•\ As'Schlieffen and his staff labored at the turnof the century to refine his^masiter conception for conquest in the West, as the elegantly attired officers and ladies of the Royal Hapsburg Court swirled to waltz music in Vienna, and as a premature revolution waxed and waned in Czarist Russia, almost nobody thought that Russian Poland, German Prussia, or Hungarian Gal 1- cia would becomethe major lod of action 1n any war among the great powers. Even on the eve of war in late July or upon its outbreak in August, no one foresaw a titanic struggle between the Elbe andthe Pripet marshes west of Moscow--a struggle that would carom back and forth for three years as one side and then the other seemed to gain a temporary advantage, until the con test was finally decided by social, rather than military forces. (See Map 24a) German military prowess was the catalyst that toppled a socially deter iorating Russia which was creaking its way into the 20th century.
Each of the powers had its own conception of how the war should proceed. In Berlin and Potsdam, in 1914,the General Staff looked anxiously westward where they expected the issue to be decided. Certainly the sluggish Russians would not mobilize, concentrate, and march towards Konigsberg and Deutch- Eylau before the Anglo-French armies could be enmeshed by the coils of five German armies advancing concurrently and in parallel into the French heart land. After that, admittedly it would probably be necessary to shift armies eastward to bait or deal with the Russian bear. Nor was the vision of land locked "advance and retreat" warfare envisioned in the councils of St. Peters burg, the forbidding and cold capital of Czarist Russia. There, the euphoria engendered by an alliance with France and an unwarranted perception of the staying power and strategy of the Hapsburg monarchy led to some optimistic predictions—that once the ominous "Russian steamroller" commenced to move no military force in central Europe could arrest it short of Berlin. Only then its momentum might expend itself by sheer friction, but certainly not before.1 Even the Germans had a healthy respect of the apparent inevitability of the forward progress of hordes of Muscovites, Cossacks, Mongols, and a dozen other ethnic groupings in the Czar's service. Austria-Hungary, although alarmed by the restive behe moth andthe fountainhead of the opprobrious Pan-Slavism, proceeded to concentrate its main effort against hated Serbia. Here, Austria's inten tions were more punitive than prag matic. England and France, like Germany, ascertained that national life and death would be decided in the Marne marshes and the uplands of Champagne.Thus, the French appealed to St. Petersburg for a premature Russian offensive against East and West Prussia, commencing on 14 August in the hopes that the Germans would Cossacks in Transit to East Prussia g eastward, to be flattened by the steamroller or at least
86 restrained from western front operations. the steamroller, the mechanical condition of this touted imple- SB&SSsH=*S in its definitive breakdown.* Russian imperial enthusiasm to be a good ally, during the opening weeks, would ultimately weigh heavily upon national collapse three years later. Germanv Austria-Hungary andRussia, the three major powers which would become Soiled on the acknowledged secondary front, all had contingency olans for operations ranging from the vicinity of the Niemen River in Russia's ba?ren northlands to mountain fastnesses of the Carpathians, the natural ba™ to Budapest and Vienna. (See Map 24b) Much to Austrian dis- mav the GeTman General Staff became increasingly oriented to a risky,all- out" anniKive stroke in the West, particularly after 1890. This demanded, accordingly economy of force in the East and a defensive strategy there; such a strategy would be implemented by the relatively light Eighth Army (General Maxvon Prittwitz) plus fortress troops (concentrated primarily in EastPrussia) whichwoulddelay any Russian thrust into the German homeland until sub iantiallories could be relieved from the Western Front and rail roaded into position opposite the Polish salient.3 Rebuffed in her efforts to convince Germany to concentrate more of the coalite's strengthen the East?Austria found it easy to become enthralled with the concept of a con clusive invasion of Serbia, her emotionally paramount objective, still, in the hopethatthe Germannortherneffort would have some offensive.punch, the Austrian Colander, General Baron Conradvon Hotzendorf, positioned four armies alongthe southern edge of the Polish Salient and easternGaiicia for another simultaneous offensive against the Russians from Brest-Litovsk south eastward io the Dniester River (Austrian plan "R").* Russian strategy, as originally conceived with French assistance, was to place the bulk of We forces (four armies) in a Southwestern Army Group to oppose Austrian strength in Ga icia (Pirn "A"), absorbing whatever initial blows Franz Joseph's troops could deliver; but after mobilization was complete, it was planned to conduct an offensive into East Prussia with the Northwestern Army Group, consisting of the First (General Paul V. Rennenkampf) and Second (General Alexander V. Sam- sonov) Armies.5 In combinedplanning conferences with the French in pre-war years, the Russians had declared that no offensive could be undertaken until at least twenty days after mobilization. The French had insistedthat the Russians mult be able to movewith 900,000 men by the14th day. In 1913, a compromise, fraught with riskto Russia, was reached whereby Russia agreed to move as soon afterthe15th day as possible. When war came, however, because of the intense pressure on the French in the west, Joffre's officers implored Russia to move against East Prussia even earlier than the mobilization target date. When the Russian staff acquiesced, General Yakov G. Jilinsky's Northwest Army Group lurched uncertainly westward toward East Prussia on 13 August, less than two weeks following the mobilization order and a full week before a realistic pre-war estimate implied readiness would be achieved." Ironi cally, it was Jilinsky who suggested that his command make the premature
87 advance in response to French pressure. This was done fully appreciating that although the Russian infantry and cavalry units approximated full strength-- they outnumbered the Germans by almost 3 to 1-the supporting units were not yet in place.7 Further, the lines of communications, marginal at best, were nowhere near the state of efficiency required to support an offensive by a half million men. On the other hand, the German and Austrian support base was already largely mobilized and in place.
On 17 August, General Rennenkampf's First Russian Army crossed the bor der into the German homeland.* Movement orders prescribed that the Second Army was to keep pace with Rennenkampf's advance toward Kb'nigsberg. (See Map 25) Samsonov was to cross the frontier in the vicinity of Soldau and swing northwest to help close the pincers on the German EighthArmy; then the two armieswere expected to proceed deeper into the German homeland, hopefully to Berlin. The vagaries of geography, Russiancommand ineptness, and the German capacity to seize opportunity when presented, however, would combine to foil the Russian scheme and derail the steamroller.
TANNENBERG AND THE MASURIAN LAKES: GERMANY SUPERIORITY ESTABLISHED
The Polish salient, at the time an extremely inhospitable place even for the Russians,'was an intriguing land form, having changed handsamong warring powers many times over the centuries, (See Map 24b) From the German pointof view, it represented a sizable base area between East and West Prussia and between East Prussia and Galicia which inhibited the lateral movement of friendly forces. It was like a fist, thrust constantly into the German mid riff. To the Russians, it was at once an asset and a liability. It afforded a forward basearea from which to attack Galicia or Prussia, but it was also a vulnerable appendage, enticing determined drives from the northwest and southeast (the vicinity of Thorn and Cracow) which could surgically separate the salient from Mother Russia and provide theCentral Powers with a con tinuous north-south front line. In this event, the communications and indus trial centers of Warsaw, Lodz, and Ivangorad, would fall well within the German lines. The salient was underdeveloped because before their peremp tory decision to go on the offensive the Russians had willed it so, antici pating in future wars a German invasion which might be slowed or stalled because of poor roads, few railways, and a dearth of food and forage. The loyalties of the population were also questionable; it was never clear whether Russian forces operating in the salient were on friendly terrain or alien, whether they were present as liberators or as occupation forces. The Germans deceived themselves, also, as to the real depth of Polish affinity forTeu tonic hegemony. It is entirely likely that the Poles endeavored to stay out of the reach of either army and cursed the houses of Romanov and Hohen- zollern.8
North of the salient and forming its northern base, ran the German-Rus sian/Polish frontier between the Niemen and Narew Rivers. A few kilometers
*Rennenkampf's name is phonetically teutonic. His ancestors were German and during the war, prior to his relief for ineptness, rumors abounded that he was passing military information to the enemy.
88 wp*t of the frontier lay the chain of the Masurian Lakes (See Map 25), a series of fresh water obstacles runningsouth from Angerburg to Johannesburg. The *akes, patroUed by German craft and guarded by the central fortress of Lotzen, prohibited the movement of large bodies of troops from east to west and channelized advancing armies into two streams-through the 40-nnle wide lns?erburg gap norihV the lakes and through Russian Poland to the south. The northern gap was cut by forests, marshes, and peat bogs which tended a so to deUy the movement of horses, gun carriages, and wagons. /W^""*' the gap lent to troops a sense of isolation in its vastnesses. South of the lakes the second channel (Russian Poland) was a rural alleyextending from Bialvstok to Mlava, northwest of Warsaw, along the most track ess edge of the salient? Hence! the Masurian Lakes region represented a formidable barrier to movement, very much like a large rock in the '^Y^nKsta! e£as which divides into two parts the approaching current until the °bst^le has been by-passed and the two streams can again merge as one to the rear of the stone While bypassing the lakes to the north and south, major forces found contact most difficult andmutual support against a foe engaging one wing or the other was virtually impossible in 1914. While the apparently inexorable German advance through Belgium was gaining momentum--Liege's forts had at last fallen-Rennenkampf 's army pjissed the frontier into Prussia and at once brought psychological pressure on E ghth Army's commander. The leftwing of the Army Group, Second Army, was still toeing toward the border before Niedenburg on the German side. Preliminary Russian cavalry thrusts had drawn the I German Corps (General Hermann von Frincois) and a cavalry division close to the frontier as Rennenkempf crossed. General Prittwitz, an individual of dubious military reputation who had been appointed to command of the Eighth ArmyoverMoltke's protests, endeavored to put into effect the agreed-upon Eastern Front strategy: to defend East Prussia in a fashion that precludeddecisive engagement withsuperior Russian forces until the western front stabilized and moretroops could be spared. This basic strategy translated in tactical termsinto a series of successive delays along such defensible obstacles as the Angerapp, Alle, Passarge and eventually the Vistula Rivers, yielding up segments of East Prussia slowly and with high manpower costs to the Russians.
Prittwitz had a difficult task at best. Although the German Army was better trained, better led, better disciplined, and superior in quality of armament and communications, the Russian hordes must havebeen awesome to behold from the standpoint of the rifleman in one of Francois frontier com panies Tales of Cossack brutality and the Russian peasants1 general disre gard for the property and persons of trans-frontier citizenship assumed legendaryproportions among the German* rank and file. The understrength Eiqhth Army was subject to assault from the east and southeast, with the likelihood that unless the commander kept his wits the Army was in danger of being pinned against the Masurian Lakes or pushed into the fortress of Komgs- burg to die on the vine while Slavic divisions marched unopposed toward Potsdam. Further, German flank security rested on the tenacity and fighting qualities of the Austro-Hungarians, a significant unknown in the equation.3 Lastly, Prittwitz appreciated that his was a secondary theater and that in event of adversity short of catastrophe, he could expect little succor from Berlin.
89 Prittwitz1 worst fears seemed realized when one of his corps commanders took the offensive. (See Map 25) The fractious but patriotic Francois, in utter disregard of the orders to avoid decisive engagement, threw his single corps against the first three Russian Corps to cross the frontier, mauling the Russiancenter but risking doubleencirclement and annihilation at Stalluponen on 17 August. Eighth Armyheadquarters was incredulous at the pre-emptive attack by Francois; Prittwitz quickly dispatched his Quartermaster General by car to I Corps Headquarters to order Francois to break off the action without further delay.10 Although the battle was indecisive militarily for either side, the ferocity of the German assault had a psychological effect on Rennen- kampf, heightening a sense of inordinate caution which had been a personal characteristic even during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. Henceforth, he would slow the pace of First Army's advance, thereby contributing inad vertently but significantly to the German victories against Samsonov s Army in the days to come. From the beginning, perceptive German officers detected another flaw in the Russian offensive—the poor state of training of the has tily mobilized Russian divisions and the low literacy level of the peasant soldiers which resulted in an inability to master intricate communications encryption systems. So, not blessed with a surplus of radios and field tele phones, the.Russians resorted to broadcasting instructions "in the clear," to the delight of German wireless interceptor teams. The net result was that Eighth Army Headquartersknew as soon as Russian subordinates what the Stavka was thinking about. Bolstered by this knowledge and the entreaties of the incurablyaggressive Francois, Prittwitz elected to attack with three corps against the Russians at Gumbinnen on the 20th. Despite initial German success, again against the Russian center, Rennenkampf's forces held, and by dusk Prittwitz was faced with the hard choice of withdrawing or digging in for the night to resume the attack on the following morning. Events else where influenced his decision.
The excitablePrittwitz knew that Samsonov's Second Army was laboring across the Polish salient, but he calculated that its advance would be slow and that it could not strike his flank for several days. As his northern wing attacked Rennenkampf on the 20th, however, he was chagrined to discover via aerial reconnaissance that Samsonov's columns were approach ing Mlava, the southeastern gateway o East Prussia, and west of the Masurian Lakes. Moreover, he was deceived by conflicting intelligence reports into believing that yet a Russian Sharpshooters In Action third Russian Army was on the march Against Germansin East Prussia and could enter the German homeland and emerge at Deutsch-Eylau and Allen- stein well to the rear of his elements then at Gumbinnen.11
90 This combination of the threat in the south and the tenuous nature of the situation in the north, necessitating at least another day's fighting— perhaps more—put Prittwitz in a state of extreme anxiety. Despite the ob jections of his principal staff officers (Quartermaster General Grunert and Lieutenant Colonel Max von Hoffman, the operations officer) that the situa tion did not warrant drastic action and that a "wait-and-see" policy might be moreexpedient, the commanding general surmised that a desperate move was required to avoid the destruction of the Eighth Army by the combined forces of Samsonov and Rennenkampf. Near panic, he rang up Moltke'sHeadquarters in Berlin and reported that he was ordering Eighth Army to withdraw without delay behind the Vistula, with no guarantees that he could evenhold on that line!n
Here one encounters one of the most interesting incidents of the entire war. Following his urgent call to Berlin, Prittwitz was calmed by his staff into a state of rationality. Grunert and Hoffman demonstrated the absurdity of retreat and began to sketch on the map a plan whereby the Germans could exploit their advantage in lateral communications, Samsonov's reluctance toward rapid movement, and Rennenkampf's ignorance of German strengths and dispositions. According to various accounts, Prittwitz consented to the operation which would become known as the "Tannenberg Maneuver" and aban doned his plans for a general retreat. The irony arises, however, from his vacillation. Although calmed in his growing enthusiasm for the staff's pro posal, he forgot to inform his officers that he had already called Moltke; thus, when he concurred on the evening of the 20th with the new plan, nobody thought to advise the Supreme Headquarters that retreat wasout of vogue and that a new German offensive was being planned. In Berlin, ignorant of Pritt witz restored confidence, Moltke was afforded an excellent opportunity to ridthe Army of another pair of presumed incompetents. With the Kaiser's approval, Prittwitz and his Chief of Staff were sacked and a new Commander- Designate selected—General Paul von Beckendorff und Hindenburg (coin- cidentally, Prittwitz1 brother-in-law),recalled from retirement. An alter- ego and Chief of Staff was also chosen—the redoutable and competent Major General Erich Ludendorff, lately famous for his role in the capture of Liege Substantiation for the relief was developed in an arcane and not too honorable fashion by U.S. Army standards but one which was apparently characteristic ofGerman General Staff procedures. Bypassing Eighth Army Headquarters, Moltke s officers contacted their counterparts at corps and division level m the Eastern Front to assure that Prittwitz1 panic wasnot justified, thereby neatly double stitching the sack-by dealing directly with Prittwitz1 subordinates.*
The new commander, Hindenburg, was already known for his victories in other German wars and provided a legitimate image; his Chief of Staff the energetic Ludendorff, was the personification of German military genius. The pair, only recently acquainted, personally came'to be known as a team—Hin- denburg-Ludendorff (or H-L) by virtue of the consistency of their joint views
*The same procedure was followed in September 1914 when Moltke was relieved following the Battle of the Marne on the Western Front.
91 BPW
and mutual affection. They would breathe new life into the efforts of the Central Powers in the East. They arrived by train at ancient Manenburg Fortress on 23 August, but while enroute, they had/already approved#the con cept of the southward deployment which Hoffman had hastened to initiate. Using an analogy, if Hoffman and Grunert were the "architects" of the coming victory at Tannenberg, then H-L were assuredly the "contractors.
The essence of the Tannenberg maneuver was to be an amalgam of mass, surprise, and economy of force. Briefly, the scheme formulated by Hoffman and sanctioned by the new command was this: the bulk of the Germanforces (I, XVII, and I Reserve Corps) were to be deployed southward, their move ments concealed behind the Masurian Lake region to join the XX Corps near the East Prussian southern border in an endeavor to envelop Samsonov s advancing Second Army; only a small force (most of one cavalry division) would remain behind to retard the hesitant advance of the Russian First Army into East Prussia. (See Map 25) If the Second Army could be defeated quickly, before Rennenkampf could react or accelerate his progress, then the German Eighth Army could reconsolidate in the Insterburg Gap and endeavor to defeat him in turn. It was a high risk proposition in which the German chips were to be their excellent lateral routes and better trained forces, despite numerical inferiority. The high command gambled on several tenuous factors: (1) that Rennenkampf would not hasten his western advance, smothering the cavalry division to his front; (2) that upon learning of Samsonov's plight, he could not or would not react quickly enough" to come to the SecondArmy's relief;ld (3) that the crude state of Russian electronic communications would give H-L timely knowledge of Russian plans and dispositions to afford counter reaction time; and (4) that the rapidity and boldness of the stroke in the south would catch the Russian High Command by surprise, when the two armies were widely separated and when Samsonov was advancing on a forty-mile front along poor lateral roadnets. They were correct—or lucky—on all counts, but both Hindenburg and Ludendorff could not be certain that any of the premises would hold,* thus adding to the brilliance of the stroke. The decision- making process, however, was not as instantaneous as many accounts suggest.
Before the arrival of H-L in the theater, Hoffman had already issued the movement plans to the Corps commanders for the intended envelopment of the unsuspecting Samsonov, then advancing along the northern lip of the Polish salient. TheRussians intended to swing to the north soon, toward Allenstein andthe out de sac which would bag the German Eighth Army. Ludendorff approved Hoffman's orders and amplified them with more details of his own. Francois1 I Corps was to move by rail from Insterburg on the 21st to the south viathe circuitous but excellent railroad from Marienberg and Deutsch- Eylau, then march southeast and take up positions on the right flankof General Friedrich von Scholtz1 back-pedalling XX Corps by the 25th of August. While this was a partial solution, it could not accomplish the desirable destruction of an active Russian Army.As the locomotives pulling strings
*In his memoirs, Ludendorff recounts the anxiety that he felt through out the period of the battle, that the ominous threat in the northeast would become a nightmare of reality. In a paraphrase he stated that the Germans were continuously "staring in anxiety over their left shoulders."
92 of cars loaded with Francois1 veterans chuffed toward its terminus, H-L pondered the wisdom of raising the ante by sending XVII (General August von Mackensen) and I Reserve (General Otto von Below) also southward against the Russians at Bischofsburg. On the 24th, they opted for the bolder course and the regiments of those two units turned their faces from the east and began a forced march to the south through Bischofstein and Seeburg, leavingRennen- kampf unattended save for the aforementioned cavalry division.
An early morning intercept of Russian radio traffic indicated that the decision was correct, for it disclosed that Rennenkampf intended to continue eastward but at a \/ery slow rate--he had already taken one dayoff on the 20th to rest his troops. Thus, the plan of maneuver began to take shape on the ground: I Corps, buffered with Lancfaehr troops, would be on the German right, in position for a thrust at the Russian left flank; XX Corps would slowly withdraw in the German center to lure the enthusiastic Russian XV and XXIII Corps deeper northeastward, upon the false anticipation of a quick and easy victory; I Reserve and XVII Corps would descend from the north, the latter sliding to the east to form the German left and thus create an inverted "U" around both wings of Samsonov's Army. In the next phase, as opportunity permitted, the German flankunits would maneuver to encircle the Russians completely so thatthey could be destroyed at German leisure. An attack was ordered by Ludendorff for the 26th, when all units were in posi tion (See Map 26). Phase II opened violently.
As might be expected, Francois1 Corps kicked off the action, although he delayed the initial assault—again in violation of written orders—to permit his tardily detrained artillery to move into position. Despite the delay, he took Seeben, the Corps objective by 1300. Although ordered to proceed eastward that day and take Usdau, he again defied his superiors and delayed the assault until the 27th,i* allowing his Corps time to consolidate. Scholtz XX Corps held its own on the 26th. Scholtz hesitantly committed only one division, whose commander, equally reluctant, did not advance expeditiously and missed an opportunity to take the advancing Russian XV Corps in the flank. On the north, I Reserve and XVII Corps sent Samsonov's VI Corps fleeing southeastward and moved ominously toward the Russian XIII Corps. Although H-L had now cast the die, Moltke was quite apprehensive about the outcome and worried that Rennenkampf would turn southwest behind the lakes He ordered Colonel von Tappen to ring up Ludendorff at his field headquarters, offering reinforcements from the Western Front. Although he protested that more troops were not then required andthat if sentthey would arrive too late, Ludendorff was informed that Moltke insisted that the transfer was in order. Thus was the German right wing in France deprived of vital combat power at a critical time.
Conforming to his own perception of the situation, Francois took Usdau on the 27th. Thisresulted in the penetration of the Russian left and isolated the I Corps from its flank Corps, the XXIII (west of Niedenburg). Francois then diverted part of his corpssouth againstSamsonov's I Corps and chewed its remnants which were falling back from Soldau. On the left, the Russian VI Corps was fleeing eastward ahead of Mackensen's XVII Corps, now turning to the southeast. The netwas closing around the Russian center although the victory was in no way assured, for it was"touchand go" in Scholtz1 sector where the situation remained in doubt.
Ludendorff ordered Francois to send a division northwards to bolster the XX Corps and forthe fourth time in as many weeks, Francois chose to disregard his superiors' instructions, without so much as an acknowledgment or explanation. Instead, he ordered his troops due east on Niedenburg on the 28th. As for XX Corps, Scholtz was left to his own devices and spent the day plugging holes in the dike; Russian rivulets in several places threatened to wash away his positions, thus deterring his envisioned advance eastward.
Meanwhile, in the Russian headquarters on 27 August, Samsonov was unaware that his army was on the brink of disaster, and he cheerfully ordered an offensive to the northwest for the next day. The friction of war and poor communications blinded him to the fact that both flank corps (I and VI) had been so roughly handled that any attack was doomed from its inception. The steamroller was creaking to a halt.
The 28th was the day of decision. (See Map 2?) Scholtz1 shaky XX Corps held in front of the limited Russian advance, although the days of long marching, fighting, and limited logistical support had taken their toll. The Germans hitthe XXIII Corps flank in the afternoon, and like a skeet target when struck by well-aimed shot, it disintegrated and its commander fled in terror, concealed under a German coat, into the oblivion of disgrace and dismissal. The annihilation of the Corps took place justeast of the tiny village of Frankenau. Francois, mesmerized by his success, drove stolidly onward toward Niedenburg, again disregarding two orders from Army Headquarters to swing northeastward to assist XX Corps, although he did divert one divi sion toward Lahna. As the Army staff's perception of the Russianplight became more evident, Francois1 orders were changed, directing him to continue toward Niedenburg. This message must have evoked a cynical Francoisian grimace as he passed it around for his own staff to read. On theeast, I Reserve andXVII Corps added little,being countermarched by Ludendorff from pursuit of the fleeing Russian VI Corps back toward Allenstein and Passenheim, respectively. Despite the troop grumbling resulting from the frequent changes in orders,two German corps were now in the rear of the Russian XIII Corps which was endeavoring to move southwest to link up with the collapsing XV Corps; steadily, Scholtz and Francois tightened the noose. As historian Cyril Falls noted, "It was like herding stock into a corral, and the head cowboy was Francois."15
The 29th and 30th were almost anti-climatic days. German activity in the last phase could euphemistically be compared to "shooting fish in a barrel." Command ineptness, fatigue, despair, communications failure—all these retarded further vigorous Russian action. The Russian soldiers, in a state of stupefaction, seemed to stand childlike, in their hasty positions, awaiting their fate—death or capture. One narrow escape alley was found, about fifteen kilometers wide and along the swift-running Omulev River toward Ostrolenka, the Russian jumpoff point on the 20th. This corridor could not accommodate all the struggling transport, soldiers, and beasts endeavoring to avail themselves of the passage, and many died along the roadside. From Usdau to Ortelsburg, wherever Russians moved, in seven of the eight principal compass points, theyfound exultant Germans with rifles poised. Artillery
94 slammed with despairing regularity on every road intersection. The three interior corps (XV, XXIII, and XIII) were literally destroyed as Second Army' died in the fastnesses of the trans-border region. General N.N. Martos, Commander of the XV Corps became a prisoner as did the commander of the XIII Corps. Samsonov, retreating with his staff, found the sheer weight of respon sibility for the debacle too much to bear; in a nighttime tragedy near a small rural village, he took unannounced leave of his subordinates and ended his life with a pistol shot. The replay of Hannibal's Cannae had materialized in southeast Prussia. A timid southward thrust to affect relief by Rennen- kampf, finally ordered by Jilinsky on the 17th, was hastily recalled by the uneasy First Army Commander.
By conservative estimates, the Germans took between 55,000 and 75,000 prisoners, having left 70,000 Russian dead in the ditches and forests which encompassed the battlefield of Tannenberg,* so named by Hindenburg in the dispatches to the Kaiser announcing the magnitude of the victory. There was little time for resting on laurels, however, because Rennenkampf's army was still in East Prussia and could at any moment move reinforced on Konigs- berg or the Passarge crossings.
During the Tannenberg imbroglio, Rennenkampf had been inching his First Army westward through the Angerberg gap, unaware that he was opposed by only the most skeletal of forces in one of the greatest deception schemes in all of warfare's history. Neither was he cognizant that ever more frequently arriving trains fromFrance and interior Germany were disgorging fresh, highly spirited regulars and well-trained reservists, eager for a chance to do battle. By the end of the Tannenberg battle, Eighth Army had been augmented by XI Corps, the Guard Reserve Corps and the8th Cavalry Division. Russian troop strength in the northwest had been reduced by aboutfifty percent while German strength had been increased by about the same. It was a far more formidable and inspired army that turned on Rennenkampf than had moved on Samsonov two weeks earlier.The Russians still had the numerical edge (24 versus 16 divisions), but numbers have never been entirelydecisive in war fare, as Hannibal, Gustavus, Napoleon, andLee would testify.
Several factors besides troops strength made the outcome almost predic table. German morale had soared as a consequence of the great victory over Samsonov's Army; Rennenkampf, jolted by the news of the disaster, forsook all previous inclination for a vigorous advance into Prussia and began to dig in; and Russian communications blunders continued to provide attentive German ears with all the information H-L needed to finalize the Eighth Army plan for a repetition of the success in thesouth. Their enthusiasm was moder ated, however, by the knowledge that the Austro-Hungarians had begun to suffer some alarming reverses in Galicia and Serbia. Conrad sought German acqui escence for a stroketoward Warsaw to draw off Russian strength south of the Polish salient, but the Germans demurred for the time being, seeing Rennen-
*Tannenberg, considering the long term, was a grudge fight. In 1410, Polishand Ruthenian armies had defeated the German Order of Teutonic knights in a pitched battle near the same location as that of August 1914.
95 kampf as the most obvious threat. Still, Hindenburg was fearful of his own right flank as he moved northwestward against the Russian First Army.
Rennenkampf anchored his army along strong natural obstacles, rivers in the north and the Masurian Lakes in the south. (See Map 28) The German scheme of maneuver called for a wide envelopment of the Russian strategic flank while holding attacks pinned the remainder of the line in place. Interestingly, the bulk of the German divisions were committed to the secon dary mission. H-L assigned two of the most aggressive German commanders (Mackensen and Francois) the enveloping mission—that is to say, they were to sally from the southern lakes region southof the fortress of Lotzen in a wide sweep to the northeast and then north to land astride the roads to Vilna behind Rennenkampf's arnr.y.
The first action following the German advance occurred on 7 September when one of Francois1 divisions scattered a Russian force at Bialla. By the 9th, the Germans were pressing all along the front. At first the Russian defense was successful in the center, but Rennenkampf noted that his left was in danger and he elected to initiate a withdrawal. By 13 September he had fallenback to the Russian border thereby restoring the situation essen tially to what it was when he had begun the advance into East Prussia a month before. The price he had paid for his brief "tour" of the fringes of the German homeland included 145,000 men and 200 guns.16
Prussia had been cleared, Rennenkampf was licking his wounds, the First Army had taken prodigious losses, and the Second Army would be months in achieving reconstitution. Two great victories in as many weeks buoyed German confidence in its Eastern contingents and served to offset the cryptic and disquieting bulletins of Moltke's failures in the Marne battles. H-L had established an initial reputation for success that already was arousing global awareness. They were becoming legends in their own time.
The Russian failure at Tannenberg and Masuria lay not entirely on the field commanders' heads. Another individual contributed directly to the disaster. While Rennenkampf and Samsonov cannot be exonerated for their tactical mistakes, neither could Marshal Jilinsky, Commanding General of the Northwest Army Group be forgiven for his strategic blunders. Jilinsky, in response to the urging of the French for an early offensive, had not counselled his superior, the Grand Duke Nicholas, to defer all movements until mobilization was complete and the requisite logistical base established for such a grandiose maneuver as was contemplated. Further, he directed that two large armies approach East Prussia in a poorly coordinated fashion, virtually isolated from each other by an obviously restrictive natural obstacle. He compounded Samsonov's problems by insisting upon a more rapid approach march than the troops could attain and at a sustained fast pace for several conse cutive days overpoor and marginally trafficable terrain. His arbitrary orders wore out Samsonov's troops who had to undertake severe sustained combat against relatively fresher German troops.17 Finally, his combat intelligence and communications planning were so poorthat he did not perceive the oppor tunity between the 26th and 30th of August to push Rennenkampf forward in the movement to the'southwest which the Germans feared most. The maneuver might have saved the bulkof Second Army and forced the Germans to separate their
96 forcesbefore reinforcements could arrive from the West. Now the Eighth Army could breathe easier. But it would have to look to the southeast, to an area where other Russian armies, like the "Old Contemptibles" and Poilus on the Western Front, were decrying the myth of Central Power invincibility. The Slavs were mauling the Teutons and the Magyars there.
OPERATIONS IN GALICIA, 1914
From the Austro-Hungarian viewpoint, as was the case with other major European participants, except for Russia, the Eastern Front was secondary. It was a primary objective of Vienna to assault and punish the recalcitrant Serbians; after that, perhaps attention and the bulk of combat power could be employed against adversaries who ranked lower on Austria's scale of priorities: Italy, possibly Rumania, the distant French even, or Russia. Notwithstanding Vienna's immediate concern, however, Conrad appreciated the ominous threat to the Empire presented by Russian armies surging across the Vistula. Moreover, there had never been great accord between Hapsburg and Romanov. These were the reasons why Austria had hoped that the German effort in the East would be greater and more closely coordinated with her ally. Barring this, Conrad had to prepare to deal with Russia largely alone, never quite being willing,however, to exercise real economy of force on one of his two fronts.
Initially, he relied on the Dual Monarchy's Plan B, which called for the launching of three armies across the Danube and Save Rivers against Serbia. (See Map 24b) Under this plan, three additional armies faced eastward in a defensive posture against the undesirable likelihood that the Russians would move against Austria and not Prussia. The abysmal failure of the firstAus trian invasion of Serbia, the surprise premature Russian advance into East Prussia, the declination of Italy and Rumania to enter the war on the Central Powers' behalf, and the visible assembly of large Russian forces between Lublin and the Dniester, all convinced Conrad that Plan B should be amended in favor of Plan R which required that an additional army be removed from the Serbian front and be transferred to Galicia. Therewere additional factors that bore on another critical decision--that to go on the offensive in Gali cia. The shallow depth of defensible terrain north of the Carpathians sugges ted the desirability of attaining more breathing room; and the desire to undertake a prestige-restoring venture following the Serbian fiasco was im portant. Also, Conrad probably was victim to the same weakness as befellthe Czar and the Grand Dukeof Russia—he wanted to be a good ally—by undertaking an offensive against the Russians he hoped to draw a considerable amount of attention and strength to the southeast, relieving pressure on East Prussia. If successful, this would permit the Germans to hold that region with the modest Eighth Army, keeping their West Front armies at full strength so as to bring the war in France to a speedy and successful close forthe Central Powers.
By contemporary European military standards, the Austrian Army should have given a better account of itself than it did. It was modeled along German lines with balance existing among the combat arms of infantry, cavalry,
97 CENTRAL EUROPE, 1914
PLANNED ARMY CONCENTRATION AREAS
SWEDEN
□ ronovichi * -i i *
Rovno" THIRD J'lom,
UK! N E
,- ■ oKlasenbufa
RUMANIA
o Craiova
V-B U L" G A R 1° A *fyarna - -" ■ n EAST PRUSSIA, 1914 TANNENBERG CAMPAIGN
Siiuolicn 23 Auqusiond Movements Since 17 Auqust 1914 ■■ BALTIC S E
PRUSSIA, 1914 BATTLE OF TANNENBERG tualion Evening of 26 Auou EAST PRUSSIA. 1914 BATTLE OF TANNENBERG * uaMan 30 Augusi and I Operalions Since 27 Ajqust 1914