The United States Atomic Army, 1956-1960 Dissertation
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INTIMIDATING THE WORLD: THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ARMY, 1956-1960 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Paul C. Jussel, B.A., M.M.A.S., M.S.S. * * * * * The Ohio State University 2004 Dissertation Committee Approved by Professor Allan R. Millett, Advisor Professor John R. Guilmartin __________________ Professor William R. Childs Advisor Department of History ABSTRACT The atomic bomb created a new military dynamic for the world in 1945. The bomb, if used properly, could replace the artillery fires and air-delivered bombs used to defeat the concentrated force of an enemy. The weapon provided the U.S. with an unparalleled advantage over the rest of the world, until the Soviet Union developed its own bomb by 1949 and symmetry in warfare returned. Soon, theories of warfare changed to reflect the belief that the best way to avoid the effects of the bomb was through dispersion of forces. Eventually, the American Army reorganized its divisions from the traditional three-unit organization to a new five-unit organization, dubbed pentomic by its Chief of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor. While atomic weapons certainly had an effect on Taylor’s reasoning to adopt the pentomic organization, the idea was not new in 1956; the Army hierarchy had been wrestling with restructuring since the end of World War II. Though the Korean War derailed the Army’s plans for the early fifties, it returned to the forefront under the Eisenhower Administration. The driving force behind reorganization in 1952 was not ii only the reoriented and reduced defense budget, but also the Army’s inroads to the atomic club, formerly the domain of only the Air Force and the Navy. But investigation into formerly classified government records indicates the effectiveness was dependent upon the adoption of three essential elements: mobility, firepower, and communications. Mobility complemented dispersion and allowed concentration at the desired place. Firepower, especially tactical atomic weapons but not limited to them, amplified the ability of dispersed units to defeat or destroy an enemy. To coordinate all of these efforts, a new level of communications was essential to tie all of the units together. The evidence indicates that the pentomic organization was neither based on the Eisenhower administration policy of massive retaliation nor solely dependant on the atomic weapons for its effectiveness. Rather, the organization evolved over time through a gradual process of experimentation and continuous dialogue among senior Army leaders. More was required than experimentation and dialogue. General Taylor ordered the pentomic reorganization, but failed to support fiscally the necessary developmental requirements. Scientific progress did not match expectations; equipment was not sufficiently advanced to base an organization on the expectation of its arrival. As a final failure, the majority of the Army only found fault with the new organization and had little confidence in it. Within four years of its implementation, the pentomic organization was discredited. The Army returned to its traditional three-unit division organization with much relief. iii For My Son iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS No work of this nature is completed alone; my thanks go to many people. Dr. Allan R. Millett carefully guided me through this process and patiently abided my clipped military writing style. Dr. Brian McAllister Linn gave me the idea for this work and very graciously provided support. Dr. Robert Cameron, the Armor Center Historian, Fort Knox, KY pointed me to many of my initial resources. Mrs. Lorraine Allen, Armor Center Research Librarian, was untiring in her efforts to find the obscure references I needed. Mrs. Dianne Atcher, International Military Student Office, Fort Knox, provided much assistance in tracking down the extent of allied officer involvement in Armor Center training in the fifties. Mrs. Ginny Navarro, Combined Arms Research Library Special Collections Librarian, Fort Leavenworth, KS, provided guidance and direction while searching through the classified stacks for material. Ms. Wendy Rejan, U.S. Army Communications and Electronics Command Historian, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, provided me unfettered access to their records. At Carlisle, Mr. Randy Rakers and Mr. Adam Priester, from the Military History Institute’s Classified Records Section, were absolutely invaluable in searching their stacks for material that pertained to the pentomic v times. Mr. James Wendt, Department of Energy, graciously traveled to Carlisle to declassify many documents and reviewed this manuscript to ensure I violated no regulations. Mr. Richard Baker and Mr. Mike Monahan frequently focused my wanderings through the MHI library. Mr. Dave Keogh, MHI, provided access to the oral histories and personal papers of many senior leaders who occupied positions of responsibility in the fifties. My fellow officers in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations frequently provided encouragement, a kind word, and a cold beer to further my efforts. Finally, my wife, Debbie, patient and nurturing as always, provided the necessary support to finish this project; without her it would not have been possible. vi VITA 24 November 1956 . Born – Elisabeth, New Jersey 1979 . B.A., History, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA 1990 . M.M.A.S., Military History, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 1991 . M.M.A.S., Theater Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 2000 . M.S.S., National Strategy, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA PUBLICATIONS Research Publication 1. Paul C. Jussel, “Operational Raids: Cavalry in the Vicksburg Campaign, 1862-1863,” USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1990. 2. Paul C. Jussel, “Corps Tactical Deception: Who’s Fooling Whom?” School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1990. 3. Paul C. Jussel, “Operational Implications of Pivots of Maneuver,” School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSAC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1991. 4. Paul C. Jussel, “In or Out of the Box: A Leader’s Creative Thinking,” USAWC, Carlisle, PA, 2000. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract . ii Dedication . iv Acknowledgments . v Vita . vii Chapters: Introduction . .1 1. The U.S. Army and the Challenge of Atomic Warfare . 9 2. The Army’s New Look . 29 3. The New Division . 78 4. The Army’s Altar of Technology . 122 5. The Pentana Study in Practice: Reorganizing the Army . 164 6. The Past is Present, Again . 206 Bibliography . 214 viii INTRODUCTION I grew up in an old, established neighborhood, just outside of New York City. Most of the houses were Victorian in architecture, large and very detailed. Our family was large so there was always plenty of activity. Our left-side neighbor also had a large family; we all played together. But that neighbor had something we did not: a fall-out shelter in his basement. In the early sixties, our young heads filled with images of aliens from outer space or black-hatted cowboys, the basement shelter was our special fort protecting us from every invasion or evil villain. It never occurred to me to ask why there was a reinforced concrete block fall-out shelter in my neighbor’s basement. It seemed a natural thing to my child’s mind. But why would my neighbor, an executive in a large corporation and a seemingly rational man, have a fully equipped, stocked shelter in his basement? What caused this man, and many others to go to such trouble and expense to protect his family from a Soviet attack? What caused this man, and many others, to believe that the nation’s armed forces would be unable to protect the homeland in the eventuality of The Bomb? 1 The dramatic postwar change from conventional to nuclear warfare forced the U.S. Army to find a new paradigm to fight and win the nation’s wars. This study will examine the Army’s 1956 decision to reorganize the core of its combat capability – the division – into a nuclear-capable organization based on a “pentomic” concept of five battle groups. The organizational change was intended to allow the divisions to fight more effectively on an atomic or non-atomic battlefield anywhere in the world. The Army spent millions of dollars developing the organization and purchasing the equipment to support it. Active divisions finished the reorganization quickly and National Guard and Army Reserve divisions completed the change by 1960. Yet, as presidential administrations changed, the Army had not resolved the basic questions of appropriate divisional organization. To make matters worse, the paradigm had shifted away from reliance on massive nuclear retaliation and the pentomic division seemed inadequate. In 1961, Army Chief of Staff General George H. Decker concluded the pentomic division “was not ‘a suitable vehicle for combat’” and abolished it.1 The background of this organizational change has significant similarities to current transformations in the Army’s warfighting capabilities. As they struggle with doctrine, organization, and equipment, today’s Army leaders face a similar challenge in institutional adaptation: reorganizing the divisions for more rapid deployment against potential post-Cold War adversaries.2 In many respects, the pentomic division owed its origins to President Eisenhower’s promise “to cut federal spending, to eliminate the budget deficit and to reduce taxes.” After his electoral victory, Eisenhower set about to fulfill his promise. Firmly believing that “a free and expanding economy” would maintain American “productivity and political liberty,” Ike refused to allow the federal budget to expand 2 beyond the limits imposed by Congress and reduced the inherited fiscal year (FY) 1954 budget by nearly $5 billion. One of his primary goals was to establish a comprehensive national security strategy and establish spending priorities for the “Long Haul” of national security.3 Eisenhower was opposed to the national economic focus on defense and wanted to turn the economic sector to consumer goods and international development.