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Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. 35 mm slides or 6"X 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. Accessing theUMI World’s Information since 1938 300 North Z eeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA Order Number 8820321 Operational art and the German command system in World War I Meyer, Bradley John, Ph.D. The Ohio State University, 1988 Copyright ©1088 by Meyer, Bradley John. All rights reserved. UMI 300 N. ZeebRd. Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 OPERATIONAL ART AND THE GERMAN COMMAND SYSTEM IN WORLD WAR I DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Bradley J. Meyer, B.A., M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 1988 Dissertation Committee: Approved by W. Murray A. R. Millett __ ___ Adviser A. Beyerchen Department of History^ Copyright by Bradley J. Meyer 1988 VITA January 8, 1957 ........Born - Miami, Florida 1979 .................. B. A., Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 1 9 8 1 ..................M. A., Ohio State University 1980-1983 .............. Teaching Assistant, Ohio State University Department of History 1983-1984 ..............DAAD Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst Dissertation Fellowship 1985 .................. Graduate Student Instructor, Ohio State University Department of History and Mershon Center 1986-1988 .............. John M. Olin Dissertation Fellow, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University FIELDS OF STUDY European Military History ......... Prof. Williamson Murray American Military History ......... Prof. Alan R. Millett Modern European History ............ Prof. Alan Beyerchen Japanese History .................. Prof. James Bartholomew - 11 - TABLE OF CONTENTS VITA ................................................... ii INTRODUCTION ............................................ 1 CHAPTER .................................................. PAGE I. THE INSTITUTIONAL ROLE AND HISTORY OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF .......................... 15 The Grossergeneralstab ................ 24 The Truppengeneralstab ................ 31 The Selection and Training of the General Staff Officer: The Kriegsakademie ............ 47 Probationary Period at the Great General Staff 57 History of the Modern General Staff ........ 65 II. OPERATIONAL ART AND THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN .... 85 III. WEISUNGSFUEHRUNG .......................... 123 IV. THE HENTSCH MISSION AND VOLIMACHT ........ 169 Second Army’s Decision to Retreat .......... 216 The Decision to Retreat from the Marne and the Campaign as a W h o l e .................... 225 The German Command and Control System During the Battle of the Marne and its Prelude . 239 V. THE ARTILLERY EXPERT: GEORG BRUCHMUELLER .... 266 The Artillery Career of Georg Bruchmueller 296 The Bruchmueller Process: Bruchmueller the Artillery Specialist ...................... 308 Bruchmueller Changes Command Arragements for the Artillery.............................. 311 Bruchmueller and Infantry/Artillery Cooperation................................ 315 Bruchmueller and Registration of Fire .... 318 The German Attack of March 21, 1 9 1 8 ........ 328 The Bruchmueller/Berendt Controversy .... 330 VI. FRITZ VON LOSSBERG, DER ABWEHRLOEWE .... 344 The Battle of the S o m m e .................... 367 - iii - TABLE OF CONTENTS CONT. Lossberg and the Chain of ComniEind........... 372 The Battle of A r r a s .......................... 376 CONCLUSIONS............................................ 389 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................ 407 IV - INTRODUCTION This work will make an argument of three steps. First, the German array in World War I had a highly developed concept of the level of warfare which it termed "operations." Second, there was a strong link between operations and certain German command practices: particularly the unusually powerful role of staff officers and the practice of giving generalized orders that allowed the subordinate a maximum of initiative. The Germans termed this practice Weisungsfuehrung or "leadership by directive." An important extension of the practice of Weisungfuehrung was the practice, in extraordinary circumstances, of granting a subordinate Vollmacht. Vollmacht means "complete power" in German, in civil life it can mean "power of attorney." In English we convey a meaning very similar to Vollmacht we we say someone has "carte blanche authority" to do something. In German military usage Vollmacht had a very specific meaning: giving a subordinate the right to issue directives {ffeisungen) in the name of a superior officer.i Thirdly, those command practices developed to complement operations: a strong staff system, Weisungsfuehrung, and Volmacht, helped the German army with problems that lay outside the realm of operations. In particular, - 1 — - 2 - these command practices helped the German army to develop new artillery tactics and new defensive tactics as the war went on. Operations is simply the art of winning campaigns. As such, it constitutes a middle area between tactics, which concerns itself with winning battles, and strategy, which concerns itself with winning wars. Operations is not simply a convenient classification, however. In operations, different sorts of considerations matter than with tactics and strategy. The particular effects of different weapons practically determine the structure of tactics. As one ascends the scale of generalization in military affairs,the specific characteristics of weapons becomes a less important factor. But time and space considerations are still important in operations— where forces are and how quickly they can move. At the level of strategy, time and space factors lessen in importance. The strategist is more concerned with the overall balance of forces and political considerations (both foreign policy and domestic) which bear on winning the war. Military historian John Keegan summarized the importance of operations for the German army: as follows: Even higher in the German army’s scale of values ...stood the cultivation of 'operational’ talent in their leaders. Operativ is an adjective which does not translate exactly into the English military vocabulary. Lying somewhere between 'strategic’ and 'tactical’, it describes the process of transforming paper plans into battlefield practice, against the tactical pressures of time which the strategist does not know, and has been regarded by the German army as the most difficult of the commander’s arts since it - 3 - was isolated by the great von Moltke in the 1860s. Taught, in so far as it can be taught, in his famous staff college courses, its traits were eagerly looked for in the performance of general staff candidates and its manifestation in practice, in wartime, was rewarded by swift promotion.% "The art of winning campaigns" is the standard definition of operations. Graf Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff 1858-1888 ("the elder Moltke"), had a system of operations, a general concept of how he wanted operations to go apart from the accidents of particular dispositions of forces, the terrain, and so on. Then von Moltke would adopt his general scheme to the particulars of a given situation. But Moltke founded his system of operations on quite concrete aspects of the military environment in which he operated. For instance, von Moltke operated in an age of increased firepower, which made the tactical defensive very strong. Therefore, the strength of the tactical defense became an element of his system of operations. Von Moltke built much of his system around the necessity of avoiding frontal attacks on his enemies in so far as possible. Instead he tried for flank attacks. At the same time, Moltke recognized that the strength of the tactical defense made isolated portions of his own forces relatively less vulnerable to enemy attacks. Therefore he could afford to maneuver his own forces more boldly— while he was seeking for an opportunity to flank the enemy forces. Increased strength of the — 4 - tactical defensive could work for the attacker as well as the defender.3 In his book The German Army. Herbert Rosinski gives an excellent synopsis of Moltke’s operational system. It is well worth working through that synopsis in some detail here. The increase in the strength of the tactical defensive mentioned above led Moltke to "offset the firepower of his opponent by concentrating superior firepower and general tactical pressure by a converging attack on front and flank.Moltke would