hi.. ":Ui('-(t> >it! •/..'/><* ttirhyft-.rti.r. ,V./iV /../.. '.i,iuith-ir»rh ti>i it iktfu a././ V^ciocc1, primarily o.. J trrnalation of) 1 r;jT.^rB^i>G-- viic cc '.-virkllch v;ar,by / imade bj auf.h:r uf hhie article. ; .• . ... _ , , . , , . . , , , , , t . , '.,;",•;,••'• •; ' . •' •<. ' '.' ' 7 " ! r " '• " ' ' "';/ ...... ,, ./ i ii ,V I it i l! II >t •< . •ili'iii I i ii I, „ „ .. II . •-. >.i) II ;. .. .i >t it H it li it ,f)i u ,i Hi, il-ul CODE; tflWBER , IR—1933 I N D IV ID U A ij *RES EAR OH STUDY A CRITICAL AKALY8I& OP TtiE BATTLE OP TANNENBERO •••i; " . • : , (baaed primarily on a translation of nTANNENEERQ--wie es wirklieh war11 General Max Hoffmann) Submitted by \ THIS SOLUTICM MtiST BS RiSTURf^ED FOR FILE BY 5:00 >!W,, OUTHE DATS SKOSN •PLEABB PLACE Y'jUR NAME ON COVZR PACE HiE WRNI1W. FOR FU.E LBUT DO NOV PLACE VGUK 1 0» SOLUTION IWEif WRESTING A RDVIEff. The Command and General Staff School .'.}••• Leavenworth'' , •Kansa ' s Fort Leftv>nworth, Kansas, May IB; 1933 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director Second Year Class, The Com mand and Oeneral Staff School, Fort Leavehworth, Kansas. A:Crjitioal Anaiysis :o£ the Battle of Tan enberg (based primarily oh•aftranslation of "Tannenberg wie es wirklioh war" by Max Hoffmann) I, PAPERS ACCOMPANYING: 1. A Bibliography for this study. 2. Maps: (1) Strategic Map--East Prussia, Campaign SO $d^&hj6e;J^^ 'Armiejst &) J'JBi^^le'j^of'^^ia%7'-F^a)^enjaii 4) !'$ei^u ', i JL v J L * ^ ' ', :; • '• J > (6) Attaok on Russian Center, August 26-28, 1914. .;.,... ;.-,...•, • (7) Final destruction of Seoond Army August 29-30, 1914. 3. Appendices. (1) Translation of "Tannenberg, wie es wirklioh war, Oen»Max Hoffmann. II. THE STlJDY PRESENTED. — A Critical analysis of the Eattle of Tannenberg, based primarily on a trans lation of "Tannenberg, wie es wirklioh war," by Max Hoff mann. Ill, HISTORICAL FACTS. OPPOSINQ FORCES. Eighth Oe^man Army was commanded originally by Qeneral Max von Prittwitz and Gaffroh, Qeneral von V/alderaee was his chief of staff, Qeneral Grunert was deputy chief of staff and Colonel Max Hoffmann was 0-3 in charge of operations. Subse quently Oeneral Von Hindenburg beoame army commander and Oeneral Ludendorff was his ohief of,staff. Oarman units consisted oft -1 I Corps-*-General von Francois, commanding ' I Reserve Corps--General von Below, commanding XVII Corps—General'•.'von Maokensen, commanding XX Corps"-General von Soholtz, oommandlng Ill Reserve Division--Oeneral von Morgen, oom mand ing * ' * ' • > '•'i'U-r' Landwehr Division—Von der Goltz, commanding 1st Cav. Division--Oeneral Breohb, oommandlng Garrison troops from the fortresses of Koenlge berg, arid those along the Vistula River. The total strength was equivalent to 13 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division (1) The Russian foroeft ooneisted of two armies known as the Mjemen or First Army and the Warsaw or Second Army, and were constituted 8s follows: Russian First Army—Qeneral Rennenkampf, commanding III Corpa--Oenoral Jepantsohin, commanding IV Corps--General AllJew, commanding XX Corps-^General Smirnoff, commanding 1st Guard Cay Div--General Kasme.kow, commanding 2d Guard Cav Dlv--Qeneral Rauoh, commanding 1st Cav Di7—General Gourke, commanding 2d Cav Div--General Naohitsohewanakl, commanding 3d Cav Div--General Bellegarde, commanding 1st IiidOav Brig '•• .. , • . • , ... '.•.•; , . , . ., Rug8Ian Second Army--General Samsonbw, commanding I Corps—General Art am on ov, oc sanding II Oorpif'--General Soheidemtnn, commanding (this 1. (14-93,94,95) (15-67) 16-appendix 18) -2 Rua a Ian 3eo ond Virmy• (0 ont inued) Corps was later detROhed from Second Army) VI Corps--Oeneral Blagewjesohtsohenaki, commanding XIII 0orp8--Qonerai kluJew, commanding XV Oorps--0eneral Marbos, commanding XXIII CorpR--Oeneral Kondratowitsoh, commanding 4th CaV;Dlv--6enerai Toipyge, commanding 6tlii Cav biV--Qeneral von^ RoppV ooijimandiiig 15th Cav Div—General Jjjxindirow, ooramanding 1st Rifle Brig The aotual strength of the Russian First Army waa"86 battalions of first line infantry and 120 squad rons of cavalry. The Second Army paper strength was 164 battaliona^ of infantry and'110'squadrons of oavalry. (2) PERSONNSL. The personnel of these two forces stand out in marked contrast to each other. The German forces were composed almost entirely of the population of East Prussia, were trained thoroughly and led by effi cient officer and non-commissioned officer personnel. These people were to fight on and for the territory in which vhey lived. They were rather robust and illiteracy was negligible. The Russians on the other hand were about 60£ illiterate, 75# of the N.O.O's were oonsorlpts of little service and therefore inefficient! The Russian units were composed of two-thirds Russians and one-third subjeot raoes, auoh as Letts, Baits, and Poles* On mo bilization, units were filled up by looal reservists. The German units were striotly territorial* (3) ARMAMENT AND EQ^IPMEHT. The outstanding su 2. (1-61,62) (7-2) (8-48) 3* (1-19,20) (10-4) (8-122,123) (18-Vol II Annex 2) -3 periority oetween the o on bat elements of the Russians and the Oermana was In artillery, especially in heavy artil lery, the proportion of guns to rifles in the twc armies beings Russians 1 gun to 202 riflesj Oermans 1 gun to 166 rifles. In heavy artillery the superiority in favor of ehe Germana' was 10 to 1. There also was a deoided defioienoy in reserve armament in the Russian army. In machine gun equlpmont both sides were on a par. The Ger mans generally were superior with respect to signal equip ment and certainly as to its use. The airplanes avail able to the Russians were few. The Germans on the other hand were superior both as to planes and as to their use. Due to'leok of roads and rai?vroQds on the Russian fron tier the Russians were decidedly hRndioapppd wnlle i . :., . . . , • V - ' • • Qern-in8 had an excellent road and railroad net available \ "• , ' •• • • for their purposes within the province of East Prussia, (4) THE RUSSIAN PLAN. General Jillnsky, who had been chief of staff of the Russian army until 1913, had made a military convention with France whereby Russia was pledged to put 800,000. men in the field on the 15th day of mobilization. This arrangement put a tremendous strain on the oumbrbus RuWsian war machine and also put a strain on the Russian Headquarters staff when it began to make decisions in a stabe of nervous flurry* It pro videdialso for ah offensive simultaneously with a.thrust against the Austriana. To make matters worse the French incessantly pressed the Russian War Offioe to do some thing to relieve the German pressure on the French and 4i(l-20,21,22) (17-40,41) (8-126) to do It quiokly. And so the Russian invasion of East Prussia, while it did not begin before the promised time, nevertheless began before it was ready. (5) :,..••' The Pi^st and Seoond Armies were to be conoeh fcrated along the froritier vinder the ooiranand of General Jilinaki and to be launched against East Prussia. Rennen kampf, oommariding the, First Army, was to advance agaihsv the eastern tip of isast Prussia, drawing upon himself the German defending forces, then two days later, Samsonow was to oroaa the southern frontier and bestride the Ger man1 8 rear outting them off from the Vistula, The plan basically was sound and its failure lay not in its concep tion but in it8 execution and in the failure to provide the essentials for the execution of suoh a plan prior to the outbreak of war, i. e* railroads, roads and satisfac tory mobilisation plans. (6) THB GERMAN PLAN. In accordance with the von Sohlief'f en plan the German Eighth Army was committed to the strategio defensive. Graf von Sohlieffen's oonoep tion of this defense was to so use the small German army in East Prussia and the advantages of the terrain as to be able to strike a strong blow with the entire army against whichever foroes appeared first and then to turn on any forces that- subsequently arrived on the Prussian frontier. One specifio caution was demanded of the lead er of the Eighth Army "not to permit himself to be bottled up in the fortress of Koenigsberg.• (7) POPULAR LEGENDS* There are two rather wide spread legend8 oonoerning the battle. One pertains to 6. (16-7,8,9,20) (19-103,104) 6. (3-23) (1-15,14,17,39,40,41,127,130) (14-19,20) 7. (19-106) (20-7) -5 the romantic picture of an old general who, as the hobby of his years of retirement, spent his entire time In de vising a gigantic trap for a future Russian Invasion, ex ploring paths through and sounding the bottom of the marshes In rrhlo'h the Russian hordes were to be engulfed and then when war came, carrying his dream to. fulfill ment* The seoond legend was that of a masterly plan of a seoond oannae, conceived and dictated in the train that was carrying IiUdendorff to pick up hie nominal master en route to East Prussia. (8) THE PRELUDE AT QUMBItiNBN. l On August 17, Rennen kampf crossed the eastern frontier with six and one half divisions and five cavalry divisions. The problem of meet ing this thrust together with a possible thrust from the south shortly thereafter long had been studied and Sohlief fen's solution had oeen that of utilizing the natural ob staoles of the country especially the Maeurlan Lakes to strike hard and with full strength at whichever Russian army came first within reach and then turn against the other* But Prlttwitz, unwilling to rely on Landwehr and garrison troopa to supplement the natural obstacles in delaying Samsonow, left the XX Corps under General Soholtz on the southern border to parry Samaonow's'threat. He concentrated the remainder of the Eighth Army consisting of seven divisions and one cavalry division, to oppose Rennenkampf• (9) ' Von Prittwitz and his chief of staff/von Wal dersee, had a mistaken conception of the disposition of the Russian First Army. They were of the opinion that e. (20-90) (14-1,2) 0. (20-7,8) (19-105) •6 fie army would advanoe with the bulk of its force south of Rominten Heide and that therefore the bulk of the First Army would be south jbf theKonigeberg-Kowno railroad, A8 a resuit of this jb'lie XVII Corps under von Mcokensen made a frontal attaoti: and1 >»as sevdrely repulsed, although the wings we're successful. (10) Rennenkampf was on the verge of ordering a re treat to save his own center from encirclement and was be ing iiri>ort>uned by his staff to do ao when next morning he found that the Germans werawithdrawing instead. For on the day that the ba ttle of Guwbinnen t ook place 3ans onow had reached ^he southern frontier, hurried on by Jilinsky. Hia troops were tired and hungry, their transport inoom plete and the supply services In chao*. He had With hini eight divisions and three cavalry divisions, while two more divisions were following on. Prittwitz, having been in formed of the situation on the south front, became unnerved, although the XX Corps was not worried* That evening two staff officers, General Grunert and Lt. Col. Hoffmann, were talking outside their office in the headquarters at Neiden burg, when Prittwitz appeared and called them into his offloe. His ohlef of staff, Oraf Waldersee was there. Prlttwltz saidt "Qentlemen, I suppose that you have heard the news from the southern front? The army is breaking off the battle and retiring 'behind the ^is tula.*1 (li) Both junior staff officers protested, urging that the Gumbinnen thrust should first be driven home, that there was adequate time and that, in any oase, a pre bipitate flight without fighting would give Samsonow, ibi (14-8,0,10) (20-9,10) 11. (14-11,12,13) (3-80,21) (20-11,12,13) (1-127-130) .7 who was muoh nearer the Vie tula, the ohanoe of cutting off the main German foroes. Pribtwitz, however, curtly told them that the decision rested with him and not with them. He then left the oYfibe leaving them to argue ^nth* Walderse© and !eventTially to persxmde him to take bolder measures. It was deoided that, to gain time and maneuver room, an attaok should be launched against SamsonowfB left or western flank. And for this purpose three divi sions should be railed back from the Oumbinnen area to reinforce the XX Corps, while the remainder of the force there/ the I Reserve and the XVII Corps; should retreat westwards by road. |)n returning to his office Prittwltz agreed to this nove and oanoeled his previous order to retire behind the Vistula. A'ne new orders for the concen tration of the Eighth Army were as followst The XX Corps shall be oonoentrated behind its right wing in the vicinity of Hohenstein. The I Corps and the 3d Reserve Division shall be sent by train, the first from Instorburg and the latter froM Angerburg to the right wing of the XX Corps. The main reserves of Konigsberg to oover the entrain ing of tho X Corps and then to go to the forti fied line of Pregel—-Daime. '•;' Th" e • . , •I • • • • 'Reserv • • . e • Corps an" d > •th • : • : ,e • XVI• / : . v : I. . 'Oorp• . • • s. to g' - o direo•:•; • • • : • t baok to the west. Here was the foundation for the Tannenberg man euver « (18) CHANQE IN COMMAND. The next day as a result of 18. (20-14,16,16) (3-21,22) (14-13) -a the f avorabie reporte from the various Units and the re port that his troops had disengaged themselves from con tact with the RUBSlan First Army, Prittwitz and the staff grew rather cheerful. Samsohow'also had come to a stend still with hie forces. But on the 22d, when headquarters had been moved to Mulhausen, a bombshell was exploded by •. • \ . . N •• • • /,- ••••,• •• • a telegram whioh announced a special train was on its way with a new Gosranander-in-chief and a new chief of staff on board--General von Hindenburg and Oenoral Ludendorff. Half an hour later came the delayed telegram which told of the recall of General Prittwitz and Graf Waldersee. Not until later did the astonished staff dlscov er the clue to this dramatic upset. It lay in the fact that while Prittwitz was out of the office during the dis cussion on the 20th he had telephoned not only to Macken sen and to the Lines of Communication authorities to tell them thpt he was going to retire behind the Vistula, but had telephoned also to the Supreme Command at Coblenz. He not only told Moltke that he was going to retire but that he could hold at the Vistula only if he were given rein foroements. To crown his broken-nerve folly, General Prifctwitz forgot to tell his staff and so prevented them from telling Moltke of the change in plan* Moltke, too, must have lost his nerve, for even when he talked with Corps commanders he was reassured that things wore going along all right. But Moltke immediately arranged for Ludendorff to be the new chief of staff and his nominal superior to be von Hindenburg, and arranged to send rein forvements, taking them from his main effort. Ludendor/f arrived at Coblenz on the 226, learned of the situation In Bast Prussia, dispatohed his initial orders directly to the Corps Commanders of the Eighth Army, o&ught the train for his new command and picked up his ottranander, Hindenburg, onthe way at Hanover* Let us pause to contemplate this delightful and arausing picture of the Gorman system of command. The staff officer is chosen first and alone consulted, while the figurehead oommander waits at Hanover. The staff of ficer telegraphing his orders before the new oousnander knew what it was all about. But the .lest was that the plan already had been framed and the necessary movements made by an even more junior offleer/ Lieutenant Ooloyel Hoffmann, chief of the operations section of the Eighth Army. (13) The calculated daring of the plan owed much to an earlier experience of Colonel Hoffmann* He had been an observer during the Russo-Japanese War and knew about how Rennenkampf and Samsanow had boxed each other's ears on the railway platform at Mukden* Therefore, in his judgment, Rennenkampf would be in no hurry to help 8am 8onow by pressing on from Qumblnnen* He also had learned the incredible carelessness of Russian methods and this knowledge led him in August 1014 to aooept as authentic, the intercepted Pussian radio orders sent out in the clear, whereas his superiors were distrustful of then and thought them to be artful deception* And so through out tho battle German headquarters intercepted complete orders, plans, and naroh tables, not only from the two Russian Armies but also from Jilinski'a headquarters an<2 were continuously advised concerning the movements of 13, (20-16-21) (3-23,26,26) (14-14-16) (22-8-14) -10 the bulk of the Russian troops* (14) The fulfillment of Hoffmann's plan was hindered by Ludendorff'fl initial orders. In order to amputate Prlttwlts's oontrol, Ludendorff had! telephoned from Cob lenz to the several corps directing them to act indepen dently until he arrived* The I Reserve and the XVII Corps on Rennenkampf»s front utilized this order to take a drty of rest in their retreat westward. Another chock on rapidity was that Eighth Army headquarters had fco move back.to Marlenburg to meet the new commanders. On the 23d| Ludendorff was pleasantly surprised to find that the movements already In progress fitted In with his half formed plan and ha confirmed Hoffmann'• arrangements* The next day it became olearer thai; Rennenkampf was not mov ing forvard In pursuit and Ludendorff enlarged tho plan by accelerating the retirement of the I Reserve Corps,so that it could strike Samsonow in flank* Then on the 26th, intercepted radio messages showed him the slowness of Rennenkampf's movements and he began to think that he could use the XVII Corps also, leaving only the cavalry to watch and delay Rennenkampf* Thereby he might strike hard &t not one but both of Samsonow's flanks and bring off a double envelopment* Unfortunately for this matured plan, even forced marches could not regain the loit day of rest* (16) THB RU38IAH SITUATION. Sansonow In the mean time had been staggering forward, driven on by telegraphic lashes from Jllinsky, who had jumped to the conclusion that the Germans were doing what Prlttwltt had contea 14. (3-27,28,35) (20-74,76) 16* (20-20,21,22-29) (3-26) (1-147-161) (21-147,146) (22-16-22) -U plated,—1, e* retreating to the Vistula* And in driving Sansonow on to cut them off, Jlllnsky not only neglected to hasten Rennenlcampf, but even diverted bio energy by or (2-Chap VI, 11,12,13) (1-135-137,141,142) (14-29-32) (20-32-36) -12 blnnen and theref oirie avoided the RUB'Si'ahs* aot ive VeBistanco by passive resisbance to Ludendorff•a orders delaying the attaok and then later capturing only an outlying ridge. Any danger to Sohbltz's XX Corps was avoided by the inac tivity of Samsohow's exhausted troops. One of his Corps had marched 150 miles in twelve days over road3 that were merely deep sand. (17) But the 26th did not pass without any hard fight ing. Away on the other flank the Russian right wing, consisting of the VI Corps and a cavalry division, se parated by two days march from the rest7of the army, had enoountered the two,German oor^s near Lauterh that were marching baok from the east front. The Russian right wing was thrown back in confusion but the attacks of Below and Kackensen were badly coordinated, their troops were tired by forced marohes nnd they did not press the pursuit. Thus the Russian right wing, although disorganized, was able to retire safely. Part of one division^ however, had been hemmed in with their backs- to the Bossau Lake and in a panic a number were drowned. Prom this small incident arose the .legend that Hlndenburg had driven Samsonow's -! i • Army into the lakes and marshes where thousands had drowned. (18) The real crisis of the battle, as a whole, came on the 27th. For that morning Francois, now amply sup plied with artillery and ammunition opened a fierce bom bardment on the position of the Russian left wing near Usdau. The Russian troops could not stand high explosives on an empty stomach and they broke in flight without wait ing for the flerman infantry. Francois ordered the pur 17. (20-29,30,36-38) (14-34,35,39) (18-148,149) (8-191,193) (21-149,160) 18. (20-41-47) (22-103-111) (14-44-48)' (21-152) -13 suit to be made upwards Neidehmirg, to get across the * ••••rea• • / ; • r • • •* • • •. , . . • ' ' ' * . ) , and his left was menaced, he had ordered his center to V . . .- .;" .'. • .. -;/:, strike northward again. As he can be,aoquited of undue optimism, there are two possible • explanatioria for his ao tion—that he wasVtoo rigidly loyal to his orders in carrying out his mission, or thWt ho was unwilling to re treat when Rennenkampf, his old enemy, was advancing. His attack probably saved the Germans a repulse, 'for Scholtz had been ordered by Ludendorfi* to chime in after Francois's • • ;. • " • ; • ' . " • • • • • . • • v , - . \ : . ; -\ ; : # . . ..' attack. As it was/ the Rus&'.Van oenter made several breeche. . • s . • in.•. . Scholtz', • • • • • • • \s v fron• ;t • •fbu / / :t . .at ' '•••th• e .prio • > ; • . • • e of' • exhaust• . • ' ' 1 : • • ' .' '• •. • -' 'if',' ' • • ' • •.vi'i1 ing itself. These breAohefaaeem to have momentarily i : :.- •...:,;/ craoked tudendorff's, nerve{for he ordered Francois both to send baok assistance ahtf with the rest of his corps to march northeast towards' Lahna against the immediate rear of the Russian o'^nter* (20) This directionij which traversed thiok forest country, would have given1Francois less time and ohance to bar th, e .. Russia-. . •: n, . , linv.,|e; of/ / retreat'... ••••. . • Fortunately. , , he • , . 19. (20-47-65) (Sl-iii2,163;i64,i55) (1-162-169) 20. (20-45,93) (21-^8,169,160) -14 again disregarded his orders and continued toward Neiden burg. Soon after midday Ludendorff discovered t hat the Russians were not attempting to deepen the breeches but rather were showing signs of retreat. So he sent Fran cois fresh orders to move not only on Neidenburgbut to Eursue in the direction of Labna. General von Francois, writing in one of his articles on the Battle of Tannen berg, states that he was surprised at the "direction of LahnaI' since the road led over broken terrain through the Kamusien Forest, which interfered with marching and ar tillery action. In spite of the fact that the order of Army Headquarters contained the additional statement,"The I Corps can furnish the greatest service to the Army if it will act in accordance with the intentions of this or der. Everything depends on the I Army Corps", neverthe less General von Francois, Who had decided to pursue to ward Neidenburg, did not change his decision and ordered "Pursuit via Neidenburg." And by night the 29th, Fran cois' troops held the road from Neidenburg to Willenberg with a chain of entrenched posts between, forming a barri cade across the line of retreat of the Russians Who now were flowing back and becoming inextricably mixed in the forest maze Which Francois bad avoided. With its rear closed and its roads congested, the Russian center, con sisting of the XIII, XV and half of the XXIII Corps, dis solved into a mob of hungry and exhausted men Who beat feebly against the ring of fire and then let themselves be rolled up by the thousands. The crowning scene of the tragedy was enacted by Samsonow himself, who had moved up from Neidenburg on the 27th to control the battle, only to find himself caught up in the swirling eddies of the retreat. Unable to do anything, he rode south again on -15 the ^8tih, only to get lost In the depths of the forest^ In the darkness he turned aside and shot himself. (21) But when he died the disaster was not so com plete as his despair nor so certain. If the Russian cen ter only had "been able to reorganize itself for a deter mined attempt to break out, it might well have suooeeded. For Francois* barricade waa thin and was Itself menaced from the outside. The source of the menace was Artamanow's I Corps, which, after its defeat atUsdau and retreat over the frontier, had been reinforced and had now returned to the resxue. Air reports warned Pranooia of the danger on the 20th, but he stoutly refused to give up his blockade, although he dispatched such force as he possibly oould spare to check-the advancing Russians at Neidenburg. Even so, the town was lost on the 30th, but Ludendorff already was sending reinforoements and Artamanow, haying made lit tle attempt to press his advantage, retreated south once more on the 31st. (28) OPINIONS OP AUTHOR AND OTHERS. 1. Although Rennenkampf had sufficient troops available after the battle of Gumbinnen, he failed to pursue, since he believed that the Second Army would be late in arriving and that it would te unwise to push the enemy too rapidly or they might esoape the blow Intended to take them in the rear. It is true his troops were tired but P3R states: lfPursuit of a decisively defeated enemy must be pushed to the utmost limit of the physical endurance of the troops and no opportunity given him to f 21. (80-66,72,73) (14-72,73) (21-161,168) (1-179-183, 186-188) 22. (20-84-86) (21-163,164) (1-186-188) -16 reorganise his forces and reconstitute his defense." And while it oannot be definitely stated that the Germans were decisively defeated and that the Russians wore vic torious yet, when some of the fog of battle cleared away R6nnenkampf, having reoovered from his confusion,realized that the Germans were retreating and he might have known that the Germans do not retreat Just to be doing something unusual. However there can be no excuse for Rennenkampf's failure to keep oontact with the Germans in his front or to asoertain the direction and state of his withdrawal after he learned of such action. His failure to move sooner to the assistance of Samsonow cannot be/condoned in any way. Whether it was treachery or jealousy cannot be definitely determined but there is that stench to the whole affair, and Hoffmann's conclusion seems to be quite plausible. (23) 2. Jilinsky certainly cannot be absolved from blame in this affair* He was the directing head and yet he acquiesced in Rennenkampf!s \lelay while, at the same time, he relentlessly urged Spjnaonow forward. He should have coordinated the action of these two armies with a firm hand so that there would have been cooperation, even though they initially were widely separated. (24) 3. Tne author is of the opinion that had Rennen kampf maintained oontact with his opponent and followed ug (we even''can exolude a pursuit) there Is a great pro bability that the battle of Tannenberg might never have taken place and certainly the annihilation of the Second Army could not have been effected. Jilinsky is reaponsi 23. (1-198) (23-196) 24. (23-196) (21-165) -17 ble for the lack of cooperation between the two armies* 1 11 ,•:•.•;'•,:, :• ' ","' • ' ,\ ' " v ; : ' t , ' ; ' • • • . • . .• ' • The head of any unit or units should exert positive oon trol over .1thos • e \ \unit • \ * s unti• ' l he i, s sur. •• e tha- t. . broad powers of independent aotion may be delegated with the assur anoe that such commander to whom they are delegated will nplay the game11, 4. It is believed that some of tho factors that led to the defeat of the Russians can be attributed to pre-war blunders such as: laok of radio equipment, air planes , heavy artillery, sufficient ammunition; defeotlve training of enlisted and commissioned personnel, poor staff training; failure to appreciate the neoeaalty of road and railroad development In the area over which the First and Second Armies had to advanoe. But even with all these deficiencies there still was a possibility of avert ing the debacle of Tannenberg if the Russians had not sent radio messages in the clear and the two army oommanders had cooperated with one another under the leadership of Jillnskl. Even the Qerman leaders pay tribute to the in dividual Russian soldier, so the loss of the battle oan not be laid at his feet. The entire affair is a monumen tal example of the more or less trite phrase; "Do some thing" • Had Renhenkampf done something instead of noth ing and had the Russians been sufficiently careful not to publish their every move to the world, it sfcill is pos sible to visualize the embarrassment it would have oaused the Oermans and it might possibly have been the salvation of the Russians. 5. For the opinion of the man who had about as much to do with the battle as anyone, General Max Hoff mann, see Chapter XVIII of translation of hie book at tached hereto as appendix (1). The author of this paper -IP concurs in all those statements. 6. Details of the battle were purposely omitted from the body of this paper sinoe they all are so well covered in the appendix. IV. CONCLUSIONS. 1. Contaot once made with the enemy must be maintained, and an initial suobess gained must be fol lowed up Immediately. 2. 0-2 agencies must be constantly on the alert both to gain information and prevent information fal ling into the enemy1s hands. 3. thorough indoctrination of leaders in the same school of thought in time Vf peaoe will pay large dividends in time of war. (This conclusion very, evident from Hoffmann1s book*) 4. The General Staff should war game plans for possible contingencies in time of peace bo insure com plete knowledge end adequacy of the plans in all their ramifications* This will develop the weaknesses of the plans and the lessons learned from them by those partici pating Will' bs of infinite value in actual conflict. 5* Once the objeotive has been decided upont mass* your forces for a quiok decision* Gnergetio leadership frequently will overcome other deficiencies* B L I 0 Key: (20-21,22,23) = No. 20 Text (below)"pages,£1,22,23. 1. Ironside, Sir Kdniund, "Tannenberg, The First Thirty I)ays in East Prussia11, William Blaokwoci and Sons, London 1925. 2. Daniloff ,^ Jurij, Former Deputy Chief of Staff, Imper ial Russian Army, ^•Reasons in the World War1?, Translated from the German by Dr, 0. M. Eleoh, Colonel Ked. Res. 1926. 3. Hoffmann, Major General Max, "War of Lost Opportuni ties", International Publishers, Hew York, 1926. 4. Hoffmann, Major General Max, "War Diaries1*, Martin Seoker, London, 1929. 6. Knox, Sir Alfred, "With the Russian Army 1914-1917", E. P. Dutton and Company. 6. "Notes on the Battle of Tannenberg", 0-2 Report No. 8758, Confidential, by Colonel A. L. Conger, U. 3. Military Attache, Berlin, 4 May, 1927. 7. Francois, Oeneral Hermann V., ^Tannenberg, Cannae of the. World Y/ar", Verlag Deutsoher Jagerbund, Berlin, 1926. \|, 8. Francois, General Hermanny., "Marnesohlaoht und Tan nenberg", August Scherl, Berlin, 1920. 9. Woods, WiliikmS., "Colossal Blunders of the War11, MaoMillan and Company, New York, 1931. 1 ' • ;•:•. • • • -« * . ' ' ••• .;• / • • ' ; • • ' " • • . • . ' • •'. •,;': ••••••, .' • 10. Olehrl, Hermah v., "Some Lights on Tannenberg from the Russian Side", translation from Wisaen und Wehr, March 1922. 11. Ludendorff, Eric v.1, "Ludendorff• s Own Story11, Harper and Bros., New York, 1919. 12. Hindenberg, Paul v., MOut of my Life", Harper and Bros., New York, 1921. 13. Encyclopaedia Britannloa, 14th Edition. 14* Oiehrl, Hermann v., "Tannenberg", E. S. Mittler and Sohn, Beriin 1923-Translatioh C&OSS Library (referenoea in this are to pages in the ori ginal text). 16* Schwarte, Liftufeenant General Max, "Oesbhidnte dea Welt krlegesf H. S. Mittler and Sohn, Berlin, 1932. 16. Oolovino, Nicolae N,, Lieutenant General, "Russian War Plan of 1914", delivered at Conduct of War Course Ho. 28 Army War College 1930-31. Library of Major Ralph Smith. -20 conours in all those statements, 6. Details of the battle were purposely omitted from the body of this paper since they all are so well oovered in the appendix* IV. CONCLUSIONS. 1. Contact ones made with the enemy must be maintained, and an Initial suooess gained must be fol lowed up immediately. 2. 0-2 agencies must be constantly on the alert both to gain Information and prevent information fal ling into the enemy1s hands• 3* Thorough indoctrination of leaders in the same school of thought In time of peace will pay large dividends in time of war. (This conclusion very, evident from Hoffmann's book.) 4. The General Staff should war game plans for possible contingencies in time of peace to insure oom plete knowledge and adequacy of the plans in all their ramifications. This will develop the weaknesses of the plans and the lessons learned from them by those partici pating will' be of infinite value in actual oonfliot. 5* Once the objective has been decided upon| mass your forces for a quick decision. Energetio leadership frequently will overcome other deficiencies. -19 17. OourfcpV Baeii, "War arid Revolution.vin Russia 1914-191711, VacMillan and Company, New York, 1919. 18. Reichsairohiv, "Dor Weltkrleg, X914-1918n, E. 3. Mlttler and Sohn/Berlin, 1^26—Translation Vol. II 19. Liddell Hart, B. H>, "^he Real War 10i4-1918n, Little, Brown and Company* 20. Hoffmann, Oeneral Max, "Tannenborg, wie es wlrklioh wa'r.i'i Kuitiirpolitik, Berlin 1926. Translation by Captain! Peodor 0. Sclimidt. Appended herewith. 21. Oroener, Wilhelm, "Das Testamev- des Grafen Schlieffen", E, S.Mittler and Sohn, Berlin, 1927. 22. Reichsarohiv, ^Tannenb^rig11, Vol. 19, By 3ohafer, Ger hard Stalling Berlin 1928 (translation by Captain 0. W. Minot, HI Res) ; , ' ; .IV" 23. Churohill, Rt. Hon. Winston, "The Unknown War", Charles Soribner Son, New York. 24. Size, Walter, "Tannenberg, The German Army of 1914. Its Principles and their effect in the victory on the eastern front." -21
V^Ciocc1, Primarily O.. J Trrnalation Of) 1 R;Jt.^Rb^I>G-- Viic Cc
