I4ob11,IZAT ION-RELATED WORLD WAK I1 IYFAN'pry
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GIINNIHG TEAI.1S: i4OB11, IZAT I ON -R E LAT ED CORRELATES OF SIJCCESS IN AMEKICAK WORLD WAK I1 IYFAN'PRY DIVISIONS A thcs.is present.ed to the Faculty of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College in parti.nl fultillmcnt of t.he requirements for thc degree MASTER OF EIILITARY ART AND SCIENCE JOHN S. BROWN, MA.1, USA B. S., United States Military Academy, 1971 M. I!., Indiana University, 1977 Ph.D., Indiana University, 1983 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1985 Approved for public release; distribution u!ilimi(:etl. MASTERS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Name of candidate: Xajor John Sloan Brown Title of Thesis: Winning Teams - - Correlates of Success in American World War I1 Infantr-J Divisions Approved by: -9 Thesis Committee Chairman Dr. Larry A. Ya z7isL4L- , Member, Graduate Faculty Ltc: Michael T. Chase , Member, Consulting Faculty Dr,’,.ilohn W. Partin ill Accepted this 7th day of June 1985 by: , Director, Graduate Degree Programs The opinions and conclusions expressed herin are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the ‘J.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoinq statement.) ABSTRACT W I N N I N G TEAEl S : MOA I L I2AT I ON-RELATED C 0 R K E L A T E S 0 F S U CC E S S IN AMERICAN WORLD WAR TI INFANTRY-CI’IISIONS by Major John Sloan Brown, USA, 195 pages. -Winning Teams identifies characteristics successful American infantry divisions had in common duri.ng World War I1 and the extent to which those Characteristics were unique. The study discusses stateside training, overseas deployment and first major battle, and sustaining effectiveness for prolonged periods. Winning Teams addresses the full range of personnel, operational, training and logistical issues, yet finds personnel stability, retraining overseas, preliminary combat pricr to major combat, the resemblance of combat to training, and an episodic pace of combat the most significant factors dist.inguishing successful infantry divisions from those that fared less well. iii A C K NOW LE CGE>IE N 1’s Ttirougliout this project 1 have enjoyed the thGL1ghtfll.t nntl c:,Jmpreie:i:;ive editorial comments of Dr. John Partin, Pr. ‘Larry Yare:,;, aiid Lieutenant Colonel. Nichael Chase. an outstanding coniml ttee from Fort Leavenworth’s Comhat Studies Institute. To their invaluable mentorship I would add helpful co.nnc:nts from many of their colleagues in the Combat Studies Ins’ll~utc,in particul-ar the chairman of the c?tiitc,rial hoard, Lieutenant Colonel Gary Bounds. A number of my classmatcs :in the Cormand aad General. Staff CoI.li?ge have added their critiques to the development of tile pro,ject; Elojor John Honti and Major Grcgg >lorton were parI-icu-Larig heipiul and attentive. Ileyorid the circle of :;chol,3rs dirf!ctly invol.ved in this project., I would 1.ike to also recog:iize the doctoral dissertat.ion c:mmitL:c.e that led me t:c writc -tee Division, the study that: suggested iiiany of the ideas in this follow-on work. These distin~,uished and patient scholars are Professors John E. Wilz, David M. Pl.rt~heK, George Jiiergens, and John P. Lovcll, all of I ndia na L’n 3. v e r :;it y . i ~x0111:llike to thank my wiCc Mary Beth, daughter Amy, and CCJII Todd for their indulgence while T ilibored throltgh this project. ‘They took up my slack in many ways and patiently eiirl~ired those occasions when I Iias not the compan:.on I might otherwise have been. t\nother c!ieerful i.n adversj-ty ha:; been Darla Rutledge, my typist. Without her this st:udy could not have appeared. During the course of my research the lihrary staff of the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenwor th tiae been most helpful. They are a1.1 :rue professionals and have been extraordinarily dedicated in their help and assistance. In my bibliographi.ca1 essay T cite the full array of my sources, but think I would be remiss if I did not mention here some personal correspondents that have proven particular.ly valiiab1.e: Colonel Dixie Reggs. Major Harvey K. Cook, IColonel Robert J. Karrer, Brigadier General. JGhn J. King, Major General John M. Lentz, Elr. IJi11j.am N. Partin, Dr. Paul Richmond, Colonel Peter I.. Topic, and Mr. C. Doc Waters. Finally, I would Like to recognize my father, Color!el. Eorace M. Brown, a superb partner in this and much cise. With his extraordinary persona! knowledge of the officers c~fhis and earlier generations he is that most. invaluable of historical assets, a source of sources. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Thesis Approval Page ii Abstract iii Acknowledgements iv List of 'Tables vii List of Charts viii I. Introduction and Historical Context 1 11. From Activation to Embarkation: 10 The Sources of Delay 111. First Rattle: The Correl.ates of Success 73 IV. The Long Haul: Sustaining the Edge 120 V. Conclusions 170 Bib 1io g r n p h icaI Essa y 187 Initial Distribution List V LIST OF TABLES Table Title Page 1 Divisions Overseas or En Route, 12 by Selected !)etcs 2 Divisions by Niiinber of 21 Hont.fls Tardy 3 T/O Equipment on Hand for New 26 Divisions, A 1) r i 1 I943 4 Re t r a i.11irig 11 e q 1: ired by Div i s io ri s 4 0 Stripped of Personnel. 5 Mobiliz,ation-Related Variables and World 108 War 71 Infantry Dj.visj.011 First Combats 3rd InLaiit.ry Division Operations 147 21 September - 16 Novembcr 1943 88th Icfantry Div:.sion Operations, 149 11 - 15 May l94S LIST OF CHARTS Chart Title Page I Sources 01 Stateside Personnel. Losses, SO Pre-1941 Divisions I1 Sources of Stateside Personnel Losses, 51 19Ll Divisions L I11 Sources of Stateside Personnel Losses, 52 1942 Divisions IV Sources of Stateside Personnel Losses, 53 1943 Divisions V Selected Division Operational Histories 123 vii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT The time was 0530 hours 16 December 1944. The Ardennes forest reverberated with the thunder of massed German guns and rocket artillery. Vithin hours, tanks and grey-clad infantry emerged from the mists to assail American defenders thinly strung along the length of a forty-roilc front. Nazi planners had done their work well; in several places att a c IciII g infantrymen inf i1t rat ed deep 1y before coning under fire, and GI's found thenise1.ves attacked from several sides at close range before they fully realized whet was afoot. For most of its length the string of outposts loosely characterized as the American "line" was manned by two green drafLee divisions. Their first real taste of battle would be uncommonly harsh. Each stood directly in the path of a panzer army in Hitler's last bid to end his war on tolerable terms. 1 The Fifth Panzer Army soon had something to celebrate. With little more than a reinforced Vo-lksgrenadier Division it punched through the American line in two places and neatly trapped most 0: the 106th Infantry Division. The 106th'~resistance, never timely nor :cl,ling, collapsed in the course of ill-coordinated efforts to extricate surrounded units. On the 19th of December, two regiments of the 106th and their attached troops marched off to Prisoner of War cages. Perhaps worse, the Fifth Panzer Army stood poised to expl.oit t.he gap it had made with the 2 tiill weight of four panzer divisions. Fortunately for L~CAllics, he Sixth Panzer Arniy Eared less well than the Fifth. Surprised initially, the battalions of the 99th Infantry Division fought back fiercely, first from one position, then from another. Spirited counterattacks swept German inliltrators out of rear areas, forcing the Kazis to resort to costly frontal assaults. Unit by uni.c, the Sixth Panzer Army became totally involved in i.ndecisive efforts to shove the 99th back. Ultimately, the American division engaged elements of one paratroop, cwo panzer, and three infantry divisions. Each new wave of Germans left a residue of grey-clad corpses in front of hotly contested pcsitions. Even when surrounded, the draftees extricated themselves -- sometimes as units, sometimes by twos and threes -- and generally brought out their heavy weapons with them. By 19 December, two regiments had collspsed back into the relative security of hastily redeployed reinforcing divisions, and the third, after repeated attacks, stil.1 cIung to its original position. In three da!;s of savage fizhting, the soldiers of the 99th earned four distinguished unit citations, two medals of honor, three distinguished service crosses, and the grudgingly conceded respect or their Nazi opponents. Perhaps even more .i.mport.ant., the Sixth Panzer Arniy -- the German main elfort -- had not ac!i-ieved the breakthrough it L sought. It deflected southwards into the now perilously 3 narrow corridor opening in the Fifth Panzer Army sector. Why did the 99th Infantry Division fare so well and the 106th so poorly? To ask a larger question, why did sume World War I1 divisions emerge as winning teams and others as losers? Neither the 99th nor the 106th were born in the Ardennes, both were the products of a lengthy mobilization -- as were all of our World War I1 divisions. Even divisions that had existed before the war were, in essence, 4 rebuilt after 1940. There is nothing new or mysterious in the basi.c principlcs of unit mobilization. For over two thousand years, as far back as one can interpret doctrine with any confidence, professional soldiers havc recognized the significance of cadre selection, recruitment, organization, 'logistical support, training, deployment, and c commitment to combat when raising new units.' They havc also recognized the hazards of carelessly conducti.ng any step.