DOCSLIB.ORG

V^Ciocc1, Primarily O.. J Trrnalation Of) 1 R;Jt.^Rb^I>G-- Viic Cc

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
V^Ciocc1, Primarily O.. J Trrnalation Of) 1 R;Jt.^Rb^I>G-- Viic Cc hi.. ":Ui('-(t> >it! •/..'/><* ttirhyft-.rti.r. ,V./iV /../.. '.i,iuith-ir»rh ti>i it iktfu a././ <r V^ciocc1, primarily o.. J trrnalation of) 1 r;jT.^rB^i>G-- viic cc '.-virkllch v;ar,by / imade bj auf.h:r uf hhie article. ; .• . ... _ , , . , , . , , , , , t . , '.,;",•;,••'• •; ' . •' •<. ' '.' ' 7 " ! r " '• " ' ' "';/ ...... ,, ./ i ii ,V I it i l! II >t •< . •ili'iii I i ii I, „ „ .. II . •-. >.i) II ;. .. .i >t it H it li it ,f)i u ,i Hi, il-ul CODE; tflWBER , IR—1933 I N D IV ID U A ij *RES EAR OH STUDY A CRITICAL AKALY8I& OP TtiE BATTLE OP TANNENBERO •••i; " . • : , (baaed primarily on a translation of nTANNENEERQ--wie es wirklieh war11 General Max Hoffmann) Submitted by \ THIS SOLUTICM MtiST BS RiSTURf^ED FOR FILE BY 5:00 >!W,, OUTHE DATS SKOSN •PLEABB PLACE Y'jUR NAME ON COVZR PACE HiE WRNI1W. FOR FU.E LBUT DO NOV PLACE VGUK 1 0» SOLUTION IWEif WRESTING A RDVIEff. The Command and General Staff School .'.}••• Leavenworth'' , •Kansa ' s Fort Leftv>nworth, Kansas, May IB; 1933 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director Second Year Class, The Com­ mand and Oeneral Staff School, Fort Leavehworth, Kansas. A:Crjitioal Anaiysis :o£ the Battle of Tan­ enberg (based primarily oh•aftranslation of "Tannenberg wie es wirklioh war" by Max Hoffmann) I, PAPERS ACCOMPANYING: 1. A Bibliography for this study. 2. Maps: (1) Strategic Map--East Prussia, Campaign SO $d^&hj6e;J^^ 'Armiejst &) J'JBi^^le'j^of'^^ia%7'-F^a)^enjaii 4) !'$ei^u<iti ioh^'/bif;;.inu81lB'ian r igfifc 'tlank 5) Attack on Russian left, August 26-28, • ' 101^ ' •' ', i JL v J L * ^ ' ', :; • '• J > (6) Attaok on Russian Center, August 26-28, 1914. .;.,... ;.-,...•, • (7) Final destruction of Seoond Army August 29-30, 1914. 3. Appendices. (1) Translation of "Tannenberg, wie es wirklioh war, Oen»Max Hoffmann. II. THE STlJDY PRESENTED. — A Critical analysis of the Eattle of Tannenberg, based primarily on a trans­ lation of "Tannenberg, wie es wirklioh war," by Max Hoff­ mann. Ill, HISTORICAL FACTS. OPPOSINQ FORCES. Eighth Oe^man Army was commanded originally by Qeneral Max von Prittwitz and Gaffroh, Qeneral von V/alderaee was his chief of staff, Qeneral Grunert was deputy chief of staff and Colonel Max Hoffmann was 0-3 in charge of operations. Subse­ quently Oeneral Von Hindenburg beoame army commander and Oeneral Ludendorff was his ohief of,staff. Oarman units consisted oft -1­ I Corps-*-General von Francois, commanding ' I Reserve Corps--General von Below, commanding XVII Corps—General'•.'von Maokensen, commanding XX Corps"-General von Soholtz, oommandlng Ill Reserve Division--Oeneral von Morgen, oom­ mand ing * ' * ' • > '•'i'U-r' Landwehr Division—Von der Goltz, commanding 1st Cav. Division--Oeneral Breohb, oommandlng Garrison troops from the fortresses of Koenlge­ berg, arid those along the Vistula River. The total strength was equivalent to 13 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division (1) The Russian foroeft ooneisted of two armies known as the Mjemen or First Army and the Warsaw or Second Army, and were constituted 8s follows: Russian First Army—Qeneral Rennenkampf, commanding III Corpa--Oenoral Jepantsohin, commanding IV Corps--General AllJew, commanding XX Corps-^General Smirnoff, commanding 1st Guard Cay Div--General Kasme.kow, commanding 2d Guard Cav Dlv--Qeneral Rauoh, commanding 1st Cav Di7—General Gourke, commanding 2d Cav Div--General Naohitsohewanakl, commanding 3d Cav Div--General Bellegarde, commanding 1st IiidOav Brig '•• .. , • . • , ... '.•.•; , . , . ., Rug8Ian Second Army--General Samsonbw, commanding I Corps—General Art am on ov, oc sanding II Oorpif'--General Soheidemtnn, commanding (this 1. (14-93,94,95) (15-67) 16-appendix 18) -2­ Rua a Ian 3eo ond Virmy• (0 ont inued) Corps was later detROhed from Second Army) VI Corps--Oeneral Blagewjesohtsohenaki, commanding XIII 0orp8--Qonerai kluJew, commanding XV Oorps--0eneral Marbos, commanding XXIII CorpR--Oeneral Kondratowitsoh, commanding 4th CaV;Dlv--6enerai Toipyge, commanding 6tlii Cav biV--Qeneral von^ RoppV ooijimandiiig 15th Cav Div—General Jjjxindirow, ooramanding 1st Rifle Brig The aotual strength of the Russian First Army waa"86 battalions of first line infantry and 120 squad­ rons of cavalry. The Second Army paper strength was 164 battaliona^ of infantry and'110'squadrons of oavalry. (2) PERSONNSL. The personnel of these two forces stand out in marked contrast to each other. The German forces were composed almost entirely of the population of East Prussia, were trained thoroughly and led by effi­ cient officer and non-commissioned officer personnel. These people were to fight on and for the territory in which vhey lived. They were rather robust and illiteracy was negligible. The Russians on the other hand were about 60£ illiterate, 75# of the N.O.O's were oonsorlpts of little service and therefore inefficient! The Russian units were composed of two-thirds Russians and one-third subjeot raoes, auoh as Letts, Baits, and Poles* On mo­ bilization, units were filled up by looal reservists. The German units were striotly territorial* (3) ARMAMENT AND EQ^IPMEHT. The outstanding su­ 2. (1-61,62) (7-2) (8-48) 3* (1-19,20) (10-4) (8-122,123) (18-Vol II Annex 2) -3­ periority oetween the o on bat elements of the Russians and the Oermana was In artillery, especially in heavy artil­ lery, the proportion of guns to rifles in the twc armies beings Russians 1 gun to 202 riflesj Oermans 1 gun to 166 rifles. In heavy artillery the superiority in favor of ehe Germana' was 10 to 1. There also was a deoided defioienoy in reserve armament in the Russian army. In machine gun equlpmont both sides were on a par. The Ger­ mans generally were superior with respect to signal equip­ ment and certainly as to its use. The airplanes avail­ able to the Russians were few. The Germans on the other hand were superior both as to planes and as to their use. Due to'leok of roads and rai?vroQds on the Russian fron­ tier the Russians were decidedly hRndioapppd wnlle i . :., . , • V - ' • • Qern-in8 had an excellent road and railroad net available \ "• , ' •• • • for their purposes within the province of East Prussia, (4) THE RUSSIAN PLAN. General Jillnsky, who had been chief of staff of the Russian army until 1913, had made a military convention with France whereby Russia was pledged to put 800,000. men in the field on the 15th day of mobilization. This arrangement put a tremendous strain on the oumbrbus RuWsian war machine and also put a strain on the Russian Headquarters staff when it began to make decisions in a stabe of nervous flurry* It pro­ videdialso for ah offensive simultaneously with a.thrust against the Austriana. To make matters worse the French incessantly pressed the Russian War Offioe to do some­ thing to relieve the German pressure on the French and 4i(l-20,21,22) (17-40,41) (8-126) to do It quiokly. And so the Russian invasion of East Prussia, while it did not begin before the promised time, nevertheless began before it was ready. (5) :,..••' The Pi^st and Seoond Armies were to be conoeh­ fcrated along the froritier vinder the ooiranand of General Jilinaki and to be launched against East Prussia. Rennen­ kampf, oommariding the, First Army, was to advance agaihsv the eastern tip of isast Prussia, drawing upon himself the German defending forces, then two days later, Samsonow was to oroaa the southern frontier and bestride the Ger­ man1 8 rear outting them off from the Vistula, The plan basically was sound and its failure lay not in its concep­ tion but in it8 execution and in the failure to provide the essentials for the execution of suoh a plan prior to the outbreak of war, i. e* railroads, roads and satisfac­ tory mobilisation plans. (6) THB GERMAN PLAN. In accordance with the von Sohlief'f en plan the German Eighth Army was committed to the strategio defensive. Graf von Sohlieffen's oonoep­ tion of this defense was to so use the small German army in East Prussia and the advantages of the terrain as to be able to strike a strong blow with the entire army against whichever foroes appeared first and then to turn on any forces that- subsequently arrived on the Prussian frontier. One specifio caution was demanded of the lead­ er of the Eighth Army "not to permit himself to be bottled up in the fortress of Koenigsberg.• (7) POPULAR LEGENDS* There are two rather wide­ spread legend8 oonoerning the battle. One pertains to 6. (16-7,8,9,20) (19-103,104) 6. (3-23) (1-15,14,17,39,40,41,127,130) (14-19,20) 7. (19-106) (20-7) -5­ the romantic picture of an old general who, as the hobby of his years of retirement, spent his entire time In de­ vising a gigantic trap for a future Russian Invasion, ex­ ploring paths through and sounding the bottom of the marshes In rrhlo'h the Russian hordes were to be engulfed and then when war came, carrying his dream to. fulfill­ ment* The seoond legend was that of a masterly plan of a seoond oannae, conceived and dictated in the train that was carrying IiUdendorff to pick up hie nominal master en route to East Prussia. (8) THE PRELUDE AT QUMBItiNBN. l On August 17, Rennen­ kampf crossed the eastern frontier with six and one half divisions and five cavalry divisions. The problem of meet­ ing this thrust together with a possible thrust from the south shortly thereafter long had been studied and Sohlief­ fen's solution had oeen that of utilizing the natural ob­ staoles of the country especially the Maeurlan Lakes to strike hard and with full strength at whichever Russian army came first within reach and then turn against the other* But Prlttwitz, unwilling to rely on Landwehr and garrison troopa to supplement the natural obstacles in delaying Samsonow, left the XX Corps under General Soholtz on the southern border to parry Samaonow's'threat.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • INFORMATION to USERS the Most Advanced Technology Has Been Used to Photo­ Graph and Reproduce This Manuscript from the Microfilm Master
    . INFORMATION TO USERS The most advanced technology has been used to photo­ graph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm master. UMI films the original text directly from the copy submitted. Thus, some dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from a computer printer. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyrighted material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are re­ produced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each oversize page is available as one exposure on a standard 35 mm slide or as a 17" x 23" black and white photographic print for an additional charge. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. 35 mm slides or 6"X 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. Accessing theUMI World’s Information since 1938 300 North Z eeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA Order Number 8820321 Operational art and the German command system in World War I Meyer, Bradley John, Ph.D. The Ohio State University, 1988 Copyright ©1088 by Meyer, Bradley John. All rights reserved. UMI 300 N. ZeebRd. Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 OPERATIONAL ART AND THE GERMAN COMMAND SYSTEM IN WORLD WAR I DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Bradley J.
    [Show full text]
  • Military Tribunal, Indictments
    MILITARY TRIBUNALS Case No. 12 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -against- WILHELM' VON LEEB, HUGO SPERRLE, GEORG KARL FRIEDRICH-WILHELM VON KUECHLER, JOHANNES BLASKOWITZ, HERMANN HOTH, HANS REINHARDT. HANS VON SALMUTH, KARL HOL­ LIDT, .OTTO SCHNmWIND,. KARL VON ROQUES, HERMANN REINECKE., WALTERWARLIMONT, OTTO WOEHLER;. and RUDOLF LEHMANN. Defendants OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (US) NORNBERG 1947 • PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c6a171/ TABLE OF CONTENTS - Page INTRODUCTORY 1 COUNT ONE-CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 6 A Austria 'and Czechoslovakia 7 B. Poland, France and The United Kingdom 9 C. Denmark and Norway 10 D. Belgium, The Netherland.; and Luxembourg 11 E. Yugoslavia and Greece 14 F. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 17 G. The United states of America 20 . , COUNT TWO-WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: CRIMES AGAINST ENEMY BELLIGERENTS AND PRISONERS OF WAR 21 A: The "Commissar" Order , 22 B. The "Commando" Order . 23 C, Prohibited Labor of Prisoners of Wal 24 D. Murder and III Treatment of Prisoners of War 25 . COUNT THREE-WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: CRIMES AGAINST CIVILIANS 27 A Deportation and Enslavement of Civilians . 29 B. Plunder of Public and Private Property, Wanton Destruc­ tion, and Devastation not Justified by Military Necessity. 31 C. Murder, III Treatment and Persecution 'of Civilian Popu- lations . 32 COUNT FOUR-COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY 39 APPENDIX A-STATEMENT OF MILITARY POSITIONS HELD BY THE DEFENDANTS AND CO-PARTICIPANTS 40 2 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c6a171/ INDICTMENT
    [Show full text]
  • La Bataille De Leipzig Scénarios
    La Bataille de Leipzig Scénarios Pour le Règlement de l’An XXX et Le Règlement des Marie-Louise 2 La Bataille de Leipzig December 19, 2013 • French Victory: Hold all hexes of Güldengossa, the Auenhain Farm, Markkleeberg, Dölitz and Connewitz, one hex each of All rules herein take precedence over any rules in the series rules, Gross Pössna and Seifertshain, and place Meerveldt’s II Corps which they may contradict. on Morale Level Three by the end of the scenario. Rules marked with an eagle or are shaded with a gray • French Tactical Victory: Hold one hex of Güldengossa, the background apply only to players using the Règlements de Auenhain Farm, all hexes of Markkleeberg, Dölitz, and l’An XXX. Connewitz and place Klenau’s IV Corps and Meerveldt’s II Corps on Morale Level Two by the end of the scenario. NOTE: All references to Artillery Ammunition Wagons (AAWs), Ammunition Supply, Artillery Ricochet, Cavalry Skirmishers and • Draw: Any result that is not a victory for either side. Grand Charges apply only to players using the Règlements de l’An XXX. • Coalition Tactical Victory: Hold all hexes of Güldengossa, the Manor House at Dölitz and place Lauriston’s V Corps on Morale Level Two by the end of the scenario. 1.0 INTRODUCTION La Batallie de Leipzig is a game of one day, the 16th, of the battle • Coalition Victory: Hold all hexes of Markkleeberg, that took place from October 14-19. Güldengossa, the Auenhain Farm, Gross Pössna, the Manor House at Dölitz and Dölitz or Connewitz by the end of the scenario.
    [Show full text]
  • Waterloo in Myth and Memory: the Battles of Waterloo 1815-1915 Timothy Fitzpatrick
    Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2013 Waterloo in Myth and Memory: The Battles of Waterloo 1815-1915 Timothy Fitzpatrick Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES WATERLOO IN MYTH AND MEMORY: THE BATTLES OF WATERLOO 1815-1915 By TIMOTHY FITZPATRICK A Dissertation submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2013 Timothy Fitzpatrick defended this dissertation on November 6, 2013. The members of the supervisory committee were: Rafe Blaufarb Professor Directing Dissertation Amiée Boutin University Representative James P. Jones Committee Member Michael Creswell Committee Member Jonathan Grant Committee Member The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and certifies that the dissertation has been approved in accordance with university requirements. ii For my Family iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Drs. Rafe Blaufarb, Aimée Boutin, Michael Creswell, Jonathan Grant and James P. Jones for being on my committee. They have been wonderful mentors during my time at Florida State University. I would also like to thank Dr. Donald Howard for bringing me to FSU. Without Dr. Blaufarb’s and Dr. Horward’s help this project would not have been possible. Dr. Ben Wieder supported my research through various scholarships and grants. I would like to thank The Institute on Napoleon and French Revolution professors, students and alumni for our discussions, interaction and support of this project.
    [Show full text]
  • University of Bradford Ethesis
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Bradford Scholars University of Bradford eThesis This thesis is hosted in Bradford Scholars – The University of Bradford Open Access repository. Visit the repository for full metadata or to contact the repository team © University of Bradford. This work is licenced for reuse under a Creative Commons Licence. THE WHITE INTERNATIONAL: ANATOMY OF A TRANSNATIONAL RADICAL REVISIONIST PLOT IN CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR I Nicholas Alforde Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Social and International Studies University of Bradford 2013 Principal Supervisor: Gábor Bátonyi, DPhil Abstract Nicholas Alforde The White International: Anatomy of a Transnational Radical Revisionist Plot in Central Europe after World War I Keywords: Bauer, Gömbös, Horthy, Ludendorff, Orgesch, paramilitary, Prónay, revision, Versailles, von Kahr The denial of defeat, the harsh Versailles Treaty and unsuccessful attempts by paramilitary units to recover losses in the Baltic produced in post-war Germany an anti- Bolshevik, anti-Entente, radical right-wing cabal of officers with General Ludendorff and Colonel Bauer at its core. Mistakenly citing a lack of breadth as one of the reason for the failure of their amateurishly executed Hohenzollern restoration and Kapp Putsch schemes, Bauer and co-conspirator Ignatius Trebitsch-Lincoln devised the highly ambitious White International plot. It sought to form a transnational league of Bavaria, Austria and Hungary to force the annulment of the Paris Treaties by the coordinated use of paramilitary units from the war vanquished nations. It set as its goals the destruction of Bolshevism in all its guises throughout Europe, the restoration of the monarchy in Russia, the systematic elimination of all Entente-sponsored Successor States and the declaration of war on the Entente.
    [Show full text]
  • East Prussia ‘14
    Designer Notes: East Prussia ‘14 In the middle of August 1914, the world's attention was focused directly on the Western Front where German armies were sweeping into Belgium and France. On the Eastern Front however, the Russians were on the offensive into East Prussia, an important agricultural region of the Prussian homeland, and the gateway to Berlin. The Russians planned a two pronged invasion into East Prussia: one army approaching from the Niemen River to the east and one army approaching from the Narew River to the south, both aimed at outflanking German forces located therein, and the eventual capture of the strategic city of Königsberg. In their way stood a single German army, two resolute commanders, and a well developed rail network. By the time the campaign was over both Russian armies would be almost completely destroyed and thrown out of East Prussia and the campaign itself would go on to become one of the most studied and celebrated victories in warfare. Table of Contents Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 5 The Belligerents ................................................................................................................. 7 The German Army .......................................................................................................... 7 Summary of Capabilities............................................................................................. 7 Organization ...............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Great Battles of the Great War
    LEWARIIBRAR^ Mm CHRONICLE wTrt"^,^ THE GREAT BATTLES OF THE GREAT WAR THE GREAT BATTLES OF THE GREAT WAR " News of battle I News of battle ! Hark I 'tis ringing down the street ; And the archways and the pavement Bear the clang of hurrying feet ! '' News of battle ! " Aytoun's Lays of the Scottish Cavaliers." PUBLISHED FOR Zbc H)atl^ Cbtontclc By HODDER and STOUGHTON london, mcmxiv CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. THE HEROIC DEFENCE OF LifGE " - " - - " . 7 II. THE OCCUPATION OF BRUSSELS I7 III. THE GIANT CONFLICT AT MONS - 22 IV. THE MASTERLY BRITISH RETREAT 30 V. HOW RETREAT LED TO VICTORY ------- 37 VI. LOUVAIN : THE BRAND OF SHAME 47 VII. THE DRAMATIC TURNING POINT 57 VIII. PARIS PREPARES FOR SIEGE - -62 IX. THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 70 X. THE GERMANS HURLED BACK 79 XI. THE BATTLE OF THE RIVERS -------89 XII. AN HISTORIC TUG-OF-WAR ---102 XIIL THE FALL OF ANTWERP - - - - - - - -112 XIV. THE FIGHT FOR THE CHANNEL -----*- 123 XV. BRITANNIA RULES THE WAVES ! 132 t XVI. AT HELIGOLAND AND ELSEWHERE ------ 138 vi CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE XVII. LOSSES AND GAINS AT SEA I44 XVIII. THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN 150 XIX. THE CONQUERING RUSSIANS 159 XX. THE CLASH OF SLAV AND TEUTON 1 69 XXI. GREAT EVENTS ON THE VISTULA - 179 THE GREAT BATTLES OF THE GREAT ' WAR I. THE HEROIC DEFENCE OF LI^GE It is impossible to over-estimate the was confronted with a peremptory de- service rendered to Europe by little mand for free passage through her Belgium in holding up for several territory for the Kaiser's legions.
    [Show full text]
  • №3 (30) 2014 №4 (31) 2014
    №4 (31) 2014 №3 (30) 2014 strategy september`14 | 04 | new defence order Strategy 1 стратегии содержание ООО «Дифанс МеДиа» 4 Мосин: отец трехлинейки 32 Новости 60 First airfields of saint petersburg – First airfields 6 Sergei mosin: Father 33 Комплекс «Шатер» в составе Генеральный директор of russia of the «three-Line rifle» сторожевого охранения Александра Григоренко 8 Винтовки и люди мобильных объектов 65 Зао «ЭЛси» – научно- [email protected] производственное 13 Guns and people 33 «shater» system as part исполнительный директор of security Outposts for предприятие 16 Высокие технологии: Инна Петрова mobile Objects В небе индии, Китая попасть в цель, уйти 66 [email protected] из-под удара 34 News и анголы Главный редактор Виктор Николаев 19 High technology: 35 Новые электронные 68 In the sky of India, China [email protected] Hit the target and evade компоненты на рынке and angola the response ВПК рФ 70 Авиакосмические арт-директор Николай Федотов 20 ОАО нПК «северная заря». 35 New electronic Components технологии в татарстане. Дизайнер 40 лет, сохраняя прошлое, in the market of military- аКто Евгений Казаков создает настоящее и Industrial Complex 72 Служба радиосвязи Менеджеры будущее релейной техники of the russian Federation российского флота 36 День инноваций Ирина Ульяшина 23 «оборонэкспо-2014» 77 Russian Navy radio [email protected], и форум «технологии Минобороны рФ Communication service Людмила Воронкова в машиностроении» 38 Инновационное 81 Спецсвязь: из рук в руки [email protected], 24 Современная мировая предприятие: официальное 81 Special-purpose Галина Шедакова военно-морская техника признание Communication: from Hand [email protected] 41 Innovative enterprise: 27 Modern World Naval to Hand Official recognition equipment ООО «Дифанс Медиа» 82 Международная научно- 29 «Композит-Проф»: 44 Основа научно-технического Санкт-Петербург, развития практическая конференция инжиниринг и производство МВд россии «сПеЦ- Средний пр.
    [Show full text]
  • Bibliography 2012-13
    List III First World War Professor Alan Kramer Reference Bibliography 2012-13 Reference works Hirschfeld, Gerhard, Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg, Paderborn, etc., 2003. Gerd Krumeich, reliable, modern reference collection with useful essays on the belligerent states, and Irina Renz, eds., 943.084 P41. This has just been published in English as: Hirschfeld, Gerhard, Brill’s Encyclopedia of the First World War. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012. A Gerd Krumeich, vitally important, reliable, reference collection with useful essays on the and Irina Renz, eds., belligerent states and on thematic questions (e.g. propaganda, war economy, etc.), as well as the encyclopedia entries. Berkeley Library Basement: REF 940.3 R21.1 Horne, John, ed. A Companion to World War I, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. Berkeley LEN 940.3 R01;1 and 940.3 R01;1. This is an up-to-date synthesis of the best research by international experts, attractive and accessible. Paperback ed. about £24 Pope, Stephen, Elizabeth- The Macmillan Dictionary of the First World War. London: Macmillan, 1995. Anne Wheal, Keith Robbins REF 940.3 N5 Neiberg, Michael S. ‘Revisiting the myths. New approaches to the Great War’, in Contemporary European History 13, 4 (2004), pp. 505-15. Good review article. Surveys and multi-nation works Strachan, Hew The First World War, vol. 1: To Arms, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 940.3 P1.1;1 and reserve. Excellent, detailed book from an international perspective, well-researched in several languages. Herwig, Holger The First World War. Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918, London: Arnold, 1997. Counter Reserve No.517 (HL-305-61) Kramer, Alan Dynamic of Destruction.
    [Show full text]
  • C:/Users/User/Desktop/2017-08-16 Tannenberg Booklet 6 Seiten BGG
    Table of contents Put the turn marker onto the August 17 space of the turn track. All other 1. Setup................................... 2 markers are set aside. 2. Sequence of Play................... 2 st 3. 1 Army march and combat.... 2 2. SEQUENCE OF PLAY 4. 2nd Army march and combat....5 th Hindenburg’s Hour is played in a series 5. 8 Army movement and of up to 15 turns, each representing combat ................................ 5 one day of actual time. A turn consists of six phases which must 6. Supply..................................6 be completed in the following order: 7. Rally.................................... 7 st 8. Victory check.........................7 1. 1 Army march and combat 2. 2nd Army march and combat 9. Optional Rules....................... 7 3. 8th Army movement and 10. Literature............................ 7 combat 4. Supply 5. Rally 6. Victory check 1. SETUP The map shows the province of East 3. 1st ARMY MARCH AND COMBAT Prussia and surrounding areas in 1914. A grid of hexagons (“hexes”) March has been superimposed on it in Roll one die, subtract one for each order to regulate movement. disrupted and/or unsupplied (see Moving from one hex to another 7.) corps in the army (do not represents having covered a subtract more than one per corps distance of approximately ten even if disrupted and unsupplied) kilometers. Note that north is on and compare the result to the top of the map. march table on the map. If the Put the four playing pieces depicting result is 6, put the forced march corps’ of the Russian 1st Army marker for the 1st Army onto the (Cav., XX., III.
    [Show full text]
  • Debating Cannae: Delbrück, Schlieffen, and the Great War Andrew Loren Jones East Tennessee State University
    East Tennessee State University Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Student Works 5-2014 Debating Cannae: Delbrück, Schlieffen, and the Great War Andrew Loren Jones East Tennessee State University Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.etsu.edu/etd Part of the European History Commons, and the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Jones, Andrew Loren, "Debating Cannae: Delbrück, Schlieffen, and the Great War" (2014). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 2387. https://dc.etsu.edu/etd/2387 This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works at Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Debating Cannae: Delbrück, Schlieffen, and the Great War ___________________________________________ A thesis presented to the faculty of the Department of History East Tennessee State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in History ________________________________________ by Andrew L. Jones May 2014 ________________________________________ Dr. Stephen G. Fritz, Chair Dr. Dinah Mayo-Bobee Dr. John M. Rankin Keywords: Nationalism, Delbrück, Schlieffen, German War Planning, Germany, Sedan, Moltke, War Enthusiasm, German Wars of Unification, World War I ABSTRACT Debating Cannae: Delbrück, Schlieffen, and the Great War by Andrew L. Jones Debating Cannae: Delbrück, Schlieffen, and the Great War provides the reader a view of the historical struggle between Alfred von Schlieffen and Hans Delbrück. They argued fiercely about the foundation of the German Empire and the use of history.
    [Show full text]
  • Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes: Germany Superiority Established
    •\ As'Schlieffen and his staff labored at the turn of the century to refine his^masiter conception for conquest in the West, as the elegantly attired officers and ladies of the Royal Hapsburg Court swirled to waltz music in Vienna, and as a premature revolution waxed and waned in Czarist Russia, almost nobody thought that Russian Poland, German Prussia, or Hungarian Gal 1- cia would become the major lod of action 1n any war among the great powers. Even on the eve of war in late July or upon its outbreak in August, no one foresaw a titanic struggle between the Elbe and the Pripet marshes west of Moscow--a struggle that would carom back and forth for three years as one side and then the other seemed to gain a temporary advantage, until the con test was finally decided by social, rather than military forces. (See Map 24a) German military prowess was the catalyst that toppled a socially deter iorating Russia which was creaking its way into the 20th century. Each of the powers had its own conception of how the war should proceed. In Berlin and Potsdam, in 1914, the General Staff looked anxiously westward where they expected the issue to be decided. Certainly the sluggish Russians would not mobilize, concentrate, and march towards Konigsberg and Deutch- Eylau before the Anglo-French armies could be enmeshed by the coils of five German armies advancing concurrently and in parallel into the French heart land. After that, admittedly it would probably be necessary to shift armies eastward to bait or deal with the Russian bear.
    [Show full text]