BATTLE-SCARRED and DIRTY: US ARMY TACTICAL LEADERSHIP in the MEDITERRANEAN THEATER, 1942-1943 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial
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BATTLE-SCARRED AND DIRTY: US ARMY TACTICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER, 1942-1943 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Steven Thomas Barry Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2011 Dissertation Committee: Dr. Allan R. Millett, Adviser Dr. John F. Guilmartin Dr. John L. Brooke Copyright by Steven T. Barry 2011 Abstract Throughout the North African and Sicilian campaigns of World War II, the battalion leadership exercised by United States regular army officers provided the essential component that contributed to battlefield success and combat effectiveness despite deficiencies in equipment, organization, mobilization, and inadequate operational leadership. Essentially, without the regular army battalion leaders, US units could not have functioned tactically early in the war. For both Operations TORCH and HUSKY, the US Army did not possess the leadership or staffs at the corps level to consistently coordinate combined arms maneuver with air and sea power. The battalion leadership brought discipline, maturity, experience, and the ability to translate common operational guidance into tactical reality. Many US officers shared the same ―Old Army‖ skill sets in their early career. Across the Army in the 1930s, these officers developed familiarity with the systems and doctrine that would prove crucial in the combined arms operations of the Second World War. The battalion tactical leadership overcame lackluster operational and strategic guidance and other significant handicaps to execute the first Mediterranean Theater of Operations campaigns. Three sets of factors shaped this pivotal group of men. First, all of these officers were shaped by pre-war experiences. Professional military education, unit training exercises, and commissioning source formed the foundation of how the Army prepared these officers for leadership and combat. This group of officers shared many of the same personal factors that consistently provided sound leadership in North Africa and Sicily. While less tangible than institutional factors, the personal factors include bravery, calmness under fire, vigor, ii and common personality traits. Finally, the officers‘ deft use of doctrine, assigned equipment, mission-oriented orders, and their ability to overcome operational limitations translated into tactical combat effectiveness. The analysis of these three categories above determined that these battalion-level professional officers were the critical cogs for early Allied success in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. iii To my best friend and wife, Mary Ann. iv Acknowledgments I wish to first thank my adviser, Allan R. Millett, for the intellectual guidance, encouragement, and moral support that helped to make this dissertation possible. I am indebted to him for his infinite patience and support of my career as an Army officer and a scholar. I also thank him for his personal interest in my research and leadership within the field of military history. I also wish to thank Dr. John Guilmartin and Dr. John Brooke for their sound advice, scholarship, and their service on this committee. Over the past seven years, they have served as role models especially in my capacity as an instructor at the United States Military Academy. I thank Dr. Richard Sommers and Dr. David Keough of the US Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania for their insightful comments and bibliographic help. In addition, I thank three archivists, Richard Baker, Shaun Kirkpatrick, and Tom Buffenbarger, also of MHI, who showed extraordinary patience and diligence throughout my research trips. Also, Susan Lintelmann, United States Military Academy Manuscripts Curator, spent countless hours combing the special collections on the stuffy four floor of the West Point library to provide me critical documents. Rusty Rafferty at the Combined Arms Research Library in Ft Leavenworth, Kansas was indispensible for locating key documents regarding 1940-1941 Maneuvers and Operation HUSKY. Dr. Tim Nenninger dedicated his precious time to help locate critical documents in the massive National Archive collections. Dr. Edward ―Mac‖ Coffman provided insightful comments and documents that greatly assisted me in writing v chapters one and two. Finally, the staffs of the George C. Marshall Foundation Research Library, the Patton Museum at Ft. Know, KY, the Donovan Research Library at Ft. Benning, GA, Norwich University Archives and Special Collections, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, and the US Army Center of Military History supplied professional and timely help to all of my requests. I thank my parents, Thomas and Joanna Barry, for teaching me to become the person I am and for their continual support throughout my entire life. Regardless of any help that I received, I take full responsibility for any errors. Finally, I could not have done this without the unconditional love and patience provided by my wife, Mary Ann. She is the backbone of our family that kept the household running smoothly even while taking care of three children during a thirteen- month deployment. I thank her from the bottom of my heart for her devotion, sacrifice, and encouragement. vi Vita February 20, 1974........................................Born Princeton, New Jersey 1996..............................................................B.S. History, United States Military Academy 2006..............................................................M.A. History, Ohio State University 2006 to 2008.................................................Assistant Professor, USMA 1996 to present ..............................................Active Duty US Army Officer, Armor Publications History of the Military Art since 1914, 3rd Edition (Pearson, 2008) Fields of Study Major Field: History vii Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgments............................................................................................................... v Vita .................................................................................................................................... vii Table of Contents ........................................................................................................... viii List of Figures .................................................................................................................... x INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 1 Historical Problem .......................................................................................................... 2 Historiographical Context ............................................................................................. 11 CHAPTER 1: WEST POINT EVOLUTION .............................................................. 22 A New Approach in the Classroom .............................................................................. 27 Forging Cadets into Soldiers: Tactical Training .......................................................... 32 Into the Gym and Onto the Fields ................................................................................. 40 Role Models .................................................................................................................. 43 CHAPTER 2: FORGING LEADERS BEYOND THE HUDSON ............................. 52 Regular Army Training ................................................................................................. 55 The Civilian Conservation Corps and Its Impact .......................................................... 64 The Thomason Act Diversifies ..................................................................................... 70 The Next Step: Army Service Schools ........................................................................ 73 The Army General Headquarters Maneuvers ............................................................... 82 CHAPTER 3: WADING IN WITH TORCH .............................................................. 95 The Western Task Force Arrives in Morocco............................................................... 99 Mixed Results: Elite Units at Oran ............................................................................ 104 Waters at the TORCH Landings ................................................................................. 113 The Big Red One at Oran............................................................................................ 119 The Training of One Division: 1st Armored Division ................................................ 128 The Eastern Assault Force at Algiers.......................................................................... 137 viii CHAPTER 4: THE RACE FOR TUNISIA ............................................................... 144 Battalion Leadership in the Fight for Chouigui Pass .................................................. 152 Medjez El Bab: Indicators of Weak Leadership ........................................................ 161 The Struggle to Coordinate at Longstop Hill .............................................................. 166 Evaluating Armored Warfare Data ............................................................................. 171 CHAPTER 5: A LONG FEBRUARY IN THE TUNISIAN