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The History and Politics of Defense Reviews C O R P O R A T I O N The History and Politics of Defense Reviews Raphael S. Cohen For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2278 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9973-0 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface The 1993 Bottom-Up Review starts with this challenge: “Now that the Cold War is over, the questions we face in the Department of Defense are: How do we structure the armed forces of the United States for the future? How much defense is enough in the post–Cold War era?”1 Finding a satisfactory answer to these deceptively simple questions not only motivated the Bottom-Up Review but has arguably animated defense strategy for the past quarter century. Indeed, over that period, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has labored under successive administrations to not only a write a strategy but build a process that prioritizes threats; aligns resources accordingly; and seamlessly links ends, ways, and means together into a compelling narrative. And yet, few say they believe that any of the dozen major defense reviews over the past quarter century produced a satisfactory answer to this task. This study, conducted in RAND Project AIR FORCE’s Strategy and Doctrine Program, asks: Why has the defense strategy process evolved in the way it has? Why, despite so much time and effort, do strategies so often come up short? And, most importantly, how can the process change to make for better strategy? This report traces the post–Cold War history of defense reviews from Base Force through the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. It then borrows political scientist Robert Putnam’s framework of a two-level game to understand the political constraints on defense reviews and argues that these constraints limit the decision space in these reviews— producing a powerful, if ultimately disappointing, tendency to embrace the status quo. The report concludes with recommendations for the services and DoD at large about how to improve both the process and content of future defense strategy. This research was sponsored by the Director of Strategy, Concepts and Assessments, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements (AF/A5S). It is part of a larger study, titled Defense Strategic Processes: How the Force Planning Construct and Scenarios Inform the POM, which assists the Air Force with preparing for the 2018 National Defense Strategy. This report should be of value to the national security community and interested members of the general public, especially those with an interest in the history and politics behind the making of defense strategy. RAND Project AIR FORCE RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the U.S. Air Force’s federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the 1 Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Washington, D.C., October 1993, p. 1. iii development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future air, space, and cyber forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Force Modernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. The research reported here was prepared under contract FA7014-16-D-1000. Additional information about PAF is available on our website: www.rand.org/paf This report documents work originally shared with the U.S. Air Force on May 12, 2017. The draft report, issued on September 1, 2017, was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and U.S. Air Force subject-matter experts. iv Contents Preface ...................................................................................................................................... iii Figures and Tables ..................................................................................................................... vi Summary .................................................................................................................................. vii Acknowledgments ..................................................................................................................... ix Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. x 1. The Quixotic Quest for a “True” Defense Strategy ................................................................ 1 Definitions and Methodology .............................................................................................................. 2 Overview and the Argument of the Report .......................................................................................... 4 2. The History of Defense Reviews ........................................................................................... 5 The Base Force (1989–1992) .............................................................................................................. 5 The Bottom-Up Review (1993) ........................................................................................................... 8 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (1995)....................................................... 12 The Quadrennial Defense Review (1997) .......................................................................................... 14 National Defense Panel (1997) .......................................................................................................... 19 The Quadrennial Defense Review (2001) .......................................................................................... 22 The Quadrennial Defense Review (2006) .......................................................................................... 26 The Quadrennial Defense Review (2010) .......................................................................................... 30 The Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel (2010) ............................................................. 34 The Defense Strategic Guidance (2012) ............................................................................................ 36 The Quadrennial Defense Review (2014) .......................................................................................... 39 National Defense Panel (2014) .......................................................................................................... 43 Understanding the “Unhappy Families”............................................................................................. 45 3. The Politics of Defense Reviews ......................................................................................... 48 How Much Do Defense Reviews Matter? .......................................................................................... 48 Why Are Defense Reviews’ Impact Seemingly So Limited? .............................................................. 52 Should Defense Reviews Matter More? ............................................................................................. 60 Why Strategies Disappoint ................................................................................................................ 63 4. Making the Most Out of the Game ...................................................................................... 64 How a Service Can Get the Most of the Process ................................................................................ 64 How the Defense Department Can Get the Most of the Process ......................................................... 67 How the United States Can Get the Most out of the Reviews ............................................................. 71 Appendix. Defense Reviews and Predicting the Future ............................................................. 73 References ................................................................................................................................ 84 v Figures and Tables Figures Figure 2.1. The Quad Chart ...................................................................................................... 28 Figure 2.2. The “Michelin Man” ............................................................................................... 29 Figure 3.1. Budget Share by Military Department ....................................................................
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