The Making of the 2016 White Paper: Incorporating Society as a Whole

Sebastian Maier August 1, 2016

The “2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr” is the most imperative recent document to lay out the Germany’s principles and tools in shaping security policy at large. It discusses key elements of security policy, describes the international security environment, identifies strategic priorities, and points out areas of engagement in which Germany has the opportuni- ty to shape policy. On first read, the paper´s most noticeable strength is the depth in which it explores its many concerns, from traditional policy power plays to the topical challenges of mass migration and climate change. The paper also bears testi- mony to the government´s clearly articulated commitment to a strategy that draws from all segments of society: domestic and international pundits, as well as consultants from both inside and outside the government, participated in drafting and shaping the document. This comprehensive approach to poli- cymaking is in keeping with, and a step forward from, the German Federal Foreign Office´s “Review 2014,” a project that used a socially integrated approach to foreign policy strategy and analysis. The timing of the White Paper coincides with the German parliament’s summer break, sheltering the document somewhat from immediate public scrutiny. It was enacted by the government on July 13, 2016, shortly after NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit: it is worth remarking that in the days leading up to the summit, General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg was outspoken in his public remarks on NATO’s antipodes.

Russia and Cybersecurity – Two Sides of the Same Coin Two highly interwoven issues of the paper stand out in terms of their significance and delicacy: Germany´s role within NATO, including its behavior toward Russia, and cybersecurity. The document describes NATO’s ongoing efforts to bolster military presence in Eastern Europe and the Baltics. It also takes the long-overdue step of incorporating cyberspace as an official fourth domain of warfare, in -ad dition to air, land, and sea. The crux of the matter is that, while both topics already have a tangible impact on the easternmost members of NATO, the organization still lacks the boldness to address the origins of the threat by name, only going so far as to say that their cybersecurity measures are not aimed at any specific entity. Germany´s approach to the Russian Federation´s noticeably more assertive role in the international arena of late is cryptically enshrined in the White Paper in references to NATO´s umbrella of “coop- erative security” and to the need to maintain “credible deterrence” while keeping the door open for institutional “dialogue” with the Kremlin.

The Making of the 2016 White Paper: Incorporating Society as a Whole 1 Why are Russia and cybersecurity central issues for Germany? In May 2016, the country´s domestic intelligence service chief, Hans-Georg Maaßen of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitu- tion, (BfV), made the case explicitly when he held Russian intelligence accountable for having allegedly hacked into the German parliament´s computer systems in May 2015, forcing it to shut down for days. However, the German government’s existing cybersecurity capabilities, designed to protect businesses from fraudulent activity and espionage, don’t match up for the security sector’s daring willingness to name the origin of the threats. Hence, the White Paper misses an opportunity for progress when it settles for stating the obvious: “attribution continues to be a problem in cyberspace”. The bottom line is that at- tribution has as much to do with political will as it does with technological and infrastructural capability. More broadly, the White Paper reflects Germany’s ambivalent balancing act with Russia. One the one hand, Germany’s economic footprint is unrivalled across Europe, especially given the UK’s decision to leave the European Union in the near future. Meanwhile, Berlin, more than ever, has a strategic inter- est in keeping viable joint policy channels with Moscow alive, since the country serves as a traditional bridge between the West and the Kremlin. On the other hand, the Germany-Russia energy relationship, in which the former depends on gas imports from the latter, has reached an unprecedented low since Russia launched an ongoing military intervention in Ukraine in February 2014. The current erratic political landscape in Europe and further afield brings to mind the words of Henry Kissinger, who fit- tingly described Germany’s posture as an “economic giant, but political dwarf,” and “too big for Europe, yet too small for the world.” In an effort to refute these statements, the 2016 White Paper calls on Germany to assume more secu- rity policy responsibility on the global stage, but goes too far when defense minister Gundula von der Leyen asserts in the preface that Germany must be “prepared to take the lead.”

A Largely Realistic Assessment of “The Future of the Bundeswehr” The second chapter of the paper, suitably titled “The Future of the Bundeswehr,” offers a lucid break- down of upcoming challenges for the armed forces without denying reality. This analysis is exemplified by the Bundeswehr’s campaign against the so-called Islamic State, code- named “Counter Daesh.” The plan encompasses a Peshmerga training mission in Kurdistan Regional Government, navy deployment of a spy ship off the Syrian coast in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the stationing of Tornado fighter jets in Turkey for tactical reconnaissance. In effect a statement of solidar- ity with European neighbor France, this naval and aerial engagement was authorized in the wake of the November 2015 terror attacks in Paris. In light of Germany’s narrow legal conditions for the deployment of armed forces abroad, this willing- ness to follow up intentions with concrete action does justice to the paper´s bid for the Bundeswehr to “play a substantial role in a reliable manner.” Linking rapid and resolute military deployment with compliance with international law and the safeguarding of the parliamentary reserve, whose consent is a prerequisite for military intervention abroad, is a bold yet nuanced and realistic evolution from Germany´s traditionally reticent military culture. Perhaps most interestingly, the second half of the paper addresses Germany’s stance on assertively “ensuring unhindered access to trade routes, raw materials and energy” as a basic requirement for

2 The Making of the 2016 White Paper: Incorporating Society as a Whole securing the country’s “prosperity” and the “well-being of its citizens.” The document renews the 2006 White Paper’s call for “flexible use of security policy instruments in order to prevent and remove dis- ruptions and blockades.” This language is interesting in light of recent political history: in May 2010, then-German president Horst Köhler suddenly announced his resignation after facing fierce criticism for partially justifying the country’s mission in Afghanistan as a safeguard for German economic in- terests, infamously saying that “military deployments appear necessary in an emergency to protect our interests, for instance with respect to trade routes.” In this delicate context, it is remarkable to see how the paper strives to overcome an often high-handed sense of moral righteousness or starry-eyed idealism among German politicians by embedding the debate about the use of military clout within an economic framework. The White Paper also paves the way for the deployment of the Bundeswehr on home soil, in accordance with the German constitution. In light of the country’s current domestic situation, it bears mentioning that the document identifies “refugee aid and relief” as well as looming “large-scale terrorist attacks” as emergency situations, authorizing the armed forces to “perform sovereign tasks and exercise powers of intervention and enforcement” in Germany proper.

An Issue of Underfunding: Preparing and Equipping the Army to Underpin its Aspirations Finally, much thought has been given to the need to make the army “fit for the future” by updating its capabilities and modernizing armaments procurement. It is about time to do so. Years of persistent budgetary shortcomings during the “peace dividend” – Germany´s military spending austerity in the aftermath of the Cold War and the achievement of reunification – has gravely imperiled mission readi- ness across the board. For example, an outdated military cargo aircraft, destined for the Peshmerga forces in Iraq, was plagued by repeated equipment failures. Other aircrafts and helicopters have shared the same fate. Along with the fact that the manufacture and arrival of urgently-needed replacement parts remain behind schedule, there is reason to be pessimistic about the Bundeswehr’s ability to reach the paper’s goals in time. Nevertheless Chancellor Angela Merkel’s preamble to the paper clearly states that “the Government has a responsibility and an obligation to provide the Bundeswehr with the necessary resources.” For the Bundeswehr to assume its manifold and possibly increasing tasks in the years to come, it will take nuanced introspection and, most importantly, the will to underwrite an altogether plausibly compiled White Paper with appropriate means for Germany to find its proper place in the international arena.

The Making of the 2016 White Paper: Incorporating Society as a Whole 3