defines the Navy’s upper tier system called Theater High Alti- approach to ensuring regional stability. Yet, tude Area Defense (THAAD) made up of ad- complexity and uncertainty are constants. vanced high-altitude, long-range, ground- The complexity of U.S. politico-military rela- based interceptors and new ground-based tions with other countries as well as the un- radars. Fielding a deployable prototype for predictability of future crises which could in- national emergencies could start in the mid- volve ballistic missile threats dictate that the 90s followed by an operational THAAD by TMD mission must be dynamic, flexible, 2000. It will be air-transportable for response adaptive, and joint. These mission character- and might be interoperable with Israel’s istics are reflected in TMD programs and Arrow ATBM. In the next decade, a short- should guide us in integrating TMD into doc- range Army Corps Surface-to-Air Missile trine, planning, operations, and organization (Corps SAM) interceptor could offer added for joint and combined warfare. lower tier TMD protection for rapid force projection. If deployed, Corps SAM could be- Multiservice and Multinational come compatible and interoperable with The overall program objectives of the other Army, service, and allied systems for Clinton administration are to field a TMD joint and coalition operations. capability rapidly by upgrading existing sys- Navy TMD would use a planned 50-ship tems and developing more advanced sys- Aegis fleet for sea-based ATBM and theater- tems for acquisition later in this decade. The wide missile defense in two phases. First, a proposed budget to support those goals is near-term capability could be provided by $12 billion for FY95–FY99.9 modifying and improving the Aegis SPY–1 An array of service programs reinforces radar and weapons control system for the the joint and combined nature of the TMD Standard missile for defensive coverage similar mission. The TMD Initiative (TMDI) in- to PAC–3 for fleet concentrations, debarkation volves the Army, Navy, and Air Force.10 The ports, coastal airfields, amphibious objective areas, and expeditionary forces being inserted ashore. Second, for longer-term theater-wide

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 83 THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE

has been studying con- the outcome of Maximum Radar Coverage of Theater cepts for an air-based the Bottom-Up boost phase interceptor to negate reactive coun- Review for TMD termeasures such as is to continue a chemical submunitions core program and, through early and multiple intercept op- for the next five portunities, enhance years overall TMD effective- ness. Specifically, these include an Assent Phase Intercept (API) system comprised of a modified Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM) with a LEAP hit-to-kill vehicle and a true Boost-Phase Interceptor (BPI) using an airborne laser platform.11 Air Force sensor programs for TMD currently include: upgrad- ing or modifying the Defense Support Program he circles traced over the Red Sea and Persian Gulf represent the (DSP) system as used in the Gulf War to cue Pa- Tapproximately 400-kilometer coverage of Aegis Radars on missile . This range coverage would detect offensive missile launches triot batteries; and the Brilliant Eyes space- from either Iraq or Iran and provide defensive protection for Saudi based sensor which has been under design by Arabia, Egypt, and portions of Israel as well as for ships in waters ad- BMDO. Congress has directed the Pentagon to jacent to the Southwest Asian region. choose only one of these three systems to per- Source: U.S. Navy form the missions of tactical warning and at- tack assessment and TMD cuing. The outcome of the Bottom-Up Review for TMD is to continue a core program for the next five years emphasizing develop- ment and acquisition of Patriot PAC–3, THAAD, and Aegis/SM–2 Block IVA systems. Also, a technology demonstration program for Corps SAM and technology research for a sea-based upper tier system as well as for an ascent phase interceptor will proceed.12 TMD as a broad mission entails three other tasks in addition to active defense: passive defen- sive measures such as hardening and decep- tion, counterforce (preemptive) offensive at- tack options, and command, control, and communications for TMD assets. These tasks are no less joint in nature. For example, counterforce attack options—preemptive de- struction of hostile ballistic missiles prior to launch—undoubtedly (1) will involve multi-

U.S. Air Force ( Pedro Ybanez) sensor identification and acquisition of Examining Scud launchers, (2) will likely involve air-control missile northwest targeting of both Army and Air Force ground of Riyadh. upper tier ATBM capability the Aegis Vertical attack aircraft, and (3) will conceivably in- Launch System might be upgraded to accept a volve Navy attack operations. sea-based interceptor consisting of Standard— An additional asset available in the anti-mis- with new Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projec- sile defense repertoire is the capability of tile (LEAP) hit-to-kill technology—or a com- Special Operations Forces. patible Army THAAD interceptor. The Air Force, in conjunction with the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO),

84 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 McDowell

Finally, command, control, and commu- nications for TMD will possibly involve all Northeast Asia Sea-Based Defense three military departments, with Navy ship- board sensor systems interfaced with Army missile defense batteries and possibly Air Force space-based and air-based ATBM assets. Clearly the complexities and challenges of the mission will make TMD both a highly integrated joint enterprise and a critical re- quirement for quick victory in joint and combined warfare in the 21st century. Beyond the oversight of TMD weapons development by the services BMDO is estab- lishing multiservice theater test beds that can provide computer simulation analysis and modeling of TMD in the areas of system ar- chitecture, doctrine, battle planning, systems integration, and war gaming. The test beds will use existing facilities funded by BMDO he two circled areas shown over the Ko- and the services including the National Test Trean Peninsula indicate the defense of- Facility at Falcon Air Force Base, Colorado, fered by SPY Radar coverage aboard Aegis and distributed National Test Bed. TMDI missile cruisers. The two-tier defended area plans for system testing and exercising—live indicates the upper tier of the Aegis Vertical and simulated—are being prepared in antici- Launch System with propulsion options. Source: U.S. Navy pation of TMD elements to be introduced in the services by late 1996. BMDO also man- ages TDM international participation and co- operation that include co-funded programs such as the U.S.-Israeli Arrow and architec- ▼ a NATO Air Defense Committee (NADC) ture studies with the British and Japanese. study of countermeasure, transportability, and in- The NATO approach to the ballistic mis- teroperability issues ▼ an Advisory Group for Aerospace Re- sile threat is to consider it as extended air search and Development (AGARD) study entitled defense which has resulted in establishing “NATO Ballistic Missile Defense in the Post-Cold an Extended Air Defense Test Bed (EADTB) War Era” that includes TMD. Both the Supreme Head- ▼ a SHAPE working group to identify long- quarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Tech- term requirements, assess the threat, and develop nical Center and the British Defence Re- operational concepts for TMD integration.13 search Agency participate in EADTB. It has In sum, TMD programs include multi- also attracted the interest of the Germans service participation in multiple weapons and French. One clear indication of the bur- technologies which when integrated effec- geoning interest in TMD by the Alliance is tively with possible allied systems will pro- the growing array of TMD activities within duce robust capabilities for defending mili- NATO. There are several groups—ranging tary and nonmilitary area and point targets from senior committees and international against various theater missile threats.14 military staffs to national staffs and research centers—working on various aspects of TMD Organizing for TMD integration. Some of the activities underway The introduction of TMD capabilities within NATO include: into the Armed Forces will be an evolution- ▼ a Defense Research Group/Research Study ary process in the next decade. Developing Group 16 study of command and control for ex- joint doctrine for TMD is ongoing and will tended air defense be updated periodically to accommodate ▼ a NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG)/ programmatic changes and developments. Sub Group 37 post-2000 technology forecast study Moreover, most allied TMD programs are at of solutions to various ballistic missile threats an incipient stage, and TMD planning for combined warfare raises myriad integration

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 85 THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE U.S. Navy (Wayne Edwards) Missile launching from USS Arleigh Burke. issues. These realities will undoubtedly chal- ▼ the need for interoperability among U.S. lenge those planners responsible for unified and allied TMD systems for use in combined op- direction of TMD. But if missile proliferation erations requires centralized technical direction, continues to worsen, TMD will become a policy planning, and negotiation with allies ▼ joint wartime mission critical to future re- centralization will ensure effective devel- opment of strategy, doctrine, and tactics for joint gional battlefields. Accordingly, a centralized TMD employment and joint approach to organizing for TMD is ▼ common technical challenges for BMD being developed. Unity of command is a systems—strategic or tactical—such as guidance, military principle of the highest order. Ac- propulsion, and sensors are most effectively and cordingly, TMD planning, development, and efficiently solved through common efforts organization suggest centralized control for ▼ fiscal constraints in the future will dictate an array of reasons: efficient use of resources which is best done through direction and centralized management ▼ missile proliferation is a global problem by a single command. that requires a planning perspective spanning more than a single region or individual CINC’s DOD organization for TMD must also be area of responsibility considered.15 Currently the Secretary and ▼ the evolutionary and dynamic nature of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition threats and regional security environments re- and Technology determine overall policy, quire flexible and adaptive force planning which program, and fiscal guidance for TMD. Re- is accomplished best with centralized control sponsibility for central management and di- ▼ the readiness, versatility, and basing re- quirements of U.S.-based contingency forces also rection of TMDI is assigned to the Director benefit from centralization and the Assistant General Manager for The- ▼ the need for joint TMD training and exer- ater Defense of BMDO. The Office of the Sec- cises requires centralized planning direction retary of Defense develops and ensures policy implementation, conducts program reviews, and assures compliance with the acquisition

86 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 McDowell

process. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs Gulf War and actively shape theater ballistic formulate concepts, validate requirements, missile defense as an exemplary joint and conduct liaison with allies, issue command combined enterprise will prove critical to and control doctrine, and establish com- the success of U.S. strategy in the post-Cold mand relationships, force structure, assets, War world. JFQ protocols, and rules of engagement. Ultimately, of course, only decentralized NOTES mission execution under the authority of 1 The first Patriot interception of an Iraqi Scud oc- CINCs, allied commanders, or joint task curred on January 18, 1991. force commanders can ensure that TMD is 2 On January 29, 1991, President Bush ordered refo- cusing SDI on Global Protection Against Limited Strikes protected in a conflict. CINCs must establish (GPALS). appropriate subordinate components re- 3 See the National Defense Authorization Acts for sponsible for identifying, analyzing, and fiscal years 1992, 1993, and 1994. tracking ballistic missile threats; TMD mis- 4 The review affirmed Secretary Aspin’s initial guid- sion operational planning, tactics, and exe- ance issued in May 1993 when the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was redesignated the Bal- cution; and planning and coordinating TMD listic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). support for other CINCs or joint task forces 5 Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Af- as directed. fairs (OSD/PA), “Secretary Aspin Announces Bottom-Up In combined allied commands such as Review Results,” News Release, September 1, 1993, p. 1. NATO which views TMD as extended air de- 6 Ibid, p. 10. 7 Ibid, p. 7. fense, it is most likely that TMD would be- 8 Ibid, p. 5. come a responsibility of the air component 9 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for In- commander. TMD must also be internalized ternational Security Policy (Strategic Defense Policy), in future joint task force planning, organiza- “U.S. BMD Policy Point Paper,” September 21, 1993. tion, and leadership. 10 Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, “1993 Re- port to Congress on the Theater Missile Defense Initia- And finally, the Unified Command Plan tive (TMDI)” (Washington: Department of Defense, (UCP) must be updated to clarify TMD com- June 1993). mand relationships and ensure that TMD 11 The original BMDO proposal for BPI (Brilliant Peb- commanders are provided with logistical bles) was relegated to a research program. support, satellite early warning information, 12 See OSD/PA, News Release, op. cit. 13 Source material for NATO activities: R. Peat and R. communications, and other requirements. Goodwin, “Theater Missile Defense Integration Issues,” Interservice cooperation for joint TMD oper- DNA–TR–92–102–N (Washington: Defense Nuclear ations will be critical in the years ahead es- Agency, June 1993.) pecially if—due to a continuing draw down 14 A comprehensive review of projected threats is in force structure—responses to threats be- found in Ballistic Missile Proliferation—An Emerging Threat, 1992 (Washington: System Planning Corpora- come more expeditionary. tion, 1992). In future expeditionary war- 15 only decentralized mission For more details on TMD responsibilities, see Bal- fare, American lives and the listic Missile Defense Organization, “1993 Report to execution can ensure success of military opera- Congress,” op. cit., pp. 4–2 through 4–5. that TMD is protected in a tions will depend upon get- ting TMD protection to re- conflict gions of interest prior to the arrival of U.S. forces and the effective integration of those defenses into an operational plan (OPLAN). Moreover, when combined operations are involved— including allied TMD systems—still another complex dimension will be added to plan- ning, coordination, and operations with for- mal allies and coalition partners. The ability to follow up on the ground- breaking success of Patriot in the Persian

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 87 A–4 Skyhawk preparing for launch from USS Intrepid off Vietnam. U.S. Navy (John G. Jacob)

The Single Manager By WILLARD J. WEBB

Summary

In the months leading up to the and the siege of Khe Sanh, General William C. Westmoreland (the Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) came to the conclusion that existing arrangements no longer enabled him to effectively coordinate and direct the air teams of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force in the northern part of the country. The solution was to place fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft under one manager. The officer selected was the Commander, 7th Air Force, which brought remonstrance from Navy and Marine commanders. In the ensuing debate, Westmoreland held that his concept did not affect service doctrine, roles, or missions. The concept was adopted in the event despite continued squabbling among the Joint Chiefs and field commanders while the control of air assets in I Corps unarguably improved.

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n the early spring of 1968, General OV–10A Bronco VTOL William C. Westmoreland, USA, the firing Zuni rocket in Commander of U.S. Military Assistance Mekong Delta. ICommand, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), introduced a single manager for tactical air in I Corps to make more effective use of available assets. He wanted to improve com- bat efficiency and streamline MACV organi- zation, but what began as an intra-command reorganization turned quickly into a serious interservice quarrel. A controversy began when Westmore- land named his own deputy for air, General William M. Momyer, USAF, as the single man- ager for air in I Corps, with opera- the single manager tional control of all fixed-wing aircraft, controversy was Marine and Air Force. The Marines re- sisted placing their assets under a non- one of the most Marine commander and the Comman- U.S. Navy ( A.R. Hill) acrimonious inter- dant brought the issue before the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) who, in turn, after service disputes of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister failing to agree called on the Secretary Churchill established an the Vietnam era of Defense to resolve the issue. But this for the entire Mediterranean area. The Com- did not end the dispute which dragged mander in Chief, Air Chief Marshal Sir on throughout 1968. The issue of controlling Arthur Tedder, controlled all air in North air assets was not unique to the Vietnam con- Africa, , and the Middle East. In North- flict. It arose in the European and Pacific the- west Africa, Tedder was subordinate to Eisen- aters during World War II and resurfaced in hower. Under Tedder was Northwest Africa the Korean War. Two decades later, the single Air Force, which consisted of all the air manager controversy was to prove to be one forces in the campaign. This organization of the most acrimonious interservice disputes combined all air elements in the area into a of the Vietnam era. single structure and allowed Eisenhower to The Prelude concentrate his air resources as needed.1 With the emergence of air power as a The North Africa experience demon- major element of combat power during strated the type of command arrangements for Air inVietnam World War II, the issue of control soon fol- needed for the invasion of Europe. In August lowed. In North Africa, General Dwight D. 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided Eisenhower, the Allied commander, initially to combine Allied commands for both air had no central direction of his air forces, and naval forces under an overall comman- with the U.S. Army Air Force acting indepen- der. Subsequently, they named Air Chief dently of Britain’s . Then at Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory comman- the Casablanca conference in January 1943 der of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF), the air component under Eisen- hower, the Supreme Commander of the in- Willard J. Webb served in the Joint Staff Historical Office for thirty vasion. But what appeared good organiza- years. His publications include two volumes on Vietnam, The Joint tion in theory did not work in practice. Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1969–1970 and The Joint Chiefs While all tactical air forces committed to the of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1971–1972. invasion came under Leigh-Mallory, the U.S.

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Army Air Forces and the the development of carrier air forces while Royal Air Force refused the Air Force believed the Navy was attempt- to put their strategic ing to assume part of the responsibility for forces under AEAF. They strategic air operations. Secretary of Defense feared a diversion of ef- met with JCS in fort from the strategic during March 12–14, 1948, to settle the dis- bombing of Germany. pute. The result was a statement on “Func- Consequently, Leigh- tions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Mallory planned all the Chiefs of Staff,” better known as the Key air operations for the West Agreement, issued on April 21, 1948. U.S. Navy (J.L. McDowell ) F–4B Phantom II from invasion and the first The agreement called for integrating the USS Ranger striking months of the war on the Continent and Armed Forces into “an efficient team of north in support of commanded tactical aircraft while strategic land, naval, and air forces” and for the pre- 3d Marine Division. aircraft remained under separate U.S. and vention of unnecessary duplication among British commands. Tedder, Deputy Supreme the services. With regard to specific responsi- Commander in Europe, coordinated Ameri- bilities, the agreement authorized the Navy can and British strategic bombers with both “to conduct air operations as necessary for ground and tactical air operations during the the accomplishment of objectives in a naval invasion and after forces were ashore. Subse- campaign.” It assigned the Air Force primary quently, in October 1944, AEAF was dis- responsibility for “strategic air warfare.” 4 solved. Thereafter the U.S. Army Air Forces The Key West Agreement did not pre- and Royal Air Force supported their respec- vent the issue of control of air operations tive ground forces in Europe. Coordination from arising during the Korean War. There of operations and settlement of problems MacArthur was Commander in Chief, were handled by the Supreme Commander’s United Nations Command, and Commander headquarters.2 in Chief, Far East, the U.S. unified comman- In the Pacific Theater the potential for der. His air component, the Far East Air trouble over control of air operations was Force (FEAF), was responsible for control of greater. Army, Navy, and Marine air was as- all air operations in Korea. Initially, the Navy signed to two major commands, the South- component, Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE), west Pacific Area under General Douglas resisted placing its air forces under FEAF, but MacArthur and the Pacific Ocean Area under did eventually recognize FEAF as the control- Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. But these forces ling authority for air operations. The all cooperated well, and centralized control Marines participated in Korea as well, and never became an issue. the Commander, FEAF, asserted that Marine The question of control and responsibil- planes should come under his control, as ex- ity for air operations arose immediately after ercised through 5th Air Force in Korea, in World War II. During the interservice de- support of ground operations when and bates of 1946 over unification and roles and where needed. The Marines objected, want- missions, control of land-based aircraft be- ing their assets used in direct support of came an issue. The Navy wanted control of their ground forces. In the end a compro- all air required for operations at sea, includ- mise was reached. Marine aviation did come ing those based on land. The Army argued under the control of the 5th Air Force, but that air operating from land bases should be was used to support Marine forces whenever under the Army Air Forces.3 The National Se- the tactical situation allowed.5 curity Act of 1947 unified the Armed Forces War in I Corps under the National Military Establishment Command arrangements governing (soon to be renamed the Department of De- Marines deployed in I Corps Tactical Zone fense) and created the Air Force as a separate (CTZ) in early 1968 dated from 1966 when service. It did not, however, resolve the Westmoreland proposed and JCS approved question of service roles and missions. that III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) op- Among other things, the Navy feared the erate as a separate uni-service command di- Army and Air Force were trying to restrict rectly subordinate to Westmoreland. III MAF was comprised of the 1st and 3d Divisions

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operating in the area, each with its own con- trol system: 1st MAW supported III MAF and units organic to it; 7th Air Force supported U.S. Army divisions, ARVN forces, and Republic of Korea marines; and, on a much smaller scale, Navy carrier-based aircraft, which were outside of Westmoreland’s jurisdiction, but responsive to him when requested.7 Early in 1968 Westmoreland became convinced that the coordination and direc- tion of the diversified air assets supporting ground forces in I Corps were beyond the ca- pability of existing command and control systems. The large number of aircraft com- mitted and the close proximity of airfields, he believed, dictated a more centralized man- agement of tactical air if he was to concen- trate air fire power effectively, exploit tactical flexibility, and provide balanced air support. He also was concerned that the Marines, who provided most of the close air support from Da Nang northward, were not supplying ade- quate tactical air support for the Army forces. These developments, plus the fact that Ma- rine fixed-wing assets now provided only a relatively small number of the total air sup- port sorties in I Corps, led Westmoreland to consider assigning responsibility for manag- ing all fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance planes in I Corps to one individual—his own deputy for air who also commanded 7th Air Force. This meant giving operational control of 1st MAW, which then resided with the American Embassy, Saigon I Corps Tactical Zone, Commanding General, III MAF, to an Air 8 the five northernmost Force general. provinces of the supported by 1st Marine Air Wing (MAW). Westmoreland first proposed the single Republic of Vietnam. The force came under Westmoreland’s opera- manager concept on January 18, 1968. He and tional control while in the service chain it the Commander of 7th Air Force met with was under “the command, less operational Lieutenant General Robert Cushman, Com- control, of the Commanding General Fleet manding General of III MAF, to discuss the Marine Force, Pacific.” 6 possibility. Westmoreland stressed that only This arrangement functioned the fixed-wing assets of 1st MAW would be in- well throughout 1966 and for the tegrated into the overall tactical air picture Westmoreland became first half of 1967 when the Marines while helicopters would stay under III MAF. convinced that the were the only American forces in I Cushman objected, however, on grounds that the proposed system would be doctrinally and diversified air assets CTZ. But as the enemy began to concentrate major forces in I functionally unsuited to his requirements.9 were beyond the Corps, Westmoreland increased From Saigon to Honolulu capability of existing strength in the region, deploying The Commander in Chief, Pacific command and control the Americal Division in the fall of (CINCPAC), Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, was also 1967 and then sending two addi- wary. He cautioned Westmoreland against tional Army divisions in January changing a system that had worked well for 1968. These forces, plus Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces, constituted a field army. With this buildup, three air teams were

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nearly three years. Any plan divesting III plans to implement the single manager con- MAF of operational control of its air re- cept. The plan, he specified, should give his sources, he thought, required “full consider- air deputy control of all assets, less heli- ation of all aspects of the problem.” Subse- copters and transport aircraft, and at the quently, the single manager for air concept same time provide for “Marine aircraft to was tabled, only to be raised again one continue direct support to their deployed month later.10 ground elements.” 12 The massive enemy Tet offensive, cou- The Marines opposed the single manager pled with increased requirements for tactical concept when it was first proposed. Now air in the defense of Khe Sanh, reinforced they objected at a higher level. On February Westmoreland’s desire for a single manager. 21, the Commandant, General Leonard F. “I have given long and detailed thought to Chapman, Jr., informed the Chairman, Joint this complex problem,” he told Sharp, “and Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, have concluded that the situation dictates USA, of his “increasing concern” over recent the creation of a single management ar- proposals by Westmoreland for assigning rangement...it is essential that I look to control of aircraft of the 1st MAW to the one man to coordinate this air effort and MACV Deputy Commander for Air. Chap- bring this fire power on the enemy in the man said that if such a plan were imple- most effective way in line with my day-to- mented, it would be “a flagrant violation” of day guidance.” 11 On February 19, 1968, the Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) 13 Westmoreland directed that Momyer, in co- and the February 1966 JCS decision fixing ordination with Cushman, prepare necessary command relations in Vietnam. He found no deficiencies in air support under the existing

I CTZ: Unified Management of Tactical Strike Aircraft

Khe Sanh Direct Air Support Center

Airborne Command and Control Center

Airborne controller (or radar) Air Force aviation

Single manager

Navy aviation control of strikes in the Khe Sanh Area coordination of firepower in the Khe Sanh Area III Marine Amphibious Force delegation of authority Task Force 77 combined frag order 1st Marine Aircraft Wing makes sorties available authority to scramble Marine aviation authority to divert Source: Bernard C. Nalty, Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1973).

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system or any evidence the change would expressed grave concern over the proposal enhance air support, and wanted to continue and its possible long-term implications for the existing arrangements for air support op- the air/ground team concept. Nevertheless, erations in I Corps without change.14 Westmoreland submitted the plan to Sharp Westmoreland found it difficult to un- who approved it with minor revisions on derstand the Marine concern. On February March 2, 1968. Westmoreland implemented 24, he explained the problem to Wheeler: the plan on March 8 which directed Cush- The situation has changed in I Corps as compared man to make available to Momyer all strike to what it was three years ago or even two months ago. and reconnaissance aircraft for mission direc- The enemy has concentrated a major portion of his reg- tion and his tactical air control system as ular forces in I Corps. I have had to counter this build- needed. Momyer would be responsible “for up with appropriate forces. I have the equivalent of a fragging [assignment of individual missions] field army now deployed [there]. To support this magni- and operational direction of these assets with tude of forces requires a major portion of the air assets all other available assets under his control to th of the 7 Air Force plus the air assets of the [Viet- meet the daily requirements of forces in CTZ. namese Air Force] VNAF, carrier forces, and Thai-based Consistent with the tactical situation, Marine forces. Marine air, therefore, has become a junior part- aircraft will be fragged...to support Marine ner in the total air effort, but an important one. The problem is one of coordination and directing all of these ground units.” The first missions flown diversified air elements so that the air support can be under the single manager system occurred on put where and when needed in the required quantity. I March 22, 1968.17 do not see how this can be accomplished without one Enter the Chiefs airman fitting the B–52s, fighters, VNAF, carrier air, With implementation of the single man- Thai-based air, and Marine air into schedules that do not conflict with one another. Thus, the old concept of ager concept, the focus of the controversy a geographical area of responsibility breaks down by shifted to Washington. On March 4, Chap- sheer magnitude of the forces going into I Corps.15 man voiced concern over the pending action telling Wheeler and other JCS members that Westmoreland added that his proposal Westmoreland’s plan violated the 1966 ap- would maintain the Marine air/ground team proval of III MAF as a separate command. He intact except when tactical situations dic- could not concur in an arrangement that tated otherwise. Moreover, he said there would prevent Marine air assets from being would be no change in service doctrine or directly responsible to Cushman. He wanted roles and missions.16 JCS to advise Sharp that only they could re- Meanwhile Momyer and his staff, after vise JCS-approved command arrangements consulting Cushman, presented Westmore- and urged Wheeler to obtain Westmore- land with a single manager plan. Throughout A1E Skyraider hitting land’s plan for JCS review.18 The Chief of the planning sessions, the Marines repeatedly target in Vietnam with Staff of the Air Force, General John Mc- phosphorous bomb. Connell, disagreed. In a personal note of March 4, he told Wheeler, “Westy has now done something he should have done a long time ago. He should also, in my opinion, place Navy air into the same structure. Also, I consider that Westy has the authority to do what he has done.” 19 the Marines repeatedly expressed Chapman’s recommendation went un- heeded until, three weeks later, he raised it grave concern over long-term again. He did not concur with Westmore- implications for the air/ground land’s action, he told JCS on March 23, and team concept recommended revoking the single manager plan. The Marines followed up with a brief- ing to JCS two days later. The new control procedure, the Marines said, would result in an “inevitable” increase in response time for both preplanned and immediate strikes be- cause of the additional “layering” of agencies U.S. Air Force

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in the chain. The Marines concluded that the situation changed, Westmoreland should re- overall system in effect prior to March 10 vamp management and control of those as- had worked well during nearly three years of sets “in light of the situation.” 24 combat, providing flexible and responsive During the JCS consideration of the sin- support to both Army and Marine Corps gle manager question, a principal Marine ground units. Since the single manager plan complaint was the lack of responsiveness of would require more resources to accomplish the new system and the long lead time be- similar results, but over a longer time, the tween requests for and authorization of pre- Marines wanted to return to the old system.20 planned sorties. Total elapsed time from bat- In reviewing the air control issue JCS talion request to first strike, the Marines said, sought Westmoreland’s views, including his was “about fifty hours.” Wheeler asked West- reasons for changing the control arrange- moreland to ensure that such requests were ment. Westmoreland replied in detail, citing handled in a timely manner. Westmoreland all the justifications previously presented to replied that the fifty-hour figure was mislead- Sharp and Wheeler.21 Should JCS rule against ing and said that the new system had actually his proposal, he requested the “courtesy” of improved response time. In any case, West- appearing before them to explain the practi- moreland directed modification of the system cal problems involved.22 to meet preplanned air support requirements. JCS considered the control of air assets Wheeler told Deputy Secretary of Defense in a series of meetings in early April but Paul H. Nitze of this pending modification could not agree. As noted, the Chief of Staff and that it would provide the necessary re- of the Air Force supported Westmoreland, sponsiveness for preplanned missions.25 and Wheeler took a similar position. On the On May 15, 1968, Nitze decided the sin- other hand, the Chief of Staff of the Army, gle manager issue in Westmoreland’s favor. General Harold K. Johnson, and the Chief of The unified commander, he said, must be Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas C. presumed the best judge of how to organize, Moorer, sided with Chapman. Consequently, command, and deploy his combat forces. He on April 21, JCS forwarded split views to the also concurred that the assignment of Ma- Secretary of Defense for resolution.23 rine air units under a single manager for air should neither set a precedent for central- Out of the Tank ized control of air operations under other It was militarily unsound, Wheeler told combat conditions nor pose a threat to “the the Secretary, to dictate to responsible com- integrity of the Marine air/ground team.” He manders of the level of Westmoreland and wanted control of III MAF air assets to revert Sharp how to organize and command their to “normal command arrangements” as the forces. He felt that, “Commanders of such tactical situation permitted. He noted the rank, experience, and knowledge of the prin- Marine concern over the responsiveness of ciples of war, who also have intimate knowl- air support under the single manager, but ac- edge of the specific situation facing them, are cepted Wheeler’s assurance that the system expected to utilize assigned forces and re- was being improved. Finally, Nitze wanted sources so as to maximize their combat effec- Wheeler to review the single manager sys- tiveness and minimize casualties sustained.” tem for necessary changes. Accordingly JCS He assured the Secretary that the single man- instructed Westmoreland in conjunction ager plan was an expedient to meet a tactical with Cushman and Momyer to continue his situation imposed by the enemy—the size- review of the single manager system and able buildup around Khe Sanh and along and submit monthly evaluation reports.26 south of the DMZ. Wheeler did not regard Nitze did not convince the Marines of the single manager system as a precedent for the merit of a single manager. On May 18, future assignment of Marine air units or as Chapman told his JCS colleagues that the cur- affecting the air/ground team concept. The rent procedure was “unwieldy, not yet pro- Chairman argued against directing Sharp to ducing the results it was designed to pro- modify the single manager system. Instead, duce.” Consequently, he proposed a the Secretary should direct JCS to note the re- vised arrangements for control of air assets in I Corps and advise Sharp that, as the tactical

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flexibility, responsiveness, and continuity in the management of preplanned air support to meet the day-by-day requirements of ground commanders.” Wheeler described the modification to Nitze as “a significant step in the reduction of delays caused by ad- ministrative procedure in handling requests for preplanned sorties.” 28 The modification did not satisfy the Marines. After two weeks of operation under revised procedures, Chapman told JCS on June 14 that the alterations “still will not meet the standards of responsiveness possible within the Marine support system.” Ground commanders, he said, were required to adjust tactical operations to accommodate advance scheduling of the air arm. Hence he could not accept the modification. Only by possessing U.S. Air Force A–1E Skyraider operational control of its own air assets could returning to base in III MAF ensure immediate availability of air South Vietnam. compromise. As “an interim measure to full support for the troops on the ground. reversion to normal command arrange- But Chapman did believe that the modi- ments,” he wanted to restore control of Ma- fication provided a framework for further re- rine fighter-bomber and reconnaissance air- vision. “An alternate interim solution,” he in- craft and control assets, as appropriate, to dicated, would be to return operational Cushman. Such Marine sorties as Westmore- control of 70 percent of his available sorties land regarded as necessary to ensure a proper to Cushman for direct support of Marine distribution of the total tactical air effort, forces, with the remaining 30 percent re- however, would be provided to 7th Air Force tained by Westmoreland for daily allocation. daily. This modification, he believed, would Chapman added that assets returned to Cush- not only increase responsiveness and reduce man’s operational control could be diverted delay in providing air support, but would be at any time to meet Westmoreland’s emer- “a logical transition step to the restoration of gency requirements. He felt that this proce- normal command arrangements.” 27 dure would increase responsiveness, allowing Semper Fatalis Cushman to assign sorties to the next day’s Before JCS could consider this Marine tasks as required by Marine ground comman- proposal, Westmoreland announced modifi- der’s plans while Westmoreland would retain cation of the single manager system. In his prerogative to preempt Marine resources if 29 essence, the change, to be effective on May needed for emergency situations. 30, would divide strike sorties into two JCS addressed the new Marine proposal groups: 70 percent for allocation on a weekly on June 19, but deferred action pending a re- basis through preplanned fragmentary oper- view by Sharp. Wheeler told Sharp that it ations orders or frags in accordance with was not necessary to do more than consider MACV priorities and the remaining 30 per- and comment on the proposal in his cent to be assigned on a daily basis by West- monthly evaluation of the single manager moreland to meet added requirements in re- system. Wheeler noted that reports of appre- sponse to enemy operations. Under this hension from the field indicated the prob- revised procedure, a specific and relatively lem was getting “out of hand” in Washing- constant number of strike sorties would be ton. Such was not the case, he said, adding: allocated weekly to major ground com- I wish to evaluate the control system as now modified mands, including III MAF. Westmoreland be- soberly, objectively, and without undue haste. In my lieved the change would provide “greater judgment it is only by proceeding in an orderly fash- ion that we can ascertain the facts of the situation and correct deficiencies to the end of providing opti- mum close air support to our ground forces.30

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there was no reason to believe the Marine air/ground capability had been impaired.31 In reviewing Westmoreland’s report, Sharp found insufficient information to sup- port the statements regarding the effective- ness of the system and asked Westmoreland for further support of his statements, specifi- cally data on the distribution of Air Force and Marine air efforts in South Vietnam dur- ing the evaluation period. The new COMUS- MACV, General Creighton W. Abrams, fur- nished this data on July 13.32 Two weeks later Abrams informed Wheeler that he had completed an appraisal of the single manager system. He cited im- provements in the processing of air support requests and a reduction in the administrative workload. He believed the system could be im- proved further by “a relatively minor U.S. Marine Corps (J. Morales) 1st MAW Crusader change”—arranging for III MAF to frag di- flying over enemy rectly those Marine sorties within the 70 per- position in support of On June 30, after the modified single cent weekly frags “or whatever split COMUS- Heli-Marine landing. manager procedures had been operating for MACV determines,” which were to be flown over a month, Westmoreland filed his in I Corps. (This would seem to have achieved monthly evaluation. Based on inputs from essentially the same result as Chapman’s June Momyer and Cushman, he reported to Sharp 14 proposal.) Such an arrangement, Sharp be- that the system had improved “markedly” lieved, would improve the evolutionary pro- since implementation. The 70/30 split in the cess further without detracting from the over- weekly/daily frag orders had proved “a giant all objective of single management.33 step in the positive direction of providing Sharp had planned to implement this maximum flexibility, responsiveness, and change immediately, but Wheeler asked him continuity within the mechanics of single to wait. Wheeler did not agree that it was a management.” Moreover, Westmoreland said relatively minor change. Sharp was retiring the 70/30 split provided executive control on July 31 and, as Wheeler planned to at- while delegating insofar as possible “plan- tend the ceremony, he suggested talking ning, allocation, and a degree of control” of about the proposal at that time.34 Sharp did strike support to major ground units. As a re- retire on July 31, and Wheeler participated sult tactical air support in I CTZ, as well as in in the ceremony, but what they discussed or the other corps areas, had improved. what decisions, if any, they reached on the Westmoreland noted that Cushman still single manager are not recorded. Nor did favored total management of his own assets Sharp take further action on the matter be- while Momyer supported current procedures. fore he retired. Westmoreland opposed the proposal to re- On September 4, 1968, the new CINC- turn 70 percent of air sorties to Cushman’s PAC, Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., forwarded control for direct support of Marine ground to Wheeler his evaluation of the single man- forces in I Corps on the grounds that it would ager system. After reviewing all pertinent in- be double management. Care must be taken formation as well as discussions with not to vitiate the Marine structure and system Abrams, Moorer, and Chapman, McCain for air/ground support. During the evaluation concluded that the system had improved period from May 30 to June 26 Marine battal- “considerably since its institution” and en- ions had received an average of 6.65 tactical abled Abrams to control the assets he re- air support sorties per day while Army battal- quired to carry out his mission. He noted ions received 3.03 sorties per day against a country-wide daily average of 2.14. Hence

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Cushman’s proposal to allocate a block of scheduled by III MAF on a daily basis to sat- sorties for fragging and Abrams’s opposition isfy the dynamic air support requirements of to it. He believed that, though the single all III MAF ground commanders, Army and manager system still did not give Marines the Marines.” He also recommended resuming responsiveness of their organic control sys- normal command arrangements for III MAF tem, it was “the best overall use of tactical air as soon as possible.37 in COMUSMACV’s assigned areas of respon- After seeking the views of Abrams and sibility.” He thought the system would con- McCain, and obtaining a review by the Joint tinue to improve as procedural modifications Staff, Wheeler forwarded Chapman’s recom- were smoothed out. He intended, therefore, mendations to Nitze on November 22, 1968, to continue the current single manager sys- stating that the field commanders continued tem, but to monitor it carefully. to support the single manager as the best Three days later, on September 7, overall use of tactical air in I Corps. There- field commanders McCain notified Abrams of his deci- fore Wheeler again recommended against continued to sion. With JCS concurrence McCain any further change.38 Nitze also accepted support the single rescinded the requirement for Wheeler’s advice again and the single man- monthly evaluations by Abrams, al- ager system for tactical air in I Corps, as manager as the best though both he and JCS wanted no- modified on May 21, 1968, operated without overall use of tification of any significant changes change during the remainder of 1968 and 35 tactical air in I Corps in the system. throughout 1969 and 1970. The issue even- tually became academic. With Vietnamiza- Nitze Redux tion of the war, the withdrawal of U.S. forces Based on McCain’s evaluation, initiated in 1969, Marine air operations Wheeler submitted a report on the single steadily declined. The operations fell by manager for air to Nitze on September 16, more than 50 percent in 1970 and ceased al- 1968. He told Nitze of the recent field evalu- together as the last Marine combat units de- ation, noting the careful and systematic con- parted in June 1971.39 sideration given the concerns of Chapman and Cushman. He described Abrams’s im- The Last Word provements and refinements in the system Despite strenuous Marine Corps resis- as well as his care not to vitiate the Marine tance to the control of its air assets by an Air structure and system for air/ground support. Force commander, the single manager for air Wheeler noted the Marine proposals for fur- worked and provided improved coordination ther revisions and of Abrams’s opposition. and direction of air elements in the combat Wheeler, like McCain, also acknowledged zone. Westmoreland viewed the initiation of that the single manager did not give the the system as part of his responsibility “to Marines their accustomed responsiveness, use all resources available to me in the most but added that air support for Marine forces effective way possible.” It was the one issue, had been “equitable under the circum- he later said, where had JCS not supported stances existing in I CTZ. . . .” He recom- him he would have considered resigning.40 mended continuing the single manager sys- The Marines, too, eventually conceded tem for as long as Abrams deemed it that the system improved coordination and necessary.36 control of air resources. Lieutenant General Chapman did not concur. While recog- Keith B. McCutcheon, who served as Deputy nizing the improvements made in the single Commander of III MAF for Air during 1970, manager arrangement, he pointed out that, confirmed this assessment in 1971: as Wheeler had stated, the system failed to There is no doubt about whether single management provide the Marines with their accustomed was an overall improvement as far as MACV as a responsiveness. On October 1, he requested a whole was concerned. It was. And there is no denying 30-day trial of a proposal by Cushman that the fact that, when three Army divisions were as- would in effect return tactical air assets in I signed to I Corps and interspersed between the two Corps to Marine control. He specifically pro- Marine divisions, a higher order of coordination and posed that, “following the MACV weekly al- cooperation was required than previously.41 location of air effort, Marine air, except that allocated by MACV outside of I CTZ, be

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 97 SINGLE MANAGER FOR AIR

The single manager experience in Viet- 17 Letter, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, “Single Man- nam proved the value of central control of agement of Strike and Reconnaissance Assets,” February air assets in joint operations. When air forces 26, 1968 (with draft directive to CG III MAF attached). Letter, CINCPAC Ser 00496 to COMUSMACV, same sub- of two or more services participate, the joint ject, March 2, 1978. Message, CINCPAC to CJCS and commander must look to a single manager COMUSMACV, 030735Z March 1968. COMUSMACV to plan, allocate, and coordinate all air re- Command History, 1968, pp. 433, 437. sources. While service needs must be accom- 18 Memo, CMC (ATA18–gwe) to CJCS, CSA, CSAF, modated, the overall joint mission remains and CNO, “Single Management of Fighter/Bomber/Re- connaissance Assets,” March 4, 1968. the primary concern. The issue of joint con- 19 Memo (handwritten), CSAF to CJCS, March 4, 1968. trol of air resources in the Gulf War recon- 20 CMC Memo number 21–68 to JCS, “Operational firmed this principle. JFQ Control of III MAF Aviation Assets,” March 23, 1968. Ma- rine Corps briefing for JCS, “Single Management of Strike NOTES and Reconnaissance Assets in Vietnam,” March 25, 1968. 21 Ibid, pp. 6–8. 1 Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, editors, The 22 Message, CJCS 3562 to COMUSMACV, March 31, Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. II, Europe: Torch to 1968. Message COMUSMACV to CJCS, March 31, 1968. 23 Pointblank, August 1941 to December 1943 (Chicago: Uni- Note to Control Division, “JCS 1478/125–2, Oper- ational Control of III MAF Aviation Assets,” April 5, versity of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 161–64. 1968. Decision On, same subject, April 8, 1968. Deci- 2 Ibid., pp. 733–56. Wesley F. Craven and James L. sion On, same subject, April 12, 1968. JCSM–237–68 to Cate, editors, The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. SecDef, April 19, 1968. III, Europe: Argument to V–E Day, January 1944 to May 24 Appendix D to JCSM–237–68 to SecDef, April 19, 1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 1968. 620–22. 25 Message, COMUSMACV 6342 to CJCS, May 15, 3 JCS 1478/9, “Missions of Land, Sea and Air Forces,” 1968. CM–3312–68 to DepSecDef, May 15, 1968. February 20, 1946, CCS file 370 (8–19–45) sec. 3. 26 Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, “Operational Control 4 “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of III MAF Aviation Assets,” May 15, 1968. Message, JCS of Staff,” April 21, 1948, in The Department of Defense: Doc- 9497 to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, May 20, 1968. uments on Establishment and Organization, 1944–1978 27 CMC Memo number 29–68 to JCS, “Operational (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. Control of III MAF Aviation Assets,” May 18, 1968. 276–85. 28 Message, COMUSMACV 14578 to CDR 7th AF and 5 Department of Air Force, Op- CG III MAF, et al., May 21, 1968, JCS IN 28559. CM– erations in the Korean Conflict, June 25–November 1, 1950, 3338–68 to DepSecDef, May 22, 1968. USAF Historical Study number 71 (Washington: Depart- 29 CMC Memo number 31–68 to JCS, “Operational ment of the Air Force, 1952), pp. 11–13, 19–30. Control of III MAF Aviation Assets,” June 14, 1968. 6 Message JCS 3964 to CNO and CINCPAC, February 30 Note to Control Division, JCS 1478/125–5, “Oper- 14, 1966. All official documents cited in this article ational Control of III MAF Aviation Assets,” June 19, have been declassified. 1968. Message, CJCS 2866 to CINCPAC, June 19, 1968. 7 COMUSMACV Command History, 1968, pp. 433–34. Message, CJCS 6737 to CINCPAC, June 19, 1968. “Proposal of COMUSMACV on Operational Control, III 31 Message, COMUSMACV 19472 to CINCPAC, July MAF Aviation Assets,” appendix A to JCSM–237–68 to 6, 1968, JCS IN 24664. CM–3651–68 to DepSecDef, SecDef, April 19, 1968 (hereinafter cited as COMUS- September 16, 1968. MACV Proposal on Operational Control). 32 Message, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV 102340Z 8 William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Gar- July 1968, JCS IN 37550. Abrams succeeded Westmore- den City: Doubleday, 1976), pp. 342–43. COMUSMACV land as COMUSMACV on July 3, 1968. and CINCPAC, Report on the War in Vietnam (as of June 33 Message, CINCPAC to CJCS, 272134Z July 1968. 30, 1968) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 34 Message, CJCS 8550 to CINCPAC, July 29, 1968. 1968), sec. II, p. 173. COMUSMACV Proposal on Opera- 35 Message, CINCPAC to CJCS, 040118Z September tional Control. 1968, JCS IN 47107. Message, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 9 COMUSMACV Command History, 1968, p. 436. 070210Z September 1968. Message, CINCPAC to JCS, 10 Message, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 182231Z 142049Z September 1968 JCS IN 67981. Message, JCS 9587 January 1968. to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, September 16, 1968. 11 Message, COMUSMACV 02365 to CINCPAC, 36 CM–3651–68 to DepSecDef, September 16, 1968. 191239Z February 1968. 37 Memorandum, CMC to CJCS, “Modification of Air 12 Ibid. Support System,” October 1, 1968. 13 UNAAF was the general JCS guidance setting forth 38 CM–3778 to DepSecDef, November 22, 1968. “principles, doctrines, and functions” governing the ac- 39 COMUSMACV Command History, 1969, pp. IV–20— tivities and performance of the Armed Forces. IV–22. COMUSMACV Command History, 1970, p. VI–19. 14 Memo, CMC (ATA16–ras) to CJCS, February 21, COMUSMACV Command History, 1971, p. VI–5. 1968. 40 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 344. 15 Memo, COMUSMACV to CJCS, “Single Manage- 41 Keith B. McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation in Viet- ment of Fighter/Bomber/ Reconnaissance Assets,” Febru- nam, 1962–1970,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. ary 24, 1968. 97, no. 5 (May 1971), p. 137. 16 Ibid.

98 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN

Admiral Arthur William Radford, U.S. Navy (1896–1973) Commander in Chief, Pacific Command Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

VITA

Born in Chicago, Illinois. Graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy (1916). Served on board the USS South Carolina (1916). Completed flight training (1921). Assigned to the fleet, at naval air stations, and in the Bureau of Aeronautics. Appointed chief of aviation training (1941). Commanded carrier division eleven in the Pacific (1943). Served at the Navy Department (1944). Commanded carrier division six (1944). Became the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (1948) and the Commander in Chief, Pacific/High Commissioner, Trust Territory of Pacific Islands (1949). Appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1953). In- volved in the so-called “revolt of the ”; as Chairman supported President Eisenhower’s “new look” policy and also dealt with the Formosa and Suez crises. Retired in 1957 and remained active in national security affairs, often being called upon for advice by the White House. Died at Bethesda Naval Medical Center.

On arrival in Washington, I wasted no time in reporting to... Secretary [of the Navy Forrestal]. He said something like this: “Radford, I have become increasingly concerned with the situation in regard to the merger fight or unification of the services....I have, therefore, had you ordered back to take charge of the Navy’s efforts to insure, if at all possible, that legislation on this subject, which is sure to be passed in the U.S. Navy not-too-distant future, is satisfactory from our standpoint. My personal position is that an improved and unified defense organization is needed. The President wants one quickly, and the Army is pushing for speedy action with his complete backing. You are to set up an office, under me, and go to work as soon as you can.” By 1946 I had a broad knowledge of the problems of the services. In my new job I tried to establish and define my own position. I concluded that: • There was no doubt that the services could not return to the earlier status quo, two separate and independent Departments of War and Navy. •Any new organization must attempt to coordinate military with national planning in political and economic fields. •A “joint chiefs of staff” organization, similar to the one that had worked so well under President Roosevelt in World War II, must become a statutory body.

—From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 99 1803 Ltrs & JW Rev 3/27/04 7:31 AM Page 100

FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

tical build up, deception operations, air and and control systems. I foresee a different first Letters... naval gunfire support, mine sweeping, and step leading to an evolution, not a revolution preparing the myriad of documents needed to creating a separate corps or service. make sure that men, equipment, and supplies Joint force commanders must be the primary reach the beach when required. I’m happy to information warriors. Senior leaders must accu- learn that all I have to do to synchronize complex rately dictate the prevailing and most urgent in- Americans and Somalis amphibious operations is to “teach soldiers to formation needs and manage information assets To the Editor—In “New Contingencies, Old climb down rope ladders and hit the beach.” as capably as they do time and forces. Is tech- Roles” (JFQ, Autumn 1993) Professor Hunting- Maj Robert P. Wagner, USMC nology becoming so complex that leaders bur- ton states that “It is morally unjustifiable and po- Student, Marine Corps Command dened with operational decisions can no longer litically indefensible that members of the Armed and Staff College direct how information resources and flow are Forces should be killed to prevent Somalis from managed? If so, the solution still is not to turn killing one another.” While true, that is exactly To the Editor—I read the letter to the edi- this responsibility over to information specialists what was happening as Somali warlords killed tor by Colonel Meilinger in the last issue with (warriors?) disassociated from decisions affect- opposition members through the weapon of disbelief. After displaying blatant service bias ing risks to forces. The race to improve informa- starvation. And, although “the United States has and parochialism, he took pot shots at examples tion technology must be kept in balance with the no interest in which clan dominates Somalia” of redundancy which diverted attention away means to manage technologies in our hierarchy our Nation does have a vested interest in the from the real flaw in Dr. Rosen’s argument of headquarters. A new breed of military leaders success of U.N. coalition-type operations, which (“Service Redundancy: Waste or Hidden Capa- could emerge from the process, but they will al- is why we are really there. Furthermore, recent bility?,” JFQ, Summer 1993). Rosen mistakenly ways command in the traditional sense. The only events suggest that future large-scale conflicts promotes redundancy by suggesting that cre- approach is to train commanders to be informa- in which the United States participates will be ative competition is healthy amongst the ser- tion warriors, each directing staff specialists to coalition rather than unilateral actions. vices and then appeals to good and bad inter- manage, protect, and use information to fight Maj Larry D. Collingsworth, USMC service rivalry to make his case. the battle. Responsibility for command still be- TCJ3/J4-LPR This is exactly the kind of debilitating thinking longs where it has always been, with those who TRANSCOM we ought to be eradicating, not advocating, in have the foresight and skill to manage both in- the pages of Joint Force Quarterly. What the formation and forces, not with a leader in com- Ahoy Maxwell! services and CINCs need to concentrate on is mand of only one field or the other. To the Editor—Ignorance and arrogance creative collaboration. We can’t afford to advo- Lauren D. Kohn are the words that come to mind to describe Col cate any (nonsporting) competition or rivalry— Science Applications International Meilinger’s letter (JFQ, Autumn 1993) question- creative or otherwise—between those who Corporation ing aspects of service redundancy in your should be cooperating and coordinating all their inaugural issue. Timing is everything, and the efforts to defend the Nation’s interests. In the I Like Ike Autumn issue of JFQ arrived here just as Dr. Joe long haul, jointness cannot be built on a shaky To the Editor—Congratulations on select- Strange was describing the complexities of the foundation of creative competition. Mutual trust, ing a picture of USS Eisenhower shown transit- Normandy invasion to students at the Command confidence, and collaboration are the construc- ing the for the cover of the inaugural and Staff College. Meilinger’s comment that “I tive building blocks of jointness. issue of Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1993). seriously doubt it took a great deal of training to CAPT J.K. Pernini, USN This carrier honors one of our Nation’s few mas- teach soldiers how to climb down rope ladders Dean, Joint and Combined Staff terful warrior-politicians and is a difficult symbol and hit the beach” received a well deserved Officer School of jointness to surpass. In 1958 another carrier, thrashing from students and faculty. Those who Armed Forces Staff College USS Essex, sailed through the canal as the out- took the greatest umbrage were my Air Force come of collaboration between President Dwight and Army students. Heaven help us if this is the Information Warriors Eisenhower and Admiral Arleigh Burke to carry standard fare served up at the School of To the Editor—I disagree with some points out a land-sea-air plan that set a precedent for Advanced Airpower Studies. made by Libicki and Hazlett in “Do We Need an today’s spirit of jointness. Col Nick Pratt, USMC Information Corps?” (JFQ, Autumn 1993). The D.L. Coulter JFQ Director, Marine Corps Command future of C4I for warfare—especially C2 war- and Staff College fare—lies in its integration into concepts and capabilities, not in separating it from joint com- To the Editor—Thanks to Col Meilinger for mand and control. Their premise is that force pointing out in his letter (JFQ, Autumn 1993) will be subordinate to a conflict between oppos- that all it really takes to pull off amphibious op- ing information systems. Whether this becomes erations is training troops to get into landing true someday, the argument seems to be that JFQ welcomes your craft and ride ashore. I’ve worried about insignif- information warriors must be in command. Infor- letters and comments. Write or icant things such as planning embarkation on mation management is too essential for joint FAX your communications to amphibious ships to sequence combat power command and control to be separate, and future ashore, preassault reconnaissance and hydro- warfare will strengthen, not weaken, this rela- (202) 475–1012/ graphic surveys to ensure that landing beaches tionship. The authors imply that an Information DSN 335–1012. can support the scheme of maneuver and logis- Corps would have to supplant current command

100 JFQ / Winter 1993–94 1803 Ltrs & JW Rev 3/27/04 7:31 AM Page 101

▼ Theater Air-Ground System— with a crisis action exercise intended Doctrine Joint considerations affecting air- to quickly coalesce individual semi- ground operations, service perspectives nars and create an appreciation of CURRENT ALSA on using air and air support of respec- the complexities of joint force opera- tive service operations, and unique ser- tions. This is followed by an CENTER vice airground systems that contribute overview of strategic synchroniza- PROGRAMS to the theater air-ground system. ▼ Foreign Humanitarian Assistance tion including service warfighting The following programs are un- Operations—Concepts, roles, responsi- philosophy and interagency opera- derway at the Air Land Sea Applica- bilities, and linkages between services tions with a focus on joint warfight- tion (ALSA) Center: and governmental as well as non- ing skills. Seminars analyze joint as- governmental agencies. See JFQ, num- pects of historical campaigns which ▼ Electromagnetic Spectrum Man- ber 2 (Autumn 1993), p. 116, for fur- agement—Procedures for commanders culminates in group presentations ther details. in planning, coordinating, and control- (each student also prepares two ▼ Joint Close Air Support (J–CAS)— ling the electromagnetic spectrum in short papers during the course). Standard procedures for close air sup- support of joint operations. Operational synchronization is port by both fixed- and rotary-wing ▼ Electronic Warfare Operations in then examined using case studies. In aircraft for all ground forces; ALSA— a Joint Environment—General unclassi- the primary review authority—will de- addition to traditional subjects such fied guidance for conducting joint liver a final draft through the Marine as crisis action and campaign plan- electronic warfare; a pocket reference Corps—the lead agent for the J–CAS ning, the course covers disaster re- handbook. joint publication project—to JCS and lief, counterdrug operations, and ▼ AWACS Ground Based Air De- then the draft will enter the joint pub- peacekeeping, humanitarian, and fense Operations—Joint early warning lication process. See JFQ, number 2 and air defense command and control limited objective operations. Over (Autumn 1993), p. 116. requirements to facilitate planning half a dozen exercises are conducted ▼ Anti-Radiation Missiles (ARMS) and operating a contingency joint air to supplement the case studies. in a Joint and/or Combined Environ- defense network. Next students focus on func- ment—Considerations for planning, ▼ Integrated Combat Airspace C2 — coordinating, and conducting antiradi- tional synchronization at the opera- Functions of service airspace manage- ation missile employment in a joint or tional level which provides them ment systems and how to integrate combined environment. with an in depth look at fire sup- them for the safe, efficient, and flexi- port, targeting, airspace control, de- ble use of airspace. For further details on these ception, air defense, joint suppres- ▼ Multi-Service Procedures for programs contact: ALSA Center, sion of enemy air defense, C4I, Forcible Entry Operations—Planning and 114 Andrews Street (Suite 101), logistics, and command relations coordinating requirements as well as Langley Air Force Base, Virginia capabilities and limitations to facilitate from a joint perspective. The course 23665–2785 or call: (804) 764–5936/ ends with a week-long war game a contested joint entry into hostile ter- DSN 574–5934 JFQ ritory; ALSA held final Joint Working which emphasizes operational level Groups to complete multi-service pub- decisionmaking. lication in October 1993; the Army has The new AFSC course also fea- Education proposed adopting this multi-service tures visits to unified commands publication as the initial draft of Joint and Washington as well as mentor- Pub 3–18. NEW SENIOR-LEVEL ing by retired general and flag offi- ▼ Army-Marine Corps Integration cers with expertise in joint matters. in Joint Operations—Techniques and COURSE procedures for effectively and effi- After twelve weeks of case studies, In response to congressional ac- exercises, campaign analysis, guest ciently integrating Marine and Army tion the Armed Forces Staff College units of Marine Expeditionary Force/ lectures, wargaming, and—most im- corps-size and smaller when operating (AFSC) has replaced its five-week portantly—learning from one’s in a joint environment. senior-level phase II Program for peers, graduates are better equipped ▼ Procedures for Requesting Recon- Joint Education (PJE) offering with a to become joint warfighters. JFQ naissance and Information in Joint Oper- new twelve-week course offered by ations—Basic background information the Joint and Command Warfight- about reconnaissance (RECCE) and ing School. The curriculum incorpo- standardizes procedures for requesting rates information drawn from uni- NEW JOINT ESSAY and using RECCE products compiled fied commands, Joint Staff, joint COMPETITION in an unclassified user-level procedures agencies, and military and civilian The U.S. Naval Institute—a non- manual. educational institutions. ▼ Single Channel Ground and Air- profit professional organization— The course emphasizes the ap- borne Radio System—Standard joint op- has announced the creation of the plication of skills acquired in phase I erational procedures for VHF–FM fre- Colin L. Powell Joint Warfighting at the service colleges and begins quency hopping systems known as Essay Contest. For information on SINCGARS that provide procedures to the contest see the announcement effect interservice communication and on the next page. operability.

Winter 1993–94 / JFQ 101 1803 Ltrs & JW Rev 3/27/04 7:31 AM Page 102

ANNOUNCEMENT Colin L. Powell JOINT WARFIGHTING

After four successful years, Entries may be heavy in the Warfighting Essay Con- ESSAY CONTEST uni-service detail, but test is turning “purple.” SPONSORED BY THE U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE must have joint applica- The U.S. Naval Institute is tion in terms of force pleased to announce the structure, doctrine, operations or first annual Colin L. Powell Joint organization for combat. Interoper- Warfighting Essay Contest. ability of hardware and procedures In the words of the former may be discussed within the context Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of of combat readiness. Essays are wel- Staff, the competition seeks “those come from military professionals who are motivated to enter this con- and civilians alike. test not by a need to ‘toe the policy The Naval Institute will award line,’ but who are devoted to the cash prizes of $2,500, $2,000, and security of this great Nation.” $1,000 to the authors of the three Essays should be about combat best essays entered. Maximum readiness in a joint context— length is 3,000 words, but shorter persuasive discussions of tactics, opinion pieces or “professional strategy, weaponry, combat training, notes” (typically 2,000-word or other issues involving two or technical arguments) may also be more services. competitive. ENTRY RULES

1 1. Essays must be original, must addition to a title to the essay. paper approximately 8 ⁄2 x11. essayist at a special ceremony in not exceed 3,000 words, and This motto shall appear (a) on Submit two complete copies. July. The award winners will be must not have been previously the title page of the essay, with (If typed on a computer, please notified by phone on or about published. An exact word count the title, in lieu of the author’s also submit an IBM-compatible 20 May 1994. Letters notifying must appear on the title page. name, and (b) by itself on the disk and specify word-processing all other entrants will be mailed 2. All entries should be directed outside of an accompanying software used.) by mid-June. to: Colin L. Powell Joint Warfight- sealed envelope containing the 6. The essays will be screened by 8. The three prize-winning es- ing Essay Contest, U.S. Naval name, address, telephone, social a panel composed of officers says will be published in Proceed- Institute, 118 Maryland Ave., security number, and short biog- from the five military services ings, the Naval Institute’s maga- Annapolis, MD 21402–5035. raphy of the essayist, the title of who will recommend six essays zine with a 120-year heritage. the essay, and the motto. This 3. Essays must be postmarked to the Naval Institute’s Editorial Essays not awarded a prize may envelope will not be opened on or before 1 April 1994. Board. The Editorial Board be selected for publication in until the Naval Institute has Proceedings. The authors of such 4. The name of the author shall will award the three prizes. made its final selections. essays will be compensated at not appear on the essay. Each 7. The awards will be pre- 5. All essays must be type- the rate established for purchase author shall assign a motto in sented to the winning written, double-spaced, on of articles.

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Documentation THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW Tomahawk missiles aboard USS Oklahoma City. EDITOR’S NOTE: The Bottom-Up Review was an effort to define the strat- egy, force structure, modernization pro- grams, industrial base, and infrastruc- ture to meet new dangers and seize new opportunities in the post-Cold War world. The review was a collaborative effort of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, unified and speci- fied commands, services, and other DOD components. Numerous studies formulated issues for decisionmakers and provided the analytical underpin- ning for the process. The summary of the Report on the Bottom-Up Review which appears below covers force struc- ture and was prepared by the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Other aspects of the report (such as overseas presence and force moderniza- tion) will be presented in subsequent is- sues of JFQ. U.S. Navy (Robert McRow)

New Dangers, New Opportunities size and shape of future The Cold War is behind us. The military forces. Soviet Union no longer exists. New dangers bring new Events in recent years—the fall of challenges, but they also the Berlin Wall, the Iraqi invasion of create opportunities: realis- Kuwait, and the failed Soviet coup— tic aspirations that, if goals underscore revolutionary change in are worthy, can mean a the international security environ- world of greater safety, free- ment. Most striking in the transition dom, and prosperity. The from the Cold War is a shift in the Armed Forces can con- dangers to U.S. interests which fall tribute to this objective. In into four broad categories: brief the new opportunities: ▼ dangers posed by nuclear ▼ expand and adapt ex- weapons and other weapons of mass isting security partnerships Lockheed (Schulzinger and Lombard) destruction and alliances ▼ regional dangers ▼ promote new regional security Engagement, Prevention, ▼ dangers to democracy and re- arrangements and alliances and Partnership form, in the former Soviet Union and ▼ implement the dramatic re- elsewhere Despite these revolutionary ductions in nuclear arsenals reached in ▼ dangers to our economic well- changes in the security environ- the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks being. (START) I and II treaties ment, the most basic goals of the The Armed Forces are central to ▼ protect and advance security United States have not changed— combating the first two dangers and with fewer resources, freeing excess re- protection of American lives and can play a significant role in meet- sources personal safety, maintenance of po- ▼ ing the other two. Predictions and for investment in other areas litical freedom and independence, conclusions about the nature and vital to our prosperity. and providing for our well-being characteristics of these dangers will and prosperity. help mold our strategy as well as the We also have core values to pro- mote: democracy and human rights,

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Force Enhancements to Halt a Short-Warning Attack

Persian Gulf Region Today’s Force Future Force Prepositioned 1 Battalion Training Set 2 Brigade Sets ashore Forces 1 Maritime Prepositioning Ship 1 Brigade Set afloat* (MPS) squadron 1 MPS squadron 7Prepositioning Ships 7 Prepositioning Ships

1 Carrier Battle Group (Tether) 1 Carrier Battle Group (Tether)

PHASE I FAIR GOOD Halt Invasion Lack of heavy forces to help stop invader 3 heavy brigade sets of prepositioned equipment Insufficient prepositioning Increased early-arriving land-based and carrier Limited antiarmor capability aircraft and long-range bombers Limited anti-tactical ballistic missile Improved antiarmor precision-guided munitions (ATBM) capability Improved ATBM capability

PHASE II FAIR GOOD Build Up Forces in Theater Slow closure due to modest sealift capability Airlift and sealift upgrades support rapid closure for Counteroffensive of heavy forces

Korea Today’s Force Future Force Prepositioned 1 brigade-sized MEF 1 Brigade Set ashore Forces 1 MPS Squadron 1 Brigade Set afloat* 2 brigade-sized MEFs (2 MPS Squadrons)

1 Division (2 Brigades) 1 Division (2 Brigades) 2.4 Fighter Wings 2.4 Fighter Wings 1 Carrier Battle Group 1 Carrier Battle Group 1 MEF 1 MEF

PHASE I GOOD GOOD Halt Invasion Substantial in-place forces 2 heavy brigade sets of prepositioned equipment Established command, control, communications, increased early-arriving land-based and carrier and intelligence (C3I) network aircraft and long-range bomber Rapid reinforcement form Japan, Okinawa improved antiarmor precision-guided munitions Limited ATBM capability improved ATBM capability

PHASE II FAIR GOOD Build Up Forces in Theater Slow closure due to modest sealift capability Airlift and sealift upgrades support rapid closure for Counteroffensive of heavy forces

*Brigade set would be positioned to “swing” to either region.

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peaceful resolution of conflict, and ▼ 400,000–750,000 total person- the nature and scale of the aggres- maintenance of open markets. To nel under arms sion and on circumstances elsewhere protect and advance such enduring ▼ 2,000–4,000 tanks in the world. If the initial defense ▼ goals, America must pursue a strat- 3,000–5,000 armored fighting fails to halt an invasion quickly, or egy of political, economic, and mili- vehicles circumstances in other parts of the ▼ 2,000–3,000 artillery pieces tary engagement internationally. world permit, decisionmakers might ▼ 500–1,000 combat aircraft This strategy of engagement is ▼ 100–200 naval vessels, primar- opt to commit more forces than defined by two characteristics, pre- ily patrol craft armed with surface-to- listed above (for example, additional vention and partnership. It advo- surface missiles, and up to 50 sub- Army divisions). The added forces cates the prevention of threats to our marines would help achieve a needed advan- interests by promoting democracy, ▼ 100–1,000 Scud-class ballistic tage over the enemy, mount a deci- economic growth and free markets, missiles, some possibly with nuclear, sive counteroffensive, or achieve human dignity, and peaceful resolu- chemical, or biological warheads. more ambitious objectives, such as tion of conflict, with priority given For planning and assessment complete destruction of an enemy’s to regions vital to our interests. The purposes we selected two illustrative war-making potential. But analysis new strategy will also pursue an in- scenarios that were both plausible also concluded that enhancements ternational partnership for freedom, and posited demands characteristic to our forces, focused on ensuring prosperity, and peace. To succeed the of conflicts with other potential ad- an ability to conduct a successful partnership requires contributions versaries. While various scenarios initial defense, would reduce overall by our allies and depends upon our were examined, we focused on ag- force requirements and increase re- ability to establish equitable politi- gression by a remilitarized Iraq sponsiveness and effectiveness to cal, economic, and military relation- against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, project military power. ships with them. and by against the South. The scenarios should not be Developing a Force Structure regarded as predictions of future Four broad classes of potential conflict but rather as yardsticks U.S. Force Structure: 1999 military operations were used in the against which to assess capabilities Bottom-Up Review to evaluate the in gross terms. Each scenario exam- Army adequacy of future force structure al- ined forces in relation to critical pa- 10 divisions (active) ternatives: rameters like warning time, threat, 15 enhanced-readiness brigades (Reserve) ▼ major regional conflicts terrain, weather, duration of hostili- (MRCs) ties, and combat intensity. Overall ▼ smaller-scale conflicts requir- these scenarios represented likely Navy ing peace enforcement operations ranges of these parameters. 11 aircraft carriers (active) ▼ overseas presence ▼ deterrence of attacks with MRC Building Blocks 1 (Reserve/training) 45–55 attack submarines weapons of mass destruction. In planning a future force struc- These types of operations al- ture, we established force levels and 346 ships lowed us to analyze the building support objectives that should en- blocks of the required forces. By able us to win one MRC across a Air Force combining and adjusting blocks to range of likely conflicts. Detailed 13 fighter wings (active) account for judgments about con- analyses of possible future MRCs, 7 fighter wings (Reserve) ducting simultaneous operations we coupled with military judgment determined the number and mix of about outcomes, suggest that the fol- Up to 184 bombers (B–52H, B–1, B–2) active and Reserve forces needed to lowing forces will be adequate to ex- carry out our defense strategy. The ecute our strategy for a single MRC: Marine Corps balance of this summary will focus ▼ 4–5 Army divisions 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces on the building blocks related to ▼ 4–5 Marine Expeditionary 174,000 personnel (active end-strength) MRCs which we considered the most Brigades 42,000 personnel (Reserve end-strength) demanding operations. ▼ 10 Air Force fighter wings ▼ 100 Air Force heavy bombers Major Regional Conflicts ▼ 4–5 Navy Carrier Battle Strategic Nuclear Forces (by 2003) During the Cold War thwarting Groups 18 ballistic missile submarines ▼ Special Operations Forces a global Soviet threat dominated de- Up to 94 B–52H bombers fense planning. Now the focus is on These forces constitute prudent 20 B–2 bombers projecting power to defeat potential building blocks for force planning. aggressors in regions of importance In a conflict response depends upon 500 Minuteman III ICBMs (single warhead) to U.S. interests. These aggressors are expected to be able to field forces in the following ranges:

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forces includes only combat force el- Combat information ements. Clearly, several types of sup- center on board USS port capabilities would play essential . roles in all phases of an MRC. These capabilities include, but are not lim- ited to: airlift; sealift; prepositioning; battlefield surveillance; command, control, and communications; ad- vanced munitions; and aerial refuel- ing. We must ensure that we provide sufficiently in these areas to meet the needs of our strategy. Second, certain specialized high-leverage units or unique assets might be dual tasked, that is, used in both MRCs. For example, certain advanced air- craft—such as B-2s, F-117s, JSTARS, and EF-111s—that we have pur- chased in limited numbers due to their expense would probably need to be shifted from the first to the second MRC. Enhancements to Support Strategy U.S. Navy (Tracy Lee Didas) As mentioned above we have al- SEAL Team desert ready undertaken or are planning a patrol. series of enhancements to improve the capability, flexibility, and lethal- ity of the Armed Forces, geared espe- cially toward buttressing our ability to conduct a successful initial de- fense in major regional conflicts. En- effectively to defend in- hancements include improving terests in another. Sec- strategic mobility (through more ond, fielding forces suf- prepositioning and improving airlift ficient to win two wars and sealift), strike capabilities of air- simultaneously pro- craft carriers, the lethality of Army vides a hedge against firepower, and the ability of long- the possibility that a fu- range bombers to deliver conven- ture adversary—or tional smart munitions. U.S. Navy (Mike Poche) coalition of adver- Strategic Mobility. Plans call for saries—might one day substantial enhancements to our Fighting Two MRCs confront us with a larger-than-ex- strategic mobility—most of which In this context, we decided early pected threat. In short, it is difficult were first identified in the 1991 Mo- in the review that the United States to foretell precisely what threats we bility Requirements Study or MRS. must field forces sufficient to fight will confront ten to twenty years First, we will either purchase and de- and win two major regional conflicts from now. In this dynamic and un- ploy the C-17 or purchase other air- nearly simultaneously. This is pru- predictable post-Cold War world, we lifters to replace aging C-141 trans- dent for two reasons. First, we need must maintain military capabilities ports. Since the development of the to avoid a situation in which the Na- that are flexible and sufficient to C-17 has been troubled we will mon- tion in effect makes simultaneous cope with unforeseen threats. itor it closely, but significant, mod- wars more likely by leaving an open- For the bulk of our ground, ern, flexible airlift capacity is essen- ing for potential aggressors to attack naval, and air forces, fielding forces tial to our defense strategy. A their neighbors, should our engage- sufficient to provide this capability decision on the C-17 will be made ment in a war in one region leave involves duplicating the MRC build- after the completion of a current re- little or no force available to respond ing block described above. However, view by the Defense Acquisition in planning our overall force struc- Board. Second, we plan to store a ture, we must recognize two other factors. First, the foregoing list of

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Force Options for Major Regional Conflicts

OPTION OPTION OPTION OPTION Strategy Win One Win One Win Two Nearly Win Two Nearly Major Regional Conflict Major Regional Conflict Simultaneous Simultaneous 1 with Hold2 in Second Major Regional3 Conflicts Major Regional4 Conflicts Plus Conduct Smaller Operations

Army 8 active divisions 10 active divisions 10 active divisions 12 active divisions 6 Reserve division- 6 Reserve division- 15 Reserve enhanced- 8 Reserve division- equivalents equivalents readiness brigades equivalents Navy 8 Carrier Battle 10 Carrier Battle 11 Carrier Battle 12 Carrier Battle Groups Groups Groups Groups 1 Reserve carrier Marine Corps 5 active brigades 5 active brigades 5 active brigades 5 active brigades 1 Reserve division 1 Reserve division 1 Reserve division 1 Reserve division

Air Force 10 active fighter wings 13 active fighter wings 13 active fighter wings 14 active fighter wings 6 Reserve fighter wings 7 Reserve fighter wings 7 Reserve fighter wings 10 Reserve fighter wings

Force Enchancements

brigade set of heavy Army equip- also will acquire stocks of new ’bril- Air Force Long-Range Bombers and ment afloat; ships with this material liant” antiarmor weapons for deliv- Munitions. There will be Air Force en- would be positioned in areas from ery by attack aircraft. Finally, the hancements in two areas. First, we which to respond on short notice ei- Navy plans to develop the capability plan to modify B-1 and B-2 long- ther to the Persian Gulf or to North- to fly additional squadrons of F/A- range heavy bombers to improve the east Asia. Other prepositioning ini- 18s to forward-deployed aircraft car- ability to deliver smart conventional tiatives would accelerate the arrival riers that would be the first to arrive munitions on attacking enemy of heavy Army units in Southwest in response to a regional contin- forces and fixed targets. Second, we Asia and Korea. Third, we will in- gency. These additional aircraft will develop all-weather munitions. crease the capacity of surge sealift to would increase the striking power of For example, the Air Force is devel- transport forces and equipment carriers during the critical early oping a guidance package for a tacti- rapidly from the United States to stages of a conflict. cal munitions dispenser filled with distant regions by purchasing addi- Army Firepower. The Army is de- antiarmor submunitions for use in tional roll-on/roll-off ships. Fourth, veloping new smart submunitions all types of weather. This will dra- we will improve the readiness and that can be delivered by the Army matically increase our capacity to at- responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), tack and destroy critical targets dur- Force through various enhance- the Multiple-Launch Rocket System ing the crucial opening days of a ments. Finally, we will fund efforts (MLRS), and standard tube artillery. short-warning conflict. to improve “fort-to-port” flow of In addition, the Longbow fire control We have also initiated improve- personnel, equipment, and supplies radar system will increase both the ments in the readiness and flexibil- in the United States. effectiveness and the survivability of ity of combat Naval Strike Aircraft. The Navy is AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. We units and other Reserve component examining a number of innovative also are examining prepositioning forces to make them more readily ways to improve the firepower more ATACMS and MLRS and having available for MRCs and other tasks. aboard its aircraft carriers. First, the Apaches self-deploy from their over- One important role for combat ele- Navy will improve its strike poten- seas bases so that all would be avail- ments of the Army National Guard, tial by providing a precision ground- able early in a conflict. for instance, is to provide forces to attack capability for many F-14s. It supplement active divisions should

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the ability to prevail in the most stressing situation we may face—two Troops boarding major regional conflicts occurring helicopter during Just nearly simultaneously. Cause in Panama. In addition, the force structure provides sufficient capabilities for strategic deterrence and defense. It also provides enough forces, primar- ily Reserve component, to hold in strategic reserve and utilize if and when needed. For example, Reserve forces could deploy to one or both MRCs, if operations don’t go as planned. Alternatively, they could serve as backfill for overseas pres- ence forces redeployed to an MRC. Structures and Mixes In the analysis that supported the review, four force structure op- tions were investigated. The options were designed to meet successively more demanding regional defense strategies. Option 3—a force struc- ture adequate to win two nearly si- multaneous MRCs—is, in broad terms, the approach chosen. Option 1 would require the fewest resources, allowing us to re- duce the defense budget and redirect excess funds to other national priori- ties. But, in providing only enough assets to fight one major regional

U.S.Army (Chuck Rogers) conflict at a time, this option would leave us vulnerable to a potential ag- Marine looking out gressor who might choose to take over Beirut. advantage of the situation if virtu- ally all our forces were engaged in a conflict elsewhere. At a minimum, this option would require us to scale back or terminate certain existing mutual defense treaties and long- standing commitments, with a cor-

DOD responding reduction in our influ- ence in those regions where we choose to abandon a major leader- more ground combat power be Overall Force Structure ship role. needed to deter or fight a second On the basis of a comprehen- Option 2 would free additional MRC. In the future, Army National sive assessment of defense needs, the resources for other national priori- Guard units will be better trained, review determined that the force ties, but is premised on the risky as- more capable, and more ready. If structure, which will be reached by sumption that, if we are challenged mobilized early in a conflict, about the end of the decade, can in one region, respond to the aggres- brigade-sized units could provide carry out our strategy and meet our sion, and then are challenged extra security and flexibility in the national security requirements. shortly afterwards in another region, event a second conflict arose while This force structure will be ade- a sizable block of remaining forces the first was still going on. There are quate for both overseas presence in will have the stamina and capability also plans to increase the capability peacetime and a range of smaller- and effectiveness of Navy/Marine scale operations. It will also give us Corps Reserve air assets by introduc- ing a Reserve/training aircraft carrier.

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to defeat the first adversary, and move to another region (possibly Marine tanks during several thousand miles distant) and Operation Desert defeat another adversary. This op- Storm. tion might provide sufficient mili- tary strength in peacetime to main- tain American leadership, but it would heighten the risk associated with carrying out a two-MRC strat- egy in wartime. Option 3 provides sufficiently capable and flexible forces to posi- tion the United States as a leader and shaper of global affairs for posi- tive change. It would allow us to confidently advance our strategy of being able to fight and win two major regional conflicts nearly si- multaneously. However, it leaves lit- tle of the active force structure to provide an overseas presence or to conduct peacekeeping or low inten- U.S. Marine Corps (Michael D. Masters) sity operations if we had to fight more than one MRC. If such tasks forces or capabilities could help off- the best choice for executing our de- became necessary—or either MRC set the loss of certain other capabili- fense strategy and maintaining the did not evolve as anticipated—then ties or forces. For example, addi- flexibility needed to deal with the we might have to activate significant tional ground forces might be able wide range of dangers. Reserve forces. Also key to option 3 to compensate for the loss of some is the ability to carry out our strat- air contributions when dealing with The Right Force for egy through a series of critical force guerrilla or insurgency threats in the Times enhancements described earlier, in- thick and constrained terrain, or In sum, the force structure that cluding further prepositioning of where an enemy is not technologi- emerges from the Bottom-Up Review brigade sets of equipment, increased cally advanced. Alternatively, substi- represents the most appropriate mix stock levels of antiarmor precision- tuting air power for some ground and balance of capabilities while re- guided munitions, and more early forces might be supportable in cases flecting the Nation’s need for more arriving naval air power. where terrain is open; an enemy is resources to devote to investments Option 4 would allow us to fight highly dependent upon key indus- in future competitiveness. In a world and win two MRCs nearly simultane- tries, resources, or utilities; or heavy of new challenges, opportunities, ously while continuing to sustain armored forces are engaged in some and uncertainties, this force—to- some other overseas presence and other conventional conflict. Even gether with planned qualitative en- perhaps an additional peacekeeping, among air components, certain envi- hancements—supports an ambitious peace-enforcement, or intervention- ronments or circumstances favor the national strategy of global engage- type operations. However, maintain- use of land-based versus sea-based ment and provides the military ing forces of this size would require air forces or vice versa. wherewithal to meet the unknown significant additional resources Nevertheless, while the analysis and unexpected. JFQ thereby eliminating any peace divi- indicated that a structure geared to- dend the American people may ex- ward particular types of forces might pect as a result of the end of the Cold enhance overall capabilities under War. Yet the analysis showed that, de- specific conditions, it would also cre- spite this larger investment, option 4 ate serious vulnerabilities under would provide only a small incre- other circumstances. Given the great ment of increased military capability. uncertainty as to where, when, and Alternative Mixes how future crises might occur, any- thing but a carefully balanced force Each strategy and force struc- will risk ineffectiveness, high casual- ture option was tested by weighting ties, or a failure to meet objectives. various mixes in favor of land, sea, The conclusion was that the bal- or air contributions. The analysis in- anced force structure we selected is dicated that, under some circum- stances, emphasis on certain types of

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Jehuda L. Wallach. Uneasy Coalition: William H. Lewis, editor. Peacekeeping: JFQuarterly Survey The Entente Experience in World The Way Ahead? McNair paper 25. War I. Contributions in military Washington: National Defense Uni- of Joint Literature studies 146. Westport, Conn.: versity Press, November 1993. Greenwood Press, 1993. 192 pp. 68 pp. [ISSN 1071–7552] $55.00. [ISBN 0–313–28879–8] Jeffrey McCausland. The Gulf Conflict: BOOKS A Military Analysis. Adelphi paper MONOGRAPHS, PROCEEDINGS, James G. Burton. The Pentagon Wars: 282. London: Brassey’s (U.K.) for TEXTS, &c. Reformers Challenge the Old Guard. the International Institute for Stra- Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, Joseph H. Alexander. Across the tegic Studies, November 1993. 91 1993. 306 pp. $23.95. Reef: The Marine Assault of . pp. $17.00. [ISBN 1 85753 100 0] [ISBN 1–55750–081–9] Marines in World War II commem- Charles D. Melson. Up the Slot: Bruce I. Gudmundsson. On Artillery. orative series. Washington: Govern- Marines in the Central Solomons. Westport, Conn.: Praeger ment Printing Office, 1993. 32 pp. Marines in World War II commem- Publishers, 1993. 176 pp. $16.95. [PCN 190 003120 00] orative series. Washington: Govern- [ISBN 0–275–94673–8] Mats Berdal. Whither U.N. Peacekeep- ment Printing Office, 1993. 36 pp. John Keegan. A History of Warfare. ing? Adelphi paper 281. London: [PCN 190 003121 00] New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993. Brassey’s (U.K.) for the Interna- Steven Metz. The Future of the United 432 pp. $27.50. tional Institute for Strategic Stud- Nations: Implications for Peace [ISBN 0–394–58801–0] ies, October 1993. 88 pp. $17.00. Operations. Special report. Carlisle [ISBN 1 85753 054 3] Robert H. Scales, Jr., et al. Certain Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf Edward J. Dennehy et al. A Blue Institute, U.S. Army War College, War. Washington: Government Helmet Combat Force. National October 1993. 40 pp. Printing Office, 1993. 435 pp. Security Program policy analysis Charles W. Ricks. The Military-News $115.00. [A companion 44-minute paper 93–01. Cambridge: John F. Media Relationship: Thinking Forward. video tape narrated by LTG Tom Kennedy School of Government, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Kelley, USA (Ret.), with the same Harvard University, 1993. 33 pp. Studies Institute, U.S. Army War title has also been released.] Herman L. Gilster. The Air War in College, December 1993. 40 pp. James P. Stevenson. The Pentagon Southeast Asia: Case Studies of Frank M. Snyder. Command and Paradox: The Development of the Selected Campaigns. Maxwell Air Control: The Literature and F–18 Hornet. Annapolis: Naval In- Force Base, Alabama: Air Univer- Commentaries. Washington: stitute Press, 1993. 445 pp. $24.95. sity Press, October 1993. 138 pp. National Defense University Press, [ISBN 1–55750–775–9] Lorna S. Jaffe. The Development of the September 1993. 167 pp. Alvin and Heidi Toffler. War and Base Force, 1989–1992. Joint History Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of Office. Washington: Government the 21st Century. New York: Little, Printing Office, 1993. 60 pp. $4.50. Brown, 1993. 302 pp. $22.95. [ISBN 0–16–043018–6] [ISBN 0–316–85024–1] James John Tritten. Our National Security Strategy: America Promises to Come Back. Westport, Conn.: SUBSCRIBE TO THE Praeger Publishers, 1992. 196 pp. On-line access to the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) may be $45.00. [ISBN 0–275–94357–7] requested on official letterhead—indicating the name, mailing Joint address, and telephone number of a point of contact—to: Director, Joint Doctrine Center Electronic 1283 CV Towway (Suite 100) Norfolk, Virginia 23511–2491 Joint Force Quarterly is pleased to bring to or call the Joint Doctrine Center at: the attention of its readers titles on joint Library (804) 444–3627/DSN 564–3627 and combined operations, coalition war- FAX: (804) 444–3990/DSN 564–3990 fare, military history, and related subjects published by defense and other govern- Once approved, users are provided with “hook up” packages that allow them to mental organizations as well as nonprofit access JEL on a 24-hour a day basis without any charge. Orders by DOD users for institutions and commercial presses. Pub- CD–ROM supplements must be placed through service distribution systems. lishers are requested to forward titles to Beginning in April 1994, JEL on CD–ROM will be offered for sale to the public by the attention of the Managing Editor at the the Superintendent of Documents. address shown in the masthead on page 3.

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ARTICLES William W. Allen et al., “Peacekeep- ing and Peace Enforcement Opera- Joint Warfare of the tions,” Military Review, vol. 73, no. 10 (October 1993), pp. 53–61. U. S. Armed Forces John D. Becker, “Combined and Coalition Warfighting: The Ameri- can Experience,” Military Review, ON VIDEO vol. 73, no. 11 (November 1993), A ten-and-a-half minute video tape pp. 25–29. that highlights major concepts and John H. Cushman, “Desert Storm’s themes found in Joint Pub 1, Joint End Game,” U.S. Naval Institute Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, Proceedings, vol. 119, no. 10 (October 1993), pp. 76–80. is available on request to military organizations/units by writing: A.W. Forsyth, “United Navies,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, National Military Command Center vol. 119, no. 9 (September 1993), Visual Recording Facility pp. 47–51. Joint Staff (J–3) Sam Gardiner, “Preparing for the Room 3C941, The Pentagon Next Quarter Century: What Washington, D.C. 20301–7000 Should the Role of the United or calling: States Air Force Be?,” Comparative (703) 697–9033/DSN 227–9033 Strategy, vol. 12, no. 3 (July– September 1993), pp. 263–76. Colin S. Gray, “Sea Power: The Great Enabler,” Naval War College Review, vol. 47, no. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 18–27. C.H. Griffiths, “How About A Perma- nent Waiver?,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 119, no. 12 Defense Library on CD–ROM (December 1993), pp. 68–71. Richard P. Hallion, “Naval Air Opera- tions in Korea,” Air Power History, vol. 40, no. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 76–85. Robert L. Lawson, “Home of Joint Operations,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 119, no. 11 (November 1993), pp. 63–64. T.M. Lorenz, “Law and Anarchy in Somalia,” Parameters, vol. 23, no. 4 (Winter 1993–94), pp. 27–41. Edward Mann, “Military Support for For information about the Peace Efforts,” Airpower Journal, Defense Library on Disc contact: vol. 7, no. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 51–61. National Defense University Library Terry C. Pierce, “Operational Maneu- ATTN: Systems Librarian ver from the Sea...Making It Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 Work,” Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 77, (202) 287–9474/DSN 667–9474 no. 10 (October 1993), pp. 60–65. or Ike Skelton, “Joint and Combined Warfare in the Post Cold-War Era,” Pentagon Library Military Review, vol. 73, no. 9 ATTN: Systems Librarian (September 1993), pp. 2–12. Room 1A518, The Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20310–6080 Mark B. Yates, “Coalition Warfare in Desert Storm,” Military Review, (703) 697–4658/DSN 227–4658 vol. 73, no. 10 (October 1993), pp. 46–52. JFQ

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VIETNAM AS On Strategy: A Critical A Soldier Reports MILITARY HISTORY Analysis of the Vietnam War by William C. Westmoreland by Harry G. Summers, Jr. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1976. A Review Essay by Carlisle Barracks, : MACKUBIN THOMAS OWENS U.S. Army War College, 1981. We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young—Ia Drang: generation has passed since The 25-Year War: America’s The Battle That Changed the AAmerica’s involvement in Viet- Military Role in Vietnam War in Vietnam nam ended, yet the question per- by Bruce Palmer, Jr. by Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway Lexington: University of New York: Random House, 1992. sists: how was our Nation, with Kentucky Press, 1984. superior technology, firepower, PAVN: People’s Army mobility, and , unable The Pentagon Papers: of Vietnam to defeat a seemingly smaller, less The Defense Department History by Douglas Pike well equipped enemy? To address of United States Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1986. this haunting question this essay Decisionmaking on Vietnam will look at a number of books Senator Gravel Edition. 5 volumes. The Limits of Air Power: published in the decades since the Boston: Beacon Press, 1971–72. The American Bombing end of that war. of The first theoretical framework The Army and Vietnam by Mark Clodfelter for examining the war was provided by Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. New York: Free Press, 1989. by Harry Summers with publication Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. of On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam the Vietnam War. The book revolu- First to Fight: tionized thinking about the role of by Ronald H. Spector An Inside View of the New York: Free Press, 1993. the Army in Vietnam and why the U.S. Marine Corps United States had lost its first war. by Victor H. Krulak (Note: Some of titles listed above are By using Clausewitz’s well-known, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984. out of print or have been reissued in oft-quoted, but seldom read On War other editions.) as the basis for his analysis, Sum- mers argued that America lacked an appreciation of strategy and did not apply the principles of war as did strategy and force were North Vietnam. The Armed Forces according to academic theorists, rendered obsolete. Thus in had won on the battlefield where the use of force in a limited war 1946, Bernard Brodie wrote DOD that heretofore “the chief their tactical and logistical superior- was only acceptable to signal ity was overwhelming, but the Peo- purpose of our military es- ple’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN)—also resolve to one’s adversaries tablishment has been to known as the North Vietnamese win wars. From now on its Army (NVA)—won at the strategic chief purpose must be to level which is what really counts. of thermonuclear weapons. Aca- avert them.” That assertion was demic theory on war, he argued, dis- echoed by Thomas Schelling some Academic Theories and placed traditional understanding of years later: “Military science can no Military Fads strategy and the use of force. The longer be thought of...as the sci- Summers contends that the Clausewitzian strategist believes that ence of military victory.” strategic mindset that characterized the purpose of war is to achieve cer- According to academic theorists, American leaders during the Vietnam tain objectives by force. The use of using force in a limited war was only era resulted from two factors, in fact, force, however, is structured by a acceptable to signal resolve to one’s from two sides of the same coin: the strategic concept guided by the idea adversaries or to force them back to academic theory of limited war and of victory. Tactical success in and of the negotiating table. The pursuit of counterinsurgency doctrine. Both fac- itself is only of minimal impor- even limited victory in the tradi- tors were rooted in the development tance—to contribute to victory any tional sense could lead to escalation such success must fulfill a strategic of a conflict, culminating in nuclear purpose and achieve a strategic goal. war. Thus nuclear weapons and the Mackubin Thomas Owens teaches defense The emergence of nuclear concomitant theory of limited war economics and strategy at the Naval War weapons led many defense experts had a corrosive effect on the Armed College and is editor-in-chief of Strategic to claim that previous notions of Forces, especially the Army. As lim- Review. He is a Marine infantry veteran of ited war caught on and as classical Vietnam where he was twice wounded and understanding of strategy gave way awarded the .

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to the economic paradigm of deter- ill-prepared to provide it. Having with counterinsurgency, policymak- rence, the very existence of the Army lost the capacity to think strategi- ers did not identify North Vietnam came into question. In this climate cally, the military could not properly as the enemy and mobilize national military affairs increasingly meant de- identify the nature of the Vietnam will to defeat it. Instead, Vietnam fense economics, the attempt to War or recommend the appropriate was fought according to a limited achieve the “maximum deterrent at military policy and strategy with war paradigm—including counter- the least cost.” which to conduct it. insurgency—that was an economic Summers indicates that as the Into this strategic vacuum rather than a strategic model. The defense establishment became pre- flowed counterinsurgency doctrine objective was to inflict incremental occupied with technical, managerial, which was less of a strategy than a pain on the North Vietnamese to and bureaucratic concerns, the military fad according to Summers. convince them that the marginal Army, in self defense, adapted to the Counterinsurgency was the social cost of continued aggression against new environment. But the cost was scientists’ answer to limited war the- the South would exceed the marginal high: officers turned into “neophyte ory. It was in vogue among policy- benefit. Every American action, from political scientists and system ana- makers in the 1960s as a means of introducing ground troops to bomb- lysts” and military influence on dealing with communist revolution- ing the North, was taken in terms of strategic thinking declined as sol- ary warfare (or wars of national liber- economic cost-benefit analysis. diers were replaced by academic ation as they were called on the left) Summers identifies the two great strategists. When Presidents called and thus seemed tailor-made for the strategic failures which characterized on the military for advice, they were situation in Southeast Asia. The U.S. conduct of the Vietnam War. problem was, Summers says, that The first was failing to focus on the Vietnam was not a revolutionary war. Because of their preoccupation

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main effort against North Vietnam, both on the ground and in the air. In- stead, he points out, we “expended our energies against a secondary force—North Vietnam’s guerrilla screen.” The second was failing to recognize that the Cold War policy of containment meant that the military would always, as in the case of the Korean War, be limited to the strate- gic defensive. The best possible out- come of the strategic defensive is stalemate on the battlefield. This did not mean that the United States could not have achieved its ostensi- ble political goal, the survival of South Vietnam. But to do so, Wash- ington would have had to seal off Saigon from Hanoi. In this view Sum- mers endorses an argument advanced by Bruce Palmer in The Twenty-Five Navy PBR operating in Year War that “together with an ex- Vietnamese waters. panded naval blockade, the Army should have taken the tactical offen- U.S. Navy sive along the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone] across Laos to the Thai border in order to isolate the battlefield and created by adherence to the aca- recommending the dispatch of a de- then deliberately assumed the strategic demic theory of war? Did the United tachment of Air Force and tactical defensive.” States fight the wrong war, mistak- to , not for military pur- Such was the plan contemplated ing what was essentially a conven- poses but “with a view toward... by General William C. Westmore- tional conflict in which the Viet potential deterrence and signalling land, Commander of the U.S. Mili- Cong guerrillas were used merely as impacts on communist activities in tary Assistance Command, Vietnam, Laos.” The Central Intelli- but rejected because the political gence Agency was main- “opportunity cost” was perceived to the Pentagon Papers attest to the taining that the proposal to simultaneously bomb tar- be too great: President Lyndon John- “how much is enough” mentality son did not wish to endanger his do- gets in North Vietnam and mestic policy initiatives by mobiliz- of the policymakers responsible negotiate “would not seri- ously affect communist ca- ing the Reserve components. for Vietnam The questions about Vietnam pabilities to continue that that both civilian and military policy- insurrection,” but would makers should have been asking, says affect North Vietnam’s will. Summers, were strategic ones: how do an economy of force measure for an Westmoreland reports a particu- we achieve our political objectives by insurgency? The Pentagon Papers sup- larly egregious example of the sig- the use of force? How do we destroy port the argument concerning a lack nalling mentality. When the military the enemy’s strategy? How do we use of strategic thinking on the part of sought permission in early 1965 to tactical successes to obtain strategic the American leadership, at least destroy the first surface-to-air mis- goals in the theater of operations? after 1962. Before then, planners siles (SAMs) that had been discovered These questions were precluded by were concerned about how to win in in North Vietnam in order to reduce the academic theory of limited war. South Vietnam, albeit what they U.S. casualties, the request was de- But the failure to ask, much less an- thought was an insurgency. But once nied. “[John] McNaughton ridiculed swer, such questions in the context of U.S. troop strength began to in- the idea,” writes Westmoreland. Vietnam, argues Summers, rendered crease, emphasis shifted from mili- “You don’t think the North Vietnamese are our superiority in firepower and logis- tary strategy to signalling North Viet- going to use them!” he scoffed to General tics ultimately useless. nam and . Thus in late 1964, Moore. “Putting them in is just a political Walt Rostow was claiming that “too ploy by the Russians to appease Hanoi.” It Strategic Vacuum? much thought is being given to the was all a matter of signals said the clever How persuasive is the explana- actual damage we do in the North, civilian theorists in Washington. We won’t tory paradigm presented by Sum- not enough to the signal we wish to bomb the SAM sites, which signals the mers? Was there a strategic vacuum send.” The State Department was North Vietnamese not to use them.

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The emphasis on signalling as opposed to traditional military strat- egy continued as the commitment increased and the intensity of com- bat escalated. Time and again, the Pentagon Papers attest to the “how much is enough” mentality of the policymak- ers responsible for Vietnam, which was an economic rather than a strategic model. As a result, the U.S. leadership failed to define a clear mission for the military or, until 1968, to clearly establish limits on the resources that would be made available to the military to pursue the war. Yet aligning ends and means is the essence of strategy. Ironically, when the failure of the limited war signalling strategy became apparent SAC B–52 releasing in 1968, and President Johnson fi- bombs over coastal nally did limit the troop level for target in South Vietnam, the military could finally Vietnam. U.S. Navy formulate a strategy to best employ U.S. Air Force the resources available. The result was the policy of . Thus the Army never empha- wars. As Krulak notes, the Com- Insurgency or Conventional War? sized the skills that constitute “the bined Action Program which Kre- The most serious challenge to essence of counterinsurgency—long- pinevich lauds originated in Haiti Summers’ thesis concerns his claim term patrolling of a small area, the (1915–34), Nicaragua (1926–33), that the Vietnam War was primarily pervasive use of night operations, and Santo Domingo (1916–22). a conventional conflict as opposed emphasis on intelligence pertaining “Marine Corps experience in stabi- to an insurgency. In The Army and to the insurgents’ infrastructure,” in- lizing governments and combatting Vietnam, Andrew Krepinevich agrees stead relying upon tactics which guerrilla forces was distilled in lec- with Summers that America fought were derived from “the Army Con- ture form at the Marine Corps the wrong war in Vietnam. But he cept:...a focus on mid-intensity, or Schools...beginning in 1920.” The stands Summers on his head by argu- conventional, war and a reliance on lectures appeared in Small Wars ing that this was because the Army high volumes of firepower to mini- Manual in 1940 which was later paid too little attention to counterin- mize casualties. . . .” adopted as an official publication. surgency, not too much. Summers Krepinevich argues that the The Marine Corps approach in writes that in the early 1960s, “coun- doctrine stemming from the Army Vietnam had three elements, accord- terinsurgency became not so much Concept had hardened into dogma ing to Krulak: emphasis on pacifica- the Army’s doctrine as the Army’s and, as a result, the Army was not tion of the coastal areas in which 80 dogma, and (as nuclear weapons had prepared for the war in Vietnam. percent of the people lived; degrada- earlier) stultified military strategic The debate between Summers and tion of the ability of the North Viet- thinking for the next decade.” Kre- Krepinevich mirrors the clash be- namese to fight by cutting off sup- pinevich, on the other hand, argues tween the Army and Marine Corps plies before they left Northern ports that a rhetorical commitment to from 1965 to 1967 over how to pur- of entry; and engagement of NVA counterinsurgency was not matched sue the war. In First to Fight: An In- and VC main force units on terms by substantive change in doctrine, side view of the U.S. Marine Corps, favorable to American forces. The training, or force structure. Victor Krulak—who was Command- Marines soon came into conflict Unable to fit [President Kennedy’s] pre- ing General of Fleet Marine Forces, with Westmoreland over how to scriptions into its force structure, oriented on Pacific (1964 to 1968)—entitles two fight the war. In A Soldier Reports, mid- and high-intensity conflict in Europe, chapters on Vietnam “A New Kind Westmoreland writes: the Army either ignored them or watered of War” and “A Conflict of Strate- During those early months [1965], I was them down to prevent its superiors from in- gies.” Unlike the Army, the Marines concerned with the tactical methods that fringing upon what the service felt were its took counterinsurgency seriously. General Walt and the Marines employed. proper priorities. What Samuel Huntington has iden- They had established beachheads at Chu tified as the strategic concept of the Marine Corps emphasizes small

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Drang represented an example of Evacuating wounded marine during fighting the enemy’s war—what Operation Taylor North Vietnamese General Vo Common. Nguyen Giap predicted would be “a protracted war of attrition.” And says Krulak, a “war of attrition it turned out to be...[by] 1972, we had managed to reduce the enemy’s manpower pool by perhaps 25 per- cent at a cost of over 220,000 U.S. and South Vietnamese dead. Of these, 59,000 were Americans. . . .” The question remains, who is right? Both Krepinevich and Krulak seem persuasive, but Summers in his observation that “. . . it was four North Vietnamese Army Corps, not dialectical materialism that ultimately conquered South Vietnam” cannot be gainsaid. How is it possible to rec- oncile these two apparently conflict- ing points of view? Hanoi’s Strategy

U.S. Marine Corps (G.W. Wright) One possible answer can be found in PAVN: People’s Army of Viet- nam by Douglas Pike. Through an Lai and Da Nang and were reluctant to go by Moore and Galloway [see the re- examination of communist strategy, outside them, not through any lack of flection on this book which immedi- he demonstrates that different ele- courage but through a different conception of ately follows this review]. ments prevailed at different times how to fight an anti-insurgency war. They Lieutenant General Harold G. which accounts for differing the per- were assiduously [sic] combing the country- Moore, USA (Ret.), commanded a ceptions of the war. In the event, side within the beachhead, trying to estab- however, Pike’s analysis provides lish firm control in hamlets and villages, battalion in the battle, and Joseph and planning to expand the beachhead up Galloway was a UPI corre- and down the coast. spondent accompanying the unit. Moore’s battalion of there were roles for both the He believed the Marines “should 450 men landed in the mid- have been trying to find the enemy’s dle of 1600 members of a Army Concept and counterinsur- main forces and bring them to battle, NVA regiment. We Were Sol- gency doctrine during the war thereby putting them on the run and diers Once describes two parts reducing the threat they posed to the of the battle, one success- population.” Westmoreland, accord- ful—the defense of Landing ing to Krulak, made the “third point Zone X-Ray—another a debacle—the substantial support to Summers. Ac- the primary undertaking, even while ambush of Moore’s sister battalion at cording to Pike, PAVN successfully deemphasizing the need for clearly Landing Zone Albany—in which 155 followed a strategy called dau tranh favorable conditions before engaging Americans died in a 16-hour period, (struggle), consisting of two opera- the enemy.” “the most savage one-day battle of tional elements: dau tranh vu trang Westmoreland’s concept is illus- the Vietnam War.” (armed struggle) and dau tranh chinh trated by the battle of Ia Drang in The battle in the Ia Drang Val- tri (political struggle) which were en- . The North Viet- ley convinced Westmoreland the visioned as a hammer and anvil or namese planned to attack across the Army Concept was correct. Summers pincers that crush the enemy. Armed Central Highlands and cut South would agree. In a head to head dau tranh had a strategy “for regular Vietnam in two, hoping to cause the clash, an outnumbered U.S. force forces” and another for “protracted collapse of the Saigon government had spoiled an enemy operation and conflict.” Regular force strategy in- before massive American combat sent a major NVA force reeling back cluded both high tech and limited power could be introduced. Ia Drang in defeat. But Krepinevich and Kru- offensive warfare; protracted conflict was the single bloodiest battle of the lak would demur. For Krulak, Ia included both Maoist and neo-revo- war. The definitive account of the lutionary guerrilla warfare. Political action is contained in a recent book, dau tranh included dich van (action We Were Soldiers Once...And Young among the enemy), binh van (action

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among the military) and dan van (ac- could have won. While Krepinevich tranh, this time in a conventional tion among the people). As Pike ob- successfully refutes the claim made (regular force) mode. Hanoi’s deci- serves, to defeat dau tranh both arms by Summers that the Army had suc- sion to mount a large-scale conven- of the pincer had to be blunted. U.S. cumbed to the siren song of coun- tional invasion of the South meant and South Vietnamese forces de- terinsurgency, he is not convincing that the North Vietnamese, unlike feated armed dau tranh. Echoing when he argues that a lack of coun- the Viet Cong in 1965–67, became Summers, Pike writes that “the terinsurgency doctrine was the prox- dependent on logistic support to an American military’s performance in imate cause of the defeat in Viet- extent that made them vulnerable to this respect was particularly impres- nam. To accept this claim, one American air power. sive. It won every significant battle would have to believe that the insur- The second change was the shift fought, a record virtually unparal- gency in the South was independent in political goals and the interna- leled in the history of warfare.” But of the North, a claim that Pike abso- tional environment. While Lyndon the Allies never dealt successfully lutely demolishes. Johnson sought an independent, sta- with political dau tranh, which led This is where Krulak parts com- ble, noncommunist South, capable ultimately to defeat. pany with Krepinevich. While he is of standing alone against future ag- Pike argues that a constant closer to Krepinevich than Summers gression by Hanoi, Richard Nixon struggle existed between Giap and on the issue of counterinsur- professional generals on one hand gency doctrine and tactics— and Truong Chinh, the party, and like most defenders of the Ma- the political leadership did not political generals on the other over rine Corps approach—he take strategy seriously because which arm of the pincer should pre- argues that the insurgency in dominate. After 1959, when the Lao the South was only part of the they were not intellectually Dong party in Hanoi decided to problem: a “multipronged equipped to do so launch dau tranh in the South, until concept” was necessary to 1965, political dau tranh prevailed. achieve victory in Vietnam. Then it shifted to armed dau tranh Accordingly, he was an early until mid-1968. And two more full advocate of taking the air war to the was willing to disengage without cycles followed according to Pike: North for reasons of military strategy achieving those goals. Additionally, political dau tranh from 1969 to 71, rather than merely as part of limited in accordance with the theory of armed dau tranh from 1972 to 73, war signalling. In 1965, Krulak rec- limited war, Johnson believed he political dau tranh from 1974 to 75, ommended addressing “our attri- had to worry about the effect on and a hurried shift to armed dau tional efforts primarily to the source China and the Soviet Union of mas- tranh as Saigon collapsed in 1975. of North Vietnamese material intro- sive airstrikes against the North. Several conclusions can be duction, fabrication, and distribu- Détente with the Soviet Union and drawn from Pike’s work. One is that tion; destroy the port areas, mine the China gave Nixon freedom to effec- there were roles for both the Army ports, destroy the rail lines, destroy tively employ air power, an option Concept and counterinsurgency doc- power, fuel, and heavy industry. . . .” that Johnson lacked. trine during the war. There were Clodfelter’s argument is com- major conventional aspects of the The Air War pelling, but there is evidence that war. The strategic thrust that culmi- Krulak’s proposal raises the issue the North Vietnamese would dis- nated in the battle of Ia Drang was of the effectiveness of air power in agree with him on the effectiveness part of armed dau tranh regular force the Vietnam war. He is not alone of air power. Pike has indicated else- strategy, as was the 1972 Easter Of- among military leaders of the time where in his writings that “the ini- fensive, and the final push in the who claim that intensive bombing tial reaction of Hanoi’s leaders to the spring of 1975. But after Ia Drang of North Vietnam could have proved strategic bombings and air strikes until 1967, armed dau tranh seems to decisive in 1965. That claim is dis- that began in February 1965—docu- have followed a protracted war puted by Mark Clodfelter in his 1989 mented later by defectors and other rather than regular force strategy. In book, The Limits of Air Power: The witnesses—was enormous dismay periods in which political dau tranh American Bombing of North Vietnam. and apprehension. They feared the or protracted war armed dau tranh Clodfelter indicates that the U.S. North was to be visited by intolera- predominated, and given the politi- strategy for employment of air ble destruction which it simply cal constraints placed on U.S. forces power failed until 1972 when two could not endure.” Based on inter- in Vietnam, there is much to be said changes occurred to create condi- views and archival research, Pike for counterinsurgency doctrine as tions favorable to an air power strat- concludes, “while conditions had applied by the Marines from 1965 egy. The first change, he argues, was changed vastly in seven years, the until 1967. the shift in North Vietnamese strat- dismaying conclusion to suggest it- On the other hand Pike demon- egy to what Pike calls armed dau self from the 1972 Christmas bomb- strates the weakness of the con- ing was that had this kind of air as- tention that counterinsurgency was sault been launched in February of the only means by which America 1965, the Vietnam war as we know

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it might have been over within a defensive—had implications for the Debate over the conduct of the matter of months, even weeks.” operational and tactical conduct of Vietnam War illustrates the necessity Surveying the historical litera- the Vietnam War. The operational for having a military that thinks ture on military aspects of the Viet- level of war consists of operational strategically. Operational art and tac- nam conflict reveals that the war was art and planning. Accordingly, it in- tical skill are of little value without multifaceted. Accordingly, a compre- volves using available military assets an overarching concept about how hensive framework is needed to ana- to attain strategic objectives in a the- and when military force should be lyze it. Without such a framework, ater of war, with or without hostili- applied to defend national interests, there will always be a tendency to ties; designing operations to meet and how military force can achieve mistake one phase of the war for the strategic objectives; and conducting political goals with limited resources. whole. I believe that Summers comes campaigns. Tactics involves winning Military professionals must un- closest to providing such a frame- battles and should serve operational derstand strategic reasoning and also work although as Krepinevich and ends which themselves should have be able to convey to the Nation’s Pike show even he commits the error strategic goals. Yet absent coherent leaders an understanding of the re- of treating a phase of the North Viet- strategic objectives, tactics and oper- sulting relationship between politi- nam strategy (armed dau tranh regu- ations become their own justifica- cal ends and military means. The lar force strategy) as the whole. As tion. This is what occurred in Viet- great legacy of Vietnam, to coin a Pike explains, the war was neither nam. Lacking strategic guidance, phrase, is the military’s recognition conventional nor an insurgency each service fought the war in accor- of the fact that articulating strategy when seen as a whole. As one form dance with its own strategic concept. is too important to be left to the or other of dau tranh dominated In Krepinevich’s words, the United likes of civilian analysts. JFQ Hanoi’s strategy, the war took on a States conducted the war in accor- more or less conventional aspect for dance with a “strategy of tactics.” the United States. But in his overall assessment Summers holds up very well under scrutiny. The American defeat in As part of an annual program of events Vietnam was the result of a strategic the National Defense University (NDU) will sponsor two failure. The political leadership did not take strategy seriously because symposia on Asian/Pacific and NATO/European they were not intellectually security affairs in the first quarter of 1994: equipped to do so. Imbued with the academic theory of limited war, they confused economics with strategy THE PACIFIC SYMPOSIUM and were far more comfortable deal- “Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities” ing with hypothetical nuclear ex- changes than with how to employ will convene in Washington, D.C., on February 15 and 16, military force to achieve political an event presented in cooperation with the U.S. Pacific Command. goals. The military leadership, for whatever reason, did not fill the strategic vacuum. THE NATO SYMPOSIUM The argument about the effects of the strategic defensive on opera- “Reshaping the Trans-Atlantic Relationship: tions seems vindicated as well. In Forging a New Strategic Bargain” After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Viet- will be held in Rome, Italy, on March 28 and 29 nam, Ronald Spector says that “an with the cosponsorship of the NATO Defense College. examination of the events of 1968 makes clear that...the most appro- priate analogy to Vietnam is World To obtain registration information for either of the above events—or War I. As in World War I on the to be placed on the mailing list for announcements about future NDU Western front, the war in Vietnam symposia—write or call: was a stalemate [but] as in World Institute for National Strategic Studies War I, neither side was prepared to ATTN: Symposia Directorate admit this fact.” Both sides, he ob- National Defense University serves, made maximum efforts to Fort Lesley J. McNair break the stalemate during 1968. Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 The strategic vacuum at the (202) 287–9230/9231 or DSN 667–9230/9231 top—including the failure to recog- FAX: (202) 287–9239 or DSN 667–9239 nize that the military had no other choice than to pursue the strategic

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Sky troopers of A REFLECTION ON the 1st Cav. WE WERE SOLDIERS ONCE...AND YOUNG By DAVID J. ANDRE

Dear Friend, You asked to borrow the Vietnam remembrance, We Were Soldiers Once...and Young. I sat down this evening to pen a quick cover note to you, but memories took over and these pages are the result. Please in- dulge me for just a few minutes. The book was coauthored by Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore,

USA (Ret.), and Joseph L. Galloway. U.S. Army (Howard C. Breedlove) It recounts four days of incredibly intense and desperate combat between the U.S. Army’s The book is one of the most important and painstak- 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and three regiments of ingly researched, lovingly created, and vividly described North Vietnamese infantry in the Ia Drang Valley of first-person accounts of infantry combat ever written. Province in November 1965. Then-Lieutenant Over the years, I’ve read widely in this genre from across Colonel commanded the 1st Battalion of the the expanse of military history. Many were skillfully and 7th Cavalry, whose saga is recalled in the first part of the even inspirationally rendered by soldiers and scholars of book. Joe Galloway, a young UPI war correspondent, was deserved renown. But none surpasses what the authors on the ground with Moore’s unit. A sister battalion, the have achieved here. It is absolutely stunning—even rivet- 2/7 Cavalry, is the major focus of the balance of the book, ing. Please excuse the underlined passages and marginal beginning with a section entitled “Albany.” Elements of comments that I made in the book. Some are rather per- several other cavalry regiments were also involved. All sonal and, I must say, not always measured. I never told, during a four-day period, 234 young Americans lost anticipated that anyone else would read them. their lives in the action. The 2/7 alone had 155 killed in Experiencing this book—and that is really the best just six hours. But together, the two battalions killed way to put it—was an intense personal catharsis for me. I perhaps ten times as many of the enemy. have deliberately avoided Vietnam, when I could, for over 25 years now. I’ve read very little about it and have seen none of the films that feature it. I guess I’ve been waiting

Colonel David J. Andre, USA (Ret.), was an infantry officer who all of these years for something to happen that would cause capped his career as a strategic analyst in the Office of the Secretary me to say, finally, it’s ended—those of us who served so of Defense and as chairman of the Department of Military Strategy at the National War College. loyally and sacrificed so greatly, only to return to ignominy

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and harsh, unfair, and mean-spirited criticism from our during the two months prior to the bloody campaign re- fellow citizens, at last have been fondly remembered and counted in this book. Even though they had just arrived in richly memorialized with genuine feeling and ennobling country and were not yet well established, elements of the dignity. The wait has been rewarded in full measure. 1st Cavalry nonetheless supported us and even came to our I have never visited the Vietnam Memorial on the relief on several occasions. Mall. I have no plans to go there—ever. Many (certainly Although my battalion was committed elsewhere when not all, perhaps not even most) of my buddies—largely the hellish battles in the Ia Drang Valley were raging that the former rifle platoon leaders and company commanders November, I personally knew many of the officers and men who led units that did most of the hard ground fighting who were involved, including their families. I had gone to in Vietnam—feel the same way, albeit for many different college, the Infantry Officers Basic Course, and Airborne and complex reasons. But, profoundly moved by Moore and Ranger Schools with some of them. Others had worked and Galloway’s immense and touching labor of love, we with or for me in earlier assignments. Many more I would have talked a great deal. We believe that this inspired meet in the years to come. creation is a truly fitting memorial to the thousands of One was a fine young infantry officer who, a decade soldiers who served, bled, suffered, were maimed, and hence, was my colleague at West Point and a dear friend. died on the field of battle in Vietnam, and for those who He died tragically a few years ago, just days after we had continue to wage that war in their minds...because enjoyed lunch together. My profound sadness at his loss is they cannot forget. This splendidly written remembrance heightened by the realization that his premature death pre- graphically tells their story and poignantly honors their vented him from reading this book, in which his and his gallantry, heroism, and appalling sacrifice as no carved buddies’ selflessness and suffering are so heart-rendingly stone monolith ever can. chronicled. In sum, this work recalls for me—and for In the autumn of 1965, South Vietnamese and many others, I am sure—a gut-wrenching personal Americans were fighting hard to prevent the forced experience of truly epic proportions. cleaving of the Republic of Vietnam across Route 19 Let me add that the only real differences between the through the Central Highlands by Viet Cong guerrilla combat actions described in this book and many others and main force units and their recently arrived allies of that we participated in before and after were the size of the People’s Army of North Vietnam. Thousands of the forces engaged and the magnitude of the carnage. Bat- other North Vietnamese soldiers were streaming down tles between small units can be equally horrendous and the Trail through Laos and Cambodia profoundly alter the minds and being of those who fight toward South Vietnam. The war had reached a major them. The phrase “hell in a very small place” (which is turning point, and we knew it. also the title of a superb book by Bernard Fall on the I was a first lieutenant and executive officer, and then French defeat at Dien Bien Phu) is an apt metaphor for the commander, of an airborne infantry rifle company the infantryman in time of war. And for all too many, the (B 2/502) in the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. hell never ends. Our battalion was involved in a number of sharp actions

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The often sanguinary passages found in We Were Soldiers Once...and Young cry out for public attention. I hope they prompt no small measure of soul searching by Americans, and especially in our Nation’s capital, by our political leaders. Washington is full of people interested in national security, and with a passion for righting all manner of injustice throughout the world, who stop well short of wearing a uniform themselves much less putting their lives on the line in combat. No political party occupies the moral high ground when it comes to the use of force. In fact, some of the most vocal hawks on defense matters and other reputed pillars of American society tend to be the biggest hypocrites on this score. Those removed from the re- ality of war are sometimes the first to talk in glib terms about Sources: Map (above) American Embassy, applying the military instrument Saigon. Map (left) Joel D. Meyerson, Images of a Lengthy War (Washington: when unfortunate and even Government Printing Office, 1986). grotesque things happen abroad that they determine can only be redressed by force of arms. Such ill-advised impetuosity seldom is heard from those who places. This they do even for vague, ill-conceived policies have survived the terrifying baptism of fire, borne the which—however well intentioned—often cannot even be awesome responsibility for the lives of others in battle, articulated adequately in terms of risks to our vital na- filled body bags with the remains of their comrades, and tional interests or the desired outcome. It is not surprising known the reality of going in harm’s way. Sadly, Erasmus then that the American people do not buy into these poli- got it right in the title of his treatise against war: Dulce cies. As we know only too well this is what happened in Bellum Inexpertis (war is sweet to those unacquainted the case of Vietnam. with it). It’s disturbing that many otherwise well-informed More to the point, policymakers of this ilk at virtually people, along with others who should know better, see a every level in Washington seem far too eager to argue for combat-wizened soldier’s insistence on receiving reasonably sending others, including no small number of essentially clear and militarily actionable political objectives prior to economic draftees, to fight and die in distant, lonely commitment to battle as a nuisance, if not an impossibility.

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How can this be? If Clausewitz had not finished On War, But there were differences worth recalling. We had learned we would have learned the fallacy—even the moral from the experiences of others and the terrain, weather, and bankruptcy—of such thinking through the many wars and tactical situation allowed us to promptly and effectively smaller actions in our Nation’s two-centuries of history. bring to bear just about every kind of fire support avail- Tragically this includes a few conflicts that have occurred able—mortars, artillery, rockets, gunships, and fighter- since the war in Vietnam officially ended and its lessons bombers. And the division piled on quickly, inserting were finely distilled, gently decanted, and widely distributed almost an entire brigade by helicopter. By day’s end we had for public consumption. Here Moore and Galloway give us overwhelmed and destroyed a North Vietnamese regiment, reason for pause. albeit at considerable cost. My company took heavy casual- Those who would use the military as a test bed for all ties and I spent most of the next year in hospital and sev- manner of social experimentation—as is the vogue eral more recovering. today—need to understand what the “sky troopers” of the Still some things never change. Leading-edge technol- 1st Cavalry experienced in the Ia Drang. They need to ogy, world-class combat systems, and new and innovative understand it clearly since, in the course of events, what organizational and operational concepts have served to happened there is only a variation on a theme: it is what make the military more effective than we were back then. soldiers experience whenever they are committed to battle. But it has made war more intense and the task of ground No amount of political and technological change in the combat potentially more deadly. Much of what I and other world is likely to significantly alter this basic fact. members of the 1st Cavalry experienced in combat in This heart-breaking yet incredibly inspiring book Vietnam could easily occur again—for many of the same breathes new life into the meaning of unit cohesion in reasons. Neither the end of history nor the end of the vital ways that no research study, academic treatise, or field role that we mortals must play in its often painfully costly manual could approach. It demonstrates how critical, pre- and not infrequently disastrous results is close at hand. cious, and, perhaps most importantly, fragile cohesion truly I was going to close by saying that I hope you enjoy is. That a superbly organized, trained, and led unit like this book. But it is not something to be enjoyed. Instead it Hal Moore’s could hover so close to utter destruction for so must be experienced, reflected upon, remembered, and then long and survive not only to recover, but also to fight cherished. It is an inspired story of the victory of human again another day, is both a lesson and a warning for those spirit against overwhelming odds. It should be read in the who would tinker, even at the margins, with the fabric of hope that we learn from what We Were Soldiers the military, the profession of arms, and the warrior ethic Once...and Young has to tell us. as we know it in the United States. I later served with the 1st Cavalry during my second Sincerely, tour in Vietnam. After taking command of my second rifle David company (A 2/5 Cavalry), we air assaulted into a hot land- ing zone north of Saigon near the Cambodian border, an action not unlike the one described by Moore and Galloway.

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MANAGING THE SCHWARZKOPF ACCOUNT: ATKINSON AS CRUSADER Two Book Reviews by PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ and RONALD H. COLE

The release this past autumn of yet another post-mortem on the Persian Gulf War received the kind of hype normally reserved for exposés by Washington insiders. While Crusade by Rick Atkinson does indeed retail a variety of personality quirks and expletives undeleted, it also raises serious questions about the purpose and aftermath of Desert Storm. In the tandem politico-military reviews that follow, a former senior policymaker and a military historian take separate looks at Atkinson as a crusader in the quest to capture the lessons of the Gulf War.

PAUL D.WOLFOWITZ RONALD H. COLE Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War he Persian Gulf War occupies a ick Atkinson won the Pulitzer by Rick Atkinson unique place in American mili- Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Prize for a series of articles on Ttary history. It is unique partic- Company, 1993. RWest Point’s Class of 1966 ularly from the standpoint of the 575 pp. $24.95 which were published as The Long casualties suffered by U.S. and coali- [ISBN 0–395–60290–4] Gray Line. Like that earlier book, tion forces. No major war in our his- Crusade: The Untold Story of the Per- tory has resulted in so few friendly sian Gulf War features anecdotal ac- casualties, a number that the U.S. counts of people, both great and Commander in Chief, General about which the most significant small, to survey the conflict. Person- Norman Schwarzkopf, aptly called observation is that Saddam Hussein alities dominate this volume—espe- “miraculously” low. survived it. cially those of the Commander in That very uniqueness seems to Ironically, if the conflict had Chief of U.S. Central Command have made it difficult for many peo- been more costly, its significance (CINCCENT), General Norman ple to grasp the broader significance might be better appreciated today. Schwarzkopf, and his senior of the event. It was a war that trans- Probably at no other time in our his- commanders. formed the security structure of the tory has the Nation so overestimated Crusade recounts Operation Persian Gulf—a region that will re- the dangers of war before the fact or Desert Storm, the 43-day military main the principal source of world so underestimated them afterwards. operation, in detail but only energy needs well into the next cen- Largely because of the fear over thou- sketches in, by way of periodic di- tury. Its impact has also been felt sands or even tens of thousands of gressions, the critical period of five more widely throughout the Middle body bags, the resolution authoriz- and half months of planning and East, with dramatic effects on the ing the use of force to evict the Iraqi preparation during Operation Desert Arab-Israeli peace process. And it ap- army from Kuwait almost failed to Shield. Atkinson leaves to others pears to have foreshadowed a truly gain a majority in the U.S. Senate. substantive treatment of U.S. strat- revolutionary change in military Afterwards, however, it all seemed so egy in Southwest Asia; crisis action technology and its accompanying easy that President Bush was sub- in the first week of August 1990; the doctrine and tactics, even though jected to a drumbeat of criticism for unprecedented air and sealift of half most of the technology demon- not having gone all the way to Bagh- a million personnel, 3,800 aircraft, strated was ten or fifteen years old. dad to round up Saddam Hussein. and three million tons of cargo over Yet in a good deal of popular In his book, Crusade: The Untold 8,000 miles; the problems of peace- discourse the Gulf War seems to be Story of the Persian Gulf War, Rick time understaffing at the headquar- dismissed as a kind of peripheral in- Atkinson offers us a helpful correc- ters of both U.S. Central Command tive to this ex post facto underestima- cident at the end of the Cold War, (continues on page 124/column 3) tion. It is a volume that is impressive Ambassador Paul D. Wolfowitz is dean of not only for the breadth of its re- Ronald H. Cole is a member of the Office of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Inter- search, but also for the drama of its Joint History where he is currently doing national Studies, The Johns Hopkins Uni- narrative. In particular, by bringing work on the Persian Gulf War. He is also the versity, and also holds the George F. Kennan to life the fears of commanders and coauthor of a forthcoming book entitled Chair in National Security Strategy at the the heroism of individual warriors, The Role of Federal Military Forces in National War College. (continues on page 124/column 1) Domestic Disorders, 1878–1945.

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(Wolfowitz continued from page 123) That view, it seems to me, exag- what they accomplish. The Gulf War gerates Bush’s rhetoric and, even prevented something truly terrible, Atkinson makes clear that this war more, exaggerates the influence of as we now know even more clearly was no cake-walk for those who ac- his rhetoric. Bush’s accomplish- from post-war revelations about Sad- tually had to fight it. ments as Commander in Chief dur- dam’s nuclear program. It seems vir- He brings the story alive with a ing the Gulf War were enormous, tually certain that—if this program technique that is in vogue among but his rhetorical powers of persua- had not been stopped—he would investigative reporters but scorned sion were not foremost among have controlled the entire Arabian by rigorous historians—the use of them. For all of his mastery in com- peninsula and would have turned quotations to give readers the feel- manding the military and leading his nuclear arsenal against either ing of being present in crucial con- the coalition, the President was dis- Iran or Israel, if not both countries versations, even though most of the tinctly not a master of rhetoric. It is in succession. To have prevented a quotes probably come from later rec- a real stretch to say that the public nuclear war by a tyrant in control of ollections of participants rather than formed its view of the conflict most of the energy supplies that are from contemporaneous records. This largely based on Bush’s rhetoric. the lifeblood of the industrialized means that many things end up in- Moreover, by any standard of a democracies of the world was no side quotation marks that probably democracy at war, the rhetoric of mean accomplishment. By that mea- do not belong there. The result, nev- this conflict was not particularly cru- sure, the Persian Gulf War achieved ertheless, is a far more complete pic- sading. Indeed, it was characterized a great deal and the sacrifices of ture than one which limits itself at least as much by emphasis on lim- those who fought it have a much to things that can be precisely ited goals as by emphasis on the larger meaning. Perhaps that is what documented. morality of the cause for which we Atkinson has in mind when he As someone who was present in were fighting. closes his account by stating that the a number of the meetings which It became almost a cliché even war was neither the “greatest moral Atkinson describes, I am impressed before the war to criticize President challenge” since 1945—as Bush had by the overall accuracy of his por- Bush for “demonizing” Saddam Hus- claimed—nor a “pointless exercise in trayal of events, even where I might sein and “overpersonalizing” the gunboat diplomacy” as some critics question the use of a particular word conflict. But it was Saddam Hussein’s saw it, but rather that “the truth lay or phrase. In general, the historical actions much more than the Presi- somewhere on the high middle record will be much richer for hav- dent’s rhetoric that demonized him ground awaiting discovery.” JFQ ing this body of information, which in the eyes of Americans. That de- could not have been assembled by monic quality became even more any other method. clear in the wake of the war, with (Cole continued from page 123) Atkinson’s detection of a “jaun- the terrible environmental destruc- diced discontent” after the Gulf War (CENTCOM) and Third Army; creat- tion he visited on Kuwait, his hor- reveals a phenomenon that has been ing a vast multinational coalition; rendous attacks on Iraq’s Kurdish common following other wars, cer- and the command, control, commu- and Shia populations, revelations 3 tainly the Korean War, but even nications, and intelligence (C I) for about the extent of Iraq’s nuclear World War II. Some perspective is a complex theater of operations. weapons program, and Saddam’s needed to form an accurate histori- By deemphasizing Desert Shield, defiance of U.N. inspections. It was cal judgment. Current assessments Atkinson also understates the role of these things, and not earlier Presi- of the significance of the Persian the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of dential rhetoric, that caused the Gulf War are colored heavily by the Staff, General Colin Powell. During public to ask what the war had popular disillusionment that began Desert Shield he helped CINCCENT accomplished if Saddam Hussein to set in afterward, as Saddam Hus- set up his command; advised Presi- remained in power, even as the ad- sein retained his grasp on power and dent George Bush and his staff on ministration attempted rhetorically continued to provoke and defy the policy; monitored CENTCOM’s oper- to downplay his importance. international community. ational, logistical, and diplomatic re- In this respect, the problem In trying to answer the question quirements; supervised the parallel arose more from the spectacular ease why the “sweet savor of victory” so planning efforts of the Joint Staff; of the victory than from the Presi- quickly turned “to the taste of and tutored the President and Secre- dent’s alleged rhetorical excess. Hav- ashes,” Atkinson places the empha- tary of Defense Dick Cheney on the ing achieved so much at a relatively sis on the critique which is implicit strategic and technical aspects of low cost, many Americans began to in his title, Crusade. President Bush, joint and combined warfare to en- assume that we could have had in his view, so “encouraged the Na- sure that, in Cheney’s words, more simply for the taking. tion to consider the war a great Schwarzkopf’s plans “passed the But there is also a failure to fully moral crusade,” that people were sanity test.” understand what the war did accom- bound to be disappointed by the Fortunately, Atkinson buttresses plish. By and large, wars are not con- limited results. the frequent quotations and per- structive acts and are best judged by sonal remarks in his book (which what they prevent rather than by

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General Norman Schwarzkopf (CINCCENT) flanked by General Colin Powell (CJCS) and the Honorable Paul D. Wolfowitz (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) at a U.S.-Saudi press conference in January 1991. U.S. Navy ( Susan Carl )

the previous reviewer, Dr. Wolfowitz, campaign that comprised the first 39 CINC for a campaign to punish Iraq commented on) with material from days of Desert Storm. His focus is if its troops invaded Saudi Arabia. published and unpublished sec- largely on how Lieutenant General Schwarzkopf later decided to ondary sources and occasionally Charles Horner, the CENTCOM air make Instant Thunder the first of a with documentation. In addition to component commander, and his four phase battle plan to eject the Woodward’s The Commanders and planner, Brigadier General Buster Iraqis from Kuwait. After Warden autobiographies by both Generals Glosson, dominated every aspect of briefed Horner and Glosson on the Schwarzkopf and de la Billière, the operation and managed until plan in August, Glosson and his Atkinson has made extensive use of the last two weeks to deflect at- team in the “Black Hole” spent the the Department of Defense’s Conduct tempts to shift resources away from next few months expanding the of the Persian Gulf War and two other the strategic air campaign against strategic phase and developing three official histories, the Air Force’s Gulf and central Iraq. other phases: air superiority in the War Air Power Survey and the draft of The book refers in glowing Kuwaiti theater of operations, prepa- the Army’s Certain Victory. In all terms to Colonel John Warden of ration of the battlefield, and close three accounts teams of authors pe- the Air Staff’s Checkmate division in air support of the ground campaign. rused mountains of documents that the Pentagon. He praises Warden as By means of a daily secure-line would have been impossible for any the principal architect of the air war; phone call to Rear Admiral Mike one person to read in the two years but in truth, Warden was one of sev- McConnell (the Chairman’s intelli- Atkinson spent researching Crusade. eral fathers of the final air plan. Fol- gence advisor who coordinated with It does appear from the notes, how- lowing the operational philosophy the Defense Intelligence Agency ever, that Atkinson has at least re- put forth in his own book, Air Cam- and Central Intelligence Agency), viewed enough documentary mate- paign, Warden and his staff did pro- Glosson got substantial targeting rial to have seen the tip of the duce Instant Thunder, a plan to de- data that became part of the mature evidentiary iceberg. stroy 84 strategic targets in six days plan. The plan eventually included Atkinson devotes the first half in response to a request from the 600 targets, half of which would be of Crusade to examining the person- struck in a war that lasted six weeks alities and salient events of the air instead of six days.

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Overall Atkinson offers a bal- In Crusade Atkinson initially thought it prudent not to have a anced summary judgment of the im- describes General Powell as a tal- third Army general occupy a top pact of the air war on the campaign, ented officer who “managed the post in CENTCOM. This uninten- including the fact that while stealth Schwarzkopf account” and picked tionally turned Yeosock’s headquar- and laser-guided munitions greatly up “broken crockery” left by a ters into an unwanted filter between enhanced lethality they didn’t negate volatile theater commander. Powell the CINC and his field forces. Also, the need for both traditional insisted that Lieutenant General impatient with Yeosock’s methodical weapons and ground forces to finish Calvin Waller join Schwarzkopf as style, Schwarzkopf often bypassed the campaign. To illustrate the point Deputy CINC to assist and calm the him and dealt directly with the he writes that, during the first five “bear.” In Desert Storm Powell did corps commanders. days, the vaunted F–117As success- far more. According to Atkinson’s From the moment Franks fully struck 46 percent of their tar- account, Powell routinely played arrived in Saudi Arabia, if not before, gets, missing the rest because of some George Marshall—the commander’s Schwarzkopf took an immediate dis- common bugaboos such as pilot commander—to Schwarzkopf’s like to the man. Atkinson says that error, malfunctions, and poor Dwight Eisenhower. When F–117s Schwarzkopf privately dismissed weather. Atkinson cites himself and bombed the military intelligence Franks as a pedant with an ability to another journalist as the source of command bunker at Al Firdos on mask battlefield timidity with ver- this statistic which, if correct, still re- February 13, 1991, inadvertently bose and theoretical lectures on flects phenomenal accuracy. Accord- killing over 200 civilians, Powell in- tactics and operational maneuver- ing to the Gulf War Air Power Survey, sisted that the Joint Staff review all ing. On G-Day, after ordering Franks “the F–117 alone, with two percent of future strategic targets. He also sup- to move his attack forward by 15 the total attack sorties, struck nearly ported ground force commanders hours, Schwarzkopf fumed over the forty percent of the strategic targets when they called for a shift of slow pace of the armored corps, es- and remained the centerpiece of the sorties away from Baghdad to the pecially when contrasted with the strategic air campaign.” Saddam Hussein line in southern progress of XVIII Corps, the When he argues that the strate- Kuwait. The Chairman played a Marines, and the Arab corps. gic campaign wasn’t critical to the critical role in resolving a dispute Atkinson defends Franks as coalition’s ultimate success Atkinson over battle damage assessment that commander of the principal attack is on far shakier ground. A closer threatened to delay the start of the on four counts: he had the largest look at the evidence including the ground war. Powell convinced his corps, his divisions needed to stop Gulf War Air Power Survey reveals a political superiors that the higher frequently to refuel their M1A1 contrary view, namely, that allied air rates of attrition claimed by tanks, he had to wheel his corps supremacy and the resulting six- Schwarzkopf’s headquarters were around a potent force of Iraqi armor, Inte week period of uninterrupted bomb- probably more accurate than the and he had to assure that division Send for a FR ing frequently disrupted Iraqi com- lower rates shown by satellite movements were synchronized to mand and control, paralyzed a good imagery. avoid fratricide and to clench the part of Iraqi efforts to supply front Based on Atkinson’s interviews fist to smash the Republican Guard. line troops, and deprived Iraqi intel- we learn, in gossipy detail, that Moreover, Franks alone can’t be ligence of . Powell’s deft handling of Schwarz- blamed for failing to encircle the Re- Owing to the absence of strategic or kopf was not mirrored by the CINC’s publican Guard. Schwarzkopf halted tactical intelligence, neither the treatment of his ground force com- the advance of the 24th Division. Iraqi general staff nor the field com- manders, notably Lieutenant Gener- Yeosock couldn’t coordinate attacks manders detected the repositioning als John Yeosock and Fred Franks. by XVIII and VII Corps across the of hundreds of thousands of coali- Atkinson takes pains to depict rear of the Republican Guard in tion troops to execute the decisive Schwarzkopf as overbearing and the time. Similarly, owing to the fog of envelopment. On the other hand, sole cause of friction both within war, Franks shouldn’t be blamed for Atkinson is correct in stating that and between headquarters. However Schwarzkopf’s mistaken assumption the 22,000 airstrikes used to prepare that is only part of the story and on the final day of the war that the battlefield were effective. They Atkinson fails to address the institu- Franks’ troops physically controlled battered and demoralized the front tional factors. Early in Desert Shield Safwan, the Iraqi airfield which had lines of Iraqi defenders and enabled Schwarzkopf designated himself, not been chosen for the talks. the allies to move north in force Yeosock, supreme land force com- Is Crusade the great classic of before the commanders of enemy mander. Perhaps to contain possible military history as claimed on the armored divisions could effectively interservice resentment over a the- dust jacket, or a gossipy account of organize their still potent forces in ater headquarters that was top heavy the names and faces in the news? an effective defense. with Army generals, Schwarzkopf The answer, like Atkinson’s appraisal of the overall significance of the Per-

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sian Gulf War itself, lies somewhere JFQ DISTRIBUTION SCHEDULE on the “high middle ground.” Per- haps the greatest fault of Crusade is A total of 35,000 copies of each issue of Joint Force Quarterly is distributed world-wide. Of an overemphasis on Schwarzkopf’s this number, over 20,000 copies are sent directly to the services for break down and de- personality, especially his famous livery to units, installations, and bases (for individual service points of contact see the temper. Atkinson blames Schwarz- Postscript on the next page). Bulk shipments of the journal are also made to the follow- ing addressees: kopf for many of the problems and setbacks during the war. But as Department of Defense copies Defense Agencies copies Clausewitz has noted such things are Office of the Secretary of Defense 250 Defense Information Systems Agency 125 part of the friction found in every Washington Headquarters Service 150 Defense Intelligence Agency 150 war. Two British observers, General Joint Staff and Activities 600 Defense Logistics Agency 150 Defense Mapping Agency 25 Sir Peter de la Billière and the distin- Unified Commands Defense Nuclear Agency 25 guished military historian John U.S. European Command 275 25 Keegan, have reminded us that it is U.S. Pacific Command 425 often desirable for a commander to U.S. Atlantic Command 150 Service Colleges focus the attention of his subordi- U.S. Southern Command 150 U.S. Army War College 500 nates on orders rather than to U.S. Central Command 275 U.S. Army Command and allow them to dwell on the enemy. U.S. 150 General Staff College 1,500 U.S. Special Operations Command 150 Naval War College 650 Schwarzkopf’s temper notwithstand- U.S. Strategic Command 275 Marine Corps Command and ing, the Gulf War was in military U.S. Transportation Command 100 Staff College 300 terms—from the magnitude of the Air War College 350 enemy’s defeat to the exceedingly Air Command and Staff College 800 low level of allied casualties—a triumph of joint and combined In addition to the organizations listed above, approximately 2,000 copies of JFQ are warfare. JFQ mailed to general and flag officers, members of Congress, research institutes, policy cen- ters, military journals, academic institutions, foreign defense establishments, and other selected activities.

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POSTSCRIPT

Bulk distribution is made to the editor, items of commentary, and A NOTE TO Office of the Secretary of Defense, De- brief essays are invited. Reproduc- fense Agencies, Joint Staff, unified tions of supporting material (such READERS AND commands, service colleges, and as maps and photos) should be sub- CONTRIBUTORS other selected activities (see distribu- mitted with manuscripts citing the tion schedule on page 127). Changes source and indicating their availabil- DISTRIBUTION: JFQ is published of address for bulk distribution ity; do not send the originals. four times each year for officers of should be mailed to the Managing To facilitate editorial review, the Armed Forces. One copy is Editor, Joint Force Quarterly, ATTN: provide two copies of the manuscript distributed for every two officers NDU–NSS–JFQ, Washington, D.C. together with a 150-word summary. assigned to joint billets and one 20319–6000. Place personal or biographical data copy for every four majors/ on a separate sheet of paper and lieutenant commanders and SUBSCRIPTIONS: JFQ is available avoid identifying the author (or au- lieutenant colonels/commanders by subscription from the Govern- thors) in the body of the manuscript. across all the services. ment Printing Office (see the order Follow any accepted style guide in Copies are distributed to the blank in this issue). To order for one preparing the manuscript, but end- field and fleet through respective year, cite: Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) notes rather than footnotes should service channels. Corrections in on the order and mail with a check be used; both the manuscript and shipping instructions, quantities for $22.00 ($27.50 foreign) or pro- the endnotes should be typed in received, and addresses from units, vide a VISA or MasterCard account double-space with one-inch margins. installations, and bases must be sent number with expiration date to If possible submit the manu- directly to the appropriate service Superintendent of Documents, script on a disk together with the activity listed below. P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, Penn- typescript version to facilitate edit- sylvania 15220–7954, or FAX the ing. While 3.5- and 5.25-inch disks ▼ ARMY Contact the local order to: (202) 512–2233. in various formats can be processed, Publications Control Officer or write Wordperfect is preferred (disks will to the U.S. Army Publications Distribu- CONTRIBUTIONS: JFQ welcomes be returned if requested). Further tion Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, submissions on all aspects of joint information on the submission of Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896 and combined warfare from mem- contributions is available by calling (please reference Miscellaneous bers of the U.S. Armed Forces as well (202) 475–1013/DSN 335–1013, or Publication 71–1). as from defense analysts and aca- addressing queries to the Managing ▼ NAVY Active and Reserve demic specialists from both this Editor, Joint Force Quarterly, ATTN: component distribution is made by country and abroad, including for- NDU–NSS–JFQ, Washington, D.C. the Aviation Supply Office, Navy eign military personnel. There is no 20319–6000. Publications and Forms Directorate standard length for articles, but con- (CODE 10363), 5801 Tabor Avenue, tributions of 3,000 to 5,000 words Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19120– are appropriate. Other submissions, 5000; FAX: (215) 697–2601/DSN however, to include letters to the 442–2601. ▼ MARINE CORPS Contact the Marine Corps Logistics Base Atlantic, Warehouse 1221, Section 5, Albany, Georgia 31704. ▼ AIR FORCE Contact the Base he back cover displays the Publishing Distribution Office flag of the Chairman, Joint (service-wide functional distribution T Chiefs of Staff, which is is made by the Air Force Distribution medium blue and white—also the Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, colors of the flags of both the Baltimore, Maryland 21220). Secretary and Deputy Secretary of ▼ COAST GUARD Contact Defense—with an American eagle either the Commander, Coast Guard holding three crossed gold arrows Atlantic Coast Area (AO), Governor’s to represent the Army, Navy, and Island, New York, New York 10004– Air Force and a shield with 13 red and white stripes. It was made for 5098, or the Commander, Coast General Omar N. Bradley, USA, when he became the first CJCS in August Guard Pacific Area (PO), Coast 1949. After being promoted to five-star rank in September 1950, Bradley Guard Island, Alameda, California indicated that he did not think another flag was needed since it repre- 94501–5100; or write to U.S. Coast sented the position of CJCS, not the rank of the incumbent. The Guard Headquarters, ATTN: Defense Secretary of Defense acceded to this wish of General of the Army Bradley Operations Division, 2100 2d Street, and consequently a five-star CJCS flag was never designed. S.W., Washington, D.C. 20593–0001.

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JOI JFQ

Living Jointnes

Bottom-Up Rev

Standing Up Coalitions

Vietnam as Military His JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

JFQ 3 1993–94 / NUMBER WINTER JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

Published by the Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Washington, D.C.

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