PRELIMINARY RE3RARCH STUDIES for TH8 DRAMATIZATION of the "BATTLS OP TANNENBSRG*. CALTER L. 7SIBT-B, F C Aptain

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PRELIMINARY RE3RARCH STUDIES for TH8 DRAMATIZATION of the PRELIMINARY RE3RARCH STUDIES FOR TH8 DRAMATIZATION OF THE "BATTLS OP TANNENBSRG*. CALTER L. 7SIBT-B, f Captain, C» A> C. PRELIMINARY RESEARCH STUDIES FOR THE DRAMATIZATION OP THE "BATTLE OF UNMENBEHO." WALTER L. WEIBLE, Captain, C.A.C. NOTE: This individual research was made for the assistance of the remainder of the group of officers engaged in this Group Research. STRENGTH, ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL OF THE OPPOSING FORCES IN EAST PRUSSIA DURING THE PERIOD AUGUST 20th - 31st, 1914. (With special reference to those forces employed in the "Battle of Tannenberg.") - Page 1. ­ PART I - OERMAN. 1. General Organisation. a. Infantry Division. 4 regiments of Infantry (5 battalions eaoh)..12 bns. (13,000 man) 24 machine guns. Artillery: 64 light field guns IB light field howltiers 72 pieces. In addition the Corps usually attached 8 of their heavy howitzer* to eaoh of Its two Infantry divlclone. b. Reserve Infantry Division. the oonposltlon snd organisation of this unit was lden­ tloal with that given above except that there were only 36 light field guns Instout of 54. This type unit had no Corps Artillery which could be attached to It except that heavy artillery which might be attached from the fortresses. o. Landwehr Brigade. 2 Infantry regiments of 5 battalions each....6 bns. (6,000 men). Maohlne guns none. Artillery: 12 light field guns .12 pieoes. d< Cavalry Division. 6 cavalry regiments of 4 squadrons each 24 squadrons (4,000 men) Machine guns .........6 Artillery: 12 light field guns 12 pieces. e. The Oernan Reserve units were expanded from secrot cadres upon the declaration of war. Die German General Staff - Pago 2. ­ had made earuful preparation* for this expansion, hence Gernany'a enemies in computing her strength did not give them proper consideration* The Landwehr or 2nd Line of Reserve unita had been used in the majority of oases for garrisoning the fortresses prior to the declaration of war. They had received field training and in East Prussia, they marched and fought as well as first line units. The Landsturn did not represent an active force at the beginning of the war but it was better trained than the Russian Militia whioh had no fighting value whatsoever. 2. Spooiflc Organizations and Personnel. a* Supreme Headquarters (The High Command or G.H.Q.) Commander: The Emperor of Germany, KAISER WILHELM II. Chief of Staff: Full General von MOLTKE. Quartermaster-General (Deputy C of 8)1 Lieut* General von STEIN. Chief of Operations Seotion (Asa't C of S, 0-3) t Colonel TAPPEN. b. Commanding Officer of wireless stations in East Prussia} 1st Lieut, von RICHTHOPEN. c. Eighth Army. Commander» Full General MAX von PRITTWITZ und GAFFROH. General of the Infantry PAUL von BENECKEN­ DORF und HINDENBURG (after August 22nd). Chief of Staff: Major General Count von WALDERSEE. Major Oeneral Erich von LUDEHDORFF (after Aug. 22). Quarter-Master General (Deputy C of S)t Major Oeneral ORUNSRT. Oeneral Staff} Col. FORNAN. - Pfcge 3. ­ i.leut. Colonel HOFFMAN (0-3). Mujor DRESCHRL (Intelligence - alao Liaison Officer with I Reserve Corps). Major THOMSKN (went to staff of von der OOLTZ'8 division on Aug. 29). Captain von WALDOW. Captain FRANTZ. Captain von BOCKKLBURO. Captain 2IPPEH (Intelligence - also Liaison Offioar with XVII Corps). Orderly Officers (Aides)» Captain lilBRZINSKI. Captain CAKUMERER ( No. 2). Lieut. PRKYKR. Inspector of the Lines of Communicationt Lieut. Oeneral von HEUDUCK Chief of Engineers: Brig. General KERSTEN. Chief of tho Field Railroader OST. Oeneral Deputy of the Kaiser (Liaison Offioer from O.H.Q.): Oeneral of the Cavalry Count BUROGRAF und ORAF au DOHNA - SCHLOBITTEN. Liaison Offioer from Austrian Ann,: Capt. FLEISCHMANN. In charge of unloading trains of I Corps: 1st Lieut, von STEPHANI. (This officer also seemed to have general charge of all transportation at Army Headquarters.) Air Corps: 16th Field Observation Flight. Lieut. G3.ERKB " PAVER " STRAUCH 4th Fortress Observation Flight (at Posen) Dirigibles: Z - 5. (a Zeppelin). It wan shot down near Mlawa In the - Page 4. ­ latter part of August. Commander: Captain 0RUN5R. d. Organization of the Eighth Army. I Army Corps. Commander: Oenercl of the Infantry HERMANN von PRANC0I3. Chief of Staff: Colonel Baron SCHMIDT von SCHWIDTSECK. General Staff: Lieut. Colonel KARMANH (0-2). Major von MASSOW (0-3). Captain MERTENS. Captain SCHUBERT Orderly Officers (Aides) t Major HARWICH (acting). Lieut, von PRAHCOIS. Lieut, von KUNHKIM (No. 2). Lieut. Count KAN 117,. 1st Infantry Division. Comnander: Lieut. Oeneral von CONTA. Chief of Staff: Major ORABERO. 1st Infantry Brigade. Commander: Major Oeneral von TROTH A ( killed August 30th). Colonel SCH0H7ELD. Adjutant: Captain SAXBR. 1st Orenadiers - Colonel EOOERSS. 4l8t Infantry - Colonel 3CH0NFBLD. 2nd Infantry Brigade. Commander: Major Oeneral PASCHEN. 3rd Orenadiers - Colonel von WEDEL. 43rd Infantry - Colonel von BI3ENHART-R0THE. 8th Uhlans - Lieut. Colonel Freiherr SCRAPPER von BERNSTEIN. 1st Field Artillery Brigade. - Page 6. ­ Commanderi Major Ooneral MOBWES. 16th Field Artillery - Colonel BROMSIS. 62nd Field Artillery - Colonel HELLWIO. 2nd Infantry Division. Commander: Lieut. Oeneral von FALK. General Staff: Major OOBDEL. 3rd Infantry Brigade. Commander! Major General MENOKLBIER. Adjutant: Captain JACOBI. 4th Orenadlers * Colonel STERN. 44th Infantry - Colonel von LOEPEH. 4th Infantry Brigade. Commander: Major Oeneral BOESS. Adjutantt Captain WOLLEKMANK. 33rd Fusiliers - Colonel von FUMETTI (killed August 26th). Lieut. Colonel WEICKB. 45th Infantry - Colonel MAASS ( wounded August 28th). 10th Mounted Jaegers - Lieut. Colonel BERRINO. 2nd Field Artillery Brigade. Cootaander: Major Oeneral FOUQUET. 1st Field Artillery - Lieut. Colonel von SYDOW. 37th Field Artillery - Colonel von der LIP#3. * Heavy Artillery: 1st Bn., 1st Heavy Art'y; 2nd Bn., 16th Reserve Heavy Art'y (on August 25th from Thorn). Engineers: 1st, 2nd and 3rd companies, 1st Engrs. (distributed among the divisions*) At* Corps: 14th Field Observation Flight: 1st Lieut, von HBYDEN. Lieut. BURCKHAHDT. MERTEN3. - Page 6. ­ Lieut. HESSE, pilot ) Aeroplane A - 29, " KORNKR, observer) " CANTER. XVII Army Corps. Commanders Oeneral of the Cavalry AUGUST von MACKENSEN, Chief of Stafft Lieut. Colonel von DUNKER. Oeneral Staff: Major Oraf von SCHWEHIN (0-3). Captain BARTENWERFSR. Captain ZIPPER (Liaison Offioer from Army Hq.). 55th Infantry Division. Couuanden Lieut. Oeneral HBNNIO. General Staff: Major BNOELIEN. Adjutant: Major von KSI8ER. 70th Infantry Brigade. Commander* Major Oeneral SCHU1DT von KN0BEL8D0RF. 21st Infantry - Lieut. Colonel HEYN (killed August 26th). 61st Infantry ­ 67th Infantry Brigade. Commander: Major Oeneral von HAHK. Adjutant: Captain TIEBEMAHH. 141st Infantry - Lieut. Colonel von STEINKELLEP. 176th Infantry ­ 2nd Jaeger Battalion (up to August 28th). 4th Mounted Jaegers. 35th Field Artillery Brigade. Commanderj Major Oeneral UHDEN. 71st Field Artillery ­ 81st Field Artillery ­ 96th Infantry Division. Commandert Lieut. Oeneral von HBINKCCIU8. Oeneral Stafft Major von WINNING. - page 7. ­ 69th Infantry Brigade, Commandert Major Oeneral von ENOfcLBRECHTON. Aidei let Lieut, of the Reserve TOBPFFER. 129th Infantry - Colonel BRES3LER. 175th Infantry ­ 71at Infantry Brigade. Commander: Colonel von PBWITZ. Aide: Lieut, of the Reserve ORACK. Adjutant; Captain BACHKR. 6th OrenadlerB - Colonel Prelherr von EICHBNDORFF. 128th Infantry - Colonel von TRECKOW. 6th Russara - Colonel Prelherr von BARNEXOW. 36th Field Artillery Brigade. Commander: Major Oeneral HAHNDORFF. 36th Field Artillery - Major WALDEYER. 72nd Field Artillery ­ Heavy Artillery: let Bn., 17th Heavy Art«y; let Bn., let Reserve Heavy Art'y from Konlgeberg (August 19th-21st). Engineerst let, 2nd and 3rd companies, 17th Eng'rs (distributed among the divisions). Air Corps; 17th Field Observation Flight. XX Army Corps. Commandert Oeneral of the Artillery von SCHOLTZ. Chief of Staff: Colonel HELL. Oeneral Staff: Major von EOOELIHO. Adjutant: Major von NOTZ. Aide: Captain of the mounted arms of tho Reserve von AMSBERO. 37th Infantry Division. Commandert Llout. Oeneral von STAABS. - Page 8. ­ General 8taffj Major von OAZEN (generally called GAZA). Aide? 1st Lieut, von KAUFMAHN. 73rd Infantry Brigade. Coomanderi Major General WILHELMI. Adjutant! Captain APFUHW. 147th Infantry - Colonel MITZSCH. 161st Infantry - Colonel DORSCH. 1st Jaeger Battalion. 76th Infantry Brigade. Commander: Major Oeneral von BOCKHANN. 146th Infantry - Colonel von HEYDEBR£CK. 160th Infantry - Colonel KUSTH*. 11th Dragoons - Lieut. Colonel HAASS. 57th Field Artillery Brigade. Commander: Major Oeneral B'JCHHOLZ, Colonel GIEBKLER. 73rd Field Artillory - Colonel FORST­ 82nd Field Artillery - Colonel PLANTIER. 41st Infantry Division. Conxnander: Major Oeneral SON TAG. Oeneral Staffs Major WEHIQER. 72nd Infantry Brigade. Commandert Major Oeneral 8CHAEK. Adjutant: Captain SCHMIDT. 18th Infantry - Colonel MECKK. 69th Infantry - Colonel SONNTAO. 74th Infantry Brigade. Commander: Major Oeneral RilSfcR. Adjutant: Captain TROMMKR. 148th Infantry - Colonel von der OSTKN. 162nd Infantry - Colonel 0EI8LER. 9. ­ 10th Dragoon* - Lieut. Colonel LEWINSKI. 41st Field Artillery Brigade. Commandert Major Oeneral NSUOEBAUER. 35th Pield Artillery - Lieut. Colonel WILCKE. 79th Field Artillery - Lieut. Colonel MARCUS. Heavy Artillery: 2nd Bn., 6th Heavy Art'y, - Major BISSIHOEN. Engineersi 1st, 2nd and 3rd oompanies, 26th Fng'ra (distributed among the dlvlaiona). Air Corps: 16th Field Observation Flight, 7th Fortress Observation Flight from Lotten.
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