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The Night Operation on the Passchendaele Ridge, 2Nd December 1917

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The Night Operation on the Passchendaele Ridge, 2Nd December 1917 Centre for First World War Studies A Moonlight Massacre: The Night Operation on the Passchendaele Ridge, 2nd December 1917 by Michael Stephen LoCicero Thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of History and Cultures College of Arts & Law June 2011 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Abstract The Third Battle of Ypres was officially terminated by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig with the opening of the Battle of Cambrai on 20 November 1917. Nevertheless, a comparatively unknown set-piece attack – the only large-scale night operation carried out on the Flanders front during the campaign – was launched twelve days later on 2 December. This thesis, a necessary corrective to published campaign narratives of what has become popularly known as „Passchendaele‟, examines the course of events from the mid-November decision to sanction further offensive activity in the vicinity of Passchendaele village to the barren operational outcome that forced British GHQ to halt the attack within ten hours of Zero. A litany of unfortunate decisions and circumstances contributed to the profitless result. At the tactical level, a novel hybrid set-piece attack scheme was undermined by a fatal combination of snow- covered terrain and bright moonlight. At the operational level, the highly unsatisfactory local situation in the immediate aftermath of Third Ypres‟ post- strategic phase (26 October-10 November) appeared to offer no other alternative to attacking from the confines of an extremely vulnerable salient. Perhaps the most tragic aspect of the affair occurred at the political and strategic level, where Haig‟s earnest advocacy for resumption of the Flanders offensive in spring 1918 was maintained despite obvious signs that the initiative had now passed to the enemy and the crisis of the war was fast approaching. Recordabor Semper For Sergeant H.J. Cuff 8th Canadian MG Company, Captain C. Cundall MC 2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, Private F.J. Wakely 2nd Royal Berkshire Regiment, Private A. Cooksey 2nd King‟s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, Private H. Cairns, Private W. Gilmour 16th Highland Light Infantry, 2nd Lieutenant W.T. Ridgway, 2nd Lieutenant W.B. MacDuff 11th Border Regiment and 2nd Lieutenant J.E. Baskott 193rd Siege Battery RGA. Acknowledgements I should like to express my gratitude to the following institutions and people in the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Canada and the United States for their generous support and assistance with this study: the extremely helpful staffs at the National Archives, British Library, National Portrait Gallery, Imperial War Museum, Royal Air Force Museum, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Churchill College Archives, Prince Consort‟s Library (Aldershot), Isle of Wight Public Record Office, Memorial Museum Passchendaele 1917 and US Army Heritage and Education Center; individuals in the UK: Dr Joanne Coyle, Brenda Eastaff, Alan Ridgway, Sue Floyd, Andrew Arnold, Chris Baker, Paul Reed, Clive Harris, Matthew Lucas, Jon Cooksey, Chris, Marianne, Julian and Olivia Barker, Captain Christopher Page RN (Rtd.), Dr James Beach, Dr Spencer Jones, Dr Lucian and Aurelia Pascut; in France and Belgium: Colonel Jack Sheldon (Rtd), Bart, Heidi, Wouter and Amber Vandeputte, Josue Denoo, Andre Winne, Wilfred and Rose Anne Caroloen Vierkelst, Emiel and Alice Depuydt; in Canada and the United States: Dr George Gilmour, Dr Richard Wertime, Dr Geoffrey Haywood, George Nafziger, Richard Baumgartner, Barbara Kulp, Marianne Brochhagen, Lieutenant- Colonel Lou Brown US Army (Rtd.), Dr Kevin Brown, Jon Kulaga, Tim Kuntz, Jeff Holder, Ron Turfitt, Dr David and Helen Cuff, Dr Janice Florey; my University of Birmingham colleagues: Professor Peter Simkins MBE, Dr Bob Bushaway, Dr Steffen Prauser, Dr Armin Grünbacher, Dr Michael Snape, Air Commodore Dr Peter Gray RAF (Rtd), Major-General Dr David Zabecki US Army (Rtd.), Dr Alun Thomas, Rob Thompson, Ross Mahoney, Peter Hodgkinson, Dave Molineux, Derek Clayton, Stuart Mitchell, Victoria Henshaw, Aimée Fox, Liz Morris, John Freeman, Nigel Dorrington, Andy Lonergan and James Gordon-Cumming; my thesis advisors Dr John Bourne and Professor Gary Sheffield. And finally, a very special thanks to Father Philip DeRea MSC, Stephen and Sylvia DeRea, my parents Salvatore and Eileen, brother Scott and YZ. Contents Notes p. 1 Abbreviations & Terms 2 Introduction 5 Chapter One: Antecedents 1.1 Setting the Stage 15 1.2 Aspinall‟s Appreciation 27 1.3 German Defensive Measures 39 1.4 Tactical Controversy 54 1.5 A New Zealand Gambit 70 1.6 Preparations & Preliminaries 72 Chapter Two: Divisional Instructions & Orders 2.1 Standard Operating Procedure & Formulaic Approach 86 2.2 8th Division 92 2.3 32nd Division 112 2.4 Loss of Teall Cottage 147 2.5 Final Hours 149 Chapter Three: A Moonlight Massacre 3.1 Assembly 155 3.2 A Moonlight Massacre 188 3.3 25 Brigade 191 3.4 97 Brigade 202 Chapter Four: Dawn & Dénouement 4.1 Loss of Southern Redoubt & Hill 52 228 4.2 Dawn 239 4.3 25 Brigade 240 4.4 97 Brigade 253 4.5 Dénouement 277 Chapter Five: Counterblow & Aftermath 5.1 Counterblow 289 5.2 Aftermath 313 5.3 Tactical Debrief 338 Contents Conclusion C.1 Operational, Strategic & Political Consequences 362 C.2 Costs 379 C.3 Epilogue 384 Bibliography 388 Contents Illustrations Plates Chapter 1 1.1 General Sir Henry Rawlinson p. 21 1.2 Brigadier-General C.F. Aspinall 29 1.3 Venison Trench 41 1.4 Northern Redoubt in the summer of 1917 46 1.5 KTK Headquarters 52 1.6 Major-General C.D. Shute 56 1.7 Major-General W.C.G. Heneker 61 1.8 German Pillboxes Flanders 1917 63 1.9 Brigadier-General C. Coffin VC 75 1.10 Brigadier-General C.A. Blacklock 77 1.11 German 4.2 cm howitzer 82 Chapter 2 2.1 Dummy Figure 94 2.2 Schematic Drawing of 32nd Division 123 communications infrastructure 2.3 Map overlay 132 2.4 Reconstruction 133 2.5 33rd Battalion MGC Sector Model 146 2.6 Site of Teall Cottage from site of 149 Northern Redoubt Chapter 3 3.1 Passchendaele December 1917 157 Contents 3.2 Private F.J. Wakely 161 3.3 Lieutenant-Colonel N.M.S. Irwin 164 3.4 Lieutenant J. Nettleton 168 3.5 Private H. Cairns 176 3.6 Sergeant (later 2nd Lieutenant) W.T. 179 Ridgway 3.7 Exert Farm from the air 193 3.8 Panorama looking east from site of 195 Southern Redoubt 3.9 Northern Redoubt and environs in the 201 summer of 1917 3.10 A.M. Burnie‟s ink drawing of 16th HLI 213 advancing from the jumping-off line at Zero 3.11 Site of 11th Border Regiment jumping-off position 214 3.12 Lieutenant-Colonel T.F. Tweed 216 3.13 Watt Brothers 218 3.14 Lieutenant-Colonel J. Inglis 220 3.15 Wallemolenstraat from Tournant Farm 224 looking north 3.16 & 3.17 Panoramas from Vat Cottage Ridge 227 Chapter 4 4.1 Lieutenant-General Sir Claud W. Jacob 229 4.2 Lieutenant-General Sir Alymer Hunter-Weston 253 4.3 Captain J.A. Alexander 256 4.4 Brigadier-General F.W. Lumsden VC 266 4.5 Map overlay 286 4.6 Panorama looking south from site of Mullet 288 Farm toward Vat Cottage Ridge Contents Chapter 5 5.1 Lieutenant-Colonel A.J. Scully 294 5.2 Private W. Gilmour 317 5.3 RE 8 of No.21 Squadron 319 5.4 Polderhoek Chateau grounds from the air 333 5.5 Observation denied 346 Conclusion C.1 Map overlay 367 C.2 Passchendaele winter 1917-18 378 C.3 2nd Lieutenant W.B. Macduff 382 C.4 Private R.T. Hogg 382 C.5 2nd Lieutenant R.H. Reid 382 C.6 Junction of Haringstraat and Goudbergstraat 387 11 August 2004 Contents Text Maps Chapter 2 2.1.1 8th Division: Dispositions Morning 150 1 December Chapter 5 5.1.1 Polderhoek Chateau 330 Tables Table A 8th Division Losses 379 Table B 32nd Division Losses 381 Contents Maps Bound at end of Appendices and Maps volume 1. Stages of the Third Battle of Ypres 2. Second Battle of Passchendaele 3. Passchendaele Salient 4. Second Army Objective Map 5. Abstract: 8th Division MG Barrage Scheme 6. 8th Division: Field Artillery Barrage Scheme 7. 32nd Division MG Barrage Scheme 8. 32nd Division Area Concentration Barrage Scheme 9. 8th Division: Dispositions at Zero 10. 32nd Division: Dispositions at Zero 11. 8th Division: Dispositions at Dawn 12. 8th Division: Ultimate Position Reached 13. 8th Division: Situation Evening 3 December 14. 32nd Division: Situation Evening 5 December 15. Annotated Google Earth image of Passchendaele north vicinity and Vat Cottage Ridge 16. Annotated Google Earth image of Westroosebeke and southern environs Notes Some of the stylistic conventions found in this thesis have been adopted from the relevant British Official History.1 Officers are described by the rank they held during the winter of 1917-18. Troop and place locations are normally written from right to left of the respective British and German forces. Thoroughfares running through the frontline are described with the names of towns or villages in British hands taking precedence, thus: „Passchendaele – Westroosebeke Road‟. OH emulation of standard BEF conventions in regard to distinguishing numbers of Army, Corps, Division and Brigade has also been adhered to, thus: Second Army, II Corps, 2nd Division, 2 Brigade.
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