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C:/Users/User/Desktop/2017-08-16 Tannenberg Booklet 6 Seiten BGG Table of contents Put the turn marker onto the August 17 space of the turn track. All other 1. Setup................................... 2 markers are set aside. 2. Sequence of Play................... 2 st 3. 1 Army march and combat.... 2 2. SEQUENCE OF PLAY 4. 2nd Army march and combat....5 th Hindenburg’s Hour is played in a series 5. 8 Army movement and of up to 15 turns, each representing combat ................................ 5 one day of actual time. A turn consists of six phases which must 6. Supply..................................6 be completed in the following order: 7. Rally.................................... 7 st 8. Victory check.........................7 1. 1 Army march and combat 2. 2nd Army march and combat 9. Optional Rules....................... 7 3. 8th Army movement and 10. Literature............................ 7 combat 4. Supply 5. Rally 6. Victory check 1. SETUP The map shows the province of East 3. 1st ARMY MARCH AND COMBAT Prussia and surrounding areas in 1914. A grid of hexagons (“hexes”) March has been superimposed on it in Roll one die, subtract one for each order to regulate movement. disrupted and/or unsupplied (see Moving from one hex to another 7.) corps in the army (do not represents having covered a subtract more than one per corps distance of approximately ten even if disrupted and unsupplied) kilometers. Note that north is on and compare the result to the top of the map. march table on the map. If the Put the four playing pieces depicting result is 6, put the forced march corps’ of the Russian 1st Army marker for the 1st Army onto the (Cav., XX., III. and IV.) onto their space for the current day on the designated hexes. Proceed likewise turn track. No army may be forced with the corps of the Russian 2nd marched on consecutive turns. If 6 (VI., XIII., XV., XXIII. and I.) and is rolled again, it triggers the the German 8th Army (I., XVII., I. advance of one hex only. The forced Res. and XX.). All units are march marker is removed from the undisrupted. Note that there is no turn track after the 1st Army march difference in the treatment of army, phase following a forced march. reserve and cavalry corps. The If the (modified) die roll yields an designations are for historical advance (3­6), all corps of the 1st reference only. Army move one or two hexes 2 westward according to the following create a gap in the Russian line, it principles: may not move. Note this does not • The army moves along the mean that all corps’ always have northernmost hexes of the map to occupy the same column. It until reaching the hex column may happen that some do move containing Angerburg. while others are blocked – as long • Once all corps’ have reached the as no gap in the Russian line Angerburg column, roll one die emerges. before advancing. On a result of •If there ever is a gap in the 1­3, the 1st Army moves nor­ Russian line, it must be closed at thwestward, otherwise southwest­ first opportunity. ward. In case of a forced march, a Note that the army may not deviate second die roll may be necessary from its designated march route. If after having advanced the first units cannot advance along this hex. route (because it would create a gap in the Russian line, for example), they do not advance at all. Hence, the 1st Army never moves otherwise than northwestward or southwestward. •A corps must stop when entering a hex adjacent to an enemy unit. •Hexes containing impassable terrain (Masurian Lakes or all­sea) or a German corps may not be entered. Other than impassable, Example: A 6 has been rolled on the there are no terrain effects. march table for the 2nd Army which Terrain features on the map are becomes 5 because one corps, the for illustration only. XV., is disrupted. The army should •There is no stacking in Hindenburg’s hence move one hex (northward, Hour. There may never be more see 5.). The XXIII. Corps must than one corps in a hex. If a advance to close the gap in the retreat path is blocked by a Russian line. The XV. Corps may not friendly corps, the path cannot be advance for this would open used. another gap. The same is true for •The 1st Army sticks together. If the I. Corps, but it is blocked by a the advance of a corps would German unit anyway, as is the VI. 3 Corps. The XIII. Corps advances or no way toward Königsberg is one hex. open, retreat may go elsewhere, If two or more hexes are eligible but first priority is to move away destinations, make a random from the enemy. Corps’ that cannot decision where to go by rolling a retreat are removed from play. die. The victorious Russians may not advance. If they were the losers, Combat they do not have to retreat. If a (modified) movement result has Following the advance of the 2nd been rolled on the march table (3­ Army above, at least one 6) and at least one Russian corps is undisrupted and supplied Russian adjacent to a German corps after corps is adjacent to a German unit. movement, the entire army attacks Therefore, the entire army of five all adjacent enemy corps. corps will now attack the three Design Note: This represents the adjacent enemy units. The die roll impact that Russian units in the yields a 3 which is modified to 4 vicinity of a battle would have even since the Russians do have a four to if not directly engaged, for example three superiority in undisrupted by reinforcing their fellow corps’. Each unit adjacent to the combatants, threatening the enemy (I., XIII. and VI. Russian, I., enemy’s flanks etc. XVII. and XX. German Corps) rolls Roll one die. 1­3 means a German, for disruption. Afterward, the 4­6 a Russian victory. If any side Germans as the losers must retreat has more undisrupted and supplied one hex toward Königsberg. The corps participating than the other, Russians may not advance. modify the die roll by adding the number of surplus corps in case of Russian and subtracting it in case of German superiority. Note that all undisrupted and supplied corps of the 1st Army count, but only those undisrupted German corps adjacent to the enemy. After combat, roll one die for each involved corps adjacent to the enemy. On a result of 1­3, it is disrupted. Flip it to its reverse side. If already disrupted, it may take longer to rally (see 8.). If the Germans (“you”) lost the combat, all their corps’ adjacent to the enemy must retreat one hex toward the Königsberg area. If more than one hex is equally distant, you decide. If already there 4 4. 2ND ARMY MARCH AND commander of the I. Corps, was a COMBAT headstrong general who repeatedly acted quite differently from what 8th This phase is conducted similar to Army command had ordered him to 1st Army march and combat with do. two alterations: You may march all, some or none of •The 2nd Army is considered to be the 8th Army’s corps’ one hex. out of play until the August 19 Undisrupted units may forced march turn. It may neither march nor two hexes. Mark them with German attack on the first two turns. forced march markers for one turn To forestall a German invasion of during which they may not forced Russian Poland, the tsarist march again. government had deliberately A corps must stop after entering a neglected the infrastructure hex adjacent to an enemy unit. south of East Prussia. This Disrupted German (and only delayed the mobilization of the German) units may not move 2nd Army. adjacent to the enemy in the first •The 2nd Army’s march direction is place. always northward. The Russian starting hexes may neither be entered nor attacked, nor do zones of control (see 7.) have 5. 8th ARMY MOVEMENT AND any impact there. COMBAT German troops operating beyond the Masurian Lakes (see the Movement corresponding line on the map) may not move east of the easternmost Foot 1st Army corps or south of the At the beginning of each 8th Army southernmost 2nd Army corps. If phase, roll one die for the I. Corps. placed in such a position by Russian On a result of 6, the unit must, if movement, the Germans do not cut possible, move one hex. Roll again supply (see 6.) and must move to indicate the direction: 1 would be west and north, respectively, at first north, 2 northeast, 3 southeast, 4 opportunity. The I. Corps is south, 5 southwest, 6 northwest. exempted from this rule when There is no further advance. If activated by François. being adjacent to the enemy after Even for daring commanders like having moved, the I. Corps alone Hindenburg and Ludendorff, battles must attack all neighboring Russian of encirclement in areas so remote units. It may not participate in were hardly conceivable at that other movement (including by rail) time. or attacks this turn. Only if no 6 was rolled in the first place, the I. Rail Corps may be used just like any Each turn you may move one corps other German unit. by rail inside Germany over an Hermann von François, the unlimited number of hexes, but not 5 beyond the Masurian Lakes. At no 6. SUPPLY time, including start and finish, may this unit be adjacent to a Russian The German corps’ (and only they), corps, or enter a hex which has whether disrupted or undisrupted, lastly been occupied by the enemy.
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