DRAINING Of OFFICERS CANDIDATES CE.S Si
ARMY GROUND FORCES STUDY HO. 31
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TRAINING OF OFFICERS CANDIDATES IN A G F SPECIAL TRAINING SCHOOLS
Study No. 31 this dots ("Fiic Sif^
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Historical Section . Army Ground Forces
1946
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; S ' LLl*« AJLtiii The Army Ground Forces
TRAINING OF OFFICER CANDIDATES IN AGF SPECIAL SERVICE SCHOOLS
Study No, 31
By Major William R. Keast
Historical Section - Army Ground Forces 1946 B E 3 T E I fc T'E D
HEADQUAETERS ARMY GROUND FOECES
WASHINGTON 25, D, C.
31^.7(1 Sept 19^o)GNHIS 1 September 19^5
SUBJECT: Studies in the History of Aimy Ground. Forces
TO: All Interested Agencies
1. The hist017 of the Array Ground Forces as a command was prepared during the course of the war and completed immediately thereafter. The studies prepared in Headquarters Anny Ground Forces,'were written "by professional historians, three of whom served as commissioned officers, and one as a civilian. The histories of the subordinate commands were prepared by historical officers, who except iii Second Army, acted as such in addition to other duties.
2. From, the first, the histoiy was designed primarily for the Army. Its object is to give an account of what was done from the point of view of the command preparing the histoiy, including a candid, and factual account of difficulties, mistakes recognized as such, the means by which, in the opinion of those concerned, they might have been avoided, the measures used to overcome them, and the effectiveness of such measures. The histoiy is not intended to be laudatory.
3. The history of the Army Ground Forces is composed of monographs on the subjects selected, and of two volumes in which an overall history is presented. A separate volume is devoted to the activities of each of the major subordinate commands.
k. In order that the studies may be made available to interested agencies at the earliest possible date, they are being reproduced and distributed in manuscript foim. As such they must be regarded as drafts, subject to final editing tod revision. Persons finding errors of fact or important amissions are encouraged to communicate with the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Attention: Historical Section, in order that corrections may be made prior to publication in printed form by the War Department.
BY COMMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS:
(J. L. TARE Colonel, AGD 1 Incl: Acting Ground Adj General Historical Study CONTENTS
Page
Prefatory Note
Mission 1
Selection of Candidates 2
Operation of Officer Candidate Schools 3
Academic Training 3 Training in Leadership 6 Selection for Commissions 7 Selection and Training of Tactical Officers 11 Factors Eelated to Success and Failure in OC School 13 AGCT Scores 15 Age 16 Source 16
Principal Changes in the Officer Candidate Program 18
Palliatives for Low Quality in 19^2 18 Preparatory Schools 19 The Turnback Policy 20 Eevision of the OCS Program in 19^3 22 Extension of the OCS Course to Seventeen Weeks} 19^3 23 Proposals for a Six-Month OCS Course 2k Consolidation of the Armored, Cavalry, and Tank Destroyer Officer Candidate Schools. 26 RESTRICTED
TABLES
Table I: Annual Output of AGS' Officers Candidate Schools
Table II: Graduation and Failure of Officer Candidates, Antiaircraft Artillery School
Table HI: Graduation and Failure of Officer Candidates, Armored School
Table IV: Graduation and Failure of Officer Candidates, Cavalry School
Table Y: Graduation and Failure of Officer Candidates, Coast Artillery School
Table YI: Graduation and Failure of Officer Candidates, Field Artillery School
Table YII: Graduation and Failure of Gffioer Candidates, Infantry School
Table YIII: Graduation and Failure of Officer Candidates, Tank Destroyer School
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PREFATORY NOTE
Stud^r No. 6, The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers, deals with quantitative aspects of the officer problem. In particular^ that study discusses the control and admini strati on of officer candidate schools; the determination of school capacities and quotas, and the adjustment of OCS operations to requirements for offi cers at home and overseas. The question of the training of officer candidates in the special service schools, excluded from Study No, 6, is discussed in the following page el In particular, this section describes the sytem used in training and selecting officer candidates in the service schools and traces the major changes in the system after the assumption of control over officer candidate training "by Army Ground Forces in March 19^2.
To separate a discussion of training from a discussion of personnel procurement and assignment is artificial, since the nature and success of any training program is largely determined by the number and quality of men to whom it is administered. Espe cially is this the case in officer candidate training. For, as will be shown in great er detail below, the officer candidate schools occupied a peculiar position in being at once agencies of training and agencies of selection. They were an integral part of the officer procurement system, not merely institutions to which officers were sent for training after being commissioned. Having a vital role to perform in the selection process, the officer candidate schools were more sensitive than other elements of the school gystem to changes in the quality of students resulting from fluctuations in de mand. When demand was high, as in 19^2 and 19W, quotas could be filled only by lower ing standards and admitting candidates of Inferior quality. In the schools closer ob servation and more careful screening became necessary to prevent the commissioning of incompetent officers. Yet the schools were under great pressure during such periods to commission as many men as possible. Training suffered, failures increased, and the number of men turned back to repeat all or part of the course mounted. "When demand for officers was low, as In 19^1 and 19*1-3, more rigorous selection could be practiced in units. Men sent to officer candidate schools were consequently of higher quality. At the same time pressure to maintain a large volume of output was relaxed. The schools were then freer to concentrate on training, the increased success of which was attested by higiher graduation rates during these periods.
In view of the role of officer candidate schools in the officer procurement system it is not surprising that most of the developments in the training system traced on pp. 35-53 below had their origin and justification in episodes in the history of officer procurement. The present study should be read in connection with Study No. 6.
This study was prepared in the Historical Section, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, by Major William R. Eeast, in consultation with the officers cited in the notes.
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TRAINING OF OFFICER CANDIDATES IN AGF SPECIAL SERVICE SCHOOLS
MibBion
The mission of officer candidate schools of the Army Ground Forces (AGE) was to convert enlisted men into combat officers to meet mobilization requirements for com missioned personnel in the company grades, in excess of the supply available in the Regular Army and the reserve components. In courses conducted at each AGF service school, originally twelve or thirteen and later seventeen weeks long, enlisted men and warrant officers were trained in the "basic duties of a junior officer of the arm, screened for the possession of leadership and other traits desirable in an officer, and, if qualified, commissioned second lieutenants in the Army of the United States.
•Officer candidate training was a mobilization procedure. Production of officers in peacetime was limited to the Military Academy, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (RGTC), and extension courses for Regular Army enlisted men at service schools. From these sources it was anticipated that enough officers would be available to meet the requirements of the first 120 days of mobilization. Thereafter, additions to officer strength were to come -- except for civilian specialists commissioned directly in tt numbers -- from the officer candidate schools (OCS), whose operations were to have b§- gun on M-Day.
Plans for officer candidate training were embodied in Mobilization Regulations and in mobilization plans drawn up before 19^0.1 Mobilization plans in 1938, for ex ample, called for 225,000 officers during the first year of mobilization, to command an Army of 3,000,000. Of these officers, 128,000 — Regular, Reserve, and National Guard — were expected to be available on M-Day. The officer candidate schools were to supply the remainder, training monthly increments varying from 25,000 to 1,500 during the first nine months and none thereafter.^
Mobilization of the Army after 1940 did not proceed according to the time scheme envisaged in prewar plans. Initially mobilization was much slower, after December 19^1 much faster and more complete, than had been anticipated. As a result, requirements for officers in excess of those who could be supplied from the Regular Army the reserve components did not appear until quite late. Large-scale officer candidate training was deferred, as a consequence, until the beginning of 19^2, by which time the Army had attained a strength of approximately 1,600,000 men.3
By 1 January 19^2 only 1,389 officer candidates had been commissioned in the ground arms; during 19^2 mobilization was very much more rapid and extensive than had been anticipated, and the officer candidate schools were forced to expand to unforeseen heights, producing 55,000 officers in the ground arms alone. By the end of 19^3, with mobilization virtually complete, while approximately 215,000 Regular, Reserve, Na tional Guard officers were on duty in the Army as a whole, and about 100,0.00'had been commissioned directly from civilian life, nearly 300,000 had been commissioned at offi cer candidate schools.4 Thus the officer candidate schools came ultimately to perform their Intended function of filling the gap between officer requirements and supply available from other sources.
Although supplying urgent officer requirements vas the mission of officer candi date schools intended in prewar planning, and actually performed by them after 1941, they*were not established primarily for this purpose. In August and September 19^0, •when General Marshall directed his staff to study the feasibility of opening such schools during December, there was an abundance of officers. The statutory size of the Ar^my was 1,400,000, including an annual increment of 900,000 selectees. Reserve
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Five officer candidate sohools — Infantry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, Cavalry, and Armored — were accordingly established, beginning limited operations in July 1941. Until March 1942 the Coast Artillery 0CS trained both seacoast and anti aircraft officers. When the Antiaircraft Command was set up as a part of the Army Ground Forces in March 1942, training of antiaircraft officers we*s transferred from the Coast Artillery School to the new Antiaircraft Artillery School at Camp Davis, N.C. Until October 1942 new officers for tank destroyer units were detailed from the other arms. An Officer Candidate Department of the Tank Destroyer School was established in October and henceforth trained junior officers for tank destroyer units.7
The Selection of Candidates
Selection of men to attend officer candidate schools was decentralized by the War Department to designated commanding generals to whom quotas for the several schools were allotted. These commanders in turn appointed boards of officers to interview applicants and recommend those best qualified for officer training. All selection boards were guided in their examination of applicants by standards laid down in War Department regulations and circulars. Although these standards were changed in detail from time to time to meet changing conditions, they always involved age, physical condition, military service, learning, ability, citizenship, character, and education.
The War Department publications setting forth qualifications for officer candi dates are readily accessible and need not be detailed here.® Standards of learning ability, education, and leadership should be mentioned because they produced the greatest practical difficulties. Learning ability was measured by the Army General Classification Test (AGCT). TO qualify for officer training, the applicant was required to have a minimum score of 110. It was not originally intended to use AGCT scores in selecting candidates: in 1941 the Personnel Research Section of The Adjutant General^ Office was* at work on an educational test and a leadership ability test to be used in screening applicants; the Army General Classification Test was decided upon only as a temporary expedient pending completion of these tests.9 Only one of the projected tests was ever developed, and that not until 1944. The Army General Classification Test became the principal instrument for selection.
No formal educational requirement was ever set for 0CS applicants. War Depart ment directives suggested that for certain technical schools (e.g., Engineer, Ordnance, Finance) academic degrees would be desirable, but they were held not to be essential. The educational standard was merely the possession of "such education or civil or military experience as will reasonably Insure ..* satisfactory completion of the course ..."1° The educational test contemplated In 1941 was ready for use late In 1944.
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It was the Officer Candidate Test (OCT), emphasizing mathematical ability, vocabulary, and ability to interpret expository writing. High correlations were noted, between OCT and. AGOT scores.H
The most taportant requirement for selection as an officer candidate was proven leadership ability, No definition of leadership was ever provided by the War Depart ment and no test of leadership ever devised. Each selection board was left to draw up its own specifications. Consequently, candidates chosen from different sources and at different times displayed the greatest variation in this respect. Other standards such as age, physique, citizenship, learning ability, were susceptible to fairly precise determination. When demands for candidates rose above the supply of men clearly qual ified for training, it was on leadership that corners were most often cut. Then the schools, instead of getting men who had "demonstrated high qualities of leadership'1 (WD Circular No. i+8, 19^2), from whom they would select the best, had to devote much time and effort to clearing the rolls of men almost completely lacking in leadership.
In general the requirements for admission to officer candidate school were so loosely drawn that the schools were forced to develop their own means of eliminating men who should never have been selected (see below, pp. 36-37)*
Operation of Officer Candidate Schools
The operations of officer candidate Schools were affected by their two-fold mission: training and selection. School instruction — which occupied the major por tion of time — was intended to provide the technical and tactical knowledge needed by a platoon leader. Concurrently a thorough screening process was carried on, to deter mine which candidates would become officers and which would be returned to enlisted status. The two functions of training and selection were performed by separate groups of officers. Regular instruction and academic examinations were the responsibility of a school faculty, which had no other connection with candidates than the conduct of their training. Selection of candidates for commissions was the primary responsibility of the "tactical officers," to whose charge the men were assigned during the course. This double structure of training and selection was in contrast to the scheme used in training officers during World War I, when the same officers taught the candidates and Judged their suitability for commissions. When candidate schools were established in 15^1, it was thought that more efficient instruction and more reliable Judgment of suitability would result if each function were performed'by specialists.12 The work of instructors and tactical officers overlapped to some extent: academic grades supplied by instructors were the chief basis for academic selection of candidates; tactical officers conducted Instruction in drill, discipline, and physical training, and — in some schools — in such basic subjects as military courtesy, first aid, and adminis tration.^3 Bridging the gap between instructors and tactical officers was the Faculty Board, a group of officers normally containing representatives of the instructional departments and of the officer candidate school staff, responsible to the School com mandant for final selection, rejection, or turnback of candidates. At regular intervals eaoh candidate class was screened by the Faculty Board, which based its decisions on academic records and recommendations of tactical officers, supplemented by its own observations.
Academic Training
Except at the Antiaircraft Artillery School, officer candidates were given only general training. That is to say, no attempt was made to prepare officers to fill speoific types of assignment within the branch. A graduate of Field Artillery OCS might become a platoon leader in a battery firing any one of several kinds of weapons, he might be assigned to training duty at a replacement training center or to duty in an^artillery staff section, or he might become an instructor or tactical officer at the
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Field Artillery School. A single curriculum was designed to prepare him for any of these jobs. But training vas not quite as generalized as a list of possible "branch assignments might indicate. The focus 'of the curriculum vas eventual duty as a combat platoon leader. To such assignments the great majority of graduates would go; to have built a program on a wider range of probable assignments would have resulted in an unintegrated course. The test applied to each subject suggested for inclusion in OCS programs was "Will this material help produce an officer who can train and lead troops in battle?" Material that could not pass this test — even though it might be adapted to Borne possible officer assignments in the branch — was omitted in favor of subjects that could. The policy of giving only general training in officer candidate schools rested in part on the assumption — fundamental in Army doctrine — that every officer should be qualified to fill any position commensurate with his rank. It rested also on the conviction in the Army Ground Forces that service in a troop unit provided the best training for an officer, and that officer candidate courses should be kept short and basic in order not to delay overlong the beginning of an officer's troop duty. After a period of service in a unit, during which habits of leadership had been developed, officers destined for higher command, staff, or technical assignments could be returned to school for more specialized instruction.
From the generalized character of OCS training it followed that programs had to include familiarization work in preparation for a number of combat assignments, fjith concentration on the one which the majority of graduates would probably be given. Thus the Infantry OCS course included training in all infantry weapons and tactical exer cises involving all elements of the infantry regiment, but more time was devoted to the rifle and to tactics of the rifle company than to the rest. At the Field Artillery OCS the candidate was given a brief orientation in each field artillery weapon, but firing problems and tactical exercises used only the 105-mm howitzer, the basic piece and the one with which the new officer would most probably deal. The Antiaircraft Artillery OCS, after January 19^3, was the only exception to the practice of conducting only general training. During its first year of operation the Antiaircraft School, like the others, had trained men to fill any second lieuten ant's position in any type of antiaircraft unit. By late 19^2, when a considerable number of graduates had reached units in the field, the School received reports that they were unqualified. They had been given a smattering of work on antiaircraft guns, automatic weapons, and searchlights, but the 12-week course had been too brief to qualify them fully for duty in a unit equipped with any one of the three. It was decided to lengthen the course to 13 weeks and to divide each class into three groups for special ized instruction on guns, automatic weapons, and searchlights during the latter part of the course. The time was divided as follows: 1 week of organization, orientation, physical hardening, and basic subjects; 7 weeks of common instruction in individual weapons, tactics, motors, communications, etc.; 1+ weeks specialized Instruction In the three groups mentioned above; the final week a field exercise in which the class was again brought together. After March 19^-3> when the Antiaircraft Artillery School received permission to lengthen its officer candidate course to 17 weeks, chiefly because the specialized training had been found to require more time than was available in the 13-week cycle, 10 weeks were devoted to common instruction and 7 "to specializa tion.^ Division of the class into three groups for specialized instruction was carried out primrily on the basis of class standing and difficulty of the specialty. Gun instruction was regarded as the most difficult, searchlights as the next most difficult, and automatic weapons as the easiest. After the number of officers required in each speciality had been determined, the.men ranking highest in the class academically were . assigned to guns, the middle portion, of the class was assigned to searchlights, and the
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"bottom group vas assigned to automatic -weapons instruction. While this system vas probably efficient from an instructional point of view, it tended to segregate the better officers in certain types of unit.3-5
Specialized OCS instruction had great immediate benefits. Officers assigned to units vere much more proficient initially than their more broadly-trained predecessors had been. This immediate advantage vas counterbalanced by serious long-run defects. Transfers vere more difficult because officers "were qualified only in one type of equipment. As the war progressed and the antiaircraft establishment shrank, necessi tating extensive reassignment of officers, it "was found that much retraining had to be conducted in order to broaden their knowledge and skill. Such retraining vas expensive and time-consuming*^
Academic training of officer candidates vas conducted in the same manner as that of other school groups. The program of instruction for the officer candidate course vas substantially identical at all schools with that for the Officers Basic Course (see Study No. 30, Wartime Training in the Schools of the Array Ground Forces. TO 25 Candidates vere required to attend a study period four or five nights a week and they were held to somewhat more rigid academic standards than were other students. The principal difference between instruction as conducted for candidates and instruction as conducted for, say, officer students In a basic course, lay in the use of regular training as a source of information about the candidate's leadership ability. Students in other courses had to vorry only about passing examinations; their attitude in class, their force, initiative, or other qualities not directly related to academic performance were disregarded. Not so the candidate. Tactical officers accompanied their men to classroom and field to observe them. The candidate had to learn the subject and at the same time to demonstrate that he possessed leadership qualities of more general application.
Use of regular training as a basis for selection, while necessary in view of the limited time available to decide upon the candidate's fitness, compromised the quality of instruction. The candidate had to think both of the work at hand and of the kind of impression he was making on his Judges. Candidates vere reluctant to ask questions for fear they vould seem stupid or slow; they preferred not to hazard answers unless they were sure of themselves; they tried to avoid responsibility and use of initiative, for with these went the prospect of coming a cropper before the class and the tactical officer. Although a good, honest mistake is frequently the quickest and surest means of learning, candidates were impelled by the instinct for self-preservation to play safe, to remain in the background, to avoid sticking their necks out, in the hope that* avoidance of error might be construed as positive merit These results of the system may throw some light on the frequent complaints that Junior officers hesitated to accept responsibility, to take risks, to carry on in the absence of specific directions from above.
The union between training and selection in some schools produced what came to be known as the "Hockey Team." The "Hockey Team" was a group of unfortunate candidates occupying the limbo between graduation and failure. To support a definite Judgment on these doubtful men, tactical officers needed more information than regular methods provided. They arranged with instructors to call on them frequently in class and to assign them positions of responsibility in training problems. Membership on the Hockey Team vas a severe blow to a candidate's morale — he regarded himself as a candidate for oblivion; the heavy load of assignments and the unrelenting public attention subjected him to more exacting standards than his more fortunate colleagues had to conform to. Indirectly, the other candidates suffered also. Largely exempted from accountability for work assigned, they had much less incentive to study and few oppor tunities to put their knowledge into practice.
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Estimates of the candidates "by instructors took the form of examination grades, supplemented "by written reports on class or field performance and .informal conferences with tactical officers. A candidate failed if his average grade on tests fell "below a designated level. In some schools the tests were weighted in proportion to the impor tance of the different subjects. Each man's academic standing was made available to his tactical officers and was included In records submitted to the Faculty Board.
Training in Leadership The officer candidate schools did not expect or attempt to teach men to he leaders. They tried to influence and to hasten the development of leadership in men who were potentially qualified for it. And they tried to weed out those who lacked leadership altogether and those who might "become leaders only after too long a period of training. Leadership training took two forms, direct and indirect, theoretical and practical. The indirect, practical training occurred during regular instruction and daily drill. Each candidate was put in as many isituations as possible — as squad leader, platoon sergeant, or company commander in the company organization; as patrol leader, platoon leader, company commander, tank commander, gunnery officer, etc., during school problems — in which he would have to exercise coTrirnand, express his ability as a leader, act on his own responsibility, and direct a group in carrying out an assignment. School problems were designed primarily to teach a subject and to demonstrate to the candidate how he could teach it to his men. But through rotation of assignments in the problems, each man had in addition a series of chances to demonstrate his leadership ability and to improve it. An outstanding example of leadership training was the training given in the technique of instruction. In learning to teach a group of men the candidate was actually learning to perform one of the basic continuing functions of military leader ship. At the Armored School, and to a more limited extent at the Cavalry School, this fact was recognized anH exploited in the curriculum. Each candidate was required to prepare and teach his classmates one *or more extended lessons on basic military subjects. The candidate's ability to capture and hold the attention of the class, to organize and transmit his material clearly, to deal with unexpected questions and problems — these gave the candidate experience and provided a basis for judgment of his potential value as an officer. Direct instruction in leadership took place in the classroom and was largely theoretical, consisting, usual 1y of lectures, case studies, and conferences designed to make clear to the candidate the ingredients of leadership, to indicate the ways in which leadership appeared in battle, and to prepare each man mentally for his respon sibilities as a leader. The candidate, it was hoped, would begin early to think about leading men in battle, inventing situations that might confront him, analyzing them, deciding what he would do, so that ha would begin at ctnce to assume the combat officer's burden of responsibility and go into battle with a reservoir of strength for any problem that might arise. At the Infantry School, where this system of teaching leadership was developed by Lt. Col. S. I. Parker, winner of the Congressional Medal of Honor in World War I, six hours were devoted to the subject. During this time the qualities funda mental to leadership were distinguished and analyzed, several actual cases of combat leadership were discussed by the Instructor, each student was required to prepare and present his analysis of a real or hypothetical combat situation involving a problem in leadership, and the students were introduced to a scale for rating themselves and others with respect to leadership. The instructors in the course were officers deco rated for heroism in World War I or II. To supplement the regular course in leadership, lectures on combat experiences were given from time to time by officers recently returned from overseas.19
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It is impossible to assess the effectiveness of these devices for improving the leadership ability of the candidates. In the practical exercise of command d-iring routine instruction, classes were too large for any man to get more than a limited number of opportunities to control a unit. The scarcity of occasions was balai. I to some ^extent by the vividness of each. Knowing he vas on trial, observed by classmates, Instructors, and tactical officers, the candidate probably learned each lesson in leadership more thoroughly.
Selection for Commissions
The selection system used in the officer candidate schools derived its special character from the absence of an objective standard of leadership ability. No my was discovered during the war of defining leadership, of measuring it, of enumerating its properties definitively, or of detecting it in individuals. Each school, within a framework of generalized attributes though indicative of leadership, amassed from as many sources as possible a collection of independent Judgments on each candidate's leadership ability. The consensus was taken as the nearest practical approximation to an objective measure. The schools frankly recognized the impossibility of reducing leadership to an exact formulation. Each observer was directed to work out for himself a criterion by which to assess the individuals under his observation. No substitute for human Judgment could be invoked. Appraisal boiled down to the question trWould I be willing to follow this man in battle?"
Despite almost complete variation in details, all AGF officer candidate schools followed the same basic plan in screening candidates for commissions.20 The purpose of screening was to determine as early as possible (l) the candidates manifestly unquali fied for commissions, so that they could be relieved and more time spent on the remaining men; (2) the candidates obviously fit to become officers — so that time would not be wasted observing them extensively; and (3) the borderline candidates needing assistance, extra practice, and careful scrutiny before final determination of their suitability could be made* Screening occurred at intervals, usually three times during the 17-week cycle. For each screening the Faculty Board or OCS Selection Board met and reviewed the record of each candidate whose tactical officers had recommended his appearance before the Board.
The first screening of the class occurred during the fifth or sixth week of the course. At this time men who were failing academically or who lacked aptitude or basic education were relieved or were turned back to a later class in the hope that they might do. better on a second try. Candidates were not usually relieved for lack of leadership at this first board; it was felt that a candidate had not yet had enough time to demonstrate his leadership ability. At the second screening, usually carried out during the twelfth or thirteenth week, men put on probation at the first board meeting were reinstated or disposed of and academic failures who had became such since the last board were relieved. The principal function of this screening was to weed out men weak in leadership. The final board, meeting usually during the sixteenth or seventeenth week, dealt with any men who had recently fallen from grace, decided what to do with men put on probation by the second board, and recommended for commissions the men considered qualified.
The decisions of the Faculty Board — to relieve the candidate, to turn him back, to place him on probation, to allow him to continue in good standing, or, if it was a final screening, to commission him — were based on the candidate's academic record, on the ratings made by tactical officers and fellow candidates, and If necessary on the Beard's own opinion of the man based on an interview with him. The function of the school faculty In supplying evidence of academic ability has been discussed. Ratings by tactical officers and fellow candidates remain to be considered.
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For information on each of the thirty to one hundred men assigned to him, the tactical officer depended on several sources. Information as to the candidate's AGCT score, civilian education and occupation, and prior military service vas available from records. Early in the course, at most schools, each candidate prepared a "brief auto biography, from wich the tactical officer made inferences about his character. The platoon leader interviewed each roan early in the course, and at intervals thereafter, to get a more direct and informal impression of his personality. Even before the course vas well under way, the tactical officer had begun to analyze his men, to mark those who looked especially good and especially poor. But the chief sources of information became available during the course. One of these, the candidate's performance during regular academic instruction, has already been mentioned. The other principal sources were the candidate's performance of assigned company duties, his skill in conducting drill and physical training, his demerits or "gigs," and the ratings of him by his fellow candidates.
Except for routine administration, messing, and supply, each officer candidate company or section was run by the candidates. The duties of company commander, execu tive, platoon leader, and so on down to assistant squad leader were performed by the men, who were rotated in these assignments weekly or semi-weekly. Tactical officers were present at all formations, during all movements of the company, and during all instruction, but they remained in the baclsground as observers, letting the candidates run the show. Regular rotation of company duties put each candidate in some kind of command position several times during the course. During these assignments he Was on his own, making decisions, giving commands, maintaining discipline, making corrections, anticipating problems, coping with emergencies. The tactical officers had an unrivalled opportunity to assess the candidate Ts capacity for command. Some form of efficiency report was maintained on each candidate during the command assignments and was incor porated in his record. In-all schools daily periods of drill and physical training were conducted by the candidates themselves. Normally four or five men in each platoon or section were detailed, two or three days in advance, to prepare instruction covering designated paragraphs of FM 22-5, "Infantry Drill Regulations, M or FM 21-20, "Physical Training." Each man took the group for ten or fifteen minutes, explaining the drills or exercises, demonstrating them, conducting practical work by the other candidates, and critiquing the performance. These assignments required the candidate to display his ability to give clear directions and forceful orders, his command over the men, the quality of his voice and. appearance. The value of the assignments was diminished somewhat by the amount of warning the candidate received and by the care the candidates took to protect each other, knowing they would be in the same fix later, they did their best to execute drills and exercises with a precision that would reflect credit on the candidate in charge. Candidates were held to severe standards of dress, conduct, bearing, obedience * to orders, and police of quarters and equipment. Infractions of the many rules were punished by demerits or delinquencies — commonly called "gigs" or "skins." Daily lists or "gig sheets" were posted showing the names of offenders and the nature and severity of their offenses. Gigs were graded according to gravity and each candidate was permitted to accumulate during a week or during the course a certain number of delinquencies. After the limit was passed — or after a major offense was committed — disciplinary action, probation, or possible relief from the school ensued. Actions or omissions Judged as delinquencies varied greatly from school to school. In most schools the candidates learned the exact list of crimes by their own transgressions or those of their classmates. Only the Armored School went so far as to publish a list of punishable delinquencies — an elaborate catalogue of sins ranging
8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED from "Abrasives? using on rifle," through "Trousers, discreditable, wearing of," to "Yelling, or cheering, or allowing same, In disapprobation of published orders. "21
The gig sheets were vexatious and universally disliked by the candidates. But they vere probably useful in the quick conversion of civilians into officers. The sys tem of allotting definite penalties for even the most minor violations of orders pro moted aleirtness, precision, foresight, and responsibility. It subjected the candidate to a regimen more rigorous than he would impose upon his men, but it gave him a stand ard toward which to guide his unit. The system aided tactical officers in judging the candidates. The man who left dust under his book shelf, appeared in formation without his name tag, and failed to get all the powder foulings out of his rifle might be habitually careless; the tactical officer would confirm or deny this Judgment in later observations.
Tactical officers were almost ubiquitous, but not quite. They could not watch the candidate in his informal moments — few though these were. An aftful candidate might conceal disqualifying habits and attitudes from the tactical officer. But he could scarcely hope to hide them from the men he lived with. As a check on the relia bility of the tactical officer's Judgment and as a source of additional information on the candidates the candidates were required to rate each other at intervals during the course. Each candidate rated the members of his platoon or section two or three times during the 17-week cycle. The most common procedure was to require the candidate to list his classmates in the order of their suitability as combat leaders and to supply a brief comment on each man Justifying the rating he was given. A rating scale or a list of important attributes was usually furnished as a guide. When consolidated, the candidate ratings gave each man a relative position in the composite Judgment of the group.
Three urn in purposes were served by the intra-platoon ratings. They gave a fairly reliable measure of each man's ability to command the respect and confidence of his fellows, a signal attribute of a successful leader. They gave some insight into each candidate's ability to Judge others, also iinportant to an officer. And they corrected themselves and the Judgments of the tactical officers. If half the men put a candidate near the top of their lists and half placed him near the bottom, something was wrong and, investigation migjit turn up evidence that would permit a fairer Judgment of the man. If the platoon leader rated a candidate high and the men rated him low, investigation might disclose error or collusion or some other flaw in the system. The system of class ratings did not work perfectly. Knowing that he was to be rated, a candidate might try to put on a new character for seventeen weeks. He might try to ingratiate himself with the other men in order to win their favor. The whole thing might at times take on the aspect of a popularity contest. Cliques migiht develop and turn into mutual commendation societies. It was in recognition of these weaknesses that the candidate ratings ac quired the derisive name of "Buddy Sheets." Purely personal feelings were difficult to divorce from the sober estimates required. Comments supplied by the candidates to Justify their ratings of each other were often mechanical — and therefore worthless -- repetitions of the vocabulary furnished by the prescribed rating scale. Remarks such as "A little weak in leadership," "Has military knowledge," and "Plenty aggressive" were too brief and too general to give a clear definition of a man's qualities. Many candi dates did not know what leadership was, nor how to recognize its presence in an individ ual. The candidate ratings were often misused by tactical officers having access to the candidate ratings. The tactical officers based their own judgments of the men on those of the candidates; independence of Judgment was thereby lost, and the significance of having several sources of data on each man largely nullified. Most schools, when they found candidate ratings abused in this manner, required tactical officers to rate their men before the candidate ratings were turned in, but it was difficult to secure complete independence.
9
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On th© whole, the men took their responsibilities seriously and tried to rate each other honestly, Some variation was inevitable in the nature of the object under consideration. But there was a high degree of concordance among their estimates, and, between their estimates and those made by the tactical officers. Used cautiously, with recognition of their limitations, and in combination with ratings and measures from other independent sources, class ratings were a valuable part of the selection scheme.
Of the three principal ratings made on each man -- academic rating, tactical officer's rating, and fellow candidate's rating — the last two carried the greatest weight because they were based on the candidate's leadership ability. A ttwji, whose leadership ability was high but whose academic average was low would probably be com missioned, A man whose grades were high, but whose leadership was thought mediocre or poor would probably not be commissioned.
Several schools experimented with supplementary or substitute techniques for selecting candidates. At the Armored OCS the Military Psychologist interviewed anfl rated each incoming candidate and predicted his chance of success in officer candidate school. Ratings were made on (l) Ability — which included General Ability, Reading, Arithmetic, and Mathematical Comprehension; (2) Personality -- including Emotional Stability, Test-Honesty, and. Pattern (a psychological term used to sum up such an observation as "Aggressive and fairly self-confident"); and (3) Totals for the first two, and Overall Suitability.22 The predictions were formulated in thfe light of standards previal 1 Tig in the school, so that it is impossible to Judge whether the psychologist and standards were correct or whether the psychologist was merely able to anticipate what the tactical officers would do. The school made no use of these ratings except to watch more closely a candidate who emerged" from the interview with low marks.23
Late- The combat adaptability test was used on the last three officer candidate classes at the Tank Destroyer School. No relationship was discovered between the test ratings and the regular OCS rating scale, or between the test and AGCT scores, age, height, weight, or education. A slight correlation was noticed with scores on the Officer 10 RESTRICTED RB^miCTED Candidate Test (OCT). Since the Tanl: Bestroyer School closed BOUD after the experiment vas undertaken, no complete findingb or revisions were possible,-'*• Selection and Training of Tactical Officers Aa the principal judge of the candidate's potential value as an officer, the tactical officer vas the key figure in OCS training. He vas in close daily contact vith his men and he vas to a considerable extent the model they imitated. He had the most opportunities to observe, assess, correct, and assist the candidate. Above all, his recommendation vas in the normal case tantamount to final selection or relief from the school. It folloved from his strategic position that the tactical officer had to "be chosen vith great care. As the Infantry School's "Guide for Tactical Officers" said:25 Every man is inclined to judge others by the values he places upon himself. This makes it vita Early plans for officer candidate training, vhich contemplated very limited operations, provided for Regular Army officers as tactical officers. In the first five classes at the Infantry School, for example, Regular Army majors commanded candidate companies and Regular and Reserve captains acted as platoon leaders.Detail of Regular Army officers to such duty could not be continued after 1941 because of the more urgent need for them in tactical units. After 19^1 the chief sources of tactical officers vere the Officers Reserve Corps and the officer candidate schools themselves, particularly the latter. To staff the greatly increased numbers of classes during 1942, hundreds of graduating candidates vere detailed. One veek they vere "being Judged, the next veek they vere Judges. The schools vere careful to pick tactical officers from among the best men in a graduating class. They tried to select men of some age and civilian and military experience. But there vas no vay of maintaining the standard originally contemplated. Maturity and visdom came to repose more and more In members of the Faculty Board, vho vere usually older Regular Army officers vith com"bat records in World War I. Not until 19^, vhen officers began to return from overseas, did the schools have large numbers of tactical officers vho combined Judgment and maturity vith fresh knovledge of vhat combat required in an officer. Little formal training for tactical officers vas conducted. Since most of "them vere recent graduates of officer candidate school, they had a detailed familiarity vith the operation of the selection system. The nev tactical officer vas normally assigned for a time as a supernumerary in a candidate company, vhere he peered over a veteran's shoulder as ne made out reports, listened as he intervieved candidates, and trailed along as he observed the men in class and field. After such a period of observation the novice vas given a platoon, vhenever possible in a "strong" company vhose commander had a reputation for reliable application of the school's standards. In addition to this on-the-job training, regular, if informal, training vas administered by battalion and regimental commanders and members of the Faculty Board or OCS Department. These men, oldest at the game and the ultimate custodians of selection standards, directed the tactical officers both through regular supervision and inspection of records, procedures, and class conduct and through the criteria they applied in recommending candidates for commission. It vas natural for tactical officers to build up a case for or against a candidate in terms acceptable to the board of officers before vhom they vere to present it. From time to time, finally, tactical officers vere brought together for orientation or for discussion of current problems. It does not appear that on the vhole the training of tactical officers vas commensurate vith their general Inexperience or vith the importance of their mission. 11 RESTRICTED i/U'jDj \K I. U ;' t\b i CAUSES OF FAILURE IN AGF OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOLS TT7TT7 mm )>>>>} ACADEMIC LEADERSHIP CONDUCT >>>) OTHER W$ ))))))) 37 6% 2 7.9% 2.7% 31.7% AVERAGE 3 !> } } > )) } )I I / } ) > )/ f !'• / ALL SCHOOLS >)>)] ))))}W)11)) > i))) 53.5% 27.2% 2.4% 16.9% ANTIAIRCRAFT 43.4% 9.2% 3.8% 43.4% iiii ARMORED 26.2% 4 0.7% 28.3% W CAVALRY m 5 5% 14 fi% 23% 2 8.2% COAST ARTILLERY 318 % FIELD ARTILLERY 35.1% 34 .2% 1.47, 29.3% NFANTRY 18.2% 51.6% 3.8% 26.4% TANK DESTROYER 1- NOT INCLUDING ROTC CANDIDATES- 2-INGLUDES PHYSICAL DISABILITY ,RESIGNATION, DIRECT COMMISSION, ETC . ALL FAILURES WERE GROUPED IN THIS CATEGORY DURING THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 1941-APRIL 1942 AT CAVALRY, FIELD ARTILLERY AND INFANTRY 0CS#S. 3-C0MPUTED FROM SCHOOL PERCENTAGES SHOWN. 12 RESTRICTED ki^i±u:oaiED Factors Related to Success and Failure in 00 School Only three-fourths of the mail detailed to officer candidate schools were commis si oiied there. A mortality rate of 25 percent represents a heavy cost -- in disappoint ment to men who failed, and, of greater practical significance, in time, money, effort, and facilities largely wasted on men who might never have "been selected for training had the conditions of success "been "better understood and. publicized, Unfortunately, though material for investigation was ample, no comprehensive studj was ever made of the causes of failure at the schools, or of the relevance of standards used in the field in selecting applicants. The following pages present some evidence "bearing first on the reasons candidates were relieved from officer candidate schools, and second on the correlation "between success or failure and ACrCT scores, age, and source of candidates. The principal causes of relief from officer candidate school were academic deficiency and lack of leadership. A few men were relieved for misconduct. Miscella neous causes of relief included resignation, failure to meet physical standards, receipt of direct commissions, hospitalization, and death. The graph on the opposite page (Diagram I) indicates the percentages of men relieved in each of these four major categories. No close comparison can "be made "between schools on the "basis of these percentages, for with the possible exception of the category "Conduct" no common defini tions or standards for the categories of failure were applied at all schools. "Other Causes" is a particularly ambiguous classification. Until April 19h2, failures were not classified at all; all men relieved during this period were lumped in the "Other" column. After April 19^2 this category included such a diversity of cases as to pre clude any sure definition. Furthermore, few failures were attributable to a single cause; they were reported in the category of the predominant cause, but methods of weighing the causes for relief varied greatly. If men relieved for miscellaneous causes are excluded, a more direct, although still not very reliable, comparison can be made. In Diagram II the schools are ar ranged in order of the frequency with which academic and leadership deficiencies were cited as the dominant cause of "failure. In general the graph indicates that schools of those arms using a good deal of complex equipment and requiring mathematical ability for the solution of gunnery problems were more difficult academically; in the arms in which the platoon leader was more often required €0 direct the combat action of small mobile units, the schools placed heavier emphasis on leadership. In the artillery schools especially, technique of handling equipment occupied a larger proportion of time than at the Infantry and Cavalry Schools, where tactical training predominated. In a course involving a high proportion of mathematics, specific educational defi ciencies, as opposed to general intelligence, could more often cause failure. The strong tactical emphasis of such a course as that at the Infantry School, on the other hand, provided relatively more opportunities for the candidate to be revealed as lacking in force, resolution, initiative, responsibility, etc. In addition to the reservation made above — that no two schools defined leader ship or academic proficiency in the same way — a further qualification must be made. Academic deficiency could be proved more easily than lack of leadership; it was a matter of test scores, about which argument was difficult. Some schools preferred to keep a weak candidate in school and allow him to fail academically than to relieve him early for poor leadership. In this manner they protected themselves against complaints from families, friends, and congressmen that inevitably followed the relief of certain candidates. No definitive listing can be given of the immediate causes of academic or leadership failure. Even if the schools had attached equal importance to the same 13 RESTRICTED COMPARISON OF THREE CAUSES OF FAILURE AT AGF OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOLS ACADEMIC LEADERSHIP 77% 6.3% 6.8% fc'h 76.5% COAST ARTILLERY 64.4% 32.8% 2.9% ANTIAIRCRAFT FIELD ARTILLERY 49.6% 48.4% 2% INFANTRY 3 6.6% 56.7% 6.7% rr7!F? CAVALRY .»:• i 2 4.7 % 70.1% flWs# ;'-.vt' TANK DESTROYER EXCLUOES MEN WHOSE FAILURE WAS ASCRIBED TO"OTHER'* REASONS t TABLE. ik RESTRICTED RESTRICTED qualities, a multitude of deviations from the standard would defy easy classification. Some indication of the reasons advanced for failure at one school can "be given. Approximately 9,000 failures in 200 classes at the Infantry School were analyzed by the school authorities. The principal deficiencies accounting for the relief of these men were found to be:27 Academic Failures (1) Insufficient preparation (lack of "basic education, insufficient "basic training, administrative rather than military experience). (2) Inadequate application (laziness, carelessness, lack of interest). Leadership Failures (1) Power of self-expression (lack of personal force, colorless personality). (2) Force and Self-assurance (lack of self-confidence, lack of initiative, inability to make quick decisions; unwillingness to assume responsibility, timidity, lack of poise under stress). (3) Attitude (lack of effort, inattention, lack of perseverance, indifference). (k) Capacity for Teamwork (intolerance, lack of adaptability). (5) Military Appearance (untidiness; lack of cleanliness; lack of coordination, stamina, and endurance). (6) Speech (crudeness of speech, lack of volume and authoritative tone). * AGCT scores. — In general, men with high AGCT scores were more likely to grad uate from officer candidate school than men with low scores. Evidence on this point is clear, but loses some of its significance because tactical officers were influenced in their Judgments by the candidate's AGCT score, and because success depended in consid erable measure on test grades, which were usually higher for men with higher AGCT's. In two groups of classes at Infantry 0CS, AGCT scores and failures were correlated as follows AGCT Score Percentage of Failures Classes 253-281 Classes 329-338 110 or less 61.3 70 111-115 1+9.2 59 116 - 120 39.6 1*2 121 - 125 32.1 33 126 - 130 23.9 31 131 - 135 ' 21.6 30 136 - llt-0 •17.1* 2k lij-1 and. over 18 .k 21 15 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Age. — Most "candidates during the period "before mid-1944 'were in their twenties. Younger candidates came to predominate in the latter months of 1944 when men were drawn principally from the replacement centers. One would expect both the youngest and oldest candidates to fail more frequently than those in the middle "brackets -- the youngest largely from lack of experience in dealing with men, the oldest from greater difficulty in standing the physical strain and from lack of recent educational experience. Avail able evidence confirms this judgment. The Adjutant of the Infantry School reported 1,465 failures in Classes 253-281, distributed in four age groups:^9 Ages Percentage of Failures 25 and under 33 • 5 26 - 30 29.7 31 - 35 34.5 36 and over 42.9 Source. -- Chances of success or failure varied also with the source from which candidates were drawn. In general, candidates from within the "branch were more suc cessful than those from other branches; candidates from replacement training centers more successful .than those from troop units. ROTC students were generally more suc cessful than regular enlisted candidates; VOC's were generally more successful than ROTC's. White candidates stood greater chance of graduation than colored. These generalizations, like those above, are based on only fragmentary1 data. The-fullest study is of the operations- of the Antiaircraft Artillery OCS. During its span, of operation, from 5 July 194-1 to 25 May 1944, this school received 33>195 candidates, of whom 25,220 graduated, Performance by race and component was as follows:3° Percentage Percentage G-raduates Relieved Graduated Relieved White ROTC 1,564 271 85.2 14.8 VOC 2,277 583 79.6 20.4 Enlisted 21,041 6.942 75-2 24.8 Sub-total 24,882 7,796 76.2 23.8 Colored. Enlisted. 323 171 65.4 34.6 VOC 15 8 65.2 34.8 Men from different sources performed as follows: ROTC 1,564 271 85.2 14.8 CA Units not stationed at AATC's 4,109 907 82.0 18.0 AARTC's; CA units at AATC's; AA Comd ' 14,039 ' 3,653 79.4 20.6 Other branches 5,506 3,144 63.7 36.3 16 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED In OC Classes 253-281 at the Infantry School, failures were distributed according to the source of candidates as follows:31 Percentage Graduated Failed Failing ROTC 237 76 24.2 Infantry 2,139 820 27.7 ASF 303 262 46.3 AAF 231 229 49.8 Other branches 66 78 5^.2 In AGF Total 2,976 1,^65 32.9 A survey of another "block of students at Infantry OCS (1,419 men in Classes 294 through 300, September 1943) showed that 60.7 percent graduated, 31.9 percent failed, and 7*4 percent were turned "back. Of the men from Infantry Divisions and replacement training centers, 70.9 percent graduated, as compared to only 44.2 percent of men from other "branches (including 42.3 percent of those from Army Air Forces). In this group, ROTC students as a whole fared much "better than men from all other sources — 74.3 percent graduating as against 60.5 percent. But araong ROTC's, those from the Junior Division were very unsuccessful, only 35*4 percent graduating, fewer than in any other group.32 ROTC candidates were more likely to graduate than men without ROTC training. During the period 1 June 1942 to 21 April 1944, ROTC and regular candidates compared as follows:3-3 ROTC Other Sources • Percentage Percentage School Entered. Appointed Entered Appointed Infantry 72.5 61,893 71.7 Field Artillery 2,357 96.9 32,660 65.0 Antiaircraft i>36 89. k 39,959 59.0 Coast Artillery 134 91.8 . 2,523 74.0 Cavalry 224 97.3 3,694 87.7 Tank Destroyer 388 92.8 6,3^6 77.2 Armored 37^ 88.8 14,260 69.2 Total 9,261 83.7 161,335 67.6 success of ROTC candidates was due largely to their superior academic performance, Leadership deficiencies were far more common among these men than among candidates from other sources. lack of leadership accounted for 73*5 percent of the ROTC failures in the group tabulated above, for only 23 percent of failures among men from other sources. In Classes 294 through 300 at the Infantry School, 87 percent of ROTC failures were traced to poor leadership, as against 48 percent of enlisted failures. In all classes at the Antiaircraft School, 70.5 percent of the ROTC failures were caused by poor leadership and only 32 *5 percent of failures among other men. Deficiency in lead ership In ROTC candidates was traceable to several causes, ftost ROTC candidates were relatively younger than regular enlisted candidates and were penalized for their "immaturity11 (although it was somewhat illogical to admit immature candidates to officer candidate school and then hold their lack of experience against them) ROTC candidates had on the whole received less practical military training than enlisted candidates, even though most had gone through a replacement training center. Leadership had been a critical factor in the selection of enlisted candidates to attend officer candidate 17 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED school, but ROTC men had. not teen screened for leadership to the same extent or on the earae Laale during.their ROTC course. Candidates from replacement training centers were in general more successful at tho officer candidate schools than men sent from units. The regular turnover of per sonnel in the replacement training centers insured a continually fresh supply of repre sentative selectees, with a relatively fixed proportion of men in the various intelli gence brackets. If a large number of candidates was assigned to school, new arrivals at the replacement training center would replenish the supply of qualified men before another quota had to be met. In units, after considerable numbers of candidates had been sent, as in 19k2, the quality of the remaining men was not so easily made up. Some fillers cane from replacement training centers, and these had already been screened for officer candidates. Unit commanders, looking toward combat, were naturally reluc tant to send their best men off to school and face the prospect of training inadequate substitutes. The super Lor record of candidates from replacement training centers was due also to more eff icier". screening methods used there. The large quotas available to replace ment training ce iters enabled them to convene selection boards at regular and frequent intervals. Officers assigned to these boards became experienced in selection; inter viewing and rating procedures were refined with much practice. With smaller quotas more irregularly allotted, units did not have an opportunity to develop such skill in selection. A third factor contributing to the success of RTC candidates was the special preparatory schools operated in most centers from late 194-2 until spring 19^-3• These are discussed Udc-v (pp. 19). The results of these differences were striking. At the Field Artillery 0C3, for example, the record of cardldr.w: in Classes 23 through 32 wao:-'* Source Total Enrolled Failures Percentage Failing .STC's- 1,118 71 6.35 Units 3,778 626 16.53 ..:rj first 6k classes at Infantry OCS (approximately 13,000 men), only 6 percent of cf-rdidates from Infantry and Branch Immaterial replacement training centers failed to graduate; the average percentage of failure for classes as a whole — most of the remaining men were from units -- was 17 percent during the period.35 Palliatives for Low Quality in 19^2 The tremendous expansion of officer candidate schools In 19^-2 and the resulting sharp decline in the quality of candidates have been discussed in Study Wo. 6.3" The officer candidate schools were confronted with a perplexing dilemma. The selection of inferior candidato.3 for officer training forced the adoption of special measures to weed out the undesirable and unfit, in order to maintair standards and protect the service. But since demand was great and supply of even poorly-qualified candidates none too abundant, the schools had to seek ways of squeezing the maximum number of graduates from the material at hand. Among the devices used to weed out the obviously unfit were retests on the AGCT and various locally-prepared qualifying examinations. The chief measures used to qualify weak or inexperienced candidates were the preparatory schools and the turnback policy. In the fall of l$k2 it became a regular practice a1 the Infantry School to administer the Army General Classification Test to all incoming candidates, even though their records showed that they had achieved a score of at least 110 on the'test. The school was convinced that the test was often improperly administered In the field and that scores were being Juggled to get men into officer candidate school. 37 Although 18 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED many men scored lees than 110 on the ret est, Army regulations prevented their relief "before oner third of the course had been completed. But tactical off! cers and Faculty Board watched such, men more closely, and they were usually relieved frej- scucol. Other schools administered A&CT retests only when there was suspicion of trie authenticity of a candidate's recorded score. Several schools developed screening tests designed to locate candidates whose educational qualifications were insufficient to enable them to complete the course or to perform satisfactorily as officers. No general educational qualification was ever set "by the War Department or by Army Ground Forces; the AGCT score was the only measure of aptitude for learning. But the schools faced a hard fact: many candidates lacked the educational equipment to cope with the material -- especially the mathematics — of the courses. The Field Artillery School developed an Arithmetic Qualifying Examination designed to screen out men with too little mathematical ability,3° in the fall of 19^2 the Infantry School adopted a basic education test, covering reading, grammar, spelling, geography, arithmetic, given in the 0C Reception Unit when the candidate arrived. Although the test was extremely simple, the number and quality of errors made by candi dates cast doubt on the ability of many men to extract meaning from field manuals, formulate and issue orders, conduct clear instruction, and solve the mathematical problems a platoon leader would encounter.39 Deficiencies in arithmetic revealed by the test were so striking that a mathematical examination, called the Platoon Leader's Computations Test, was made a regular part of the Infantry OCS course in 19*4-3. The Armored School in 19^-2 adopted a basic education test covering grmomar, geography and current events.^0 9 By the use of such tests as these the schools protected themselves against extreme variability resulting primarily from the absence of measures to eliminate unfit candidates at the source. The schools were not permitted to relieve candidates merely on the basis of failure to pass an educational screening test. But adoption of such tests reflected a disposition to unload at the earliest opportunity men who could not pass them. Such candidates were watched more closely and it was usually found — by coincidence or design — that their subsequent performance tallied with their low screening test scores. In effect, the same result was achieved as if candidates had been subjected to similar screening in units. Had this been done, the time and expense of sending educationally unqualified men to school might have been saved, and greater uniformity might have been achieved through use of a single test prepared by experts. Preparatory Schools. Officer candidate schools in 19^2 were handicapped not only by basically inferior candidates but also by the presence of men who were merely inexperienced, slow, immature, or lacking in basic training. To conserve and ultimately to commission as many of these men as possible, two special devices were employed -- preparatory schools and the turn back policy. When, in 19^2 RTC commanders were authorized to retain OCS applicants up to 15 percent of center capacity for 30 days to receive special instruction and final selec tion, OCS Preparatory Schools were established in the replacement training centers of each arm.^l During a 4-week course the applicants were taught weapons> small-unit tactics, map reading drill, and other subjects stressed in officer candidate school. Special attention was given to inspections and to practice in giving commands. Men who failed the course were not selected for officer candidate school. In December 19^2 the Commandants of the Infantry, Cavalry, and Tank Destroyer Schools were authorized to send to the Preparatory Schools at the.nearest replacement training center candidates from other branches who lacked basic training in their new arm. This measure enabled potentially good candidates from other branches to complete at officer candidate school on equal terms with men from within the branch served by the school.^2 19 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED The candidate schools conducted their own preparatory instruction. Before pre paratory courses were started at replacement training centers, the Field Artillery School, in September 19^2, inaugurated a Salvage School for candidates reporting to officer candidate school with inadequate artillery training and for men encountering difficulty during the regular officer candidate course. The Salvage School course, lasting four weeks, taught "basic mathematics, gun drill, fire control instruments, and fire direction procedure. It was found that "by putting through this course transferees from other branches, and candidates from artillery units whose duties had "been largely administrative, the pace of instruction in the regular officer candidate course could be maintained and a higher proportion of graduates insured.^3 At the Antiaircraft Artillery OCS a Special Training Battery was set up to give two weeks of drill, disci pline, and basic training to men deficient in command ability. Men were normally detailed to this "battery after their weaknesses had "been revealed in the regular course.^4" By . April 19^3 the OCS program had been greatly reduced and it seemed no longer necessary to give special attention to the preliminary training of candidates. Pre paratory schools at the replacement training centers were closed down.^5 General Bull, Commanding General of the Replacement .and School Command, sum marized the "benefits derived from the Preparatory Schools: "...men are "better prepared to undertake the course, have a uniform "background, and those weak in leadership are weeded out, thus protecting school capacity."^6 He recommended'that all men entering the officer candidate school of an arm in which they had not been trained should attend a preparatory school. It was "unfortunate that these schools could not have "been started earlier in 19^2 and. that they could not .have "been, continued in Q.9^3 and 19^, for large numbers of men continued to arrive at officer candidate school without adequate prelim inary training. Preparatory schools were "beneficial for all candidates; they were indispensable for transferees from other "branches. The Turnback Policy During 19^1 and the early months of 19^2, when the need for officers was not acute and supply of applicants for officer candidate school far exceeded training capacities, a candidate judged lacking in. academic or leadership ability was relieved. He was not given a second run at the course to redeem himself. So many applicants were waiting for a crack at officer candidate school that it was both unnecessary and unfair to nurse a weak candidate along. As demand for officers mounted and supply dwindled, it appeared that some'deficient candidates might "be salvaged if they were given a chance to repeat all or part of the course. Some men lacked experience, others lacked basic training, some men had been away from school for a long time and could not keep up with the class. The principle followed "by the schools in regard to such men was enunciated by the Chief of Field Artillery in January 19^2: no man who showed "reasonable prospect" of developing into a satisfactory officer should "be dismissed prior to completion of the prescribed course.^7 The volume of turnbacks "became tremendous. At the Antiaircraft Artillery School 5,8^7 students were turned "back in 19^-3, 23.6 percent of the enrollment; at the Field Artillery School 3,69*1- men — 22.1 percent of enrollment — repeated parts of the course in 19^3; 2,683 men were turned "back at the Infantry School during the same year. The numbers and percentages turned "back were smaller at the other schools, where the demand for quantity production was less acute. Between July 19^2, when separate account "began to be taken of turnbacks, and January 19^5, nearly one candidate out of every six was turned back: 20 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Number Total School of Turnbacks Candidates Antiaircraft Artillery 8,158 28,244 Armored 923 7,902 Cavalry 180 2,1+75 Coast Artillery 57 1/751 Field Artillery 4,351 23,076 Infantry 4,417 52,979 Tank Destroyer 400 5,954 Total 18,486 122,381 It is impossible to determine what proportion of these 18,000 men were commis sioned after their second (or, in some cases third) try at the course. Detailed figures are available only from the Infantry School. There it was found that the proportion of turnbacks graduating was generally similar to the proportion of all graduates in classes leaving the school in the same period. Candidates turned hack in Classes 10 to 300 graduated as follows:^8 Class No. Percentage of Graduates 10 - 38 80.5 39 - 67 92.1+ 68 - 85A 93.5 89 - 116 81.4 119 - 139 69.6 ll*0 - 139 69.6 11*0 - 162A 80.8 163 - 186 66.6 187 - 206 69.0 207 - 227 82.3 229 - 21+9 53.2 251 - 276 50.7 277 - 300 53.2 Total 61.7 Three classes at the Infantry School consisted entirely of turnbacks. Class No. 273, made up of 254 turnbacks, graduated only 30.3 percent, the lowest percentage in the histDry of the school. Classes 290 and 293 graduated 58*3 and 44.4 percent respec tively.^ If 50 percent of the candidates turned back were commissioned, the Army gained 9,000 officers who would have "been lost had there "been no turnback policy and. had no "better candidates "been available. The crux of the matter was in the availability of suitable material. When good candidates were plentiful the turnback policy was waste ful, expensive, and discriminatory. It prolonged candidate training by one to four months; it greatly increased the cost of producing a second lieutenant; it absorbed facilities that might have been devoted to training a first-rate candidate; and it did not insure graduation of even a majority of those turned back. Under conditions of scarcity resulting from faulty scheduling of officer candidate production, the policy was Justified by sheer necessity. 21 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Revision of the PCS Program in 19^-3 The deterioration in quality of officer candidates during 19^2 had effects more far-reaching than the institution of local correctives discussed above. As noted in Study No, 6, the prevailing theory of officer recruitment was modified to permit the commissioning of volunteers from deferred classes under Selective Service and of candi dates regarded as suitable for the performance of administrative duty only. In this way large demands for officers were more nearly met. Proposals for major revisions of the OCS program itself were discussed during 19^3, and the course was extended from fourteen to seventeen weeks. Recommendations for major changes in the procedures used in selecting candidates ware put forward "by The Inspector General in January 19^-3 • Inspection of nine schools -- of which five were in the combat arms -- had led The Inspector General to the con clusion that "During recent months, there has "been a definite decline in the quality of candidates." The efficiency of school operations was "being compromised "by in creasing percentages of failures and turnbacks. The Inspector General noted that "a substantial portion" of failures and turnbacks consisted of men whose AGCT scores were only a few points above the 110 minimum; that the educational requirement was too loosely drawn, the mere possession of a college degree — in art appreciation, for example -- not being a guarantee of probable success in a candidate course; that men sent to a school of another branch were severely handicapped by lack of proper basic training, as were men with mainly clerical experience within their own branch; and that many candidates were given no opportunity to develop and demonstrate leadership ability before they went to school. In view of these conditions, The Inspector General recommended several means of raising the quality of candidates and tightening the selection process. The minimum AGCT scbre was to be raised to 115. "Substantiating examinations" were to be prepared at each school to measure, in borderline cases, "the minimum adequacy of candidates" educational (or equivalent) background." All schools were to establish preparatory courses to give basic instruction to candidates who had no basic training in the branch. Commanders were "to take active steps" to insure that potential candidates had ample opportunity to develop and demonstrate leadership qualities'. Some of these measures, as already mentioned, had been adopted"piecemeal at certain schools.5° Army Ground Forces opposed all of The Inspector General1 s recommendations. Raising the AGCT score, it was felt, might eliminate,,many candidates with good leader ship qualities, but little education. School tests were not needed, because borderline cases could be rejected without further examinations, which would also place an addi tional administrative burden on the schools. Army Ground Forces did not favor pre paratory schools for candidates lacking proper basic training. The number of men who would fall in this category was not expected to be large enough under greatly reduced candidate. quotas to justify the time, expense, and overhead for such special'training. New pressure on unit commanders to select candidates who had demonstrated leadership was not thought necessary in view of the great reduction in the number of candidates units were not required to furnish; the selection standards would be self-correcting under conditions of severe retrenchment. In place of the policy recommended by The Inspector General, which would have improved candidates by refining the selection system, Army Ground Forces advocated improving the officer material available to the ground arms. It was essential, in the view of Army Ground Forces, that the ground arms receive a proportionate share of Class I and II men (those whose AGCT scores were 110 or higher), to provide ample leadership not only in commissioned but also in noncommissioned and enlisted specialist positions. The diversion of high-intelligence inductees to the Air Forces, and the siphoning of Class I and II men out of the Ground Forces into the Army Specialized Training Program made imperative provisions for rectifying the allotment of high-quality personnel to 22 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED the ground anas.51 Nothing came of The Inspector General's recommendations. The War Department issued special instructions to insure that every candidate -would have com pleted basic training "before going to school. 5^- Ihctension of the PCS Course to Seventeen Weeks, May 19^-3 Remedy for low quality was sought instead in an increase in the amount of train ing given in the OC course. The proposal to extend the course cam'e from Army Service Forces/which recommended a four-month (17-week) period.53 The War Department looked with favor on the proposal, as did the Replacement and School Command. 5^- Army Ground Forces opposed the extension on the ground of its consistent view that, "beyond minimum technical training in the schools, officers were best trained in units, where respon sibilities of troop training would develop whatever leadership qualities the officer had. Army G-round Forces agreed that the "school" training of officers would be improved in a longer course, and that initially the new second lieutenant might be a better qualified instructor in certain subjects. But it viewed with disfavor a plan that would delay the moment when the officer would be thrown upon his own resources in a unit. Furthermore, it saw no reason why all OCS courses should be of the same length. Since their mission was primarily to give basic technical and tactical training, they might reasonably vary in length as the subject matters of the several arms varied in diffi culty. The Antiaircraft officer candidate course had already been extended to seventeen weeks and proposals for a similar increase in Armored officer candidate training were under consideration. Army Ground Forces saw additional reason for rejecting the four- month scheme in the fact that the officer candidate course was not the whole of an officer's schooling. After a suitable period of troop duty the officer would be re turned to school, if he was qualified, for an advanced general or technical course.55 The War Department, on 18 May 19^3, decided in favor of the original ASF proposal and directed that all OCS courses be extended to a mini mum of four months by 1 July 1943-56 Seeking to salvage as much of its original scheme as possible, Army Ground Forces directed its school commands to draw up courses that would emphasize practical instruc tion and technique and reduce theoretical instruction to a minimum. 57 The programs of instruction submitted by the schools to cover the extended training period revealed considerable variation, both as to total length and treatment of common general subjects. Courses varied in length from 7^2 hours (Coast Artillery) to 852 hours (Tank Destroyer). Army Ground. Forces directed that all courses be co ordinated at" 8l6 hours, the correct total for seventeen 48-hour weeks. Certain general subjects common to all branches were treated in a wide variety of ways in the programs submitted. Schools TP Cav(M) Cav(E) FA CA Inf Admini strat i on 31 17 16 7i 30 17 Military Law 10 5 5 4 0 0 First Aid 8 b b 3 6 6 Defense Against Chemical Attack 7 9 9 0 ri 3 Methods of Instruction 6 18 lb 7 0 13 Safeguarding Military Information 0 b b 0 0 0 Reserve Time ^7 73 71 Indefinite 50 It was unlikely on the face of it that a £arLk Destroyer officer needed four times as much instruction in company administration as a Field Artillery officer. If a Cavalry officer required some instruction in military law, so did an Infantry officer. While 23 RESTOICTED RKoTh ICTilb some Reserved Time was useful in givi;^ thfc? program flexibility, it was doubtful that the Cavalry Course needed nearly twice tho flexibil." t,,y required by the Tank Destroyer course. Army Ground Forces directed tnat, all progr-cucs bo rev lowed to equalize the time spent on such common courses as those listed above.^ The Replacement and School Com mand worked out a list of common subjects and directed their inclusion in the programs of all officer candidate schools under its control. The list totalled li+O hours, or approximately one-sixth of the course.59 Subject Hours 1. Classification Procedure 1 2. Company Administration (including Mess Management) 16 3. Defense against Chemical Attack b Elementary Map and Aerial Photograph Reading (including foreign maps) 30 5. Leadership and Morale 2 6. Methods of Aircraft Identification 1 7. Methods of Armored Vehicle Identification 1 8. Methods of Instruction 10 9. Military Censorship 2 10. Military Courtesy and Discipline (including Customs of the Service) 3 11. Military Law (including Courts-Martial Procedure) k 12. Military Sanitation and First Aid 8 13. Mines and Booby Traps* 16 Ik. Organization of the Army** 1 15. Physical Training 3^ 16. Safeguarding Military Information 2 17. Special Service Activities 1 18. Training Management ^ *Except Coast Artillery School **Not including Dismounted Drill Proposals for a Six-Month PCS Course While the schools were getting under way with the new 17-week course, a proposal to extend officer candidate training to six months was being studied. Put forward by G-l of the War Department and concurred in by Army Service Forces, which wanted part of the six-months training conducted at a single basic school for candidates of all branche the proposal was strongly opposed by Army Ground Forces. An AGF study was produced for the War Department to show that probable additions to the 17-week programs would not improve the quality of new officers. The study indicated that adding two months to the course would result in increasing by one-third subjects adequately covered in the cur rent programs (tactics and weapons), and in adding physical drill and open time to keep the candidate in condition; no new subjects would be added since all those pertinent to officer training were already included in the courses. Army Ground Forces reiterated its views on officer training: to a minimum of technical instruction should be added service with troops where the habits of leadership and command could be developed. Comments of overseas commanders on the performance of Junior officers were cited to show that technical training was not criticized. Only leadership, which Army Ground Forces felt could not be improved by lengthening school courses, was questioned.°0 Army Ground Forces had scarcely finished its rebuttal of this proposal when it was invited to consider another scheme for amplifying officer candidate training. G-l of the War Department, on 1 September 19^3, put forward a detailed plan for giving six months training, the first thirteen weekB in a basic course for candidates of air, 2k RESTRICTED RESTRICTED ground, and service forces conducted at Ft. Benning, the remainder in specialized "branch courses at the existing candidate schools. G-l "believed that such a program would pro duce "better qualified officers "by increasing instruction in common "basic subjects, sub jecting all candidates to more uniform standards, and enhancing the candidates readiness for specialized instruction. The "basic course was to include: Hours Weap ons: T e chni que ikk Tactical Employment 78 Tactics: Company and higher units including staff procedure 87 General subjects common to all "branches 231 Administration: processing, "boards, organization, graduation k8 Unscheduled time 52 Total 6k0 hours To meet Army Ground Forces' objections to six months of training for candidates, G-l pointed to" the fact that "no emergency exists at present which would require the short ening of officer candidate school courses."6l Army Ground Forces sought once more to make clear its views on the education of officers. Candidate training in wartime, General McNair stated^ in his reply to G-l, "should "be as "brief as practicable, and limited to sound basic training and technical and tactical training sufficient to enable the young officer to J'oir. a training unit and render reasonably effective service." tfhe training of any officer did not cease with his graduation from a candidate school; it continued while the officer performed his regular duty in a unit. Indeed, this schooling on the job was the most important part of his education, best because it was practical. Befresher and advanced training followed after the officer had acquired enough experience to benefit from it. General McNair found the scheme undesirable on other grounds. The mobilization of the Army was nearly complete and it seemed fruitless to revise radically the plan for officer train ing at so late a date. The proposal would increase overhead, already absorbing more than 300,000 officers and men in Army Ground Forces. Curtailment, not expansion, was in order. Most candidates in 19^4 were to come from the ROTC;'the few enlisted men would be more carefully screened than ever before. Expanded training was therefore less necessary than in the past.62 No action was taken by the War Department but the extension scheme remained a live issue. By the end of November 19^3 the Acting Chief of Staff of the War Department had tentatively approved a plan similar to that put forward in September; three months of basic officer training at the Infantry School and three months of branch training. The attitude of.Army Ground Forces had not changed. The plan was seen as undesirably dividing the responsibility for officer training between the Infantry School and the branch schools; as increasing the number of men to be trained at Benning without cor responding reductions elsewhere, thereby increasing overhead requirements; and as throwing all candidates into a common pool from which Army Ground Forces might have difficulty getting its own men back. Since mobilization was "over-complete" in officers, there being at this time a surplus of approximately 30,000 officers in the ground arms alone (see Study No. 6), it seemed futile to embark on a new plan for officer training. "The crying need," General McNair observed, "is to improve the officers available in superabundant numbers." No more was heard of proposals for the reorganization of the officer candidate system. The leisurely pace of OCS operations gave way in 19^-^ to an accelerated program. 25 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED School facilities vera absorbed, in converting surplus officers to "branches in which, they could be usefully employed and, at the Infantry and Field. Artillery Schools especially, in great expanded officer candidate production. Ground. Force officers continued to receive the bulk of their military education in units rather than in prolonged school courses. Consolidation of the Armored, Cavalry, and Tank Destroyer Officer Candidate Schools, 19*A The increased officer requirements resulting from accelerated operations in Europe during 19U-1+ vere not uniformly distributed among the combat arms, as has been explained, in Study No. 6. They were concentrated primarily in infantry and. field artillery. Early in 1941+ anticipated requirements for antiaircraft, coast artillery, cavalry, and destroyer officers were so low in relation to the supply available that the officer candidate echools of these arms were suspended. Armored officers, it •was expected, would be needed in somewhat larger numbers, but suspension of the Armored OCS was planned for September 19V+. By September the estimates made early in the year had been found too low. Future needs for armored officers were too great to permit closing the Armored OCS; it became necessary to resume the production of cavalry and tank destroyer officers. The numbers required were too nmal 1 to Justify the expense «nd overhead required to re-open the Cavalry and Tank Destroyer Officer Candidate Schools. Since the Armored OCS was in operation and since the training of Armored, Cavalry (Mechanized), and Tank Destroyer officers had so many common features, it was decided to train officers of all these arms at the Armored School. The consolidated program went into effect in. November JS)hb, candidates of the three arms being admitted in the following proportions: Armored ^0 percent, Tank Destroyer 15 percent, Cavalry l(-5 percent. 3 The program provided for twelve weeks of common training and five weeks of branch instruction. Breakdown of hours was as follows:^ Common Branch Brill and Discipline 99 General Subjects 52! Tactics 129 108 Communi cat i ons k2 Motors, Wheeled 50 Motors, Full Track k6 Gunnery 136 9b Instructor Training 33 Orientation 1Ti Reserved Time 9k Total 568 2^8 26 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED 27 RESTRICTED BESTRICTED GRADUATION AND FAILURE OF OFFICER CANDIDATES BY MONTH 1941—1944' ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY SCHOOL 2 MOW antoiLw ClAJOftATB TAILS TUBSD BACK worn Vo. 1 Aoadtale Loador*hlt> Conduct Other To. "I to. 1 IN S£ K lo. * 19Ul Oct 200 lb8 8U. (Can*** of failure not reported 32 lb. Oct 19^1 Doe 173 86.9 199 prlLor to April 19U 2) 28 lU. Doc TOTAL 399 3^1 85.5 bO 15. TOTAL •JOU 19*2 Apr 252 82.9 31 10.2 1 .3 20 b.6 Apr 19U2 May U23 ^ 81.3 U2 9.9 1 .2U 1 ,2U UO 9.U5 May Jun 971 71*0 76.2 131 13.5 19 1.9b 5 .5 7b 7.83 Jun Jul 159*» 1138 71.U 206 12.9 2U2 15.2 Jul 1050 66. U A*C 15«2 188 11.9 18 l.l ? :? 210 13-3 109 b.9 An« ••P 1807 1159 bU.l 2W1 13.3 11 .b 5 .'27 391 21.b Sop Oct 2Ufej 15^5 62.7 313 12.7 7 .3 18 .7 580 23.5 Oct *OT 2251 1U3U b3.7 317 lU.l b' .27 lb .7 **79 21 HOT 298* Doc 1975 bb.2 358 12. lU .U7 26 .87 blO 20.U Doc TOTAL 1W.379 9.637 67- 1827 12.7 39 .27 59 >1 653 S'5 2169 15.1 TOTAL I9U3 Jan 2503 1598 63.8 315 12.6 112 U.5 13 .5 3b l.U U29 17.1 Jon 19^3 Fob 2fe77 bl.l lb36 310 11.b' IbO 6. 20 .75 32 1.2 519 19.* fob Mar 2072 1251 bO.U 213 10.3 80 3.0 28 1.3 *«b 23.5 Mar Apr 5?*»T 1607 U«. 313 "9.3 708 21.1 at & 12U 3.7 582 17.U Apr Maj 2M30 109W U5. 159 b.5 309 12.7 16 .66 139 1.75 Jon 713 29.3 Mo7 19 ^2 103U 53.5 1« 9.7 157 8.1 b .3 53 2.7 U9U 25.6 Jun Jul 9«3 *•98 50.7 92 9.3 89 9.1 b .b 37 3.7 2U0 2U.U Jul Aac 2»*3l 11<*> US.9 278 11.U 162 b.7 lU ,5« 108 U.U Sop 67b 27.8 Anc 3125 lb5? 53.1 319 ,10.2 189 b. 22 .7 7b 2.U 8bl 27.b Oct Sop 20U« 106U 51.95 181 8.8 122 5.9 UU 2.1 bll 10.8 Oct VOT 806 531 65.7 7b S.h •*8 U.7 * .5 15 1.8 VOT Doc lM 17.7 390 223 57.2 5U 13.9 22 5-b b 1.5 12 3. 73 18.7 Doc TOTAL 2*4,7^ 13.385 5*».l 2U98 10.1 21Ug 6.7 133 .53 70U 2.8 58U7 23.6 TOTAL 19^ Jon 231 106 U5.9 29 12.5 16 b.9 1 .u 2 .87 75 ^2.5 Jon 19UU Feb 130 72 55.3 10 7.7 lU 10.8 1 .77 7 5> 2b 20. Tofa Nor 82 53 bU.6- U U.9 U U.9 2 2.U 11 1\U 8 q.8 Mar Apr 8U 3U *10.5 11 13.1 7 8* 1 1.2 ?1 36.9 Apr May U2 38 90.5 1 2.U 1 2.U 2 U.8 TOTAL 5b9 •303 53.25 5** 9.5 U2 7.3 * .7 22 3.9 1U2 2U.95 TOTAL QBDSS^ I9U1.UU U0.093 23.66B 59. *379 10.9 2229 5.5 19b .U9 1379 3> 8158 20.3 OBOSS 19U1.UU 23,666 7U.2 IK 19U1-W* 31.935 ^379 13.7 2229 7. 196 .6 1379 U.3 I9U1.UU fttcluolTO of BOTC candidate*. Court* discontinued 25 Maj 19UU. i Consolidated Baports of Of fl ' Monthly enrol la ont Include* turnback* froa previous months oor Caadllat* School*. Ground ( Including tuimbaeko Statistic* Section. Bq AOF. v fecludln* turnback* 28 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED GRADUATION AND FAILURE OF OFFICER CANDIDATES BY MONTH 1941—-I9441 ARMORED SCHOOL M0»1» WWU.W2 OlATOAlffi FAILS RIB BACK MOW fc. * Leadership lo. i ir"1? 19*»1 tap 26b 177 66.5 *9 1«.U (Causae of failure nat report ad Sap 19W1 to February 19 U2) TOTAL 26b 177 66.5 I prlor *9 1M TOTAL 19**2 Jaa 225 1^* 86.2 31 13.* Jan 19>* Fab b? 52 82.25 2 3.2 1 1.6 1 1.6 7 11.1 Fab Mar Mar 177 16U 92. b 7 3.95 3 1-7 3 1.7 Hay 5*3 519 «9. 12 2.1 10 1.7 3 .5 38 6.5 Kay Jua 5*9 U«8 85.7 26 U.fe 8 l.U & 7.7 ? J tan Jul U51 8?U 77.7 12U 10.8 6 .5 123 10.7 Jul Au« 591 W*3 75. bb 11.2 * .7 78 13.? ** Sap 579 *38 75.6 *•2 7.3 10 1.7 99 17.1 *n> Oct 1165 907 77.9 97 8.3 15 1.3 1U6 12.5 Oct ITot 59? *•69 79.? 7U 12.5 2 .3 3 .5 »»5 7.6 lOT Dac 569 ^30 75.6 Bk lU.f 6 1-. >*9 8.6 Doc TOTAL b.Zfc5 *•.998 79.7 53* 8.5 27 >3 52 .8 b6? 10.6 total I9U3 Jaa 15?9 1010 bb. 193 12.6 50 3.3 9 .6 13* 8.8 133 8.7 Fab Joa 19*3 1220 85* 70. 160 1V1 3U 2.8 8 .bb 78 6.U 86 7. Fab Mar 1218 72^ 59. U 170 Ik. M ^.9 21 1.7 101 8.3 15* 12.6U Mar Apr 1317 750 56.9 179 13.6 39 3. 25 1.9 138 10.5 186 lH.l May 687 3*7 56.3 80 11.b 20 2.9 5 .73 79 11.5 116 16.9 May Jus u 500 273 5*.6 67 13. 19 3.8 * .8 67 13> 70 lW. W91 Jua Jul 2U7 50. ^ 85 17.? 30 6.1 5 1. 93 18.9 2(f 93 18.9 31 6.J Jul An* 1W* 52. 26 9.& 22 7.9 8U 30.3 76 27> Sap 302 Aft* 109 5**. 17 8.u 23 11.u 5 2.5 *1 20.3 Sap Oct 7 3.5 Oct *©• 1 I? * 65 **.5 20 IU.9 * V 2 1.5 27 20.1 16 11.9 •OT Dac 27 bjA 57 27 bjA 10 17.6 5 8.8 6 10.5 9 15.8 Dac total U.590 bO.l 7.632^ U.590 bO.l 1.007 13.2 29* 3.85 sU 1.1 8U« ll.l 88U 11. b TOTAL 191* Jan 59 35 59.3 9 15.? 3 51 5 8.U 7 11.8 Pab to/ Jan 19^1 39 58.2 6 9. 5 7> 7 10. U 10 1U.9 Fab Mar 52 30 57.7 8 15.* 2 "*.8 1 1.9 Apr 2 3.8 9 17.3 Mar 26 1»* 5V« 1 VS 1 3.8 *» 15.3 *•7 U Ui.U 6 23. Apr 9 2 2.2 1 l.l 2 2.2 Jua 13 Hay 7 53-8 1 7.7 1 7.7 2 15.3 2 15.3 Jua Jul b 2 ^.3 1 lb.b 3 50. Jul Au« 8 7 87.5 1 12.5 Sap ?0 26 86.7 AO* ... 3 10. _ _1___3^L. total 270 16W bO.7 11 U.l 31 11.5 2 .7U 2? 8.5 39 lM total OKSS3 lM33 9.929 *8.8 OSOSS 1.572 10.9 332 2.3 1?8 .96 1583 11. 923 b> 19U1.1* 13.510 9.929 73.5 1.572 11.b 332 2.5 138 1.0 158? 11.7 IV 19Ul-W» feclualva of BOTC caadldata* Saurca: ConaoUdatad l«port* #f Off!- Monthly roll mat lncluda* turnbacks fro* prarloua aonth* ear Caadldata Schools, Oram* Including turnback* Statistic* Sactloa, S* AOF. fecludln* turnback* 29 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED GRADUATION AND FAILURE OF OFFICER CANDIDATES BY MONTH 1941-1944' CAVALRY SCHOOL MOItt •BOLL®2 OHADCAf® FAIL® Tl/tVK BACK MQWtt lo. i Academic LoAdsrship Conduct Other Vo. i lo. i V < f *0. f l?Ul sap 100 8U 8U. lb lb. Sap 19U1 Dae 100 97 97. 3 3. Doc TOT AI< 200 181 90.5 (Causes of failure not reported 19 9.5 TOTAL pr lor to June 19U;>) 19U2 Mar 201 190 9*.5 n 5.5 Mar 19>*2 *•7 10b 105 99.0b l .9* Kay Jon 105 97 92.»» 2 1.9 b 5.7 Jun Jul 115 107 93. 3 2.b 5 S.3 Ju; Aa« 231 221 95.7 2 .86 8 3.5 Attf Sap 100 93 53. 1 1. b b. Sap Oct JUU 307 «9.2 l .3 15 M 21 b.l Oct VOT 208 199 95.7 f 3> 2 .9b «OT Doc 2UU a7 88.9 5 2. 3 1.2 1 > 19 7.8 Doc TOTAL lb5>* 153b 92.9 13 .78 U ,2U bO 3.b *2 2.5 TOTAL 19^3 Jan 25b 233 91. * 1.5 2 .78 2 .78 20 7.8 Jaa 19^2 Tab 257 237 92.2 2 .77 *» 1.5 2 .77 3 1.2 - lb b.2 r*b Mar 272 22U 62.u 8 2.9 13 *.8 » 1.5 31 ll.1* Mar Apr 35* 278 78.5 lU U, 31 8.8 2 .5b 7 2. 2b 7.3 Apr May 117 9b 82. 7 b. 12 10.2 1 .8 1 .8 May Jus 113 9>* 83.2 9 8. 7 b.2 1 .9 2 1.8 Jun Jul 308 ?1U b9.5 lb 5.2 30 9.7 3 .97 2 .b5 M 13.3 Jul 70 8U.3 1 1.2 " 13.25 1 1.2 Anc lOT S. 22 91.7 1 U.2 1 U.2 Kot TOTAL IT®1* 1UbS 82.3 58 3.25 H3 b.3 10 .5b 19 1.1 1X8 7.7 total 19UU Jan 2b lb t>1.5 3 1.2 5 19.2 2 7.b Jan 19UU Mar u« wu 91.7 2 U.2 1 2.1 Mar TOTAL 7*» bO 81. 5 b.S 5 b.S 3 *».l TOTAL MOSS3 oaoss I9U1.UI* 3.712 3.2U5 87. U 7b 2. 118 3.2 lU .U 82 2.2 180 M 19U1-UU fit'4 IV 19U]-UU 3.533 3.2*5 91.8 fb 2.2 118 3.3 14 .u 82 2.3 1 19m. Uk delusive of BOTC ceadldates. Course discontinued 11 March 19^. Source: Consolidated Imports of Offi- Monthly enrollment Includes turnback e froa prerloue south* cor Caadldato School*. Ground Including turnbacks Statistics Soctlon, Bq A&F. frcludla* t turn backs 30 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED GRADUATION AND FAILURE OF OFFICER CANDIDATES BY MONTH I94I-I9441 COAST ARTILLERY SCHOOL nam SOK8LLE)2 OBADDATV 7AILV rumm BACK MOMH t Aeadoalo Loadarahlp Coadoet Othor lo. *0. % lo. f lo. * *0. * lo. * 19^2 J«1 79 88.8 1 1.1 9 1. Jul 19U2 ** 90 86.6 9 8.7 2 1.9 3 2.9 At* »•* 216 168 77.1 3b 16.5 5 2.3 9 U.i Sop Oct 332 256 77.1 35 10.5 2 .6 3? U.7 Oct 211 170 80.6 16 7.6 2 .9 1 .5 U 1.9 18 8,b lov Dae 219 150 68.5 U8 21.9 1 .u 20 9.1 Doe TOTAL 1173 913 77.8 1U5 12.3 2 .17 11 .9 8U 7.2 18 .7 TOT^ 19U3 Jaa 133 63.6 Ul 19.6 16 7.7 1 .5 7 3.3 11 5.3 Jaa 19U3 ?* 12 V*9 66.5 *5 15.6 21 9.U 1 .u 13 5.8 5 2.2 M Mar 217 132 60.8 56 25.8 9 3.2 13 6. 7 3.2 Mar Apr 281 17U bl.9 51 18.1 23 8.2 2 .7 27 9.6 U l.U Apr May 96 U2 75. 5 8.9 5 8.9 3 5. 1 1.8 Majr Jaa 58 U7 81. 7 12. 3 5.2 l 1.7 Jun Jul 51 Ub 90.2 3 5-9 2 3.9 Jul ia< 5* U8 88.9 3 5.6 2 3.7 l 1.9 8«p 51 U9 9b. 1 2. 1 2. Sop Oct 50 38 7b. U 8. * b. 5 10. Oct lOT 30 21 70. 3 10. 1 3.3 5 lb.b I«? DM 28 20 71. U 3 10.7 5 17.9 Doe TOTAL 1309 899 b8,7 209 16. 88 b. 7 * .3 70 5.3 39 3. TOTAL 19UU J» U U 100. Jan 19UU Tob 35 25 n.u u u.u 2 5.7 U u.U fob Mar 30 0 l 3.3 3 10. 26 8b.b Mar TOTAL 69 29 U2. 5 7.2 5 7.2 30 U3.5 TOTAL OKM3 2.551 l.SUl (2,2 359 lU.l 95 3.1 15 .5® 18U 7.2 57 2.2 0B0S8 19112.101 19U2.UU frf1 IP 1^2-Wt 2.U9U 1.8*1 738 359 1U> 95 3.8 15 .6 18U 7.U 19U2_UU 1 feeluolvo af aOfO oaa&ldatoo. Couroo Aloooatlauod 1? March 19UU. Soure*: Consolidated Imports of Of f i- Meftihlj «rollswt laeladoo taratacko froa prorloao aoatho e«r Caadldato Schoole. Orouad * Statistic* Soctloa. Bq 407. y Xacladla* taimbaeko * feel*dla« tuiafcaeko 31 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED GRADUATION AND FAILURE OF OFFICER CANDIDATES BY MONTH 1941-1944' FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL MOW •nous2 OlAODATS FAIL D TUim BAtiK MOM LeeAorah^p •6. % *?: "i Vo. * 191* Oet 12* 79 b3.7 *5 3b.J Oet 19*1 lor 127 b7 52.7 bO *7.2 3 2.3 Va? Sao 130 87 bb.9 *3 33. Dae (Caueee of failure act reported TOTAL 581 233 bl.l Lor to April 19*2) 1*1 3«.8 3 .78 TOTAL 19U2 JU Jan 19*2 Tat 122 98 8O.3 2* 19.b fat' Mar 5® ** 82.7 10 17.2 Mar Apr 102 255 8*.* 11 3.b 3* 11.9 Majr 370 309 83.5 23 b.2 1 .2 3b 9.7 Itojr Jon 891 7*7 83.8 28 3.* 21 2.3 87 9.7 Jua "Jul 1371 1071* r8.3 101 t.3 19 1.3 * .02 13* 9.7 Jul Auc 2192 lbSl /b.b 22b 10.3 ?5 1.1 * .1* 257 11.7 Sap 2223 lb*5 73.9 2*b 11. 20 .89 7 .3 • 232 10.* 1 .ou Sep Oet 323? 213b bb. *35 13.* b5 2. 3 .09 *57 l*.l 127 3.9 < Oet lor 21bb 1*5? b7. 2*5 11.3 bb 3. *03 18.b «OT Sac 2319 I*b0 t>2.9 18* 7.9 58 2.5 i 33b 1*.* 280 12. Dtc TOTAL 15.2*6 10.905 a. 5 1*99 9.8 275 1.8 19 .12 2012 13.2 *06 2.67 ' TOTAL 191*? Jan 2232 1270 5b. 8 1*7 b.5 -73 3.2 107 *.7 b35 28.* Jaa 19*3 P»b 2*75 15** b2.3 128 5.1 52 2.1 1*5 5.8 bOb 2*.* Tab Mar 22b9 1312 57.8 70 3. 131 5.7 20b 9. 550 2*.2 Mar Apr 2962 1809 bl. 100 3.3 227 7.b 2b? 9. 557 18.8 ipr May lbOl 9b2 bO. 52 £2 "115 7.1 1U& S.9 325 20.2 Jon 1538 9lK) bl.l t>0 3.9 173 11.2 1 :l 95 b.l 2b9 17.* Jus Jul 1587 909 57.3 3* 2.1 139 8.7 8 .5 11% 9.2 300 18.9 Jul Auc 1193 b2S 52,b 93 7.8 *7 3.9 3 .2 97 8.1 257 21.5 Aac lap 5bb 351 b2. 25 *.* 17 3. b* 11.3 109 19.2 Sap Oct *b 2b 5b.b 1 2.* 1 2.1 2 M.3 4 S.b 12 26. Oet lOT 183 93 50. S 11 b. 5 2.8 3 l.b 28 15.3 43 2J..5 •aT Dac 95 5* 5b. 8 3 3.2 2 2.1 5 5.3 31 3*.b Dae TOTAL lb. ^7 9.898 59.1 72U 4.3 982 5.9 - 23 .5 12Ub 7.4 369* 22.1 TOTAL. 19** J *n 7* Us b*.9 3 *. 2 2.7 •» 5.* 17 22.9 Jaa 19** Tmt 117 7*» b3.2 5 *.3 2 1.7 * 3.2 32 27.b Feb Mar 90 UU U«.9 1 1.1 45 50. Mar Apr 152 7b 50. 3 2. 5 3.3 1 .bb b7 **.1 Apr May 35 U9.3 b S.5 1 1.* 1 1.* Jua 28 39.* a 25 56.8 3 b.S * 9.1 12 27.3 Jua Jul 31- 58.5 2 3.8 2 3.8 18 3*. Jul **€ 3 25 58.1 1 2.3 9 a. 8 18.b Aa« Sap 95 59 b2.l 1 1.05 9 9.5 7 7.* 19 20. 8*P TOTAL 739 *17 5b.* 23 3.1 20 2.7 33 *.5 2*6 33.3 TOTAX •JB* 28.763 21 .*53 7*. S vxr 19U1.UU 22*b 7.S 1277 *.* *2 .15 3503 12.3 19U1-UU Breluaiva ftf ROTO eaadldataa of c Saurea: Coaaolldatad laport# Offl- Moathlj aaroll»«nt iaeludaa turafeackt from prrrlcmt aoatha oar Candidate Sehoole, Orouad ' Xaeludluc turabaeka Statist lee Saetloa, l( A4*f. U kelvdlBf tnntaeka 32 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED GRADUATION AND FAILURE OF OFFICER CANDIDATES BY MONTH 1941—1944' INFANTRY SCHOOL nouD2 01APUAT1P TAILM) TOimap BAPS Acad—1c Loadtrthip Conduct 10. * Othar Ve. So. i 19*1 lap 20* lbb 81. U 38 18.b Bap 191*1 Oct Oet I«T 19* 153 78.9 *1 21.1 Hot Dec i«5 13® 73- 51 27. Doe (Caueee of failure not reported TOTAL 5*7 *•57 77.9 prior to April 19*2) 130 22.1 TOTAL 19*2 Jan 398 3*b 8b.9 52 13.1 Jan 19*2 m fab Mar 202 17* 8b.1 28 13.9 Mar Apr 20U 172 8*. 3 * 1.8 2* 11.7 * 1.* Apr Hay 1805 lbl8 89.b 82 *.5 55 3. 3 .lb *7 2,b May Jun 20*7 1790 87.* 98 *.8 70 3.* 3 .15 86 *.2 Jun Jul 30** 2575 8*.b 203 b.7 101 3.3 b .2 153 5. Jul A«« 3715 3101 83.5 301 9.7 22 .b 21 .5b 239 b.* Au« 9«p tUUU 2853 82.8 3*5 10. 29 .8* 3 .09 211 b.l .09 Sap Oct U232 3393 80.1 U85 l*.b *5 1.1 10 .23 29* b.9 Oct i*79T lOT *» 75.9 831 17.3 I 1 .02 217 *.5 110 2.3 So* Dac 5720 >*529 f9.2 720 12.b 70 1.2 22 .38 220 3.8 203 3.5 Doc 4—' TOTAL 29.b08 2*.190 81.7 3129 10.b 51b 1.7 b9 .23 1551 5.2 nb i.l TOTAL 19*3 Ju 1U2U 33*W 75.7 18* *.2 *23 9.b lb ."*6 273 b.2 180 *.1 Jaa 19*3 fab U55b 3028 bb.5 3*b 7.5 bl7 13.5 Q .2 29 2 b.* 26* 5.8 m Mar 5«70 3707 b3.2 *M 8. 797 13.7 .25 391 b.7 Ubi 7.9 Mar Apr 3«75 2318 59.8 321 8. S87 15.1 s .lb 319 8.2 26b b.9 Apr May 271* lb09 59.3 13b 5- ^bl 13.3 19 .'7 ^42 12.b 237 8.7 M«y Jun 2320 1328 57.2 b5 2.8 291 12.5 9 .18 173 7.5 *51 20. Jun Jul 2859 15b7 5*.8 92 3.2 *50 15.7 11 .38 323 11.3 ^9 13.b Jul 2*70 1*23 57.b 177 7.2 12* 13.1 20 .8 19* 7.9 288 U.7 Sap 1253 b89 55. 135 10.8 192 15.3 8 .b 118 11. <»l 7.3 Sap Oct lib b9 59.5 3 2.b 29 25. 11 9.5 U 3.* Oct lOT 579 2bb *5.9 51 8.8 127 a.9 k .7 98 lb.9 33 5.7 Hot Dae 178 100 5b.2 21 8.5 31 17.* 2 1.1 7_ 3.9 17 9.b Sac TOTAL 31.21* 19,*52 b2.3 1999 b.* *229 13.b 127 .* 25bl 8.2 2683 8.6 TOTAL 19** Jaa 282 lb2 57.* 17 b. 58 20. b 25 8.9 20 7.1 Jan I9U4 Tab 1*5 83 57.2 17 11.7 30 20.7 10 b.9 5 3.* M Mar 198 93 *7. 18 9.1 UO 20.2 12 b. 35 17.7 Mar A(r 2b lb bl.5 1 3.8 k 15.3 1 3.8 1 38 2 7.7 Apr May 175 81 *6.3 22 12. b a 12 1 .b 13 7.* 37 21.1 Jun 9b 38 39.b 19 20. lb lb. 7 8 8.3 15 15.b JUA Jul 159 99 b2.3 lb 10. 19 11.9 b 3.8 29 18.2 Jul Ax* 162 87 53.7 23 1*.2 11 b.8 1 .b U 2.5 30 18.5 Au#t »«P 98 37 37.8 15 15.3 10 10.2 1 .1 11 11.2 2* 2*.* Sap Oct 989 U09 **!.* 1*3 lb.5 b2 b. 3 U .* 81 8.2 270 27.3 Oct •OT 270* 1**2 295 10.9 2b7 9.9 21* *b7 17.3 SOT 5S-3 .7 1.9 Dm 2955 159b 5s*. 208 7. K08 H.6 _S .5 2*5 8.3 UgU lb.* Dac TOTAL 7.989 *.1*3 51.85 71* 8.9 9*b 11.8 *1 .5 blO 7.9 1*18 17.7 TOTAL Qam* *9.J9« *6,2*2 b9.5 58*2 8. *2 5b91 8.2 237 .3 *872 7. Uh\7 b.3b ansa 19U1-UU 19*1-** I** b*»981 *6.2*2 7*.2 5691 8.8 IV !9Ul-iiU 5«*2 9. 237 .36 *872 7.5 19U1.11* 1 feelwalre of SOTO caadldatea 2 Source: Consolidated Boporto of Offi- Monthly enrollment laoludao tunbacka f roa prevloua Month* car Candidate Schools, Orouad ' Inelu41nc turnback • Statistics SactIon, Hq AOJ. * Arcludlac turncock • 33 KESCRICTED RESTRICTED GRADUATION AND FAILURE OF OFFICER CANDIDATES BY MONTH 1942-1944' TANK DESTROYER SCHOOL MOltt AMOLLW2 OKASOATS) FAIL® TUEIM) BACK MORA Acad SSI lc Leadership Conduct Other Vo. i Vo. i lo. * io. r Ko. % *0. f 19U2 Oct UbU U2U 91.U 13 2.8 1 .22 7 1.5 19 U.i Oct 19U2 SOT b28 550 87,b 30 U.8 2 . "*2 13 2.1 33 5.3 HOT Dec b71 591 88.1 19 2.8 2 .3 8 1.2 lb 2.U 35 5.2 Dec TOTAL l,7b3 1»5b5 88.8 b2 3.5 2 .11 11 ,b 3b 2. 87 U.9 TOTAL 19U3 Jan 5*1 *51 83.U 9 1.7 39 7.2 b 1.1 9 1.7 27 5. Jan 19U3 Feb b9U 5b3 81.1 11 l.b 53 7.b U .S8 25 3.b 38 5.5 R*b Mar 73® 5b7 7b.8 29 3.9 71 9.b 2 .27 22 2.2 U7 b.U Mar Apr 778 U85 b2. ? 30 ?.? 92 11.8 8 1. 55 7.1 108 13.9 May Uib 271 b5.1 20 U.8 b5 15.b u 1. 2b 6.2 ?o 7.2 IUgr JUA 392 291 7U.2 9 2.3 bO 15.3 lU 3.b 18 U.b Jua Jul m 212 b8„2 5 l.b 53 17. 28 9. 12 3.9 Jul Auc 2b5 181 b8.3 U 1.5 38 1U.3 1 .** 25 9.* lb b. **€ Sap 270 189 70. 12 U.U 3« lU.l 2 .7 17 b.2 12 U.U Sra HOT 5? 28 52.8 13 1 1.9 9 17. 2 3.8 Io» Sec 2b 23 88,U 3 11.5 Dec TOTAL u,u?u 3»2bl 72.7 129 2.9 522 11. b 28 .b 233 5.2 ?10 b.9 TOTAL 19UU Jan bb U5 b8.2 12 18.2 1 1.5 5 7.b 3 *.b Jan 19UU Mar Ul 32 78. b 1U.7 3 7.3 Mar TOTAL 107 77 72. 18 lb.8 1 .9 8 7> 3 2.8 TOTAL Q*JSS3 OBOSS 19U2.1(L b.?5*» U.903 77.2 191 3. 5*2 8.b *0 .b3 277 U.U Uoo b.3 19U2-UU 10 19U2 -UW 5.95U U.903 82.? 191 3.2 5*2 9.1 UO .b7 277 U.7 19*2-UU 1 feeluslre of KOTC cardidatea. Course discontinued 10 March 19UU 2 Monthly enrollment includes turnbacks from previous souths Source: Consolidated Beports of Offi cer Candidate School*, Orouad ' Including turnback* Statistics Sectloo, Hq AflF. b fecludlnc turnbacks 3^ RESTRICTED • EES.CRICTED NOTES 1. MR 1-1*, IT Oct 38, 25 Oct 39; MR 3-1, 3 Apr 39, 23 Nov kO. 2. AWC Study (R), l Nov 38, sub: Procurement of Off Pers. Cf also .AWC Study (R), 2 Nov 39, sub as above. AWC Records Sec. 3 • Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Sec- retary of War, July 1, 191+1- to June 30, 19^ Chart 11^ k. Ibid, Chart VII. 5. WD memo of Brig Gen F. M. Andrews for CofS USA, 7 Sep 1+0, sub: OCSa. AG 352 (9-19-^0)(l) Sec 1, Part 1. 6. WD memo G-3/25^5, for CofS USA, 19 Sep 1+0, sub as In note 5 afcove. Ibid. 7« (l) History of AGF, Study No 26, The Antiaircraft Command and Center. (2) Ibid. Study No 29, The Tank Destroyer History, Vol I, Chap VII. 8. The principal WD publications governing officer candidate selection and training are as follows: 19^1 WD ltrs AG 352(^-10-^l)M-M-C, 26 Apr 1+1 AG 352(VlO-i+l)MC-M-C, 9 May ^1 AG 352(5-8-ln)MT-M-C, 29 May lj-1 AG 352(5"-21 -1+1)MT -M-C, 6 Jun 1+1 AG 220.63(7 -30 -1+1)KB, 30 Jul 1+1 AG 352(8-27-1+l)MD-M-A, 30 Aug 1+1 AG 352(&-23 -lt-l)MT -C -M, 30 Aug 1+1 AG 352(8-27-l+l)Mr-M-A, 9 Sep 1+1 AG 210.31 0EC(9-9-1+l)Mr-A, 13 Sep 1+1 AG 352(9-13-1+1)EB, 13 Sep 1+1 AG 210.3(9-H-lH)EA-C. 16 Sep 1+1 AG 352 MP-M-A 8 Oct 4l AG 352(11-17-4l)MT-A-M, 26 Nov 1+1 WD Cirs No 109, 6 Jun 1+1, Sec VI No 21+5, 26 NOT 1+1 No 266, 2l+ Dec 1+1, Sec II 191+2 WD Cirs No 1+8, 19 Feb 1+2 No 65, 5 Mar 1+2, Sec VI No 75, 13 Mar 1+2, Sec II No 86, 21+ Mar 1+2, Sec HI No 98, 3 Apr 1+2, Sec IH No 102, 7 Apr 1+2, Sec I No 126, 28 Apr 1+? No 128, 30 Apr 1+2, Sec IH No 131, 2 May 1+2, Sec 17 No I87, 13 Jun 1+2, Sec II No 205, 25 Jun 1+2, Sec IV No 221, 10 Jul 1+2, Sec H No 2l+7, 28 Jul 1+2, Sees V & VI No 358, 28 Oct 1+2, Sec HI 35 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED AR 625-5, 26 NOT k2 19h3 WD Cirs No 11, 6 Jan l£ Sec II No 266, 23 Oct k3 19b-k WD Cirs No 150, 15 Apr li4, Sec 17 No 261, 26 Jim Sec V No 319, 1 Aug ¥t-, Sec I No 367, 9 Sep ¥»•, Sec 3X WD MEMO 625-W-, 29 NOT 1)4 AR 625-5, 12 Sep kb 9. WD AG memo for G-l WD, 6 Jun 4l, sub: Selection of Trainees for OCS. AG 352(9-19-1<0)(1) Sec 1, Part 1. 10. Par 6 (h) Clr 126, WD, 28 Apr l)-2. 11. (1) IRTC, Ft McClellan, ltr to TAG, 13 NOT kk, sub: 0C TeBt. 352Ml (OCS). (2) Statement of Lt Col G. S. Hollo-way, Classification Off, Inf Sch, to AGEF Hist Off, 7 Mar kj. 12. Statement of Col R. R. Coursey, WD G-l DiT (formerly Director of Officer Candidates, Inf Sch) to AGF Mst Off, 2 Mar k5; of Col Waine Archer, G-3 DiT Hq. ETOUSA (formerly Coordinator of Tng, Inf Sch), 7 May k5. 13. TJntil 19^3, for example, at the Tank Destroyer OCSj statement of MaJ W. B. Anderson, Sec, TD Sch, to AGF Hist Off, 13 Mar li(-. History of AGS', Study No 26, The Antiaircraft Command and Center. Chap III. 15. Statement of Lt Col D. F. Sellards, S-3, AAA Sch, to AGF Hist Off, 17 Mar l»-5 16. (l) See note 15 AboTe. (2) Statement of Lt Col S. W. Luther, G-3 Schs Br, AA Comd, to AGF Hist Off, 17 Mar 1+5. 17. History of AGF, Study No 30, Wartime Training in the Schools of the Army Ground Forces. 18. Cf Cpl Henry G. Fairbanks, A Candidate's Critique of Infantry OCS. unpub lished IE, on file in Office of the Secretary, Inf Sch. 19. The course is outlined in the Infantry School Mailing List. Vol XXVI (19^3), Chap 7, and Vol XXVII (I9IA), Chap 1. 20. The following 7 pages are based largely on the following documents, all of which are located in 31^.7 (AGF Hist), except those on Tank Destroyer School, -which are in TD Sch Files. , Antiaircraft Artillery School "Candidates1 Class Record," 6 Apr 1*3 36 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Armored School "Orientation for the Officer Candidate of the Armored Officer Candidate School/' July 19*6 • "Standing Operating Procedure for the Rating of Officer Candidates," undated. "The Armored Officer Candidate School—General Regulations and Informa tion, " 2 Oct k3. OCS Forma: OC3-876 Form 5 OCS-863-S 0CS-1321-M OCS-864-M OCS-1291 OCS-1285 OCS-130^ Memo of Col A. S. J. Stovall Jr, Director, Armd OCS, for New Members of AFGCS Status Board, 22 Apr ^3 • Cavalry School "Instruction Circular for Officer Candidates," Oct ^3. OCS Information Bulletin No 1, Apr ^3* OCS Memo, Classification and Final Selection of Officer Candidates, undated. Field Artillery School 'Handbook for Officer Candidates,11 15 Mar kk. "Handbook for Officer Candidates,tf 15 Mar 45. '•Rating Form for Use of Interviewers and Oral Examiners," 22 Jan ^5- ,fRating and Observation Report on Officer Candidates," 16 Jan *4-5 • OCS Form 190-A, 1 Mar ^5. Infantry School Hq 3cL Student Tng Regt memo, 21 Dec ^3, sub: Guide for Officers of the OCS. "Leadership Rating Scale," 1 Jul . leadership -- How to Use the Rating Scale," 1 Jul kb. Memo of Capt J, J. McGrath for Asst Comdt, undated (19*1-2), sub: OC Failures -- Some Obsns. "Guide for Tactical Offs of the Tng Brig," 9 Nov k2. Regulations Governing the Opns of the Faculty Bd for OC Classes," 2k Mar kk. Tank Destroyer School "Candidate Rating Sheet," undated, "Consolidated Efficiency Report," undated. "Officer Candidate Characteristics," 1 Jun 1*3. OCS Dept Memo for Co OCS Regt, 12 Dec 42, sub: Reports on OCs. Memo for All OCs, TD Sch, 12 Nov k2, sub: Academic and Leadership Standard. 21. Armd F OCS pamphlet, "Demerit and Punishment Procedure." 31^7 (AGF Hist). 37 RESTRICTED I- fc ^ •', W'*,/ T"u V '* 22. Study, Axmd Sch, Office of the'MilitaryPsychologist, "Report of Psycholog ical Examinations of OCs ("based on tentative Norms) OC Class #68," 20 Jun 1+4. Armd OCS Dept Files. 23. Statement of Col T. E. Winstead, Dir OCS Dept, Armd Sch, to AGE Hist Off, 21 Mar ^5. 2k. Study (R), TD Sch Classification Dept, 20 Dec ^3, sub: Pers Research Rpt — Experiment in Combat Adaptability. 3 Parts. TD Sch Files. 25. Ltr, 9 Nov k2, sub: The Rating of OCs, Infantry School Mailing List, Vol 23V (19^3), P 202. 26. Statement of Col W. S. Coursey, WD G-l Div (formerly Dir of OCs, Inf Sch) to AGF Hist Off, 2 Mar kj. 27. Inf Sch pamphlet, undated (23 Oct k$), sub: The Selection System of the OC Course, The Inf Sch, and An Analysis of OC Failures. 31^-7 (AGE Hist). 28. (l) Incl to personal ltr, Col Thornton Chase, Inf Sch AG, to Lt Col W. S. Renshav, AGE G-l Sec, 9 Aug ^3. Ibid. (2) Inf Sch Classification Sec study, Jul kk, sub: OC Performance Related to AGCT Scores. Inf Sch files. 29* Note 28 (l) above. 30. AAA Sch, OC Div Einal Statistical Rpt, 15 Jun Mj-. AA Comd Files. 31. Incl to personal ltr Col Thornton Chase, Inf Sch AG, to Lt Col W. S. Renshaw AGE G-l Sec, 9 Aug k-3. 314.7 (AGE Hist). 32. (l) Inf Sch Classification Sec study, Dec 43, sub: Study of OCs. Inf Sch files. (2) Inf Sch Classification Sec study, Dec 43, sub: Study of Junior ROTC candidates. Ibid. 33» Table, "WD Office of the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, sub: Com parative Mortality Among OCs, 29 May 44. Originally consulted in 314.7 (AGF Hist); document missing at date of final revision. 3^-. ACT M/S(C), G-l to CofS, 8 Max ^3, sub: OCS. 352/60 (C). 35* Memo of Col Thornton Chase, Inf Sch AG, for Col C. E. Krams, R&SC G-l, 25 Sep 42. R&SC OCS Gen #1. 36. Histoiy of AGF, Study Ho 6, The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers. 37* Statement of MaJ F. C. Ash, AGF G-l Sec (formerly Inf Sch AG Sec), to AGE Hist Off, 20 Feb 45. 38. FA Sch 2d ind, 1 Dec 42, on AGF ltr to CG R&SC, 18 Nov 42, sub: Visit of Dr. James Grafton Rogers to FA Sch. 095 (Rogers, J G). 39- Inf Sch study, Tabulation of Performance of Candidates on the TIS Test, 1943 • Filed in Office of the Secretary, Inf Sch. UNCfcfesiFiED RESTRICTED 40. Statement of Major Combat&lade, Chiefs Gen Tng Sec, OCS Dept, Armd Sch, to AGF Hist Off, 21 Mar 45- 41. AGF 1st ind, 24 Nov 42, on R&SC ltr, 18 Not 42, sub: Instructor Pers for OffsT Pool Sch and OCS Preparatory Sch, FA RTC. 35^/108 (FA OCS). 42. (1) R&SC ltr to CGrS, 31 Dec 42, sub: Preliminary Tng for OCS. R&SC OCS Gen Binder. (2) WD Memo W 350-56-43, 13 Mar 43, sub: Guide for OCS Applicants and OCS Examining Bds, pars 24, 32, 38; 57- 352/424 (OCS). 43. History of the Field Artillery School, note 832. Draft copy on file at FA Sch. 44. (l) History of AGS1, Study No 26, The Antiaircraft Command and Center, Chap XII. (2) Statement of Lt Col D. F. Sellards, S-3> AAA Sch, to AGF Hist Off, 17 Mar 45. 45. (l) R&SC ltr to CGs, RTCs, 27 Apr 43, sub: Discontinuance of OC Preparatory Schs. R&SC 352 (Schs Gen) #1. (2) R&SC ltr to TAG, 30 Apr 43, sub: Change on WD Memo W 350-56-43. 352/424 (OCS). 46. R&SC 1st ind, 1 Dec 42,. on AGF ltr, .18 Nov 42, sub: Visit of Dr James Grafton Rogers to FA Sch. 095 (Rogers, J G). 47• Office CofFA ltr to Comdt FA Sch, 8 Jan 42, sub: Turn-back of OCs. R&SC 352 OCS Gen #1. See also par 11 (3), Cir 126, WD, 28 Apr 42. 48. Incl 3 to Inf Sch ltr to CG R&SC, 10 Aug 44, sub: Selection of OCs. File of Lt Col V. S. Renshaw, AGF G-l Sec. 49- Analysis of Inf Sch OC Classes 1-408. Originally consulted in 31^*7 (AGS' Hist); document missing at date of final revision. 50. TIG memo (C) IG 352.4 (OCS)(l-26-^3) for WD ACofS G-l, WD, 26 Jan 43, BU1J: OCSb. 352/60 (C). 51. (1) AGEF memo (C) 352/60 GNGDC (3-13-^3), for ACofS G-l, WD, 1^ Mar 1+3, sub as in note 50 above. Ibid. (2) AGF M/STs, G-l, G-3* AG, various dates, Feb and Max 43, sub as above. Ibid. 52. WD Memo W 625-4-43, 13 Apr 43, sub: OCS Applicants. 35^/434 (OCS). 53- WD SOS memo SPTRS 352.11(OCS) (23 Apr 43) to ACofS G-3, WD, 23 Apr 43, sub: Increase in length of OC Course. 352/440 (OCS). 54. (1) WD memo WDGCT 352 0CS(4-23-43) to CG AGEF, 24 Apr 43, Bub: Increase in Length of OC Courses. Ibid. (2) AGF M/R, Tab G, telephone conversation, Col Shaw, AGF and Col Shallene, R&SC, 29 Apr 43. Ibid. 55* (l) AGF,memo for CofS USA, 9 May 43, sub: Increase in Length of OC Courses. Ibid. (2) AGS1 M/S, G-3 to CofS, 30 Apr 43, sub as in (l). Ibid. 39 •• RESTRICTED " {• • -•1 Vu A" J 4 id .1 • •••< RESTRICTED. ; ; V' , \ 56. WD memo WDGCT 352 OCS(4-23-43) for CGs, 18 May .43,, sub as in note 55(1)• IMd. 57* AO1 ltr to CO R&SC, 28 May 43, sub as in note 55(l)* Same ltr to Annd F. IMd. 58, (l) AGEF M/S a-3 to CofS, 26 Jun 43, sub: Increase in Length of OCS Courses. IMd. (2) AGEF 2d ind 352/440 (0CS)(28 May 43)GNGCT to CQ R&SC, 2? Jun 1+3- Ibid. (3) lT-^eek OCS programs. IMd. 59 • R&SC ltr to Comdts Inf, Car, FA, OA, and TD Schs, 6 Jul 43, su"b: Increase in Length of OCS Courses. G-3 Schs Br OCS Gen Binder /46. 60. (l) AGEF memo for CofS USA, 11 Aug 43, sub as in note 59 above. 352/20 (0CS)(S). (2) AGEF m/s, G-3 Misc Div to G-3, 30 Jul 43, sub: Conference at WD Con cerning Extension of OCS Course to Six Months. G-3 Schs Br OCS Gen /V7. (3) AGEF memo for CofS USA, undated, but about 6 Aug 43, sub: Increase in Length of OCS Courses. Not Sent. Ibid. 61. WD d/f WDGAP 352 OCS (C), 4 Sep 43 to CG AGEF, sub: Plan for Centralized Basic 0C Tng at the Inf Sch, Ft Benning, Ga. With inols. 352/21 (0CS)(S). 62. (1) AGF memo for CofS USA (G-l Div), 10 Sep 43, sub as in note 6l above. Ibid. (2) AGEF M/S G—1 to G-3, G-3 to CofS, 6-9 Sep 43, sub as above. Ibid. (3) Draft, AGEF memo for CofS USA, undated, but about 4 Sep 43, sub as above. G-3 Schs Br OCS Gen /52. 63. (1) AGEF memo (S) for TAG, 6 Sep 44, sub: AGEF OCS Quotas. 352/105 (0CS)(S). (2) WD ltr (C) AGOT-S-A 352 (20 Sep 44) to CG AGEF-, 26 Sep 44/ sub: OCS Capacities. 352/342 (C). 64. R&SC "Program of Instruction for OCS (Consolidated Mechanized Cav, Armd, and TD)," 20 Oct 44. Originally consulted in 314.7 (AGEF Hist); document missing at date of final revision. COMBINED ARMS ^SEARCH LIBRARY 3 lb^S uUiiti i tibu c . r* jr t - Ills i f ii f HBHHBMHHBnBBBIIBHMnwnni