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POLISH AND CAMPAIGNS IN 13TH–19TH CENTURIES

WOJSKOWE CENTRUM EDUKACJI OBYWATELSKIEJ IM. PŁK. DYPL. MARIANA PORWITA 2016

POLISH BATTLES AND CAMPAIGNS IN 13TH–19TH CENTURIES

WOJSKOWE CENTRUM EDUKACJI OBYWATELSKIEJ IM. PŁK. DYPL. MARIANA PORWITA 2016 Scientific editors: Ph. D. Grzegorz Jasiński, Prof. Wojciech Włodarkiewicz

Reviewers: Ph. D. hab. Marek Dutkiewicz, Ph. D. hab. Halina Łach

Scientific Council: Prof. Piotr Matusak – chairman Prof. Tadeusz Panecki – vice-chairman Prof. Adam Dobroński Ph. D. Janusz Gmitruk Prof. Danuta Kisielewicz Prof. Antoni Komorowski Col. Prof. Dariusz S. Kozerawski Prof. Mirosław Nagielski Prof. Zbigniew Pilarczyk Ph. D. hab. Dariusz Radziwiłłowicz Prof. Waldemar Rezmer Ph. D. hab. Aleksandra Skrabacz Prof. Wojciech Włodarkiewicz Prof. Lech Wyszczelski

Sketch maps: Jan Rutkowski

Design and layout: Janusz Świnarski

Front cover: against Theutonic , XVI century drawing from Marcin Bielski’s Kronika Polski

Translation: Summalinguæ

© Copyright by Wojskowe Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej im. płk. dypl. Mariana Porwita, 2016 © Copyright by Stowarzyszenie Historyków Wojskowości, 2016

ISBN 978-83-65409-12-6

Publisher: Wojskowe Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej im. płk. dypl. Mariana Porwita Stowarzyszenie Historyków Wojskowości Contents 7 Introduction

Karol Olejnik 9 The Mongol Invasion of in 1241 and the battle of Karol Olejnik 17 ‘The Great War’ of 1409–1410 and the Zbigniew Grabowski 29 The Battle of Ukmergė, the 1st of September 1435 Marek Plewczyński 41 The Battle of 8th September 1514 Henryk Lulewicz 51 Stephen Bathory’s Expeditions against Muscovy (1579–1581) Witold Rawski 59 The Battle of Kircholm 1605 Przemysław Gawron 67 The Paweł Przeździecki 87 The Polish-Turkish War of 1620–1621: the battles of Cecora and Chocim Rafał Roguski 103 The Battle of Berestechko 28–30 June 1651 Mirosław Nagielski 113 The Campaign of 1660 Marek Wagner 127 The Battle of Chocim, 10–11 November 1673 Mirosław Nagielski 139 Campaign 1683 Janusz Wojtasik 147 The Battle of Racławice, 4th April 1794 Tomasz Malarski 155 The ’s Polish Troop in 1815 Tomasz Strzeżek 167 Battle of Iganie, April 10, 1831 Zbigniew Moszumański 177 Battle in the Kobylanka Forest, 1–6 May 1863

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Introduction

The thousand-year and the Polish battles from that period, starting with the nation reveals many battles which not only changed the (1514) and ending with the Vienna Campaign (1683), con- course of the history of Poland, but also other countries stitute the core of this work. in Central and Eastern . A team of Polish The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which was the historians from both civil and military circles wishes to name of the state created by Poland and after present you with a selection of campaigns and battles the Union of in 1569, was a military superpower fought by , from the at the time. Victories achieved in the battles of Kircholm, against Tataro-Mongolians in 1241, through the Battle Klushino, Berestechko, Chocim and Vienna made Polish of Grunwald against the Teutonic Knights in 1410, to the famous throughout Europe. Above all, it was of 1863–1864. The battles were selected the , who, with their daredevil charges that de- according to their significance and results. Campaigns and cided the course of campaigns, earned people’s greatest battles are presented chronologically and each study has respect. been appended with a drawing. Other important battles from the point of view of the The book begins with texts on campaigns and battles of history of the Polish include battles fought in the the in Poland (Legnica, Grunwald, Ukmergė). name of sovereignty at the end of the 18th century and However, battles that are particularly interesting, espe- armed attempts to regain independence at the end of the cially from the point of view of general , are . These problems are discussed in the last texts those fought during the Polish-Lithuanian Union, as dur- of the book. ing that period were very eager to learn from their The authors and editors of this work are aware that this allies and enemies and incorporated new types of arms, is not a full record of the history of the Polish army. Never- military organisation, tactics and strategy into the Polish theless, they hope that the book will be warmly received army. This led to the creation of the peculiar blend and and plan to continue the subject in the form of studies distinctiveness of the Polish art of war which flourished in on selected campaigns and battles fought by the Polish the 16th and 17th centuries. Descriptions of campaigns and Armed Forces in the 20th century.

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– Karol Olejnik – Higher School of Humanities and Journalism in Poznan

The Mongol in 1241 and the battle of Legnica

The process of feudal fragmentation, although com- firmation of how little we knew about the strangers from mon in medieval European countries, was relatively short the depths of the Asian steppes. in Poland. However, its effects were disastrous. The first The Tatar army entered the territory of Poland between endeavours to recentralise the country, initiated in , December and January 1241. In its first stage, the invasion were made between the 12th and 13th centuries. At that time, covered lands on the east of the river, particularly Henry I the Bearded, and later his son Henry II the Pious, Lublin and . Within several weeks the invaders established the so-called ‘monarchy of the Silesian Hen- advance farther to the west and besiege , ries’. Although their rule was consolidated only in Silesia Wiślica and Skarbimierz. After breaking down resistance of and , in many areas Henry’s authority being local knights in Tursko Wielkie and besieging Zawichost, purely nominal, and although the remaining regions of the the troops head towards Sieciechów, where they cross fragmented country were still feuding, Wrocław’s initiative the Vistula river and move to ’.2 At the beginning of is considered the first stage of the unification process.1 March 1241 attacked for the third time. This time It needs to be assumed that this state of affairs was also after crossing the Vistula river in Sandomierz, the noted by other countries, which perceived the Henries as divided into two groups, one of which headed north and a political factor in the territory between the Vistula, the other, probably stronger, advanced towards Cracow. and Warta. In any case, in all their political endeav- On their way, the army won the battle of with ours, the external factors in distant territories had to allow knights from and reached Cracow. Upon for the Silesian line of the Piast . And vice versa, capturing the city (only st. Andrew’s church withstood all political events that took place outside their dominion the attack) and after a short repose, they continued west. triggered Wrocław’s reaction. Their route went on through Racibórz and , and at The above mentioned comments will gain significance the beginning of April the hostile army stopped outside in the context of events which took place in the 1230’s in Wrocław. At this point, however, we need to stop our nar- territories to the east of the , in connection with threats ration in order to point out some details. from Tatars. News of the Mongolian army reached Poland 2 The most creadible and at the same time extensive source of as early as the end of the 12th century and became par- information is ‘Annals or Chronicles of the Famous Kingdom ticularly intensified ca. 1237, when the Mongol invasion of of Poland’ by Jan Długosz (Roczniki czyli Kroniki sławnego Rus’ practically ended. These news, however, cannot be Królestwa Polskiego, Chapter VII, 1974), which was assumed to have contained sufficiently detailed informa- proved to have used (cf. G. Labuda, ‘Wojna z Tatarami w roku tion on the character of the army, its equipment or fighting 1241’, in Przegląd Historyczny, vol. L, pp. 189–224), lost sour- methods. To some extent, the course of events which took ces, unknown to us today. According to Długosz, in 1241 ‘Batu […] of the Tatars […] arrives in Poland and with unusual place on our lands in the first half of 1241 constitute a con- swiftness plunders and ravages two highly populated Polish cities: Lublin and Zawichost together with adjoining 1 Cf. J. Baszkiewicz, Powstanie zjednoczonego państwa polskie- and lands’ (author’s translation). J. Długosz, Roczniki czyli Kro- go na przełomie XIII i XIV w., Warsaw 1954. niki…, Chapter VII, pp. 9–10.

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It follows from the above comments that before Tatars oeuvres (arrow barrage, manoeuvre) than reached the city walls of Wrocław, Polish knights had the Polish knighthood, accustomed to close combat with tried to stop them. Their effort was realised in the battles the use of pole-arms and melee weapons; 6. the Mongol of Tursko, Racibórz and Chmielnik. It is assumed that the army mainly consisted of , unburdened with first of the mentioned battles took place approximately in tabors and riding unusually sturdy horses. All this added to the middle of February. The Mongol army fought against the great swiftness of the Tatar army, as well as to its ability from Sandomierz and Cracow, summoned by to travel long distances and overcome natural obstacles. Bolesław V the Chaste. Despite a promising beginning, Thus, the subsequent attempts to suppress the danger- the battle resulted in a total defeat of the Polish army.3 It ous assailants from the east failed. Only then did the loose turned out that even when forces of the two regions were sovereignty of the Silesian duke over the attacked regions combined, the Polish knighthood could not be compared of Lesser Poland become significant, for it is known that to the aggressors. The historians are baffled by the second those who had been defeated in the mentioned battles battle, i.e. the battle of Racibórz, because of the lack of fled to Silesia.6 At this point, however, a question arises: written sources. According to the recent findings, Tatars did Tatars assume the necessity to defeat Henry II the Pi- surrounded Racibórz twice.4 At first the town was defen- ous upon their arrival in Poland, or was the battle of Leg- ded, but when Mieszko II the Fat, encouraged by his initial nica merely a result of their successful battles with the success, decided to lead the local forces against the ag- knights of Sandomierz, Cracow, Opole and Racibórz? The gressors, he was completely defeated and had to withdraw available sources do not explain this issue, which leaves to Silesia with the remaining troops, where he was taken historians with a wide uncertainty margin. under Henry II the Pious’s wing. At that moment, Henry Based on war campaigns led by the newcomers from was perceived as the last chance of successful resistance. Asia, the historical and military literature assumes that The third battle was fought in Lesser Poland, in Chmiel- prior to commencing their expeditions, the Mongols car- nik. This time the Tatars, headed for Cracow, battled with ried out a thorough reconnaissance of the lands on which the knighthood of Sandomierz and Cracow, unfortunately they would perform their future manoeuvres. We can as- with the same result.5 sume that this time their tactics did not differ. Thus, the It follows from the above mentioned assumptions that: aggressors were aware of the balance of Polish political 1. The sovereignty of Henry II the Pious over the attacked forces and Henry II the Pious must have been perceived areas could not have been well-established if the local as the most dangerous opponent who had to be defeated dukes tried to defend their lands single-handedly; 2. The in order to properly pacify the acquired lands to the north attempts at local concentration of forces (knighthoods of the Carpathians. At this point it is worth mentioning of Sandomierz and Cracow, followed by knighthoods of that the main Tatar forces were headed towards the Pan- Opole and Racibórz) did not produce great results be- nonian Plain, , which constituted the dominant cause they were made too late (almost in the face of the political power in this part of Europe. The assault on Po- enemy); 3. wrong tactics were employed in the battles. land, therefore, was merely supplementary. The fact that The Polish knighthood fought in accordance with the only Henry’s army did not react to the January or February at- strategy they knew – close combat. In the first stage of tacks could have led them to believe that it was a result of the battle, Tatars assumed this technique, but they sub- both surprise at an unexpected time of the invasion and sequently feigned in order to break the oppon- the lack of awareness of its gravity. Nonetheless, the duke ent’s ranks and perform a fast manoeuvre which would of Silesia remained a potential threat to the aggressors, result in heavy defeat; 4. this form of clash was greatly in- which induced the Tatar command to launch an assault fluenced by the fact that Polish was unable on Wrocław. to defy the light cavalry of the Tatars; 5. During the fight, The invasion began at the beginning of March 1241 and the aggressors could perform a much wider array of man- its objective was to pillage as much of Henry’s lands as possible, so that he would not be able to partake in the

3 J. Długosz, Roczniki czyli Kroniki…, Chapter VII, p. 11. events which were simultaneously taking place in Hun- 4 G. Labuda, ‘Wojna z Tatarami…’, p. 204, footnote 63. 5 J. Długosz, Roczniki czyli Kroniki…, Chapter VII, p. 14. 6 Ibid., Chapter VII, pp. 15–16.

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gary. To this end, the Tatars divided their forces into two sary for Henry II the Pious to await the opponent in Silesia. parts. The southern part headed towards Cracow, and Perhaps the news of the January of Sandomierz later Racibórz, Opole and Wrocław. The aim of the second reached the duke early, but did not contain information on troop was to support the former by deterring forces from the enemy’s future intentions. The Tatars could have taken Łęczyce, Sieradz and . The troop’s objective con- a number of routes when heading to Wrocław. They could sisted in taking a detour to Łęczyce and change the direc- have e.g. go via Cracow, Racibórz, Opole, as well as in the tion to south-west, heading towards the capital of Henry centre of Poland via Sulejów and Sieradz. II the Pious.7 We should add that at one point part of the The second route led through populated and fertile northern group joined the first troop outside Cracow. It is lands, whereas the first one went through three well-for- likely that the reinforcement of the mentioned group was tified urban centres. The duke could assume that these dictated by allowing for the possibility of a Silesian attack. centres would detain the assailants, giving him sufficient It is also worth noticing that the operations of both these time to make further decisions. The enemy knew the troops were aimed at rejoicing in Silesia. This proves that route which led from Wrocław via Sieradz and Sandom- the aggressors were perfectly aware of the balance of ierz, which is proved by information contained in an an- political powers on our lands. nual called Rocznik świętokrzyski (the name deriving from Around 5th–7th April the entire Tatar forces met near the Świętokrzyskie province – translator’s note), accord- Wrocław, but there was no sign of the Silesian army, which ing to which the Tatars took the route when returning to at the time gathered in Legnica. The choice of this place Rus’ after the victory in the battle of Legnica.8 The doubts was dictated by several premises. First and foremost, it was as to the direction from which the Mongols would attack favourable in that it allowed the anticipation of help from seemed to have been resolved by the beginning of March, the west and south (), where – as can be suspec- when the duke received information on the devastation of ted – the news of the aggressive invaders had already cir- areas around Iłża, Piotrków and Sieradz Land. At this point culated, spurring the ‘crusade’ impulses of its knighthood. Henry could only gather the forces and await the raid on Furthermore, it was there that a large castle stood, which Silesia from both sides, for he already had received bad the duke considered his residence rather than Wrocław. news, first from Cracow and a little later from Racibórz and Additionally, Henry could assume that in the case of Opole. Wrocław’s siege, he could attack the besiegers, which was One of the further consequences of the decision to not without significance. Regardless of the reasons, Leg- await the enemy in Silesia was the assignment of the con- nica became the place of intentional concentration, the centration point in Legnica instead of Wrocław. Legnica point to which the survivors of previous battles fled as well was situated more to the west and there was a chance as the centre of force accumulation, from which the Polish that the enemy would want to siege the capital of Silesia, planned to attack the aggressors. which made it possible to ‘come to the rescue’. To this Before we discuss the issue connected with the course end, the duke made feverish arrangements which would of the battle of Legnica, it is worth noticing a series of allow the citizens of Wrocław to defend the city as persist- doubts arising from the actions the Silesian duke had ently as possible.9 The possibility of siege seemed to have taken since the beginning of the Mongol invasion. The been proved in the case of Cracow, Racibórz and even st. first of the arising questions – why didn’t Henry face the Andrew’s church in Cracow, which was the only centre of enemy – has already been answered when we mentioned resistance that withheld the aggressors in the burning city. the high level of political of the attacked areas It needs to be added that the lack of clarity in Długosz’s as well as difficulties connected with the accumulation of writing makes it impossible to confirm whether the city forces, adverse weather conditions and the element of sur- of Wrocław was in fact besieged or not, however it is of prise. There are also military reasons which made it neces- 8 ‘Rocznik świętokrzyski’, in MPH, vol. III, p. 71. This message was 7 Apart from Długosz (Roczniki czyli Kroniki…, Chapter VII, pp. conveyed with the wrong date of 1239, and the place name 16–17), other sources also provide information on this subje- was pyszne pole (pyszne field). Also compare: G. Labuda, ‘Woj- ct. These are: ‘Rocznik kapituły poznańskiej’, in Monumenta na z Tatarami…’, pp. 222–223. Poloniae Historica (hereinafter: MPH), vol. III, p. 9; also ‘Kronika 9 Cf. Dzieje Wrocławia do roku 1807, Warsaw 1958, p. 72, footno- wielkopolska’, MPH, vol. II, p. 561. te 188.

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little consequence here. But if well-fortified Legnica was tioned theories. The analysis of written sources concern- appointed as the place of concentration of forces led by ing the rule of both Henries allows us to conclude that the Silesia duke, then what persuaded Henry to leave the armed forces played a major role in the implementation fortification and face the risk of confronting the enemy in of their unification plans. This was the case when Henry the open field? I the Bearded strengthened his position in Greater Poland There are differences among the authors on this mat- as well as at the time when he kept strategic Lubusz from ter. Some assume that the Polish army left the town in the Margraviate of Brandenburg. It is hard to imagine that order to meet Wenceslaus I, king of Bohemia, who was his heir, Henry II the Pious, should not have been trained approaching with help from the Kamienna Góra mountain in . Considering that his deeds were noted in pass.10 Some researchers claim that by doing that the duke records as early as around 1210, he had plenty of time and wanted to stretch his forces, which on the one hand does opportunities to gain not only political, but also military not agree with the chivalric code that had already been experience. This can be proven by the fact that occasion- employed in knighthood, but on the other – made sense ally Henry I the Bearded trusted his heir with the entire considering that there were many survivors of the previ- army during the mentioned (some indeed unsuccessful, ous clashes with the Tatars (battles of Sandomierz, Tursko, we should add) power struggles.13 All this allows us to Chmielnik). Their accounts must have awed Henry and dismiss the incompetence theory, especially that Henry influenced his decision.11 It seems, nonetheless, that the was perfectly familiar with the area in which the fight took answer to the aforementioned questions could be found place. What then? What may help us is literature, namely when analysing the formation in which Henry II the Pious an attempt at a different interpretation of Jan Długosz’s arranged his army as well as the battle itself. account. Jan Długosz writes that the duke spread his troops over When describing the departure of the Polish army from a vast plain, divided by a river. Studies have shown that Legnica, W. Zatorski writes: ‘[…] knowing that the Mon- the place of the battle stretched between Koskowickie gols were immobilised by a blockade of Wrocław, Henry lake and the village of Koskowice, situated on the edge remained ignorant of their plans. Had he carried out a re- of a highland.12 Across this area ran a route from Legnica connaissance, he would have acquired information about to Wrocław, which the Tatars took. It is easy to note that their departure to Legnica’ (author’s translation).14 The at the moment of the clash Henry’s army had two water situation is judged differently by a contemporary histor- obstacles behind its back – the and Biała Struga ian, who concludes from the writing of Jan Długosz that rivers, the former quite substantial. Considering the season upon hearing that Henry was accumulating his forces in (early spring) this was a significant factor. The mentioned Legnica, the Tatars immediately headed there from Ra- highland narrowed the spot suitable for deploying the en- cibórz, avoiding Wrocław. Moreover, the historian notices tire army. This means that Henry either made a striking an advantage in the Mongolian strategy, resulting from the mistake by choosing such an inconvenient place, or was ability to move on roadless tract.15 Both the mentioned surprised in the course of implementing some other plan historians came to the same conclusion, namely that the and had to take up arms. approaching Mongols had taken Henry by surprise. It can At this point, account should be taken of the attributes be assumed that even if the Silesian duke had counted on of the duke’s army in order to bow to one of the men- the Tatars arriving at Legnica (according to Zatorski), he

10 Cf. W. Zatorski, ‘Pierwszy najazd Mongołów na Polskę w 1240– 13 Cf. S. Smolka, Henryk Brodaty, Lwów 1872, p. 101; and M. Ło- 1241’, in Przegląd Wojskowo-Historyczny, vol. IX, 1937, pp. dyński, ‘Polityka Henryka Brodatego i jego syna w latach 175–237; S. Krakowski, Polska w walce z najazdami tatarskimi 1232–1241’, in Przegląd Historyczny, vol. XIV, p. 144. Also: w XIII w., Warsaw 1956, pp. 148–149. A great amount of interes- R. Grodecki, ‘Dzieje polityczne Śląska do roku 1290’, in Historia ting information can also be found in sketches devoted to the Śląska, vol. I, Cracow 1933 and J. Baszkiewicz, Powstanie zjed- battle of Legnica, a volume entitled Bitwa legnicka. Historia noczonego państwa polskiego…, p. 77 et seq. i tradycja, Wrocław–Warsaw 1994, however it does not involve 14 W. Zatorski, ‘Pierwszy najazd…’, p. 226. any new suggestions as to the interpretation of the battle. 15 Cf. T. Jasiński, ‘Strategia i taktyka wojsk polskich i mongol- 11 G. Labuda, ‘Wojna z Tatarami…’, pp. 214–216. skich pod Legnicą w świetle nowo odczytanych zapisek Jana 12 Ibid. Długosza’, in Bitwa legnicka. Historia i tradycja, pp. 110–111.

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could not have ruled out the possibility of meeting them the was: ‘[…] composed of the best and bravest on his way to the rescue. If, on the other hand, he had been warriors […] for some time the fight between the two surprised by the Mongols (as Jasiński claims), it is without opponents was fierce. When a significant number of the much importance whether they actually avoided Wrocław Tatars were killed, the Polish almost won, for the Tatars or not. In truth, the latter variant is confirmed by the form- started to think of retreat when their ranks thinned out. ation of the Christian army during the battle itself. Among many banners in the Tatar army there was a size- The formation of the Polish army and its allies at the be- able one […] At the top of its shaft there was an image of ginning of the battle is not accounted by Długosz in great a ghastly head […] when the Tatars retreated by one detail. But let him have his say: ‘Upon passing the outskirts furlong and commenced to escape, the bearer of said ban- of Legnica, […] he arranges the army and divides it into four ner began to […] shake the head […] Instantly, it belched divisions. The first division consisted in the Crusaders and forth steam, smoke and fog which then spread over the volunteers of different nationalities and speaking different entire Polish army and due to its repugnant smell […] the tongues. In order to tighten their ranks, they were comple- Polish, almost fainting and barely alive, could not fight any mented by gold miners from the town of Złota Góra. […] more’ (author’s translation). The second division (constituted) knights from Cracow and Before we move on to the bottom line, we need to add Greater Poland. […] The third were knights from Opole […] that extensive research on the Tatar military service has The fourth […] Poppo von Osterna, the grand master of confirmed Długosz’s account of the use of stupefying gas , with brothers and his knights. The fifth was led by by the Mongols during battles. It may be that it had merely duke Henry himself. It consisted of Silesian and Wrocław a psychological effect on the medieval knighthood and squires, skilled and important knights from Greater Poland did not result in casualties, but its significance must have and Silesia as well as a small number of others, hired for been significant. For us, however, the above description pay’16 (author’s translation). Unfortunately, little can be of the battle is of a different significance. It tells us how concluded from the above information, although it is pos- Henry’s army was arranged immediately before the battle. sible to complement this description with the account of There is no uniform stand on the question of the Polish the battle itself, also written by Długosz. Upon dismissing military formation in literature. Some authors assume that information which is not relevant to our analysis, we are there were two wide lines (the first one consisting of the left with the following: : one, two, three and four; the second one – of – the first , composed of foreigners, volunteers duke Henry’s reserve regiment).17 Other suggest ‘steps’ or and gold miners from Złota Góra (as a means of tightening ‘horseshoe’ formations.18 However, it is easy to notice that the ranks) fought the Tatars in the first stage of the battle. compared with Długosz’s accounts, these assumptions Despite its initial success, it was soon surrounded and must raise serious doubts. broken; – If the line was composed of four regiments, why did – subsequently, other two regiments entered the battle only one attack the Tatars in the first stage of the battle? (the second and the third). Again, despite a promising be- – Why was the first regiment surrounded at the very be- ginning, both divisions were defeated as a result of a trick ginning of the fight if it was supported on both sides by the performed by the enemy (the opposing army encouraged remaining divisions? to escape the battle by shouting ‘run, run!’, which confused – Why didn’t these remaining divisions attack the en- the Polish ranks). The other cause of the defeat was the emy when it was engaged in fights with the first regiment? fact that the protective of the Polish army turned – Why did regiments two and three enter the battle only out to be ineffective in the face of an all-out barrage of the after the first regiment was destroyed? Tatar archers. On the other hand, they remained out of Moreover, it is worth noticing that the arrangement reach of the Poles’ melee weapons. of Henry’s army as described in literature strikes as quite – at that point, Henry used the reserve regiment. But let 17 Cf. J. Sikorski, Materiały do historii sztuki wojennej, part I, War- us once again give the floor to Długosz, who claims that saw 1953, p. 91 etc. 18 Cf. W. Majewski., J. Teodorczyk, ‘Historia wojskowości polskiej 16 J. Długosz, Roczniki czyli Kroniki…, pp. 21–27 description of w XIII w.’, in Przegląd Historyczny, vol. XLVIII, no 1, p. 334; G. La- the battle of Legnica. buda, ‘Wojna z Tatarami…’, p. 219.

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static. Everything happens in stages. Attacks are carried Although Henry probably assumed that he would com- out one after another until the final defeat. The literature mence attack only on the outskirts of Wrocław, the form- fails to answer the above questions, which encourages to ation in which his army was arranged allowed him to take seek resolution elsewhere. It seems that the fact that Henry on the battle much earlier. In that case the regiment at the II the Pious entered the warpath at that particular mo- head of the march was to attack first. Upon engaging the ment, place and array – which probably looked different opponent, the next divisions would enter the battle end- than described in historiography – should be considered ing with the reserves. However, this idea turned out to be holistically and treated as his preconceived strategy. faulty, as the head of the Christian army was surrounded For such an experienced leader as Henry II the Pious, and the Tatar archers prevented the other two regiments news of subsequent defeats faced by the Polish - from entering the battle. The duke’s regiment, however re- hood in the east contained certain hints as to the reas- mains calm, for the role of the surrounded division was only ons for these failures. The choice of Legnica for the place significant in terms of binding time. A longer resistance of of the concentration in itself was dictated by the neces- the regiment was impossible because of poor armament. sity to help besieged Wrocław (its siege being probable, At this stage, the battle proceeded in line with the duke’s considering the seizure of Cracow or Sandomierz). The expectations. Although the first division was surrounded, choice of Legnica also resulted from the assumption that regiments two and three entered the battle with great im- the Tatars could approach from two sides (Sieradz and pact, and Henry’s own strong regiment, which was still in Opole). The news from Tursko, Chmielnik and Racibórz control of the battle, was close behind them. The retreat did not incline the duke to attempt fighting in the open of part of the warriors from the battlefield, the result of the field without proper preparations, as it would result in Tatars’ deceptive shouts, constituted the pivotal moment another failure, which had to be prevented. The sub- of the fight. In this situation the reserve group could not sequent stages of Henry’s actions ought to be perceived achieve much. Although the duke’s division fought fiercely, in this context. the preponderance of the Tatar regiment as well as the ter- The duke led out his army from Legnica and at the same ror in the Polish ranks caused by the mysterious ‘smelly’ time could not remain within the town, for his objective gas constituted the final straw. Henry, along with many was not to defend it, but to defeat the enemy before they outstanding Polish and foreign knights, was defeated. destroy the whole region. We also need to remember that The significance of the battle of Legnica was great, and the knighthood which Henry amassed was not fit for de- multidimensional, constituting both a political and mil- fensive battles. If we assume that leading the Polish army itary failure. The political significance was the death of out of Legnica was a result of a particular strategy, the sub- Henry II the Pious, which broke the first attempt to cent- sequent decisions made by the duke as well as the course ralised the divided Poland. Under the reign of Henry I the of events on the battlefield become reasonable. Henry in- Bearded and Henry II the Pious, Silesia underwent dy- tended to head to Wrocław, where he could conveniently namic growth on all levels, which is why the plan of unific- attack the Tatars when they were occupied with the siege. ation, propagated by the local dukes, had a solid working Upon leaving Legnica, the Christian army is divided into base and chances of success. After the defeat at Legnica, regiments and assumes a marching formation. The fourth this process was disrupted for several decades and the and first regiment (according to Długosz’s numbering) separatist tendencies gained the upper hand. Only at the form the head division – the vanguard followed by regi- end of the would the dukes of Greater Poland ments two and three. Finally, in order to avoid mistakes come forth with a similar idea, although it would happen made in the previous battles with the Mongols (perhaps in much worse conditions and with an increased external resulting from the survivors’ accounts), the duke himself threat. Let us add that this second attempt at the unific- takes place at the head of the reserve regiment. In this ation of Poland would again be broken after the tragic marching arrangement, the Polish divisions are headed death of Przemysł II. towards Wrocław on a road that leads to the town. It is Secondly, the collapse of the Piast state of Silesia easy to note that this type of formation constituted a tight would result in a gradual German and (to a lesser extent) block which was secured, to a certain extent, in case of an Czech colonisation of the district within the next decades, attack at all times and from all sides. which in turn would bring about its political and economic

– 15 – – Karol Olejnik –

inclination towards rather than Cracow. This pro- capital of Poland, but also individual ‘capitals’ of the re- cess would also have its cultural dimension, for the knight- gions, such as Sandomierz or Opole. A substantial surface hood, merchants as well as (to a certain extent) craftsmen of the country was destroyed, as a result of the enemy’s and monks would be ‘recruited’ from . It is no tactics, aimed at disorganising and weakening the Polish wonder, therefore, that when Cracow would make yet an- lands in order to rule out possible assistance given to the other, this time successful, attempt at unification at the attacked lands at the . There is no doubt, there- beginning of the 14th century, Silesia would remain outside fore, that such extensive consequences of these first sev- of the grasp of Władysław the Short, the unifier of Poland, eral weeks of the year 1241 must have result in numerous and would become part of the Crown of st. Wenceslas. afterthoughts. The military consequences of the Legnica defeat were They would manifest themselves both instantaneously also significant. The 1241 invasion was the first encounter and in the longer term. The latter would include the con- of the Polish knighthood with different tactics. Insofar as viction of limited power when it comes to resisting the the contemporary Polish art of war was a typical product hostile armies from the east – which is confirmed by sub- of the European military tradition, the Tatar army was rad- sequent Tatar invasions in the second half of the 13th cen- ically different. It’s difference was reflected in armament tury – and which would result in attempts to create a safe- and equipment as well as in strategy and tactics in all guard in the form of a stronghold at the time of Casimir III stages of war preparation. This encounter was extremely the Great. These are the categories (apart from political, painful to the Polish party. Henry was defeated, as were dynasty and economic justifications) in which we can per- many distinguished knights from all regions, including ceive the return of the policy of the Kingdom of Poland to a large portion of those killed during the previous battles. the Galician Rus’, so that such strongholds as: Jarosław, Several large urban and town centres were destroyed, not Przemyśl, Lwów, Halicz, Tustań or Trembowla successfully only Cracow, at the time of fragmentation considered the protected the Polish lands.

Bibliography Primary Sources S. Krakowski, Polska w walce z najazdami tatarskimi w XIII w., J. Długosz, Roczniki czyli Kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego, Warsaw 1956 Lib. VII–VIII, Warsaw 1974 (J. Długosz, Annales seu Cronicae S. Smolka, Henryk Brodaty, Lvov 1872 incliti Regni Poloniae, Lib. VII–VIII, Warsaw 1975) J. Sikorski, Materiały do historii sztuki wojennej, vol. I, Warsaw ‘Rocznik kapituły poznańskiej’, in Monumenta Poloniae Historica, 1953 vol. III Articles ‘Kronika wielkopolska’, in Monumenta Poloniae Historica, vol. II G. Labuda, ‘Wojna z Tatarami w roku 1241’, in Przegląd Histo­­- Books rycz­ny, vol. L Bitwa legnicka. Historia i tradycja, ed. Wacław Korta, Wrocław– M. Łodyński, ‘Polityka Henryka Brodatego i jego syna w latach Warsaw 1994 1232–1241’, in Przegląd Historyczny, vol. XIV Dzieje Wrocławia do roku 1807, Warsaw 1958 W. Majewski., J. Teodorczyk, ‘Historia wojskowości polskiej w XIII w.’, Historia Śląska od najdawniejszych czasow do roku 1400, vol. I, in Przegląd Historyczny, vol. XLVIII, no. 1 Cracow 1933 W. Zatorski, ‘Pierwszy najazd Mongołów na Polskę w 1240–1241’, J. Baszkiewicz, Powstanie zjednoczonego państwa polskiego na in Przegląd Wojskowo-Historyczny, 1937, vol. IX przełomie XIII i XIV w., Warsaw 1954

– 16 – – Karol Olejnik – Higher School of Humanities and Journalism in Poznan

‘The Great War’ of 1409–1410 and the Battle of Grunwald

One of the results of fragmentation of the Polish early Order’s forces were also strengthened by guest crusaders Piast state was loss of territory. Due to emerging decent- who, in search for glory, came to in order to wage ralist tendencies, the authority of the central government war against pagan Lithuania and thus fulfil the duty of diminished along with the possibility to manage military a ‘holy war’ against heathens. In addition, the Order’s army forces, which, in consequence, led to weakened defence was supremely equipped and armed which, in addition to capabilities. It shouldn’t be surprising that the expansion other of its values, such as an efficient chain of command of neighbouring states (especially Bohemia and the Mar- and resources gathered in strongholds, made it an enemy graviate of Brandenburg) caused the loss of Silesia, Lubusz to be feared. Land and Western . The latter, under the influ- This situation lasted throughout almost entire 14th cen- ence of ’s and the Empire’s expansion, in the end tury, when not only Poland but also the Grand Duchy of chose its own path and developed into an independent Lithuania could see the power of the Order. Whereas the duchy. A different fate awaited and the lands Kingdom of Poland ruled by Casimir the Great (1333–1370) on the right bank of Vistula’s mouth. The latter, originally and his successors ( and queen Hed- settled by Baltic Prussians, were conquered during the wig) tried to avoid military confrontation with the Order, second half of the 13th century by the Order of Brothers Lithuania had no choice but to fight uncompromisingly of the German House of Saint Mary, commonly known in defence of its territory. It was the Teutonic threat that as the . After impoverishing the Prussians, pushed both of the countries to sign a in the Teutonic Knights built a strong state with its capital in the late 1380s (signing of the treaty took place in Krewo Malbork and in the beginning of the 14th century reached in 1387)1. for the territories on Vistula’s left bank. They quickly From this moment the situation changed radically. conquered not only Gdańsk but also lands bordering with Although the Order’s power, multiplied even further by the Brandenburg dominion on the west and with Kujawy the help of the aforementioned guest crusaders and the on the south. support of the Empire on international arena, still posed The cause of these astonishing victories was not only a threat, nobody in Malbork underestimated the joint Pol- the weakness of the Kingdom of Poland which was still ish-Lithuanian forces. Moreover, the united countries had uniting at that time (early 14th century), but also the virtues of an efficiently organised Teutonic state. The structure 1 Of the vast literature devoted to both the consequences of of this organisation was ruled by religious discipline and fragmentation and the rising threat of the Order, the following military needs. Material resources acquired from taxes col- works are of fundamental value: J. Baszkiewicz, Powstanie lected mercilessly from villagers allowed to build strong- zjednoczonego państwa polskiego na przełomie XIII/XIV wieku, Warsaw 1957; M. Biskup., G. Labuda, Dzieje zakonu krzyżackie- holds and fortify cities, which made keeping citizens in go w Prusach, Gdańsk 1986; K. Górski, Zakon krzyżacki a po- line easier and, in case of an attack, permitted unrelenting wstanie państwa pruskiego, Wrocław – Warsaw – Cracow– defence. These castles also served as additional staging Gdańsk 1977, every aforementioned item contains a vast areas for military activities aimed at further expansion. The literature on the subject.

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time on their side. slowly adopted from Cracow not strengthened its cause by new conquests and thus posed only the basics of Christian faith (effectively knocking the a threat to the whole of Greater Poland. It was especially argument of ‘holy ’ out of the Teutons’ hands), dangerous that Teutons reigned over , which but also the achievements of western civilization, includ- was separated from Pomerelia3 only by a thin stretch of ing the military field. Polish territory with Wałcz, and . As it In Polish-Lithuatian relations with the Order, the turn of soon turned out, the Teutons decided to take advantage the 14th and the characterised itself by rising of this fact to finally dispose of Poland. They planned to tensions which admittedly resulted in Teutonic ‘reysas’ on direct the main strike from Neumark against both Greater Lithuanian territory, but never led to a larger-scale con- Poland and the aforementioned narrow pass connecting flict. The factors inhibiting more decisive steps on the Pol- Poland with . However this idea didn’t ish side were both the actions of queen Hedwig and the become reality due to an unrelenting defence by the Pol- established realization, that a war with the Order, posing ish military in the castles of Wałcz Land (i.a. in , as a symbol of Christian expansion on territories not sub- Mirosławiec and Wałcz). The strike of the Order’s army on ject to the rule of , carries a risk of not only clash- Kujawy and the northern part of Greater Poland in August ing in battle, but also of suffering various political con- had a similarly meagre effect, although the attackers did sequences. It required multilateral preparations, which succeed in seizing for a brief period of time. could be observed not only in Cracow, but also in Vilnius Nonetheless, the counter attack of Polish forces in au- and Malbork. tumn allowed to regain this stronghold. The incoming The turn of the centuries also carried many démarches winter convinced both parties to sign a truce effective on both sides, aiming at improving their strategic situation. until 24 June 1410. It was agreed, that all issues will be It is such categories through which we should perceive resolved by Zygmunt Luksemburski, a person seemingly the Order acquiring Dobrzyń Land, which met with Polish neutral, but in truth favouring the Teutons. Both Malbork response in the form of fortifying several castles in Wałcz and Cracow didn’t have any doubts, that the war will be Land and an alliance with Western Pomerania. However, continued. when the Teutons reached for (partly by purchase, partly It seems that military activities of 1409 had a decisive by force) Neumark, the situation escalated quickly. The impact on both sides’ strategic objectives in the following first clash between Poland and the Order took place at the year. The Order found out, that their opponents possesses turn of the years 1403 and 1404. The castle in military forces adequate not only to thwart the Teutons’ was seized by the Order’s army and thus became the bone strategic plans (elimination of the narrow pass in Wałcz of contention. Strategic location of this stronghold (on Land), but also to regain lost points of fundamental value, a road from deep within the Empire to Malbork) inclined such as Bydgoszcz. An outright recapture of this strong- the Polish side to win it back, although without success. hold from the Order’s forces could reinforce the Teutons’ Over the course of the coming years both sides fought conviction, that regaining control over Pomerelia will be of battles for , Gwda and middle Noteć Rivers with utmost priority to Jagiełło. The Teutons deduced, that the varying luck, while at the same time maintaining diplo- Polish strike will be carried out from Bydgoszcz and from matic relations. However the spectre of an impending war northern Greater Poland, along the left bank of the Vistula became more and more obvious2. River and into their dominion. From the start it was their The year 1409 marked the beginning of the great strategic objective to keep all of their lands. Accordingly, struggle between Poland, Lithuania and the Order. The they had to adapt a defensive tactic. This had crucial influ- Polish-Lithuanian side reinforced their conviction that ence on the Order’s preparations and the first stage of the actions on a limited scale not only do not improve the incoming war. situation, but worsen it even further. It was attested The Polish side approached the matter with scope and by the fact that, despite Polish resistance, the Order diligence unparalleled at that time. First of all, in December 1409 a war council was held in Brześć Litewski (Lithuanian 2 These matters are discussed in great detail based on vast so- urces and with international context in mind by: K. Olejnik, Brest) with the king, the grand duke and a vast Obrona polskiej granicy zachodniej od końca XIV do schyłku XVIII wieku, Poznań 1985. 3 Pomerelia, also referred as Gdańsk or Eastern Pomerania.

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circle of both military and civil advisers attending4. During This choice served to conceal the strategic objectives the meeting basic foundations pertaining to the summer of the Polish leadership (Czerwińsk, located upstream of campaign next year were laid down. The main directions the Vistula River from Płock, was 80 kilometres away from of the assault were dominions of the Order’s state on the the border of the Order’s state) and keep the enemy con- right bank and their capital – Malbork. It was decided, that vinced, that the Polish army will march through Bydgoszcz all manoeuvres should be carried out on enemy territory, to Pomerelia. in such a way as to bring about a decisive battle. The stra- The Teutons decided to act defensively and chose tegic objective was to inflict as much damage as possible Świecie on the left bank of the Vistula River as the wait- and afterwards regain at least some of territories lost to ing location. This tactic originated from the experiences of the Order earlier. It especially applied to the recently lost previous campaigns, when strongly fortified territories of Dobrzyń Land. The bulk of the joint Polish-Lithuanian the Order succeeded in resisting the Polish army, let alone forces were led by king Jagiełło, with the grand duke Lithuanian forces, which were hopeless against such an Vytautas as his subordinate. Devising such and ambitious obstacle. Thus, the Order could assume that the enemy plan required remarkably thorough material preparations will withdraw after the first strike. The Teutons would and caused a great deal of both tactical and organisa- then gain the opportunity to reinforce their defences on tional difficulties. During the aforementioned war council newly dominated land. The validity of such decision was many details were thought over, such as provisioning the further strengthened by news coming to Malbork about future army with food supplies (just for that in the winter hired by the Polish side and drawing (i.a. at the turn of 1409 and 1410 a great hunt was held in the from Bohemia) to Nakło, Bydgoszcz, Brześć Kujawski and entire country with salted meat sent to Płock), gathering Inowrocław. Furthermore, since the early spring of 1410 horse carts, wagons and appropriate military equipment. the Polish side was building up troops in Wałcz Land with Sometimes in literature we can find implications, that the small forces trying to attack Drezdenko which belong to Polish leadership used maps for planning future actions. the Teutons. A deep foray by the troops from Bydgoszcz It doesn’t seem likely. However, it shouldn’t raise any sus- in the first days of July reached the vicinity of Świecie, picions that precise terrain reconnaissance carried out by which forced the Teutons to put units garrisoned in castles emissaries – spies played a pivotal role. One should add, in Pomerelia on high alert. At this point one can notice, that identical means were used by the opposing side. that the Polish side maintained tactical initiative since the Because the war was supposed to be waged using Pol- beginning of the war, forcing the enemy to a limited de- ish knights and Lithuanian army, the necessity to concen- fence of fixed defence sites. At this moment the Kingdom trate the army arose, whereas the chosen direction of the of Poland’s army began to fulfil the fundamental strategic strike determined, that it should happen on the right bank objectives, which meant shifting the manoeuvres to the of the Vistula River. Since it was planned to strengthen right bank of a big water obstacle. The first step towards the Teutons’ conviction, that the assault will target their this was crossing the Vistula River. It undoubtedly was left‑bank dominions, a decision was made to cross the a difficult task for medieval knighthood further burdened Vistula River in the last phase of the manoeuvres, just be- with many carts and wagons and as a whole posed a great fore entering Dobrzyń Land, which wasn’t fortified by the organisational undertaking. Even this issue was discussed enemy heavily enough. Accordingly to those intents, it during the aforementioned council in Lithuanian Brest, was settled in Brest that Płock will serve as the place to where decisions were made about the construction of concentrate the military forces, whereas the Kingdom of a floating bridge in the upper reaches of the Vistula River Poland’s army will cross the Vistula River in Czerwińsk. (in ). It was afterwards floated to the vicinity of Czerwińsk at the turn of June and July. In its time it was 4 Cf. a fundamental work by S. M. Kuczyński, Wielka wojna z za- a very difficult operation. Such a skilful execution gives konem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411, Warsaw 1960. One can a high to the Polish military technique5. find there a detailed overview of the vast literature pertaining to the battle itself and the war campaign as a whole. A slightly different standpoint towards many specific issues can be fo- 5 Cf. M. Nowak, ‘Uwagi o technice budowy mostów polowych und in a study by A. Nadolski, Grunwald. Problemy wybrane, w Polsce w w. XV do XVIII’, in Studia i Materiały do Historii Woj- 1990. skowości, vol. II, 1956.

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The crossing took place between 30 June and 2 July Teutons reacted to the enemy movements by also setting and was carried out very efficiently. The basic source re- off towards the river’s source, in a parallel march along the porting these events, The Annals of Jan Długosz treat Drwęca River’s right bank. It was a significant convenience it as an indisputable tactical achievement, long before for the Teutons, that the castles located in this region (Kur- even encountering the enemy. Let’s add, that the plans zętnik, Iława, Ostróda, and ) could serve, if the pertaining to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania’s army cor- need arose, to assume defensive positions, take advant- responded with the place of the crossing as well as with age of the terrain, block the enemy’s movement or – bring the general plan of manoeuvres. In Brest, decisions were about a decisive battle. made for Lithuanian forces and Ruthenian regiments to Meanwhile the town and castle of Dąbrówno found gather up in the vicinity of the upper Narwia River at the themselves on the way of the Polish-Lithuanian army. turn of June and July. The concentrated military was to Despite adequate defence measures they were seized on traverse northern Mazovia with the intention to close in 13 June. According to Długosz the castle was conquered on the main royal force and then continue the intended by peasant and various camp servants. Maybe march into the Order’s state in the general direction of this way the king wanted to save the main troops, but it’s Malbork. Until the last moment the Teutons were utterly also possible, that he was acting conservatively in case convinced, that Jagiełło will emerge from the vicinity of of larger enemy activity. Storming the Dąbrówna castle Płock (along the left bank) and into the north. When they gave the Order’s army time to relocate towards Ostróda. received the message that the Polish army had crossed Its castle guarded the roads crossing nearby. The Teutonic the Vistula River and is most probably marching towards army took positions nearby, in the vicinity of Stębark vil- Malbork, the Grand Master had to verify his earlier plans lage, with the intent to await the further development of in great haste. events. Literature on the subject is dominated by a belief, The Teutons quickly moved from Świecie towards the that the Order’s leadership choose this spot on purpose, castle in Kurzętniki on the Drwęca River. Both the strong- because of a vast plain located nearby and stretching hold and the river itself seemed to constitute an effective between the Stębark–Łodwigowo–Grunwald and the Łu- defence measure. Both armies (Kingdom of Poland’s and bień Lake. Such a space would serve as a way to cross the Lithuania’s) conjoined even before reaching the Drwęca path of the incoming Jagiełło and Vytautas’ army perfectly. River and had superiority in numbers over the Order’s The opposing side probably also was in possession of this knighthood, which hastily drew more forces to Kurzętniki. information, and because a decisive battle was Jagiełło’s At that moment the defenders gained a chance of effect- plan from the beginning, and as opportunity presented it- ively standing their ground. Crossing the Drwęca River just self, he decided to take advantage of it. That the Teutons under the enemy front on the other side of the river (the chose the location of the battle earlier is evidenced by the Teutons gathered not only all of their manpower but also fact that they managed to prepare positions for their artil- almost all of their on the projected route) posed lery units and also dug a number of pitfalls (so called ‘wolf a great risk and threatened with the campaign’s collapse, pits’), which were to serve as an obstacle for the Polish cav- when it was just in its early stages. With such a situation at alry attacking their positions. It would be impossible with hand a decision was made in the allied camp to reroute the enemy directly at hand, so one should assume, that it the march towards the Order’s capital and avoid the afore- was in the evening of June the 14th, when the royal army mentioned water obstacle altogether. It was decided to was slowly approaching from the south-east. Jagiełło’s move away from the enemy blocking the crossing spot army stopped in the woods on the western shore of the and under the cover of the river go around Drwęca up to Łubień Lake, between the villages of Stębark and Łod- its source. Probably for convenience reasons it was de- wigowo. The field of the incoming clash stretched to the cided at that moment to leave the carts in that area. One west from their position. Beyond it the Order’s knighthood should add, that such a decision was dictated by terrain prepared itself for battle. conditions, because the area in which these manoeuvres The size of both forces remains as one of the most con- were carried out characterised itself with dense afforesta- troversial matters up until this day. From the beginning tion, numerous water obstacles in the form of lakes, which sources indicated profound discrepancies in this matter, forced the military to use the sparse roads available. The which, in a way, was used by literature, which quoted this

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data with great liberty6. The Jan Długosz related, that they approached the battlefield to finish off the wounded, 50.000 enemies were killed in the battle and 40.000 more take prisoners and loot. were taken prisoner, although he honestly admitted to not From above comparison shows that both forces were knowing if these numbers were correct7. Historiographers more or less even in numbers. The difference mainly per- who came after him usually multiplied these figures, per- tained to equipment. Knights from the West, mainly vo- taining to both the participants and the casualties. Modern lunteers (the guest crusaders) and mercenaries were the researchers are much more cautious and usually take mo- elite of European knighthood. We can’t doubt that their bilisation capabilities of both fighting parties as a basis of weaponry and equipment was cutting edge at that time. their calculation. Consequently, the Teutonic army prepar- The cavalry’s strike force was comprised of heavily ar- ing for a decisive battle on the fields of Grunwald totalled moured knights, fighting with , light spears, 21.000 cavalry and 6000 footsoldiers, to which circa 5000 and axes. They didn’t dominate in sheer numbers but, camp servants can be added, whose duty was to guard along with much more numerous equipped with the war camp comprised of horse carts. In total it would chain mails, determined the results of cavalry attacks. Let’s give the number of circa 33.000 people ready to fight the add that the horses used by heavy cavalry were equipped Polish-Lithuanian army. It’s worth to add, that these num- with barding, a sort of horse armour (it was usually made bers were mostly made up of mercenaries and the guest of , in rare instances – plate). Sometimes horses crusaders and not the Order’s knighthood. The Teutons were protected by caparisons. The Teutons paid much not only possessed enough material means to hire mer- attention to the quality of mounts. Horse breeding was cenaries (mainly from Germanic countries) but also had a common practice in their dominion, so the Order’s cav- excellently organised diplomatic corpus, which was able alry presented itself excellently from this perspective. The to convince travellers from Western Europe to take part in training regimen of the knighthood commanded by the a war with a fake-Christian Jagiełło and heathen Vytautas. Grand Master was set on a very high level. These people Armies of the latter were high in numbers also. They learnt basic military skills as early as during household were made up of: Polish knighthood and mercenaries education, in accordance with a detailed code of conduct, (circa 18.000 cavalry and 2.000 footsoldiers), Lithuani- which a young member of this social class had to abide. an-Ruthenian knighthood (circa 11.000 cavalry and 5.000 Regarding the practical side, altogether, monk-knights, infantrymen) and a rather unknown number of Tatars (ac- visiting volunteers and mercenaries had participated in cording to Długosz, there were three hundred of them)8. several war campaigns and also had experience from tour- The presence of the latter (let’s add, that their numbers naments, which at that time were held on most European were multiplied up to dozens of thousands both in histor- courts. ical sources and in literature) caused the Teutons to use it The Order’s infantry was of ranged character (cross- as an aggressively propagandistic argument, which served bows were the most common weapon) but in melee as the main evidence of the pagan nature of Jagiełło and combat swords, axes and spears were used. Protective his army. Going back to the quoted numbers, we can as- gear of the infantrymen comprised of shields, helmets sume that between 31 and 32 thousand soldiers took part and chain mails. According to some researchers, the Or- in the fight against the Order. Similarly to the Teutonic der’s infantry didn’t play a significant role in the battle of army, there was a rather large group of servants (circa Grunwald. Such claim is further evidenced by the fact, 500 people) on the Polish-Lithuanian side. Although they that both Długosz and the Teutonic sources remain silent didn’t take part in the main battle itself, it can be stated in this matter. Although it’s difficult to assume, that there without a shadow of doubt, that in the last phase of the were none present within the ranks of the Grand Master’s fight, when the scales of victory tipped in Poland’s favour, army. Teutons who rode into the field couldn’t rule out the necessity of defending at least river crossings or, in case of breaching the kingdom’s borders, the need to capture 6 These matters are discussed in detail by S M. Kuczyński in his enemy strongholds. Cavalry wasn’t fit for such tasks. Re- polemical book Spór o Grunwald, Warsaw 1972. 7 J. Długosz Roczniki czyli Kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego, garding the lack of sources, one could explain it by the Warsaw 1982, Chapter XI, p. 135. peasant nature of footsoldiers, who were overshadowed 8 Idem, p. 107. by the achievements of proper knights.

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The presence of artillery in the Teutonic army deserves Polish knighthood went to war with the Order due to the separate attention. The basic Teutonic account of this so-called general call (expeditio generalis), which was reg- battle, the Chronicle of the Conflict, reports that artillery ulated during the reign of Casimir the Great. According to was used in the first phase of the battle9. It could be at- it, a land owner had to answer the call of the monarch and tested by the fact that it was placed along with the foot- show up in a designated location along with an armed soldiers in the front line of the Order’s forces and was unit, equipped on his account. A rule was in force that protected by terrain obstacles on the forefront. Because both the equipment of the knight himself and his lack- during preparations the Grand Master’s army had to man- eys should be ‘within best ability’. This lack of precision oeuvre accordingly to the movement of the royal army, turned out to be unfortunate at best, because it allowed one should rule out, that the Teutons brought with them for arbitrariness in evaluating own capabilities pertaining siege artillery (such as bombards). They were probably to purchasing equipment and weaponry used during the light , which shot rock projectiles. The dynamic expedition. On the other hand, the respect for own safety course of the battle forces us to assume, that the outcome (and the safety of the fellowship) and the rules defining the of using this type of weapon was meagre. position of the knight depending on his financial abilities Knowing the excellent organisation of the Order’s state, excluded excessive departure from actual needs, where including the well developed town (i.a. in Gdańsk, Toruń, equipment and weaponry were concerned. The second Elbląg) and castle (above all in Malbork) craftsmanship, we form of was the so-called ‘expedition from can’t doubt that the Teutonic army possessed standard- demesnes and boroughs’. The landowner didn’t go to war ised equipment and weaponry, Apart from their own pro- personally, rather than send a certain number of cavalry duction, the Teutons bought weaponry on a large scale, and footsoldiers, whom he had to equip and arm by his especially in Germanic states, which were well known for own means. In such a case the command had a much such trade. Large quantities of weapons were stockpiled in bigger say in choosing certain weapons and equipment individual castles of the Order, which was a consequence possessed by the soldiers coming to the concentration. It’s of the precedence of aggressive politics employed in re- worth to note the third form of recruitment, which was the gard to neighbouring states. so-called ‘defence of the district’. According to it, all men Finally, let’s say a few words about the camps used by were obligated to participate in the war. The scope and both of the armies. Unfortunately we don’t possess precise form of participation were specified depending on the cur- data pertaining to this matter. One should assume, how- rent needs. It affected peasants (conscripted mainly to in- ever, that the Polish-Lithuanian camp was much bigger fantry and auxiliary units) and townsfolk, who were mainly than the Teutonic one. It was determined by the fact, that required to man the city walls. In the reality of the year the latter were acting on the territory of their own state 1410 it involved mainly regions directly bordering with the and could also use both human and material resources Order’s dominion, so it’s difficult to assess the role of this found in numerous castles. Because of the aforemen- form in the outcome of the campaign, much less the battle tioned strategic plan which was to reach the Order’s cap- of Grunwald itself. ital, the opposing side, had to take care of food supplies, The offensive equipment of a knight wasn’t additional weaponry and other equipment necessary for much different from what was used in the ranks of the Or- such operations. der’s military. It comprised of a , a , a dagger The matter of weaponry and equipment used by the and sometimes an axe. The main difference lay in the pro- army commanded by Władysław Jagiełło was a bit dif- tective gear. The chain mail was much more frequent than ferent. It was caused both by the structure of its specific plate armour10. The diversity was even bigger when choos- units and with the place of origin of a particular part of the ing the specific elements of the equipment. Sometimes it army. Vast differences were present between the army of didn’t even form a complete set, which most probably was the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, and even bigger the result of a less rigorous approach to the requirements ones between the latter and the Tatars supporting them. of the battlefield. It also involved helmets. They were com-

9 Cf. Cronica conflictus Wladislai regis Poloniae cum cruciferis. 10 Polska technika wojskowa do roku 1500, ed. A. Nadolski, War- Anno Christi 1410, Poznań 1911, p. 18. saw 1994.

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monly used, but greatly diverse in shapes and sizes and matters (the variety of weapon and equipment types), sometimes only decorated with elements associated with which didn’t have a decisive impact on the troops’ com- the crest. The ranged weapon of a lancer was a crossbow. bat value. However, it was somewhat different with troops Riding equipment of Polish knighthood was comprised brought by Vytautas. It is commonly agreed in literature on of all the necessary elements, although it wasn’t as rich the subject that only Lithuanian cavalry arrived at Grun- in shapes, as it was common in the West. It regarded ca- wald. It was ethnically diversified. Apart from , parisons in particular (less common and less exquisite). there were , Samogitians, Poles and finally In particular horse were a rarity. The quality of Tatars living in the southern reaches of the Grand Duchy. mounts used by Polish knights wasn’t much different from Equipment of these warriors was a result of entirely differ- what the Teutons and their guest crusaders used. It can ent needs of the battlefield. Success was rarely decided be attributed to horse breeding which was well developed by a decisive battle of knights so frequent during wars on our lands. The last element which decided about in Western Europe. More common, however, were short the combat value of Polish knights, namely the training clashes with speed, manoeuvrability (including the ability of individual units, was similar to the opponent’s regi- to feign a retreat) and similar elements often bearing signs men. Household education gave basic skills in this field, of improvisation playing a crucial role. Such type of com- whereas commonly held hunts for big game in a sense bat required lighter inventory, most of all. Offensive equip- served as a substitute to less frequent military operations, ment was dominated by spears, bows and (rarely when compared to the West. Participation in tournaments swords). Protective gear was comprised of characteristic and various games was only gaining on popularity at that wedge helmets, scale armours (rarely – chain mails) and time, whereas foreign travels connected with these activit- shield. It doesn’t mean that pieces of equipment typical ies were the domain of only the most prominent persons. for western knighthood didn’t occur, but they were in great Sources regarding Grunwald almost omit the participa- minority and could be found used only by the highest dig- tion of infantry in the royal army, but most definitely there nitaries. Even the quality of mounts varied greatly. The was a certain number present. Let’s add, that among its west was dominated by more massive horses (it had to ranks fought mainly townspeople and peasants armed carry a knight in full armour and its own equipment), with bows, crossbows and slashing weapons (swords, whereas because of the required speed and generally axes, spears). On the other hand the basic protective lighter equipment of the rider, eastern cavalry used much equipment was a shield, with the chain mail covering only lighter and much more manoeuvrable horses. the upper body and the head protected by a helmet. We It was with such equipment and weaponry that two should add, that Jagiełło’s army also went to the war of similarly numerous armies clashed on the morning of 1410 with a certain amount of cannons. It is mentioned 15 June. Controlling such a big mass of people wasn’t an both by Długosz, and the Chronicle of the Conflict as well, easy matter, both in general and individual sense, consid- not only in the context of crossing of the Vistula River near ering that the soldiers didn’t look very different to one an- Czerwińsk, but also the transportation of rock cannonballs other. These matters had to be settled before the battle. by wagons11. However the royal forces didn’t use artillery The latter was solved in such a way that on king’s order during the battle, which can be explained not only by the all allied forces wore strawbands, as an optical recogni- fact, that Jagiełło’s forces were the attacking party from tion sign. The second one was a verbal sign in the form the start, but also because these were siege weapons, as of a password. At Grunwald these were: ‘Cracow’ and ‘Vil- it was planned from the beginning to capture subsequent nius’, the names of both capitals12. Literature is dominated points of resistance in the Order’s state. by a conviction, that both parties commanded their units The above thoughts give the conclusion, that the King- directly. The Grand Master on one side and Jagiełło on the dom of Poland’s army didn’t differ in terms of weaponry other, with Vytautas accompanying him. Both sides used and equipment from the knighthood commanded by the mounted messengers or verbal commands when neces- Grand Master. The differences pertained to secondary sary. If the distance was bigger, banners and sound signals made with trumpets and drums were used. 11 J. Długosz Roczniki…, Chapter XI, p. 75; Cronica conflictus…, p. 15–18. 12 Cronica conflictus…, p. 22.

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The battle of Grunwald was but one of many clashes a look at the formation of the Polish-Lithuanian force and of medieval knighthood fought on open field, but one Jagiełło’s intentions. can easily find many elements, which definitely distin- The royal army, as we remember, marched from the guish it from seemingly similar struggles. It especially south-east through the woods surrounding the Łubień involved the preparations made by both fighting parties, Lake and the village of Ulnowo. In the evening of 14 June starting with the methodical arrangement of formations. camps were set on both ends of the Łubień Lake. Poles As we already mentioned, the Order’s armies reached on the south end and Lithuanians on the north. Jagiełło the future battlefield the day before. The coming of Ja- was informed about the Teutons, their preparations and giełło’s army was marked by fires lit by the Lithuanians assumed positions by cavalry banners sent forward. Polish and Tatars along their march. Because the Grand Mas- leadership evidently decided to use the environment con- ter ordered to lay battle at this spot, the army began the ditions to thwart the enemy’s plans. At first sunlight first necessary preparations. Terrain conditions determined positions were started to be taken. Banners of Lithuanian the place of the battle and, at the same time, allowed cavalry were prepared for battle on the right flank. The to prepare obstacles such as the ditches, behind which front line was comprised of Lithuanian and Ruthenian artillery was placed. Teutonic footsoldiers took position guard, whereas the next two lines of Lithuanian cavalry. between emplacements, forming the forming The whole right flank of Jagiełło’s army was located under line of the Order’s army. Cavalry was placed behind the the cover of a forest. There were marshlands behind there infantry lines in such a way, that its right flank reached backs, also covered by trees. Duke Vytautas took his com- Łodwigowo, whereas the left flank reached Stębark. Apart mand post directly behind his troops. The centre of the from the main force, to the east of Grunwald Village, the formation was comprised of regiments support- Teutons placed a camp surrounded by wagons with a few ing the Lithuanians, on the left flank Polish banners reach- banners of cavalry stationed nearby. The Grand Master’s ing as far as the Łodwigowo forest prepared for battle. command post was located in the centre of the forma- Deeper within the first strike group, on a hill near the west tion, a next to the cavalry lines13. shore of the Łubień Lake stood the royal tent. Polish ban- From the pattern of unit placement one can risk in- ners left as a rear guard were positioned right next to it. terpreting the intentions of the Order’s leadership. They The royal army slowly prepared for battle and didn’t relied on waiting for the Polish-Lithuanian knighthood’s show any signs of eagerness to strike. Although first move, which would be met with cannon fire and then began to fight right in front of both armies, Jagiełło didn’t break due to the aforementioned terrain obstacles. At this want to commence the battle too early. The king had to moment the Order’s infantry would gain the chance to stop Vytautas, who, according to Długosz’s accounts, was shoot their crossbows at the breaking enemy formations, spoiling for a fight. Jagiełło was well aware of the fact, which would then provide a perfect condition for a flank- that time was on his side. Apart from that, he wanted to ing attack carried out by the Order’s cavalry. It would be provoke the Teutons to relocate from their positions. After even easier because of the chaos ensuing among the royal hearing out the mass, the king knighted a dozen young army’s lines. Such a turn of events would give the Order’s men and began preparing for the fight. It was at that time, forces an almost certain victory. Literature on the subject that he received news about the heralds who came from agrees, that one could point out a few flaws in these plans. the enemy’s camp and brought two swords (one for the First of all, the Order’s army assumed battle formation king and one from Vytautas), calling them out to battle. since the early morning hours of 15 June. Because the The emissaries announced that their forces will move day was sunny, with each moment the temperature rose back to allow the royal army to deploy formations. This rapidly, which caused faster fatigue, especially amongst gesture was probably caused by the impatience of the Or- heavily armoured knights. Secondly, the opponent wasn’t der’s knighthood, which expected their enemies to abide eager for battle. Additionally, for a long time they were the rules of medieval battlefields and who weren’t famil- barely even visible, which will make more sense as we take iar with the tactics used by Jagiełło. Apart from that, the Teutons began to grow weary from standing in direct sun- 13 Cf. annotation 3, also S. M. Kuczyński, Bitwa pod Grunwaldem, light on an open field. Jagiełło didn’t allow himself to get Katowice 1985. provoked, especially since the enemy gave some space

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and at the same time uncovered their artillery positions. the strike of a stronger enemy and a means to provoke him The king was much too experienced not to understand the into a chase, in order to choose the most advantageous enemy’s intentions, who could still have some surprises up moment and resume the fight. In that moment, however, their sleeve. However, the clash was inevitable, so he gave that was a major turning point of the battle which could the order to start the battle. end up with Jagiełło’s defeat. And yet the Lithuanians ‘When the reveilles began to sound, the whole Polish while retreating in fear penetrated deeply forested areas army sang with loud voices the native song Bogurodzica to the north and south-east of Stębark, managing to scat- and then, lifting spears, they threw themselves into battle. ter the Order’s knights in pursuit. What’s more, there were The first, however, who went to battle were the Lithuanian reserve units in these woods, which not only stopped the army…’ is how Jan Długosz begins describing the battle14. escapees but also helped the scattered banners to regain Sending Lithuanian and Tatar light cavalry in the first wave combat value. Meanwhile, after chasing away the Lithuani- was probably intentional move by the monarch, who ans, the Order’s knighthood, filled with success, didn’t wanted to break the enemy’s tight formations. Because continue the pursuit, but rather began to return to the the Lithuanians and Tatars carried out this attack, truly to main battle field. Here the situation was entirely different. their eastern customs – in a loose formation, they easily The situation was different on the left flank of the royal managed to reach enemy positions, attacking mainly the army, where the Poles and banners comprised infantry and artillery positions. The attack was most prob- of Bohemians and , later joined by Smolensk ably successful, as the sources don’t contain any mentions knights. Soldiers of similar equipment and battle exper- about further usage of Teutonic cannons, just as they ience fought on both sides. It’s worth to mention, that don’t mention the effects brought by terrain obstacles pre- the greatest Polish knights were present, with Zawisza pared by the Order’s army. However, the Lithuanians and Czarny among them. A great royal flag was waving over Tatars provoked the opponent’s forces to unleash a frontal their heads and the monarch was overlooking the course attack on Jagiełło’s positions. The fight concentrated on of events, reacting accordingly to the changing situation two flanks. On the right flank of Jagiełło’s army, closer to by sending more reserves. Let’s add, that the king com- Stębark, fought the Lithuanian and Tatar units supported manded the battle while standing on a hill, surrounded by by Polish knighthood, the left flank (nearby the village of a cavalry unit protecting him. The monarch, however, was Łodwigowo) was occupied by and mercen- spoiling for a fight but his retinue didn’t allow it. Unrelent- aries. Let’s concentrate on the right wing of the allied army ing resistance of the royal knighthood made the attacks for a moment. less effective and after some time the Teutons began to The Lithuanians had to oppose not only the Order’s give ground. The most critical moment of this battle took knights but also a banner comprised of guest crusaders, place, when after the right wing retreated, the Lithuanians who were especially eager to prove their combat skills. uncovered the right flank of Polish banners. Intoxicated It wasn’t surprising that the fighting which took place with success over the Lithuanian-Ruthenian cavalry, the here was especially fierce, thus after some time the light heavily armoured guest knights of st. George could carry Lithuanian banners began to suffer heavy casualties and out a critical strike. However, they were stopped by the crumble under the might of the opposing cavalry. Their re- Lithuanians returning to the field, which averted the Polish treat albeit slow at start soon turned into a panic escape. cavalry’s impending catastrophe. Only the Smolensk banners – according to Długosz – man- In this situation the Grand Master ordered the last aged to maintain formation and retreat in the direction rear guard into combat, which was comprised of 16 elite of the left flank of the royal army without getting broken. cavalry banners, whom he chose to lead personally. This Regarding the aforementioned events it’s worth to men- strike could decide the fate of the battle, because the Pol- tion, that in literature one can find an opinion, according ish knighthood fighting since the beginning of the battle to which the escape of Lithuanian and Tatar forces was was growing wearier. However, this attack was noticed a manoeuvre commonly used in eastern combat (espe- by the combatants early enough, which enabled the king cially by the Tatars). It served as a tactical retreat before to lead his remaining reserves to the endangered loca- tions. The Grand Master along with his dignitaries and his 14 J. Długosz Roczniki…, Chapter XI, p. 122–123. 16 banners were immediately surrounded and the last

– 25 – – Karol Olejnik –

– 26 – – ‘The Great War’ of 1409–1410 and the Battle of Grunwald –

stage of the battle begun. The circle of the royal army was The battle was conceived to be just one step forward in tightening and just a few Teutons managed to escape. the execution of those far-reaching intentions. The signs of Among those who died were the Grand Master Ulrich von a modern approach to combat on the allied side were vis- Jungingen, the Grand , the Grand Marshal, ible already at the point of preparing the campaign itself. the Grand Treasurer, the rest of commanders and the ma- An event unprecedented on European scale was the war jority of monk knights. Also, the majority of the visiting council in the Lithuanian Brest. Similarly, quite unusual knights were victims of the battle. The victors took the was the fact that the place of the main strike was not re- possession of the Teutonic flags, and a few thousands of vealed to the enemies. Several early spring strikes/attacks prisoners of war were captured. Also those, who managed directed from the line of Noteć River towards the interior to escape from the battle field, were killed by unrelenting of the Order’s state served the purpose. Another achieve- Lithuanians. The last act of the battle was the conquest of ment with regard to a technical aspect was undoubtedly the Teutonic military camp by the Polish infantry accom- getting such a huge army across of the marshes of the Vis- panied by camp servants. This stage of the battle caused tula River. The concentration of the Lithuanian and Polish many deaths among the enemies. Those who were fleeing forces in the exact place and time was the proof of another could not be let alive and were still within the grasp of the tactic test passed, along with the rapid march (after vengeful hand of the king. As Długosz wrote: ‘The road was escaped from the enemy forces) from Kurzętniki towards covered with corpses for many miles’. the area of the forthcoming battle. Despite the fact that, in the literary sources, the Battle The battle itself also delivers numerous examples of Grunwald is called the last, typical battle of the Middle to prove our hypothesis. Jagiełło would not be misled Ages, one can notice numerous departures from the norm neither by the Vytautas’ insistence to proceed with an at- as established by other such battles. The difference could tack immediately once he had stood in front of enemies’ be seen in reference to the Polish-Lithuanian Army, and troops, nor by the Grand Master’s provocations. He made the discrepancy is apparent throughout the whole milit- a maximum use of terrain conditions, keeping his own ary campaign of the years 1409–1410. We assume that the forces in a forest, while the enemy suffered from a heat characteristic feature of the medieval was of a July’s sun, whereas the reserves he kept till the last to settle the outcome of a war with the help of one crucial moment helped to annihilate the desperate attacks of the battle. Although it was apparent in the deeds/actions of Grand Master in the last stage of the battle. Speaking of the Command of the Teutonic Order, such attitude was ab- differences which make us perceive the battle in categor- sent among the opposing troops. From the very beginning, ies quite different from typical medieval armed battles, we the tactical aim of the Polish-Lithuanian army was to move could mention high level of priority awareness within the hostilities to the enemy’s territory, whereas their strategic Polish army. Despite the fact that the outcome of the cam- objective was to reach to the capital of the Order, which paign was not so successful (Malbork was not conquered; was to be conquered later. It was assumed that the success soon after the defeat the Order again stood on its feet, of such plan would result in the domination over at least and, after the painful experience in Grunwald, it changed a part of the enemy’s territory, which would deprive it of its its attitude towards Poland), due to all of the reasons men- meaningful defensive potential, namely highly developed tioned above, the victory in the battle of Grunwald has castles. The scope of tactical and strategic was really wide. went down in the history of Poland.

Bibliography Primary sources Cronica conflictus Wladislai regis Poloniae cum cruciferis. Anno J. Długosz, Roczniki czyli Kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego, Christi 1410, Poznań 1911 Lib. X–XI, Warsaw 1982 Books (J. Długosz, Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae, Lib. X–XI, Polska technika wojskowa do roku 1500, ed. A. Nadolski, Warsaw Warsaw 1997) 1994

– 27 – Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, vol. II, Warsaw 1956 K. Olejnik, Obrona polskiej granicy zachodniej od końca XIV do J. Baszkiewicz, Powstanie zjednoczonego państwa polskiego na schyłku XVIII wieku, Poznań 1985 przełomie XIII/XIV wieku, Warsaw 1957 A. Nadolski, Grunwald. Problemy wybrane, Olsztyn 1990 M. Biskup, G. Labuda, Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach, S. M. Kuczyński, Bitwa pod Grunwaldem, Katowice 1985 Gdańsk 1986 S. M. Kuczyńsk, Spór o Grunwald, Warsaw 1972 K. Górski, Zakon krzyżacki a powstanie państwa pruskiego, Wroc- S. M. Kuczyński, Wielka wojna z zakonem krzyżackim w latach ław–Warsaw–Cracow–Gdańsk 1977 1409–1411, Warsaw 1960 – Zbigniew Grabowski – Military Bureau for Historical Research in Military Centre for Civic Education

The Battle of Ukmergė, the 1st of September 1435

During the civil war in Lithuania (1431–1435) a battle was struggling with the Polish gentry about securing the between the Polish-Lithuanian and Teutonic-Ruthenian throne for his oldest son, Władysław. Therefore, armies took place on the 1st of September 1435 near Jagiełło decided not to incorporate Lithuania into Poland, the village of Ukmergė and between the Šventoji and contrary to what the Polish nobles suggested, but keep it Zyrnowka Rivers. This battle has ended a long series of for his sons. The throne in Vilnius was, in fact, hereditary2. wars between Poland and the Teutonic Order in the first The king was convinced that the Poles will not allow half of the 15th century, which began with the great war the union to break off and therefore will have to choose of 1409–1411 and the victory over the Prussian branch of the one who will become the Grand Duke of Lithuania as the Order at Grunwald on the 15th of July 1410. The Battle their ruler. The Polish monarch could not immediately of Ukmergė did not have the significance of the Battle of transmit the rule over Lithuania to his son, because he Grunwald, although some did put it on par with the vic- was still a minor. Therefore he took into account the as- tory from 25 years earlier. However, very serious losses pirations of his youngest brother Švitrigaila, ‘a man of an among the Teutons, including the death of the Teutonic equally violent temper and insatiable ambition’3. Jagiełło commander and other far-reaching effects (weakening of hoped, however, that his childless brother would become the Livonian branch of the Order), nevertheless raise some loyal after receiving the long coveted power and recognize kind of analogy and the notion of a ‘Livonian’ Grunwald. his nephews (Władysław and the younger Casimir) as his successors. The actions of the king, primarily oriented to- Background wards fulfilling dynastic interests, resulted in many disap- proving voices throughout the Crown, including that of the The Lithuanian Grand Duke Vytautas died on the 27th of royal council. October 1430 in the castle in . Under the provisions Meanwhile Švitrigaila did not live up to the king’s ex- of the Union of Vilnius and from 1401, the Lithua- pectations and laid the groundwork towards complete nian state was to be returned to the Polish king and the self-empowerment and to break the union with Poland. In ‘supreme Duke of Lithuania’ Władysław Jagiełło. This ruler, order to strengthen his position, on the 19th of June 1431 in in accordance with the Union of Horodło of 1413, was to Skirsnemunė, he formed an alliance against the Kingdom appoint the new ruler of Lithuania, with the consent of of Poland with the Teutonic Order. Upon learning of the the Polish and Lithuanian nobility1. At that time the king Lithuanian-Teutonic alliance, Polish troops marched out towards the east as early as in late June, in order to capture 1 At the beginning of October 1413, Władysław Jagiełło, Alex- ander Vytautas and the Polish and Lithuanian nobles met in ish nobles. The union was to be respected even if the Jagiello- Horodlo at the River. The new provisions on the union of nian dynasty expired. both countries were drawn up there. It had been determined, 2 T. Stolarczyk, ‘Świdrygiełło przeciwko Jagielle – tzw. wojna łu- that Lithuania will be ruled by Vytautas as the Grand Duke and cka w 1431 r.’, in Mars, vol. X, 2001, p. 4. his successor will be appointed by the Polish king, with the 3 H. Łowmiański, Polityka Jagiellonów, 2nd ed., Poznań 2006, pp. advice and knowledge of the Lithuanian and the Pol- 136–137.

– 29 – – Zbigniew Grabowski –

the territories disputed between Poland and Lithuania4. In tonic aggression6. The Teutons, however, failed to capture early July 1431, the border castles of , Włodzimierz Bydgoszcz, Brest Kujawski and Naklo. and Horodło were taken from the Lithuanians, who had Their task was all the easier, as the Polish troops were captured them earlier. On the 31st of July 1431 Švitrigaila′s already engaged in fighting with Švitrigaila. Only in Krajna, units clashed with the Polish army at Kobiałki near . the local knights Jan Jarogniewski, Bartosz of Wezenborg The grand duke declined to wage a decisive battle. and Dobrogost Koliński formed armed units from the local The subsequent military manoeuvres focused on peasantry within the legal boundaries of the ‘defence of Volyn. The Polish troops tried to capture Lutsk using siege the land’ (defensio terrae) and commanded these forces of, engines brought from Krakow and cannons called ‘fal- approximately, up to 5000 people. On the 13th of Septem- conets’ (taraśnice). The castle, however, was well fortified ber they defeated the fourth Teutonic group at Dąbki, near and the garrison defended it valiantly, fending of attacks Nakło, capturing several banners and taking many prison- and organizing outings against the royal troops5. In ad- ers. Following the conclusion of the aforementioned truce dition, internal conflicts, caused by the lack of success, with Švitrigaila, the Grand Master ordered a retreat, fearing began to arise among the besiegers, who – according to retaliation from the Poles7. That is why in mid-September, Długosz – blamed Jagiełło himself. The king was said to the Teutonic Knights fell back to the territory of the mo- be reluctant towards a strike against Lithuania and his be- nastic state. loved brother, and agreed to military action under heavy The year 1432 brought a political upheaval in Lithua- pressure from his advisers. As a result, a truce was signed nia. Švitrigaila was overthrown and Sigismund Kęstutaitis, on the 1st of September 1431, near the walls of the Lutsk the brother of the Grand Duke Vytautas, was ascended to castle, which was besieged unsuccessfully throughout the throne. Švitrigaila, although a Catholic himself, mainly August. The document was to be in force until the 24th of had the support of Orthodox, predominantly Ruthenian, June 1433. gentry, as it was consistently devoid of equal treatment Meanwhile, in the vicinity of the 20th of August 1431, the by Władysław Jagiełło, who supported Catholics, repre- Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, Paul von Rusdorf, im- sented by the Lithuanian boyars8. Sigismund Kęstutaitis plemented the provisions of the alliance with Švitrigaila by was the Ruthenian representative. Despite old age, he has ordering the Teutonic Knights to invade Poland at several not distinguished himself yet. As a result, the Grand Duchy locations. War was declared as soon as they crossed the of Lithuania broke down into two hostile camps and found border. One of the Teutonic groups, under the command itself in a state of civil war. Russian Orthodox boyars led by of Heinrich Rabenstein, the Vogt of Neumark, stormed Švitrigaila, supported by the Teutonic Order and the Ta- out of Neumark into the north-western regions of Greater tars, along with the Lithuanian, mainly Catholic, gentry led Poland and destroyed, among others, the town of Między- by Sigismund Kęstutaitis and supported by Poland faced chód. The second one, led by the komtur of Torun, Jan each other9. von Pommersheim, attacked the Dobrzyń province from Fights still continued after Švitrigaila was overthrown Chelmno on the 29th of August, pillaging Rypin, Lipno, and Sigismund Kęstutaitis took reign over Lithuania. In Nowa (Dybów) and other towns. The third and autumn of 1432 Polish troops led by the Ruthenian starost largest group of the Teutonic Knights, several thousand Wincenty of Szamotuly, struck Podole and forced out soldiers strong, commanded by marshal Jost von Strup- Švitrigaila′s forces. On the 30th of November 1432 at the per, rushed in from Bydgoszcz into Kujawy and burned battle of Kopystyryn over the Murachwa River, the royal Radziejów and Włocławek, and captured Inowroclaw. The troops defeated Švitrigaila’s soldiers led by the former fourth group, composed of Marshal Werner von Nessel- rode and ’s komtur Jost von Hohenkirchen’s Livo- 6 T. M. Nowak, J. Wimmer, Historia oręża polskiego 963–1795, nian units was directed from Tuchola to Krajna. In total, 24 Warsaw 1981, p. 212. 7 nd towns and more than 1000 villages fell victim to the Teu- T. Korzon, Dzieje wojen i wojskowości w Polsce, vol. 1, 2 ed., Lvov–Warsaw–Cracow 1923, pp. 143–144; P. Bunar, S. A. Sro- ka, op. cit., p. 85. 4 P. Bunar, S. A. Sroka, Słownik wojen, bitew i potyczek w śred- 8 H. Łowmiański, op. cit., pp. 136–137. niowiecznej Polsce, Cracow 2004, p. 84. 9 W. Mikołajczak, Wojny polsko-krzyżackie, Zakrzewo 2009, p. 5 H. Łowmiański, op. cit., p. 140. 165.

– 30 – – The Battle of Ukmergė, the 1st of September 1435 –

governor of , Fedko Nieświcki. During this tion was organised in 1433 in order to avenge the Teutonic battle the Moldovans and Tatars aided Švitrigaila. The re- aggression. In this matter the Polish command negotiated cently overthrown Grand Duke soon lost a significant part with the Czech , who offered Poland armed sup- of Volyn to the Crown. However, the situation in Lithuania port against the Teutons. has stabilised in such a way that Sigismund Kęstutaitis Two battle groups were formed: the first one composed gained advantage in ethnically Lithuanian lands, whereas of units from Greater Poland aided by the Czech Hus- Švitrigaila has kept his influence in Ruthenian territories.10 sites, numbering between 5,000 and 7,000 infantry, and Meanwhile, in early 1433, the Livonian master Cisse von 120 armed cars – it was to hit Neumark. During a coun- dem Rutenberg joined the military operation. The Livo- cil in Poznań, the king Władysław Jagiełło, the nian branch of the Order so far participated in the actions of Poznań Sędziwój of Ostroróg, and Jan Čapek of Sany against Poland and Lithuania only to a small extent. The and other Hussite commanders decided on concentrating Livonian knights were absent, among others, at Grunwald. these troops in Miedzyrzecz. The second group, composed However, the power of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, rein- of a levy en masse from Lesser Poland and mercenary forced by the union with Poland and Lithuanian influences troops was to invade Pomerelia13. in and , and the resulting sense of The Hussite troops passed Odra at Głogów and reached vulnerability made the Livonian Teutons change their po- the place of concentration through Świebodzin at the end sition and express their support for the actions taken by of May. The Polish side had to give them material aid, the Grand Master in order to break down the Jagiellonian because most of the Hussites had destroyed shoes and Union. Their participation in the battle of Dąbki already clothing. A strong Hussite unit led by Jan Čapek and the showed a shift in this matter. On the 11th of January, von troops from Greater Poland commanded by Sedziwój of dem Rutenberg’s troops gathered by the River, Ostroróg entered Neumark in June and ravaged its lands. marching up river in order to join Švitrigaila. His troops and Meanwhile, on the 25th of June, the second group of the Livonian Teutons’ forces intended to jointly attack the Polish troops set off from Kolo, where its concentration Lithuanian army, which was supported by Polish units11. place was located and entered the Teutonic territories On the 28th of January the Livonian Master declared war on after crossing at Bydgoszcz. Due to the King’s old age Sigismund Kęstutaitis. Two days later he invaded northern (he was about 80 years old at the time), the Castellan of Lithuania, burning and pillaging. Krakow, Mikołaj of Michałów, commanded all of the troops This action, however, was not synchronized with (including the levy) as exercituum Regni Poloniae capitan- Švitrigaila′s troops, which were at that time in the vicin- eus generalis. In the meantime, the troops from Greater ity of and . In this situation both Švitrigaila, Poland and the Hussites entered the Pomerelia after pil- who blamed the Livonian Master von dem Rutenberg for laging Neumark and began the siege of Chojnice14. Units the lack of coordination, and the Teutons themselves gave from Lesser Poland soon joined them. up the joint action. The latter, on their way back, burned However, the Poles and failed to capture and robbed yet again, ravaging the lands of western and , which was boldly defended by the Teutonic gar- northern Lithuania and capturing numerous prisoners rison. A month-long siege was abandoned on the 15th of (3000 people). August and the army marched through the Tuchola For- Meanwhile, Švitrigaila, consistently supported by the est towards Świecie. Afterwards they went along the left Ruthenians, managed to reclaim the castle in Lutsk, along bank of the Vistula River towards Gdańsk. Along the way, with the Lutsk province in Volyn in April 1433.12 In the the monastery in Pelplin was destroyed and was meantime, in Krakow, it was considered that the matter captured and burned15. On the 1st of September, the Pol- of great damages caused by the Teutons on Polish lands ish and Hussite troops reached Gdańsk, pillaged the sub- could not escape with impunity. A great retaliatory expedi- urbs, fired at the city and destroyed a Cistercian abbey in Oliwa. On the 4th of September the army reached the Gulf 10 P. Bunar, S. A. Sroka, op. cit., p. 84. 11 Liv-, Est- Und Curländisches Urkundenbuch, Bd. 8, 1429 Mai – 1435, –Moskau 1884, pp. XIII–XIV. 13 Pomerelia, also referred as Eastern or Gdańsk Pomerania. 12 M. Biskup, Wojny Polski z Zakonem Krzyżackim (1308–1521), 14 H. Łowmiański, op. cit., pp. 149–150. Gdańsk 1993, p. 160. 15 Ibid., T. Korzon, op. cit., p. 147.

– 31 – – Zbigniew Grabowski –

of Gdańsk. The Hussite troops were especially impressed join forces with Švitrigaila. Troops belonging to the latter by the view of the sea. Many Czechs poured seawater into set out from Polatsk in mid-July and merged with the Livo- bottles, taking them home as souvenirs16. nian Teuton’s army at . Afterwards the allies tried Their return led through Starogard and Tuchola. The to conquer Troki, but to no avail20. Švitrigaila and von dem raid was not easy on the Teutons, however they did not Rutenberg opted out of the attack on Vilnius and moved dare stand against the Poles and Czechs in an open field. south in order to join the troops under Ruthenian dukes When the news from Lithuania did not come and the Po- marching from Lutsk. Their aim was to lay a decisive battle meranian and Chełmno gentry demanded the end of the with the retreating Sigismund Kęstutaitis. war, the Teutons sent their representatives, who signed However, Kęstutaitis’s troops managed to stop the ad- a ceasefire at the castle in Jasienica on the 13th of Septem- vance of the Ruthenian dukes at Kletsk, and even push ber 1433. It was supposed to last until Christmas17. During them back, not allowing them to merge with the enemy this time both sides were to prepare the conditions for troops. This resulted in the retreat of Švitrigaila and Livo- a lasting peace. However, negotiations advanced slowly, as nian Master’s forces towards Minsk, but heavy rainfall and the Teutons did not agree to Polish terms, which included, diseases have significantly weakened their army. The ail- among others: the Order renunciating any connection to ing Livonian master turned back north. On the 18th of Sep- the Empire, abandoning the matter of Švitrigaila, exempt- tember he arrived to Riga with the rest of his troops and ing their subjects from the obligation of obedience in case died there in October 1433. Before his death he wrote to the truce broke off. The last term was to affect both sides. the Grand Master that ‘many knights and servants have The Polish determination, and therefore the threat of died, he himself is sick and «there are not even two of us war and the attitude of the Prussian estates (the Mayor of still healthy»’21. Meanwhile, Švitrigaila seized a large por- Torun said to the Grand Master, that if ‘Your Grace […] will tion of Ruthenian lands in the eastern part of the Grand not bring us peace and tranquillity, then let it be known Duchy of Lithuania, overrun Kiev and still reiterated his as- to Your Grace that we will think about it ourselves and pirations to the Grand Duchy. will look for such a master, who will give us peace’)18. In Due to the fact that the Grand Master of the Order had to this situation, the Grand Master, on the 15th of December, reckon with retaliation from the Poles, and with the Prus- agreed to sign a truce agreement for a period of 12 years in sian estates and their anti-war resolutions, the successor Łęczyca. Under this agreement, the order pledged to with- to von dem Rutenberg, Franke von Kerskorff decided to draw from forming an alliance with Švitrigaila. The Livo- support Švitrigaila′s cause on his own.22 In the summer of nian branch of the Order did not acknowledge this agree- 1434 the latter prepared another great military expedition ment, despite the fact that it was also signed on its behalf. against the Grand Duke Sigismund, which was to include – During the war in Pomerlia, the struggle between in violation of the Łęczyca truce – Teutonic reinforcements Švitrigaila and Sigismund Kęstutaitis flared up with new from , with the silent acceptance and support of the force. Švitrigaila, taking advantage of the truce with the Grand Master Rusdorf. This foray began in August, when Polish in , had complete freedom of Švitrigaila gathered his armies. The core of Švitrigaila and movement and planned aggressive manoeuvres19. Vilnius the Livonian Master Kerskorff’s army, which marched from was to be the target of his attack. He planned to strike it Brasław to Ukmergė in order to cut off from the from two sides. capital, Vilnius, had to retreat in September 1434, due to The military action initially planned for June was de- Grand Duke Sigismund Kęstutaitis concentrating his vast layed, because Švitrigaila′s ally, the Livonian Master von forces, including auxiliary Polish troops. dem Rutenberg left Wenden as late as on the 8th of July, The Livonian Teutons supporting Švitrigaila (counting leading most of his troops toward Lithuania in order to 800 riders and infantrymen) suffered heavy losses. The

16 P. Bunar, S. A. Sroka, op. cit., pp. 86–87. 20 M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 178. 17 Ibid., T. Korzon, op. cit., p. 147. 21 T. Korzon, op. cit., pp. 147–148. 18 A. Lewicki, Powstanie Świdrygiełły. Ustęp z dziejów unii Litwy 22 Such spelling was used in the list of the national Livonian ma- z Koroną, Cracow 1892, p. 210; H. Łowmiański, op. cit., pp. sters by Klaus Militzer (Dostojnicy i urzędnicy Zakonu Kawale- 149–150. rów Mieczowych i Zakonu Krzyżackiego w Inflantach, in: Zakon 19 W. Mikołajczak, op. cit., p. 180. Krzyżacki w Prusach i Inflantach, Toruń 2013).

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Grand Master quickly sent a promise saying that the as- Council, which has changed its decision, ordering most of sault was made without his ‘will, knowledge and order’ the nobility to defend the northern borders. to the Grand Duke and the Polish gentry23. Sigismund re- In mid-July Švitrigaila concentrated his troops in sponded derisively: ’How did the land master dare to do Vitebsk27. They were about 6,000 light Ruthenian cavalry so? After all, is he not your subordinate?’24. However, in and 500 Tatars strong. After the 20th of July they moved in view of important state affairs in Poland and Lithuania af- the direction of Braslaw, which was located near the Livo- ter the death of king Władysław Jagiełło, it stopped at ex- nian border. Approximately on the 20th of August, Livonian changing letters, without any armed response. At the same troops under the personal command of the Livonian Mas- time Švitrigaila lost his seat on the southern Ruthenian ter Kerskorff and the former Marshal Werner von Nessel- lands, where some of the dukes – acquired by extending rode, a veteran of the battle of Dąbki in 1431, arrived there the Polish law unto and Podole – crossed too. They had 3,000 cavalrymen28, 1,500 mercenary infan- over to Sigismund Kęstutaitis’s side. He did not intend to try, armed with long wooden pikes and iron flails, trained lose his aspirations to the throne of the Grand Duchy and in waging war the Hussite way, using cannons and planned to resume operations in 1435, with the help of the placed on wagons29. These infantrymen also knew how to Teutons from Livonia. locate wagons. Undoubtedly, they made a very formida- ble opponent30. They were commanded by Duke Sigis- Opponents mund Korybutowicz, a participant of the Hussite wars in Bohemia. Presumably, this stock counted 300 cars. Among In light of Švitrigaila and the Master of the Order in Livo- the soldiers from Livonia, there were perhaps some Teu- nia Frank Kerskorff’s, military preparations for a new cam- tonic Knights from Prussia, who were banned from taking paign against the Grand Duke Sigismund Kęstutaitis, at part in any hostilities by the twelve-year truce between the the beginning of 1435, the Crown Council decided to call Crown and Sigismund. a 12,000 strong levy en masse and send it to Lithuania25. Overall, the Teutonic army counted circa 4,500 soldiers, The Order’s Grand Master, Rusdorf, assumed this mobilisa- predominantly cavalrymen. The whole Ruthenian-Livo- tion as directed against Prussia and decided to take simi- nian army could be as many as 11,000 soldiers strong. lar action in order to stop the Polish troops still within the The infantry comprised between 15 and 20 percent. The Crown’s territory. The Prussian estates strongly opposed Teutonic Knights, including the very best among the Or- this, citing the truce in Łęczyca as being still in force. The der’s officials, and the Teutonic guest crusaders were typ- mayor of Chełmno, Johann Sterz, even resorted to threats ical medieval heavy cavalry, in terms of their weaponry31. against the Order’s officials. He said that, if the Grand Mas- The whole of the Order’s forces from Livonia was made up ter does not listen to the estates’ council, then ‘an evil wind from soldiers. In the previous year, the Teutons from Livo- could start blowing, and it will not die down easily’26. Sterz nia asked the Grand Master to send 400 infantrymen from was imprisoned by Rusdorf, who at the same time assured Prussia, who were to guard Livonian strongholds during the opposing estates that he will comply with the provi- the offensive. sions of the Łęczyca truce. Nevertheless, after learning the 27 news from Livonia and with Švitrigaila preparing an attack J. Skrzypek, ‘Bitwa nad rzeką Świętą’, in Przegląd Historyczno- -Wojskowy, vol. X, 1938, p. 44; M. Plewczyński, op. cit., p. 40; M. on Lithuania in the summer of 1435, in early August Rus- Biskup, op. cit. p. 192. dorf began to simulate an army concentration on the Pol- 28 As during the time of Teutonic plundering raids (‘rejzy’) in the ish border. This made a strong impression on the Crown 14th and the first years of the 15th century, soldiers from west- ern Europe hurried to take part in the of 1435. Over 100 foreign guest crusaders, along with their retines, par- 23 J. Caro, Dzieje Polski, vol. 4, 1430–1455, Warsaw 1897, pp. 132– ticipated in the excursion. Many of them came from Bohemia, 133. Silesia and . Švitrigaila and his cause, because of his 24 Ibid. connection with the Order, has became very popular in Ger- 25 M. Plewczyński, Wojny Jagiellonów z wschodnimi i południo- many. wymi sąsiadami Królestwa Polskiego w XV wieku, 2002, 29 J. Skrzypek, op. cit., p. 46–47; M. Plewczyński, op. cit., p. 40. pp. 39–40. 30 J. Skrzypek, op. cit., p. 46–47. 26 M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 191. 31 Ibid.; M. Plewczyński, op. cit., p. 40.

– 33 – – Zbigniew Grabowski –

In the middle of August Sigismund Kęstutaitis received commander36. This lack of a unified command was un- help in the form of gentry from Lesser Poland, mainly favourable. Regarding the Polish-Lithuanian side, Sigis- from the Lublin province, against the concentration of mund Kęstutaitis did not exhibit any leadership capabil- Teutonic forces at the Polish border. They mostly came ities and certainly did not command any troops in the from a levy en masse and were commanded by Jakub of field. According to Długosz, Jakub of Kobylany became Kobylany (Kobylański)32, consisting of 800 lances-fournies, the commander in chief of the combined allied force37. It which equalled 3,000–4,000 cavalrymen, mainly medium seems possible, as he was known in Lithuania and – to cavalry33. They were accompanied by circa 500 horsemen some extent – could pass for a man associated with the from Polish garrisons in Lithuania, thus the auxiliary corps local affairs after staying in Grand Duke Vytautas’s service from the Crown could – at most – about 4,500 riders for a few years38. In other sources, the son of Duke Sigis- in total. Jakub of Kobylany went to Vilnius, which was des- mund, Michal, is mentioned as the supreme commander, ignated as a concentration spot for all the troops that were but according to Długosz, at that time he was in Trakai39. to march against Švitrigaila. Therefore, as long as historical science fails to clearly re- Sigismund’s troops, which concentrated in Vilnius, solve this matter, one can accept the notion that Jakub of came from the north-western part of Lithuania, includ- Kobylany commanded the Lithuanian-Polish forces dur- ing Samogitia. They consisted of light cavalry (less armed ing the battle. than Polish knights), mercenary troops and Tatars, how- As mentioned above, the Livonian group led by master ever it is difficult to determine the size of the Lithuanian Frank Kerskorff reached Braslav around the 20th of August, army, because of the lack of historical sources. Taking into where he joined Švitrigaila′s forces. The plan established account the calculations of Otto Laskowski concerning the by the commanders of the Teutons and the Ruthenians Lithuanian army during the Battle of Grunwald, as well as assumed conquering Trakai and Vilnius40. The battle with the data supplied by Tadeusz Korzon, especially his calcu- Sigismund Kęstutaitis’s forces was anticipated to happen lations covering the first half of the , one can in the vicinity of these major political centres of Lithua- hypothetically assume that the mobilization conducted nia.41 Švitrigaila and Kerskorff’s troops moved southwest, by the Grand Duke of Lithuania covered about 5,000–6,000 towards Ukmergė after the 20th of August. Most probably people, including the mercenaries, but counting out Pol- they intended to cut off Samogitia from Lithuania and ish troops. Thus, in total the Lithuanian-Polish force can approach Vilnius and Trakai from the west. It is also pos- be estimated at about 9,500–10,500 soldiers, including sible, that they counted on Prussian reinforcements from a small group of infantry34. Therefore, in terms of numbers, the Grand Master coming from in order to quickly there was a relative balance between the opponents, with merge with them. a possible, but slight advantage of the Ruthenian-Teuto- The Lithuanian-Polish army also moved out to meet the nian forces. Teutonian-Ruthenian military. It seems that due to a uni- There was no single commander in chief appointed fied command structure they had better military organisa- on Švitrigaila′s side – Švitrigaila, Kerskorff and Sigismund tion than their enemies. The marching system utilized by Korybutowicz commanded only their own soldiers35. The Jakub of Kobylany is difficult to determine, but due to the Tatars, who also were in Švitrigaila′s army, had their own fact that the Lithuanian-Polish army was mainly mounted, it can be assumed that it moved, more or less, in a com-

32 Jakub Kobylański, Kobyleński of Kobylany, of the Grzymała crest, courtier of Queen Anna 1407, Starost of Łuków 1440, 36 S. Zakrzewski, ‘W pięćsetną rocznicę: Bitwa nad Świętą, - Court Marshal of Lithuania 1425–1430, Castellan of czej pod Wiłkomierzem, dnia 1 września 1435 r.’, in Pamiętnik 1440, died 1444 On the contrary to common belief, Jakub VI Powszechnego Zjazdu Historyków Polskich, vol. I, Lvov 1935, Kobylański did not participate in the battle of Grunwald. His pp. 555–556. uncle fought there, he also bore the name Jakub. During the 37 J. Długosz, Roczniki czyli kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego, excursion to Lithuania in 1435 he wore the title capitaneus ex- Chapters XI and XII, 1431–1444, Warsaw 2009, p. 176. ercitus regis. 38 J. Skrzypek, op. cit., pp. 47–48. 33 M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 191; M. Plewczyński, op. cit., pp. 39–40. 39 J. Długosz, op. cit., p. 176. 34 Ibid. 40 W. Mikołajczak, op. cit., pp. 182–183. 35 Ibid., p. 40. 41 M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 192.

– 34 – – The Battle of Ukmergė, the 1st of September 1435 –

pact column, with wagons in the back. Jakub of Kobylany Żyrnowo. After scouting the positions of the enemy ordered the whole army to march through Širvintos in the groups, he decided to attack the first two that crossed direction of Ukmergė42. At the end of August he reached Żyrnówka. Due to the fact that the lake covered his left an area north of Širvintos, the forested and marshy area flank, he moved his troops past its northern shore and cut of lake Żyrnowo. The lake was the source of the Żyrnówka off the third enemy group from the first two (29th or 30th of stream, which flowed into the Šventoji River. August). Such positioning gave him an advantage at the very beginning of the battle. Due to the marshy land on Course of the battle the left bank of Żyrnówka, the Polish commander could not strike first. The wetland at the southern shore of Lake A forested plain stretched to the east of Lake Żyrnowo, Żyrnowo also did not allow to bypass it and attack from reaching the city of Ukmergė, from which a road ran to the south-west45. Striking the Livonian troops at Ukmergė the south. Near the village of Pasila it branched in the di- proved too risky, as in such a case the Lithuanian-Polish rections of Širvintos-Vilnius and Gielwanty-, which army would have the majority of the Livonian-Ruthenian crossed the Żyrnówka stream. With news of the enemy army behind its back. The commander of the Lithuanian rushing from Ukmergė, Jakub of Kobylany decided to and Polish troops did not have a choice, but to keep his cross his way and lay battle43. soldiers at bay despite heavy rainfall and patiently wait for After leaving Ukmergė (on the 29th or 30th of August), Švitrigaila and Kerskorff’s move.46 Švitrigaila′s corps headed south in Pasile, along the trail to The Teutonic-Ruthenian army commanders could not Alytus. Two groups of the Teutonic-Ruthenian troops, in- unanimously decide on how to proceed. They did not re- cluding a part of the Livonian army and the guest crusad- alize that they have the whole Lithuanian-Polish army in ers commanded by Kerskorff himself and Ruthenian units front of them. Only a failed attempt to force enemy troops led by Švitrigaila, as well as Sigismund Korybutowicz’s to withdraw using marksmen sent to the right shore of infantry crossed to the left bank of the Żyrnówka stream, Lake Żyrnowo showed the difficulty and complexity of the north of Lake Żyrnowo, by a dam or a wooden bridge, situation: the burdensome repeated crossing to the right possibly a piled one. In contrast, the third group moved shore of Żyrnówka and assuming battle formations in slower. It was mostly made up of Livonian knights, guest front of Jakub of Kobylany’s army. It is not known whether crusaders and their supply wagons. It lagged a few kilome- there was any communication with the Livonian troops tres behind both other groups and probably still had the at Ukmergė. For two days the army stood idly, although village of Pasile, to the south of Ukmergė, ahead of it44. in full combat readiness, only shooting bows, crossbows, Jacob of Kobylany initially did not think that the enemy muskets and harquebuses at the Poles and Lithuanians. would move along the Alytus road. It was only when the Soon they began to run out of food and fodder for horses, first unit moved past Pasile and entered the second high whereas the rain soaked stock on the wag- road, did he recognize their intentions. Seeing that the ons47. Švitrigaila and Marshal Werner von Nesselrode enemy stretched his forces and did not expect battle, he wanted to attack the Lithuanian-Polish forces in front of based his actions on surprise. The terrain was mostly for- them, but Kerskorff opposed and Sigismund Korybutow- ested and very marshy, the roads were narrow, forest tracts icz advised negotiating with the enemy. in very bad condition, especially because of heavy rainfall Finally, it was decided to carry out offensive action. in the days preceding the clash. It favoured the lightly ar- They decided to cross the Zyrnowka again. They planned moured Polish-Lithuanian troops, but proved very difficult to march further to Ukmergė, join the third Livonian group to heavily armoured , especially their infantry, and only then lay a decisive battle. They realized that the hindering not only their ability to march, but also to fight. enemy would not stay passive, so they decided to act by Jakub of Kobylany sent one reconnaissance unit surprise48. to Pasile and a second one to the south shore of Lake 45 M. Plewczyński, op. cit., p. 41; M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 193. 46 J. Długosz, op. cit., p. 176; J. Skrzypek, op. cit., p. 54; M. Plew- 42 W. Mikołajczak, op. cit., pp. 182–183. czyński, op. cit., p. 41. 43 J. Skrzypek, op. cit., p. 52. 47 M. Plewczyński, op. cit., p. 41; M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 194. 44 M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 193. 48 M. Plewczyński, op. cit., p. 41.

– 35 – – Zbigniew Grabowski –

– 36 – – The Battle of Ukmergė, the 1st of September 1435 –

Just before dawn on the 1st of September, they ad- Frank von Kerskorff, the former Marshall Werner von vanced to cross Żyrnówka. The Tatars fought with the Nesselrode and six other dignitaries of the Order were Lithuanian-Polish guard, trying to protect the march of the killed during the battle. Świdrygiełło managed to es- main force. They most probably moved in the following or- cape along with 30 people to (or Polatsk)51. This der: first Sigismund Korybutowicz’s wagons with , clash caused huge losses among the Teutons, many of paving the way for the Ruthenian cavalry and the Livonian whom were prominent knights – ‘good men’. Many of the knights and guest crusaders in the back. At the same time, Švitrigaila′s Ruthenian supporters were also killed, includ- Jakub of Kobylany, immediately after receiving news of ing 13 dukes. Forty-two were taken prisoner. the enemy crossing the river, positioned his troops along However, the Teutons were treated especially merci- the road from Pasile and sidelong to the marching enemy. lessly – just like at Grunwald, a quarter of a century earlier. Lithuanian light cavalry was located on the left and right The Lithuanians and Poles suspected that the Grand Mas- flanks and the centre was comprised of Polish heavy sol- ter sent some of the Teutonic knights from Prussia (it could diers. Some were left near Ukmergė, just in case. They still be true only about a few persons). Some of them got into could have been of use as rear guard. It was decided to Lithuanian and Polish captivity (in such cases, they were take advantage of enemy separation and strike in wedge brought to the Crown, in order to obtain ransom). As a res- formation and afterwards, in full strength, split their for- ult, the Livonian branch began lacking Order personnel mations even further and push them away into the marshy for maintaining and defending the country. Upon learning banks of the Rivers Żyrnówka and Šventoji49. about the defeat, the Livonian Marshall Heinrich von Buck- This manoeuvre decided the fate of the battle, bring- envorde immediately asked the Grand Master to quickly ing glory to the Lithuanian-Polish commander. The send 400 armed men in order to save the branch of the Lithuanian-Polish army crossed the same stream in a dif- Order from destruction. ferent place and in the opposite direction, and by strik- As a result, the Polish (and Lithuanian, from the right ing in wedge formation split the enemy troops into two. flank) cavalry strike shredded the wagons and pushed They managed to sing just the beginning of ‘Bogurodzica’ them away from the road to Pasile. The Lithuanian light (‘Mother of God’) before it came to melee combat. Firstly, cavalry quickly ousted the weakened enemy, who sought the main body of the army, which closed the marching rescue in escaping towards the Šventoji River and Uk- column, was attacked. The banner of St. George and its mergė. Some of the Ruthenians tried to secure the bridge protector Werner von Nesselrode was the first to fall; af- over Żyrnówka, but suffered defeat. Similar fate awaited terwards they crushed Master Kerskorff’s units and then a Teutonic unit, which tried to hold the bridge on the every subsequent unit that appeared on the battlefield. It Šventoji River52. is possible, that the left Lithuanian flank struck too soon, The real tragedy happened 2–3 kilometres further north. allowing some Teutonic troops to retreat to the left bank Ruthenians and the Teutons stumbled upon a column of of Żyrnówka. Livonian knights and their wagons, while fleeing in panic. The main attacks were directed from the right, Lithua- These units, in accordance with the battle plan, moved out nian flank onto Švitrigaila’s units, which already crossed on the morning of the 1st of September to meet the main the river, and from the middle group, that is, the Polish cav- force. The weak Polish-Lithuanian guard was not able alry clashing with the central enemy formation. Lithuanian to stop their march, however slow it was due to difficult and Polish lighter cavalry units moved smoothly through terrain conditions – soggy ground caused the wagons to the marshy ground, on the contrary to heavier armed move with difficulty and regularly get stuck. The Lithuani- units, which began to trudge. It was especially true for an-Polish pursuit clashed into the column of soldiers Livonian and ‘guest’ troops. Infantry fire from Sigismund marching away from the battlefield. As a result, the third Korybutowicz’s wagons turned out to be impossible, due 51 to wet gunpowder50. The Livonian master received two mortal wounds, one in the face, the other in the abdomen (T. Narbutt, Dzieje narodu lite- wskiego, vol. VII, Wilno 1840, p. 175, footnote 1); ‘Pskovskaya pervaya letopis’, in Polnoye sobraniye russkikh letopisey, vol. IV, 49 M. Plewczyński, op. cit., pp. 41–43. St. Petersburg 1848, pp. 209–210. 50 M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 194. 52 Liv-, Est- Und Curländisches…, p. XVIII.

– 37 – – Zbigniew Grabowski –

group of Teutonic-Ruthenian troops panicked and began dispose of Švitrigaila, in order not to strengthen Kęstu- to flee along with other units53. taitis’s position in Lithuania. As a result, the march of the The battle lasted for just an hour and ended with an Lithuanian and Kobylański’s troops after the st1 of Sep- utter defeat of Švitrigaila and Kerskorff’s army54. This part tember 1435 has been suspended, and most of the Polish of their troops, which had taken refuge on the other side troops returned to the Crown with their Livonian prison- of Żyrnówka was taken prisoner by Lithuanian soldiers. ers58. Most of the Lithuanian and Polish lightly armoured sol- A Ruthenian chronicler wrote ‘there wasn’t such a bat- diers chased the escapees, most of whom lost their lives tle in the Lithuanian lands since long ago’59. The Poles also in the Šventoji River and in the wetlands. The defeated maintained that ‘there is no similar battle in human mem- Teutons and Ruthenian sought refuge in the forest and in ory’, and that it could be compared only to the one which the bushes along the shore of the lake, where they were took place 25 years ago at Grunwald. Some considered it either killed off or taken captive by the Lithuanians during even bigger than that60. The consequences were extremely the following 15 days. momentous, but not quite visible yet: the battle has de- The same happened with the infantry maintaining the cided the fate of both the Order and Švitrigaila. Livonia lost wagons. Those soldiers, taking advantage of a break in its influence on the position of the whole Teutonic Order Polish attacks, decided to escape, dying in the depths of on the matters of Poland and Lithuania. the Šventoji River or during the subsequent chase55. Those The battle of Ukmergė settled the war for the throne who remained alive surrendered along with their com- of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but it did not break mander, Sigismund Korybutowicz, who received wounds Švitrigaila. Although Smolensk, and Mcensk to the head and neck.56 fell into the hands of Sigismund Kęstutaitis in Septem- ber 1435, other great north-Ruthenian centres (Vitebsk Consequences and ) still recognized Švitrigaila′s authority and reign61. With the help of the Tatars he succeeded in recov- The news of Švitrigaila and the Livonian army’s defeat ering Volyn and Bracław Land in November. A total failure on the 1st of September 1435 made a great impression of Švitrigaila did not lie in the interest of the Polish lords. both in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, especially in the Experience has already taught that Sigismund Kęstutaitis Ruthenian lands, as well as in the Polish Crown. The ban- will seek to secure independence from Poland. While gain- ners captured in the battle at the Šventoji River, especially ing more and more support among the Lithuanian elites, Livonian ones, were displayed in the by he could return to Vytautas’s political programme, which order of King Wladyslaw III57. The Grand Duke Sigismund was popular in Lithuania. Švitrigaila, deprived of Teutonic funded a parish church near the Żyrnowo Lake, in a town support after the Brest armistice, did not seem dangerous henceforth bearing the symbolic name of ‘Pobojsk’ (de- for the Polish interests in Lithuania and maintaining his rived from the Polish word for ‘battlefield after the battle’). reign could prove a good protection against the ambitions Švitrigaila and the Livonian army’s defeat on the 1st of of Sigismund Kęstutaitis62. September 1435 could result in the Lithuanian and Pol- However, the effects of the Ukmergė disaster proved ish army’s invasion on almost defenceless Livonia, which dire for Master Rusdorf: in the coming negotiations with could put an end to the power of the Order in the lands Poland he could no longer use evasive tactics, as the Poles surrounding the Daugava River. However, neither was the clearly intended to strike Teutonic Prussia before the Grand Duke Sigismund Kęstutaitis interested in its eradi- winter of 1435 and force a peace treaty by using repres- cation, fearing the overwhelming domination of the Poles sions. The Grand Master’s cries to Emperor Sigismund did in Lithuania, nor the Crown Council strived to completely not bring any reaction, as he was busy settling relations with Bohemia and securing full royal reign over them. 53 M. Plewczyński, op. cit., p. 43. 54 J. Długosz, op. cit., p. 177. 58 M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 196. 55 A. Michałek, Wyprawy krzyżowe. Husyci, Warsaw 2004, p. 95. 59 ‘Pskovskaya pervaya letopis’, p. 210. 56 Sigismund Korybutowicz soon died under mysterious circum- 60 A. Lewicki, op. cit., pp. 257–258. stances. 61 M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 196. 57 J. Długosz, op. cit., p. 178. 62 S. Szczur, Historia Polski. Średniowiecze, Cracow 2006, p. 509.

– 38 – – The Battle of Ukmergė, the 1st of September 1435 –

Further hostilities broke the peace negotiations un- way for their massive uprising against the Teutons 20 years dertaken in relation to the Polish-Teutonic treaty in Brest later, at the beginning of the Thirteen Years’ War. Kujawski. Under the peace treaty concluded on the 31st of After the war ended in 1435, the Order needed the December 1435 (its main part reiterated the provisions of money and began to seize the cities’ income from minting the ), the Order yet again promised to sever and exporting grain and at the same time tried to deprive its ties with Švitrigaila, and the Teutons had to pay 9,500 the Chełmno gentry of the privilege granting them tax free- Hungarian gold coins for violating the Treaty of Melno. The dom. As a result, the Union of Prussia, an anti-Teutonic or- Treaty of Brest Kujawski ultimately forced the Teutons to ganisation was founded in 1440, grouping the knights and abandon their plans of forcefully breaking the Polish-Lith- cities under the Order’s rule. Despite the Teutons trying to uanian union, by abandoning Švitrigaila, precluding any counter its development, the Union grew in strength, seek- Papal or Imperial intervention in the affairs of the Order. ing support in the nearest state, Poland. The possibility of the Order winning against Poland has Initial negotiations with Švitrigaila began in early 1436. been removed, just as the Luxembourgs have been doing The following year he signed an agreement in Lvov. How- for years. Thus, the monastic state began to lose its inter- ever, Polish diplomacy failed to strike an agreement be- national importance. The last day of 1435 was also the last tween Jagiełło’s brother and Sigismund Kęstutaitis, who day the Teutonic Order could think of itself as an indepen- was irreconcilable and did not intend to accept Švitrigaila′s dent, international actor. rule over even the smallest part of the Grand Duchy65. The Poland regained the economically and strategically im- Polish lords could do nothing else, but stop supporting portant district of Nieszawa, but reiterated the abandon- Švitrigaila and recognize Sigismund’s authority. The price ing of Gdańsk Pomerania and Chełmno Land. A number of of the compromise was the recognition of Polish rights provisions of the treaty regulated the freedom of economic to the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Under an trade with the , particularly along of the Vistula agreement with Kęstutaitis in in 1437, after his River, and free trade of Prussian merchants on Polish soil death Lithuania was to fall into the hands of Władysław and Polish ones in Prussia. The right of the knights and Jagiełło’s son. citizens of both states to relocate freely has been secured In March 1440, as a result of a conspiracy, Sigismund along with a peaceful elimination of border disputes63. The Kęstutaitis was assassinated. The envoys from Lithuania whole treaty sought to develop free contacts between the proposed King Władysław to take the throne of the Grand two sides, with the exception of peasantry. Fugitives of this Duchy. It was decided that the king’s thirteen-year-old estate were to be given up. The Prussian estates became brother, Prince Casimir, would be sent to Vilnius as a gover- the warrantors of the Treaty on the Order’s side, because if nor. In the second half of May 1440, Casimir went to Lithu- the Teutons breached it, the estates were to be exempted ania with an armed guard commanded by Jan of Czyżowo from the obligation of obedience. and the accompanying Polish nobles were to keep watch The peace in Brest Kujawski ended the most import- over him. When he arrived, the Lithuanian boyars, without ant stage of the Polish-Teutonic wars started in 1409, in- their consent and violating the resolutions of the Grodno cluding a great victory of the allied forces at Grunwald, union, elected him as the Grand Duke and Casimir be- and a second, equally important, victory at Ukmergė, gan his independent reign in Lithuania. Švitrigaila, on the however it did not cover the most important Polish in- other hand, has never returned to the throne of the Grand terest – Pomerelia, which still remained in the hands of Duchy. the Teutons64.Nevertheless, the Polish-Teutonic wars of 1409–1435 have significantly weakened the Order both on economic and political ground, have undermined the au- thority of the Order among its own subjects and paved the

63 M. Biskup, G. Labuda, Dzieje Zakonu Krzyżackiego w Prusach, Gdańsk 1986, p. 377. 64 T. M. Nowak, J. Wimmer, op. cit., p. 213–214. 65 S. Szczur, op. cit., p. 509.

– 39 – Bibliography Primary sources J. Caro, Dzieje Polski, transl. S. Mieczyński, vol. 4 1430–1455, Liv-, Est- Und Curlandisches Urkundenbuch, Bd. 8, 1429 Mai – 1435, Warsaw 1897 Riga–Moskau 1884 T. Korzon, Dzieje wojen i wojskowości w Polsce, vol. 1, 2nd ed., ‘Pskovskaya pervaya letopis’, in Polnoye sobraniye russkikh leto­ Lvov–Warsaw–Cracow 1923 pisey, vol. IV, St. Petersburg 1848 A. Lewicki, Powstanie Świdrygiełły. Ustęp z dziejów unii Litwy J. Długosz, Roczniki czyli Kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego, z Koro­­ną, Cracow 1892 Lib. XI–XII, Warsaw 2009 H. Łowmiański, Polityka Jagiellonów, Poznań 2006 (J. Długosz, Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae, Lib. XI–XII, W. Mikołajczak, Wojny polsko-krzyżackie, Zakrzewo 2009 Warsaw 2001) T. Narbutt, Dzieje narodu litewskiego, vol. VII, Wilno 1840 Books T. M. Nowak, J. Wimmer, Historia oręża polskiego 963–1795, War- Pamiętnik VI Powszechnego Zjazdu Historyków Polskich w Wilnie, saw 1981 17–20 września 1935 r., vol. I, Lvov 1935 M. Plewczyński, Wojny Jagiellonów z wschodnimi i południo­ Zakon Krzyżacki w Prusach i Inflantach. Podziały administracyjne wymi sąsiadami Królestwa Polskiego w XV wieku, Siedlce i kościelne w XIII-XVI wieku, ed. R. Czaja, A. Radzimiński, Toruń 2002 2013 S. Szczur, Historia Polski. Średniowiecze, Cracow 2006 M. Biskup, Wojny Polski z Zakonem Krzyżackim (1308–1521), Articles Gdańsk 1993 J. Skrzypek, ‘Bitwa nad rzeką Świętą’, in Przegląd Historyczno- M. Biskup, G. Labuda, Dzieje Zakonu Krzyżackiego w Prusach, -Wojskowy, 1938, vol. X Gdańsk 1986 T. Stolarczyk, ‘Świdrygiełło przeciwko Jagielle – tzw. wojna łucka P. Bunar, S. A. Sroka, Słownik wojen, bitew i potyczek w średnio- w 1431 r.’, in Mars, 2001, vol. X wiecznej Polsce, Cracow 2004 – Marek Plewczyński – Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities

The Battle of Orsha 8th September 1514

Smolensk – we tend to associate this city with the great risoned Smolensk with his own troops1. It was only after tragedy that afflicted the Polish nation on 10th April this four months, in the latter half of August, that King Sigis- year. However, it should be remembered that the soil of mund the Old led the Polish-Lithuanian army from Vilnius the Smolensk district soaked up the blood of Polish sol- in order to regain the lost fortress. A census of gathered diers throughout ages. As early as 1514 thousands of troops was conducted in Minsk. The army consisted of Poles, Lithuanians and Ruthenians gave their lives here 15 thousand Lithuaninan landed service, 14 thousand while defending the Jagiellonian borders against the Mus- regular cavalry and 3 thousand regular infantry as well covite onslaught. What is meant here is, above all, the as 2500 and voluntary detachments battle fought on 8th September, near the town of Orsha, from Polish . The artillery was quite numerous, 110 km away from Smolensk. Nearly 100 thousand people but the number of cannons remains unknown. The Pol- may have taken part in it, which is twice as much as in the ish-Lithuanian army had ca. 35 thousand soldiers in total, battle of Grunwald in 1410. Though the battle is one of the 57% of whom were Poles. The Crown of the Kingdom of biggest in the and its significance, Poland had never before deployed such a numerous reg- both political and military cannot be overestimated, it has ular army in the field. The Lithuanian landed service was not become the subject of any greater monograph and the commanded by the – Grand Konstanty western historiography hardly notices it. Six years ago, its Ostrogski and Field Hetman Jerzy Radziwiłł. The regular 490th anniversary passed completely unnoticed in Poland, Polish army was under the command of Janusz Świer- and the present authorities in Minsk abandoned the idea czowski, the castellan of Biecz, the household troops and of celebrating a Belarussian national holiday in honour of private detachments were led by Wojciech Sempoliński. the victory of Orsha. Therefore, it befits to recall the battle To face the royal troops, Vasili sent a much bigger force. of Orsha, which stopped the Muscovite expansion to the Apart from the strong crews in Smolensk and the nearby west, just as the victory at Grunwald crushed the power 1 of the Teutonic Order threatening the Polish-Lithuanian Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw, Lithuanian Metrica vol. CXCIII, No. 238, p. 348, 361; Akty otnosyashchiy- union from the north. esya k istorii Yuzhnoy i Zapadnoy Rossii, sobrannyye i izdan- A crew consisting of Polish, Lithuanian and Ruthenian nyye Arkheograficheskoyu Komissiyeyu, vol. II, S. Petersburg soldiers defended Smolensk for 40 days with great fierce- 1863, p.115; J. L. Decjusz, Księga o czasach króla Zygmunta, ness. It was only the strong fire of Muscovite guns operated pp. 76–77; M. Bielski, Kronika polska, ed. K.J. Turowski, Sa- by German gunners that forced the boyars and residents nok 1856, pp. 970–971; T. Korzon, Dzieje wojen i wojskowości of the city to capitulate on 30th July 1514. After 110 years w Polsce, vol. I, Lvov – Warsaw – Cracow 1923, pp. 257–258; of Lithuanian rule and six previous , the fortress of L. Kolankowski, Polska Jagiellonów. Dzieje polityczne, Olsztyn 1991, pp. 144–145; idem, Dzieje Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskie- Smolensk was captured by Russians. This fact strongly im- go za Jagiellonów, vol. II, Warsaw 1930, p. 123; W. Pociecha, pressed the whole Europe. Grand Prince Vasili III had all Daszkiewicz Eustachy, Polski Słownik Biograficzny, vol. IV, p. the gold and silver from churches and the castle brought 445; E. Razin, Historia sztuki wojennej, vol. II, Warsaw 1958, pp. to . He took Lithuanian soldiers captive and gar- 333–337.

– 41 – – Marek Plewczyński –

castles, it consisted in, according to exaggerated data, 80 Slowly and carefully (10 km a day), the Pol- thousand soldiers, including auxiliary staff. The high com- ish-Lithuanian army reached Orsha on 6th September. mand lay with Kniaz Ivan Chelyadnin. The main burden The men were ordered to stop for two days and carry out of warfare was carried by the cavalry of feudal pospolite a reconnaissance to see if there was a possibility of cross- ruszenie (levée en masse). Chelyadnin’s mounted nobility ing the . While Lithuanian mounted archers rode was reinforced by sparse mercenary and infantry along the bank making an impression that the entire royal Tartar squadrons.2 army stayed by the ford, the main force moved up the Sigismundus decided to take military action, but did river searching for another suitable place to cross it. After not intend to direct it himself. He stayed in an encamp- marching for 5 km, the second ford, opposite the village ment near Borisov with 4 thousand soldiers, and sent the of Pashino, was found. There, Ostrogski erected a military remaining troops beyond the River, handing the camp surrounded by carts and ordered the army to pre- high command to Hetman Ostrogski. Chelyadnin was sur- pare for crossing the river.3 prised by the size of the Polish-Lithuanian force. After all, On the night of 7th to 8th September 1514 two pontoon spies had reported on the small size of the royal army and bridges were built of floating, tightly closed barrels tied the grand prince himself told him to ‘drive them to Moscow together and beam rafts. Some of the light cavalry swam with whips like cattle’. Ostrogski’s march induced him to across the river. A few infantry companies and some can- gather his scattered troops. During his stay in Drutsk, by nons were transported to the left bank on rafts. Just after the River, Chelyadnin ordered his forces to retreat to the infantrymen garrisoned the beachhead secured by Orsha, by the Dnieper River, and only there did he decide the cavalry, the pontoon bridges were deployed. At about to face his enemy in a decisive battle. Orsha, situated on 6 a.m. the remaining troops started to march over them. the right bank of the Dnieper, constituted the last line of First, the infantry were carried, followed by the cannons defence before Smolensk. However, the crew in the castle and military equipment, and then the heavy cavalry set were Polish. Chelyadnin did not want to risk a battle with off. Yet, there were dramatic moments. One of the bridges enemy in the rear, and ordered a retreat to the other bank collapsed under the heavy lancers, so the riders in 30 kg of Dnieper. Having crossed the river, his army took po- armour had to swim to the other bank. During this oper- sition at the edge of a forest on a gentle slope of a wide ation, the army showed unusual skill, losing only one sol- hill at the distance of 2.5–3 km from the river bank, near dier. One can doubt whether the heavy lancers crossing the road leading from Orsha to Dubrovna. The Muscovite the Dnieper were wearing full armour. The written sources, leader planned to attack the royal army while they were however, state explicitly that expecting a Muscovite attack, crossing the river, or to make them march on the left bank, ‘all the cavalry in formation, as if for the battle, jumped into surround and then crush. the swift river without scattering’. Also the painting ’Battle

3 K. Górski, Acta Tomiciana, vol. III, ed. T. Działyński, Poznań 2 B. Wapowski, ‘Kroniki’, in Scriptores rerum Polonicarum, vol. II, 1853, pp. 3–6; J. L. Decjusz, Księga o czasach króla Zygmun- ed. J. Szujski, Cracow 1874, p. 115; T. Korzon, Dzieje wojen…, ta…, pp. 78–79; M. Bielski, Kronika polska…, pp. 973–974; S. p. 258; S. Herbst, M. Walicki, ‘Obraz bitwy pod Orszą 1514’, in Sarnicki, ‘Księgi hetmańskie’, in Jagiellonian Library, no 171, Rozprawy Komisji Historii Sztuki, vol. I, Warsaw 1949, pp. 33–68; p. 237, printed in Z. Spieralski, Wypisy źródłowe do historii pol- Z. Spieralski, ‘Wojskowość polska’, in Zarys dziejów wojskowo- skiej sztuki wojennej, vol. IV, Warsaw 1958, p. 140; T. Korzon, ści polskiej do roku 1864, vol. I, ed. J. Sikorski, Warsaw 1965, p. Dzieje wojen…, p. 258; Z. Spieralski, ‘Wojskowość polska’, in 331; J. Teodorczyk, ‘Bitwy polskie. Orsza’, in Tygodnik Kultural- Zarys dziejów wojskowości…, pp. 333–336; N.S. Golicyn, Rus- ny, no. 16, 1984, vol.27, p. 11; J. Wimmer, Historia piechoty pol- skaya voyennaya istoriya, vol. II, Petersburg 1878, pp. 309–327; skiej do roku 1864, Warsaw 1978, p. 102; K. Górski, ‘O rozwoju O. Laskowski, ‘Orsza’, in Encyklopedia wojskowa, vol. VI, ed. sztuki wojennej w Polsce w wieku XV’, in Biblioteka Warszaw- O. Laskowski, Warsaw 1938, pp. 161–163; E.J. Kashprovskiy, ska, vol. III, 1890, pp. 85–95; M. Plewczyński, ‘Polska technika ‘Borba Vasiliya Ivanovicha s Sigizmundom I izh – za oblada- wojskowa w XVI wieku’, in Studia z dziejów polskiej techniki niya Smoleńskom (1507–1522)’, in Sbornik Istorichesko–filolo- wojskowej od XVI do XX wieku, ed. J. Wojtasik, Warsaw 2001, gicheskovo obshchestwa pri Institute kn. Bezborodko v Nezine, p. 100; idem, ‘Wkład Serbów w rozwój staropolskiej wojsko- II, 1899, pp. 112–118; L. Podhorodecki, Sławne bitwy Polaków, wości’, in Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, vol. XXXVI, Warsaw 1997, p. 105; P. Dróżdż, Orsza 1514, Warsaw 2000, pp. 1994, pp. 14, 17–18. 193–194.

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of Orsha’ from ca. 1520, a leading piece of of the smaller gully and the forest. The regiment was currently in the National Museum in Warsaw, probably at the front, with the archers following. Com- shows the heavy lancers swimming across the river and panies in each of the regiments were divided into 3–4 at- then drying themselves on the left bank. Some of them tack groups. The Lithuanian forward regiment was com- are even pouring water out of iron boots. In three hours manded by Ostrogski himself. It probably consisted of ca. an army of over 30 thousand men was on the left bank of 3 thousand cavalrymen deployed between the Pugaylovo the Dnieper. At about 9 a.m. the passage was finished. The and the Pashino ravine. It consisted mostly of horsemen surprised enemy did nothing to stop them. The Muscovite wielding only bear spears, less often bows and sabres. The command had already known about crossing the river by main regiment of the Lithuanian army was under Radzi- the royal army in the morning, but Chelyadnin refused the wiłł’s command. About 6 thousand cavalry were packed suggestion to attack the Polish-Lithuanian troops divided on a plateau only a couple of hundred metres wide at by the river. He hoped that, due to the advantage in num- the bend of the Pashino gully. The heavy lancers stood bers, he would turn his army, surround the enemy corps at the front, followed by the hussars, crossbowmen and and push all of them to the Dnieper. horsemen wielding sabres and swords. Lastly, the three The Polish-Lithuanian force took the position on a flat Lithuanian reinforcement regiments deployed in a wide hill, four kilometre wide, situated to the left of the Dnieper, space between the Pashino gully and the Dnieper. They which turned from the east to south. The hill was di- consisted of about 3 thousand archers. vided in the middle by a wide gully leading to the village The only road from the village of Pashino led south‑east of Pugaylovo. Closer to the river, at the entry to the gully, to Pugaylovo situated over a kilometre away from a bend there lay the village of Pashino. The area was covered by of Dnieper. By this road, over the entrance to the Pugaylovo numerous groves, bushes and holes, which significantly ravine, between the Polish and the Lithuanian armies, limited the possibility to observe the area and to use can- a few Crown infantry companies were deployed slightly in nons and heavy lancers. At his right flank, Ostrogski de- front of the remaining troops. This sector, 200–300 metres ployed most of his infantry and cavalry under the cover wide, could not hold more than 3–4 companies, i.e. up of the forest. On the left, the cavalry stood in a formation to 1000 infantrymen. Ostrogski wanted to fight a defens- known as ‘the old Polish device’. The forward regiment ive-offensive battle. In the initial phase, he wanted to pin constituted the first attack group, then the main regiment the Muscovite cavalry in the centre and weaken them with was to enter the battle. Beside them there were three re- infantry fire. Subsequently, the Lithuanian commander inforcement regiments consisting of light cavalry. The for- intended to weaken the enemy horsemen with hand can- ward and main regiments were divided by the Pugaylovo nons and artillery fire at the right flank (thus the 2 thousand gully splitting both of them into two parts. The left side was infantry and artillery in the forest between the village of occupied by the Lithuanian horsemen, and the right by Ruklino and the Dnieper) and crush with cavalry charges. the Polish cavalry. The Polish forward regiment was com- The decisive role was to be played by Świerczowski’s main manded by Sampoliński. He led the troop of 2500 house- regiment. hold and volunteer cavalrymen, mostly heavy lancers, The Muscovite army, consisting exclusively of cavalry probably divided into two attack groups in 7–9 columns. (cannons had been left in the captured castles), deployed The main regiment, comprised of ca. 9 thousand regular in its traditional formation. The vanguard regiment stood cavalry, was under Świerczowski’s command. Almost 70 at the front. 7 thousand horsemen that comprised it hid in companies were crowded into a small, half a kilometre the gully leading north-west from Pugaylovo to Dnieper, wide, space between two gullies (the Pugaylovo gully and whose slopes were overgrown with bushes. In front of the a second, smaller one) and the bank of the Dnieper. The entrance to the gully, on the right flank, the right hand area was only wide enough for lines of 5 companies. They regiment (12 thousand cavalry in three attack groups) un- were probably deployed in 13 attack groups in a chequer- der the command of Mikhail Golitsa was deployed. The board formation – first the heavy lancer companies, then left hand regiment (ca. 10 thousand horsemen) took po- Polish hussars and crossbowmen at the back. The three sition opposite the Polish army, on the left flank near the auxiliary regiments of the Crown consisted of ca. 3.5 thou- Muscovite encampment east of Ruklino. In the centre, on sand horsemen in total. They were deployed between a hillside by a road connecting Ruklino with the Dubrovno

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route, there stood the grand regiment (ca. 20 thousand was conducted in front of some of the Muscovite vanguard cavalry) consisting of ‘the bravest and the best equipped troops. The speed of the lancers passing through the range men’. On the top of the hill, in the reserve, stood the rear- of enemy archers was so great that the Polish casualties guard regiment (ca. 10 thousand horsemen), accompan- were insignificant. Golitsa’s horsemen had few lances and ied by Chelyadnin himself. The Muscovite leader intended swords, and they were attacked from the side. Before they to use the opacity of terrain obstacles (groves, gullies) were able to release their arrows, they were reached by and flank the Polish-Lithuanian forces from both sides. the violent Polish . They must have been shaken Then, having separated them from the bridge and the and petrified by the sight of protruding lances and the ford, he planned to push them to the Dnieper and crush approaching mass of the armoured cavalry crushing and them. trampling everything on their path. Deploying forces lasted a few hours. During that time The sword from the early 16th century could be used there was only some skirmishing. About 2 p.m. in the not only for hacking, but also for thrusting by placing a fin- Muscovite army ‘the trumpets hit and the signs of attack ger over the crossguard with extended cantles protecting were raised’. The right hand regiment (12 thousand men one’s hand. The Muscovite horsemen could counter this under Golitsa) marched forward, crossed the gully east weapon only with axes, bear spears, javelins and shorter of Pugaylovo and started to move around the Lithuanian sabres, less useful in mounted combat. Thus it is not formation in a wide arch from the left. The vanguard regi- surprising that Sampoliński ‘having slaughtered them in ment followed it to the Dnieper valley through the ravine. great numbers, forced them to retreat’. The impetus of Concealed by the elevated terrain, covered by riverbank his charge and the help of reinforcement regiments only bushes, it deployed right from Golitsa’s regiment, intend- disturbed the right hand regiment, but did not crush it. ing to face the rear of the Lithuanian regiments. The man- It could not balance the great advantage in numbers, oeuvres were not unnoticed by the Lithuanian auxiliary as Golitsa was quickly reinforced by the vanguard regi- regiments. An exchange of arrows took place there, The ment. Its horsemen, implementing Chelyadnin’s plan, left Muscovite archers were four times more numerous than the Dnieper valley, crossed the bushes and attacked the the Lithuanians, thus the hail of enemy arrows was more Lithuanian auxiliary regiments from the rear and the side intense. Both parties used short eastern weapons, known with ‘trumpets and war-cries’. Their advantage in numbers as reflexive bows. was overwhelming – 5.5 thousand Polish-Lithuanian cav- Ostrogski realised that the Muscovite flanking man- alry could not stop the mass of 19 thousand Muscovites. Is oeuvre from the left is the biggest threat to his forces, as some places ‘there were not two against one, as the Kniaz it was directed towards the Polish bridge. He knew that [Ostrogski] had predicted, but six against one’. The com- the enemies first ‘harm horses and men with arrows, and panies of the Polish forward regiment and the Lithuanian only then enter close combat’. Hence the Lithuanian het- auxiliary regiment started to yield. man ordered the Polish forward regiment to attack. Due At the moment, Ostrogski rushed to help Sempoliński to its close position, the attack should have been made with his forward regiment consisting of landed service. by the Lithuanian forward regiment. However, it would He commanded the attack personally – as it can be seen have to turn on the spot. Moreover, the lightly armoured in the painting, with a long wind-blown beard, ferezja on Lithuanian horsemen could have been threatened by the his head, splinted mail, at his side and in his hail of enemy arrows to a greater degree, especially while hand. 3 thousand of fresh Lithuanian horsemen wielding crossing the Pashino gully. The threat of being flanked bear spears, bows and sabres crossed the Pashino gully was too serious to enter a fight whose result would be un- and struck the Muscovite cavalry. Over twenty thousand certain. It had to be a crushing and decisive attack. Thus mounted men clashed in a deadly fight over an area about Sampoliński’s heavy armed lancers were chosen. They a kilometre wide and long, on a gentle slope limited by the changed their direction, descending to the Pugaylovo gullies and the bank of the Dnieper. This monstrous bat- gully, then they went round in an arch onto a rather flat tling crowd did not allow anyone to use a bow. Soldiers plateau and running quite a long way downhill (ca. 1 km) hacked one another with sabres, swords and picks. How- they gathered even greater momentum for the charge. ever, the Lithuanian bear spear proved most useful. It was The attack of the household and volunteer companies lighter and shorter (2 m) than the lance. It was also thrust

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to the sides and the back, used to parry various blows and Meanwhile in the forest neighbouring the Dnieper, even thrown like a javelin. It was due to the Lithuanian ‘in suitable places’, the gathering of 3 thousand infantry- bear spear and the Polish sword that Ostrogski succeeded ment (about 15 companies) was completed. They were at his left flank. Having better training and equipment, the mostly gunners ‘who carried long ’ and hand royal soldiers started to push the enemy to the gully and cannons. The gaps between the companies were used against the bank of the Dnieper. Eventually – in spite of be- to deploy cannons known as kartouwes. Several hun- ing twice as numerous – the right hand and the vanguard dred metres from these positions hidden ‘in the ambush regiments were crushed and fell back towards the main among thickets’, fierce combat took place. The left hand forces. regiment, having advantage in numbers, started to push Meanwhile, at the centre and the right flank of the the Polish auxiliary forces on the right flank. They resisted Polish-Lithuanian army, fierce fighting took place. After until the infantry companies showed at the edge of the Golitsa’s manoeuvre, Chelyadnin immediately ordered his forest and stood in tens, ‘in formation similar to protrud- left hand regiment to attack. According to his plan, he in- ing lances with gun facing those regiments’. In the front – tended to flank the sides and the back of the Polish form- as a charge of enemy cavalry was expected – there were ation as well. Yet he was worried about the Polish infantry pikemen in plate armour. Then the pavisiers with large deployed at the front. The infantry companies stood about rectangular wooden shields fixed to the ground. The third a kilometre away from the place at the left flank, where line consisted of crossbowmen, if a particular company in- Sempoliński’s forward regiment and the Lithuanian auxili- cluded them. The last 7–8 lines comprised gunners with ary regiments fought Golitsa’s troops. Neither firearms nor hand cannons. It is probable that groups of arquebusiers missile weapons could be used at such a distance. What is with loaded guns were placed in front of the pikemen in more, there was a hill, and further off Ostrogski’s forward a loose formation. The line of the Polish infantry and artil- regiment, in the line of fire. The grand hetman of Lithuania lery possibly stretched for about half a kilometre, almost probably abandoned his plans after the fight at the flanks perpendicularly to the bank of the Dnieper. started, and ordered the infantry companies to move away When the Polish infantry was ready, the light cavalry from the centre and join the remaining ones hidden in the feigned retreat towards the Dnieper. Chelyadnin thought forest near his right flank. that Poles were crushed. He wanted to capture the bridge The charge of the Muscovite left hand regiment was across the Dnieper as fast as possible and ordered the not as impetuous and well concealed as in the case of the grand regiment forwards. When the disorderly masses of right hand regiment and the vanguard. Polish auxiliary re- the Muscovite left hand regiment stretched while chasing giments at the right flank, comprising archers and hussars the Poles along the forest and a part of them entered the resisted attacks of three times more numerous enemy (3.5 ravine in the vicinity, the infantry and cannons revealed thousand against ca. 10 thousand) for a long time. The by the Polish cavalry fired. Of course the basic guidelines fighting probably consisted in quick charges and imme- of combat had been discussed by the grand hetman of diate retreats by the hussar companies. The slowly with- Lithuania beforehand, but at the decisive moment, the drawing archer companies marched in a chequerboard Polish commanders decided on their own. The ‘senior formation. The hussars repeatedly moved though the commander’ of the infantry was one Polobsza, but ‘this gaps between the attack groups just to turn their horses foot hetman had not been signalled by Konstanty to en- after the attack and to fall back. Such a tactic, based on gage in combat, but he did it himself, yet successfully…’ Tartar manoeuvres, proved to be very effective. Thus the Anyway, Ostrogski was personally involved in the fights at auxiliary regiments allowed Sampoliński to attack Golitsa. his left flank. Despite this, Chelyadnin did not bring the grand regiment Unexpected strong artillery, and hand can- into battle at either of the flanks. He waited passively for non fire from the side caused great disturbance among the the enemy formation to stretch and for the main regi- attackers. A of almost 2 thousand infantrymen firing ments to enter the battle. Besides, the rough terrain par- upwards (‘clout shooting’) from the distance of almost tially covered with groves, limited by the Dnieper river, a hundred metres caused ‘such a great cry and thunder of forced him to manoeuvre limited masses of cavalry on men, horses and guns that the earth quaked’. Due to the both flanks. necessity of standing behind the pikemen and pavisiers

– 45 – – Marek Plewczyński –

– 46 – – The Battle of Orsha 8th September 1514 –

protecting against the enemy cavalry, firing forwards at the stretched left hand regiment from the side. This charge such distance was virtually impossible. Thus the method of over thirty companies (ca. 4.5 thousand cavalry) was led of ‘clout shooting’ over the heads of friendly troops was probably by such experienced captains as Jan Boratyński adopted from crossbowmen. Only the arquebusiers at (2300 hussars), Jakub Secygniowski (1600 crossbowmen) the head ran towards the back of the company after firing or Mikołaj Iskrzycki (600 lancers). Heavy lancer companies a salvo. The bullet spread of firearms at that time was still were the first to attack, crossbowmen shot clouds of bolts quite significant, thus the rate of fire was more important from behind, but the lead role at this stage of the battle of than precision. No one even attempted at aiming the guns, Orsha was played by the Polish hussars. it sufficed to direct the barrel towards the target or up- This new type of cavalry, present in Poland for only wards, at a desired angle. Loading and firing was very slow 14 years, was based on Serbian light mercenary cavalry, – it lasted a dozen or so minutes. In the painting depicting known as racowie, and Hungarian hussars. The charging the battle one can see all the stages of a shot: loading the riders wearing felted hats, żupicas, stitched and padded gun with a ramrod, aiming with the stock by a cheek and kaftans, depicted in the painting, were probably an ex- firing. Hence it is probable that all the lines managed to ception. The vast majority consisted of hussars wearing fire their guns and some of the soldiers did it again. leather kaftans under mid-thigh-long mails with sleeves Due to the noise, flashes and smoke the horses bolted, reaching elbows. This kind of armour, made of interwoven and the Muscovite boyars were frightened of death decim- metal rings, was prone to tearing resulting from a sabre ating their lines. Voivod Ivan Temka Rostovskiy fell hit by ar- or spear thrust or from piercing with an arrowhead with tillery fire. The horsemen ‘fell off their horses like sheaves, a beak-like bulge. A hussar, however, was additionally became confused’, ‘crowded and at the same time struck protected by a Hungarian shield. During mounted com- by the infantry with their machines (guns)’. High casualties bat, while passing an enemy, hussars usually used strong caused by gunfire should be attributed to weak armour of cutting swing moves from the shoulder with a relaxed the Muscovite soldiers. Probably only a small portion was arm. Yet the sabre was not the main weapon of the hus- equipped with splinted mail and iron helmets. Most of sars that made them so successful. It was the Hungarian them wore quilted broadcloth or linen kaftans with occa- lance, based on the Turkish one. It burst on hit, but pierced sional metal plates stitched to them. Leather helmets and through Muscovite armour. It was discarded afterwards – misiurkas did not provide protection against bullet hits. as it was a disposable weapon. Only then did the hussars Panic broke out. Some sought shelter in trees, not under- draw their sabres. The companions who were riding in the standing where the invisible death came from. first line of a troop often just parried enemy blows with The artillery and infantry fire could break the charge of their sabres without striking opponents. They rode for- the enemy cavalry provided two basic conditions were ful- ward, while their pocztowi (retainers), who followed them, filled. First, the gunners had to surprise the enemy; second ‘finished’ the enemies. – they had to cooperate with the friendly light cavalry. And The left flank of the Muscovite army, caught in the am- in fact, the auxiliary regiments suddenly turned back, and bush set by the more numerous Polish forces, was crushed charged at the enemy violently, supported by a portion and pushed towards the grand regiment (ca. 20 thousand of Świerczowski’s main regiment. Another unexpected well armed cavalry) that fell to battle just at that moment. event intensified the panic in the Muscovite army. From Crowded Muscovite horsemen, pushed from the front and the left, the men of the left hand regiment were struck the sides by the Poles and from the rear by the friendly by gunfire and assaults by infantrymen attacking with troops, started to flee to the left, towards Pugaylovo. At melee weapons. From the front, a hail of arrows hit them, that very moment, Ostrogski’s forward regiment charged followed by a charge of the Polish hussars (1000 horses) at them. The hetman, having left finishing Golitsa’s troops and mounted archers (2500), who tightened their forma- to Sampoliński, galloped through the Pugaylovo gully and tion and attacked in line with sabres in their hands. The reinforced the Poles. In the ‘crowded throng’ of the Mus- strongest hit struck the Muscovite horsemen from the right. covite regiments, Lithuanian riders wielding bear spears Świerczowski’s main regiment, 300–400 m away, probably proved to be very effective. As a result, the grant regiment split in half. A portion of its soldiers turned right on the run in the centre was disordered, and the crushed left and and, having passed the nearby gully in an arch, attacked right flank of the Muscovite army fled towards Dubrovno.

– 47 – – Marek Plewczyński –

Then the Muscovite commander ordered his reserve – an insignificant number of Muscovites managed to reach the rear guard regiment – to attack and save the situation. Smolensk through the woods. It attacked the Polish-Lithuanian cavalry from the right Bielski probably exaggerated when he wrote that flank in an attempt to assist the grand regiment. Thus the 40 thousand enemy troops died at the battle of Orsha. Muscovite army gained advantage in the centre, as their However, the massacre of the Grand Prince’s army is cer- men (ca. 30 thousand) were three times more numerous tain. ‘One could see a vast area with open fields with the than the Polish-Lithuanian forces (11 thousand). The result bloodstained corpses lying on the ground without heads, of the battle could still be changed. Ostrogski ordered his arms or legs’. The victors captured 5 thousand men, in- forward regiment to withdraw from the chase, regrouped cluding 8 voivods (Chelyadnin, Bulgakov, Ivan the companies and personally led the decisive charge at Lugvitsa, Ivan Pronski, Dimitri Kitayev, Ivan Kolychev and the Muscovite grand regiment and rear guard. Lithuanian Mikulinski) and 37 lesser commanders. Supposedly, only main regiment under Radziwiłł, which had not taken part 500 soldiers of the Polish-Lithuanian force died, including in the battle by that time, together with a portion of the captain Słubicki and Jan . The victorious army Polish main regiment under Świerczowski, accompanied seized the enemy encampment with all its equipment, the grand hetman. This greatest clash in the battle of Or- banners, precious standards and valuables. 20 thousand sha took place near Pugaylovo, within a space of two kilo- horses were captured as spoils of war. All the loot was dis- metres limited by gullies from the north, east and west. It tributed among the soldiers. The prisoners of war were was a hillside, gently sloping towards the north with vil- sent to Borysov, to the king, but ‘a day after the battle [Os- lage buildings in the middle, probably already existing at trogski] received them as his guests and lifted their spirit that time, and the road connecting Ruklino and Pashino in misfortune with knightly consolation, induced a hope of with the Dubrovno route in the middle. The royal forces the king’s grace in them’.4 that took part in the fight consisted of about 21.5 thou- This battle, the greatest since Grunwald, lasted for six sand horsemen – 12.5 thousand Polish cavalry (including hours. Its result was mainly decided by the manoeuvre of 5.5 thousand hussars and 3.5 thousand crossbowmen) the Polish auxiliary cavalry (hussars and mounted archers) under Świerczowski, attacking from the direction of the that made the Muscovite cavalry fall into the ambush, un- Pugaylovo gully, and 9 thousand Lithuanian cavalry (in- der the fire of firearms and cannons. Ostrogski’s leadership cluding 3.5 thousand hussars and 2.5 riders wielding bear skills should be emphasised. He destroyed Chelyadnin’s spears) coming from the direction of the Pashino gully. army in stages, in accordance with the economy of forces Once again the Polish-Lithuanian hussars proved their and managed to control large masses of cavalry on the bat- superiority over the cavalry. Despite the enemy’s tlefield. Each of the components of the Polish-Lithuanian advantage in numbers and the necessity to charge uphill, force and various types of troops excellently cooperated the Muscovite troops were flanked from both sides, pinned with arrows and crushed with lances. 50 thousand cavalry 4 K. Górski, Acta Tomiciana…, p. 6; M. Bielski, Kronika polska…, faced one another in a clash unprecedented in our history. p. 976; M. Stryjkowski, Kronika polska, litewska, żmudzka The main regiment and the rear guard were forced to i wszystkiej Rusi, ed. M. Malinowski, vol. I, Warsaw 1846, pp. retreat, and Chelyadnin himself was taken prisoner. The 380–384; J. L. Decjusz, Księga o czasach króla Zygmunta…, pp. 80–83; S. Herberstein, Zapiski o moskovitskikh delakh, ed. defeated enemy army was chased by Polish-Lithuanian A. Malezna, S. Petersburg, 1908, p. 18; S. Sarnicki, Księgi het- companies to the Kropivna river (5 km away from Or- mańskie…, p. 140; T. Korzon, Dzieje wojen…, p. 259; Z. Spieral- sha). Its marshy banks made fleeing more difficult, thus ski, ‘Wojskowość polska’, in Zarys dziejów wojskowości…, p. 4 thousand Muscovite soldiers supposedly fell there. ‘Such 336; S.M. Sołovev, Istorija Rossii s drevnejsich vremen, vol. V, a great number of men and horses lay there that it pol- Moskwa 1960, pp. 334–352, 369; H. Lulewicz, ‘Konstanty Os- luted the water and obstructed its course, and our men, trogski’, in Hetmani Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów, ed. M. out of thirst, drank the bloodstained water from their hel- Nagielski, Warsaw 1995, pp. 387–388; P. Dróżdż, Orsza 1514, p. 195–204. E. Razin, Historia sztuki wojennej, pp. 340–344; J. Bia- mets’ – wrote Marcin Bielski, speaking of the massacre on łostocki, Zagadka ‘Bitwy pod Orszą’, in Biuletyn Historii Sztuki, the banks of Kropivna. The chase continued even after no. 1, 1955, vol. 17, p. 80–98; M. Plewczyński, Wkład Serbów…, the dusk (the sun set before 6 p.m.). It stopped past mid- pp. 14, 17–18; Z. Żygulski jun., Sławne bitwy w sztuce, Warsaw night, about 50 km away from the site of the battle. Only 1996, pp. 76–85.

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with one another. This element was missing in the Mus- victory of Orsha had some positive results in the field of covite tactics. Their troops attacked separately, while the politics – it ended the alliance between the Empire, the main force passively waited until the regiments at the Teutonic Order and Muscovy. flanks were totally defeated. Better equipment and lead- Since that war, the Muscovites tried to avoid battles in ership, as well as the bravery of Lithuanian levée en masse the open field. The Polish-Lithuanian force refrained from and military experience of the regular Polish troops resul- sieges, and the only attempt at capturing Opochka (1517) ted in great successes in the two biggest cavalry clashes ended in defeat. Though the balance of necessary castle – at the left flank and then in the centre. The battle of Or- defence was positive (8 resisted assaults – mostly Polotsk, sha not only showed increased significance of coopera- 4 capitulations), the most significant fortress in Smolensk tion between field artillery, wielding infantry and was taken by the Muscovites. They intended to seize the light cavalry. It also proved the superiority of the hussars territory by capturing subsequent points of resistance equipped with lances, sabres, shields and mail. The effect- and destroying the enemy with cavalry raids. The loss of iveness of this new type of cavalry could especially be seen Smolensk was even more severe for Lithuania due to the in the flanking attacks to the sides of the enemy formation. fact that it lost the most powerful stronghold of the line The glorious victory at Orsha, just like the one at Grun- comprising Polotsk, Vitebsk, Smolensk, Mstislavl, Krichev, wald over a hundred years earlier, was not sufficiently Prupoy and Chechersk. It was like giving a picket of the taken advantage of. The army spent over a dozen days north-eastern bastion consisting of those castles, and doing nothing and marched toward Smolensk only after directed towards Moscow. Smolensk guarded the whole almost three weeks. Only three towns were regained: upper Dnieper area, constituted a hub of trade routes and Dubrovno, Krichev and Mstislavl. Their crews surrendered a political and military centre on the road from Lithuania at the news of incoming royal army. In Smolensk, to Moscow. Its possession gave the Grand Prince of Mus- Varsonofi arranged a plot to the benefit of the king. Ostrog- covy a political and military advantage, and infringed the ski reached the fortress at the end of September. He was defences of Lithuanian border on the Daugava River and too late. The plans of surrendering the city prepared by the Dnieper. Smolensk became a gateway to Lithuania for the supporters of Lithuania had been revealed and their Muscovy, as it had been a gateway to Muscovite lands for proponents executed. The army, fatigued and weakened Lithuanians. The first stage of the plan aiming at making in numbers, lacked the force to take the city. The Grand the Grand Prince the ruler of ‘the whole Rus’’ was com- Prince of Muscovy provided the castle with large supplies plete. The second included Kiev, and the third – Vilnius. and numerous crew. The mighty stronghold would require As early as in the initial stages of defensive struggle that months of siege. Ostrogski did not have siege artillery. Ac- lasted almost a century, this long-term Muscovite strategy quiring food came with difficulty. After a number of futile convinced Lithuanian nobles that Polish political, military assaults, when the cold October weather took its toll on and financial support was necessary. the soldiers, the hetman ordered his troops to retreat. The

Bibliography Primary sources Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw, Lithuanian M. Stryjkowski, Kronika polska, litewska, żmudzka i wszystkiej Metrica vol. CXCIII, No. 238 Rusi, ed. M. Malinowski, vol. I, Warsaw 1846 Akty otnosyashchiyesya k istorii Yuzhnoy i Zapadnoy Rossii, B. Wapowski, ‘Kroniki’, in Scriptores rerum Polonicarum, vol. II, sobrannyye i izdannyye Arkheograficheskoyu Komissiyeyu, ed. J. Szujski, Cracow 1874 vol. II, S. Petersburg 1863 Books M. Bielski, Kronika polska, ed. K.J. Turowski, 1856 Encyklopedia wojskowa, vol. VI, ed. O. Laskowski, Warsaw 1938 J. L. Decjusz, Księga o czasach króla Zygmunta, Warsaw 1960 Hetmani Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów, ed. M. Nagielski, K. Górski, Acta Tomiciana, vol. III, ed. T. Działyński, Poznań Warsaw 1995 1853 Polski Słownik Biograficzny, vol. IV, ed. W. Konopczyński, Cracow Z. Spieralski, Wypisy źródłowe do historii polskiej sztuki wojennej, 1938 vol. IV, Warsaw 1958 Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, vol. XXXVI, Warsaw 1994

– 49 – Studia z dziejów polskiej techniki wojskowej od XVI do XX wieku, S. M. Solovev, Istorija Rossii s drevnejsich vremen, vol. V, Moscow ed. J. Wojtasik, Warsaw 2001 1960 Zarys dziejów wojskowości polskiej do roku 1864, vol. I, ed. J. Sikor- J. Wimmer, Historia piechoty polskiej do roku 1864, Warsaw 1978 ski, Warsaw 1965 Z. Żygulski jun., Sławne bitwy w sztuce, Warsaw 1996 P. Drożdż, Orsza 1514, Warsaw 2000 Articles N. S. Golicyn, Russkaya voyennaya istoriya, vol. II, Petersburg J. Białostocki, ‘Zagadka „Bitwy pod Orszą”’, in Biuletyn Historii 1878 Sztuki, 1955, no. 1, vol. 17 S. Herberstein, Zapiski o moskovitskikh delakh, ed. A. Malezna, K. Górski, ‘O rozwoju sztuki wojennej w Polsce w wieku XV’, in Bib- St. Petersburg, 1908 lioteka Warszawska, 1890, vol. III L. Kolankowski, Polska Jagiellonów. Dzieje polityczne, Olsztyn S. Herbst, M. Walicki, ‘Obraz bitwy pod Orszą 1514’, in Rozprawy 1991 Komisji Historii Sztuki, 1949, vol. I L. Kolankowski, Dzieje Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego za Jagiel- E. J. Kashprovskiy, ‘Borba Vasiliya Ivanovicha s Sigizmundom lonow, vol. II, Warsaw 1930 I izh – za obladaniya Smoleńskom (1507–1522)’, in Sbornik T. Korzon, Dzieje wojen i wojskowości w Polsce, vol. I, Lvov– Istorichesko–filologicheskovo obshchestwa pri Institute –Warsaw–Cracow 1923 kn. Bezborodko v Nezine, II, 1899 L. Podhorodecki, Sławne bitwy Polaków, Warsaw 1997 J. Teodorczyk, ‘Bitwy polskie. Orsza’, in Tygodnik Kulturalny, 1984, E. Razin, Historia sztuki wojennej, vol. II, Warsaw 1958 no. 16, vol.27 – Henryk Lulewicz – Polish Academy Of Sciences Institute of History Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities

Stephen Bathory’s Expeditions against Muscovy (1579–1581)

The relatively short reign of Stephen Bathory, lasting should be referred to here are Witold Nowodworski4 and only ten years (1576–1586), had an indelible influence on Tadeusz Korzon.5 The issue of the military organisation the military history of the Polish-Lithuanian Common- from the times of Bathory attracted particularly wide in- wealth. The victorious campaigns against Muscovy from terest in the interwar period, due to round anniversaries 1579 to 1581 were a special study subject for many milit- related to that king, first the quadricentennial of his birth, ary historians, starting with the second quarter of the 19th and then the 350th anniversary of his death, which was cel- century, when the first editions of source texts relevant to ebrated by a joint publication in French,6 and a collection the times of Bathory’s wars were published. Those were of documents under the title of Księga Batoriańska edited mostly memoirs or chronicle accounts. Editions of sources by Ryszard Mielnicki.7 Names of other historians distin- that were most essential for historians were published guished in the field should also be mentioned. Those in- in 1880s, largely as a result of editorial activity of Adolf clude Marian Kukiel8 and Jan Natanson-Leski, due to his Pawiński,1 a renowned historian of the Warsaw school. work on diplomatic bargaining over the eastern border,9 The first serious dissertations based on in-depth study of or Otton Laskowski, the author of the analytical article de- sources, including archives, appeared slightly later, and voted to the battle of Toropets, published in the Przegląd the historian I would like to start with is Konstanty Górski, Historyczno-Wojskowy journal.10 After over thirty years, author of treatises on Bathory’s three military campaigns Laskowski’s work was continued by Henryk Kotarski, in the east, published in 1892 in the Biblioteka Warszawska who comprehensively discussed the issue of Polish and journal.2 His works on the history of infantry, cavalry and Lithuanian military organisation in the second stage of artillery published at the turn of the 20th century are also the Livonian war of 1576–1582 in five parts, which were worth mentioning.3 Other authors whose publications published in a post-war journal devoted to the subject of military history, namely in Studia i Materiały do Historii 1 Źródła dziejowe, ed. A. Pawiński, vol. IV: ‘Początki panowa- nia w Polsce Stefana Batorego 1575–1577, listy, uniwersały’, 4 V. Novodvorskiy, Borba za Livoniyu mezhdu Moskvoy i Rech’yu Warsaw 1877, vol. IX, Warsaw 1881; also, cf. ‘Sprawy wojen- Pospolitoy 1570–1582 gg, Sankt Petersburg 1904. ne króla Stefana Batorego. Diariusze, relacje, listy i akta z lat 5 T. Korzon, Dzieje wojen i wojskowości w Polsce, Cracow 1912. 1576–1586’, ed. I. Polkowski, in Acta historica res gestas Polo- 6 Etienne Batory, roi de Pologne, prince de Transylvanie, Cracow niae illustrantia ab anno 1507 ad annum 1795, vol. XI, Cracow 1935. 1887. 7 Księga Batoriańska. Zbiór dokumentów ku uczczeniu 350-let- 2 K. Górski, Pierwsza wojna Rzeczypospolitej z Wielkim Księ- niej rocznicy zgonu króla Stefana Batorego, ed.. R. Mienicki, stwem Moskiewskim za Batorego, vol. CCVI (1892), pt. 2; idem, Wilno 1939. Druga wojna Batorego z Wielkim Księstwem Moskiewskim, vol. 8 M. Kukiel, Zarys dziejów wojskowości w Polsce, Cracow 1929. CCVIII (1892), pt. 3; idem, Trzecia wojna Batorego z Wielkim 9 J. Natanson-Leski, Epoka Stefana Batorego w dziejach granicy Księstwem Moskiewskim, vol. CCVIII (1892), pt. 4; wschodniej Rzeczypospolitej, Warsaw 1930. 3 K. Górski, Historia piechoty polskiej, Cracow 1893; idem, Histo- 10 O. Laskowski, ‘Wyprawa na Toropiec. Ze studiów nad wojna- ria jazdy polskiej, Cracow 1894; idem, Historia artylerii polskiej, mi moskiewskimi Stefana Batorego’, in Przegląd Historyczno- Warsaw 1903. -Wojskowy, vol. IX, Warsaw 1936.

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Wojskowości.11 Thus, the expeditions against Muscovy which could neither be ended during his reign nor during of 1579–1581 are discussed in a relatively rich collection the two periods of prolonged interregnum (1572–1576). of historical documents, both in the form of editions of Let us start with a brief reminder of the basic events. The source texts and monographs concerning their course. military activity of 1577–1581 at the eastern frontier of the Much less attention was paid to Bathory’s other cam- Grand Duchy of Lithuania (the Commonwealth) and in paigns. Nonetheless, the conflict with Gdansk of 1576– Livonia were, in fact, another stage of the northern war, 1577, which preceded expeditions against Muscovy, also which started with Sigismund ’ expedition to Poz- became a subject of interesting publications. The works vol and, as a result, the inclusion of the declining Livonian worth noticing include the edition of source texts prepared state of the Teutonic Order in the Lithuanian sphere of in- by the abovementioned historian A. Pawiński, entitled Ste- fluence, and then in the Commonwealth. During Bathory’s fan Batory pod Gdańskiem 1576–1577.12 To avoid making reign the war was waged with varying luck. The result of too long lists of historians and their treatises, though many the first stage was unfavourable for the Polish-Lithuanian names deserve this honour, I will mention two newer pub- side, when, during the summer campaign of 1577, Ivan lications, more of the popularising type, that present the the Terrible’s armies conquered the part of Livonia bey- person of the monarch to the wider audience. I mean bio- ond the Daugava River (except Riga), which had not been graphical monographs: Stefan Batory 1533–1586 by Karol occupied by Muscovy before. However, by the end of the Olejnik,13 and one by Jerzy Besala, under the same title14. year, Jan Hieronimowicz , the governor and What is also worth noticing is another conclusion of hetman of that land and the of Samogitia, star- the research on the military of the epoch. Due to studies ted the laborious process of regaining the lost Livonian done by Karol Buczek15 and Stanisław Alexandrowicz16 we castles. This stage of military action in Livonia can be said learned about the significant influence that the campaigns to have ended with a successful battle fought on 21st Oc- of that time had on the development of contemporary Pol- tober 1578 at Kieś (Wenden), in the area of modern , ish cartography. but under a new commander, Andrzej , a lieuten- So what made the decade of Stephen Bathory’s reign ant appointed by the contemporary voivod of Vilnius and such a significant period in the history of the Polish mil- grand hetman of Lithuania, Mikołaj ‘the Red’ Radziwiłł, itary? I shall start with a trivial statement that in many re- with the participation of allied (if temporary cooperation spects Bathory’s reign was a continuation of many aspects could be called so) Swedish troops. A sabotage raid by the of the Jagiellonian military, especially from the reign of the court (field) hetman of Lithuania, Krzysztof Radziwiłł, later last rulers of the dynasty. This can be concluded particu- known as ‘the Thunderbolt’ deep into the territory of Livo- larly clearly from the basic facts. First of all, the direction nia, which ended in seizing the castle of Kierepeć (mod- of Stephen Bathory’s military operations resulted from ern Kirempee, at the border between Latvia and ) conflicts inherited from Sigismund Augustus (1548–1572), and pillaging the area of Dorpat () started a new, offensive phase of the Livonian war. It was crowned by 11 H. Kotarski, ‘Wojsko polsko-litewskie podczas wojny inflan- three campaigns that followed: the expedition to Polotsk ckiej1576—1582. Sprawy organizacyjne’, in Studia i Materiały in 1579, which resulted in capturing the city and regaining do Historii Wojskowości, pt. 1: vol. XVI/2 (1970), pt. 2: vol. XVII/1 the whole district, including castles built by Muscovy; the (1971), pt. 3: vol. XVII/2 (1971), pt. 4: vol. XVIII/1 (1972), pt. 5: expedition to in 1580, ending in a successful vol. XVIII/2 (1972). siege of that stronghold. The last expedition, to Pskov, 12 Źródła dziejowe, vol. III: ‘Stefan Batory pod Gdańskiem 1576– 1577’, ed. A. Pawiński, Warsaw 1877. undertaken in 1581 did not lead to victory on such a scale 13 K. Olejnik, Stefan Batory 1533–1586, Warsaw 1988. as the two previous ones, but instead it ended in a diplo- 14 J. Besala, Stefan Batory, Warsaw 1992. matic success, as Ivan IV the Terrible was forced to enter 15 K. Buczek, Dzieje kartografii polskiej od XV do XVIII w. Zarys peace talks concluded in the truce of -Zapolsky, sworn analityczno-syntetyczny, Wrocław 1963. on 15th January 1582. On the whole, the prolonged war 16 S. Alexandrowicz, Rozwój kartografii Wielkiego Księstwa Litew- ended in a Polish-Lithuanian success, Livonia was granted skiego od XV do połowy XVIII w., 2nd ed., Poznań 1989; idem, ‘Źródła kartograficzne do wyprawy płockiej Stefana Batorego to the Commonwealth, and the eastern border of the Pol- roku 1579’, in: Od armii kompotowej do narodowej (XVI–XX w.), ish-Lithuanian state was returned to an approximate sta- Toruń 1998, pp. 17–43. tus quo ante, i.e. the state from before the conflict of .

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It is also worth mentioning that in the political and military peditions against Muscovy, was similar and boiled down dimension the success of Bathory’s expeditions was a res- to the necessity to perform siege works in the main dir- ult of shared Polish and Lithuanian military effort, and in ections. In the period in question, there was also another the financial aspect, it was, to some extent, the price that front of military operations, but of secondary importance. Poland paid Lithuania for the union of Lublin. I shall not What is meant here is, of course, the defence of the south- continue with this train of thought, but focus on the main eastern border (Podolia and ) against the Tatar subject matter instead. hordes. Military operations in that area, opposing the raids Another theatre of military confrontation during of the nomads, were conducted in the sping (March–April) Bathory’s reign was the war with Gdansk. Chronolo- of 1577 and in February 1578, and had the nature of man- gically, this conflict had been resolved earlier than the oeuver warfare. Due to this fact it is difficult to treat them main struggle against Muscovy mentioned above, as it the same way as other conflicts, but they led to the neces- had already started in late 1576 and ended in late 1577. sity of leaving a portion of the forces in Podolia, and drew The conflict with the burghers of the wealthy port city of the king’s attention away from the main direction of oper- Gdansk was also a Jagiellonian legacy. In the final years ations. of Sigismund Augustus’ reign the matter of the conflict Stephen Bathory, who arrived in the Commonwealth in was the subjection of the economic interests of the city to the spring of 1576 to take the throne, found the military of contradictory interests of the monarch and raison d’état. the realm in a complete disorder after years of prolonged The Jagiellonian king aimed at strengthening his control interregnum and Henry de Valois’, the first elected king’s, over the port, situated on the Vistula estuary, a position escape. One of the earliest decisions taken by Bathory in strategic for the kingdom, bringing the city substantial this field was to dissolve wojsko kwarciane (quarter army) income. In the early period of Bathory’s reign, apart from stationing in Podolia in the summer of 1576, as it was de- the economic conflict, a political one arose due to the moralised and unable to take military action. This army city’s political stand opposing the will of the Nobles’ Com- refused to follow the king’s order anyway. At the beginning monwealth after the double election at the end of 1575. of his reign Bathory trusted only his , whom he Gdansk firmly backed Maximilian II Habsburg against the brought to Poland in a group of about 1000 horsemen and majority of the nobles, who supported the election of 550 footmen (hajduks). Soon after the coronation in , giving her Stephen Bathory for husband. June and July 1576, he started to restore the army paid As a consequence, both parties took military action. Dur- from the public treasury. He started with enlisting over ing the struggle, Court Hetman Jan Zborowski, command- a dozen cavalry companies, mainly Polish hussars, num- ing the royal army, gained victory on 17th April 1577, in bering over a thousand horses, which constituted the a battle fought on the open field near Lubieszów. How- so-called court army, whose primary task was to protect ever, the siege laid by the king to the strongly defended the monarch and his court. A separate court hetman was city and its fortifications controlling the entry to the port, appointed to command this force, and it was the above- i.e. the fort known as Latarnia (Wisłoujście) in the summer mentioned Jan Zborowski. Since January 1577 the re- and autumn of that year, did not bring any success. The stored wojsko kwarciane was formed, and it stationed in war ended in a compromise: the city accepted Bathory’s Podolia in the number of well-nigh 3 thousand soldiers sovereignty and paid a huge contribution of 200 thousand (slightly over 2 thousand cavalry, almost exclusively contemporary Polish zloty. That sum enabled the king to armed lightly, in the Cossack manner, and 850 infantry enact his plans of war against Muscovy, as he received the with artillery). Over the years and with the settlement of funds necessary to wage it. Yet, this compromise meant the state matters, as well as due to the monarch’s efforts, resignation from stronger subjection of Gdansk and its fin- the military potential of the Commonwealth was restored ances to the royal control. relatively quickly. The mobilisation capability of the com- War with Gdansk, which, in fact, was an internal con- mon Polish-Lithuanian state was shown in the full extent flict, has been included here in order to provide compar- during subsequent military campaigns, namely at Gdansk ison with main campaigns conducted by the Common- in 1577, with only the forces of the Crown, and during the wealth at its north-eastern border. The nature of military three expeditions against Muscovy – to Polotsk, Velikiye operations, both during the war with Gdansk and the ex- Luki and Pskov in 1579–1581. The contemporary army of

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the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland consisted mainly of Grand Duchy of Lithuania due to the war. The enormous regular troops. Only in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was financial liability to Lithuania’s soldiers was resolved by the whole of the nobility levied, under the so-called landed spreading the payment out over many years following service (a counterpart of levée en masse), apart from the the war. A portion of the Lithuanian army consisted of regular troops. The duration of essential sieges, as well as the nobles of the landed service, hardly useful at sieges, the manpower of armies gathered for the main campaigns who did not take part in the last of the Pskov campaigns. of Stephen Bathory, is shown in the table below: This explains the smaller manpower of the Lithuanian

The Crown Lithuania TOTAL: Gdansk (Apr–Dec 1577) – 8 months ca. 12 000 – ca. 12 000 Polotsk (late Apr – 30th Aug 1579) – ca. 5 weeks 18,839 22,975 41,814 [campaign – 2.5 months] Velikiye Luki (26th Aug – 5th Sep 1580) – 11 days 22,719 ca. 25 680 ca. 48 400 [campaign – 3 months] Pskov (Aug 1581 – I 1582) – ca. 6 months ca. 24 000 ca. 14 500 ca. 38 500

Source: H. Kotarski, ‘Wojsko polsko-litewskie podczas wojny inf- army during the blockade of that city. What was the ef- lanckiej 1576–1582 r. Sprawy organizacyjne’, in Studia i Materiały fect of such great expenditure of forces and funds for the do Historii Wojskowości, vol. XVI/2 (1970), p. 122; vol. XVII/1 (1971), Livonian war then? Well, the successful conclusion of the pp. 103–105; vol. XVII/2 (1971), pp. 107–108; vol. XVIII/1 (1972), pp. conflict indubitably resulted in strengthening the bonds 78–87; cf. also: H. Lulewicz, Gniewów o unię ciąg dalszy. Stosunki between Poland and Lithuania within the newly created polsko-litewskie w latach 1569–1588, Warsaw 2002, pp. 334–336. federal state, which the Commonwealth constituted after the union of Lublin in 1569. After the victorious war, this The above table requires author’s comments on the Commonwealth became a regional power. Despite the data concerning the manpower of the combined Pol- fact that none of the Lithuanians voted for Bathory dur- ish-Lithuanian armies, which took part in the greatest war ing the autumn election of 1575, it was the Hungarian, of Bathory’s era, i.e. the three victorious campaigns against who wielded the royal power over the Commonwealth, Muscovy in 1579–1581. First of all, it should be remarked who contributed significantly to its integration. His energy that most of the data presented here is approximate, due and willingness to launch offensive military operations to the lack of precise information. Based on the revised led to meet the basic condition the fulfilment of which the calculations by Henryk Kotarski, the manpower of the Lithuanians expected from their Polish partners after the armies of the Commonwealth participating in particular union of Lublin. It should be admitted that the Poles of the campaigns can be estimated at 38 thousand (at Pskov) to time, some of them unwillingly, managed to provide not even over 48 thousand during the Velikiye Luki campaign. only financial support, but often themselves joined the The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of that time could armies that headed towards the eastern frontier. Such mil- afford to keep relatively numerous armies for a few years. itary commitment was enough to ensure a decisive victory The overall cost of military actions during the Livonian over Muscovy and secure peace at the eastern border of war incurred by the Commonwealth in 1578–1582 is es- the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which at the same time con- timated at 3–3.5 million Polish zloty. Most of the cost was stituted the border of the whole Commonwealth. borne by the Polish part of the Commonwealth, as it was Due to the limited size of this paper I should not go more affluent and less exhausted from the conflict with into details on the tactics or strategy of the military oper- a powerful neighbour, which was the share of Lithuania. ations in question. After all, their nature is not to provide The Lithuanian participation in the cost of the Polotsk ex- the reader with a precise description, as those operations pedition, the first of those campaigns, reached ¼ of the consisted mainly in gathering large masses of soldiers, co- total expense, but it undoubtedly decreased throughout ordinating their march to a chosen target and laboriously the years because of a worsened situation of local taxpay- besieging a particular stronghold. Siege operations usu- ers and additional tax burden borne by the people of the ally lasted extremely long, rarely for weeks, more often for

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months, and, in some cases, even for years. It is not a situ- Muscovy to conclusion, which was favourable for the Com- ation suitable for the media, unlike spectacular victories in monwealth. One should not only emphasise the king’s the battles fought by field armies. I shall confine myself to courage to undertake plans of military operations, but mentioning just a few elements characterising the times of also the accuracy of his decisions regarding the choice of Bathory’s wars. The basic stipulation of the strategy em- hetmans, as well as lower level commanders. Bathory was ployed in the greatest of the wars waged at that time was not afraid to change commanders at decisive moments, to lead the offensive away from Livonia in order to seize it e.g. to appoint Mikołaj ‘the Red’ Radziwiłł as the grand het- as unharmed by prolonged siege operations as possible. man of Lithuania in early 1578, and then as Another characteristic feature of the operations was the the grand hetman of the Crown. He could also choose the precise determination of the objective, which was an un- right advisers and associates. questionable merit of the king. The size and type of the There were also other achievements in the field of polit- forces as well as the planned amount of necessary funds ics that made an impact on the history of the military, and were adjusted to the intended goal. Moreover, there was an through affecting its condition, the history of the Com- additional element, which could especially be seen in the monwealth as well. They usually include the following: operations of great armies with complex national struc- a) The conclusion of the development of the Polish hus- ture and military formations participating in them, notably sars as an old Polish cavalry formation. Fashioned, espe- in the Muscovite territory (the campaigns of Velikiye Luki cially in regard to equipment and organisation, as it was and Pskov). It complemented the usual cover of the right described, more hungarico (according to Hungarian cus- flank, i.e. the potentially endangered one, with activities tom), it constituted the basic type of cavalry in the Polish aimed at diverting the enemy’s attention. This was done and Lithuanian army during the last decades of the 16th by chosen detachments, who conducted sabotage actions and throughout the . deep within the enemy territory. A classic example of such b) The establishment of the chosen infantry, consisting action is a raid against the rear of the Muscovite defence of peasants from royal estates, who would constitute the conducted by a force under Krzysztof Radziwiłł, the field beginning of the national infantry formation, most often hetman of Lithuania, in the autumn of 1581, during the known as the Polish infantry, in 1578. Pskov campaign. c) The age of Bathory was characterised by careful plan- The time has come to summarise the achievements of ning and preparation for military operations with respect the Polish military during the reign of Stephen Bathory, to gathering forces and funds, but also carrying out recon- and to list the merits of the king himself. Bathory should, naissance of the enemy army and the theatre where pro- above all, be attributed with the shift from the passive de- spective operations were to take place. fence to daring military offences. Due to his personal en- d) Another element is the use of large detachments – ergy and willingess, as well as the skill to organise offens- namely regiments of the infantry of the ‘foreign contin- ive operations, the tradition of ineffectiveness, especially gent’ (this name, more typical for the 17th century, can on the front of the struggle against the eastern neighbour already be used), i.e. mercenary Hungarian and German of Lithuania, was broken. The defensive nature of military (Landsknecht) infantry, necessary for siege works, without activity was visible especially during the wars against the which capturing strongholds would be impossible. eastern neighbour waged by the Jagiellons in the former e) Bathory can also be attributed with creating a milit- half of the 16th century, but also during the Livonian War. ary formation resembling a royal guard. In the final years The only exception was the war of Starodub of 1533–1537, of his reign he kept 400 household ‘Hungarians’, half of which nonetheless ended with rather unfavourable res- whom constantly guarded him, mostly during the king’s ults for Lithuania. The spectacular case in point is the so- stay in the castle in Grodno. The other half stationed in called Radashkovichy expedition of 1567–1568 organised the so-called blockhouse, i.e. the keep guarding and con- by Sigismundus Augustus at a huge cost, which concluded trolling the access to the port in Riga from the sea. with a complete failure, inter alia because of the king’s f) Another element is also worth emphasising, i.e. rais- lack of initiative to take decisions. Bathory’s campaigns of ing the generations of later hetmans and middle-level 1579–1581 can serve as a contrary example. Their cost was commanders and providing them with experience during also huge, but they brought the prolonged conflict with the triumphs of the age of Bathory. I shall confine myself

– 55 – – Henryk Lulewicz –

– 56 – – Stephen Bathory’s Expeditions against Muscovy (1579–1581) –

to naming the hetmans, such as Jan Zamoyski, Stanisław Western Europe, and thus probably to some extent, its Żółkiewski or, in Lithuania, Krzysztof ‘the Thunderbolt’ modernisation and development. On the other hand, Radziwiłł. after its failure directed its expansion to the east, In the field of politics, the greatest of Stephen Bathory’s into the almost completely uninhabited areas beyond the triumphs was stopping the expansion of the Grand Duchy . Within another century, Russians reached of Muscovy (the Russian state) towards the Baltic Sea for the seas at the eastern end of Asia, gradually incorporating over a century. It hindered Russia from contacting the those territories into their state.

Bibliography Primary sources S. Alexandrowicz, Rozwój kartografii Wielkiego Księstwa Lite­w­ Księga Batoriańska. Zbiór dokumentow ku uczczeniu 350-letniej skiego od XV do połowy XVIII w., 2nd ed., Poznań 1989 rocznicy zgonu króla Stefana Batorego, ed., R. Mienicki, Wilno J. Besala, Stefan Batory, Warsaw 1992 1939 K. Buczek, Dzieje kartografii polskiej od XV do XVIII w. Zarys anali- Źrodła dziejowe, ed. A. Pawiński, vol. III: ‘Stefan Batory pod tyczno-syntetyczny, Wrocław 1963 Gdańskiem 1576–1577’, Warsaw 1877 K. Górski, Historia artylerii polskiej, Warsaw 1903 Źrodła dziejowe, ed. A. Pawiński, vol. IV: ‘Początki panowania K. Górski, Historia jazdy polskiej, Cracow 1894 w Polsce Stefana Batorego 1575–1577, listy, uniwersały’, K. Górski, Historia piechoty polskiej, Cracow 1893 Warsaw 1877, vol. IX, Warsaw 1881 K. Górski, Pierwsza wojna Rzeczypospolitej z Wielkim Księstwem ‘Sprawy wojenne krola Stefana Batorego. Diariusze, relacje, listy Moskiewskim za Batorego, vol. CCVI (1892), pt. 2, Warsaw i akta z lat 1576–1586’, ed. I. Polkowski, in Acta historica res 1892 gestas Poloniae illustrantia ab anno 1507 ad annum 1795, K. Górski, Druga wojna Batorego z Wielkim Księstwem Moskiew- vol. XI, Cracow 1887 skim, vol. CCVIII (1892), pt. 3, Warsaw 1892 Books K. Górski, Trzecia wojna Batorego z Wielkim Księstwem Moskiew- Etienne Batory, roi de Pologne, prince de Transylvanie, Cracow skim, vol. CCVIII (1892), pt. 4, Warsaw 1892 1935 H. Lulewicz, Gniewów o unię ciąg dalszy. Stosunki polsko-litew- Od armii komputowej do narodowej (XVI–XX w.), ed. Z. Karpus, skie w latach 1569–1588, Warsaw 2002 W. Rezmer, Toruń 1998 J. Natanson-Leski, Epoka Stefana Batorego w dziejach granicy Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, pt. 1: vol. XVI/2, Warsaw wschodniej Rzeczypospolitej, Warsaw 1930 1970 V. Novodvorskiy, Borba za Livoniyu mezhdu Moskvoy i Rech’yu Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, pt. 2: vol. XVII/1, War- Pospolitoy 1570–1582 gg, Sankt Petersburg 1904 saw 1971 T. Korzon, Dzieje wojen i wojskowości w Polsce, Cracow 1912 Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, pt. 3: vol. XVII/2, War- M. Kukiel, Zarys dziejów wojskowości w Polsce, Cracow 1929 saw 1971 K. Olejnik, Stefan Batory 1533–1586, Warsaw 1988 Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, pt. 4: vol. XVIII/1, War- Articles saw 1972 O. Laskowski, ‘Wyprawa na Toropiec. Ze studiów nad wojnami Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, pt. 5: vol. XVIII/2, War- moskiewskimi Stefana Batorego’, in Przegląd Historyczno- saw 1972 -Wojskowy, 1936, vol. IX

– 57 –

– Witold Rawski – Military Bureau for Historical Research in Military Centre for Civic Education

The Battle of Kircholm 1605

In 1587 the son of the Swedish King, Sigismund Vasa, military victories with crushing the Swedish forces at Ko- became the ruler of Poland. After his father’s death, he left kenhausen, followed by the victories of Jan Zamoyski and Poland and went to with a desire to take over the Stanislaw Żółkiewski3. throne. Unfortunately, the opposition led by Charles of When in October, l602, the seriously ill Jan Zamoyski Södermanland rejected his candidacy. As a result, in 1594 left the army, Hetman Żółkiewski left the command to the he handed over the reign over Sweden to the Regency Great Hetman of Lithuania Jan Karol Chodkiewicz4. Five Council led by his uncle and returned to Poland. In 1598 thousand men went under his command, most of whom he launched an attack on Sweden. The lack of a strong constituted the crew in Livonia fortresses. Unfortunately, fleet made it impossible to transport reinforcements. The the number of soldiers has been constantly decreasing. absence of support in Sweden and the surrender of the Two months later, due to a harsh winter, famine, epidem- army at Linköping compromised Vasa’s dreams about the ics and desertions of troops, there were only just over 2,000 Swedish throne. In addition, in 1600, the Swedish parlia- servicemen. Impatient by the lack of pay, the soldiers often ment dethroned him and his descendants were deprived initiated revolts. The commanders of the army had to pay of hereditary rights to the throne1. Sigismund did not give out wages from their own pocket5. up. He needed the power of the Republic of Poland to fulfil Chodkiewicz did not cease to fight with the . his plans. The nobility did not intend to agree to war, but At the end of the year, he marched at the head of 1,200 the magnates authorised Sigismund’s plans. After long dis- troops to Dorpat (currently Tartu) and tried to conquer it. cussions held on the 12th of March 1600, the Sejm passed Two thousand soldiers defended the city. At the beginning the incorporation of Estonia to the Republic of Poland. of 1603 the Swedes tried to launch an offensive and force At that time, in the summer of 1599, Charles of Söder- Chodkiewicz to withdraw from the siege. In February, the manland pacified Finland, as the country had been in Swedes set off to the north of Estonia, to Rakibor (Wesen- favour of Sigismund. In the autumn of the same year he berg, Rekvere) and tried to conquer it. However, on the redeployed his troops to Estonia. In March of 1600, the 5th of March, Chodkiewicz crossed their way with 1,000 sol- troops ousted the Polish army. In August, 10,000 soldiers diers and won the battle. Having heard the grave news, the of Charles came to Estonia and received reinforcements Dorpat garrison surrendered on the 15th of April. consisting of the local nobles and peasant infantry. In such circumstances, in 1601, the Sejm passed the 3 For the description of the first part of the campaign cf. S. taxes for the war with Sweden. Meanwhile, the poorly or- Herbst, Wojna inflancka 1600–1602, Zabrze 2006. ganized began to suffer one defeat after an- 4 L. Podhorodecki, 1560–1621, Warsaw other2. Krzysztof ‘Thunder’ Radziwiłł has begun a series of 1882. 5 The financial problems of the Finnish Campaign are de- 1 M. Roberts, The Early Vasas. A , 1523–1611, scribed by A. Filipczak-Kocur, Skarb litewski za pierwszych dwu Cambridge 1968. Wazów 1587–1648, Wrocław 1994. (pp. 51–62); Cf. J. Wimmer, 2 Cf. M. Paradowski, Studia i materiały do historii wojen ze Szwe- ‘Z zagadnień ekonomiki wojskowej XV–XVIII w.’, in Materiały cją 1600–1635, Oświęcim 2013, pp. 15–29. i Studia, no. 32, 1974.

– 59 – – Witold Rawski –

Unfortunately, further Polish military action was sus- had to defend the most important fortresses in Estonia. pended due to the fact that the unpaid soldiers refused They were to constitute the basis of offensive actions to fight. In this situation, Chodkiewicz was forced to set aimed at conquering the rest of Estonia, Biały Kamień, up camp south of . Hence, during the summer he Fellin, Dorpat (where Chodkiewicz’s army had quartered) roiled the enemy and blocked all Swedish operations in and Rakvere. The troops were garrisoned at Cesis, Wen- the direction of Dorpat and Biały Kamień (). To facili- den, Cests and Dyjament (Daugagriva) at the river mouth tate the task he stood at Dorpat in July. of the Daugava (150 infantry and 100 peasants). In August 1604, the Swedish commander Arvid Eriks- Riga could provide hundreds of mercenaries (including son Stalarm, using the distance from Chodkiewicz, took 200 Poles) and a few thousand soldiers. The trail along the offensive measures towards Fellin and Ibarpol. However, coast from Pärnu to Riga was not protected due to the lack along the way he had to conquer Biały Kamień. The first of men. It needs to be emphasized that the sea was almost offensive was unsuccessful. Eriksson, hearing the news entirely ruled by the Swedes. that the Hetman is coming, chose not to fight. He with- Charles of Södermanland made the decision to venture drew, but a month later with 5,000 men and 6 cannons at for Riga. The siege of the city would create a basis for fur- his side, he tried to besiege the city again. After 10 days, ther action along the Daugava River. As a consequence, it on the 25th of September, Chodkiewicz came to the rescue would cut off of Livonia from Poland. The Swedes failed to of the besieged city with 2,500 men, mainly cavaliers. This transport all of their forces by sea to Riga. The lack of trans- time the Swedes decided to fight. They grouped north of port ships caused the Swedish forces to dispersed and the city. Their left flank was leaned on the embankment land in several different places. Joachim Mansfeld with on the marshy Paide (Pärnu) River valley and on the side 5,000 men, mostly Germans and siege artillery, had landed road to Reval (Tallin). In order to hinder the breakdown of at Dyjament on the 12th of August and blocked Riga. Be- their own cavalry, the Swedes decided to mix it with infan- tween the 15th and 20th of August the troops of Anders Len- try regiments. nartsson, circa 4,000 men, mainly from Finland and the Knowing this, Chodkiewicz reinforced his right flank Netherlands, have been landing at Revel. Finally, on the with the Hussars. They were to carry out the critical strike. 30th of August, Charles IX, the King of Sweden, landed at He deployed infantry, light cavalry and artillery in the Pärnu with around 4,000 men, mainly Swedes and Scots. centre, and on the left flank he deployed the rest of the Chodkiewicz set off to retaliate, as he was urged to help cavalry. The two groups were to engage the enemy forma- by the citizens of Riga. In order not to delay the march, tions and therefore, deliberately withdrawn, they attacked he left most of the camp at Dorpat. He reached Wolmar, later. The right flank of Chodkiewicz’s army encircled the 150 km away from Dorpat, in four days, on the 21st of Swedish light cavalry and broke their left flank, cutting off August. It was here that he received reassuring information their retreat. Swedish losses amounted to approximately about the situation in Riga. The Swedish attempt to be- 5,000 men and 6 cannons. They also lost their wagons. siege the city did not cause the crew to surrender. On the Chodkiewicz’s army lost around 200 men. The victory was contrary, Riga decided to launch an offensive of its own. On not used well. The unpaid Lithuanian army rebelled and the 14th and 15th of August the soldiers of Riga succeeded refused further service. in battling the Swedes outside of the city. Therefore the The Swedes have not abandoned the attempts to crush citizens of Riga informed the Hetman that temporarily the Chodkiewicz’s forces operating in Livonia. After over six rescue was unnecessary6. months, in the summer of 1605, they managed to con- In Wolmar, Chodkiewicz acquired information about centrate an army of 12,000 soldiers. It consisted mainly of Lennartson landing in Reval (Talin) and about his march foreign mercenaries. At that time the Republic of Poland to the south. Knowing that Riga was safe, Chodkiewicz lacked the money to pay the army wages. The Sejm that set off against Lennartson on the 25th of August. He se- gathered in the beginning of 1605 has dissolved without cured himself from the south by sending a few cavalry passing the taxes necessary to cover the army’s wages.

However, Chodkiewicz, using his own resources, man- 6 A. Ziemlewska, ‘Postawa Rygi wobec państwa polsko-litew- aged to gather about 5,000 soldiers. Unfortunately he skiego na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku’, in Wojny północne w XVI– could use only 3,500 in the battlefield, because the rest –XVIII wieku, Toruń 2007, pp. 75–76.

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regiments towards Riga. Possessing this information, Len- IX arrived at Riga, he summoned the citizens and the gar- nartsson decided to take Fellin. But after the information rison to surrender. The city has rejected the proposition that Chodkiewicz moved to the north, the Swedes direc- and in consequence the Swedes began preparations for ted their troops to Fickel (Vigala) and garrisoned there in the siege. order to avoid battle. The Swedes took position among Upon receiving the news that Chodkiewicz is approach- marshes and forests and it fortified it well – fences were ing the city, the Swedes decided to relocate all of their built all around. Chodkiewicz arrived there on the 29th of forces grouped at Riga to Kircholm on the 26th of Septem- August (210 km from Wolmar). The attempts to induce the ber. Only a few hundreds soldiers were left to protect the Swedes into an open battle have failed. camp. In accordance with the previous plan, on the even- Additionally, the situation became further complic- ing of September 26, all of the Swedish forces, counting ated by the news that Charles IX landed at Parnu. Bearing 10,700 soldiers left the camp (8,200 infantry, 2,500 cavalry, in mind that Charles IX is a threat to Fellin, the Hetman 11 canons). moved towards him (100 km from Fickel). He arrived on The road to Kircholm was difficult. The night and the the 5th of September. It allowed Lennartsson’s forces to pouring rain were delaying the Swedish march. move away from Parnu. Here the Swedish forces have con- At dawn of September 27 the Swedes spread along the centrated. While Chodkiewicz was approaching the city, hill east of the village of Kircholm. They were separated Charles IX travelled by sea with all of his forces (8,000 men) from the Hetman’s army by an oxbow, only from the north in the direction of Riga. He was convoyed along the coast were they protected by a marsh. The Swedes had the by the fleet. In addition, his forces were protected from Daugava River8 on their right side. the east by a line of marshes and forests. It made it more King Charles’s troops were dispatched in the follow- difficult for Chodkiewicz to predict enemy movement. He ing way: three batteries, each consisting of three canons, was unsure as to the direction of the march of the main were placed in the first line, the pikemen were covering the Swedish force. He assumed that the Swedes would turn musketeers and the infantry was divided into three groups. to the east, towards Fellin. Hence, he moved in that dir- The light cavalry regiments stood behind the infantry and ection. Around the 14th of September he was informed had the possibility to enter the gaps between the infantry that the Swedes were marching south. Immediately, he regiments of the first group. As such, they would be able marched to Wolmar (100 km) and arrived there on the to form a strong defense capable of a counter strike. The 16th of September. However he has still not considered the last two lines could form a similar defense line to the flank possibility of the Swedes heading towards Riga. On the (Gustave II Adolph has used this idea a refined form). The other hand, the forces that he had under his command chosen formation allowed to carry out cavalry attacks were too small to engage in a battle. He awaited reinforce- from beyond of the infantry flanks: the infantry regiment ments from Lithuania. When he received the information of the third group would fill the gaps of the first group9. that ‘the Swedes are going to attack him’, he crossed the The Swedish right flank was stronger than the centre Gavia River near Kiesi and fortified there, planning to at- and the left flank. Charles tried to train his soldiers accord- tack the Swedes while they were crossing the river. The ing to Dutch tactics. Both sides ‘not wanting to lose the supply from Dorpat also arrived at Kiesi. Unexpectedly, on opportune position towering over the oxbow valley waited the 24th of September, Chodkiewicz received information for the opponent to attack’10. Willing to encourage the that Charles IX had arrived at Riga7. other side to attack, Chodkiewicz formed his forces into In those circumstances, despite how meager his forces several groups, so that the opponent might think that the were, the Hetman had to make decisions quickly. He set off Poles were in smaller numbers than they in fact had been. for Riga immediately. On the 26th of September, after an ex- hausting two-day march (110 km) he reached the Daugava 8 H. Wizner, ‘Polska sztuka wojenna XVII w. Wątpliwości i hipo- River at Kircholm (), 15 km away from Riga. tezy’, in Kwartalnik Historyczny, 1977, p. 408. 9 G. Petri, ‘Bitwa pod Kircholmem 27 września 1605’, in Wypisy Mansfeld had been stationing near Riga, but having do ćwiczeń z historii wojskowej, part 1, Warsaw 1961. small forces, he did not attack the city. As soon as Charles 10 S. Herbst, ‘Wojskowość polska i wojny w okresie 1576–1648’, in Zarys dziejów wojskowości polskiej do roku 1864, vol. 2, War- 7 H. Wisner, Kircholm 1605, Warsaw 1987. saw, pp. 352–433.

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Yet, it has not worked out as planned. Charles IX, being Chodkiewicz was at a dry land enabling the Polish cavalry an experienced commander, was afraid of going down the to profit from their main value – the vehemence of the im- valley and being trapped by the raging Hussars. pact – a charge in full gallop. At noon, the impatient Chodkiewicz ordered that the The wet meadows of the oxbow in the north ‘limited skirmishers ‘suddenly and in panic withdraw from the the possibility to perform a charge’ at full speed, ‘made front towards the army’, faking the withdrawal of the whole it impossible to perform a properly forceful flanking army. manoeuvre and forced to engage in almost stationary Charles IX, fearing the escape of a weak opponent, combat’. At the same time, these meadows ‘did not pose commanded his army to attack. He rejected caution and a serious obstacle for the Swedish cavalry, which was renounced a formation focused on both defensive and of- not familiar with a galloping charge’. ‘The Polish [cav- fensive actions in favor of placing the cavalry in the front alry] could not show its disastrous advantages over the flanks in order to add more impact to the offensive. Swedes and had to fight on almost equal conditions’. He moved the greater part of his cavalry to the left flank, However, the Polish right flank was quite strong, pro- intending to push the Poles towards the Daugava River. portionally stronger than the engaging flank at Koken- The columns of the Polish troops formed a battle form- hausen (1601). Most probably it was supposed to be the ation. Chodkiewicz commanded 3,700–4,000 soldiers, in- active flank. Without the advantage of momentum or cluding 2,700–3,000 horsemen (before the battle, the army sheer numbers, it had the advantage of looser forma- was reinforced with 500 light cavalrymen of ori- tion allowing to take more lances into the fray. As the gin and under the command of their prince Frederic), and centre and the right flank almost exclusively consisted circa 1,000 infantrymen. of heavy hussar cavalry and , best suited for The Hetman was, all in all, much weaker than Charles breaking enemy formations in a frontal charge, the left but he managed to achieve domination on the left flank flank was dominated by Cossack regiments, perfectly led by Tomasz Dąbrowa: 1,200–1,500 horsemen (100–400 suited for encircling the enemy flank. When the Swedish Hussars, 200 light cavalry, 700–900 ), that was ar- infantry ‘began climbing the opposite slope’ after des- rayed in four groups. cending into the valley, ‘Polish artillery [opened fire] as The far left flank, based on the fortified camp placed on the enemy infantry approached’. Afterwards, ‘hussars a high bank of the Daugava River, constituted of infantry emerged’ galloping from within its intervals, followed with two cannons and four Tatar regiments (350 mounts). by reiters. There was a fierce battle. It soon reinforced Mansfeld had 1,000 of light cavalry11 there. the Polish infantry. Wincenty Woyna stood in the middle and had 1,000 Allowing the first line of the infantry to strike without the infantry, 500 Hussars, 500 Courland light cavalry and five reiters was Charles IX’s mistake. The reiters were directed cannons at his command. He was being faced by 8,200 at the flanks, in order to allow the second wave of infantry Swedish infantry and 11 Lennartsson’s cannons. and – at the same time – strike Polish flanks. There was On the left flank, 700 cavalry (The Hussars and Cos- a gap between the first and the second wave of the infan- sacks) were grouped in four units. In the front, there were try. Chodkiewicz sensed the moment perfectly when the 1,500 light cavalrymen under Henryk Brandt. Chodkiewicz Swedish army became ‘torn apart’12. The centre of the bat- kept 200–400 Hussars under Teodor Lacki in reserve. tlefield was empty. After the Polish artillery volley, Chod- Seeking the definite conclusion of the battle at his left kiewicz’s infantry charged at the enemy formations. It was flank, therefore ‘moving the Swedes towards the Daugava only supposed to engage the enemy forces. Knowing how River, but not pushing them to it’, as it might have been the enemy manoeuvred, Chodkiewicz could disregard the expected in theory, was a consequence of the fact that Swedish infantry. He knew that it was not able to change the front. It could only begin to withdraw. The Hetman was 11 A. Hniłko, ‘Plan bitwy pod Kircholmem Józefa Naronowicza- interested in breaking the first line and preventing subse- -Narońskiego z r. 1659’, in Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy, quent Swedish waves to merge. Dąbrowa and Sapieha’s 1935, vol. 7. Further reading cf. M. Balcerek, ‘Ordre de Bataille armii walczących pod Kircholmem dnia 27 września 1605 r.’, in Do szarży marsz, marsz… Studia z dziejów kawalerii, vol. 4, 12 W. Rawski, ‘Kircholm 1605. Refleksje w 400-lecie bitwy’, in Toruń 2013, pp. 27–62. Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy, 2005, no. 3, p. 168.

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– 63 – – Witold Rawski –

flanks were to divert the attention from the strike tearing re-form after the clash and the subsequent chase. When apart the centre. the Swedes stepped on dry land, they were broken down When the Swedish formations were approximately 370 by Sapieha’s second line, pushed away in the meadows by metres away from the Hetman’s troops, Chodkiewicz gave the recently re-formed first line commanded by Brandt. the order to attack. Two best regiments under Woyna’s Due to Dąbrowa’s success and the engagement of the command went first. Swedish centre, Chodkiewicz noticed that the enemy has The total distance of the charge equalled to not more spent all of his troops and decided to use his rear-guard than 375 metres, that is, about two minutes. A ’s in order to resolve the situation of Sapieha’s flank. Lacki maximal range of fire equals 250–300 metres, however, in struck the side of Brandt’s reiters and broke their forma- practice, shots were fired from a distance of 100 metres, tion14. which is less than 30 seconds before direct engagement. In The fleeing Swedes stumbled upon the left flank of such a situation only one or two volleys can be fired. In the- their – already retreating – infantry. When the centre com- ory, infantry trying to stop the hussar charge was doomed mander Lennartsson was killed, some of the retreating to fail. Breaking down the pikemen’s defence usually led to units were crushed. Polish cavalry trapped a part of the the whole formation getting scattered. infantry. The rest got caught during a pursuit, which made This time the Swedes did not allow to be broken apart the defeat complete. The Swedes lost about 6,000 people, so easily. The hussar squadrons were stopped (the losses including several hundred prisoners. The infantry suffered amounted to circa 150 horses – 50% of the total number, heavy losses; well over half of them were killed. A hundred 25 killed and 17 wounded – 14% of the total number). The Poles were killed; several hundred were wounded, mostly regiments marching after them could barely walk through while fighting the infantry. The remnants of the Swedish the heaps of horse corpses. The attack had to be re- infantry were loaded onto ships at Dyjamant a few days peated. Woyna used the rest of his hussars and attacked later, whereas the remnants of Mansfeld’s reiters went to again, reinforced by two Courland companies13. This time Pärnu15. the companies struck between two Swedish regiments. One of the reasons of the Swedish defeat was poor train- The first Swedish line, threatened with being surrounded ing of the musketeers (they were a far cry from the Dutch by the Polish cavalry, began to retreat in battle order, leav- veterans, masters in handling this type of weapon). That is ing behind its artillery, which in no way could be pulled to why they could not create an effective firewall against the the rear. hussars. Shots from their muskets, requiring long reload- The skirmishers’ retreat on the right wing lured the ing, were fired too rarely. Swedish cavalry directly under Polish fire. The enemy The Swedes could not possibly win the battle using cavalry was shocked. It was attacked from the front by just infantry muskets (who fought with counter-march) Dąbrowa’s main force and flanked by the Tatar companies and the pistols (who used ). One and a half and immediately torn apart. Dąbrowa’s cavalry struck the thousand reiters meant 150 pistols used at the same time. rear and the sides of the right-flanking infantry engaged by The first line of Swedish infantry consisted of 175 pikemen the Polish centre. The fight at Sapieha’s flank lasted lon- and musketeers able to engage in direct combat. A mo- ger. Brandt’s reiters moved out a little later than the rest bile, melee-fighting enemy obtained advantage even over of the formation. Sapieha waited until they pass the wet a much more numerous opponent. meadows, where his hussars would lose their momentum. Kircholm is not a victory achieved by massive hussar When the Swedish cavalry entered dry land, Sapieha at- charge, like Lubieszów, Kokenhausen or Biały Kamień. tacked it with his first line, which broke the enemy forma- What we have here is the concept of not only beating, but tion and pushed him away into the meadows, however the utterly destroying the enemy’s main force. Chodkiewicz second Swedish wave resisted the hussars, which failed to was aware of the significant tactical advantage of the Pol- ish cavalry and went even further than Radziwiłł at Koken- 13 The problem of the Courlanders’ arrival at Kircholm is de- scribed by M. Balcerek, cf. ‘Wkład księstwa Kurlandii i Se- 14 F. Kudelka, Bitwa pod Kircholmem, Warsaw 1921. migalii oraz powiatu piltyńskiego w bitwie pod Kircholmem 15 J. Teodorczyk, ‘Tajemnice zwycięstwa czyli bitwa pod Kirchol- w 1605 roku’, in Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy, 2009, No. 2, mem w ikonografii z XVIII w.’, in Muzealnictwo Wojskowe, 2005, pp. 9–14. vol. 8, p. 377.

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hausen. He created not one, but two offensive groups in Kircholm is one of the few examples in international order to not only break, but also trap the Swedish centre history, unique because of the balance of power decidedly after breaking both flanks, except that one of these groups unfavourable for the winner. The new Swedish formation (the left flank) was twice stronger than the other and it used at Kircholm, not tested in practice, included relevant had its opponent vastly outnumbered; Obtaining this ad- concepts that could have neutralized the Polish cavalry’s vantage is one of the classic examples of force economy, advantage to some extent: deep grouping and mixing cav- applied despite the fact that the opponent had of almost alry with infantry, later used by Gustav Adolph in a slightly three times more soldiers16. different manner.

16 W. Majewski, Kampania 1603–1605. Kircholm 1605, typescript in the author’s collection.

Bibliography Books M. Balcerek, cf. ‘Wkład księstwa Kurlandii i Semigalii oraz Wojny północne w XVI–XVIII wieku. W czterechsetlecie bitwy pod powiatu piltyńskiego w bitwie pod Kircholmem w 1605 roku’, Kircholmem, ed. B. Dybaś, Toruń 2007 in Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy, 2009, no. 2 Zarys dziejów wojskowości polskiej do roku 1864, vol. 2, Warsaw A. Hniłko, ‘Plan bitwy pod Kircholmem Jozefa Naronowicza- 1965 -Narońskiego z r. 1659’, in Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy, A. Filipczak-Kocur, Skarb litewski za pierwszych dwu Wazów 1587– 1935, no. 7 –1648, Wrocław 1994 G. Petri, ‘Bitwa pod Kircholmem 27 września 1605’, in Wypisy S. Herbst, Wojna inflancka 1600–1602, Zabrze 2006 do ćwiczeń z historii wojskowej, 1961, vol. 1 F. Kudelka, Bitwa pod Kircholmem, Warsaw 1921 W. Rawski, ‘Kircholm 1605. Refleksje w 400-lecie bitwy’, in Prze- W. Majewski, Kampania 1603–1605. Kircholm 1605 (typescript) gląd Historyczno-Wojskowy, 2005, no. 3 M. Paradowski, Studia i materiały do historii wojen ze Szwecją J. Teodorczyk, ‘Tajemnice zwycięstwa czyli bitwa pod Kirchol- 1600–1635, Oświęcim 2013 mem w ikonografii z XVIII w.’, in Muzealnictwo Wojskowe, 2005, L. Podhorodecki, Jan Karol Chodkiewicz 1560–1621, Warsaw 1882 vol. 8 M. Roberts, The Early Vasas. A History of Sweden, 1523–1611, J. Wimmer, ‘Z zagadnień ekonomiki wojskowej XV–XVIII w.’, in Cambridge 1968 Materiały i Studia, 1974, no. 32 H. Wisner, Kircholm 1605, Warsaw 1987 H. Wisner, ‘Polska sztuka wojenna pierwszej połowy XVII wieku. Articles Wątpliwości i hipotezy’, in Kwartalnik Historyczny, 1977, nr 2 M. Balcerek, ‘Ordre de Bataille armii walczących pod Kirchol- mem dnia 27 września 1605 r.’, in Do szarży marsz, marsz... Studia z dziejów kawalerii, vol. 4, Toruń 2013

– 65 –

– Przemysław Gawron – Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw

The Battle of Klushino

On 4 July 1610 Polish-Lithuanian units commanded by ians is much more modest in this matter. One can partly the voivode of Kiev and Field Hetman of the Crown Stan- explain it by the reluctance to cover a spectacular defeat isław Żółkiewski defeated a much larger Muscovite army in of one’s own army and partly by a relative lack of Muscov- the battle of Klushino. Without a shadow of doubt, it was ite sources, as indicated by Boris Nikolaevich Floria in his one of the biggest victories of old Polish warfare, despite monography devoted to the Commonwealth’s interven- the fact that it didn’t bring expected results. The battle tion in Moscow during the Time of Troubles5. itself became an object of attention for many, especially A reconstruction of the course of events of 4 July 1610 is Polish, historians. One should mention the works of Kon- possible thanks to relatively rich and diversified, for the 17th stanty Górski, Franiczek Kudelka, Franciszek Kusiak and, century, source base, which includes not only numerous a few years ago, Robert Szcześniak.1. It was also covered by written sources, but also iconographic material. A review the Hetman’s biographers, mainly Antoni Prochaska, Jerzy of accounts describing the Battle of Klushino should begin Besala and Leszek Podhorodecki2. It wouldn’t be correct with the report by Stanisław Żółkiewski. A historian pos- to state that the course of the battle had been determ- sesses at least three relations, which were written by the ined decisively. One can learn about this just by reading Hetman. The day after the victorious battle, the Hetman the newest monography written by Radosław Sikora, who informed the monarch and the most prominent dignitar- attempted to revise existing descriptions, basing on pre- ies staying in the camp at Smoleńsk about the victory. Let- viously unused sources – mainly iconography – and a dif- ters to Sigismund III and containing numer- ferent interpretation of already known accounts3. Wacław ous interesting information are well-known6. Next, three Sobieski and Wojciech Polak were concerned about polit- ical and diplomatic aspects of the Hetman’s expedition, Polska a Moskwa 1603 – 1618. Opinie i stanowiska szlachty pol- whereas to Jarema Maciszewski we owe an excellent study skiej, Warsaw 1968. devoted to the attitude of the nobility’s public opinion to- 5 B. N. Floria, Polsko–litovskaya intervenciya w Rossii i russkoye wards the war with Moscow4. The output of Russian histor- obstshestvo, Moscow 2005, p. 165; also cf.: M. Karamzin, Hi- storia państwa rosyjskiego, translated by G. Buczyński, vol. 1 K. Górski, ‘Oblężenie Smoleńska w latach 1609–1611 i bitwa XII, Warsaw 1830; S. M. Sołowiew, Istoriya Rossii drevneyshikh pod Kłuszynem’, in Przewodnik Naukowy i Literacki, vol. 23, vremen, vol. VIII, Moscow 1866; M. Kostomarow, Smutnoye vre- 1895; F. Kudelka, ‘Bitwa pod Kłuszynem’, in Bellona, nr 6, 1920; mya Moskovskogo gosudarstva w nachale XVII v. (1604–1614), F. Kusiak, Bitwa pod Kłuszynem 1610 roku, Wrocław 1992; R. Sankt Petersburg 1868; S. F. Płatonow, Ocherki po istorii smuty Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610, Warsaw 2008. w Moskowskom Gosudarstwie XVI – XVII v., Moscow 1995. 2 J. Besala, Stanisław Żółkiewski, Warsaw 1988; L. Podhorode- 6 Letter from S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at Tsaryovo- cki, Stanisław Żółkiewski, Warsaw 1988; A. Prohaska, Hetman -Zaymishche (Carowe Zajmiszcze) 5 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Libra- Stanisław Żółkiewski, Warsaw 1927. ry 33, p. 154 v; different copy BJ 3596/II, p. 13 et seq.; printed 3 R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610, Warsaw 2010. in Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego, kanclerza koronnego i het- 4 W. Sobieski, Żółkiewski na Kremlu, Warsaw 1920; W. Polak, mana, publ. A. Bielowski, Lvov 1861; p. 198 et seq.; J. U. Niem- O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę. Polityka Rzeczypospolitej wobec cewicz, Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III, króla polskiego etc., Moskwy w latach 1607 – 1612, Gdańsk 2008; J. Maciszewski, vol. II, Warsaw 1819, p. 598 nn.; S. Żółkiewski to L. Sapieha,

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years after the described events, the Hetman wrote a short who mostly switched sides in favour of royal service and description, and as well a justification, of his Muscovian were located in the Polish-Lithuanian army camp.9. While actions, called Początek i progres wojny moskiewskiej (‘The analysing the letter one should have in mind that the au- Beginning and Course of the Muscovian War’; hereinafter thor wasn’t a professional military man, however he was Początek i progres), in which he also covered the Klushino no stranger to the matters of war. Although he didn’t per- campaign in detail. This work, although printed as late sonally participate in the fight, he was present in the com- as the 19th century, was published eight times and trans- mander-in-chief’s surroundings, which improves the value lated to Russian and English7. Thanks to its literary values of his report. and truthfulness attributed to the Hetman, it was treated Two other participants of the battle, Mikołaj Ścibor as a basic source of research on the Battle of Klushino, Marchocki and Samuel Maskiewicz, left behind journals though historians passed over the differences between the in which they mentioned Klushino. Especially the latter, descriptions in the letters and in Początek i progres. Mean- a companion from duke Janusz Porycki’s hussar company while, as W. Polak proved, the latter text does not always (‘’ – also called ‘chorągiew’, a unit of 100–150 cavalry- contain accurate information8. Moreover, while writing, men), which was a part of the Field Hetman’s regiment, de- the Hetman used Russian sources, especially the account scribed in great detail his and his brothers in arms’ struggle of the commander-in-chief Dmitry Ivanovich Shuisky, who, with much more numerous enemy cavalry. Thanks to its along with his brother, Vasili IV, were taken prisoner by literary value, this description often served as a basis for the Poles. It very well could influence their description of reconstructing the course of the fight, although the main the battle of Klushino. part of the journal was probably created between 1625– The goal motivating Żółkiewski while writing Początek 1631, so almost fifteen years after the described events.10. i progres could be of some importance to the described Similarly, Marchocki’s journal was written after 1625. In the matter. The Hetman, faced with unfavourable public opin- battle of Klushino he served in the rank of a Hussar com- ion pertaining to the authors of the Muscovian war, clearly pany rotmistrz (a commander of a cavalry company).11. In aimed to justify his actions and underline the weight of the both cases one should carry in mind the fact, that both au- achievements which, in his opinion, could have ended the thors actively took part in the battle and therefore could Smoleńsk expedition with great success. It didn’t happen, not know of the course of the fight in other places. Apart although not of his fault. from that, because the respective accounts were written Interesting information can be found in the letters after a certain period of time, their memory couldn’t serve of Stanisław Domaradzki, Lvov’s deputy master of the them accurately, in consequence causing the journals to pantry, addressed to Zygmunt Kazanowski, the starosta be mistaken when it comes to details. There is also the risk of Kokenhausen and a Jesuit, priest Piotr Kulesza to an that the authors relied not only on their own memories but unknown addressee. Both authors participated in the also on relations of other people, including those, who did battle and described its course at length, with the letters written shortly afterwards. Kulesza’s letter clearly states, that he made contact with tsar Vasili Shuisky’s soldiers, 9 Letter from S. Domaracki to Z. Kazanowski, camp at Tsaryovo- -Zaymishche 10 VII 1610, AGAD, AR II, 556 (hereinafter: S. Do- camp at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche 6 VII 1610, fragments printed maracki); P. Kulesza SJ to N.N., from the camp at Tsaryovo 5 VII in A. Prohaska, ‘Wyprawa pod Smoleńsk (z listów litewskiego 1610, The Princes Library (hereinafter: B. Czart.), kanclerza r. 1609–1611)’, in Kwartalnik Litewski, vol. V, Sankt 342, p. 759, publ. W. Sobieski, in Kwartalnik Historyczny, vol. Petersburg 1911, p. 68. XXXV, vol. 14, Lvov 1921, p. 154 (hereinafter: P. Kulesza). 7 As to the date of the uprising, L. Podhorodecki, Stanisław Żół- 10 A. Sajkowski, Introduction in Pamiętniki Samuela i Bogusława kiewski…, p. 196 et seq.; as to editions and translations, cf.: Kazimierza Maskiewiczów, publ. A. Sajkowski, Wrocław 1961, S. Żółkiewski, Początek i progres wojny moskiewskiej, ed. A. p. 55 et seq.; ‘Dyjaryjusz Samuela Maskiewicza’, in ibid, p. 93 Borowski, Cracow 2009, p. 36 et seq. (hereinafter: Początek et seq. (hereinafter: S. Maskiewicz). i progres); I have used this edition while writing this text. 11 ‘Historia moskiewskiej wojny prawdziwa przez mię Mikołaja 8 W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 238 et seq., per- Ścibora z Marchocic Marchockiego pisana’, in Moskwa w rę- taining to the autonomy of the Hetman’s actions during the kach Polaków. Pamiętniki dowódców i oficerów garnizonu negotiations in Moscow, as the account in Początek i progres polskiego w Moskwie w latach 1610 – 1612, ed. M. Kubala, T. deviates from the truth. Ściężor, Cracow 2005, p. 21 et seq. (hereinafter: M. Marchocki).

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not participate in the battle, which should urge a historian ing numerous very interesting details, especially pertain- to be cautious. ing to fights against mercenaries. The last of the aforemen- We also possess two accounts written by English mer- tioned texts was, probably, written by the Hetman himself, cenaries who participated in the battle of Klushino on because this account is in many points very similar to the the Russian side. Henry Brereton published his relation in letter addressed to Sigismund III. in 1614. As a soldier in Swedish service since 1609 One must also mention the information contained in he was sent to help Vasili Shuisky as a part of a mercen- the accounts of people who didn’t fight in the battle itself, ary unit, under the Vyborg treaty signed between the tsar but relied on information supplied by actual participants. and the Swedish king Charles IX, and probably took part Some of these relations come from that time, mainly letters in the aforementioned battle, after which he returned to written by , Jan Zawadzki, Samuel Targowski, his homeland. An anonymous Narrative of an Englishman Andrzej Bobola and Giovanni Luna addressed to persons serving against Poland was, without a shadow of doubt, concerned with the course of military actions, especially written by a participant, a soldier of English cavalry from Szymon Rudnicki, the bishop of , and Wawrzyniec Captain Crale’s company, who also decided not to stay in Gembicki, of the Crown, and the memoirs of Moscow and, through Gdańsk, returned to England after Józef Budziłło, a soldier serving False Dmitry II, or Konrad the events in Klushino. Both texts show the battle from Bussow and Pierre de la Ville, who served the Russians17. the perspective of foreigners in Russian service and thus We also possess works of historians, Paweł Piasecki, Stan- are a valuable addition to Polish accounts. One should isław Kobierzycki and Johan Widekindi18, written at a later remember, however, that because of Russian accusations time, who created descriptions of the battle many years stating that the battle was lost because of mercenaries’ later, basing on documents and witness accounts, espe- treason, their relations can arise from the need to counter cially of Hetman Żółkiewski. Of special character are doc- the allegations and should be meticulously confronted uments registering losses suffered by the Hetman’s subor- with other descriptions12. dinates. They allow to not only estimate losses but also It’s difficult to indubitably settle, if the authors of an- provide information about the causes of death, types of onymous Polish accounts of the events in Klushino took wounds or the equipment used by both sides19. part in the battle or if their relations were based on inform- ation taken from the participants. Precisely, I have in mind: go powodzenia przez lat dwie do wzięcia zamku Smoleńska Progres potrzeby z Moskwą pod Kłuszynem in anno 1610 4 w roku 1611, ed. J. Byliński, Wrocław 1999, p. 157 et seq. (here- Julii za szczęśliwego panowania Zygmunta III szczęsliwie inafter: Relacja z diariusza); in a large part is identical with the odprawiona13, Spod Możajska d. 23 July 161014, Wiadomość Żółkiewski’s letter to the king, dated 5 VII 1610. 17 J. Budziło, Wojna moskiewska wzniecona i prowadzona z oka- o porażce Dymitrowego15 and an untitled relation attached zji fałszywych Dymitrów od 1603 do 1612 r., pub. J. Byliński, J. 16 to the Diariusz drogi Króla Jmci Zygmunta III… , contain- Długosz, Wrocław 1995 (hereinafter: J. Budziło); K. Bussow, Moskovskaya kronika, 1584 – 1613, pub. I. Smirnow, Moscow 12 H. Brereton, ‘News of the Present Miseries of Russia’, in: The – Leningrad 1961 (hereinafter: K. Bussow); ‘Krótka powieść False Dmitri. A Russian Romance and Tragedy, described by o tem, co się zdarzyło na Moskwie od panowania Iwana III do British Eye – Witness, 1604–1612, ed. S. E. Howe, London 1916, Szujskiego r. 1611. Przez Piotra de la Ville sieur de Dombasle’, p 69 et seq. (hereinafter: H. Brereton); Narrative of an English- in Skarbiec historii polskiej, vol. I, publ. K. Sienkiewicz, Paryż man serving against Poland, in ibid., p. 151 et seq. (hereinafter: 1839 (hereinafter: P. de la Ville). Narrative). 18 S. Kobierzycki, Historia Władysława, Królewicza Polskiego 13 BJ 102, p. 411 et seq.; printed in Wypisy źródłowe do historii i Szwedzkiego, trans. M. Krajewski, publ. J. Byliński, W. Kaczo- polskiej sztuki wojennej, vol. 5, Polska sztuka wojenna w latach rowski, Wrocław 2005; P. Piasecki, Kronika, trans. A. Chrząsz- 1563–1647, ed. Z. Spieralski, J. Wimmer, Warsaw 1961, p. 187 czewski, publ. J. Bartoszewicz, Cracow 1870; J. Widekindi, et seq.; (hereinafter: Anonimowa relacja). Istoriya desyatiletney shvedsko-moskovitskoy voyny, trans. S. 14 AGAD, AR II 557 (hereinafter: Relacja spod Możajska). A. Annenskiy, A.M. Alexandrov, A.F. Kostina, Moscow 2000. 15 B. Czart. 105, p. 177; other copy titled ‘Die 3 July’, B. Czart. 342, I used an electronic version published on the website www. p. 755; The Raczyńscy Library 139, p. 376 v. (hereinafter: Wia- vostlit. info. domość). 19 ‘Regestr pobicia Towarzystwa w potrzebie pod Kłuszynem za 16 Diariusz drogi Króla Jmci Zygmunta III od szczęśliwego wyjazdu Carowym Zamieściem mil 2 dnia 4 lipca’, in R. Sikora, Kłuszyn z Wilna pod Smoleńsk w roku 1609 a die 18 Augusta i fortunne- 1610…, p. 129 et seq. (hereinafter: Regestr pobicia); a different,

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Annalistic quality can be attributed to certain passages With the above caveat in mind we can now move on to contained in Razryadnyye zapisy20 and Russian historic describe the origin of the Klushino campaign. There is no works, such as: Nowyj letopisiec, Rukopis Filareta, patri- need to analyse the cause and course of the crisis in which archa Moskowskogo i wseja Rossii or Letopisnaja kniga21. the found itself after the death of The main attribute of these writings is their briefness (per- Ivan IV the Terrible and later on after the termination of the haps with the exclusion of Filaret’s manuscript), lack of de- in 1598. It has been done already by Danuta tails pertaining to the course of the battle and the strength Czerska, Andrzej Andrusiewicz and Rusłan Skrynnikow24. of the Russian side. , who took the throne after the mentally Two iconographic representations were devoted to the ill Feodor I, faced strong boyar opposition. They put up battle of Klushino. Based on Teofil Szemberg’s drawing, against him a pretender to the Tsar’s throne, Dmitry. He who was present near Smoleńsk during the battle, Jakub claimed to be the younger brother of Feodor, who died Filip, probably a student of Tomasz Makowski, the court in 1591 in . The False Dmitry found support among engraver of Mikołaj Krzysztof ‘the Orphan’ Radziwiłł, made the Crown’s magnates, especially the Wiśniowieckis and an etching, which depicts the formations assumed dur- the voivode of Sandomierz . In exchange ing the battle by both armies in great detail. It is located for support he promised Mniszech, who was in great debt, in the Library collection22. In Olesko many bestowals and the status of the Tsar’s father-in-law, one can find a painting of the battle made by Szymon as he was to marry Mniszech’s daughter – Maryna. Inform- Boguszewicz, the court painter of Hetman Żółkiewski. It is ally he also received support from Sigismund III Vase and said, that the commander himself made remarks pertain- the papal nuncio Claudio Rangoni, who expected political ing to the contents of the painting, which would greatly benefits from putting False Dmitry II on the throne. In 1604 increase its worth as a historic source23.. the pretender began his expedition for the Monomach’s To sum up, the battle of Klushino was represented in Cap while commanding Cossacks and Polish mercenary many diverse sources, which in itself can be a cause of forces. It brought him many victories, mainly thanks to the joy. On the other hand it can induce discrepancies, which betrayal of some tsarist dignitaries, who switched sides. make it difficult to reconstruct the course of events and However, in January of the following year he suffered de- forces caution in interpreting each account, including feat at Dobrynicze and, in consequence, found himself iconography. One cannot overly trust only one source, in a difficult position, only to be saved by an unexpected which was known to happen among researchers in refer- death of Tsar Boris and the following May revolt in Moscow, ence to the work of Hetman Żółkiewski. which overturned his son and successor Feodor Godunov. The pretender succeed to the throne, albeit it wasn’t to last for long. Little more than a year later, when Maryna

later register published in Diariusz drogi…, p. 162 et seq. (her- Mniszchówna came to the city with her father and a large einafter: Regestr z diariusza). Polish retinue, including royal envoys, another revolt en- 20 ‘Razryadnyye zapisy za smutnoye vremya (7113–7121 g.)’, sued. Among the victims were the Tsar himself and nu- publ. S.A. Belokurov, in Chteniya v Imperatorskom Obstchestve merous newcomers, who already managed to get under Istorii i Drevnostey Rossiyskikh, vol. II–III, Moscow 1907 (herein- the locals’ skin. Those who survived were imprisoned. This after: S.A. Belokurov). group included the Tsar’s wife Maryna and her father. Va- 21 Rukopis Filareta, patriarkha Moskovskogo i vseya Rossii, ed. P. sili Shuisky succeed to the throne. He strived to consolid- Muchanow, Moscow 1837; ‘Novyy letopisets’, in Polnoye So- branyye russkikh letopisey, vol. XIV, Sankt Petersburg 1910; S.I. ate his power and had no intention, at least for the time Szachowski, Letopisnaya kniga, www.old-ru.ru. being, to start a war with the Commonwealth. Sigismund 22 University of Warsaw Library (BUW), Gabinet Rycin, GR 5444, III, who had problems with his own people in the form of review S. Alexandrowicz, ‘Wykorzystanie źródeł kartogra- the Sandomierz Rebellion (TN: rokosz sandomierski), also ficznych w badaniach nad historią Polski XVI i XVII wieku’, in was not eager for a conflict. Thus, in July 1608 both lead- Z dziejów kartografii, vol. XIV, ed. S. Alexandrowicz, R. Skrycki, 2008, p. 57; I used a copy published on the website 24 D. Czerska, Borys Godunow, Wrocław 1988; idem, Dymitr Sa- www.hussar.com. pl mozwaniec, Wrocław 2004, A. Andrusiewicz, Dzieje wielkiej 23 R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 20, I used pictures published on smuty, Katowice 1999; R. Skrynnikow, Borys Godunow, trans. the website www.hussar.com.pl J. Dancygier, M. Migalska, Warsaw 1982.

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ers after long negotiations signed a truce effective until 30 with Charles IX whereby he would obtain help against his June 161225. enemies. Intervention of Sweden, with whom Sigismund Shuisky didn’t feel too confident on the throne, espe- III and the Commonwealth were at war for Livonia, into the cially because he had to deal with a peasant Muscovian matters and the alliance of both leaders had to in led by Ivan Isayevich Bolotnikov. When his com- be interpreted in Warsaw as a threat to vital affairs of the manders dealt with it, in July 1607 a new threat emerged king and the state, because after defeating False Dmitry, – another False Dmitry ‘miraculously’ saved from the Moscow and would most probably designate slaughter in Moscow. As was the case with the first pre- the Crown and Lithuania as next targets. On the contrary, tender, this time the main military force was also com- Dmitry’s victory could turn into an alliance against Charles posed by Poles and Lithuanians. They were commanded IX of Sweden29. by duke Roman Rożyński and since July 1608 also by Jan In the meantime, the Swedish-Muscovian agreement Piotr Sapieha, the starost of Usvyaty (TN: Uświat). When, began to bear its first fruit. Between April and July 1609, pursuant to the truce, Shuisky released Maryna and her using Swedish reinforcements commanded by Jacob Pon- father in September 1608, False Dmitry sent military units, tusson de la Gardie, Mikhail Skopin-Shuisky, the tsar’s rel- who kidnapped her and brought her to the camp. Her ative, managed to unblock Veliky Novgorod and conquer, father negotiated a favourable agreement with Dmitry’s after an indecisive battle, , although the castle stayed army commanders, whereas Maryna ‘recognized’ False in the hands of Polish units. Afterwards he started consol- Dmitry as her late husband26. idating his forces in the Transvolga Region. In the vicinity Nevertheless, despite Vasili Shuisky’s weakness, Di- of Moscow, clashes between tsarist soldiers and False mitri didn’t conquer Moscow, although he set a camp in Dmitry’s mercenaries at the Chodynka river ended in a de- Tushino, then a nearby town, nowadays one of the capital’s feat of the latter. Everything pointed towards a steadily districts. , on Dimitri’s order, besieged, as weakening position of the villain of Tushino and his men30. it would later turn out – in vain – The Trinity Lavra of St. In such a situation Sigismund III could not wait any Sergius, but more and more towns and provinces accep- longer. He decided to begin preparations for war and com- ted False Dimitri’s reign. However, negotiation attempts mence propaganda activities in order to justify it. Without between Moscow and Tushino didn’t succeed27. With time the permission of the parliament, he strived for senator’s the situation started to turn for the worse. The pretender’s support. In order to receive financial backing he called arrears with the mercenaries rose, which threatened with on September’s deputational to enact taxes for revolt in the camp, whereas attempts to exploit conquered the war, which ended in a partial success, although at the Muscovian lands led some of them to rebel, which com- beginning of military manoeuvres the king didn’t possess plicated the situation in Tushino camp even more28. enough resources to carry them out for long. Moreover, the In such a situation Sigismund III, who in June 1608 fi- king’s entourage was conflicted as to the strategy of future nally reconciled with the rebel leader, voivode of Cracow, actions. The king in his universals addressed to gentry re- Mikołaj Zebrzydowski, once more started to think about cognized recapturing Smoleńsk and the Severia Region as launching military action against Moscow. This plans goals of the war, but also expressed hope that the course didn’t take a specific form before the parliament session of the war will allow to conquer all of Russia. Thus, the of 1609 which, in accordance with King Henry’s Articles Field Hetman of the Crown Stanisław Żółkiewski proposed (TN: Artykuły Henrykowskie), was competent to permit to march through Severia straight to Moscow, whereas the waging a war. The matter wasn’t discussed during sejm, Lithuanian advisers of the king, especially Lew Sapieha, although it was mentioned during senatorial votes, but suggested, more conservatively, to besiege Smoleńsk. the course of events inclined the king to execute his Mus- Sigismund III acquiesced to the latter opinion and – des- covian plans. In February 1609 Shuisky signed a treaty pite the lack of proper siege equipment, especially heavy cannons and infantry – decided on a siege, probably be- 25 W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 42 et seq. cause of information presented to him by Sapieha and 26 A.G. Przepiórka, od Staroduba do Moskwy. Działania wojsk Dy- mitra II Samozwańca w latach 1607–1608, Zabrze 2007. 27 W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 65 et seq. 29 Ibid., p. 67 et seq, about the treaty in Vyborg, p. 93 et seq. 28 Ibid., p. 87 et seq. 30 Ibid., p. 94 et seq.

– 71 – – Przemysław Gawron –

– 72 – – The Battle of Klushino –

Aleksander Korwin Gosiewski, the starost of Wieliż, as if Kaluga along with some of his allies. Conflicts in Tushino the local voivode, Michał Borysowicz Szein, wanted to sur- played into the hands of Skopin Shuisky, who launched render the castle without a fight31. a counter-offensive and freed up The Trinity Lavra of St. When the vanguard of Polish-Lithuanian forces reached Sergius using Swedish reinforcements, which had tre- Smoleńsk at the end of September 1609, it turned out that mendous propaganda value to the Russians. Sapieha Szein doesn’t exhibit any will to surrender and the strong- retreated to Dymitrów and because of constant harass- hold was well prepared for a siege. The assault carried out ment by Skopin’s forces – afterwards, in March, to Osipów. on 4 October didn’t succeed and thus began an unsuccess- The camp in Tushino found itself in a terrible spot, espe- ful blockade of the city and the wait for either the heavy cially because was overrun by Shuisky’s sup- cannons to arrive or Dmitry’s soldiers to switch sides. The porters and Dmitry cut off food shipments in Kaluga. In mood in the camp wasn’t good. Conflicts arose between such a situation Różyński’s subordinates left Tushino in the Hetman and the voivode of Braclav, , and March and went to Volok and afterwards to Osipowo. On his brothers. Crown soldiers frowned upon the Lithuatians 22 March Skopin Shuisky triumphantly marched into the and vice versa, volunteers didn’t listen to Żółkiewski’s or- unblocked capital. Although he died only a month later, ders and the winter began to take its toll on everybody. military manoeuvres carried out by two Russian armies, Despite all that no one decided to march on Moscow, as commanded by Grigory Valuev and Jakub Boratyński, and Żółkiewski proposed32. aided by foreign mercenaries in May managed to break The camp at Smoleńsk was only one of the vertexes of Dmitry’s former forces in the battle of Osipów and began a pentagram, which was to decide about the fate of Russia prepare military action against Bely stronghold overrun in the coming months. The second one was the camp in by royal forces35. Tushino, where Sigismund III sent his envoys in order to In the royal camp at least since February a plan to send drag Dmitry’s soldiers to his cause. This plan didn’t suc- a strong unit tasked to crush Skopin Shuisky’s forces in ceed because of overly greedy financial requests of the cooperation with the military from Tushino. Originally Jan mercenaries, which the king wasn’t able to fulfil33. How- Potocki, the voivode of Braclav, was supposed to become ever, in February 1610, the monarch reached an agree- its leader, with 2 thousand men under his command. This ment with the Muscovian boyars supporting False Dmitry, idea wasn’t realised because the candidate’s illness sup- who recognised prince Władysław Zygmunt Vase as the posedly stood in the way36. When Potocki regained his Muscovian tsar, while at the same time accepting the health, tall snow became a new problem. Afterwards the king’s rule until the situation in the country settled down voivode began to haggle with the king about the strength and without deciding about the nationality of Smoleńsk of cavalry companies under his command and their pay- and Severia. Swedes, and, of course, tsar ment, although Żółkiewski, rather unfriendly towards him, Vasili were the remaining vertexes and had an important thought that Potocki, in reality, tried to avoid the expedi- role to play in the coming events34. tion because he didn’t expect to gain any laurels and con- In January 1610 False Dmitry’s camp divided itself be- sidered it very dangerous. Instead, he hoped to capture cause of negotiations conducted by soldiers and their Smoleńsk swiftly37. commanders with Sigismund III. Dmitry escaped to The dissolution of the camp in Tushino and Shuisky’s counter-offensive aided by Swedish reinforcements forced the need for decisive actions, especially because the tsar 31 W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 97 et seq.; W. Sobie- ski, Żółkiewski na Kremlu…, p. 13 et seq.; R. Szcześniak, Kłu- rejected negotiations with the King, as proposed by the szyn 1610…, p. 24 et seq. 32 W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 136 et seq.; W. Sobie- ski, Żółkiewski na Kremlu…, p. 44 et seq; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 35 W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 175 et seq; W. Sobie- 1610…, p. 28 et seq.; L. Podhorodecki, Stanisław Żółkiewski…, ski, Żółkiewski na Kremlu…, p. 69 et seq; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn p. 158 et seq. 1610…, p.35 et seq. 33 W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 139 et seq.; W. Sobie- 36 S. Targowski (?) to S. Rudnicki, camp at Smoleńsk 28 II 1610, ski, Żółkiewski na Kremlu…, p. 60 et seq. 6 III 1610; B.Czart. 1630, pp. 973, 979 34 W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 157 et seq.; W. Sobie- 37 J. Zawadzki to S. Rudnicki, camp at Smoleńsk 20 III 1610, ski, Żółkiewski na Kremlu…, p. 77 et seq. B.Czart. 105, p. 79; Początek i progres, p. 68.

– 73 – – Przemysław Gawron –

Polish-Lithuanian side38. Therefore, during the war council passed. On 12 June he was no doubt of it anymore, be- on 1 June the king entrusted Żółkiewski with command- cause the camp was reached by Gosiewski’s envoys, in- ing troops, which left False Dmitry’s service, enforcing or- cluding 12 foreign soldiers – 11 Englishmen and 1 Scot, der among them and lastly, striking tsarist forces prepar- who joined the king’s cause by informing that the tsar- ing to relieve Smoleńsk39. The Hetman had to carry out ist army relocated to Rzhev. He decided to continue the this task with forces weaker than those proposed to Po- march, because the mercenaries’ account stated that the tocki, because he was ordered to rally only two regiments Russians are preparing to besiege the castle once more43. from Smoleńsk; his own and Mikołaj Struś’s, the starost He reached Bely two days later, where he rested for two of Chmielnice. He gave out an order that commanders more days, reinforced the stronghold’s garrison and sent who were located farther to the east, that means Marcin four cavalry companies back to the royal camp. Afterwards Kazanowski and Samuel Dunikowski who was replacing he moved towards Shuyskoye, where on 22 June he joined Ludwik Weiher, concentrate their units and issued a dead- some of the companies sent from Smoleńsk and the regi- line of four days to rally camp servants sent away from the ments of Kazanowski and Ludwik Weiher, commanded, as camp for provisions40. I have mentioned, by Samuel Dunikowski44. However, before Żółkiewski left the trenches of Smo - Since the end of April Russians rallied their forces at leńsk, on 6 June came alarming news of Bely fortress Mozhaysk. Their objective was to unblock Smoleńsk and threatened by Boratyński’s and Horn’s units, which forced decisively crush the Polish-Lithuanian mercenaries, who the king to summon another council. In consequence, the served False Dmitry II in the past. Regiments from Moscow objective of the expedition was changed. Żółkiewski was commanded by Andriej Golicyn and Danilo Ivanovich to relieve the castle and his troops were strengthened by Mezecki reached it first, followed by Ivan Andreyevich several additional cavalry companies41. In the end, the Khovansky’s regiment from Rzhev and Vasily Ivanovich Hetman left the camp in the evening of 7 June. Some Buturlin and Grigori Sulevich Pushkin’s from Pogorełowe troops moved out earlier in the direction of Shuyskoye Gorodiszcze45. Additionally, units from Wolok, Osipowo and the rest on the following day. It caused problems to and Zubtsof reached the place of concentration, whereas the authors of sources, which differ in the amount of cav- in the middle of May came 15 thousand soldiers led by the alry companies and soldiers, with the difference amount- supreme commander, Dmitry Shuisky. After long hesita- ing to circa a thousand horses (2–3 thousand). Similarly tion, with initial disapproval of the tsar, who finally gave to R. Szcześniak and R. Sikora, I propose to assume as in to his brother’s demands, foreign mercenaries led by a foundation the list included in the manuscript located Jacob Pontusson de la Gardie and Evert Horn appeared in The Raczyński Library in Poznań 33. According to it, on at the end of July. They demanded the Muscovian side 8 June the Hetman had 3280 portions (TN: units of sol- paid the overdue salaries, with some arrears reaching as diers’ salary) at his disposal. It coincides with Samuel Tar- much as half a year in case of some units. In the foreigner’s gowski’s account, mentioning that the troops leaving the camp there were even some revolts provoked by camp at Smoleńsk were three thousand people strong42. Nicolas Pinarte and Colville with Englishmen supposedly The Hetman marched hastily to Bely. On 9 June he trav- taking part in them. The rebellion was thwarted and the elled 8 miles (between 51 and 62 kilometres) and started to receive news that the direct threat to the fortress had 43 Letter of S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at the Tsaritsa River 9 VI 1610; 10 VI 1610; Raczyńscy Library 33, p. 151 v; 152. 38 Początek i progres, p. 66; Diariusz drogi, p. 139 et seq. (a mis- 44 Początek i progres, p. 69; pertaining to sending off the com- sion of His Royal Majesty’s courtier Śliźń); W. Polak, O Kreml panies: Diariusz drogi, p. 149; (four companies); J. Zadzik to i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 181. S. Rudnicki, camp at Smoleńsk 19 VI 1610, B. Czart. 342, p. 746; 39 Diariusz drogi, p. 145; Początek i progres, p. 68. a copy in B.Czart. 105, p. 145; (5 companies and a hundred in- 40 Początek i progres, s. 68 i n.; S. Maskiewicz, s. 123 et seq. fantrymen) as to the reinforcement of the Bely garrison, N.N. 41 Diariusz drogi, p. 146. to N.N., camp at Smoleński 11 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library 42 S. Maskiewicz, p. 124; Diariusz drogi, p. 147; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 139, p. 376; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 26 et seq.; differently: 1610…, p. 22 et seq.; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 48, R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 48. especially annotation no. 48; cf. S. Targowski to S. Rudnicki, 45 S. A. Belokurov, vol. II, p. 18, 54 n.; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn camp at Smoleńsk 7 VI 1610, B. Czart. 1630, p. 1119. 1610…, p. 42.

– 74 – – The Battle of Klushino –

provokers punished46. The tsar sent the foreigners 10 thou- a personal side to it, because Aleksander Zborowski was sand roubles, which were paid to de la Gardia by diak Samuel’s son, whose death on a scaffold in 1584 was gen- Razriadnego prikazu Jakow Demidow, but the Swedish erally caused by Żółkiewski, then a loyal assistant of Chan- commander didn’t pay them out to soldiers before the cellor and Hetman of the Crown, Jan Zamoyski. battle. Another twenty thousand roubles in the form of Despite the weakness of his forces, the Hetman didn’t furs and cloth, which the Russians kept in their camp also delay any longer and as soon as on 23 June made a per- weren’t paid out47. sonal reconnaissance of Muscovian positions, without Shuisky ordered Grigory Valuev and Fedor Jelecki to engaging the enemy. On the following day he achieved take front-end position at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche, where two significant successes. In the result of heavy fighting, both leaders, choosing a naturally defended location, in which cossack (the name of light cavalry formation, made camp. The Polish-Lithuanian side estimated these not ethnic description) rotmistrz Spodwiłowski and Mar- forces to be 6–8 thousand soldiers strong, although after cin Weiher were killed, Polish-Lithuanian forces managed the battle of Klushino Valuev quoted a number of 10 thou- to surround the enemy in the camp, although fire from sand48. Tsaryovo-Zaymishche was located 2–4 miles from harquebuses and improvised firearms drove the Poles Shuyskoye (between 12,5–17 and circa 25–31 kilometres) and Lithuanians away from the embankments. Moreover, which forced Żółkiewski to take action49. Valuev’s forces Zborowski’s soldiers decided to go under the Hetman’s were also a threat to False Dmitry’s units, commanded command which strengthened his position greatly, how- by Aleksander Zborowski, which stationed in a separ- ever, without relinquishing their demands. The Muscovian ate camp and didn’t want to serve under the voivode of camp in which, according to prisoners’ accounts, circa 5 Kiev. Therefore the Hetman wanted to attend the gen- thousand soldiers were trapped, was well prepared to eral’s council to personally convince his companions but defend itself for Żółkiewski, lacking any heavy artillery, to Zborowski convinced him otherwise. Żółkiewski only decide about an assault, thus a siege began. After fending sent his envoy, in the person of a Hussarian rotmistrz and off two Russian forays on 25 June, the Hetman’s soldiers, starost of Tłumacze – Mikołaj Herburt. Other members of commanded by Paweł Rudzki (also called Szysz) built the council faced him with conditions of paying a donat- a few wooden forts (‘ostrógi’, also: ‘ostrożki’) manned by ive of 100 thousand zlotych and overdue salaries for time . They managed to cut off Valuev served under Dmitry, threatening to form a confedera- and Jelecki’s supply lines and any contact with Shuisky. tion otherwise. They promised, however, that in case of The besiegers captured some, although probably not all, danger they won’t hesitate to join forces with the Hetman. messengers sent by Muscovian leaders to the supreme Żółkiewski couldn’t pay because he lacked the necessary commander. What’s more, Polish infantry was supposed resources, although he didn’t stop influencing Zborowski to reverse the river flow in order to cut off water supplies and his subordinates informally by using his most trus- to the beleaguered51. Żółkiewski’s camp was in high spirits, ted men50. One should remember, that this matter had as it was assumed that no one should fear the relief forces coming from Mozhaysk, because Jan Piotr Sapieha’s sol- 46 J. Widekindi, op. cit, vol. VIII; P. de la Ville, p. 299; Narrative, p. diers wouldn’t let any of them through. Fortunately, the 176; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 43 et seq. Hetman didn’t succumb to such optimism and constantly 47 J. Widekindi, op. cit., vol. VIII; B.N. Floria, op. cit., p. 168, some- what differently: R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 44. 48 Początek i progres, p. 70; Letter of N.N. to N.N., camp at 51 Letter of S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at Tsaryovo-Zay- Smoleńsk 30 VI 1610, Raczyńscy Library, 139, p. 239 v. mishche 25 VI 1610, Raczyńscy Library, 33, p. 153; printed in (8–10 000); letter of J. Hrydzicz to L. Sapieha, Tsaryovo-Zay- J. U. Niemcewicz, Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III…, vol. II, p. mishche 25 VI 1610; Sztokholm, Riksarkivet Skokloster Sam- 594; letter of J. Hrydzicz to L. Sapieha, Tsaryovo-Zaymishche lingen, E 8604 (6000) 25 VI 1610; Sztokholm, Riksarkivet Skokloster Samlingen, 49 2 miles: letter of J. Hrydzicz to L. Sapieha, Tsaryovo-Zay- E 8604; Relacja spod Możajska, p. 1; letter of N.N. to N.N., camp mishche 25 VI 1610; Stockholm, Riksarkivet Skokloster Sam- at Smoleńsk 30 VI 1610, Raczyńscy Library, 139, b. 239 v.; Now- lingen, E 8604; 4 miles: S. Maskiewicz, p. 125. iny spod Smoleńska de data 28 Juny, ibid., p. 240; Początek 50 Letter of S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, half a mile from Tsary- i progres, p. 70 et seq.; S. Maskiewicz, p. 126 et seq.; Diariusz ovo-Zaymishche 22 VI 1610, Raczyńscy Library, 33, p. 152 v.; drogi, p. 152 et seq.; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 51 et seq; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 50. R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 47 et seq.

– 75 – – Przemysław Gawron –

sent forays in order to identify Shuisky’s intentions. How- about the unwillingness of their comrades to fight arm in ever, if Żółkiewski is to be trusted, after some time defeat- arm with the Russians and the possibility to aid the royal ism spread among the ranks, probably under the influence cause which, nota bene, was nothing new, as the Hetman of the news describing the size of the army at Mozhaysk. had to consider such offers in the past. This time he de- The Hetman, in turn, was accused of planning a spectac- cided to use the help and sent one of the mercenaries, ular suicide52. a Frenchmen of unknown name, with a letter written in One can assume that news of tragic position in which Latin urging to leave the enemy’s army. The messenger the beleaguered troops in Tsaryovo-Zaymishche found was captured by Horn, who ordered to have him hanged, themselves reached Mozhaysk. A war council was held but the content of the letter became publicly known and there on 1 July. It was probably then, that the decision definitely didn’t improve relations between the mercenar- to move out to Tsaryovo-Zaymishche was made and put ies and the Russians55. into effect the day after. The Russians marched fast along The Hetman summoned his colonels and rotmistrzs a high road parallel to the main road connecting Mozhaysk to a war council. According to his words, the participants and Smoleńsk. Hot weather in July led to many losses dur- proposed different solutions. Some of them feared that ing the march and extreme exhaustion among some of dividing forces and leaving the barricade at Tsaryovo-Za- the soldiers and mounts. In the village of Masłowoj Jakow ymishche weak in manpower can only help the defend- Boriatyński and Evert Horn’s units joined the main force. ers’ cause. Others, maybe from Zborowski’s regiment, The ill commander of the Frenchmen stayed behind in which had bad experience in this matter, feared that the Pohorełe Gorodiszcze along with two of his companies. Russians will use the aforementioned ostrógi strategy, On 3 July they stopped a few kilometres from the village which could lead to a quick and easy extermination of of Klushino, Russians separately from the foreigners. They the military force. That’s why they proposed to move out intended to march further on and didn’t build any fortific- against Shuisky in full force while using weaker forces to ations except for a makeshift embankment made of horse block Valuyev and Jelecki. The Hetman didn’t make any carts and wagons. It also seems as if they didn’t carry out decision during the council, however he advised his sub- any intensive reconnaissance activities53. The premises on ordinates to be ready to march out at a moment’s notice. which Russian strategy was built remain unknown, but it The underlying intention was, most of all, to keep the plan is possible, as R. Szcześniak has already done, to attempt to leave the camp a secret from the Russians. Thus, he to reconstruct it. It seems that Shuisky didn’t intend to gave the order to move out two hours before sunset. Ac- fight a decisive battle, although it cannot be ruled out cording to R. Szcześniak it was at around 6 p.m. He sent unambiguously. On the other hand, it’s very likely that he officers round without using drums or trumpets, whereas wanted to use a method which brought exceptional suc- the arrangement of the march was written down on pa- cesses to his younger brother, Mikhail Skopin. It relied on per. Cavalry companies moved out about an hour later, building a whole chain of fortified positions, which were if Maskiewicz’s account is to be trusted56. used to cut off the enemy’s supply base along with food The Polish-Lithuanian camp was to be left under the and animal feed deliveries, which led caused weakening command of rotmistrz Jakub Bobowski and manned by of their forces54. 55 Początek i progres, p. 74 et seq.; S. Maskiewicz, p. 127, where In the morning of 3 July rotmistrz Niewiadorowski vel it is mentioned about four captured Germans as a source of Niewiadomski brought several boyar sons, who stated information; M. Marchocki, p. 71, mentions two Germans; the that Dmitry Shuisky intends to crush the camp at Klushino. number of Germans is not included in Anonimowa relacja, Almost at the same time deserters from foreign units ar- p. 188; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 54 et seq.; R. Sikora, rived at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche. They informed the Hetman Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 49. 56 Letter of S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at Tsaryovo-Za- 52 Letter of J. Hrydzicz to L. Sapieha, Tsaryovo-Zaymishche 25 VI ymishche, 5 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library 33, p. 154 v; different 1610; Stockholm, Riksarkivet Skokloster Samlingen, E 8604; copy BJ 3596/II, p. 13 et seq.; printed in Pisma Stanisława Początek i progres, p. 74 Żółkiewskiego…, p. 198 et seq.; J. U. Niemcewicz, Dzieje pano- 53 P. de la Ville, p. 300; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 55 et seq.; wania Zygmunta III…, vol. II, p. 598 et seq.; Początek i progres, B.N. Floria, op. cit., p. 166. p. 75; S. Maskiewicz, p. 127; M. Marchocki, p. 72; R. Szcześniak, 54 R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 55 et seq. Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 58 et seq.; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 56.

– 76 – – The Battle of Klushino –

one cossack and eight hussar companies, totalling circa utterly convinced that the enemy is located circa 8 kilo- 700 horses, 200 infantrymen, 4 thousand Zaporozhian Cos- metres farther to the east. They almost missed them on sacks, all wagons and probably most of the camp servants. their road towards Klushino. Fortunately the sound of It was aimed at convincing the Russians that a whole army alarm trumpets from de la Gardie and Horn’s camp made is still residing inside and at the same time at speeding up them stop and prepare for battle60. the movement of the Hetman’s cavalry companies, which In the light of Jakub Filip’s etching, Boguszewicz’s paint- had a night march along a muddy and narrow forest road ing, written sources and 18th century Russian maps of the ahead of them. The Poles and Lithuanians took with them terrain, R. Sikora convincingly established that the battle- only the most necessary equipment, food supplies for two field was a flatland narrowing to the east, in the direction days and two falconets57. of Shuisky’s camp, which was located near the village of In the meantime Shuisky and his subordinates felt so Łoszczinka. Swamps and a forest in the west and two vil- confident that, as I have mentioned before, they didn’t lages with common fences, Cziernawka and Preczistoje, in fortify they camp and didn’t send out any reconnaissance the east made a corridor leading from the Poles from their units. The foreigners explained themselves by saying that positions to the enemy. Cziernawka’s location caused the they trusted the Russians, who knew the vicinity better, to Polish-Lithuanian forces to divide into two groups, which take care of this duty. What’s more, they were supposed even R. Szcześniak identified as flanks fighting the Rus- to be so full of confidence that when Jacob Pontusson de sians and the foreigners separately. A cautious analysis la Gardie in the evening of 3 July met with Shuisky, who of the etching indicates that it was true only for Marcin gave him an equivalent of 350 thousand zlotych by way Kazanowski’s regiment on the right flank. The village was of overdue payment for the soldiers, boasted that he will set on fire on the Hetman’s order61. It looks somewhat dif- repay the Hetman for the lynx fur cloak, which he received ferently in the light of Boguszewicz’s painting, in which in exchange for sable fur when Żółkiewski took him pris- the buildings of a burning village clearly divide the Pol- oner in 1602 after the fall of Valmiera58. There’s nothing ish-Lithuanian formation into two flanks. The aforemen- out of the ordinary to the fact that when Polish-Lithuanian tioned fences turned out to be a significant obstacle. The forces showed up early in the morning at the outskirts of Hetman ordered his subordinates to destroy them, how- Shuisky’s camp panic ensued, essentially crippling any ever it didn’t succeed everywhere, which is excellently battle preparations. As Maskiewicz put it, using his unique visible on Boguszewicz’s painting. It led to a situation in sense of humour, the enemies shouted ‘saddle trousers which Żółkiewski’s units on the left flank could attack us- and bring me the horse’, which clearly indicated the con- ing only narrow corridors between the fences or tried to fusion among them59. destroy them with their lances or mounts which, including Żółkiewski’s army had to traverse circa 3 miles, that is concentrated enemy fire, hampered the attack and led to between 19 and 23 kilometres. It took them all night, circa substantial losses62. 9 hours. Maskiewicz praised the local guides and men- The issue of the fighting sides’ numbers raises contro- tioned that the rear regiments fell behind too much. It versy and historians probably won’t ever be able to de- was caused by the falconets, which got stuck in the mud termine an accurate number of soldiers participating in and blocked the road. Partly, it was also the fault of the battle. As an example, we possess two newest estimates of Hetman’s reconnaissance, because the commanders were 60 S. Domaracki, p. 1; Początek i progres, p. 76; S. Maskiewicz, p. 127 et seq.; M. Marchocki, p. 72 et seq.; Anonimowa relacja, 57 Początek i progres, p. 75 n.; S. Maskiewicz, p. 127; R. Szcześ- p. 188; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 72 et seq.; R. Sikora, niak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 60, mentions 700 cavalrymen, 800 in- Kłuszyn 1610…, p.81 et seq. fantrymen and 3 thousand Zaporozhian Cossacks; R. Sikora 61 R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 82 et seq.; a traditional, different Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 57 n. mentions the same numbers as pre- from Sikora’s, description of the battlefield, see R Szcześniak, sent in the main text. Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 83, who, however, didn’t take into account 58 Początek i progres, p. 76; H. Brereton, p. 142; R. Szcześniak, neither the etching nor Boguszewicz’s paining. Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 58; L. Podhorodecki, Stanisław Żółkiew- 62 S. Domaracki, p. 2; Początek i progres, p. 76; S. Maskiewicz, ski…, p. 168 p. 128.; M. Marchocki, p. 73.; Anonimowa relacja, p. 189; 59 S. Maskiewicz, p.128, see also: H. Brereton, p. 142; P. de la Ville, R. Szcześniak,­ Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 74.; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 300. p. 83.

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the Polish-Lithuanian forces. R. Szcześniak relied on, sim- ovo-Zaymishche which came from the Smoleńsk camp ilarly to most historians, on a financial register, Komput za- and were omitted by Sikora. After all their authors could służonego wojsku moskiewskiemu stołecznemu, estimating have access to the reports send by the Hetman to the the number of people entitled to a donative given by vir- king and the Crown’s dignitaries. An anonymous author tue of the Klushino victory at 5556 hussars, 290 petyhorcy of a letter dated 30 June estimated that the Hetman has, (TN: medium-armoured cavalry), 679 Cossack cavalry and excluding Moscow and the foreigners, 12 thousand men, 200 footsoldiers, and later adding 400 Zaporozhian Cos- including 5000 hussars at his disposal. After subtracting sacks which amounted to a total of 7 thousand soldiers63. units at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche it would amount to 7000 R. Sikora contested the above method of calculation by men at Klushino67. Another anonymous letter states that pointing out that the aforementioned document lists only after the battle the victorious camp had 5000 hussars. Jan financial entries, without including blind portions and Zawadzki wrote about 5500 hussars who left the camp at losses suffered before the battle. Additionally he assumed, Smoleńsk with Żółkiewski. On 3 July he also estimated alluded by the title, that the calculation didn’t regard the his force at over a dozen thousand men. To be fair, a cor- Klushino army but the military stationed in Moscow 1612. respondent of Stefan Zadorny in Vilnius mentioned 3000 An analysis of the data provided by the participants of the hussars, 7000 Cossacks and 1000 infantrymen. It would battle implicates that Żółkiewski had between 2700 and near the number of heavy cavalry to the level proposed 4000 soldiers at his disposal. Basing on that information, by Sikora, whereas Giovanni Luna said about 4000 hussars the first number is much more probable, as it was told by and 500 infantrymen68. Samuel Maskiewicz, especially since Jakub Filip’s etching The question arises, whether the authors who parti- shows similar numbers64. cipated in the battle gave in to the temptation to blow up However, this line of reasoning contains significant the size of the victory by diminishing the size of their own errors. First of all, the term ‘the capital’s army’ was used forces and increasing the enemy numbers. For example, in the second decade of the 17th century was used to de- Samuel Maskiewicz said that 2700 Poles and Lithuanians scribe the crew at Kremlin, which entered it along with fought against 50 thousand enemy soldiers and additional Żółkiewski and later served under Aleksander Gosiewski 20 thousand Russian peasants gathered for building up until the forming of the on 27 January fortifications69. Moreover, it’s difficult to completely be- 1612 and leaving Moscow. Therefore, these would be the lieve a later note written by king John Sobieski who was units from Klushino and Tsaryovo-Zaymishche65. One can supposed to refer to a family tradition, which also could have understandable doubts pertaining to the credibil- have fallen victim to the aforementioned phenomena. ity of the calculation, because the confederates overes- To conclude, determining the number of soldiers serving timated the numerical strength of the units by including under the Hetman requires additional research, although people who found themselves among their ranks after Sikora’s remarks, concerning the differences between the 6 July 1610. It also includes units, which didn’t fight at financial calculation and the real size of the unit, must be Klushino. Nevertheless, it mustn’t be rejected as a whole. taken into account. Secondly, not all accounts from the Hetman’s camp The organisation of the Polish-Lithuanian army, recon­ indicate numbers as low as the authors quoted by Sikora structed by Sikora, based on the etching seems much do. On 25 June Jan Hrydzicz estimated them at circa 10 thousand. Excluding forces left at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche 67 Letter of N.N. to N.N., camp at Smoleńsk 30 VI 1610, Raczyńscy the Hetman would have circa 5000 soldiers at his dis- Library, 139, p. 239 v. posal66. Also, there’s no reason to reject en bloc relations 68 Letter of N.N. to N.N., camp at Smoleńsk 11 VII 1610, Raczyń- concerning the strength of Żółkiewski’s forces at Tsary- scy Library. 139, p. 376; letter of J. Zawadzki to S. Rudnicki, camp at Smoleńsk 3 VII 1610, B.Czart. 342, p. 753, copy in 63 Jagiellonian Library 160/51, p. 92; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn B. Czart. 105, p. 179; letter of N.N. to S. Zadorski, Vilnius 7 VII 1610…, p. 60. 1610, ibid, 342, p. 757; letter of G. Luna do N.N., camp at Smo- 64 R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 58 et seq. leńsk 17 VII 1610, and in A. Sajkowski, W stronę Wiednia. Dole 65 T. Bohun, Moskwa 1612, Warsaw 2005, p. 168 et seq. i niedole wojenne w świetle listów i pamiętników, Poznań 1984, 66 Letter of J. Hrydzicz to L. Sapieha, Tsaryovo-Zaymishche 25 VI p. 355 (hereinafter: G. Luna). 1610; Stockholm, Riksarkivet Skokloster Samlingen, E 8604; 69 S. Maskiewicz, p. 127.

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more plausible. It was supposed to be composed of 5 regi- Hetman Żółkiewski mentions two numbers: 30 thousand ments: Stanisław Żółkiewski’s (5 hussar companies, 1 pety- in a letter to the king dated 5 July and 10 thousand more in horcy, 1 Ccossack, 1 infantry – nominally 1180 mounts); Początek i progres R. Sikora explains this by the fact he re- the starost of Chmielnice, Mikołaj Struś’s (3 hussar com- ceived information from Shuisky several months after the panies, 1 cossack, 1 infantry – nominally 600 people); Mar- battle. It would be equally probable that the Hetman blew cin Kazanowski’s (3 hussar companies, 2 cossack – nom- up the number of enemies in order to increase the size of inally 550); Ludwik Weiher’s, led by Samuel Dunikowski his success. One should have in mind what was the aim (3 hussar companies, nominally 300 mounts); Aleksander of his memoirs73. Thirdly, as the aforementioned historian Zborowski’s (9 hussar companies, nominally 1400 mounts) has noticed, the farther an author of a source was located and Wysokiński’s cossack company belonging to an un- from the battle, the lower were the numbers he provided. known regiment70. For example, Budziło wrote about 16 thousand, whereas Sikora, basing on Jakub Filip’s etching, the English Luna about 15 thousand. Maskiewicz quoted data similar accounts of the battle, Widekind’s chronicle and histor- to those of the Hetman74. ian’s research – Daniel Staberg from Sweden and Michał R. Szcześniak assumed that 30 thousand Muscovian sol- Paradowski from Poland – determined in a believable way diers and circa 10 thousand peasants fought at Klushino, the numbers and formation of foreign forces serving un- so he stood by the numbers provided by the Hetman and der the Russians. Seven Reiter regiments (led by Samual tried to reconcile them. R. Sikora, on the other hand, as- Colbrone, Pierre de la Ville, Evert Horn, Johann Jost von sumed that the camp was most probably manned by 15 Quarnhemb, Posse and Glazeraby) and three infantry re- thousand soldiers and the same number of camp servants. giments (nominally led by Samuel Colbrone, Reinhold He mostly relied on clues left by Luna and Bereton. In the Taube and Johann Conrad Linck von Thurnburg) would light of Targowski’s data, this number seems to be a little total 1830 cavalry, 1500 infantry and 4 cannons. It differs more probable, but it’s difficult to solve this problem def- from the numbers given by Żółkiewski both in the letter initely without researching the sources more extensively75. to the king from 5 July and Początek i progres, which con- Apart from the accepted set of numbers, one can easily tained respectively 5 and 8 thousand soldiers. It indicates notice that the Russian side had a large numerical advant- the tendency to increase the enemy numbers by the Het- age, although its exact size is a matter of dispute. However, man. Priest Kulesza wrote about 4 thousand ‘excellent there were several factors which acted in favour of the Pol- men’71. ish-Lithuanian side. Primo, as the Hetman briefly put it in In regard to the Russian army, the problem lies in the his speech given to the troops, referring to ancient times: fact, that there are no known Russian sources which ‘neccesitas in loco, spes in virtute, salus in victoria.’76 The contain information pertaining to its numerical strength, Polish-Lithuanian army, having the Russians Valuev and whereas the numbers given by their allies and enemies Jelecki behind them, couldn’t, in fact, fight in a different are highly unbelievable. There are several phenomena place. A defeat would condemn them to a fate similar to at play here. The first one consisted in underestimating the one, which the False Dmitry’s soldiers experienced Shuisky’s forces, maybe because of the victorious fight at when retreating from Volok. Of 1500 men only 1/5 sur- Tsaryovo-Zaymishche and involved mainly the Smoleńsk 1610, ibid, p. 1233 (8 thousand) camp. They were estimated to consist of between 8 and 10 73 Letter of S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at Tsaryovo-Zay- thousand Russian soldiers, although one should remem- mishche 5 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library. 33, p. 154 v; different ber that some part of the army reached Shuisky just before copy in Jagiellonian Library 3596/II, p. 13 et seq., printed in the battle, so these early estimations should be related to Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego…, p. 198 et seq.; J. U. Niem- the situation during the last ten days of June72. Secondly, cewicz, Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III, króla…, vol. II, p. 598 et seq.; Początek i progres, p. 77; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, 70 R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 59 et seq. p. 75. 71 Ibid, p. 65 et seq.; P. Kulesza, p. 155; differently: R. Szcześniak, 74 J. Budziło, p. 100; G. Luna, p. 356; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 43, who deemed the number of 8.000 fore- p. 74. igners believable. 75 R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 43; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 72 Letter of S. Targowski to S. Rudnicki, camp at Smoleńsk 26 VI 1610…, p. 74 et seq. 1610, B. Czart. 1630, p. 1229 (10 000); camp at Smoleńsk 3 VII 76 Początek i progres, p. 77.

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vived77. Only bravery could achieve this victory, thus the de la Gardie or Horn great leaders. Additionally, they didn’t soldier’s determination rose to a widely seen level. The have any influence over the Russians79. Russians didn’t really intend to die for an unpopular tsar, The Hetman surprised his enemy, but because of ter- whereas the mercenaries fought as long as it made sense rain conditions, especially the aforementioned fences (or from a purely rational, military standpoint. rather – a fence) and village buildings and the late-com- Secundo, only the foreigners could stand up to the Het- ing reinforcements, he wasn’t able to fully take advant- man’s subordinates when it comes to military training and age of his success. Just as the etching shows, he placed experience. In the past most of the soldiers served either Kazanowski’s regiment on the right flank. It was to attack in the ‘quarter army’ (‘wojsko kwarciane’) or in Livonia, or in the corridor between Cziernawka and a small forest, in False Dmitry’s army. One can’t exclude that they lived however the fence was located also in front of his posi- through all of these experiences. The Russian army was tions. Zborowski’s regiment stood farther to the left and composed of noble host and half-professional marksmen had Cziernawka on its right side. The location of the village used to overly common defeats throughout the last dec- isn’t as obvious as R. Sikora would want it to be, because ade. That’s why the ‘ostrógi’ strategy was implemented on Boguszewicz’s paining, the village had been located ex- and brought success, but it couldn’t be used this time78. actly in the middle of the Crown’s forces, dividing it into Tertio, Shuisky’s units were troubled with the lack of two parts, which is more consistent with the description trust and communication issues between the mercenar- from Początek i progres. The Hetman’s regiment, com- ies and the Russians themselves, The assumed formation manded by Janusz Porycki, took the middle and in the implies that both armies were to fight almost separately. back, between Zborowski and Porycki was Wejher’s regi- Unpaid foreigners who deserted and switched to the Pol- ment. The left flank was occupied by Struś’s regiment. Its ish side resulted in rising distrust among the Russians, left edge was taken by a unit of Cossacks from Pohreby- whereas the low level of training among the filled shche, a domain of the Zbaraski princely family, thus the their allies with concern, especially since neglecting their Hetman called those soldiers ‘Pohrebyshchans’. This flank duties, as was the case with the aforementioned recon- was covered by swamp and forest80. The Hetman gave naissance, led to serious danger. It also concerned the a short speech. It limited itself to the aforementioned foreigners. Englishmen looked wryly on the Flanders and quote, which gave the signal to begin the battle. Frenchmen and all of them feared the Swedes and Fins. The matter of who was it exactly that the hussar com- Last but not least, the Poles and Lithuanians could trust panies had struck remains controversial to this day. De- the experience and responsibility of their officers, start- termining this aspect is vital to the correct reconstruc- ing from the Hetman, who lived through over thirty years tion of the events of the battle, especially the problem of exceptional service and several meaningful victories, of ‘treason’ committed by the mercenaries, or rather the although – as we tend to forget – Klushino was the first Russians, Traditional descriptions, which can be found, big battle which Żółkiewski commanded. The colonels, for example, in R. Szcześniak’s work were mainly based rotmistrzs and also had significant battle ex- on Początek i progres and Marchocki’s journal. It assumes perience. At the same time Shuisky didn’t display a great that Russians took the left flank of the formation, whereas military talent. His previous achievements, including the the foreigners took the right and both sides clashed with, battle of Bolchowo (10–11 May 1608) didn’t exactly im- respectively, Zborowski’s and Struś’s regiments81. How- bue with optimism. The question remained whether the active list, chosen according to the rules of mestnichestvo 79 See also: R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 60 et seq.; A.G. Prze- (Russian system of seniority derived from feudal hierarchy) piórka, od Staroduba do Moskwy…, p. 113 et seq. instead of military skill, could stand up to the enemy. It 80 Letter S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at Tsaryovo-Zay- didn’t, however, concern the mercenaries who had exper- mishche, 5 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library. 33, p. 154 v; different ienced officers in abundance, although it’s difficult to call copy in Jagiellonian Library 3596/II, p. 13 et seq., printed in Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego…, p. 198 et seq.; J. U. Niem- cewicz, Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III…, vol. II, p. 598 et seq.; 77 M. Marchocki, p. 70. Początek i progres, p. 76 et seq.; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 83 78 About Russian army cf. R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 66 et et seq. seq. 81 Początek i progres, p. 77; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 75.

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ever, this theory is incompatible on many different levels On the far-right flank the Cossack company (or com- with iconographic depictions. Let’s begin with Filip’s etch- panies), previously commanded by either Spodwiłowski ing, the basis of R. Sikora’s reconstruction. According to or Zylicki, both killed at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche, struck it, Shuisky’s army formation took the shape not of a line, a foreign infantry unit, probably English and Dutch, led but rather a ‘stairstep’. Foreigners were located in the front by Samuel Colbrone, because Taube was positioned on lines on both flanks. They were spread from Cziernawka the left flank and Linck didn’t take part in the battle 84. It as far as the forest and swamplands, totalling, as Sikora means that at this section a clash with Russian forces was thinks, 5 infantry companies from Taube’s regiment and 10 possible only after breaking through the infantry, about cavalry units. However, the main bulk of Muscovian forces which the sources remain silent. Whereas Marchocki’s ac- formed two lines and stayed somewhat in the back. In this count indicates that some companies from Zborowski’s light Zborowski’s main assault marched to clash with the regiment stumbled upon companies of boyar children and foreign cavalry, rather than the Muscovian one. The latter forced them into retreat swiftly. It is possible, however, that could only be targeted by the most far-right units of this Teofil Szemberg was right and the front line was taken by regiment and a much weaker formation commanded by Kazanowski’s units, as depicted on the etching based on Kazanowski. Similarly, the heroic assault by the hussars, his drawing85. as depicted by Maskiewicz, would have been fought with The sight of Russian army retreating unexpectedly the Reiters and not boyar cavalry (‘jazda pomiestna’)82. quickly from the battlefield dominates English and It is not, however, entirely consistent with Boguszewicz’s Swedish accounts. Brereton stated that the whole Rus- painting, which, as I have mentioned, locates Cziernawka sian army uncovered the allied flank when they suddenly in the middle of the Polish-Lithuanian forces’ position. Ad- started escaping despite being ‘out of danger’. In a similar ditionally it places foreign infantry in front of Żółkiewski’s fashion, the author of Narrative said that the Russian re- far-right flank, and although it’s nowhere to be seen in treat began even before they experienced any attacks and Filip’s etching, it would be consistent with Anonimowa described it as an ‘outward cowardice’. Also Widekind ac- relacja. What’s more, in the front line opposite the infantry cused the Russians of not helping the mercenaries under were not the hussars but the cossack cavalry, which would attack86. These accounts are coherent with Budziła’s rela- mean that in this section the cavalry also had to break tion, who clearly stated that the Muscovians stood in the through infantry in order to fight the enemy cavalry, Rus- second line and ran away from the battlefield instead of sian in this case. On the other hand, what’s really import- helping the foreigners. Other Polish-Lithuanian sources in- ant is that the painting clearly indicates, similarly to the dicate that the Russian resistance was, at most, weak and etching, that Zborowski’s hussars attacked the Reiters and concentrated on fighting ‘the Germans’87. In these light the not the boyar cavalry. accusations made by the Russian side, as if treason com- Let’s try to reconstruct the course of events. A sturdy, mitted by some, especially Evert Horn’s regiment, or all oaken fence, partly destroyed by Żółkiewski’s units, maybe mercenary soldiers contributed to the defeat, unless we also by the Russians on the previous day, makes it signific- relate them only to the last part of the battle, which will antly harder for the attackers to carry out the assault. The be discussed in a moment88. However Shuisky and some gaps had, at most, 10–15 metres, usually less. It made it of his subordinates found shelter in the camp, where they possible for a formation less than 10 horses wide to attack. still had some role to play out89. Charging directly at the fence threatened the hussars with loosing speed, weapons (lances), mounts or even their 84 R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 93. own health or lives. On the other hand, attacking through 85 M. Marchocki, p. 73; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 101; B.N. Flo- the breaches helped the enemy infantry and cavalry con- ria, op. cit. p. 167. centrate fire and increase accuracy. The Hetman and his 86 H. Brereton, p. 143; Narrative, p. 178; J. Widekindi, op.cit., vol. people, however, didn’t have a choice83. 9. 87 J. Budziło, p. 100; Początek i progres, p. 78; Relacja spod Możaj- ska, p. 2 82 .Anonimowa relacja, p. 189; see also: R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, 88 Novyz letopisets, p. 97 et seq.; Rukopis Filareta, p. 29; p. 85 et seq. and p. 93. S. A Belokurov, vol. 2, pp. 18, 55; B.N. Floria, op. cit., p. 167 83 M. Marchocki, p. 73; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 94 et seq. 89 Ibid., p. 167; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 103 et seq.

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On the Polish left flank the companies from Struś’s regi- A situation described in an entirely different way by ment struck Taube’s infantry regiment, which had 400 men the Lithuanian and the Englishman also happened here. and an unspecified number of companies from Colbrone’s Samuel Maskiewicz saw the reasons of this unexpected regiment. The hussars charged through gaps in the fence success in a failed attack of two Reiter units (‘kornety’), under musketeer fire, who were so close that they ‘almost which tried the caracole after the first line’s volley. The hus- stabbed their muskets our [hussars’] bodies’, and suffer- sars used this in their advantage, attacking in full speed ing heavy losses in men and mounts. Struś’s company and meddling the enemy’s formation. It was probably had 2 men killed and 9 wounded and 22 horses killed, 9 this situation, which the author of Narrative described as wounded and one missing in action. It took about three a treason of six hundred Frenchmen, who switched sides hours but finally the infantry arrived with two falconets. and attacked their former brothers in arms. It supposedly They managed to widen the breaches and inflict some happened after de la Gardie and Horn escaped the bat- damage to enemy footsoldiers, which allowed Polish in- tlefield. Interestingly, no Polish source confirms such situ- fantry to rout Taube’s soldiers, who escaped to the forest, ation. On the contrary, some emphasize French bravery, whereas the hussars stumbled upon Reiter companies whereas accusations of treason hurt also the Englishmen fighting in the centre90. and Scots, as it was mentioned before92. In the middle of the battlefield most companies from Either way, the resistance continued. According to Nar- Zborowski’s regiment struck Horn’s regiment composed rative the Englishmen charged four more times. There were of his, Posse’s and Quarnhemb’s units. Right next to it only 1200–1400 Scots, Englishmen, Germans, Swedes and the Hetman’s regiment attack de la Ville’s Frenchmen, Fins left on the battlefield, who were ultimately attacked Glazerabi’s Flamands and later on six English compan- by the hussars from Struś’s regiment and pushed back into ies. However, the etching is partly in conflict with Narrat- the camp. The whole clash took circa 3–4 hours and took ive and Brereton’s account. Most of all, the Englishmen a heavy toll on the Englishmen. According to Narrative, out were located in the third line, behind the Flamands and of 80 men only 12 survived and out of six company com- four French regiments, close to de la Gardie’s position. manders one was killed in battle, two died from wounds, Thus, it’s difficult to imagine them going into battle right one wounded in the head survived and only one, Captain after the Fins, which is clearly stated in both accounts. Al- Crale, managed to escape unscathed, although his unit though Luna accused them of passiveness, it should be didn’t have the same fortune93. emphasized that they fought bravely. They charged three Some Polish-Lithuanian cavalry companies rode times, repulsing Polish attacks. It was probably this sec- through both camps in pursuit of the escapees, namely: tion that witnessed the events so masterfully described the Hetman’s, Jan Daniłowicz’s, Bałaban’s and Herburt’s by Maskiewicz, when hussar companies couldn’t break and from the left flank Struś’s Firlej Dunikowski’s and Kopy- through the enemy and thus attacked 8–10 times. The ciński’s94. At the same time the Hetman declared that the Hetman himself was impressed by their bravery. Not until battle was won and left to attend mass said by a Jesuit, Zborowski’s companies attacked, was it possible to break priest Piotr Kulesza95. In the meantime armed units began through the enemy and force de la Gardie and Horn to re- 92 treat91. S. Maskiewicz, p. 129 et seq.; Narrative, p. 178; R. Sikora, Kłu- szyn 1610…, p. 103 et seq. thinks that Maskiewicz described the final, seventh attack of the Englishmen; praise of the 90 Początek i progres, p. 78; Relacja z diariusza, p. 158; see: Ano- Frenchmen: letter of S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at nimowa relacja, p. 189; Wiadomość, p. 177 one could deduce Tsaryovo-Zaymishche 5 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library, 33, p. 154 from it, that it was the hussars, who broke through infantry v; different copy Jagiellonian Library 3596/II, p. 13 et seq., lines; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p.94 et seq. printed in Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego…, p. 198 et seq.; 91 Wiadomości z Moskwy [17 VII 1610], B.Czart. 105, p. 215; S. Ma- J. U. Niemcewicz, Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III…, vol. II, skiewicz, p. 128 et seq.; M. Marchocki, p. 73; G. Luna, p. 356; p. 598 et seq. Anonimowa relacja, p. 190; H. Brereton, p. 143; Narrative, 93 Narrative, p. 179; Wiadomość, p. 177; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 178; Rukopis Filareta, p. 29, mentions that on the Russian p. 118. side Horn’s regiment was first to enter battle with de la 94 Anonimowa relacja, p. 190; S. Domaracki, p. 2; R. Sikora, Kłu- Gardie’s and Andriej Golicyn’s regiments following soon after; szyn 1610…, p. 106. R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p.88 et seq. 95 P. Kulesza, p. 155; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 106.

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to gather once more in the foreign camp. Shuisky tried to Afterwards the royal army, despite its losses and general make contact with them by sending Gavrilo Grigorievich fatigue, moved out to Tsaryovo-Zaymishche, fearing that Pushkin, a falconer and proud esquire, along with Mikhail during their non-presence Valuev and Jelecki could take Fyodorovich Babarykin. Żółkiewski noticed the imminent offensive measures and break away from the siege, taking danger in time to gather some of the companies and pre- advantage of the absence of the bigger part of Żółkiewski’s pare for further struggle. In one section Andrzej Firlej’s hus- forces. It turned out that these concerns were unsound. sar company broke through German formation protected The Russians didn’t take any action because they weren’t by kobylice (TN: a kind of wooden palisade), which con- even aware of the Hetman’s expedition to Klushino. Dur- vinced the latter of Żółkiewski’s determination96. ing the return march the Hetman ordered to place some During their commanders’ absence they sent a nego- of the wounded in his carriage and the rest on stretchers tiation proposal to the Hetman. Żółkiewski eagerly took between two horses98. their offer by sending his nephew Adam Żółkiewski and The commanders of foreign troops found themselves in Piotr Borkowski. In exchange for surrendering the camp he great trouble. It was especially the case with de la Gardie proposed the possibility to join the royal side while retain- who was almost killed by English soldiers accusing him ing their current pay and those who didn’t want to serve of seizing money reserved for them. He managed to es- under Polish-Lithuanian banners were offered free pas- cape alive and, along with Horn and Swedish and Finnish sage to their homeland. The mercenaries, exhausted by mercenaries, went to Pohorołe Gorodiszcze, where sick more than a dozen hour long battle, lacking the support de la Ville could be found. The mercenaries’ commander of not only the Moscals but also their own units, such as promised the Hetman that he won’t fight in Moscow and Finck’s regiment, didn’t see much sense in spilling blood at the same time stated that he doesn’t want to return to for the tsar anymore. The efforts of Shuisky’s envoys and Sweden, rather than travel to the Netherlands. He kept his de la Gardie and Horne, who by that time returned to the word only halfway. He didn’t fight against the royal army camp, were all for nothing. The foreigners surrendered to in Moscow anymore but participated in the campaigns Żółkiewski, pledging either loyal service or never to fight against the Moscals side by side with Gustav II Adolf’s against the king, especially in Moscow. When he got word Swedes and in 1616 was one of the negotiators of the of it, Shuisky and his men escaped from the camp. On their Swedish-Russian truce99. way they threw around valuable trinkets in order to slow The Polish side paid a high price for their victory. down the chase. Despite that the Russian commander ar- Sources differ in regard to the size of their losses. The Het- rived at Mozhaysk on a worn-out nag and without shoes. man himself estimated them to be circa 100 companions. From there he quickly escaped to Moscow. Pushkin man- Different registers of killed and wounded gave numbers aged to elude the foreigners through the swamplands and ranging from 180 to 300 people killed and wounded out of forests and reached Mozhaysk, whereas Babarykin was all types of soldiers, and over a thousand horses. R. Sikora captured and handed over to Żółkiewski. The decision to assessed, also based on registers of killed and wounded, surrender the camp and join the royal side let the Russians that it would be circa 80 killed and 100 wounded. As to the shape the accusation of treason because, in their percep- horses – respectively 200 killed and as much wounded100. tion, they still had a chance to achieve victory. It’s hard to ton, p. 144; Narrative, p. 180; J. Widekindi, op. cit., vol. 10; blame the mercenaries for not wanting to die for an unreli- S. A. Belokurov, vol. 2, p. 55; K. Bussow, p. 301; B.N. Floria, op. able ‘employer’, whose units left the battlefield first97. cit., p. 168. 98 Początek i progres, p. 80; S. Maskiewicz, p. 131; R. Szcześniak, 96 S. A. Belokurov, kniga 2, p. 55; M. Marchocki, p. 73, annotation Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 116 et seq. 1; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 106 et seq. 99 Letter of S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at Tsaryovo-Za- 97 Letter of S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at Tsaryovo-Zay- ymishche, 5 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library, 33, p. 154 v; different mishche 5 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library, 33, p. 154 v; different copy Jagiellonian Library 3596/II, p. 13 et seq., printed in Pis- copy Jagiellonian Library 3596/II, p. 13 et seq.; printed in ma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego…, p. 198 et seq.; J. U. Niemce- Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego…, p. 198 et seq.; J. U. Niem- wicz, Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III…, vol. II, p. 598 et seq.; cewicz, Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III…, vol. II, p. 598 et seq.; Anonimowa relacja, p. 192; B.N. Floria, op. cit., p. 167. S. Domaracki, p. 2; Początek i progres, p. 78 et seq.; S. Maskie- 100 Początek i progres, p. 79; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 109 wicz, p.130 et seq.; Anonimowa relacja, p. 190 et seq.; H. Brere- et seq.; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 117.

– 83 – – Przemysław Gawron –

When it comes to estimating Russian losses the differences The second factor, which in my opinion decided about were even larger, because numbers provided ranged from the victory, was the training and determination of the 2 to 15 thousand soldiers, mainly killed during the chase, Hetman’s subordinates. It was even more striking when because, as we remember, Russian participation in the compared with both the passive behaviour, or even cow- battle was rather insignificant. Among the killed was, inter ardice, of the bigger part of Russian units, and the cold alia, Jakov Boriatyński, wheras Vasili Buturlin and Jakov calculation of the mercenaries who surrendered after Diemidov were taken prisoner. The losses among foreign- coming to the conclusion that further struggle is futile. ers are estimated to be between 100 and 2 thousand men. Żółkiewski played a large role in it. He convinced his sol- Both of these numbers aren’t really believable, especially if diers to fight in circumstances when defeat would doom we take into account the aforementioned English losses101. them. Surprising the enemy, the bravery and battle skills The Polish-Lithuanian side captured several dozens ban- of the Polish-Lithuanian cavalry and the enemy’s attitude ners, including the ones belonging to Shuisky and Bu- minimized the negative effects of insufficient reconnais- turlin, 11 cannons, the sabre, helmet and buława (TN: ce- sance, which didn’t take notice of the Russians’ different remonial mace) of the Russian supreme commander and position and led to laying battle in a largely unfavourable goods intended as payment for the mercenaries, valued at spot (fences, farm buildings). 20 thousand roubles102. The success wouldn’t be possible if not for the over-con- While analysing the operation and battle of Klushino, fidence of the opposing side, which neglected proper camp one should, first of all, take notice of the speed at which the fortifications and didn’t send forays. It led to a situation in Polish-Lithuanian side acted, beginning with the march which de la Gardie was almost captured in his own tent103, towards Bely, through the assault at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche whereas battle preparations were conducted in chaos and up until the night march towards Klushino. Thanks to both general confusion. One can also assume that the shock the speed and a tendency for risky but well-thought man- lowered the morale and contributed to a bad attitude, es- oeuvres, such as dividing the troops, the secret march pecially among the Russians. It should be also noted that from Tsaryovo-Zaymishche and the night march along the defeated side accused each other of treason: the Rus- a muddy road through the forest, Żółkiewski managed to sians blamed everyone or only Evert Horn’s Swedes and surprise the enemy, forcing him into changing the estab- Fins, Frenchmen blamed the English and Scots, and they lished strategy and accepting battle in the field. It didn’t repaid with the same. let the Russians use their existing strategy of exterminating The victory at Klushino didn’t, however, end the war. enemy forces by means of a long-term blockade, which al- Valuev and Jelecki surrendered not long after the battle. lowed them to defeat the False Dmitry’s army earlier. Ad- With Żółkiewski’s approval, they sent envoys to Klushino ditionally, as one can presume, Shuisky’s battle order was in order to confirm news they received, as if the relief was caused by confusion and surprise, because, probably, the truly defeated. One of the conditions of the truce was an foreigners took positions earlier and were ordered to pro- oath to Władysław IV Vasa and the obligation that when tect the Russians while they assumed formation. Thanks Smoleńsk surrenders to the prince, Sigismund III will to it, and the surprising behaviour of the Russians, out- withdraw from besieging it104. On 12 July a group of 300 numbered Poles and Lithuanians indeed engaged more Spaniards, Englishmen, Scots, Germans and Frenchmen, soldiers than the enemy and achieved higher ground be- who surrendered to the king, reached the camp. It was cause mainly mercenaries took part in the battle. a living testimony of the victory105. Five days later, a ce- remony was held in the royal camp. The Hetman’s and 101 R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 109; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn the army’s envoys – Adam Żółkiewski and Mikołaj Struś 1610…, p.117 et seq. – presented both Shuisky’s banner and buława and the 102 Letter of S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at Tsaryovo-Zay- postulates of the victorious army: the request for quarterly mishche, 5 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library. 33, p. 154 v; different pay, payment of overdue salaries, compensations for the copy Jagiellonian Library 3596/II, p. 13 et seq., printed in Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego…, p. 198 et seq.; J. U. Niem- 103 P. de la Ville, p. 300. cewicz, Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III…, vol. II, p. 598 et seq.; 104 W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 199 et seq. R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 110 writes about as much as 105 Letter of A. Bobola to S. Rudnicki, camp at Smoleńsk 12 VII 18 cannons. 1610, B. Czart. 1631, p. 539.

– 84 – – The Battle of Klushino –

injured and wounded and the bestowment of office pos- in exchange for the fulfilling the requests of changing the itions. The Russians, headed by Jelecki, presented them- religion and keeping the Muscovian state integral. Despite selves to the king, and were answered by the Chancellor never having the agreement accepted by Sigismund III, in of Lithuania Lew Sapieha, along with the foreign soldiers. October the Hetman brought in the military into the cap- The Vice-Chancellor of the Crown Szczęsny Kryski spoke ital in order to protect it from foreign armies. It seemed as for the king. Nevertheless, the senate council on 24 July the war was won108. proved that fulfilling the army’s requests will be very diffi- However in the next two years everything came crash- cult because of an empty treasury106. ing down as a house of cards. The king didn’t manage to In the meantime events occurred with great speed. The find a common ground with the boyars, an uprising broke Hetman planned to cooperate with Jan Piotr Sapieha’s out in Moscow, which provoked the Kremlin garrison com- army which, after Klushino, began an offensive against Mo- mander Aleksander Gosiewski to burn the city. The re- scow but were stopped by the Crimean Tatars in mid-July. bellion overtook whole Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian They were commanded by Bata Gerej and Khan Temir, treasury was empty. Unpaid soldiers from Moscow formed who – on Shuisky’s request – struck the False Dmitry’s a confederation and left Russia. Jan Karol Chodkiewicz, forces and set camp (‘kosz’) at Serpukhov107. It turned out, who replaced the bitter Żółkiewski, tried the best he could however, that Vasili Shuisky doesn’t possess significant to deliver supplies to the Polish garrison in Kremlin but armies anymore. He was abolished on 27 July. No one was the attempts taken in September 1612 ended in a fiasco. appointed in his place and the boyars took power. They The soldiers surrendered on 6 November, when the began negotiations with Żółkiewski, fearing him less than royal army marching to relieve them was at the False Dmitry. A treaty was signed on 27 August. The Het- River. On 3 March 1613 the Zemsky Sobor chose Mikhail man secured the right to appoint the prince as the tsar Feodorovich Romanov as the new tsar, therefore cancel- ling the election of Władysław Sigismund Vasa. The war lasted until the end of 1618. At that time the stake was 106 Letter of J. Zadzik to W. Gembicki, camp at Smoleńsk 17 VII 1610, 24 VII 1610, Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Extranea IX Polen, only control over Smoleńsk, captured in June 1611. The 105; letter of S. Targowski to S. Rudnicki, camp at Smoleńsk truce of Deulino gave it to the Commonwealth, thus end- 17 VII 1610, B.Czart. 1630, p. 1287; Diariusz drogi, p. 165; the ing the Vasas’ dream about reigning over Russia. Therefore army’s financial demands were known a few days earlier, cf. Klushino joined the gallery of beautiful but untapped vic- letter of A. Bobola to S. Rudnicki, camp at Smoleńsk12 VII tories, where it takes a prominent spot next to similar 17th 1610, B. Czart. 1631, p. 539. century battles, such as Kircholm or Vienna. 107 S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, the same month, after 16 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library 33, p. 157 v; Wiadomości spod Możaj- ska, p. 3; S. A. Belokurov, vol. 2, p. 55; W. Polak, O Kreml i Smo- leńszczyznę…, p. 200 et seq. 108 W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 204 et seq.

Bibliography Primary sources Diariusz drogi Krola Jmci Zygmunta III od szczęśliwego wyjazdu The Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw (AGAD) z Wilna pod Smoleńsk w roku 1609 a die 18 Augusta i fortun- The Jagiellonian Library nego powodzenia przez lat dwie do wzięcia zamku Smoleńska The Princes Czartoryski Library (B. Czart.) w roku 1611, ed. J. Byliński, Wrocław 1999 The Raczyńscy Library ‘Krótka powieść o tem, co się zdarzyło na Moskwie od panowania Iwa- University of Warsaw Library (BUW) na III do Szujskiego r. 1611. Przez Piotra de la Ville sieur de Domba- Swedish National Archives (Riksarkivet Skoklostersamlingen) sle’, in Skarbiec historii polskiej, vol. I, ed. K. Sienkiewicz, Paryż 1839 Letter from P. Kulesza SJ to N.N., from the camp at Tsaryovo 5 VII Moskwa w rękach Polaków. Pamiętniki dowódców i oficerów gar- 1610, P. Kulesza SJ to N.N., from the camp at Tsaryovo 5 VII, nizonu polskiego w Moskwie w latach 1610–1612, ed. M. Kuba- in Kwartalnik Historyczny, 1921, vol. 14 la, T. Ściężor, Cracow 2005

– 85 – ‘Novyy letopisets’, in Polnoye Sobranyye russkikh letopisey, 1910, B. N. Floria, Polsko-litovskaya intervenciya w Rossii i russkoye vol. XIV obstshestvo, Moscow 2005 Pamiętniki Samuela i Bogusława Kazimierza Maskiewiczow, M. Karamzin, Historia państwa rosyjskiego, transl. by G. Buczyń- ed. A. Sajkowski, Wrocław 1961 ski, vol. XII, Warsaw 1830 Pisma Stanisława Żołkiewskiego, kanclerza koronnego i hetmana, M. Kostomarow, Smutnoye vremya Moskovskogo gosudarstva ed. A. Bielowski, Lvov 1861 w nachale XVII v. (1604–1614), Sankt Petersburg 1868 ‘Razryadnyye zapisy za smutnoye vremya (7113–7121 g.)’, publ. F. Kusiak, Bitwa pod Kłuszynem 1610 roku, Wrocław 1992 S. A. Belokurov, in Chteniya v Imperatorskom Obstchestve J. Maciszewski, Polska a Moskwa 1603–1618. Opinie i stanowiska Istorii i Drevnostey Rossiyskikh, 1907, vol. II–III szlachty polskiej, Warsaw 1968 Rukopis Filareta, patriarkha Moskovskogo i vseya Rossii, ed. P. Mu­ J. U. Niemcewicz, Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III, króla polskiego cha­now, Moscow 1837 etc., vol. II, Warsaw 1819 J. Budziło, Wojna moskiewska wzniecona i prowadzona z okazji S. F. Platonov, Ocherki po istorii smuty w Moskowskom Gosudar- fałszywych Dymitrów od 1603 do 1612 r., ed. J. Byliński, J. Dłu- stwie XVI–XVII v., Moscow 1995 gosz, Wrocław 1995 L. Podhorodecki, Stanisław Żołkiewski, Warsaw 1988 K. Bussow, Moskovskaya kronika, 1584–1613, ed. I. Smirnow, W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę. Polityka Rzeczypospolitej wo- Moscow–Leningrad 1961 bec Moskwy w latach 1607–1612, Gdańsk 2008 S. Kobierzycki, Historia Władysława, Królewicza Polskiego A. Prohaska, Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski, Warsaw 1927 i Szwedzkiego, transl. M. Krajewski, ed. J. Byliński, W. Kaczo- A. G. Przepiorka, Od Staroduba do Moskwy. Działania wojsk Dymi- rowski, Wrocław 2005 tra II Samozwańca w latach 1607–1608, Zabrze 2007 P. Piasecki, Kronika, transl. A. Chrząszczewski, ed. J. Bartoszewicz, A. Sajkowski, W stronę Wiednia. Dole i niedole wojenne w świetle Cracow 1870 listów i pamiętników, Poznań 1984 A. Prohaska, ‘Wyprawa pod Smoleńsk (z listów litewskiego kan- R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610, Warsaw 2010 clerza r. 1609–1611)’, in Kwartalnik Litewski, 2011, vol. V R. Skrynnikow, Borys Godunow, transl. J. Dancygier, M. Migalska, J. Widekindi, Istoriya desyatiletney shvedsko-moskovitskoy voyny, Warsaw 1982 transl. S. A. Annenskiy, A. M. Alexandrov, A. F. Kostina, Moscow 2000 W. Sobieski, Żołkiewski na Kremlu, Warsaw 1920 S. Żółkiewski, Początek i progres wojny moskiewskiej, ed. A. Boro­ S. M. Solovev, Istoriya Rossii drevneyshikh vremen, vol. VIII, wski, Cracow 2009 Moscow 1866 Books R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610, Warsaw 2008 The False Dmitri. A Russian Romance and Tragedy, described Articles by British Eye – Witness, 1604–1612, ed. S. E. Howe, London K. Górski, ‘Oblężenie Smoleńska w latach 1609–1611 i bitwa pod 1916 Kłuszynem’, in Przewodnik Naukowy i Literacki, 1895, vol. 23 A. Andrusiewicz, Dzieje wielkiej smuty, Katowice 1999 F. Kudelka, ‘Bitwa pod Kłuszynem’, in Bellona, 1920, no. 6 J. Besala, Stanisław Żołkiewski, Warsaw 1988 Websites T. Bohun, Moskwa 1612, Warsaw 2005 www.hussar.com. pl D. Czerska, Borys Godunow, Wrocław 1988 www.old-ru.ru. D. Czerska, Dymitr Samozwaniec,Wrocław 2004 www. vostlit.info – Paweł Przeździecki – Military Bureau for Historical Research in Military Centre for Civic Education

The Polish-Turkish War of 1620–1621: the battles of Cecora and Chocim

In the autumn of 1620, near , the army of the A new confrontation arose at the end of the 15th century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth suffered its first cat- due to the Ottoman expansion to the west coast of the astrophic defeat. During the tragic finale of the unsuc- . subjected the reigned cessful Moldavian excursion, the troops retreating from by , and afterwards conquered Kilię and Bil- Cecora (today – Țuțora in ) under the command horod – gaining control over the mouth of the Danube of the Grand Hetman of the Crown Stanisław Żółkiewski and the . In the last decade of the 15th century the were decimated by the Tatars and the commander himself Empire strengthened its dominance in . The at- killed. The destruction of the Crown’s armies resulted in tempt to restore the influence of the Kingdom of Poland opening the southeastern lands of the Republic of Poland over the Black Sea by Jan Olbracht ended in a disaster in to the attacks and provoked the Turkish Sultan to invade. the forest in Moldova in the year 1497. The un- Less than a year after the Cecora disaster, there was the successful expedition provoked retaliatory Turkish-Tatar month-long battle of Chocim (today – in Ukraine). raids. Because neither party was interested in continuing Mobilised with great difficulty, the Commonwealth’s forces an open war, a truce was signed at the beginning of the faced the powerful army of the , and came 16th century. The Empire and The Kingdom (since 1569, the out of this battle victorious. Commonwealth of Both Nations) were in neutral relations The (and the tragic retreat from Mol- throughout the century. However, the plundering Tatar at- dova) and Chocim entered Polish military history as ex- tacks on the southern Polish provinces did not stop. Con- amples of the extraordinary bravery of Polish soldiers. stant threat of the ‘hordes’ (i.e. the Tatars belonging to the These clashes, however, also deserve some attention due Horde) forced major changes in the organization of Polish to the tactical solutions used by the Commonwealth’s armed forces, which became the basis of the so-called commanders and their relentless fighting. old-Polish warfare1. At the beginning of the 17th century the Repub- Background of the conflict lic remained in proper relations with Turkey. The Pol- ish-Lithuanian State became involved in the internal crisis The history of Turkish-Polish conflict dates back to the in the Russian Tsarism, whereas the first half of the 15th century. It was then that the spheres fought a war with the Habsburgs and Persia. Both parties of influence of the up-and-coming Jagiellonian monarchy wanted to maintain peace. Under the agreements of 1607 and the quickly expanding Ottoman Empire intersected. In and 1617, the Republic had to give up its influence in Mol- 1444, during the , the young king of Poland davia and , but the Hospodars interred there by and Hungary Ladislaus III was killed at the hands of Turks. the Sultan were to stay in friendly relations with Poland. Earlier, in the battles against the Turks on the side of the The aim was also to regulate the two most contentious King of Bohemia and Hungary, Sigismund of Luxembourg, the most famous Polish Knights, coat of 1 Z. Grabowski, Dzieje oręża polskiego. Odrodzenie, Warsaw arms Sulima was killed. 2012, pp. 104–111, 157–159.

– 87 – – Paweł Przeździecki –

issues in their relations: Tatar attacks on the southern Another reason, in addition to the Cossack raids, for the and southeastern Polish lands and – pillaging raids of Za- conflict was the explicit support of King Sigismund III Vasa porozhian Cossacks (so-called ‘chadzki’) in the domain of to the Habsburgs in the thirty years ‘ war. Although the the Empire and its vassals2. forces of the Republic did not participate in the struggle, The Cossacks were determined to be the population however, the monarch gave the Allies help by sending ir- residing mostly in the areas of the lower reaches of the regular troops of the so-called lisowczycy against the army Dnieper, the so-called Zaporozhia. They were a rampant of , a Turkish vassal. In 1619, the lisowczycy element, eager to revolt and fiercely defending their decimated the army of the Transylvanian Prince Bethen freedom against the nobility. , em- Gabor at Humienno, leading to breaking the siege of Vi- ployed by the Commonwealth, were relatively few. The enna. This event has passed into history as the first relief vast majority were Sich Cossacks, staying in fortified of Vienna6. camps – Sichs – who were not subject to any control by The situation in the Turkish fiefdom in Moldova became the Polish-Lithuanian State. The existence of the Cos- a pretext for the future war. Early in 1619, Gaspar (Casper) sacks became an important and unsolvable problem for Grazziani ascended the the Hospodarski throne. The new the Commonwealth. On the one hand, critics praised the ruler favoured the Republic and during the first period of combat valour of the Cossacks, there were numerous his reign mediated between Poland and Turkey, seeking warriors, eager to fight, and relatively cheap, and their to improve relations between the two countries7. How- help was used over the course of the operations against ever, at the turn of 1619 and 1620 in , there were the Russians and especially against Tatars. On the other changes among the most important and closest nobles hand, the lack of discipline and Cossack raids could con- to the Sultan. Grazziani felt threatened, and besides, stitute a with Turkey in the future3. To impose it was not without grounds, and in the summer of 1620 he the yoke on the Cossacks exceed the possibility of the declared compliance of the Moldovan hospodarstwo to Republic of Poland. The Polish forces were able to choke the Republic.8 down the occasional Cossack revolts; however, they From the perspective of Poland, the acceptance of the could not keep the rebellious population in check and offer of the Turkish vassal could mean open conflict with prevent sub­sequent ‘chadzkis’4. the Ottoman Empire. Most probably, however, it was be- In 1617 a new Sultan, Osman II rose to the throne in lieved that Turkey is committed to waging a war that will Istanbul. Initially, the young lord has been friendly for the break out sooner or later. Signals from the envoys sent to Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; assurances that the Istanbul and the testified to this. Decisive action Polish side had taken the steps to halt the Cossack raids in Moldova was supposed to be a demonstration of the were helping. However, ‘chadzki’ did not stop. Early in the Commonwealth’s force and serve to strengthen the Polish spring of 1620, there have been several attacks directly on influence in the region. For King Sigismund III Vasa the in- the territories of the Empire. During one of the pillaging tervention in the South would serve to ease his opposition raids Cossacks ransacked the suburbs of Istanbul, which at and conciliate the nobility. Similar reasons have probably that time was visited by an envoy from Poland, Hieronim also influenced the Grand Chancellor of the Crown Het- Otwinowski. In these circumstances, the diplomat met man Stanislaw Żółkiewski, who on the 2nd of September with a cold reception. Under the influence of the atmo- 1620 stepped in with his army to Moldova, which became sphere prevailing in the capital of the Empire, Otwinowski a direct cause of the outbreak of the Polish-Turkish war.9 sent cautionary letters back to the country, notifying about the war with the Republic the Turks are preparing5. 6 Ibid., pp. 23–25. 7 R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 29–33. 8 Ibid., pp. 41–44, 69–70. 2 L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, Wojna chocimska 1621 roku, Cra- 9 Ibid., pp. 69–72, 76–83, 149–152; L. Podhorodecki, Hetman cow 1979, pp. 6–9. Stanisław Żółkiewski, Warsaw 2011. Stanislaw Żółkiewski mil- 3 Z. Budzyński, L. Fac, Wojny polsko-tureckie w XVII w., Przemyśl itary and political career started alongside Jan Zamoyski. He 2000, pp. 4–5. participated in numerous battles and campaigns, during, inter 4 R. Majewski, Cecora 1620, Warsaw 1970, pp. 24–25. alia, the War of Danzig (1576–1577), with Russia (1577–1582), 5 L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op.cit., pp. 18–22. and Sweden (1600–1611), he participated in military attacks

– 88 – – The Polish-Turkish War of 1620–1621: the battles of Cecora and Chocim –

Intervention in Moldova scenario. Hetman counted that the mere presence of the Polish army would force the Turks to open negotiations After crossing the border of Moldova on the Dniester, and step down before the power of the Republic12. The the Polish forces have taken an unhurried march towards success of the plan depended on an effective stop of the the hospodarstwo’s capital in Iaşi. The delay was to allow Tatar-Turkish units moving towards Iaşi, to impose an Grazziani, who has officially broke relations with Turkey, agreement, and the activity of Grazziani, who would have to strengthen his position and gather auxiliary Moldovan been able to mobilize strong, Moldovan reinforcements. troops. Probably at this stage of the expedition Żółkiewski On the 12th of September, during the evening, Żół­kie­ decided to post the so-called Cecora position10. wski’s troops stood at the Cecora line. The Hetman’s army Cecora (currently Romanian Ţuţora) was a small vil- consisted of more than 10,000 people, including 2,500 lage on the right bank of the Prut, located to the East of Hussars, 2,600 Cossack cavalry, 200 reiters, between 1,200 Iaşi. On the other side of the river, along its course, led to 1,800 lisowczycy, 100 Tatars and 3,000 infantrymen. an important route from the southeast, leading by a ford The support was composed of 16 guns and several ar- on the River Prut to the capital of Moldova, and further to quebusses. In addition to Polish troops, they were joined Chocim and Kamieniec Podolski (Kamyanets Podilsky). by Grazziani’s Moldovans – in the number of only around Conquering this vast terrain, located in a bend of the river 1,000 people.13 The hospodar himself, despite the Het- and lined on three sides of her waters, allowed strategic man’s insistence, was not eager to return to Iaşi, which put control of the crossing and blocked the road of the Turkish into question the meaning of the whole expedition, after forces. The Cecora position may have been a convenient all, aimed at strengthening the ruler’s position. base for possible strikes against the important Ottoman On the 17th of September, the army of the beylerbey forts of Galați and Tehinia. This place was the scene of of Sylistria (province governor) Iskender Pasha reached the first battle of Cecora from 1595, when the army of the the vicinity of the Polish camp. Not intruded by the pass- Commonwealth, under the command of Crown Hetman ive Żółkiewski, the Sultan’s official managed to mobilize Jan Zamoyski stopped the Tatar-Turkish forces under the between 10,000 and 13,000 people out of a total of five leadership of the Crimean Khan Gazi Giray II. The success, sandžaks (county equivalents). The core of the force was thanks to the strengthened Cecora field position11, has en- comprised of 2,000 Turks, including infantry, abled placing a ruler favouring Poland on the hospodarski reinforced by sparse artillery. Iskender’s call was answered throne. Żółkiewski, the Field Hetman of the Crown at that by numerous Budziak Tatars14 led by Cantymir Murza time, participated in Zamoyski’s excursion. Remembering and Crimean Tatars, commanded by Kalga Sultan Devlet the past course of events, he sought to repeat the former Giray15. Due to negligence in identifying the position of enemy to Moldova (1595 and 1600), suppressed the Nalewajko’s Cos- sack uprising (1596). During the so-called ‘dmitriads’ – armed forces, the arrival of Iskender Pasha’s troops surprised the interventions in Russia during the – he has Poles. The Tatars took prisoner a large number of camp achieved a magnificent victory at Klushino (1610). In 1606 he workers, who tended to the horses outside the camp or defeated the Tatars under Kalnik. He was the Field Hetman of were busy searching for food in the surrounding area (the the Crown in the years 1588–1618. It was only in 1618, at the so-called picownicy). They forced a last-minute Polish raid age of 70, when he received the baton of the Grand Hetman to retreat, while still taking prisoners. In the face of such of the Crown. His political opponents accused Żółkiewski of a strong enemy, it became clear that a confrontation is incompetence in defending the southern borders of the Com- monwealth from the Tatar raids (especially after the battle of imminent. The work to rebuild the old Zamoyski’s for- Orynin in 1618), he saw the intervention as a chance of regain- tifications was sped up – so far, they have been conduc- ing reputation and silencing his opponents. ted slowly and rather carelessly.16 The next day, on the 10 R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 152–163. 11 Ibid., p. 173. At the command of the Hetman, the area in the 12 Ibid., pp. 163–164. bend of the Prut was sealed off from the east by a field fortifi- 13 Ibid., pp. 169–171. cations. The wall was made of earth and it was over 2 metres 14 The so-called , residents of , a part of Bessara- high and reinforced with 14 earthen bastions. There were four bia, currently the vicinity of Odessa in the Ukraine. gates made in it, they were used during forays between the 15 R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 178–180. 18th and the 20th of October 1595. 16 K. Śledziński, Cecora 1620, Warsaw 2007, p. 155.

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18th of October, there was a cavalry battle, which began ations of the Cecora position, manned with a part of the in- with the Tatar attack on the lisowczycy’s camp outside of fantry, protecting the soldiers’ backs at the foreground. On the Cecora position. The enemy was repulsed, a prisoner both flanks the Hetman has placed wagon trains, 4 rows has been taken captive, but his testimony did not prove of 50–60 cars in each one. The wagon trains were guarded to be very useful for estimating of the number of Iskender- by several hundred infantrymen, and cannons and har- Pasha’s units17. The lisowczycy, in turn, moved their camp quebuses loaded unto them. To defend the fragile joint behind the fortifications18. of rows of carts and camp fortifications on the right flank, Żółkiewski has directed the lisowczycy and the Moldovans The Battle of Cecora under Walenty Rogowski (Commander of the lisowczycy). Stefan Chmielecki protected the rear of the wagon train Information gained during skirmishes and the generally on the left. In accordance with the idea of the Hetman, optimistic result of the first clash prompted Żółkiewski the wagon trains, staffed by densely shooting infantry and to lay a decisive battle on the 19th of October. The plan artillerymen, were to stop and bleed out the Tatars. The of the armed confrontation developed by the Hetman is fate of the battle would be decided by a decisive blow of considered as a glimmer of the old genius of the winner the Polish central formation in which Żółkiewski set 5 re- from Klushino.19 The main idea of it was based on the giments, composed of hussars and Cossacks supporting assumption that the most dangerous part of the army of them. They were, counting from the left, the units of: Duke Iskendera-Pasha, in view of the numbers and strength, , governor of Kamieniec, Walenty Kalin- are the Tatars. The main strength of the mounted warriors owski, the Grand Hetman of the Crown himself, the Field was their extraordinary mobility, allowing them to avoid Hetman of the Crown Stanisław Koniecpolski, governor of an attack and carry out their own strike from the flank. Halicz Mikołaj Struś. Due to limited space, the units formed The weapon of the Tatars, which most of them was as- the so-called ‘granite huf’, in columns21. sociated with, was a short bow, which they were able to The weakness of this unique setting was the lack of accurately and quickly shoot while riding. They also used a strong rear-guard, characteristic for Polish military. The djerids – javelins. In direct combat they also used sabres, formation was rigid and fairly compact, making it difficult spears and lassos. Most of the Tatars – the so-called ‘black’ for any modifications during the fight. In addition, proper were, however, very badly armed20. They set off to fight implementation of the plan required excellent coordina- in a loose, flexible formation, showering their opponent tion of the wagons march, cavalry strikes and shielding. with a barrage of missiles and constantly striving to flank. The Turkish-Tatar army stood in front of the Common- In view of the almost total lack of military protection, the wealth’s camp. On the right flank, under the command of Tatars tried to avoid frontal clashes as much as they could. Yussuf-Pasha, the beylerbey of , lined up the No- They often faked retreats and then attacked the relaxed gais of Cantymir Murza. Iskendera-Pasha entrusted the formation of the enemy. The nomads were very sensitive left flank to Devlet Giray. The governor of Sylistria himself to gunpowder weapons, which they did not have and were commanded the centre, occupied by Turkish troops, i.e. clearly respecting. the janissaries and the artillery. Perfectly knowing the possibility of Tatars, Żółkiewski The battle took place on 19 September. It began with decided to neutralize their threat to the maximum extent. a powerful attack of the Polish regiments to the middle of To this end, the Polish formation was based on the fortific- the Turkish-Tatar formation. In a bloody battle the hussars and the Cossacks supporting them, despite losses, gained 17 Ibid., p. 158. an advantage over the opponent. The mercilessly repelled 18 R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 180–182. centre of Iskender-Pasha’s forces could be broken. 19 J. Besala, Stanisław Żółkiewski, Warsaw 1988, p. 357; R. Majew- At this critical moment of the battle an unexpected ski, op. cit., p. 183. breakthrough appeared in the thus-tight Polish formation. 20 The maslak is a blunt weapon consisting of a wooden handle The regiments of Struś and Koniecpolski, and the right with a bovine or equine jaw strapped to it. Arkan was a rigit rope with a loop, used mainly to capture animals, but also useful in battle, for example – to pull an opponent down from 21 R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 183–184; L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, a mount. op. cit., pp. 34–35.

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wagon train, positioned on the right side of the centre and more than 2,000 cars. The losses of the opposing party group, slid ahead of the front line. At the same time the were, probably, considerably lower24. However, Żółkiewski column of cars stood somewhat obliquely in relation to still had a strong amry and the Cecora position remained the formation of the opponent. Most probably, the reason practically impregnable for Iskender-Pasha. The worst for this phenomenon was the encounter with a previously consequence of this failure, however, was the collapse unrecognized off-road obstacle – a shallow ravine, which of the morale of the Commonwealth’s soldiers. It would was manned by Turkish infantry22. Attempts to circumvent take its toll a day later, in the evening of the 20th of Octo- the trench led to the asymmetry of formations and the cre- ber. The Hetman’s decision to prepare for the retreat and ation of gaps between the right wagon train and the line move towards the country under the cover of the rescued of fortifications of the Cecora position and their own cav- carts, reached the general public in a distorted form. The alry. Devlet-Giray’s Tatars immediately attacked the first soldiers felt that the commanders intended to save their breach. own hides, leaving the army to its fate. Grazziani’s actions The attack of the Crimean fighters was so hard, that were also destructive to the morale. He has witnessed his neither strong infantry fire nor the lisowczycy and Mol- own doom in Żółkiewski’s withdrawal. The Hospodar has dovan cavalry protecting the rear of the wagon train convinced, Kalinowski, among others, to try and force managed to stop it. What’s worse, some of the hospodars their way to Prut and escape by horse. Many soldiers switched sides. The lisowczycy were dispersed, fleeing in followed the starost of Kamieniec. Some commanders, the direction of the camp and the interior of Polish forma- including Duke Korecki also rushed towards Prut. At the tion, increasing the confusion and hindering effective pre- same time an uproar broke out within the camp, numer- vention. While encircling them, the Tatars fought with the ous tents were looted by the demoralized servants and rear of Struś’s regiment and the Hetman’s units. The unex- the lisowczycy. The Hetmans were unable to control the pected attack faltered the density of the regiments, which chaos, only the awareness of the terrible fate that befell retreated to the camp. The right wagon train was isolated some refugees drowning in the rushing stream of Prut or from its own forces, surrounded by the enemy, and after were murdered by marauding Tatars on the other side25, a few hours of fierce battle, decimated. A few dozens of dampened the mood of the soldiers. The rest has been people (including Szemberg) managed to survive the ex- done by Żółkiewski’s attitude, whose personal presence termination on the right flank. They broke through the blew away all the rumours about the plans to abandon the Tatar circle and reached the mounds of the Cecora pos- army26. The allegation made by the soaking Duke Korecki, ition. The left wagon train, covered by the brave Korecki who was not able to cross the river, that it was the Hetman and Chmielecki’s units managed to withdraw to the camp, who caused panic by getting ready to flee, was met with still in formation.23 Żółkiewski’s proud response: ‘Here I stand, and water does It is estimated that as a result of losing the battle, the not drip from me’27. Hetman’s forces lost approximately 2,500–3,000 people, The disaster on the night of 20 to 21 September cost the and more or less a third of the cannons and harquebuses Polish forces another 2,000 soldiers. The following days the Hetman devoted to rebuilding morale of the army reduced 22 J. Besala, op. cit., p. 360; R. Majewski, op. cit., p. 187; L. Pod- horodecki, N. Raszba, op. cit., p. 36. A participant of the battle, 24 R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 194–195. commanding over the right wagon group, Teofil Szemberg 25 Walenty Kanilewski drowned in the Prut. Grazziani tried to mentioned that erroneous formation of the left column of the cross the river and escape his pursuers, but he was soon mur- carts was the reason for the confusion. The carts led by Duke dered by his own bodyguards. Stefan Chmielecki also man- Korecki was supposed to stand to close to the camp, thus aged to escape – he was initially send by the Hetman to stop the Hetman’s central cavalry did not have enough space to the escapees – he arrived safely in Poland bringing news of gain speed and began to push against the right column. Cf. the defeat at Cecora. T. Szemberg, Relacja prawdziwa o wejściu wojska polskiego 26 R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 196–198. do Wołoch, fragment in: O. Laskowski, B. Pawłowski, Polska 27 Entry devoted to Samuel Korecki in: Polski słownik biogra- Historja Wojskowa (w wypisach źródłowych), Warsaw 1928, pp. ficzny, ed. Władysław Konopczyński, vol. XIV, p. 61. Various 90–91. versions of Żółkiewski’s response cf. Cecora i Chocim, prelek- 23 R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 187–193; L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, cja prof. Józefa Szujskiego z dnia 5 grudnia 1870 roku, Cracow op. cit., p. 36. 1871, p. 8; J. Besala, op. cit., p. 363.

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to half the size of the enemy. Negotiations with Iskender- The Tatars took chase on the morning of the 30th of Pasha became one of the tools for this purpose. The con- September, quickly catching up the army resting after versations allowed to gain a few days, during which the a night march, but were repulsed infantry fire. They were soldiers in the camp were being convinced that the only not able to threaten the Poles during the next stage of the chance of saving is to yield to the discipline and the carry journey; their attacks on the 1st of October have failed. on with the Hetman’s plan, that assumed retreat under During the next day, Turkish infantry reached the camping the cover of the wagons. In addition, Żółkiewski tried to site, reinforcing Devlet-Giray’s forces. A successful German convince the army, that the negotiations with the Turkish infantry counterattack induced severe losses among the side are merely a ruse. As soon as the captain found that enemy ranks and the capturing of two guns, both of which his forces are ready to march, he broke talks with Iskender- were identified as those lost on the 19th of September, Pasha. He temporarily abandoned carrying out justice to along with the broken right-flank wagon train. The retreat the participants of the night raids28. that followed was held in worse conditions, as Iskender- Pasha, avoiding open confrontation, ordered the Tatars The retreat and defeat at Mogilev to ravage the lands on the expected withdrawal route. Ex- treme conditions during the march through the scorched On 29 September, the Polish troops dug northern sec- desert took their toll especially on the horses, which fell in tion of the mound of the Cecora position and left the camp. scores31. The task of forming the pattern marching Żółkiewski en- On the 4th of October the leader of the Turkish-Tatar trusted to Duke Korecki. All saddle horses were positioned forces decided to carry out a decisive assault on the army at the head of the group. In this way, the Hetman wanted resting after the next stage of its journey. The enemy, how- to step up discipline by thwarting all attempts to rush ever, was bloodily repulsed again, thanks to the personnel ahead to Poland on mounts. In addition, the herd served operating the Polish guns. After this lesson the Turks dis- as front cover of the wagons. Behind the herd there was continued the pursuit, the Tatars temporarily confined to one wagon train, consisted of 6 or 7 rows of up to 100 cars observing and occasionally harassing the Poles32. each. Apart from the wounded and sick, transported on On the morning of the 6th of October, after a total of 6 vehicles, the military has been dismounted. Soldiers from night marches, the column stopped near Serwirni village, cavalry companies, hussars and Cossacks marched in prior set on fire by the Tatars, about 10 km from the city rows on both sides of the wagon train, with weapons on of Mogilev. Around noon the Hetmans ordered to move their shoulders. The vanguard consisted of two hundred out, due to the proximity of the border and the gunpowder Polish and on hundred German infantry under the com- stock running dry, opposing the majority’s insistence to mand of Wolmar Farensbach. They were supported by 5 wait until the night. At the request of some soldiers, vic- cannons and several harquebuses. The same artillery sup- tims of the robberies of the night of the 20th of September, port was granted to the rear-guard, counting 550 infantry Żółkiewski promised direct searches and that he will begin soldiers and all of the surviving lisowczycy29. to administer justice without delay after crossing the bor- The route led along the shortest possible road to the der. It seemed as if the Tatar threat ceased. In this situation Commonwealth’s border, but it was chosen carefully non- the servants, the lisowczycy and all of the soldiers who etheless. Żółkiewski’s army had to travel about 175 km. had something on their conscience, decided to leave the Along the way, they had to cross three rivers – the Deli, camp. Another uproar broke out, this time it could not be Reut and Kubołta. All major narrows, ravines and forests, thwarted. The column was torn, most of the horses stolen which could introduce confusion in the column and disor- by the escapees, which were soon joined by the rest of the ganized defence, were avoided. They marched during the scattered army. At this point the Tatars came again, this night and rested during the day30. time no one could stop them. Only a dozen people stayed with the Hetmans. Żółkiewski refused to save himself, demonstratively killing his horse, but soon enough the 28 R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 200–202. 29 Ibid., pp. 202–208. 30 Ibid., pp. 209, 212, 214; L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op.cit., 31 R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 210–211. p. 41. 32 Ibid., p. 211.

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hussar Abraham Złotopolski convinced the commander A general sejm (session of parliement) was called to and put him on a mount almost forcefully. However, the meet on the 3rd of November in Warsaw. The proceedings Grand Hetman of the Crown did not reach the border. He took place with knowledge that after the destruction of was killed in battle on the night of the 6th of October. On the royal army, an attack is inevitable and the deputies al- the following day, about 5 kilometres from Mogilev, the most unanimously agreed to adopt emergency measures Turks found Żółkiewski’s body, wounded in the head and to counter the threat. Altogether it was intended to spend with a severed right hand33. almost 7,000,000 zlotys for the defence purposes. Accord- About three thousand soldiers survived the Cec- ing to the agreements, the Commonwealth was to issue ora campaign, including the escapees from the 20th of a 60-thousand army, including 15,000 hussars, 10,000 re- September. Most of the veterans returned to the country iters, 20,000 Cossack cavalry, 10,000 German infantry and without weapons, in a state of shock due to the devastat- 5,000 Polish infantry against the Ottoman Empire. The ing experience of the retreat and the disaster in Mogilev. combined armies of the Crown and Lithuania were to be The casualties were particularly severe, as they concerned strengthened by a contingent of Zaporozhian Cossacks. In professional military personnel on the basis of which the addition, considerable sums were spent on strengthening Republic exhibited an army in case of danger. The Grand the fortresses and on purchasing artillery cannons and Hetman of the Crown and many other officers fell. The ammunition. In order to raise such funds the parliament Field Hetman of the Crown Stanisław Koniecpolski, Duke passed very high taxes, including doubled quarter tax and Samuel Korecki, Wolmar Farensbach, Mikołaj Struś and charges on the production and sales of honey, wine and the son and two nephews of Hetman Żółkiewski were all beer. A bill against excess was passed, setting uniform taken prisoner by the Turks34. prices of luxury goods and banning the sale of jewellery under the penalty of confiscation. They also banned the Mobilisation of the country export of horses and nitrate, which is the basic raw ma- terial used in the production of gunpowder. Lessons have The news of the defeat of the excursion to Moldova and been learned from the terrible accidents that led to the death of Żółkiewski, and the loss of the army quickly went tumult and the collapse of morale during the Cecora cam- around the Commonwealth. The terror intensified due to paign. The Sejm (the parliament) has passed a special bill Tatar actions, who in the autumn of 1620, almost with im- on military discipline, confirming the judicial powers of punity, ravaged the lands of the Ruthenian, Volyn and commanders and Hetmans36. provinces. King Sigismund III was advised that, for his own In cities located on lands directly threatened by the safety, he should leave Warsaw – the monarch rejected the invasion, works were underway to restore and construct idea. Also a mound was hastily piled around the capital35. additional fortifications. The Sejm decided to form the ‘chosen infantry’ (‘piechota wybraniecka’) and call a mass 37 33 At Iskender-Pasha’s order, the Hetman’s head was cut off mobilization . and sent to the Sultan. After some time the widow, Regina Command of the armed forces of the Republic in the up- Żółkiewska, bought it off and buried along with the rest of the coming campaign was entrusted to the Lithuanian Grand body in the seat of the family in Żółkiew. Cf. J. Besala, op. cit., Hetman Jan Karol Chodkiewicz38. The command over pp. 365–367; R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 211–218. 34 Ibid., pp. 218–219, 239–240. Most of the wealthy prisoners 36 L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op. cit., pp. 77–79. managed to buy their freedom or were bought out with the 37 Ibid., p. 81. help of the country. In this way Hetman Koniecpolski, who 38 Jan Karol Chodkiewicz began his military career by suppress- was soon to crush the Tatars at Martynov (1624) and Ochma- ing Semen Nalewajko’s Cossack uprising in 1596. Since 1600 towo (1644), regained his freedom. The only exception was the Polish-Lithuanian Hetman took part in the second expe- Duke Korecki. He was murdered in Istanbul in 1623, shortly dition of Jan Zamoyski to Wallachia, afterwards he fought at before the start of the negotiations for his release. Most of the the side of the Grand Hetman of Lithuania Krzysztof ‘Thunder’ common soldiers never returned to Poland. About 2,000 died Radziwiłł against the Swedes in Livonia. In 1601 he displayed soon after being captured, because of exhaustion, cold, mal- commanding talent in the battle of Kokenhausen. The over- nutrition and ill-treatment. The others awaited a bitter fate on whelming defeat of the much more numerous Swedish army Turkish galleys and slave work in the estates of feudal lords. at Kircholm in 1605 brought him fame. In the same year he 35 Ibid., pp. 232–235. received the baton of the Grand Hetman of Lithuania. He took

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the partially rebuilt Crown troops was given to the Crown cut off from their lands by the waters of the Dniester and cupbearer Stanisław , appointed ‘regimentarz’ have little chance for rescue, and that is why, according to for the duration of the campaign. The sejm has also cre- the Hetman, the soldiers should fight well. Crossing the ated a War Council, an supporting body for the Hetman. river also gave a clear signal to the Zaporozhian Cossacks Although the presence of the council limited power of the that the Polish-Lithuanian army wants to resist the enemy Hetman – the commissioners had the prerogative to give in combat, and not seek concord at the expense of the consent to lay a battle against the enemy or to start ne- Sich’s population42. gotiations – but also made invaluable contribution in the The combined army went over to the Dniester at the process of organizing the army, taking over some issues end of July. The crossing of the main forces across the river from the over-worked Hetman39. at Chocim, wide for over 250 meters, was held between 1 Despite the great financial effort, the State failed to and 19 August. They made a fortified camp on the plat- collect the planned funds. The attempts to raise money eau, rising slightly to the south of the Chocim castle. He from abroad met with partial failure – the gained sums was connected with the fortress by drawbridge, slung over were transferred to Poland only after the war. In June a steep ravine. From the east, access was blocked by the 1621, it was estimated that the funds would suffice for rocky slopes of the Dniester. Plateau sloped gently toward the maintenance of 36,000 people for 3 quarters. Full suc- the south, toward a deep ravine. Convenient approach to cess in recruiting the soldiers also was not achieved. The the Chocim position was possible only through the plains concentration of troops proceeded slowly and it quickly extending to the west43. became apparent that the target numbers would not be In order to increase the defensive qualities, work was reached40. It is estimated that the Republic issued a little organized at the beginning of August on strengthening more than 33,000 cavalrymen and infantry against the Ot- the Chocim position. The operations were led by an ex- toman Empire. Taking into account the differences in the perienced engineer from , William Appelman, payrolls and the actual size, the Polish-Lithuanian army well-versed in the Dutch art of fortification. Under his lead- was smaller by approximately 10%. In addition, part of the ership, the camp was surrounded by with a high embank- resources were allocated on the strengthening of border ment and a ditch. Every couple of hundred steps brought fortresses and major cities, including the ‘chosen infantry’ bastions built of wood and earth. The main rampart was and mercenaries41. covered in the most vulnerable spots by additional ones, Knowing his own numbers and having information sometimes hidden among the unevenness of the ground. about the might of the enemy, Chodkiewicz developed Access to the interior of the camp was possible only by two a careful plan of action. According to it, the army of the Re- heavily fortified gates, which were facing west: the crown public was to actively defend based on the fortified strong- gate, which was located in the north of the fortifications, hold, lying on the route of the march of the Turks and their and the Lithuanian one in the southern part. In order to allies. The location of the position would prevent the con- further the field of view and prevent the enemy from mov- tinued march of the forces of the Ottoman Empire, barring ing unseen in the immediate vicinity of the position, some the way to the lands of the Commonwealth. The Hetman’s vegetation in the foreland was cut down. Also the wooden choice fell on the old Moldavian fortress of Chocim, which buildings of the Chocim village, lying northeast of the guarded the crossing through the Dniester, and was ac- castle, were burned. Only the remains of a stone church quired at the beginning of the ill-fated Żółkiewski’s excur- survived. The Communication with Polish banks of the sion. Taking position on the right bank of the river was also Dniester was provided by a bridge built by the engineers associated with the morale-raising method adopted by (and repaired a number of times during the campaign) a Chodkiewicza. In the event of defeat, the army would be near the ruins of the village of Braha. The bridge approach was defended by a small infantry garrison44. Engineering part in the Polish-Russian war in the years 1609–1618, com- work continued during the battle itself, expanding the line manding, inter alia, the attempts to relief the crew of the Kremlin. 39 L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op. cit., pp. 81–86. 42 Ibid., pp. 100–101. 40 Ibid., pp. 97–108. 43 Ibid., p. 156. 41 Ibid., pp. 174–175. 44 Ibid., pp. 181–184, 188.

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of the fortifications with forward cannons, based on un- terms of weapons and equipment, as well as, in the case even terrain and sometimes cleverly disguised. of cavalry, mounts. The mercenary troops under the com- The names of the gates were directly linked to the tac- mand of Prince Ladislau presented themselves much tical division the personnel of the Chocim position, as better. The number of Cossacks led by the Cossack Het- decided by Chodkiewicz. The Crown’s army under Lub- man Piotr Konaszewicz-Sahajdaczny, can be estimated omirski’s command stood in the north of the camp. Het- at around 30–35 thousand. The Zaporozhian army had 23 man personally led the Lithuanians in the south. The cent- cannons, usually of small dimensions and with limited fire ral part of the west-facing fortifications was taken by sol- capabilities49. diers from Prince Ladislaus’s corps45. These forces, num- The Turkish army was nearly twice as large as the de- bering about 10,000 people reached Chocim at the very fender. At the Sultan’s order the mass mobilization ap- end of August and crossed through the Dniester already in peared – the mounted spahis – from remote provinces the presence of the enemy46. of the Empire, i.e. from the territory of Syria and . A little earlier, in the last week of August, Chodkiewicz’s Some of the troops had to travel more than 2000 km. Tak- army was joined by the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who set ing into account the marching losses, fights during the camp on the southern slope, outside of the Chocim pos- travels and the number of desertions, the Turkish levy en ition. The Cossack forces crossed to the right bank of the masse at Chocim totalled about 55,000 riders. Osman II Dniester quite early and throughout August ravaged the was accompanied by about 12,000 janissaries, 8000 spahis lands lying on the planned route of the Turkish march. The and a few thousand Tatars of the Sultan’s guard during his Cossacks fought fierce battles with the Tatar patrols, but march towards the Dniester. The imperial artillery was re- also got in the way of the Sultan’s troops, delaying their latively strong, numbering 62 guns, including 15 siege en- march. On the 19th of August there was a violent skirmish gines. Its weaker side was the poor level of training among on the Prut crossing, during which the unit of a couple of the gunsmiths. hundred Zaporozhians induced heavy losses to the rush- Auxiliary units took part in the excursion along with ing janissaries, before it was almost entirely cut down. The the Turkish army. The Tatars were the most numerous at contemporaries have compared the brave Cossacks to about 10,000 soldiers from the Crimea under the leader- Leonidas’s Spartans, defending the Thermopylae gorge47. ship of Dżanibek Gerej and 5000 Cantymir’s Nogais. The Osman II was so furious with the valiant Zaporozhians that Tatar troops made the vanguard of the Sultan’s troops, he killed some of the few prisoners himself with a bow48. they were also responsible for reconnaissance and per- In total, the number of Polish-Lithuanian forces which forming raids on the left bank of the Dniester. In addition, were at the Chocim position at the beginning of Septem- the Moldovans and issued reinforcements circa ber is estimated to total 25,000 people. Of that number, 12-thousand strong. In total, Osman II’s army consisted of there were approximately 8,000 hussars, as many Cos- about 100,000 soldiers accompanied by tens of thousands sacks and lisowczycy, nearly 2000 cavalry and about 6,000 of servants.50 German infantry and 7,000 Polish infantry. One must also add several thousand camp servants to this number. The Battle of Chocim Chodkiewicz’s army possessed 28 guns but their useful- ness was limited due to the poor condition ofl doges and At the end of August the Tatar troops forming the van- poor gunpowder quality. The Crown’s military, barely re- guard of the Sultan’s army approached the Chocim po- built after Cecora was clearly behind the Lithuanians in sition. The Tatar presence turned out to be particularly worrisome for the defenders on the Polish bank. They con- 45 The son of Sigismund III Vasa, the future of the Common- stituted an immediate threat to the safety of the shipment wealth, King Ladislaus IV. trail from Kamenets Podolski. The warriors also harassed 46 L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op. cit., pp. 162, 188. Recent Prince Ladislau’s corps at the last stage of the march. subdivisions have crossed the river on September 4, cf. ibid., Shortly thereafter, on 2 September, first Turkish troops p. 197. 47 Ibid., pp. 122–137. 48 J. Sobieski, Jakóba Sobieskiego, pamiętnik wojny chocimskiej, 49 L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op. cit., pp. 174–177. xiąg troje, Petersburg 1854, pp. 18–19. 50 Ibid., pp. 167–172.

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– 97 – – Paweł Przeździecki –

closed on Chocim51. The siege of the defensive positions With a strong and constantly upgraded defensive began. It was to take more than a month – until the 9th of position, and good observation conditions Hetman October. Chodkiewicz was able to see the enemy moves and suc- The initial tactical plan envisaged to use the Sultan’s cessfully oppose the assaults by manoeuvring on internal troops to quickly resolve the battle by outnumbering the lines. The Turks bled in the strikes on the Cossack camp enemy. The main objective of the first attack was the Cos- and afterwards were decimated by the counter-attacks sack camp, as their numbers were larger than soldiers of of the Polish-Lithuanian cavalry. That is why the Sultan’s the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, although their camp decided to abandon the existing tactics and move camp was unguarded by massive earthen fortifications on to a regular siege of the Chocim position. At the same already present at the Chocim position. In fact, the Zapo- time the Sultan finally gave consent to the conveyance to rozhians only began to form a double wall from two rows the bulk of the Tatar hordes to the Polish coast55. Through- of carts filled with ballast. They dug ditches for the defend- out the following weeks the Tatars ravaged the lands of the ers under the carts. Republic, paralyzing any attempts to organize the relief of The first assault was carried out just by the guard defenders in Chocim and capturing most of the shipments troops of Osman II’s forces. The attack of the dismoun- of food and ammunition. ted spahis and the Sultan’s janissaries, more than 11,000 All of the Turkish troops reached the battlefield on people in total, was repelled by the Cossack infantry, the the 7th of September. From early morning the Sultan’s lisowczycy and cavalry reinforcements sent by the alert army carried out several assaults on different parts of Hetman as support for the Zaporozhians. This first suc- the Chocim position, aiming to engage the defenders. cess of Chodkiewicz’s troops had utter psychological sig- The Cossacks found themselves in a particularly difficult nificance, as in the public awareness the Turkish army was position. Their camp was first shelled by Turkish artil- almost invincible.52 Defenders also enjoyed the rich spoils lery, and then attacked four times by the janissaries and taken away from defeated opponents, including saddles, spahis. Despite the lack of success, at noon Osman II again swords, hides and mounts themselves53. sent his troops to fight, this time hitting the contact point The two consecutive strikes ended similarly, but this between the Lithuanian and the Prince’s forces. The sud- time carried out by a much larger force of the slowly ap- den attack surprised the mercenary infantry. Two com- proaching Turkish army. On the 3rd of September the as- panies were decimated to the last man. The Turks trying sault was preceded by a dummy attack on the Lubomirski’s to storm the ramparts were scared away by a counter-at- royal army positions, the next day the Tatars invaded the tack of the already prepared rear-guard of the Cossack and ruins of Chocim, briefly occupying the church. The main hussar cavalry56. attack, however, was still directed against the Cossacks. Despite the temporary settlement of the threat, Again, Sahajdaczny’s troops were aided by the Common- Chodkiewicz realized that the last attack made a breach in wealth’s infantry and scarce artillery, making breaches in the position of defenders. Expecting another strike in the Turkish lines with heavy gunfire. They were then repelled same place, he commanded 3 hussar companies and one by Cossack counter-attacks with the lisowczycy’s compan- reiter company (in fact, hussars without lances), 605 riders ies and Lithuanian cavalry’s jabs. On the 3rd of Septem- in total, to leave the camp through the Lithuanian gate and ber the Cossacks succeeded capturing 4 cannons during take a hide in the shadow of the German infantry’s rampart a counter-attack. On the 4th of September they managed in front of the gate. Indeed, just before dusk around 10,000 to break into the Turkish camp, tents and dam- Turks began advancing towards the empty positions. The aging several guns54. first spahis’ line was followed by janissaries57. When the enemy approached the fortifications, Chodkiewicz gave the order to attack. A strike of four com- 51 Ibid., pp. 185–191. panies of scarce, but elite cavalry hit the Turkish flank. At 52 Sobieski mentioned that ‘on that day, the army accepted [success] as the best omen of the on-going war’, cf. J. Sobieski, 55 Ibid., p. 201. op. cit., p. 27. 56 Ibid., pp. 203–204. 53 L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op. cit., pp. 185–191. 57 R. Sikora, Niezwykłe bitwy i szarże husarii, Warsaw 2011, pp. 54 Ibid., pp. 194–200. 54–55.

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the same time the attackers were welcomed with infantry and with organized from time to time armed raids. The fire from the mounds. The attacked flank has collapsed and Cossacks and lisowczycy stood out in these excursions. the crowd of escapees confused the lines. The On several times have they broke into the Turkish camp, assault of Osman II’s military was stopped and the separ- raided the Turkish crossing over the Dniester River, causing ated forces partially routed. Turkish losses could amount severe losses among the enemy and causing a permanent to several hundred killed. Dozens of Polish-Lithuanian sense of threat among the besiegers62. riders were killed from the janissaries’ dense fire, many Until the 23rd of September, the defenders have mod- were wounded58. ified their positions. First of all, all defences beyond the The battle of the 7th of September became the culminat- main line of fortifications were destroyed, and the main ing point of the battle of Chocim. Repelling the assaulting line itself expanded. The Cossacks moved their camp a bit troops raised the spirits of the defenders, who henceforth further north63. These changes were necessary due to the acted courageously, organizing forays into the forefront losses, both caused by combat and by diseases and the and skirmishing with the enemy. Morale in the Turkish increasing hunger, all of which limited the numbers of the army greatly deteriorated, the army of the Sultan avoided defenders guarding the Chocim position. melee combat and dug their own trenches. Osman II him- The three last strikes on the Sultan’s military camp were self, witnessing the defeat of his subjects, among whom conducted on the 19th, 25th and 28th of September. The first were ‘many veterans, many men basked in the glory of attack was provoked by a successful night excursion of the their knighthood and the very best […] warriors’, was sup- Cossacks, who plundered the Turkish tents. The assault posed to complain and weep59. was repelled with strong rifle fire. On the 24th of Septem- Severe defeat in the field forced the Turks to change ber the heavily ill Hetman Chodkiewicz died. Despite the tactics in a battle of attrition. The Turks intensified their attempts to preserve this fact in secrecy, the news of the attacks on food shipments, the Osman army began the death of the Commonwealth’s commander reached Os- construction of a crossing through the Dniester, in order to man II. A powerful attack directed at the southwestern be able to shoot at Chodkiewicz’s camp from the Polish section of the fortification was preceded by an artillery bank. At the same time the Sultan’s forces evaded a decis- barrage, which caused some casualties among the de- ive battle, and did not take the challenge thrown by the fenders. This attack failed as well. During the attack many Hetman, who has moved his army to the forefront twice, Polish and Lithuanian soldiers learned of Chodkiewicz’s on 8 and 9 September60. death from the Turks cursing them64. In the following days skirmishes took place, the shelling The last assault took place on the 28th of September. of the Commonwealth’s camp intensified. It was not un- During the night before the attack the Turks set up four til the 15th of September, when a massive assault on the batteries which began shelling the camp come dawn. After centre of the defensive formation took place. The newly the artillery preparation, it came to the main attack. It in- arrived Karakasz-Pasha led about 27,000 people, some of cluded most of the Sultan’s troops. The Turks sent most of which even managed to penetrate the Polish-Lithuanian their forces against the Cossacks and lisowczycy, engaging ramparts. The attack was repelled, however, mainly by the defenders at both gates and near the church in Chocim dense infantry fire, and the Sultan’s commander found with smaller units. The enemy’s rush was so strong that death in battle. Another defeat heavily damaged the mor- ale of the Turkish army; desertions became widespread, in- 62 M. Franz, Wojskowość Kozaczyzny Zaporoskiej w XVI–XVII wieku. th cluding to the Polish side. Since the 15 of September, the Geneza i charakter, Torun 2002, p. 199–201; L. Podhorodecki, Sultan’s army virtually ceased any offensive operations, N. Raszba, op. cit., pp. 224–229. confining to the siege and artillery bombardment.61 The 63 Ibid., pp. 223–224. defenders responded with cannon fire from the mound 64 Ibid., pp. 225–226, 229–232. The death of the commander brought a short-lived crisis in the Commonwealth’s com- 58 L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op. cit., pp. 205–206; R. Sikora, op. mand structures. Although Chodkiewicz clearly designated cit., pp. 55–61. his succesor by giving the baton to Lubomirski, but not only 59 J. Sobieski, op. cit., pp. 36–37. the Cossacks but also the Lithuanians did not want to yield 60 L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op. cit., pp. 206–208. before the new commander. In the end, the Lithuanian army 61 Ibid., pp. 211–215. was persuaded by Prince Ladislaus to obey the new leader.

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signs of panic began to appear in the Polish-Lithuanian podarstwo also regained Chocim. On the 10th of October camp. The defenders were down to their last men in or- the Sultan’s army began their retreat from the Common- der to defend the enemy rushing to the ramparts, includ- wealth’s borders68. The Horde did not obey the imperial ing Prince Ladislaus, who sent a small unit of his adjutant order. The Tatars continued to ravage the lands of the Scottish infantrymen into the fray. At the same time, the southern provinces of the Crown even in the second half battle raged on in the Cossack camp and in the foreground of October, bringing thousands of people into captivity69. of the Crown’s position. The attack on the northern sec- It is estimated that during the month-long siege of the tion was repulsed, among others, due to the intense gun- Chocim position the Polish-Lithuanian army lost almost fire laid unto the rushing enemy from a masked, advanced 7,500 soldiers. Of this number, about 2,000 of them were position prepared by Szemberg. After the whole-day fight- killed, and 3,000 died of wounds, from disease or starva- ing, the Turks retreated to their camp, losing nearly 1,000 tion. On the list of deserters, there were approximately killed65. The attackers have used up all of their gunpowder 500 comrades, which were covered in common infamy. stock. Bullets for rifles and artillery cannons were also The hussars suffered particularly heavy losses, almost scarce. At some point of the battle the lisowczycy loaded one third of them did not return from Chocim. Similarly to their bandoliers with buckshots from scrap metal and many German infantrymen. The fighting in the siege killed broken glass, whereas Szemberg’s gunsmiths rammed the about 6,500 Cossacks. The total losses of the Zaporozhi- cannons even with dirt and grass66. ans, taking into account the fallen during the march The unsuccessful assault and an earlier, equally un- through , during the struggle at sea, and the sick successful, excursion to Kamenets Podolski ultimately and wounded, amounted to several thousand people. The discouraged Osman II to continue the campaign. Morale failed Turkish assaults cost the lives of about 9,000 soldiers in the Turkish camp was very low; the Sultan’s army was and another 4,000–5,000 were killed during night raids and decimated by disease and desertions. Particularly high skirmishes. To the several thousands killed in the fights at losses concerned the contingents from Minor Asia, they Chocim, one should add a similar number of those killed were not suitable for the climatic conditions and inappro- by hunger and diseases (caused mainly by the lack of ad- priately dressed. The situation defenders became increas- aptability to the colder climate and malnutrition). In total, ingly desperate, also. Food and feed were at their limits, the war with the Commonwealth will cost the Sultan’s after the attack of 28 September, reportedly, there was army even about 40,000 people. The Tatars have suffered only one barrel of gunpowder left and most horses fell. relatively low losses, at the level of a few hundred fight- There were cases of desertion, the escapees mostly fell ers. Irreversible losses among the mass deserters of Wal- prey to marauders on the left bank of the Tatar’s River67. lachian and Moldavian reinforcements are estimated at The recent success has allowed the defenders to resume 3,000 soldiers70. negotiations (preliminary agreements were initiated dur- ing the life Chodkiewicz) with a strong position. After sev- Consequences eral days of talks, during which virtually every hostilities ceased, it was agreed to jointly honour the content of the The unfortunate expedition to Moldavia became the agreement. Under the so-called Chocim agreement, the direct cause of the Polish-Turkish war. Thanks to the ex- Commonwealth had to stop the Cossacks from raiding the traordinary efforts of the Commonwealth, the State man- lands of the Empire, whereas the Turks were to effectively aged to put together an army, whose long-standing and prohibit Tatar expedition against the Polish-Lithuanian fierce defence of the Chocim position enabled to end the state. Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania remained un- conflict. The mortal threat from the powerful and fear-in- der the Turkish , the first of these hos- citing all over Europe Sultan’s army was pushed back from the borders of the country. The Chocim treaty became 65 Ibid., pp. 234–238. a starting point for the subsequent peace negotiations. 66 In combat over short distances the use of such an original projectiles turned to be extremely efficient, the Turks – fired at with ‘something green’ – thought the defenders were using 68 Ibid., pp. 240–257. magic. Ibid., s. 237–238. 69 Ibid., pp. 263–268, 278–279. 67 Ibid., pp. 216–218. 70 Ibid., pp. 260–263.

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They were on-going with varying success until October Chocim enriched the Polish military tactics. For the first 1623, but it was crowned with the treaty, the provisions of time field fortifications, often masked and skilfully com- which were formally to survive half a century71. bined with natural obstacles were used on such a scale. The Commonwealth emerged very weak from the war. Battles have proven the superiority of the Western-type Huge losses were suffered, including – an experienced infantry’s firepower, provided with muskets, over less well- army – the southern reaches of the country were dev- armed infantry. The numerous cavalry at Chocim was astated and the treasury largely empty. Following the served mainly a secondary role, as a moving rear-guard re- agreement, the Polish-Lithuanian State renounced its located to an endangered position in the critical moment efforts to build a sphere of influence to the south of the of the enemy attack. The presence of one’s own cavalry, Dniester. Despite peace with the Turks, Tatar attacks did especially the hussars, however, was also important for the not cease. The threat from the Horde was to last until the morale of the troops remaining in the lap. During a joint end of the seventeenth century. The weakness of the Pol- struggle valuable experience was gained while observing ish-Lithuanian state and emptying Lithuania of its troops the Cossacks. The courage and tenacity of the Zaporozhi- was used by the Swedish king , who ans, counter-attacking after almost every Turkish assault, attacked Livonia in August 1621. The war with Sweden led and the ability to harass the enemy by sudden raids and to the separation of major areas of Lithuania, which the night excursions, made a great impression on the Polish Commonwealth has never recovered. and Lithuanian soldiers. The short camaraderie with the The conflict with Turkey brought extraordinarily rich Cossacks, however, did not survive the test of time and military experience. The operations in 1620 brought ser- after the war with the Tatars, the issue of non-yielding and ious use of carts and wagons for the first time since the rebellious Sich remained one of the biggest internal prob- battle of Obertyn in 1531. Although the Cecora formation lems of the Commonwealth. failed, three years later, the Hetman of the Crown Stan- The unfavourable outcome of the war shook the Turk- islaw Koniecpolski reached for a similar solution (released ish Empire. The smouldering conflict between the Sul- in 1623 after the conclusion of the peace with Turkey). In tan and the janissaries rekindled after he returned from June 1624, the royal army, the harnessing the firepower his journey. In the spring of 1622, in Istanbul there was and the cover of the manoeuvring rolling stock crushed a palace coup, which resulted in Osman II being killed. Kantymir’s Tatars at Martynov. The retreat from Cecora has Fortunately for the Commonwealth, the next leader of shown, in turn, the possibility of effectively using wagons the weakened Empire agreed to conclude the peace both while marching, even in contact with the enemy. Disaster countries needed. in Mogilev caused that experience was lost along with The Chocim position played its role in the next great those who died or were taken prisoner. Polish-Turkish war of 1672–1676. In November 1673, the The operations in 1621 proved that the Commonwealth trenches occupied by the Turks were captured in a spec- still has the ability to stand up to a power considered tacular assault of the Polish army led by the Grand Het- almost unstoppable in Europe. Position operations in man of the Crown Jan Sobieski.

71 The next Polish-Turkish war broke out as late as in 1672. Ear- lier, in the years 1633–1635 there was the so-called war with Abazy-Pasha, the rebellious Silistran Sanjak-bey. This conflict ended with routing the Turkish-Tatar forces in the battle of Kamenets Podolski, whereas Abazy-Pasha was killed at the order of the Sultan.

– 101 – Bibliography Primary sources Z. Budzyński, L. Fac, Wojny polsko-tureckie w XVII w., Przemyśl J. Sobieski, Jakóba Sobieskiego, pamiętnik wojny chocimskiej, 2000 xiąg troje, Petersburg 1854 M. Franz, Wojskowość Kozaczyzny Zaporoskiej w XVI–XVII wieku. T. Szemberg, Relacja prawdziwa o wejściu wojska polskiego do Geneza i charakter, Torun 2002 Wołoch, fragment in: O. Laskowski, B. Pawłowski, Polska His- Z. Grabowski, Dzieje oręża polskiego. Odrodzenie, Warsaw 2012 torja Wojskowa (w wypisach źródłowych), Warsaw 1928 R. Majewski, Cecora 1620, Warsaw 1970 Books L. Podhorodecki, Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski, Warsaw 2011 Cecora i Chocim, prelekcja prof. Jozefa Szujskiego z dnia 5 grudnia L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, Wojna chocimska 1621 roku, Cracow 1870 roku, Cracow 1871 1979 Polski słownik biograficzny, ed. W. Konopczyński, vol. XIV, Cracow 1938 R. Sikora, Niezwykłe bitwy i szarże husarii, Warsaw 2011 J. Besala, Stanisław Żółkiewski, Warsaw 1988 K. Śledziński, Cecora 1620, Warsaw 2007 – Rafał Roguski – Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities

The Battle of Berestechko 28–30 June 1651

In the first half of the 17th century the most serious threat melnytsky and the Tatar forces led by Krym Girej moved to the security of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth deep into Poland, reaching as far as Lvov2. were the Cossacks, who constituted a specific group of fu- During the royal election, a new ruler was chosen gitives gathered at the Lower Dnieper. They were hostile between the two brothers of the deceased King towards the borderland Polish nobility, and considered Władysław IV Vasa – John Casimir and Charles Ferdinand. the Polish politics to be a strike against vital Cossack in- The first one received support of the chancellor Jerzy terests. An unfriendly attitude of Polish government to- Ossoliński and . Bearing in mind wards the Orthodox faith, constant restrictions on Cossack the defeat at Pyliava, the people chose John Casimir and register, cruel repressions of participants in the several the policy of compromise for further dealings with the peasant uprisings, breaking the promises of amnesty, and Cossacks. At that time, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who failed finally the intent to turn the Cossacks into peasants were to seize Zamość, returned to Kiev and at the beginning the sources of universal hatred1. At the beginning of 1648 of 1649 rode in triumph as a victorious chieftain. After the Cossacks took action aimed at starting a new uprising. a short armistice, the hostilities began anew in Spring The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth then started organ- 1649. After fighting was renewed in Ukraine a number ising a defence, despite the scale of the real threat was not of new military commanders – the Regimentarz officers yet known. The first battle took place at Żółte Wody (the – retreated to Zbarazh, which was afterwards surroun- Yellow Waters) and lasted from the 29th of April to the 16th ded by the Cossack-Tatar army. John Casimir came to of May 1648. The Polish army was defeated. Another battle the rescue of the besieged. At the crossing of the river took place at Korsuń, where the Cossacks captured two Strypa at he fought the Cossack troops and the Polish hetmans – Mikołaj Potocki and Tatars led by hetman Khmelnytsky and Islam-Giray. The (and handed over to the Tatars). The Korsuń battle turned King used Islam-Giray’s inclination for negotiations and out to be catastrophic for the Polish side. On the 20th of communicated with him behind Khmelnytsky’s back. May, six days before the fight at Korsuń, King Władysław The was a sign of the Commonwealth’s IV Vasa died. The next battle lost by the Poles happened weakness, but it also was a blow against the Cossacks on 23–24 September 1648 at Pyliava (Piławce), where the and their attempt at gaining independence3. Although Polish troops – with a few exceptions – fled the battlefield. Joint Cossack forces under the command of Bohdan Kh- 2 W. A. Serczyk, Historia Ukrainy, Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow 1990, pp. 117–120. 3 W. A. Serczyk, Historia Ukrainy…, pp. 122–126; Islam III Giray, 1 Register – a list of the Cossacks on soldier’s pay in the Polish born 1604 – died 1654 – a khan of the Crimean Khanate in army. The registered Cossacks were most commonly the 1644–1654, the son of khan Selamet I Giray. In 1644 Sultan members of the starshyna (Polish starszyzna), the most pro- Ibrahim I appointed him the Crimean Khan. In 1648 Islam es- minent, as well as the best armed and thus the richest Cossa- tablished an alliance directed against the Polish-Lithuanian cks and their sons. Based on: L. Podhorodecki, Kozacy zaporo- Commonwealth with the Cossack hetman Bohdan Khmelnyt- scy. Czy Polska stworzyła Ukrainę?, Warsaw 2011, p. 59. sky. He participated in the siege of Zbarazh and in the battle

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the agreement ended the 1649 war campaign, it did not and intended to incite a peasant rebellion throughout calm the unrest in the Ukraine, because two most cru- Poland6. cial points were not accomplished: the return of nobil- This caused preparations to a military solution. Milit- ity banished from their land in Ukraine in 1648 and the ary operations that ended with the Battle of Berestechko completion of a 40-thousand register including only the were ongoing already in February 1651. They were centred part of the people integrated with the Cossack culture in and run by the Cossack soldiers, 30 thou- obliged to give themselves under the authority of their sand of whom entered Podolia under the command of old lords. In February 1650 there was a Cossack outbreak Danylo Nechay and Ivan Bohun7. They took over Krasne against the elders (starshyna) suppressed by Khmelnyt- 6 sky. Hetman wanted to centralise power and the Cos- Encyklopedia wojskowa (A Military Encyclopaedia), ed. O. La- skowski, vol. 1, Warsaw 1931, p. 261. sacks – accustomed to war – were against it. 7 Nechay (Niechay) Danylo, born ? – died 1651; a of the The chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński tried to peacefully settle Regiment in 1648–1651; took part in the Khmelnytsky the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s relationships Uprising. A participant of the opposition against the realisa- with the Cossacks. A possibility emerged to seal an an- tion of the Treaty of Zboriv. He took part in battles at Zbarazh ti-Turkish coalition consisting of the Republic of , and Zboriv, and in the campaign to Moldavia in 1650. Taken the Cossacks, and even the Tatars wanting to shake off prisoner by hetman S. Lanckoroński’s troops at Krasne and the dependency on Porte. However, one factor import- killed during a quarrel over a captive. Based on: Encyklopedia Wojskowa. Dowódcy i ich armie. Historia wojen i bitew. Techni- ant in that part of the world was not considered – Russia. ka wojskowa. N–Ż…, p. 18. At the beginning of 1650 there was a Russian message Ivan Bohun, born ? – died 1664. In 1649–1658 – a colonel of with a demand for the return of Smoleńsk and the pay- the Kalnik Regiment, one of the main leaders in Khmelnytsky ment of a compensation. If it wasn’t for an outbreak that Uprising. A of the Regiment. In 1651 he con- started in Moscow, Poland would face yet another war, quered and burned down . At Berestechko he ma- this time with Russia. Khmelnytsky turned to the Russian naged lead out what remained of the Cossack camp, which got encircled by the enemy. He was against the subjugation Tsar with a request for taking the Cossack nation under of the Cossacks to both Moscow (Treaty of Pereyaslav), and his care4. the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth ( In August 1650 Bohdan Khmelnytsky received the sul- 1658). In 1657–1664 colonel of Połock. During the John II tan’s protection, and a group of supporters of war with Casimir against Russia (1663–1664) he was the Acting Het- the Cossacks gained political advantage at the court of man. During the John II Casimir against Russia (1663–1664) the Polish king John Casimir. Khmelnytsky’s agreement he was the Acting Hetman. During the Swedish Bohun with Turkey destroyed the chances for an internal solu- encouraged the hetman to support the Commonwealth, and then supported his stand against Poland (Treaty of Radnot). tion to the Cossack problem, and Khmelnytsky designs After his death, Bohun was a supporter of the pro-Polish Ivan on Moldavia threatened to burden the Polish borders. In Vyhovsky, then of Yurii Khmelnytsky, until he decided to asso- response to the political and military situation, in Decem- ciate with Moscow. Bohun did not swore his allegiance to the ber 1650the Polish parliament passed an increasing of Tsar again. He fought the Russians on the Polish side, but was the number of troops in the Crown to 33 thousand, and in removed from his post and imprisoned in Malbork. Released Lithuania to 18 thousand, as well as called a levy in mass5. in 1663, he took part as the Acting Hetman in the struggle with the pro-Moscow Ivan Briukhovetsky and . He Bohdan Khmelnytsky increased the register of Cossacks then contacted Briukhovetsky and Vyhovsky, for which he was executed by firing squad on the 27th of February 1664. Based at Zboriv. In 1649 he made a treaty with the Polish side and on the Polish Biographical Dictionary: Polski Słownik Biogra- retreated, plundering Ukraine. In the battles of Berestechko ficzny, ed. W. Konopczyński, vol. II, Cracow 1936, pp. 227–229, and Żwaniec in 1653 he supported Khmelnytsky. In 1654, after entry: Ivan Bohun. the Cossack-Russian treaty in Pereieslav he crossed to the Yurii Khmelnytsky (Jerzy Chmielnicki, Juraszko), born 1640 Polish side. Islam III Giray died in 1654. Based on a military – died probably 1685, a Cossack hetman, son of Bohdan encyclopaedia: Encyklopedia Wojskowa. Dowódcy i ich armie. Khmelnytsky. During Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s life Yurii was Historia wojen i bitew. Technika wojskowa. A–M, managing ed. chosen his successor in 1657. He received his in 1659; A. Krupa, Warsaw 2007, p. 365. participant of the Cudnowo campaign run against Poland in 4 W. A. Serczyk, Historia Ukrainy…, pp. 127–128. 1660. After the defeat of the Cossacks and the Russians he 5 Ibid., p. 128. assumed sovereignty of Poland. In 1633 he renounced het-

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and started their march towards Bar, threatening the troops on the – Zbarazh front and awaited the communication lines of the Crown Field Hetman Marcin arrival of the Tatars9. Kalinowski8. Hetman Kalinowski concentrated his forces In May and June 1651 the main Polish forces were gath- at Stanyslaviv (Stanisławczyk) along the Bar-Krasne line. ering, under the command of the Crown Grand Hetman The night between the 19th and the 20th of February he Mikołaj Potocki, in a fortified camp near , blocking struck the main Cossack forces at Krasne and defeated Khmelnytsky the way into Poland10. The Polish King John them after a few-days battle (21–23 February). After the Casimir set off on a war campaign from Warsaw on the 13th battle colonel Danylo Nechay was captured and then of April 1651, and reached Sokal on May 16th the same year. died. After the victory at Krasne, Kalinowski wanted to He gathered an army of 28–30 thousand regular troops take over the area between rivers Dniester and Boh to and 30–40 thousand nobility from the levy in mass. Before stop or delay the march of the main Cossack army. Op- the Battle of Berestechko the Polish army amounted to ca. erating very slowly, he managed to move to Jampol and 70–80 thousand men. All the most prominent Polish com- reach Vinnytsia, beset by the Iwan Bohun’s regiment. The manders were present. The role of the King’s right hand city and the castle were conquered, however the siege was played by the Crown General of Artillery Zygmunt of the monastery in which Bohun took refuge along with Przyjemski, general Krzysztof Houwaldt and the military his men, was not successful. When Khmelnytsky himself judge, the Grand Hetman’s Stefan Czarniecki11. came to Bohun’s rescue, hetman Kalinowski quickly re- 9 Encyklopedia wojskowa (The Military Encyclopaedia), ed. O. La­ treated to Kamieniec, leaving behind the wounded, as s­kowski, vol. 1…, p. 261, entry: Berestechko. well as wagons and cannons. He manned the fortress 10 Potocki Mikołaj, born ca. 1593 – died 20 11 1651, castellan in with soldiers and on the 23th of April 1651 headed for Cracow and Crown Grand Hetman, alumnus of the Academy the main camp near Sokal (via Pobożno – Janowo – in Zamość. Captain, then colonel of crown troops. Participa- Kupczyńce – Pomorzany route), losing – due to a Cos- tor in the siege of Smoleńsk in 1609–1611. Was taken capti- sack-Tatar pursuit – all his wagons, cannons and many of ve by the Ottoman army in the battle of Cecora. A fellow of hetman S. Koniecpolski. A participant in the Polish-Swedish his men. It wasn’t until the 22 May that he reached Sokal war of 1626–1629. A commander in 1633 in the battle with with less than six thousand soldiers. After his attempt at Abazy, the pasha of the Ottoman province, at Kamieniec. conquering Kamieniec, Khmelnytsky concentrated his Since 1633 a general (general starost) of Podolia. 1636 – voi- vode of Bratslav, 1637 Crown Field Hetman. Quelled Cossack uprisings led by Pawluk and Huni. Opponent of plans for the manship and entered a monastery. He was held prisoner in Commonwealth’s war with the Ottoman Empire. 1646 castel- Marlbork in 1664–1667. In 1667, after hetman Petro Doroszen- lan of Cracow and Crown Grand Hetman in 1648. In 1648 defe- ko gave himself under the protection of Turkey, Yrii took lea- ated at Korsuń and taken captive by the Tatars, from which he dership of a part of the disgruntled Cossacks. Held in Turkish returned in 1650. Fought at Berestechko, and then took part in captivity since 1669. Later appointed the Prince of Sarmatia establishing a truce with the Cossacks in Bila Tserkva. Based by the sultan, and nominated for the Cossack bulawa. His on: Encyklopedia Wojskowa. Dowódcy i ich armie. Historia wo- rule over Ukraine, which was subject to Turkey, were those jen i bitew. Technika wojskowa. N–Ż…, p. 178. of tyranny. In 1681 he was called off to Stamboul. Based on: 11 R. Romański, Beresteczko 1651, Warsaw 1994, p. 106–107; Ho- Encyklopedia Wojskowa. Dowódcy i ich armie. Historia wojen uwaldt Krzysztof, German, born 1602 – died 1663, general-ma- i bitew. Technika wojskowa. A–M…, p. 145. jor of infantry, military engineer. Participated in the Emperor’s 8 Kalinowski Marcin, born 1605 – died 13 June 1652, crown field war with Venice and the Thirty Years War in Germany. Later hetman, 1632 chamberlain of Podolia, 1635 voivode of Cher- he served in the Gustaw Adolf’s army during the war again- nihiv, 1646 crown field hetman. Participated in the war with st Poland in Livonia and ; a Swedish general, the Swedes in Prussia; in 1633 he fought Russia at Smoleńsk, Saxon field marshal (went over to the Saxon side due to an in 1644 the Tatars at Ochmatów; the opponent of the Polish- unpaid soldier’s pay), a commander for the Gdańsk armed -Ottoman war planned by Władysław IV. After Khmelnytsky forces for 12 years. In 1647 due to Polish-Ottoman war plan- Uprising he was defeated at Korsuń and until 1650 held cap- ned by Władysław IV entered the Polish service. When the war tive by the Cossacks. In 1651 at Krasne he destroyed the army did not break out, he joined the Brandenburg army, and then led by Danylo Nechay. In the Battle of Berestechko Kalinowski on 10 April 1649 entered Polish service. He fought at Zboriv. commanded the army’s left wing. He died in combat at Batoh. Participated in the Berestechko campaign (developer tactical Based on: Encyklopedia Wojskowa. Dowódcy i ich armie. Histo- plans for the Battle of Berestechko). In 1652 he received a Po- ria wojen i bitew. Technika wojskowa. A–M…, p. 401. lish indygenat. Participant of the Żwaniec campaign. In 1654

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In order to secure and protect the Polish forces in Sokal, at and the city of Leśniów were burned. The Polish troops the beginning of 1651 the Crown Field Hetman stood with started to take positions outside the camp ramparts. The 12 thousand of his experienced men at Morachwa on the spreading of formations and the military operation on that border of Podolia and the Bratslav . Whereas day was conducted by John Casimir himself. The right wing the Cossack side placed about 30 thousand armed Cos- was led by the Crown Grand Hetman Mikołaj Potocki, the sacks near the Bila Tserkva, which were then joined by left wing by the Crown Field Hetman Marcin Kalinowski. about 20–25 thousand Tatars12. In the first day of battle nearly 18 thousand riders of the A false message about a retreat of the Bohdan Kh- mercenary cavalry and nearly 40 thousand men of the levy melnytsky’s army made the Polish command send the in mass stepped outside the Polish camp. The individual troops on Dubno. The march stopped when the message soldiers or small groups of soldiers from the Tatar side ap- arrived that the joint forces of the Cossacks and the Tatars proached the Polish group and challenged Polish soldiers were closing in (about 20–30 thousand strong). The Pol- to duels but to no effect, as the Poles were forbidden to ish army retreated to Berestechko. The battle started on leave the ranks. John Casimir allowed the Polish cavalry to Wednesday, on June 28 1651 and was supposed to resolve participate in duels only when it turned out that the enemy the Polish-Cossack conflict for both sides. Individual Tatar does not intend to send forth his main forces and only sent troops, the czambuls, appeared near the Polish camp reconnaissance to gather information before the fight15. already on the night before the battle. The Polish king re- While the duals were under way, a number of Tatar cz- ceived a message that a great number of horses were cap- ambuls attacked the Polish posts, provoking the expected tured, along with the servants who went against the kings confrontation. The Polish command turned the attack orders and grazed the animals on nearby grasslands 13. towards the greatest Tatar forces, breaking their ranks, The Polish side did not realise the size and strength of turning and striking three more times. However, the Polish the incoming Cossack-Tatar forces14. After pushing through attack was too weak to succeed16. the Plaszówka river crossing the Tatar czambuls spread out On Thursday, on the 29th of June 1651, ca. 8:00 a.m. across the area. They divided themselves into smaller divi- shots were heard form Korytno and the Plaszówka cross- sions and took over the surrounding hills. Villages, manors ing, which meant that the enemy was trying to push past the river crossing guarded by a group of Polish . he left the Polish army and entered the Brandenburg service. Separate units of Polish cavalry – the banners were led out After the Swedish attaca on Poland he defended the Duchy of of the camp. Only the cavalry entered the battlefield. The Prussia. Died on the 29th of November 1663. Based on the Po- infantry and a part of the dragoons were left to beset the lish Biographical Dictionary: Polski Słownik Biograficzny, ed. camp sconces and ramparts17. K. Lepszy, vol. X, Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow 1962–1964, pp. On the 29th of June the fight was joined by the whole 35–36, entry: Houwaldt Krzysztof; Zygmunt Przyjemski, born ? – died 1652, Polish artillery gene- Tatar horde strengthened by all sotnias of the mounted ral, crown field writer. Served in the French army under the Cossacks. It was a cavalry gathering of about 35–45 thou- command of Louis de Bourbon, Prince of Conde and in the Swedish under Bernard of Saxe-Weimar. In 1650 he beca- 15 Ibid., p. 155; Duels during the preparations for the final battle me a crown field writer and in 1650 became a general of the were called harce – from the Hungarian word harc – fight. The crown artillery. He led the artillery at Berestechko. It was most duelling men were the mounted soldiers outside of the main likely he who authored the battle plan. He died in combat at formation; they fought with the enemy riders or raided their Batoh. Based on: Encyklopedia Wojskowa. Dowódcy i ich ar- divisions. Such raids were called harce. In the 16th and 17th mie. Historia wojen i bitew. Technika wojskowa. N–Ż…, p. 209. centuries such a form of aggressive fighting was common 12 L. Podhorodecki, Kozacy Zaporoscy. Czy Polska stworzyła practice throughout Europe. In the Polish military soldiers Ukrainę?(Zaporozhian Cossacks. Did Poland create the Ukrai- designated to these particular duels constituted the forma- ne?), Warsaw 2011, p. 131. tion cover. They often feigned retreat to draw the enemy out 13 M. Kukiel, Zarys historii wojskowości w Polsce, Cracow 1929, of his advantageous position, provoke an attack or a chase, Reprint Poznań 2006, p. 105; Berestechko – a city in the Ukra- thus creating better fighting situation. Based on: Encyklopedia ine, in the Volyn Oblast, on the River, based on: Encyklo- Wojskowa. Dowódcy i ich armie. Historia wojen i bitew. Techni- pedia PWN w trzech tomach, vol. 1 a–h, ed. A. Krupa, Warsaw ka wojskowa. A–M…, pp. 331–332. 2006, p. 177. 16 R. Romański, Beresteczko 1651…, p. 158. 14 R. Romański, Beresteczko 1651…, p. 153. 17 Ibid., p. 164.

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sand soldiers, perhaps the biggest such battle in the his- was assisted by Stanislaw Lanckoroński. The Tatars, how- tory of the 17th-century Europe, and the engagement itself ever, encircled both regiments and forced them to defend could well be the biggest cavalry battle in the world history themselves. This was the critical moment of this stage of of that era18. the battle. The Tatars reached the bulwarks of the Polish The front of the Cossack-Tatar group crossing the camp, where they were fired on by the infantry and regi- Plaszówka reached the vicinity of the Polish camp at 8:00 ment cannons. However, the Tatars fell short of reserves a.m., and the last troops arrived a little past noon. Simil- and reduced the pressure against the left wing by getting arly to the previous day the Tatars spread out, taking over involved on the right wing and in the centre. This made it the surrounding hills and setting fire to all the buildings. possible for the Wiśniowiecki’s forces to provide effective Next they approached the posts of the Polish crown sol- assistance to the left wing of the Polish army. The threat diers, challenging them to duels. At 11:00 a.m. the Voivode was averted by a counterattack of the right wing, i.e. the of Podolia Stanisław Rewera Potocki and Stanisław Lanck- regiments of Hetman Mikołaj Potocki under the com- oroński led the attack of the Polish right wing banner. It mand of Stefan Czarnecki, and the forces of Jerzy Lub- threw off the Tatar duelling soldiers who shielded the omirski and Kazimierz Sapieha, followed by the reiters of grouping of czambuls located on the hills opposite the Boguslaw Radziwiłł under his personal command. Polish camp. Around noon the enemy finished crossing the river forces repulsed the Tatars and pursued them forgetting and the main corps of the Cossack-Tatar army reached the that escape is a favourite Tatar manoeuvre, and hence battlefield. Under the cover of the ongoing duels a power- they got surrounded by a superior Tatar and Cossack force ful division of 20–25 thousand soldiers managed to re- (perhaps by reinforcements deliberately hidden behind group near the camp. a hill)20. They escaped the encirclement owing to the help He struck the left wing of the Polish army, but was of Jeremy Wiśniowiecki regiment and mass levy units. The driven back by the attack of the Jeremy Wiśniowiecki’s re- Tatars and Cossacks attacked the gap between the right giment19. wing and the centre of the Stanisław Lanckoroński regi- A critical situation on the left wing of the Polish army ment backed by mass levy units. The threat was averted was saved by the charge of the regiment of Stanislaw only after the counter attack of the Stanislaw Rewera Po- Rewera Potocki – the Voivode of the Bratslav Voivode- tocki’s regiment and the right and left wing units, which ship. Repulsed from the left wing, the Tatars attacked the were sent to the endangered sections by John Casimir21. centrally located regiment of Szymon Szczawiński, who The intensity of fighting weakened gradually to cease en- tirely about 4 PM. Royal squadrons went back to the camp. 18 Ibid., p. 165. The Polish army found themselves in a dangerous po- 19 Ibid., p. 167; Jeremi Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki (also some- sition. They were pushed into a desperate defence. The times spelled as Jarema), was born on 17.08.1612 in Łubnie, died on 20.08.1651 in a camp near Pawołocza; he was Prince incompetence of the combat leadership of the Polish of Wiśniowiec, Łubnie and Chorol, commander of the royal command was revealed. Every senior commander acted army, the Voivod of the since 1646, on his own and he commanded his troops only. There was Staroste of Przemyśl, , , Hadziacz, Kaniów no co-ordination between various forces, which resulted region. He was the father of the Polish king Michał Korybut in the recurring uncertainty. The Poles suffered significant Wiśniowiecki. He participated in the war with Moscow in losses – about 300 soldiers while the Tatars lost about one 1633–1634 and in the demonstration manoeuvres against the thousand fighters, including leaders such as Tugay Bey Swedes in Pomerania, he fought against the Cossack Ostrza- nin Uprising. He fought battles with the Tatars, among others and Mehmed Gerey and the captured treasurer, Muffrach. in the Battle of Ochmatów. He was a bitter opponent of the Khan was dissatisfied with the course of the battle, but . During the elections in 1648, he initial- achieved his objective – the controlled the river crossing ly supported Jerzy Rakoczy, later Charles Ferdinand Vasa. He and the area around the camp22. The Poles debated their commanded the defence of Zbarazh; he was an opponent of strategy for the future actions. The plan was to fight the the Treaty of Zboriv signed with the Cossacks in 1649. He died suddenly during an expedition against the Cossacks, which caused rumours that he was poisoned. Quoted from: Encyklo- 20 R. Romański, Beresteczko 1651…, pp. 168–169. pedia Wojskowa. Dowódcy i ich armie. Historia wojen i bitew. 21 Ibid., p. 171. Technika wojskowa. N–Ż…, p. 445. 22 Ibid., p. 171.

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battle in a (tabor) array. John Casimir, how- and the one-hundred-men cavalry units guarding them. ever, decided to use the offensive option: to field all the The Polish cavalry wedge smashed through the enemy forces and force the opponent to fight a decisive battle. lines, breaking the Cossack masses and attacking wagon At that time, at night, under the cover of Tatar armoured fort. The critical situation of the Cossack wing was saved spearheads, the Cossack infantry and artillery crossed the by a counterattack of Tatar forces of Nurredin Sultan. The Plaszówka river and occupied the positions on the hills Nurredin Sultan’s cavalry posed a threat to the Polish re- between the marshes of Plaszówka and the Szczurowiecki giments that were facing the wagon fort and fighting the forest23. Cossacks who defended it. The units that were trying to On 30 June 1651, the Polish forces were arranged in assist Wiśniowiecki rushed into the crowd of Tatars and a Western European army manner, which consisted in po- were surrounded by them, but this event made it possible sitioning the army in a chess board deployment with the for Wiśniowiecki to change the front of the squadrons. The fields formed alternately by cavalry and infantry squad- Polish artillery placed in the centre began firing. After driv- rons that were able at any time to support each other in ing out the Tatar cavalry, Wiśniowiecki broke through the the fight. John Casimir commanded the forces of 35,000– Cossack one-hundred-men cavalry units, forcing them to 40,000 mercenaries (both the supplemental army enlisted flee in the direction of the wagon forts. At the same time soldiers and the private military) and 40,000 of mass levy as the charge of the squadrons of the left wing, the centre units. The cavalry squadrons were grouped mainly in the moved to attack26. wings whereas in the centre there was the army and for- The fight continued on the Cossack wing, where a group eign-style forces composed of dragoons, reiters with ar- of Wiśniowiecki and Kalinowski attacked Zaporozhye in- quebuses and infantry. There were reinforcements made fantry intending to break and capture the Cossack wagon up of reserve reiter cavalry of the Elector of Brandenburg fort. Tatar troops tried to stop the Polish forces twice, but and other mass levy forces24. The troop deployment took their charges were interrupted by the fire of artillery, dra- place under the personal supervision of the King. The en- goons and infantry. Polish infantry units were slow, but emy was grouped relatively far away from the front of the consistently moved towards the top of the hill in the centre Royal army. The Cossack troops lined up on the right wing, of the enemy ranks, attempting to breach them and cut the Tatars under the command of Amurat, the brother of the communication between the Tatar and the Cossack Islam-Gerey were deployed on the left and partially in the wing. During the battle, both John Casimir and the Tatar centre. The Tatars were also placed in the centre, which Khan were exposed o danger. The Polish King was fired on was composed of Tatar, Walachian and Turkish forces un- from Tatar field cannons and slightly wounded in the leg. der the command of Nurredin Sultan and Sultan Kalga. The The Polish artillery commanded by Zygmunt Przyjemski Khan took a position behind the left wing by the forest25. fired at the position of the Khan and killed an unidentified The battle was started by Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, who dignitary standing next to the ruler27. asked for permission to attack as late as at 3 PM. The clash From the centre, the Tatars were struck by the left wing began with the charge of the regular army cavalry squad- forces of Jeremi Wiśniowiecki. The Tatars’ situation be- rons, which consisted of about 2,000 cavalry. At the spear- came critical. Islam-Gerey was terrified by the prospect of head there was Jeremi Wiśniowiecki without armour. The clash with all the power of the Polish army. Khan’s rear- attack was led towards the Cossacks wing in the direction guard was obliterated by the Polish cavalry riding from of a wagon fort and the troops who were digging trenches the right wing. The Tatar forces were pursued by the right wing squadrons, mainly by the regiment of Koniecpolski. 23 Ibid., pp. 172–173. The Tatars fled in panic, leaving the dead and wounded. 24 Ibid., pp. 175–176. The escape of the Khan and his troops from the battle 25 Ibid., p. 178; Sultan Kalga was the Khan’s steward and ad- decided the outcome of the Battle of Berestechko, all ministrator of the right (east) region of the Khanate and the the more that Bohdan Khmelnytsky was gone along with commander of the Tatar right wing of the army. Nureddin Sul- tan was the second steward of the Khan, the administrator of the left (western) region of the Khanate and the commander 26 Ibid., p. 181–182; M. Kukiel, Zarys historii wojskowości w Pol- of the left wing of the army. Quoted from: M. Wagner, Wojna sce…, p. 108. polsko-turecka w latach 1672–1676, vol. 1, Zabrze 2009, p. 145. 27 R. Romański, Beresteczko 1651…, pp. 181–189.

– 108 – – The Battle of Berestechko 28–30 June 1651 –

– 109 – – Rafał Roguski –

the Khan. The Horde’s main forces retreated through not know the Hetman’s plans and thought that he was the road towards Kozin-Krzemieniec and further to running away with the elders, leaving them at the mercy Wiśniowiec, and its rearguard fled to Leśniów. This group of the enemy. Panic ensued in the camp. The Hetman of Tatars was chased and captured by light squadrons and mounted Cossacks who started leaving the camp in of Aleksander Koniecpolski when crossing the Ikva river. order to organise a crossing were followed by everyone. They were saved from extermination by the king’s order to Convinced that Cossacks launched a massive assault on give up the pursuit for fear of ambushes. his regiment, Lanckoroński ordered his forces to with- The Polish assault was interrupted by a heavy rain. draw towards Korytno and Kozin. However, when they Throughout the night, the Poles were waiting in readiness realised what was happening in reality on the battlefield, in the pouring rain. During that time, the Cossacks man- the Royal troops marched into the enemy camp and star- aged to dig up their wagon fort28. The casualties suffered ted a slaughter. “[…] Our army entered the camp and by the Polish forces during the three-day battle included massacred every Cossack they found while others chased only 700 soldiers and nobles from the mass levy. Cossack them a few miles. Over 10,000 of them were killed this casualties are not known, but were certainly many times day. The Cossacks were deprived of their banners and the higher than the Polish. banners given formerly to Cossacks by our kings […] The The decisive battle at Berestechko was intended to be King and the whole army sang Te Deum Laudamus celeb- fought in defensive-offensive way. The decision to attack rating the victory […] Meanwhile, the servants and nobles was taken only after it was noticed that the Cossack wagon plundered the enemy camp. They seized large quantities fort crew started to build trenches. The infantry and artil- of food, clothing, animals, bells, vessels, various types of lery, guarded by the cavalry in the centre, was ordered to rifles, money. The cannons were given the King“30. fire at the Tatar cavalry, which was vulnerable to firearms. The evening’s council decided to order Marcin Kalin- The Cossacks were attacked by cavalry, which knew how owski, Jeremi Wiśniowiecki and Aleksander Koniecpolski to engage the enemy infantry that operated using the pro- to pursue the insurgents. During the fighting, they killed tection of the wagon fort. The cavalry could even quite ef- anyone who fell under the sword. No women, children fectively attempt to break wagon fort29. and priests found with the Cossack army were spared. When the battle came to the end, the remains of the They captured the Seal of the Zaporozhye Army, the ori- Cossack army found shelter in the fortified wagon fort. ginal document of the Treaty of Zboriv, the mail between The encircled group of Cossacks showed signs of de- Khmelnytsky and the Sultan, Khan and György Rákóczi II, feat. There was no leader with any authority. Previously, a considerable sum of money and other valuables. The this role was played Bohdan Khmelnytsky; afterwards, number of Cossack casualties could not be established. the Cossack peasant infantry (a type of mass levy) did Today it is estimated at 3,000–30,000. Most likely, over not want to listen to the colonels. The commanders of 10,000 people were killed in the pursuit31. the Polish army, hearing the buzz of voices in the Cos- However, the victory of Berestechko was not properly sack camp, ordered an emergency, convinced that they exploited since mass levy nobility, concerned about the are preparing to counter-attack. The turmoil resulted in anti-feudal incidents in Podhale and Wielkopolska (Greater fact from the resignation of Filon Dzhalalii from the Het- Poland), refused to participate in the rest of the campaign. man title and appointment of Ivan Bohun to fulfil this The mercenary army reduced to 18,000 soldiers as a result function. The new Hetman accelerated the work on the of combat losses, marches and plagues marched into the construction of crossings over the Plaszówka river, where Ukraine and merged with the Lithuanians at Bila Tserkva. he intended to escape with the Cossack forces from Meanwhile, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, freed from the Tatar the encirclement, and then to strike the Lanckoroński’s bondage, managed to organise new military forces, which forces and provide an opportunity for the rest of the in- put up stiff resistance. The Polish army was too weak to surgents to get out as well. However, the insurgents did force a favourable outcome of the campaign. After several

28 M. Kukiel, Zarys historii wojskowości w Polsce…, pp. 108–109. 29 W. Majewski, ‘Polska sztuka wojenna w drugiej połowie XVII 30 W. A. Serczyk, Na płonącej Ukrainie. Dzieje Kozaczyzny 1648– wieku’, in Historia wojskowości polskiej. Wybrane zagadnienia, 1651, Warsaw 1998, p. 346. ed. W. Biegański, P. Stawecki, J. Wojtasik, Warsaw 1972, p. 201. 31 Ibid., p. 347.

– 110 – – The Battle of Berestechko 28–30 June 1651 –

days of fights at Bila Tserkva (23–28 September), Hetman Prince Charles Ferdinand wrote about mass levy fleeing Potocki signed a new treaty. It limited Cossack conscrip- from the King. He concluded his dilatation with the words: tion census to 20,000, setting Voivodeship as their “We have learned well what it means to wage wars with headquarters. The others “are to remain under mass levies. God forbid this ever happens’35. It was not and works for the castles of His Majesty’. This treaty was in enough that the Polish King as a personal example went fact not put into effect and represented only a short‑term into the Ukraine and reached as far as Krzemieniec. The ceasefire32. Vice-Chancellor Radziejowski accused the monarch of de- Cossacks routed in one place, gathered in another. Re- liberate releases of Cossacks from encirclement. Only the leased by the Tatars, Khmelnytsky managed to concen- Hetmans with the army followed the King. Seeing the futil- trate 50,000 people at Bila Tserkva, while noble mass levy ity of his endeavours, the King returned to Warsaw36. began to disperse to their homes. Abandoning of the Royal Army by the King and part In military terms, the Battle of Berestechko was a sig- of the leadership commanders after the Battle of Ber- nificant step forward in the development of tactics of the estechko had a negative impact on the discipline and mor- Polish infantry and artillery. They worked not only with the ale of the troops that continued the campaign against the use of fire, but also by means of the movement of artillery, Cossacks under the command of Hetmans Mikołaj Potocki the movement of light three-pound regiment cannons. and Marcin Kalinowski. The army ranks were left by Prince Synchronising the fire and movement, both the infantry Bogusław Radziwiłł and Krzysztof Houwaldt. “All the cap- and artillery acted offensively against the Tatar cavalry, tains were ordered by the King to stay with their squad- with unguarded right wing. Infantry easily manoeuvred on rons, but many of them escaped’37. the battlefield (changing the direction towards the Cossack On the Cossack side, Khmelnytsky conducted a very wagon fort). On the third day of the Battle of Berestechko, clever political game in the period in question. He man- there were endeavours to co-ordinate the activities of in- aged to isolate the Polish-Lithuanian State, which could dividual weapons. “The Przyjemski’s artillery supported not count on the support from Russia or Transylvania, the attack of Wiśniowiecki’s cavalry with diagonal fire’ and and all the more from Tatars. He secured his back and “a whole bunch of infantry under the command of the King managed to win the support of some allies. As a military manoeuvred during the assault in order to co-operate with commander, however, Khmelnytsky made mistakes by the struggling left wing cavalry’. The infantry alone would losing the initiative to the Polish side. He let the King John not be able to counteract the return of the defeated Tatar Casimir decide the direction of the conducted military op- cavalry to the battlefield, which was achieved only by the erations, and later to choose the location of the decisive pursuit of the right wing cavalry33. Despite this, during the battle, the Battle of Berestechko. He also failed to protect Khmelnytsky Uprising, the infantry played a major role, Kiev against the Lithuanian army of Janusz Radziwiłł. In not only in the defence of the besieged fortresses and for- the campaign of 1651, Khmelnytsky showed a lot of con- tified camps, but also in some of the battles in the open servatism, which was one of the causes of the Cossack and field. Its fire frequently was the decisive factor in the battle Tatar defeat at Berestechko38. against the Tatars allied with the Cossacks. In particular, Contacts of Hetman Khmelnitsky with Russia were it was in the battle of Berestechko. Deployed in the West- more important for the Cossacks than further war plans. European style, the infantry skilfully combined musket fire The Battle of Berestechko and the subsequent skirmishes with manoeuvre34. and battles have shown that it is hard to defeat the Pol- The nobility refused to participate in further campaigns ish-Lithuanian Commonwealth even with the assistance against the Cossacks in the Ukraine. This forced the Pol- of Tatars. Therefore, Khmelnytsky reached an agreement ish monarch to withdraw from the military operations and with the Russian Tsar Alexei, the Treaty of Pereyaslav to pass the leadership to the Grand Hetman of the Crown 35 Mikołaj Potocki. A. Miaskowski in correspondence with M. Nagielski, ‘Armia koronna w latach 1651–1653’, in Studia i materiały do Historii Wojskowości, vol. XL, p. 25. 32 Ibid., p. 348. 36 W. A. Serczyk, Na płonącej Ukrainie…, p. 347. 33 W. Majewski, Polska sztuka wojenna…, p. 201. 37 M. Nagielski, Armia koronna w latach 1651–1653…, p. 31. 34 Historia wojskowości polskiej. Wybrane zagadnienia, Warsaw 38 M. Franz, Idea państwa kozackiego na ziemiach ukrainnych 1972, p. 172. w XVI–XVII wieku, Toruń 2006, p. 303.

– 111 – – Rafał Roguski –

signed in 1654, under which Ukraine accepted the Russia’s Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth revealed its weakness. authority. In the year 1667, the was Well-organised and able to use the latest achievements in signed resulting in the division of the Ukraine between military thought, the Polish army lacked discipline after Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It was the end of the battle. The mass levy was a particularly confirmed by the Eternal Peace Treaty signed in Moscow serious weakness as it refused to continue fighting and in 1686 by Grzymułtowski39. dispersed to their homes. After the victory at the Battle The Battle of Berestechko did not bring the results pro- of Berestechko, the war continued. At the later stage, the portional to the achieved victory, neither in military nor in Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was defeated at the political terms. The routed Cossack army managed to re- Battle of Batoh, which ended with the massacre of Polish build its fighting capacity, and the victorious forces of the prisoners.

39 W. A. Serczyk, Na płonącej Ukrainie…, pp. 348–349.

Bibliography Books Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, vol. XL, Warsaw 2003 Encyklopedia PWN w trzech tomach, vol. 1 a–h, ed. A. Krupa, M. Franz, Idea państwa kozackiego na ziemiach ukrainnych w XVI– Warsaw 2006 –XVII wieku, Toruń 2006 Encyklopedia wojskowa , ed. O. Laskowski, vol. 1, Warsaw 1931 M. Kukiel, Zarys historii wojskowości w Polsce, Cracow 1929 Encyklopedia Wojskowa. Dowódcy i ich armie. Historia wojen L. Podhorodecki, Kozacy zaporoscy. Czy Polska stworzyła Ukrainę?, i bitew. Technika wojskowa. A–M, ed. A. Krupa, Warsaw 2007 Warsaw 2011 Historia wojskowości polskiej. Wybrane zagadnienia, ed. W. Bie- R. Romański, Beresteczko 1651, Warsaw 1994 gański, P. Stawecki, J. Wojtasik, Warsaw 1972 W. A. Serczyk, Historia Ukrainy, Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow 1990 Polski Słownik Biograficzny, ed. W. Konopczyński, vol. II, Cracow W. A. Serczyk, Na płonącej Ukrainie. Dzieje Kozaczyzny 1648–1651, 1936 Warsaw 1998 Polski Słownik Biograficzny, ed. K. Lepszy, vol. X, Wrocław–War- M. Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka w latach 1672–1676, vol. 1, saw–Cracow 1962–1964 Zabrze 2009

– 112 – – Mirosław Nagielski – University of Warsaw

The Chudniv Campaign of 1660

There is rich literature on the campaign of Chudniv con- Russian historians; essential publications that ought to ducted in Ukraine by both hetmans – Stanisław Rewera Po- be mentioned here include works by V. Gerasimchuk,10 M. tocki and Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski. The subject was dis- Kostomarov11 or A.V. Malov.12 cussed by W. Czermak,1 F.R. Gawroński in his work on Yurii The end of the war with Sweden (the treaty of Oliva of Khmelnytsky,2 A. Hniłko,3 and, in recent times, P. Kroll,4 Ł. 3rd May 1660) gave the Polish-Lithuanian side the oppor- Ossoliński,5 R. Romański,6 or, from the point of view of Pol- tunity to take action in the eastern theatre of war, where, ish-Tartar rivalry, Z. Wójcik.7 The issue of the manpower of following Ivan Khovansky’s offensive in Lithuania and the the Polish forces participating in this campaign has been defeat of Ivan Vyhovsky in Ukraine, the Muscovite forces addressed by J. Wimmer.8 In order to present the course of of Aleksey Mikhailovich once again took the initiative. The the Chudniv campaign it is necessary to discuss the milit- downfall of Hetman I. Vyhovsky and Yurii Khmelnytsky’s ary actions in , where the Polish-Lithuanian ascension to power were particularly severe. The new forces took offensive action against the Tsar’s army under hetman was forced to sign the Pereyaslav Artices with I. Khovansky; the battles have been discussed in detail by Moscow on 27th October 1659, which ceded much of his K. Kossarzecki.9 The operations at Chudniv, Liubar and power to Tsar’s voivods.13 The Commonwealth could not Slobodyshche were an object of interest of Ukrainian and assist I. Vyhovsky in defending the union of Hadiach due to difficult operations against the Swedes in Royal Prussia 1 W. Czermak, ‘Szczęśliwy rok. Dzieje wojny moskiewsko- and a confederation formed by a portion of the army of the -polskiej z r.1660’, in Przegląd Polski, vol. 82, 83 and 107 from Crown under Military Prefect Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski.14 1886–1893. 2 F.R. Gawroński, Ostatni Chmielniczenko, Poznań 1919 Though the confederation was dissolved in early Septem- 3 A. Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku, Warsaw 1931; ber, due to the change of the Zaporozhian hetman and the idem, ‘Bitwa pod Słobodyszczem’, in Przegląd Historyczno- new relations between Cossacks and Moscow, sending -Wojskowy, vol. 1–2, Warsaw 1929. any major force to Ukraine could hardly be imagined. 4 P. Kroll, Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudnowa. Kozaczyzna między Rzecząpospolitą a Moskwą w latach 1658–1660, Warsaw 2008, 10 V. Gerasimczuk, Cudnivskaja kampania 1660 r., Lvov 1913; pp. 331–394 idem, ‘Pered cudnivskoyu kampaneyu’, in Naukovyy Zbirnyk 5 Ł. Ossoliński, Cudnów-Słobodyszcze 1660, Zabrze 2006. prysvyacheny profesorovy Mykhaylovy Hrushevskomu, Lvov 6 R. Romański, Cudnów 1660, Warsaw 1996. 1906. 7 Z. Wójcik, ‘Rywalizacja polsko-tatarska o Ukrainę na przeło- 11 M. Kostomarov, ‘Getmanstvo Yuriya Khmelnytskogo’, in Isto- mie lat 1660–1661’, in Przegląd Historyczny, vol. XLV/4, Warsaw richeskiye monografii i issledovaniya Nikolaya Kostomarova, 1960, p. vol.XII, St Petersburg 1872. 8 J. Wimmer, Wojsko polskie w drugiej połowie XVII wieku, War- 12 A.W. Małow, Moskovskiye vybornyye polki soldatskogo stroya v saw 1965, pp. 125–131; cf.: idem, ‘Materiały do zagadnienia nachal’nyy period svoyey istorii 1656–1671, Moscow 2006. liczebności i organizacji armii koronnej w latach 1660–1667’, 13 P. Kroll, Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudnowa…, pp. 318–326 in Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, vol. VI, Warsaw 14 More on the confederation: E. Janas, Konfederacja wojska 1960, page numbers missing. koronnego w latach 1661–1663. Dzieje i ideologia, Lublin 1998, 9 K. Kossarzecki, Kampania roku 1660 na Litwie, Zabrze 2005. pp. 26–32.

– 113 – – Mirosław Nagielski –

In the spring of 1660, due to the initiation of peace the Berezina and the Dnieper Rivers created new oppor- talks with Sweden, the royal court began preparation for tunities for the forces of the Crown heading towards the an offensive in the eastern theatre of war, which aimed Ukrainian theater of war.17 The concentration of both di- at regaining Ukraine and White Ruthenia. Russians oc- visions lasted long, as the cavalry from the division under cupied key cities and strongholds of the Grand Duchy of the grand marshal of the Crown reached Horodło in late Lithuania, including Vilnius, and after Y. Khmelnytsky’s July, and the infantry gathered near Kryłów around 19th forces had surrendered to the Tsar, they controlled not August. At the same time, troops were being concentrated only Left-bank Ukraine, but also the right-bank Ukraine under S.R. Potocki, the grand hetman of the Crown. His of the Commonwealth. The king and the forces gathered near Ternopil. The two divisions and Tatar senate were aware of the fact that unpaid soldiers, whose reinforcements under Nuradyn-Soltan Safer joined as late number amounted to 54 thousand, could not be kept for as 9th September.18 a long time because it exceeded financial capability of the What were the forces of the Crown and the Tatar re- state. In total, according to J. Wimmer’s calculations, on inforcements on the eve of the Chudniv campaign like? the eve of the Chudniv campaign the army of the Crown Within J. Lubomirski’s division we see: 9 infantry regi- had 224 units with 38,976 horses and portions in total. ments with 7761 portions, including the hetman’s own This, after deducting so called ‘blind’ portions15 for both Hungarian foot company under Kalinowski (100 portions), cavalry and infantry officers, meant about 35 thousand 3 regiments and 2 squadrons of dragoons, 2107 por- men. The most significant task of the commanders was to tions in total, 2 regiments and a squadron of reiters with regroup forces from the territory of the Crown to the east- 1453 horses and 4 cavalry regiments (Jerzy Lubomirski’s, ern theatre of war. Thus, ’s troops return- Aleksander Lubomirski’s, Stanisław Lubomirski’s and Jan ing from Denmark marched to Podlasie in order to support Sobieski’s). S.R. Potocki’s division consisted of the follow- weak Lithuanian forces under Paweł Sapieha, as the main ing units of all types of weapons: 4 foreign foot regiments armies, led by Aleksander Połubiński and Michał Kazimierz and 4 Polish infantry regiments with 3020 portions, 5 regi- Pac, stayed in Courland. ments and 3 squadrons of dragoons with 2986 portions in The armies of the Crown, which besieged Malbork and total, J. Zamoyski’s reiter regiment with 586 horses and the Elbląg, including the HRM’s guard regiment under F. von remaining cavalry of the national contingent divided into Lüdinghausen Wolff or detachments under Jan Sapieha, 13 regiments. The army was led by Hetman S. Potocki him- the field scribe of the Crown.16 self, Anrzej – the voivod of Bratslav, Andrzej – the starosta The council of war held in Warsaw in May 1660, and of , Jakub – son of the castellan of Cracow, mem- participated by the king, was a decisive action against bers of the , Stanisław Jabłonowski, Samuel the Russian offensive under Khovansky, who had seized Leszczyński, Mariusz Jaskólski, Jerzy Bałaban and Jan Brest-Litovsk. The council decided to relocate the army Wyhowski. In total, both hetmans’ armies, which stationed by splitting it into two parts. S. Czarniecki and his divi- in a camp near Starokostiantyniv, consisted of: sion were to reinforce the Lithuanians in order to oppose – infantry, 10861 portions, i.e. about 9800 men the Russians under Khovansky, and S.R. Potocki, the – dragoons, 5093 portions, i.e. about 4600 men grand hetman of the Crown, together with Tatar forces, – reiters, 2039 horses, i.e. about 1800 men was sent to Ukraine; J.S. Lubomirski’s division remained – cavalry of the national contingent, 13,804 horses, i.e. in reserve, but it was also sent to Ukraine after signing about 12,400 men. peace terms with the Swedes. The Polish-Lithuanian vic- In total, there were 31,797 portions and horses, i.e. tory over I. Khovansky at Polonka, on 27th June 1660, and 28,800 soldiers, which, including the Tartar reinforce- the initiation of the offensive operation directed towards ments estimated at 15 thousand men,19 amounts to

15 Portion was general unit of account of soldiers’ pay. About 17 The campaign in White Ruthenia is thoroughly discussed by K. 10% portions (called ‘blind’ portions) was allocated for offi- Kossarzecki, Kampania roku 1660 na Litwie…, pp. 201–300. cers’ salary, thus number of portions was not equal to the ac- 18 A. Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku…, pp. 37–38. tual size of the army. 19 Some authors estimate that the Tatar forces were smaller and 16 J. Wimmer, Wojsko polskie w drugiej połowie XVII wieku…, p. did not exceed 12, due to the absence of the khan, see: Ł. Os- 126. soliński, Cudnów-Słobodyszcze 1660…, p. 102.

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about 43 thousand men fit for fighting.20 These forces tion. Their manpower did not exceed a dozen or so thou- were hardened in battle after the campaigns against the sand men, due to serious problems with recruiting troops Swedes, Brandenburgians and Transilvanians of ‘the De- in Ukraine because of the military operations carried out luge’, and many a soldier remembered the war in Ukraine from 1648 onwards. The Cossack corps certainly did not preceding the outbreak of the conflict with Charles Gustav. amount to 20 thousand men, as A. Hniłko stated, consid- The Polish-Tatar forces faced the Russo-Cossack ering the fact that the main Cossack army had not yet fin- armies. The manpower of the latter cannot be easily es- ished gathering near Bila Tserkva, and is believed to have timated. Vasili Borisevich Sheremetev’s army consisted of had 30–35 thousand men divided into 8 regiments.23 The three divisions: his own, Osip Shcherbatov’s and Grigori Polish side overestimated the Cossack forces both in the Kozlovski’s. They were accompanied by Cossack forces un- Muscovite encampment and in the division led by the new der Tymofiy Tsetsura, the colonel of Pereyaslav. Their re- Zaporozhian hetman, Y. Khmelnytsky. In his Climacteres, spective manpower amounted to: Sheremetev’s division – W. Kochowski explicitly stated that Tsetsura had been ac- about 10 thousand men, O. Shcherbatov’s division – 3900 companied by 30 thousand, and young Yurii by 40 thou- men, G. Kozlovski’s division – 5400 men; in total – about sand Cossacks, which proved to have been exaggerated by 19 thousand regular soldiers, not including over a dozen almost a half.24 thousand ‘loose men’ accompanying the Muscovite corps. Such a superficial calculation leads to the clear conclu- As far as the unit types are concerned, Sheremetev’s forces sion that it was necessary for the Poles to crush the Mus- included: covite forces under Sheremetev before they joined Yurii – cavalry of the national contingent, i.e. mounted boy- Khmelnytsky’s army. For the enemies had at their disposal ars, with 5100 horses an army of well-nigh 80 thousand men in two large divi- – foreign reiters, estimated at about 6 thousand horses sions.25 The Polish-Tatar side could deploy about 40 thou- – dragoons, with 4000 portions sand soldiers, not including servants and loose men, who – infantry, with about 4000 portions, consisting of both always accompanied regular forces. Unlike the Muscovite foreign regiments, as well as a Russian marksmen regi- force, well prepared for the campaign in terms of logist- ment under Levontovich. ics and food supply, the Polish army was hungry and un- In total, the Muscovite army is estimated at 30–34 thou- derpaid, and provisions had to be transported by foragers sand men.21 It is worth noticing that the Russian army in- from areas increasingly distant from the encampment. cluded a few foreign units, consisting of Germans, Swedes, Who held the chief command of both armies that were Englishmen, Dutchmen and people of other nationalities. to fight at Liubar and Slobodyshche? The Polish army was For example, selected infantry regiments were led by von led by both hetmans of the Crown; Grand Hetman Stan- Staden and Craffort, while one of the regiments 22 was led by von Howen. 23 A. Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku…, pp. 50–51. The Muscovite forces were accompanied by six regi- 24 Historya panowania Jana Kazimierza przez nieznajomego ments of Cossacks under acting hetman Tymofiy Tsetsura, autora, ed. E. Raczyński, vol. II, Poznań 1840, pp. 84–85. The the colonel of Pereyaslav. Apart from the hetman, they low evaluation of the Cossack forces is confirmed by Samuel were led by Pavel Apostol (), Vasili Dvoretsky Leszczyński’s poem of 1660, describing the battle of Chudniv, where we read: (Kiev), Fedir Zhuchenko (), Anikiy Silich (Chernihov) ‘Tsetsura counted his Cossacks, under him there served and Yakov Zasadka (). These regiments originated Thirty thousand, to those who observed from the Left-bank Ukraine and supported the Russian op- They resembled not men, but rather cattle As they hideously crowded in the field of battle’ 20 J. Wimmer, Wojsko polskie w drugiej połowie XVII wieku…, pp. S. Leszczyński, Potrzeba z Szeremetem, hetmanem moskiewskim 129–130. i z Kozakami w roku pańskim 1660 od Polaków wygrana, ed. 21 R. Romański, Cudnów 1660…, pp. 18–19. Ł. Ossoliński estima- P.Borek, Cracow 2006, p.56. tes the regular Russian army at 19,200 men, not including the 25 A. Hniłko overestimates Sheremetev’s forces stating that they servants at the encampment and the acting hetman Tymofi consisted of 11,200 cavalry, 4000 dragoons, 24 thousand regu- Tsetsura’s corps, which accompanied Sheremetev’s troops. lar infantry, about 10 thousand levée en masse infantry and Ł. Ossoliński, Cudnów-Słobodyszcze 1660…, pp. 102–103. 50 cannons. A. Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku…, 22 R. Romański, Cudnów 1660…, pp. 18–19 p. 52.

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isław Rewera Potocki, was the nominal commander of took place as early as on 14th September, when the cavalry this force. He had served under Żółkiewski and Koniec- reconnaissance troops brought the news of approaching polski and tried to regain king John II Casimir’s trust as Russo-Cossack army. The enemy’s vanguard, consisting atonement for the events of 1655. The actual command of T. Tsetsura’s men, was crushed. 600 Cossacks were re- was held by the younger Field Hetman Jerzy Lubomirski, portedly killed, and the Polish-Tatar troops captured many whom A. Hniłko rightly described as ‘the heart and the wagons. On the next day, both armies prepared for a de- brain of this expedition’, as he was HRM’s trusted official. cisive battle. The Poles were waiting for their infantry and Unlike his senior colleague, he was not only successful in artillery, Sherevemtev entrenched his camp before com- operations based solely on cavalry, but he could also use bat. The Russo-Cossack force occupied the place known other types of units: infantry, dragoons and artillery, which as Kutishche, and the camp was headed towards the area he proved when he commanded the siege of Toruń in the known as Pola Hanczaryskie, where the Poles were expec- autumn of 1658. The Tatar reinforcements sent by Khan ted to come from. The Verbka River, swamps and forests Mehmed IV Giray were led by Nuradyn-Soltan Safer Giray, covered the sides and the rear of Sheremetev’s camp. known to Poles for his earlier operations in Ukraine. Their Though the Russians held a defensive position, they run manpower was estimated at between 12 and 15 thousand into difficulties with finding fresh water and forage for their sabres, though contemporary sources provide us with horses. The Polish camp had been set up near Liubar, and numbers reaching even 40 thousand.26 the Tatars settled by the lower course of the Verbka River, The command over the Muscovite forces was held by north of that town. On 16th September the battle over the Vasili Borisevich Sheremetev, the voivod of Kiev, firmly hill overseeing the area began. The hill was occupied by keeping the Cossacks of the Left-bank Ukraine under the the dragoons of the royal guard under Col. Jan Henryk Tsar’s power. He was known to the Polish commanders von Alten-Bockum. The troops were pushed back by the from the battle of Ochmatów, fought in January 1655. He Muscovite cavalry, and their retreat was stopped by Maj. enjoyed Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich’s support, granted for Jan Magnus von Ochab’s infantry company from the field his successes in inducing Y. Khmelnytsky to accept the hetman’s foot regiment, whose actual commander was Lt articles of Pereyaslav and in repelling the Cossack attack Col. Mikołaj Ghissa. The Russian infantry tried to surround on Kiev led by Daniel Vyhovsky in 1659. Sheremetev was Polish infantry, but it suffered great casualties inflicted by an outstanding Muscovite commander of his time; he was cavalry led by Dymitr Wiśniowiecki and Jakub Potocki. consistent in action and enjoyed great authority among After chasing away the enemy infantry, the horsemen his men. approached the Muscovite wagon fort, from which they During the council of war in Starokostiantyniv, two were fired at by the artillery. The grand hetman’s troops concepts of conducting the military action against Shere- did not manage to break the positions held by the Russian metev’s forces were confronted. One of them was to wait for infantry. the Russian army, which was heading for Liubar; the other The forces on the right flank, led by J. Lubomirski, fought was to surprise them on their way, which would require with varying luck. The Cossacks in front of the wagon fort leaving the camp immediately. The Poles decided to de- were struck by cavalry under Jan Sobieski, Jan Sapieha part from Starokostiantyniv, and following the Sluch River and Ivan Vyhovsky, followed by Stefan Niemirycz’s and via Ostropol, head towards Liubar, to confront the Russian Krzyszof Korycki’s foot regiments. Cossacks were forced forces under Sheremetev directly.27 The first skirmishes to flee to the wagon fort. Meanwhile, Safer Giray’s horde, having noticed the Polish success and desirous of loot, at- 26 ‘Soltan came [to Starokostiantyniv] with hordes that num- tacked the Muscovite wagon fort and the Russian gunners bered 40 thousand sabres, not including servants in the en- had no difficulty in repelling them with fire from muskets campment’; see: ‘Diariusz wojny z Szeremetem i Cieciurą and cannons. When one of the Tatars was shot and pinned półkownikiem perejasławskim, która się odprawowała w mcu to the ground by his horse, the Cossacks ran at him from wrześniu, październiku i listopadzie roku 1660’, in Ojczyste behind the walls, hoping to take him captive. The horde, spominki w pismach do dziejów dawnej Polski, ed. A. Grabow- ski, vol. I, Cracow 1845, p. 144. known for their cunning, charged at the Cossacks once 27 Cf. map of the Chudniv campain of 1660, by M. Krwawicz and T. Nowak, in Zarys dziejów wojskowości polskiej do roku 1864, ed. J. Sikorski, vol. II, Warsaw 1966, p. 104.

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again and, chasing them, entered the part of the Muscov- piercing deeply into the enemy’s left flank. In the even- ite encampment garrisoned by Tsetsura’s men. The Tatars ing, the Muscovite formation, having marched for 2 miles, were followed by light Polish horsemen, and even some reached a muddy rivulet known as Ibr, that hindered the infantry companies under Gen. Maj. Grotthauz. Lubomirski wagons from moving further. The Poles did not manage himself did not give permission for general assault of that to stop the enemy at the crossing, because the infantry part of the camp, because Sheremetev managed to recre- and artillery were far behind the cavalry that blocked the ate the defensive front within the encampment, and the moving convoy. They managed to crush only the portion fights could have ended in heavy casualties among the of Muscovite infantry and Cossack force that was stuck cavalry, for the Cossacks fired their guns at their horses. at the crossing. The night allowed Sheremetev to move Both sides suffered major losses, but the outcome of this further away from the ford and recreate the wagon fort struggle led Sheremetev to realise that the Polish-Tatar formation. Diarists estimated the Muscovite casualties side had an advantage, and that he ought to assume de- at 2 thousand; Polish casualties were significantly lower, fensive tactics while he was waiting for incoming Cossack but many officers leading the reiters and the infantry regiments. died, including Bartłomiej Gaszyński, Lt Col. of the reit- The rumours about disagreements between Tsetsura’s ers, or Maj. Wierzchowski from Franciszek de Buy’s foot Cossack’s and the Muscovite commanders began to regiment. Stefan Niemirycz, commander of the foot re- spread among the men in the Polish camp; thus J. Lub- giment, was shot in the arm, and so was his deputy, Lt omirski sent Cossacks a letter promising the king’s mercy Col. Jan Stachurski. In this regiment only, over a hundred should they swear allegiance to HRM and the Common- men suffered from bullet wounds. wealth. It persuaded some Cossacks to desert their force Meanwhile, the Russo-Cossack forces marched to- and join the Polish side. Sheremetev did not waste his wards Chudniv, on the Teterev River, initially harassed time as well. He intended to end the Polish-Tatar alliance only by Tatar skirmishers. As late as at the dawn of 27th and to this end, he sent a messenger to Safer Giray, prom- September, the Polish cavalry set off to chase the enemy ising more gifts for leaving the Poles.28 who had already managed to cross the river with their The position of the Muscovite forces worsened when wagons. The Russians, however, made a serious mistake: the general of the artillery of the Crown, Formhold von they had not garrisoned their crew at the Chudniv keep, Lüdinghausen Wolff, arrived at the Polish camp with which was immediately taken by J.H. Bockum’s dragoons heavy cannons, mortars and a supply of gunpowder on following J. Lubomirski’s order. Neither Cossack nor Mus- 23rd September. The Poles built new entrenchments and covite infantry managed to seize that stronghold – they began to fire at the enemy, who soon started to suffer confined themselves to setting the town on fire. That from the shortage of supplies, especially drinking water gave both divisions the time necessary for surrounding and forage for horses. Thus, on 26th Semptember, after Sheremetev’s wagon fort, which was forced, by the Pol- the earthworks facing Chudniv were disassembled, the ish artillery, to entrench its position and encircle it with Muscovite leader ordered a retreat in a defensive forma- wagons. As late as on 28th September, the Polish wagons tion. The Muscovite troops were at the front, Cossacks at crossed the river and the Poles started to set artillery po- the rear and two outer rows of wagons were garrisoned sitions. The exchange of cannon fire began. At the same by dragoons and arquebusiers. At the corners of the time, a troop of Tatars supported by S. Niemirycz’s foot convoy there were cannons, which were supposed to regiment repelled the enemy from the Chudniv orchards provide the retreating army with artillery support. The after a hard struggle. The battle with the Cossacks began rear of the formation, occupied by Cossacks, was at- with a general clash that included several regiments of tacked by J. Lubomirski, while S. Potocki tried to stop the the Polish cavalry, along with J. Sobieski’s unit, which enemy from the front. The Tatars appeared on the field distinguished itself in confronting Muscovite footmen of battle, and the Muscovite formation, which was a kilo- and horsemen sent to support the Cossacks. Though the metre long, was attacked from each side. Jan Zamoyski’s Russians managed to defend their position, they suffered hussar company under Lt Silnicki distinguished itself by great casualties. The joy of the success on 27th September was over- 28 A. Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku…, p. 77. shadowed by the message of approaching Cossack corps

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under Yurii Khmelnytsky. Capt. Teodor Szandarowski, The Poles constantly sent forayers whose task was to sent on a reconnaissance mission, brought the news observe the movement of Khmelnytsky’s corps. They that the Zaporozhian hetman, leading an army of almost confirmed that the Zaporozhian hetman was approach- 40 thousand men and 30 guns, had set off towards the ing Chudniv and that he reached Slobodyshche with the Muscovite forces and, marching towards Chudniv, had regiments of Right-bank Ukraine on 6th October. Hence, already reached Pryluky. In fact, young Yurii had at his in the night from October 6th to October 7th, the Poles pre- disposal 8 Cossack regiments of the Right-bank Ukraine: pared forces who were supposed to march against the Bila Tserkva regiment under Ivan Kravchenko, Bratslav Cossacks in order to prevent them from joining besieged regiment under Mikhail Zelinsky (Zelensky), Chyhyryn Sheremetev. The division assigned to this task consisted regiment under Petr Doroshenko, regiment led of 14 companies under I. Vyhovsky, which constituted by Mikhail Khanenko, Podolia regiment under Eustakhy the vanguard together with 6 thousand horde riders Hohol, Pavoloch regiment under Ivan Bohun, Korsun (‘Soltanik’ – nuradyn-soltan’s son remained with 5 thou- regiment led by Yakov Ulezko, and Kalnik regiment un- sand Tatars near Chudniv, in order to block the Muscovite der Ivan Verteletsky.29 In total, Khmelnytsky’s forces convoy) and 6 cavalry regiments: hetman’s own unit un- numbered 20–25 thousand Cossacks supported by 12 der Andrzej Sokolnicki, Aleksander Lubomirski’s regiment companies from Constantin Serban, the former prince of under Władysław Wilczkowski, Stanisław Lubomirski’s Wallachia. regiment under Stanisław Wyżycki, Dymitr Wiśniowiecki’s In spite of Sheremetev’s pressure, the Cossacks re- regiment, Jan Zamoyski’s regiment and Jan Sobieski’s re- mained at Pryluky, east of Vinnytsia, awaiting further giment. Their manpower is estimated at 5–5.5 thousand reinforcements. In fact, the news of Polish-Lithuanian men. Other types of units led by J. Lubomirski included: military successes in Lithuania and the difficult situation 2 regiments under Stefan Franciszek de Oedt’s and Jan of Muscovite forces in Ukraine gave rise to a party within Zamoyski’s reiters with about 1500 horses;30 3 regiments of the Cossack army that drew conclusions from the military dragoons under J. H. de Alten Bockum (royal guard), Józef advantage of the Commonwealth in the eastern theatre Łączyński’s dragoons and dragoons of the hetman’s body- of war. The Cossacks might have been waiting for the guard company under Aleksander Pniewski (about 800 and regiments, which had been sent to portions in total31). The infantry consisted of 1000–1200 Zaporozhia beforehand. Khmelnytsky eventually decided men chosen from Paweł Cellari’s, Stefan Niemirycz’s and to leave Pryluky on 30th September and marched towards the hetman’s own regiment under M. Ghissa. The majority (in straight line, his position was only 87 km of infantry and dragoons remained at Chudniv because from Chudniv, which the Zaporozhian army could traverse the Polish commanders feared that Sheremetev might in 4–5 days in the tabor formation). After three days, the try to leave his positions and fight his way through to Kh- Cossack regiments reached Berdychiv, where they were melnytsky’s Cossacks. Thus, assuming a lowered estimate joined by a messenger from the hetmans of the Crown – of the manpower of particular units, the field hetman’s Piotr Stepczyński, who brought the offer to enter peace talks and a the promise of pardon from the king and the 30 According to the data from the third quarter of 1660, their Commonwealth. After a stormy debate among the colon- respective strength was: J. Lubomirski’s reiters under baron de Oedt – 919 horses, and J. Zamoyski’s reiters under Gordon els the offers were refused, and on 5th October the Cossack – 586 horses. In total, 1505 horses, not including casualties formation left Berdychiv and headed towards Chudniv. incurred in combat or during the march; cf.: J. Wimmer, Mate- On the next day, the Cossacks reached Slobodyshche, at riały do zagadnienia liczebności i organizacji armii koronnej…, the mere 27 km distance from the site of battle between pp. 242–243. the Poles and Sheremetev. The Cossacks would need 1–2 31 Probably only a part of dragoons from those regiments was days of march to join the Russians. Meanwhile, the Cos- taken, as according to the data from the third quarter of 1660 sack wagon fort was approached by Polish troops under their strength was: the royal regiment under J.H. Bockum – 636 portions, J. Łączyński’s regiment – 200 portions; hence in field hetman J. Lubomirski. total – 1372 dragoons; ibid., pp. 248–249. Ł. Ossoliński estima- tes the number of dragoons marching towards Slobodyshche 29 See the list of Cossack colonels given by P. Kroll, in P. Kroll, Od against the Cossacks at 500; idem, Cudnów-Słobodyszcze ugody hadziackiej do Cudnowa…, pp. 411–412. 1660…, p. 59.

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– 119 – – Mirosław Nagielski –

corps did not exceed 15 thousand, including the forces un- spoils of war, which gave Cossacks time necessary to or- der I. Vyhovsky and the Tatar horde.32 ganise a counterattack and push the enemy outside the In the camp near Slobodyshche, inexperienced Yurii wagon fort. This situation was described by Joachim Jer- Khmelnytsky had 20–25 thousand Cossacks reinforced by licz, a diary writer, who explicitly stated that ‘some fought, Wallachian cavalry with 1200 horses. The Cossack corps some, namely dragoons and infantry, rushed for the loot. did not expect the Polish-Tatar attack, and, what seems Cossacks, having noticed it, regrouped, repelled our men strange, did not conduct any reconnaissance. The Tatar and killed quite a lot of noble captains, German com- vanguard captured many Cossack horses grazing in the manders and lieutenants’34. The reiters also managed to nearby fields as early as on 7th October. J. Lubomirski’s enter the camp after the horde had been repelled and fled forces reached the Cossack wagon fort in the late after- the field. The reiter troops succeeded, yet not without dif- noon,33 and, having noticed confusion among the sur- ficulty, in retreating from the wagon fort, but they suffered prised Cossacks, started preparing an assault on their huge casualties. Let us quote Hieronim Chrystian Holsten, encampment. Though the men were eager to fight, the a reiter in the Polish service: ‘Eventually, they chased hetman was aware of the difficulty in breaking the Cos- us away from the camp with guns, pikes, bows, scythes, sack wagon fort, which seemed to be impressive. In front staves and even wagon posts, to a place which happened of the army of the Crown there was a marsh formed by the to be a marsh. There, a battle started for good and lasted Hnilopiat River, and the Cossack camp could be seen on until sunset’35. Reinforcements sent by J. Lubomirski did a hill beyond the town. As Cossacks started to build earth- not manage to provide any help. The Cossacks seized two works and entrench the wagon fort in a hurry, the hetman reiter standards and killed many high ranked officers who took the only possible decision – to attack the Cossack led their men to battle. Baron de Oedt, the actual com- fortifications immediately. A well entrenched wagon fort mander of Grand Marshal of the Crown’s reiters, fell, Lt with field artillery positions was impossible for the Poles Col. E. Łącki suffered a bullet wound, ‘Maj. Łaszowski was to capture, which they learnt from the very beginning of wounded, and Captain Mautner was killed with an axe, the war with Khmelnytsky. having slain about twenty men himself’36. Cavalry com- After crossing the Hnilopiat River, the Tatars attacked panies, mainly the hussars, suffered great casualties as the wagon fort and lost many horses, which fell into holes well; Holsten wrote that ‘a few hussar companies were to- dug by the Cossacks in front of their wagons. The horde taliter crushed.’ Dusk falling on earth stopped the struggle, was followed by two reiter regiments, four hussar com- and the next day the belligerents saw piles of corpses in panies and 200 dragoons. Yet only after the attack of Gen. the field of battle. Holsten counted ‘3000 Cossacks, not Cellari’s dragoons and infantry the Poles managed to fight including the wounded and injured,’ though he seems to their way into the Cossack wagon fort. Sobieski’s and exaggerate greatly. The Polish casualties were significant Zamoyski’s cavalry regiments distinguished themselves by as well, they ought to be estimated at a few hundred killed reaching deep into the Cossack camp, and Wilczkowski’s and wounded. The battle of Slobodyshche was inconclus- hussar company endangered Khmelnytsky’s tents. The ive, but it made the Cossacks aware that the Polish-Tatar Poles and German reiters in Polish service caused their forces were dangerous, as they not only managed to own demise by their lust for loot, as both infantry and stop the Cossack convoy, but also surrounded their ally dragoons rushed towards the enemy wagons to take the – Sheremetev. On 8th October, after inspecting the Cos- sack encampment, J. Lubomirski abandoned the idea of 32 A. Hniłko estimates J. Lubomirski’s corps at 16,000 men, just a frontal assault, at the same time initiating peace talks, like R. Romański, while Ł. Ossoliński lowers its manpower to 13,800–14,200 men; A. Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 34 J. Jerlicz, Latopisiec albo kroniczka różnych spraw i dziejów roku…, p. 102; R. Romański, Cudnów 1660…, p. 127; Ł. Osso- (1648–1673), vol. II, Warsaw 1853, p. 54. liński, Cudnów-Słobodyszcze 1660…, p. 59. 35 H.Ch. Holsten, Przygody wojenne 1655–1666…, p. 59. 33 A reiter in the Polish service who took part in those events 36 Ibid., p. 59. As the diarist adds: ‘Captain Makowski had his – Hieronim Chrystian Holsten – wrote in his diary that J. head split open with a scythe, my lieutenant captain was shot Lubomirski’s corps reached the wagon fort at noon (sic!); cf.: too, and four lieutenants fell in the field, as well as three cor- H.Ch. Holsten, Przygody wojenne 1655–1666; ed. T. Wasilewski, nets. Two horses were shot under me, and there were some Warsaw 1980, p. 58. cuts and bullet holes in my banner’; ibid.

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whose aim was to persuade Cossacks to break the alliance through the enemy regiments with some Cossacks, espe- with Russia. Due to the news of the Muscovite attempt cially because there was confusion among them’37. Only at fighting their way through the surrounding forces, and 12 thousand Cossacks left the wagon fort, but they moved having received alarming letters from S. Potocki, the field so slowly that they reached Pyatka when the battle with hetman set off to return to Chudniv on the same day. He Sheremetev was about to conclude, and the Muscovite left Murat Giray’s Tatars and several Polish companies to wagon fort was encircled by both hetmans’ division again. keep Khmelnytsky in check. At the same time he appoin- Most of the Cossack forces remained at Slobodyshche ted Pavel Tetera and Ivan Hrusha to conduct negotiations waiting for the further course of action. An unknown au- with the Zaporozhian hetman. The promises of HRM’s and thor of a report on the events rightly observed that if the the Commonwealth’s pardon worked. From 7th to 14th Oc- Cossacks had wanted it, they would have reached Shere- tober the Cossack elders debated the situation stormily. metev’s camp, as most of the Polish-Tatar forces were They even sent messengers to the Tatars, trying to bribe called back to stop the Muscovite formation that headed them to join the Cossacks. Murat Giray, however, handed towards Pyatka. He wrote: ‘The resonation of that noise the letters to Lubomirski. percutit Khmelnystky, because he was convinced that Meanwhile at Chudniv, most probably due to an agree- there was shooting at Pyatki, which induced him to agree. ment with Y. Khmelnytsky, the Muscovite forces tried to He was estimated to have had 20000 Cossacks and 30 can- move towards Pyatka, but they were stopped by the horde nons by him; he could have reached Sheremet had he and Polish cavalry regiments. In the evening, the grand wanted to, for after that battle our companies were decim- marshal’s forces, returning from Slobodyshche, entered ated, the artillery summo defektu laborabat, and there the camp. On the next day, there arrived a group of Cos- were no horses to pull the cannons’38. sack emissaries, led by Ivan Kravchenko, the colonel of The news of Sheremetev’s failed evacuation attempt Bila Tserkva, demonstrating their conciliatory attitude and reached the Cossack encampment quickly. Khmelnytsky willingness to enter into peace talks. Between 9th and 13th himself assumed that the Muscovite struggle was lost, October, the pro-Russian option once again triumphed in sending the Chyhyryn colonel, Petr Doroshenko, to the young Yurii’s circle, and the date of joining Sheremetev’s Polish camp with the information that the Cossacks are troops was set to 14th October. On that day both armies willing to enter negotiations with Poles. To allow the talks were to meet near Pyatka, which Poles learned from the to begin, the Poles sent hostages to the Cossack wagon Cossacks who opted for re-establishing the relationship fort (Capt. Tomasz Karczewski, the cup-bearer of Chełm, with the Polish monarch. Indeed, on 14th October, after dis- Lt Władysław Wilczowski and Mehmed Mirza), and over assembling the earthworks in the early morning, the Mus- a dozen colonels and sotnia leaders, headed by Hrehory covite forces started marching along the road to Pyatka, Lesnitski, Mikhail Hanenko and Ivan Kravchenko. The Pol- capturing entrenchments that blocked their path. As late ish delegation was presided by Michał Jerzy Czartoryski, as at about 1 p.m., the Russians were once again chased the voivod of Bratslav, Aleksander Cetner, the castellan of back to their wagon fort, which situated the enemy in an Halych, Jan Sobieski, the standard bearer of the Crown, unfavourable position, at the edge of the forest. Muscovy Jan Szumowski, the pantler of Sandomierz, and Andrzej reportedly lost many wagons, a portion of supplies and Sokolnicki, the standard bearer of Lvov.39 Initially, the talks cannons, and suffered large casualties. A. Hniłko estimates were conducted in a good atmosphere, due to the Pol- them at 1500 deceased Russians and Tsetsura’s Cossacks. ish guarantee that all the privileges and liberties given to Sheremetev’s situation was becoming hopeless, especially them by the Polish kings would be preserved. However, due to the fact that the Poles drew Murat Giray’s horde when the Cossacks demanded restoration of the pact of from Slobodyshche. The Muscovite leader himself coun- Hadiach, the talks came to a standstill. ted on Khmelnytsky’s Cossacks, who started preparing for It was decided that the Poles should seek agreement the march from their camp towards Pyatka on 14th Octo- with the Cossacks to separate them from Muscovy, but ber. However, upon hearing the sounds of battle between 37 Cf. P. Kroll, Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudnowa…, p. 382. the Muscovites and the Poles, the Cossacks slowly formed 38 Diariusz wojny z Szeremetem i Cieciurą…, vol. I, pp. 159–160. their wagons into a marching column. According to one 39 Diariusz wojny z Szeremetem i Cieciurą…, vol. I, p. 160; P. Kroll, of the witnesses ‘The hetman did not dare fight his way Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudnowa…, p. 384.

– 121 – – Mirosław Nagielski –

the final compromise should be renegotiated after the attempt of the Pereyaslav colonel’s passage to the Polish end of the conflict. The Polish party eventually consen- camp: ‘Tsetsura, not having gathered all the Cossacks and ted to the restoration of the treaty of Hadiach, excluding not having told everyone about the agreement, took his the point which established the Duchy of Ruthenia. On company, as upon seeing Khmelnytsky’s troop, as he had 17th October 1660, an agreement, known as the treaty been ordered, and left the camp followed by only 2000 of Chudniv, was signed, and the most important points Cossacks. They were struck by the Tatars who caused concerned the return of Ukraine and the Cossack lands a great tumult among our men, because they took Cos- under the reign of the Polish monarch. In exchange, the sacks, and our men, who intended to attract both parties, Cossacks not only renounced Tsar Aleksey Mikhalovich’s tried to hinder them from doing so. In this confusion, protection, accepting John Casimir Vasa as their king but about 200 Cossacks were killed by the horde, others were they also took on the duty to capture the strongholds and led to our camp, and some were taken by the horde’41. The cities which still remained in Muscovite hands. T. Tsetsura Polish commanders were surprised by the attitude of the and the Cossacks in Sheremetev’s camp received pardon horde, which insisted on striking Khmelnytsky’s Cossacks, on the condition that they left the Muscovite wagon fort slaughtering them as rebels against the king and the Com- immediately. The regiments of Nizhyn and monwealth and taking the survivors captive. This incident were to abandon the Muscovite service and support Pol- served as a pretext for Khmelnytsky to ignore the terms of ish-Lithuanian forces that fought in White Ruthenia. In the Chudniv agreement, as he neither sent 2 regiments to the evening of 17th October, Zaporozhian Hetman Y. Kh- continue the fight with Muscovy, nor intended to continue melnytsky came to the Polish camp in person to swear military operations in Ukraine or to besiege Kiev, gar- the treaty. The solemn oath was taken in Grand Hetman risoned with a mighty crew under Kniaz Yurii Bariatynsky. Stanisław Potocki’s tent on the next day. The Cossack With the hetmans’ consent, Khmelnytsky was allowed to Hetman himself was to send public letters with informa- march deep into Ukraine, but his forces weakened due to tion about the treaty to cities of Ukraine in order to per- mass desertions of men fleeing to their homes. The bur- suade both Cossacks and the municipal authorities to den of concluding the campaign against Sheremetev lay resume their loyalty towards HRM. only on the hetmans and their corps. The first mutual Polish-Cossack initiative was to lead The battle between the Polish infantry and the Mus- Tsetsura’s regiments out of the Muscovite wagon fort. covite arquebusiers near the encampments started on Fearing the reaction of the Russian commander and 22nd October. It was accompanied by constant exchange with Cossacks opting for alliance with the Tsar, T. Tstetsura of artillery fire. Sheremetev’s situation became increas- kept the plans secret, which resulted in the failure of the ingly desperate due to the location of his wagon fort on attempt to leave Sheremetev’s camp on 21st October. The marshy terrain, insufficient supplies and lack of forage for colonel of Pereyaslav rallied his Cossacks prematurely, horses, drinking water and fuel, necessary as the nights without waiting for the Poles to take positions opposite the became colder. The Russian leader counted on rein- earthworks occupied by his men. The plan was not known forcements from Kniaz Y. Boriatynsky, who indeed had to the Tatars, who attacked the Cossacks who were leav- left Kiev with 4 thousand soldiers, but having heard of ing the encampment. Some of them were slain; some had the Cossack’s betrayal, stopped at Rozhevo, i.e. about 60 been taken captive before the hetman reacted by send- km southeast of Kiev and waited for more troops.42 From ing cavalry companies towards the Muscovite entrench- 23rd October on, due to pressure from his soldiers, Shere- ments. As little as 2 thousand Cossacks under T. Tsetsura and Pavel Apostol, the colonel of Myrhorod, reached the 41 Diariusz wojny z Szeremetem i Cieciurą…, p. 161. Polish camp; the remaining men, seeing the fate of their 42 Bariatynsky left Rozhevo with a corps of 5 thousand men as companions, went back to the Muscovite wagon fort.40 An late as on 28th October. He led many horses and supplies for anonymous witness to the events described the failed besieged Sheremetev. He reached Brusyliv, about 90 km from the Muscovite camp, but due to the change of the Cossack and the local sentiments, he marched back to Kiev. The news 40 A. Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku…, pp. 139–140. of his approach induced J. Lubomirski to order J. Sobieski’s Tsetsura was arrested for leading the passage without suc- regiment to cooperate with Khmelnytsky’s Cossacks; cf.: A. cess. Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku…, p. 147.

– 122 – – The Chudniv Campaign of 1660 –

metev decided to start negotiating his capitulation with Tatars were promised not only the payment of 300,000 Poles. The talks were conducted by a commission led by talars, but also 24 hostages as security.45 The Tatars op- Stanisław Bieniewski, voivod of Chernihiv, representing posed accepting Sheremetev’s and Tsetsura’s Cossacks’ the Poles, Kniaz Grigori Kozlovsky representing the Rus- capitulation from the beginning. The Poles, forced by sians and Omer-Agha and Kammekhmet-Mirza repres- their ally, had to pay Safer Giray with Cossack and Rus- enting Tatars. The talks were stormy and difficult as the sian prisoners including the Muscovite leader himself. On Russians rejected numerous terms proposed by the het- 3rd November Cossacks from Tsetsura’s regiments were mans, including of 4 million and handing handed to the horde, and on the next day the Muscovite the documentation concerning the recognition of the au- regiments leaving the encampment were captured by the thority of Moscow by Ukraine. They only agreed to turn in Tatars. Though Sheremetev, the boyars and the nobles the Cossack traitors who remained in the Russian camp. remained in the Polish camp, most of the Muscovite sol- Eventually, the tragic situation induced Sheremetev to diers stayed in their wagon fort. In the night from 4th to accept the terms offered by the Poles. The conditions 5th November, the horde attacked the encampment, and, in the camp were described by Holsten, who had been having crushed the Polish guards and slaughtered those taken prisoner by the Muscovites. Let him have his say: who opposed, took all the Muscovite captives. The Tatars ‘There was such great famine that I cannot even begin did not confine themselves to this, but also demanded to describe it. Our Poles and Tatars blocked them so ef- the head of Sheremetev, who was in the hetmans’ camp, fectively that they could only take 20 steps from their en- under their protection. J. Lubomirski had to comply, as campment. A horse ate another horse out of hunger, and it might have resulted in the fall of the alliance with the one could find neither leaves, nor wood, nor tree roots. Tatars, who were more numerous than Poles, who suffered To us, their prisoners, they handed a piece of raw horse great casualties during the battles and part of whom (J. meat from time to time. Out of bones we immediately Sobieski’s and Jakub Potocki’s regiments) had been sent made fire and coal that we used in order to cook meat, towards Y. Bariatynsky’s corps. Sheremetev was handed until it was burnt’43. The talks concluded on 1st Novem- to the Tatars, proclaiming rightly that the conditions of ber, and the Cossack leader confirmed the agreement on the capitulation had been violated by the Poles, and that the following day. Let us list some of the most important Russian garrisons could not be expected to leave Ukraine. conditions of the Russian capitulation: Only the reiters in the Polish service sheltered their fellows – Muscovite were to leave Kiev, Pereyaslav, Nizhyn, – the prisoners from Muscovite regiments – which was de- Chernihiv and other cities, handing cannons and military scribed by Hosten in his war diary: ‘However, we saved all supplies to Polish commissars. the Germans and divided them between our German re- – Kniaz Bariatynsky was to accept the conditions and giments.’ He noted with satisfaction that he gained quite arrive in the Polish camp as a hostage, guaranteeing Mus- a lot from the Muscovites who were handed to Tatars, and covite departure from Ukraine whose wagons were left at the soldiers’ disposal: ‘I halted – The Russians were to hand over weapons, cannons Muscovite carts and took many costly items, I gained over and ammunition to Poles. a few thousand (talars)’46. – V. Sheremetev, eight boyars and 300 noblemen were Muscovites suffered the greatest deal of casualties; in to remain hostage in the Polish camp until the Muscovite fact, Sheremetiev’s army ceased to exist; part of the sol- garrisons abandoned cities in Ukraine. diers were killed, others died of wounds and hunger, and – The Muscovite forces were to leave the wagon fort the remainder, including their leader, became Tatar cap- after 3 days, and march to Kodnya, Kotelnya and Pavoloch tives. T. Tsetsura’s Cossacks lost about a thousand men until the conditions were met. killed in combat, 3 thousand wounded or dead of injur- – The captives were to be freed from the Muscovite ies and exhaustion, and about 2 thousand taken cap- camp.44 45 Patryk Gordon writes that Tatars were promised 60 thousand reichstalar and 20 hostages from Russian courtiers; see: P. 43 H.Ch. Holsten, Przygody wojenne…, p. 62. Gordon, Pniewnik 1659–1667, ed. D.G. Fedosow, Moskwa 2002, 44 Ł. Ossoliński, Cudnów-Słobodyszcze 1660…, pp. 92–93; cf.: R. p. 74. Romański, Cudnów 1660…, pp. 180–182. 46 H. Ch. Holsten. Przygody wojenne…, pp. 64–65.

– 123 – – Mirosław Nagielski –

tive by the Tatars. Actual Cossack casualties were much The victories of S. Czarniecki’s division and the Lithuanian higher because they ought to include men killed and in- army at Polonka and Lyakhavichy in White Ruthenia, and jured in battle at Slobodyshche, whose number is estim- the success of the Crown forces in Ukraine began a new ated by historians at between 1500 and 4000. What were chapter of the conflict between Muscovy and the Common- the victors’ casualties? The Tatars lost the fewest men, wealth after the conclusion of the war with the Swedes. The amounting to a few hundred dead and wounded; the triumphs of 1660 foreshadowed the regaining of the opera- total number did not exceed a thousand horde warriors.47 tional initiative by the Commonwealth and reclaiming the A. Hniłko estimates the Polish casualties from the whole provinces that had been lost since the outbreak of the war Chudniv-Slobodyshche campaign at 3500–4000 men, i.e. with Muscovy (1654). Despite the casualties suffered during about 15% of the total manpower of the army that entered the campaign, the results were impressive; V. Sheremetev’s Ukraine in the summer. J. Wimmer adds about 1500–2000 army ceased to exist, and the Polish command were faced dead from starvation, disease and exhaustion.48 The casu- with a prospect of renewing the military operations in the alties were most probably higher, as many soldiers deser- following year. The unfortunate military confederations of ted after the conclusion of the campaign, while others died 1661–1663 wasted the opportunities that had arisen after of hunger and exhaustion. The great casualties of the army the Polish-Lithuanian victories of 1660. The Cossack issue of the Crown were described by diarists who participated is an important aspect of the Chudniv campaign. The Rus- in the events in Ukraine. Joachim Jerlicz noted in his di- so-Polish struggle for Ukraine started with B. Khmelnytsky’s ary that the number of the killed amounted to 14 thou- Pereyaslav articles of 1654. The union of Hadiach created sand, which sounds improbable. News of the great losses a short-lived bond between the Cossacks and the Com- among the nobles who served in cavalry companies that monwealth, but due to both parties I Vyhovsky could not took part in the campaign spread in the Commonwealth. retain his power in 1659. The young Zaporozhian hetman, Under date of 9th November 1660, Antoni Chrapowicki from Yurii Khmelnytsky, and his colonels faced the dilemma of Podlasie wrote in his diary that: ‘Sheremetev himself was choosing between Muscovy and the Commonwealth. The taken prisoner and his army was crushed on 29 octobris. campaign of 1660 showed the might of the Commonwealth God forbid that it should change. True, but many of our and induced the Cossack elders to support the idea of sur- men are said to have died’49. In the anonymous account rendering to John Casimir Vasa. of the fight with Sheremetev we read that though the The violation of the conditions of Sheremetev’s ca- campaign was victorious, the army was in a lamentable pitulation by the Polish-Tatar side and their rejection by state: ‘Old soldiers, remembering the Russian, Livonian Aleksey Mikhailovich led to the necessity of fighting for and Prussian wars cannot remember such a beautiful and both Right-bank and Left-bank Ukraine. The lands beyond tough war; because for seven Sundays, men could fight the Dnieper, including Kiev, which had a strong garrison, each day and the guards had to be kept the whole day and remained in Russian hands. The success at Chudniv only night, hay had to be sought 8 or 10 miles away, grass 3 or 4 brought the Commonwealth closer to repelling the Mus- miles away, and grain over 20 miles away, and horses died covites from Ukraine, but the Polish side was aware of before it was brought’50. Did such high casualties balance the difficulty resulting from cooperation with Tatars, who out the victories of that campaign? How should the het- pursued their own political and military goals, and of the mans’ actions and the results of the Russo-Polish struggle lamentable state of the military, who had not been paid of the autumn of 1660 be judged? since 1655. The agreement of Chudniv initiated a lasting division among the Cossacks, who were deprived of able 47 Ł. Ossoliński, Cudnów-Słobodyszcze 1660…, p. 95; A. Hniłko, commanders, and the army of the Crown took their winter Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku…, p. 162. lodgings in Right-bank Ukraine, to some degree mani- 48 A. Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku…, p. 161; J. Wim- festing the end of the Cossack autonomy. The struggle mer, Wojsko polskie w drugiej połowie XVII wieku…, p 130. Ł. for Ukraine continued in the years that followed (John Ossoliński estimates the Polish casualties at 5300 killed. Ł. Casimir’s invasion of Left-bank Ukraine of 1663/1664), thus Ossoliński, Cudnów-Słobodyszcze 1660…, p. 95. 49 J.A. Chrapowicki, Diariusz, pt. (1656–1664), ed. T. Wasilewski, leading to the lasting division of the country into the Polish Warsaw 1978, p. 267. (right bank of the Dnieper) and Muscovite part (left bank), 50 Diariusz wojny z Szeremetem i Cieciurą…, p. 163. confirmed by the Treaty of Andrusovo in January 1667.

– 124 – Bibliography Primary sources P. Gordon, Pniewnik 1659–1667, ed. D.G. Fedosov, Moskwa 2002 ‘Diariusz wojny z Szeremetem i Cieciurą półkownikiem pereja- A. Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku, Warsaw 1931 sławskim, która się odprawowała w mcu wrześniu, paździer- E. Janas, Konfederacja wojska koronnego w latach 1661–1663. niku i listopadzie roku 1660’, in Ojczyste spominki w pismach Dzieje i ideologia, Lublin 1998 do dziejów dawnej Polski, ed. A. Grabowski, vol. I, Cracow 1845 K. Kossarzecki, Kampania roku 1660 na Litwie, Zabrze 2005 Historya panowania Jana Kazimierza przez nieznajomego autora, P. Kroll, Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudnowa. Kozaczyzna mię- ed. E. Raczyński, vol. II, Poznań 1840 dzy Rzecząpospolitą a Moskwą w latach 1658–1660, Warsaw J. A. Chrapowicki, Diariusz, pt. (1656–1664), ed. T. Wasilewski, 2008 Warsaw 1978 A. W. Małow, Moskovskiye vybornyye polki soldatskogo stroya H. Ch. Holsten, Przygody wojenne 1655–1666, ed. T. Wasilewski, v nachal’nyy period svoyey istorii 1656–1671, Moscow 2006 Warsaw 1980 Ł. Ossoliński, Cudnów-Słobodyszcze 1660, Zabrze 2006 J. Jerlicz, Latopisiec albo kroniczka rożnych spraw i dziejów (1648– R. Romański, Cudnów 1660, Warsaw 1996 –1673), vol. II, Warsaw 1853 J. Wimmer, Wojsko polskie w drugiej połowie XVII wieku, Warsaw S. Leszczyński, Potrzeba z Szeremetem, hetmanem moskiewskim 1965 i z Kozakami w roku pańskim 1660 od Polaków wygrana, Articles ed. P. Borek, Cracow 2006 W. Czermak, ‘Szczęśliwy rok. Dzieje wojny moskiewsko-polskiej Books z r. 1660’, in Przegląd Polski, vol. 82, 83, 107 Naukovyy Zbirnyk prysvyacheny profesorovy Mykhaylovy Hrushev­ A. Hniłko, ‘Bitwa pod Słobodyszczem’, in Przegląd Historyczno- skomu, Lvov 1906 -Wojskowy, 1929, vol. 1–2 Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, vol. VI, Warsaw 1960 M. Kostomarov, ‘Getmanstvo Yuriya Khmelnytskogo’, in Istoriche- Zarys dziejów wojskowości polskiej do roku 1864, ed. J. Sikorski, skiye monografii i issledovaniya Nikolaya Kostomarova, 1872, vol. II, Warsaw 1966 vol. XII F. R. Gawroński, Ostatni Chmielniczenko, Poznań 1919 Z. Wojcik, ‘Rywalizacja polsko-tatarska o Ukrainę na przełomie V. Gerasimczuk, Cudnivskaja kampania 1660 r., Lvov 1913 lat 1660–1661’, in Przegląd Historyczny, 1960, vol. XLV/4

– 125 –

– Marek Wagner – Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities

The Battle of Chocim, 10–11 November 1673

In October 1673 Grand Hetman of the Crown – Jan i m - situated between Dniester and Prut, the army of Hetman pact on his further plans, on the presence of three Turkish Sobieski reached on 31 October, then it crossed corps on the Moldavian and Podolia operational area: in the Moldavian border and on 4 November it arrived at Kamieniec, near Chocim and near Cecora. As early as at Zuczka; the next day the army was near Bojan, where it the end of the month there was a new concept of how to met in the Hetman’s camp with the Lithuanian army “com- attack and destroy the Hüseyin Pasha corps before Ka- ing through ’3. plan Pasha reaches Cecora with his troops. Sobieski was Meanwhile, the joined armies covered small distances, convinced of its accuracy. His only justified concern was mainly, due to unfavourable terrain conditions for march- whether there will be an alliance between the Lithuanians, ing troops (valleys, gorges, brooks, forests) and the need to Moldavians, and the inhabitants of the Crown territory construct numerous bridges over various Prut tributaries. (Polish: Koroniarze), otherwise the Poles will have to fight At the beginning, reconnaissance parties failed to bring the overwhelming Turkish forces1. reliable information on the enemy’s positions, and only Thus the army immediately marched from the Lvov on the night of 4 to 5 November, several Turkish prison- region towards Sniatyn to join with the Moldavian troops ers and Moldavian boyars were captured, who confirmed of Stefan Petriceicu on 31 October. Hospodar camped previous reports – on 5 November Hetman Sobieski was near Barbesti, but tired of waiting for the reinforcements, also informed of the presence of the Kaplan Pasha corps he marched off towards Suceava, where he arrived on 3 near Cecora. In early November Sobieski and Petriceicu November. While in Suceava he exchanged letters with carried on intensive correspondence. Hospodar repor- Sobieski informing him on the positions and intensions of ted on Turkish-Tatar corps of Yusuf Pasha numbering the Turkish commanders2. 2.5 thousand men, stationed at Budžak, and proposed Hetman Sobieski had to chose one of two roads lead- a joint Polish-Moldavian expedition to destroy the groups ing to Chocim – one from Nieźwiska, through Horodenka, of enemy’s troops providing supplies to Kamieniec and Wasilów and Hruszowce of approx. 100 km, and the other Chocim. Petriceicu suggested also to install the Crown’s one through Sniatyn, Linkowce and Zuczka covering ap- infantry troops in Suceava. He was concerned with the at- prox. 135 km. Although the first one was slightly shorter, titude of Kaplan Pasha, who ordered to murder many of but it ran through areas difficult in terms of terrain and his subjects, was responsible for plundering villages and climate conditions, while the longer route guaranteed towns and collected a levy for provisions in the area of Iași comforts on the way and lead straight to the camp of Pet- and Cecora. Hospodar also sent to Sobieski the letters of riceicu. Thus, taking the longer march through the areas the Grand Vizier, which called both Hospodars to under- take peace mediations. He wrote about the poor state of 1 M.Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka w latach 1672–1676, vol. 1, Zabrze 2009, pp. 354–368. 3 A. Przyborowski do A. Trzebickiego, Bojan 5 November 1673, 2 S. Petryczejko do J. Sobieski, Suczawa 1–3 November 1673, Scientific Library of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences The Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine (hereinafter: NBU and of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Cracow (hereinafter: Kiev), Chreptowicz archive, no 5985, pp. 119v–120. B.PAU-PAN), no 1070, p. 652.

– 127 – – Marek Wagner –

the Ottoman army near Chocim, urging Poles to step up regards logistics also contributed significantly to the de- offensive operations4. cision on marching off towards Chocim7. On 5 November Hetman Sobieski was stationed in the In preparation to the offensive operations Sobieski sent camp near Bojan, where from he reported on the difficult many reconnaissance parties and on 4 November he sent position of the Crown army. A paid quarter of their milit- in the direction of Chocim a group of 20 squadrons (Pol- ary service was lapsing, so the soldiers started ‘to stir up ish: chorągiew) of Gabriel Silnicki, and on another day – 12 trouble’, and only the payments from the Hetman’s treas- squadrons of Krzysztof Łaska that returned with confirmed ury could prevent further incidents. There were also cases information that the Turks ‘have hid carefully, now even of desertion mainly because of high food prices in the very behind their defenses’. Moreover, a group of 12–15 camp. However, the firm stand of Hetman Sobieski, who squadrons of Jan Rzeczycki were sent to the Cecora re- even order an execution of two officers, restored order gion and these brought back several Moldavian boyars, and discipline. On 15 November, the Lithuanian soldiers runaways from Chocim, who confirmed that Turkish sol- also would reach a quarter of their military service. Their diers and commanders are very much concerned with the situation was similar to that of the Crown army, and thus swiftly approaching Hetman’s army8. Hetman Sobieski feared that they might go back home. Under such circumstances on 8 November Hetman’s Everything spoke in favour of stepping up the offensive op- army left the general camp heading northeast across the erations. The disastrous financial situation was evidenced Bukovina region. The march was difficult in terms of terrain by the fact that Sobieski decided to borrow 100 thousand (through “grand and thick crossings’, i.e. wooded hills and zloty from Moldavian Hospodar, if it proved necessary to valleys) and climate conditions (gusty winds and heavy pay the salaries to the Lithuanian army5. rains), which greatly influenced the mobility of individual Surely, these were also the reasons for considering an- units. Despite these impediments the cavalry squadrons other variant of the Polish operation plan. The contem- pushed on quite efficiently, and only the infantry and dra- porary reports reveal a plan of dividing the army into two goon regiments with canons “advanced more slowly’. On groupings – one (‘the right wing’), led by Sobieski was to the very same day the Silnicki vanguard (20 cavalry and march towards Cecora to destroy the corps of the Kaplan dragoon squadrons), after crossing the wooded hills, Pasha, and the second one (‘the left wing’) with Prince reached the area of the Turkish camp on the early morning Dymitr Wiśniowiecki was to besiege the Chocim corps of of 9 November9. Hüseyin Pasha until its surrender. The project was, un- The camp of the Hüseyin Pasha was situated at the doubtedly, developed by Hetman Sobieski since it was place of the former Polish camp of 1621, hence on the right his grouping that got the most difficult task. Moreover, bank of Dniester. It stretched on a plateau from the brick the concept of dividing the Lithuanian army between two Orthodox church, the Chocim castle and a deep gorge groupings in order to eliminate any possible opposition in the north, through the western edge of the plateau, to only attests to our assumptions6. a small ravine in the south. Whereas a steep bank of Dni- Finally, the October operations plan of Jan Sobieski ester closed the camp to the east. There was a quite large has been approved for execution. This resulted from two forest to the west of fortifications, and smaller to the south events that took place at that time – firstly, the recon- of the Ottoman camp. A road running from Żwaniec to the naissance parties confirmed the enemy’s presence near bridge over Dniester descended to the Braha village situ- Chocim and Cecora, and secondly – on the same day the ated on the left bank of the river. envoys of the Moldavian Hospodar brought a letter to the Turkish army camp was located to the west of the camp in which Petriceicu gives himself up to the protec- river and south of the castle, at a vast plateau located tion of Sobieski. The dramatic situation in the camp as 7 A. Przyborowski do NN, Chocim 11 November 1672, NBU Kiev, Chreptowicz archive, no. 5983, p. 2. 4 S. Petryczejko do J. Sobieskiego, Suczawa 5–7 November 8 ‘Victoria pod Chocimiem…’, Chocim 12 November 1673, ibid., 1673, NBU Kiev, Chreptowicz archive, no. 5985, p. 120. p. 1. 5 J.Sobieski do NN, bm. 5 November 1673, B.PAU-PAN, no. 1070, 9 ‘Z pod Chocimia z obozu’, 11 November 1673, The National p. 652. Archives in Krakow (hereinafter: ANK), archive of Pinocci fa- 6 M. Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka…, vol. 1, p. 370. mily, no. 372, p. 419.

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approximately 2 km from the Dniester river. From the built on the Dniester, connecting the other side with the north, a natural obstacle was a deep ravine, where once Chocim camp and the rampart before the bridge with the a stream run which flowed into the Dniester below the ‘wooden castle’ (blockhouse) located on the left bank Chocim castle. At the height of the brick church, there of the Dniester completed the fortification. Therefore, was a narrow bridge, which was the passage connecting the Turks used the defensive qualities of the terrain and the edges of the ‘northern’ gorge, a second bridge linked modernized the field fortifications, forming a real forti- the plateau and the castle. The north-eastern edge of the fied camp on the Dniester. hill was a steep bank of the Dniester, so the camp em- Turkish camp was surrounded by a zigzag embank- bankment was not too high here, and in some places ment, behind which was a number of canons and groups even rudimentary. Its regular redan outline began with of Janissaries. Embankments did not have a deep moat or the ‘northern’ bridge and continued along the banks of palisades, but the undulating camp foreground was well the gorge, which then separated into two small ravines, visible, especially the gorges and ravines. The interior of closing the northern section of the Turkish fortifications. the Turkish camp was ‘filled with’ groups of soldiers, loc- Because of no natural barriers on the west side, it was ated at the western side of the main embankment (I phase necessary to raise a relatively high embankment in this of the battle) or already fighting with Poles (second phase section that extended from the fork of the ‘north’ gorge of the battle). The iconography shows us the interior of the to the fork of the ‘southern’ gorge. In the western section camp as an ordered arrangement of lines and tents (large there were two ‘gates’ – Bukovina, situated closer to the and small), alongside images of horses and camels, with northern corner, and Jaska (also called Cecorska) – in the main street running to the bridge over the Dniester the southern corner of embankments, which F. Gratty and two secondary roads – one to the bridge on the north presented in the form of narrow passages in the embank- gorge and one to the Moldovan camp. Despite minor dif- ment. In turn, on the south side, the obstacle was the ferences, both accounts and the iconography show very local ‘south’ gorge with not very steep slopes and also similar, in general terms of course, image of the Ottoman forked in the western corner of the plateau. The edges of army camp at Chocim10. the elevation gently sloped here towards the edge of the In the history and military literature, it was adopted that gorge, also between them and the embankment there about 25–30 thousand Turkish, Moldavian and Wallachian was a considerable distance, so the Turkish fortifications soldiers were present at Chocim. These included 8 thou- had considerable height and width. However, they did sand Janissary corps, about 10–12 thousand cavalry, and not reach the very edges of the Dniester, creating a con- about 6–8 thousand Moldovan and Vlach troops. Here venient side entrance into the camp on the south side. is a list of Ottoman groups participating in the Battle of Between the edge of the escarpment and the bank of the Chocim (and their approximate numbers): river, there were small buildings, and further a narrow passage leading down to the foot of the Chocim castle. – Spahi troops of Hüseyin Pasha beylerbey of Silistra – In 1673 the Ottomans took the position at the main 3000 people plateau. All natural obstacles were taken advantage of – Spahi troops of Mehmed Pasha beylerbey of Rumelia by raising an embankment with a redan outline on the – 3000 people perimeter of about 5 km. On the south side, its defens- – Spahi troops of Soliman Pasha beylerbey of Bosnia – ive qualities were reinforced with a camp for Moldavian 2000 people and Wallachian contingents, although they were placed – Spahi troops of Jahay beylerbey of Siwasu – 2000 outside the main line of the Turkish fortifications. Exper- people ienced Ottoman engineers reinforced profiles of earthen – Troops of Murtaza Pasha bey of Ohrid – unknown embankments, deepened the moats to the depth of eight – Troops of Suleiman Pasha bey of Thessaloniki – 1000 cubits (about 4–5 m deep) and provided with in the so- people called ‘excursions’ (passageways in embankment) and – Troops of Ahmed Seidoglu Pasha bey of Sofia – un- artillery batteries. They also performed enormous earth- known works, adapting it to the needs of the military. The ‘old’ Chocim castle was strengthened, a floating bridge was 10 M. Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka…, v. 1, pp. 371–374.

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– Janissary corps – 8000 people (including some 2000 so the soldiers of Hussein Pasha had to endure in trenches mercenaries) for that time. – Corps of artillery and engineering – number un- Another issue was related to the choice of the place of known11. battle. This begs the question, why Hüseyin Pasha did not Considering the preparation of individual groups – decide to battle on the outskirts of the camp? The answer 2 thousand mercenary Janissary troops were deployed to is not simple, probably the Turkish commander was afraid the main embankment (‘western’), a further 5–6 thousand to face the Poles and Lithuanians in the open field, not be- of infantry were sent to the flanks, with selected corps of lieving in the tactical superiority of his subordinates and cavalry – on the right flank of Soliman Pasha beylerbey of hoping that the massive fortifications and firepower will Bosnia and Jahay bey beylerbey of Siwasu and on the left help to stop the Hetman forces until the arrival of ‘Cecora flank – of Mehmed Pasha beylerbey of Rumelia with other corps’. troops. The reserve of sultan cavalry was commanded by On the morning of 9 November, the banners of the Hüseyin Pasha himself. Cavalry corps consisted of about vanguard reached a distance of 500–600 meters from the 3–4 thousand soldiers, their rearguard was stronger, and Turkish embankments, taking ‘the road from Jass’ through the infantry defended embankment.12. flat hills and beech forests to the west side of the camp. Ini- Command post was located in the middle of the camp, tially, the Turks did not take up the challenge. It was only probably at the intersection of the two main ‘streets’. Quite when they realized that only the vanguard appeared at the significant space of the camp was occupied by tents, cars, foreground that real clashes of skirmishers began. Armed stables for horses, mules and camels, which created a gen- groups leaving the Ottoman camp consisted of dozens of eral feeling of chaos, although the F. Gratty placed tents riders but ‘they could not be pulled away from embank- only in five locations right next to the embankment line, ment’, despite the day-long efforts of Polish skirmishers. the quarters of Hüseyin Pasha was at the centre of the Meanwhile, the cavalry regiments regularly arrived in camp. However, during the fighting this ‘mess’ was a ma- the foreground of the camp. In the evening, however, they jor obstacle to advancing troops due to the lack of space retreated to their camps, ‘leaving the vanguard’. By the inside the camp. time the dusk fell, the regiments of infantry and dragoons Tactical action plan of Hüseyin Pasha assumed internal with canons and caravans arrived. Hetman army camps and external defence positions until the arrival of the corps created in the evening were located approximately 2 km of the Kaplan Pasha from Cecora. It is possible that Turks west of the Turkish embankments, beyond the hills and considered abandoning and burning Chocim camp and forests. retreat towards Kamieniec in the case of serious threat The number of Polish-Lithuanian forces at the Battle from the advancing Hetman troops. On the other hand, of Chocim according to is about 29–30 it does not seem possible, because the commanders of thousand soldiers, among them there were about 22 thou- Kamieniec traditionally forbid the entrance to the fortress sand Crown troops and about eight thousand Lithuanian of the larger masses due to purely pragmatic reasons (lack troops. Among the latter, about 3500 cavalry and 4800 of food, diseases, etc.)13. The Turkish commander pre- infantry, with 15 guns, participated in the battle; on the dicted that for similar reasons Khalil Pasha would be care- Polish side about 12 thousand cavalry and about 11 thou- ful in helping his corps, and in fact he could only count on sand infantry with 50 canons participated. 13 regiments of the support of the Cecora corps, located within 150–160 Crown cavalry participated, including a total of 12 hussar km from Chocim. He calculated that Kaplan Pasha would regiments (about 1.5 thousand people), 109 armoured arrive in the area of the Chocim camp within 7 or 8 days – squadrons (about 10 thousand) and 19 light squadrons (about 1.5 thousand) and 23 infantry regiments (about 7 11 W. Majewski, Wojny polsko-tureckie 1672–1699, [in:] Polskie tra- thousand) and 19 regiments of dragoons (about five thou- dycje wojskowe, v. 1, ed. by J. Sikorski, Warsaw 1990, p. 378. sand people) with artillery corps14. 12 ‘Data 11 Novembris z obozu…’, Chocim 11 November 1673, Polish-Lithuanian forces were divided into five major B.PAU-PAN, No. 1070, p.653. 13 ‘Opisanie potrzeby z Turkami…’, after 11 November 1673, The groups, which have traditionally formed, in two echelons, Princes Czartoryski Library (hereinafter: B.Czart), No. 171, pp. 569–570. 14 W. Majewski, Wojny polsko-tureckie…, p. 379.

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the centre of the two wings, formed in semicircle around groupings – the front one with Lithuanian infantry (4800 the Turkish embankment, with overall circumference of men) and the pterygoid one – with the right Pac’s column about 6.5–7.0 km. Right wing based at the southern gorge, and left Radziwił’s column. In front of the infantry, a dozen the left reached the north gorge, while the centre covered of Lithuania canons were placed. The Lithuanian wing the area beyond the beech forest, opposite the two gates covered the area from Bucovina gate to the shore of the – Bukovina and Jaska15. Dniester, outside the bed of the northern gorge, and the The right wing (Crown) consisted of two powerful group- area – because of the many hills – was less convenient for ings – the leading corps of 15 regiments of infantry and offensive operations here. dragoons (5400 people) with 30 canons and the reserve The majority of Polish relations puts five Chocim mil- corps of six cavalry regiments. Two cavalry groups stood itary groups in such a way: the ‘guardian party’ was loc- here – of Bidziński and Sobieski. The first involved three re- ated ‘a little higher than the Dniester’, then the Sobieski giments (commanders, M. Zbrożek and W. Skoraszewski), group ‘in the middle’, followed by the group of Hetman protected by light squadrons, and the group of Sobieski Wiśniowiecki, next to and ‘near Dniester consisted of three regiments (Hetman, S. Jabłonowski and from the side of Żwaniec’ Lithuanian troops were sta- W. Leszczyński), protected by light cavalry. tioned16. The first line consisted of three groups of infantry, dra- W. Majewski assumes that the right wing had 7,000 in- goons and artillery – on 10 November Poles lead three re- fantry and dragoon, and in the centre and on the left wing giments of dragoons with four canons, which created the about 4 thousand people respectively, which meant that, utmost group located closer to the Dniester, to the Mol- according to the concept of Hetman Sobieski, almost ‘half dovan camp. The group of Crown infantry of M. Kątski with of the Polish forces were concentrated on the right wing’. battery of 20–24 canons stood before the regiments of The other groups were only to hold back the enemy troop Jabłonowski. To the left of the infantry there were infantry movements, when the right wing was attacking fortified regiments of K. Korycki with eight canons, including ‘two Ottoman camp17. big’ ones (maybe 60-pound). All of these groups covered Sobieski’s tactical plan was therefore based on using the area from the Dniester to the Jaska gate, in a hilly ter- infantry and dragoon regiments on the south-western rain, declining towards Turkish embankment and conveni- corner of the embankments with a gateway, with support- ent for offensive action of cavalry. ing attack on the northwest corner of Bucovian gate. An The centre of Polish formation consisted of a frontal in- important part of the Hetman’s plan were also attacks dir- fantry group – nine regiments of E. Denhoff and S.S. Czar- ected from both wings towards the bridges over the gorge necki (2800 soldiers) with a battery of eight canons – and and the river. If successful, infantry was followed by squad- two or three groups of cavalry, set in the second echelon. rons, ready to occupy the enemy’s camp and destroy the J. Woliński suggested the setting of three cavalry corps – Hüseyin Pasha’s corps. Sobieski realized that success in of Wiśniowiecki and two Potockis (Andrzej and Szczęsny), armed fighting depends primarily on effective and instant on the other hand, W. Majewski distinguished positions decisions, but also on the effective cooperation ‘in time of the two cavalry corps – of Wiśniowiecki and A. Potocki. and in space’ of individual groups during the execution of This concept seems more likely, which in turn gave only defined tactical tasks18. two groups of cavalry – of Wiśniowiecki (two regiments – of On the morning of 10 November, the Polish group went the king and Hetman) and of A. Potocki (three regiments close to camps embankments, and when noticing no re- of Andrzej, Szczęsny and Jan Potocki). The centre covered action from Turkish commanders, Sobieski decided to get the area between the gates – Jaska and Bukovina, in some the Crown troops closer to the embankments. This was hilly terrain, also convenient for an offensive action by cav- around 10 a.m. After that, the Lithuanian grouping took alry and infantry. positions under the embankments. After 11 a.m. rapid The left ‘Lithuanian’ wing, under the leadership of Het- shooting started from the canons and mortars from the man Pac, was arranged in two shootouts involving two 16 M. Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka…, vol. 1, pp. 376–378. 17 W. Majewski, Wojny polsko-tureckie…, pp. 380–381. 15 ‘Data 11 Novembris z obozu…’, Chocim 11 November 1673, 18 [J. Woliński] Chocim, Encyklopedia Wojskowa, vol. 1–2, War- B.PAU-PAN, No. 1070, p. 653. saw 1931, pp. 674–676.

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enemy’s camp, as well as the Moldovian camp. At that right wing of the Crown and evenly placed before the time, Petryczejko demanded help from the Ottoman Em- Turkish defences, despite the fact that such a claim is not pire, but it was only an excuse for the official transfer of confirmed by the tactical battle plan adopted by Sobieski, Moldovans onto the Polish side. Three regiments of in- which assumed that the attack will come from the right fantry with several canons were directed to their camp, all wing21. Meanwhile, some of the iconographic reproduc- of which were used to shoot at the left flank of the Turk- tions show two, three and four artillery batteries, while the ish embankments. Sobieski and Kątski intended to break most reliable of the records is definitely the one by J. Ben- down the enemy on this section of fortifications, to allow sheimer. The author placed two mighty cannon batteries the crown infantry to attack and enter the Turkish camp. on the Crown wing, firing at the south corner of the Turk- Despite much distance from the line of embankments ish posts, the third battery, also powerful, placed on the (over 500 m) and a fairly deep gorge, this plan was not Lithuanian wing, and the fourth, significantly smaller in abandoned19. size, in the Moldavian camp. It seems that his drawing de- About 12 p.m. Sobieski ordered to start preparations to cides on the location of the cannon batteries in the area, make an assault on the embankments on the left wing, as- prepared to carry out a strong artillery fire22. signing to this task the infantry of general J.W. Dennemark In the night of 10 to 11 November, the last war council and seimens of colonel J. Motowidło. The fight started was held before the battle, during which Hetman M.K. Pac after 1300, but infantrymen and seimens were stopped criticised Sobieski’s plans, stressing numerous difficulties by a strong fire of handguns of the janissaries, and hav- in their performance pointing to the number of Turkish ing lost many injured and killed on the same shaft, they cannons, the exhaustion of the soldiers and the lack of retreated to entry positions. The incident depicted in the food provisions in the camp23. This was met with a firm literature of the subject as a stand-alone Dennemark and resistance from the Crown Hetman, who presented a new Motowidło action seems to be a rather non-agreed ele- tactical plan, approved by the officers present on the coun- ment in the implementation of the tactical plans of John cil. Sobieski proposed to conduct the main attack from the III Sobieski, rather than a daring attack by these officers, right wing on the southern corner of the defences, with the who were killed in the clash along with a few non-com- supporting attack on the northern corner, planning also to missioned officers and privates. A definite lack of combat flank and cut off the Ottomans from Dniester crossing24. support was decisive for the defeat of a group of two col- The same night, around 3 a.m., all Polish and Lithuanian onels, but helped the Hetman to reconnoitre the Turkish units took the designated positions in the battle ranks – positions on this section20. in order to secure bulwarks and batteries, as well as to This enabled Sobieski to prepare Polish soldiers more ‘weaken the battle ability’ of the Turkish soldiers in difficult effectively to the final attack. It turned out that the defend- for them climate conditions. Moreover, various accounts ers were properly prepared in this section for defence and informed about the “night drills’ carried out by the infantry had considerable firepower. Therefore, for Poles, who were companies under the guidance of Sobieski, however, it at a distance of 500–600 m from the ramparts, the position seems that the author confused them with the soldiers’ of the enemy was very important – if Sobieski planned to march ‘through difficult gorges’ to the designated battle take decisive assault on the right wing, then fighting recon- posts25. naissance was a logical consequence of his tactical plans. The military assessment of the first day is definitely As the dusk came, before 4 p.m., servants and infantry favourable for the Polish-Lithuanian side which used tra- begun the construction of several (?) artillery batteries ditional tactical elements, namely skirmishes, reconnais- located within approx. 200 m from the Turkish positions, sance through fighting, regrouping of the units and the placing on them several dozens of cannons and mortars. W. Majewski claims that because of the preparations for 21 W. Majewski, Wojny polsko-tureckie…, p. 380. 22 the general attack, the cannons were removed from the M. Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka…, vol. 1, pp. 380–381. 23 K. Bobiatyński, Michał Kazimierz Pac, wojewoda wileński, het- man wielki litweski, Warsaw 2008, pp. 290–291. 19 ‘Victoria pod Chocimiem…, Chocim 12 November 1673’, NBU 24 “Victoria pod Choimiem…’, Chocim 12 November 1673, NBU Kiev, Chreptowicz archive, no. 6283, p. 1–1v. Kiev, Chreptowicz archive, no. 6283, p. 1v. 20 BU Wrocław, no. 535992 adl. p. 1–1v. 25 M. Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka…, vol.1, pp. 381–382.

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construction of the artillery batteries. Hetman Sobieski re- However, such description of the battle does not, in- cognised enemy’s fortifications, locations and resistance clude the defensive operations of the Ottoman troops – it of the defenders, and more importantly acquiring a Mol- seems that the simple absence of the Janissary companies, davian and Wallachian ally, which aided in “closing’ the which were surprised by the swift pace of the attack of the circle around the Turkish camp, allowing for a successful Polish infantry played a certain role during the onslaught. preparation of Hetman’s groups for the deciding attack the The accounts also mention the fierce hand‑to‑hand com- next day. bat, which erupted at certain sections. What is charac- Before 7 a.m., on the 11 November, right after dusk, teristic is that those Janissaries later disappear from the Hetman Sobieski with a group of higher commanders ob- preserved descriptions of further stages of the battle. It served the positions of Turkish troops, and confirmed that seems then that their troops were partially destroyed and only scant guards were present on the embankments, and partially “assimilated’ into the camp, later taking limited that the majority of the Turkish soldiers were resting in the part in further fighing. The accounts also informed about camp. Because of that Sobieski decided to immediately the counter-attack of the Turkish cavalry on the left wing, attack, before the units of Janissaries appear again on warded off by the advance of cavalry regiments of S. Bidz- the embankments, ready to repulse further attacks. After 7 iński and W. Soraszewski28. a.m., the commanders of the groups were ordered to pre- Around 8.30 a.m. the infantrymen and dragoons be- pare a common attack for 8 a.m. On 7.30 a.m. the artillery gun coming down from the embankments to the camp; began a 15-minute preparation, firing intensely from the some of them were already ordered to dig up the earth cannons and mortars at selected defences26. and backfill the moat with it, as well as to arrange bridges On 8 a.m., the Crown and Lithuanian regiments of in- from the wooden stockade, and prepare the area for the fantry and dragoons begun the attack on the selected sec- deciding attack of the Hetman’s cavalry. The operations tions of the defences, and despite the serious loss in men lasted until 10 a.m., preventing the Turkish commanders during 10–15 minutes, the soldiers managed to climb the from regrouping and preparing their own cavalry troops to embankments, pushing away the troops of Janissaries. counter-attack the Hetman’s infantry and dragoon groups The unquestionable tactical victory was owed to the sur- invading the camp. prise and swiftness of action, as well as courage demon- Around 10.30 a.m., Hetman Sobieski’s group of cavalry strated by Hetman Sobieski and many of his officers27. attempted to enter the camp from the right wing, in order The infantry of the right wing quickly reached the line to support and defend the infantrymen, but also to at- of the defences, since the gorge there was flat, just like the tempt a reconnaissance. Jabłonowski, who commanded edges of the plateau. On the left wing, the attack of the on this stage, with 7–8 hussar squadrons even attempted Lithuanian regiments was delayed because of the deep to cross the dug up passage in the defences, but he im- gorge and the narrow bridge over it and the steep slope mediately found himself in a difficult situation. Because of the plateau. It seems that at least on certain sections of the too narrow passages, the cavalry had to march in of the attack, the regiments of infantry and dragoons had columns, which come across a strong group of Rumelia to overcome significant difficulties – frozen water in the (numbering approx 4,000 men) prepared for battle, moat, as well as the significant height of the defences and and the cavalry suffered significant losses. From the same palisades there had to hinder the effective access to the reasons Jabłonowski ordered a retreat to the current po- fortifications for the Poles and Lithuanians. The drawings sitions, because he was unable to receive support from show the infantry forming regiments, however, it is be- other squadrons29. lieved that during the attack it had to initially attack in This moment was captured by J. Bensheimer in his companies (platoons), and during the seizing of the de- drawing, proving the thesis about the column formation fences it attacked in a lose order. of the cavalry. W. Kochowski wrote also about the strong resistance of an unknown group of Janissaries, defend-

26 “Spod Chocimia’ [November 1673], NBU Kiev, Chreptowicz archive, no. 5985, p. 116. 28 M. Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka…, vol. 1, pp. 383–384. 27 A. Przyborowski to NN, Chocim 15 November 1673, B.PAU- 29 Iden, Stanisław Jabłonowski (1634–1702). Polityk i dowdówd- -PAN, no. 1070, pp. 654–655. ca, vol. 1, Siedlce 1997, p. 111.

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– 134 – – The Battle of Chocim, 10–11 November 1673 –

ing the entrance to the camp with janczarki (light Turkish Sipahi corps was thrown back outside the line of the line firearm). All those factors preconditioned the failure of the of defences. Hetman Sobieski saw a chance for victory and Polish hussars, and only the help of the squadrons from decided to charge the enemy lines in order to brake them, neighbouring troops stopped the movements of Rumelia seize the Jaska gate and enter the camp thereby definitely Sipahi emerging on the outskirts of the defences. Those crushing the Turkish forces. were the squadrons of pancerni (medium-cavalary) Het- After 12 p.m. Jabłonowski, with 15 hussar squadrons man Sobieski, supported on Dniester by Bidziński’s troops (around 1,200 men) charged violently Turks crowded near and the Moldavian divisions, which forced the Ottomans the Jaska gate and by penetrating through the groups to retreat to the entrance of the camp. The course of the of Sipahi, entered the camp. The hussars of the Russian fight in the accounts clearly points to the deliberate ac- Voivode, crossed the gorge, the dug up defences and the tions of Sobieski, for it was his order to support the retreat gate, and despite the strong resistance of the Turks, man- of the Russian Voivode’s squadron, the mentioned groups aged to successfully break through to the lodging area of cavalry flanked the enemy, forcing him to retreat inside of Hüseyin Pasha’s tents33. The hussar squadrons were the camp30. accompanied by the pancerni units of the Sobieski and The Crown’s cavalry did not cross the line of the de- Wiśniowiecki cavalry groups34. fences anymore, instead on the Lithuanian wing three hus- After the battle, Hetman Sobieski praised Voivode sar squadrons of J.K. Chodkiewicz and the Sapieha clan, Jabłonowski’s courage and his commanding virtues, admittedly crossed the defences, but they were quickly because Polish cavaliers fought in an almost two hour forced out to the outskirts by the counter-attack of the vicious combat with the Sipahi troops, who by the use of Turkish cavalry – those were the Bosnian Sipahi, which un- “fire and movement’ inflicted significant casualties in both til now did not participated directly in the battle31. men and horses. The success of the hussar charge had Hüseyin Pasha saw at that moment some chances for a crucial meaning for the course of the further fights. The victory and decided to lead the cavalry groups outside the Poles reached the tents of Hüseyin Pasha, which caused defences and make an attempt to break Polish troops loc- panic among his people and a swift retreat towards the ated on the right wing. bridge, but it also allowed the Hetman’s infantry a secure The train of thought of the Turkish Pasha was logical, entrance to the Turkish camp35. because the foregoing tactical successes were optimistic. In the course of these struggle, the Polish infantrymen He could also expect that the squadrons of Jabłonowski showed their insubordination, as instead of fighting, they and Sobieski were tired and exhausted by the fighting. were preoccupied with plundering and robbing the Turk- Moreover, he took into account the threat for his own ish camp. The intervention of the Russian Voivide in the units – which was the possibility of flanking them on the form of firm orders directed at their commanders restored defences of Dniester by the Polish and Moldavian squad- discipline among the infantry, which is mentioned in every rons, or the necessity of escape “to Cecora’ with his own account36. cavalry group. Arguably, all those conditions caused the Meanwhile, on the Lithuanian section the attack was Ottomans to undertake offensive action32. delayed. Since at that same time, the leading regiments Around 12 p.m., the enemy’s cavalry begun its attack of infantry were only reaching the Bukovina gate, passed on two sections of the outskirts of the camp – the south- it and allowed the cavalry squadrons of the Lithuanian ern (Rumelia Sipahi) and western (Bosnian Sipahi). Along Hetman to slowly advance into the Turkish camp. Het- the first section they were stopped by the counter-attack man Pac, not waiting for all of the units to enter, organised of the Bidziński’s cavalry regiment and at the second by a group of hussars and petyhorcy and carried out a violent the Wiśniowiecki and Potocki’s regiments, whereupon the charge at “the flank of the enemy fighting with the Crown

30 W. Kochowski, Roczników Polskich Klimakter IV, ed. J.N. Bobro- wicz, 1853, p. 341. 33 “Opisane potrzeby z Turkami…’, B.Czart. no. 171, pp. 570–571. 31 Relacja gdańska, Gdańsk po 3 grudnia 1673, The Gdańsk Li- 34 From Gdańsk 22 November 1673, B.PAU-PAN, no. 8189, brary of the Polish Academy of Sciences, N.1 5 adl. 99. p. 29v. 32 “De data 11 Novembris z obozu…, Chocim 11 November 35 W. Kochowski, Roczników Polskich klimakter IV…, p. 347. 1673, B.PAU-PAN, no. 1070, p. 656. 36 M. Wagner, Stanisław Jabłonowski…, vol. 1, p. 111.

– 135 – – Marek Wagner –

squadrons’. This caused panic in the ranks of Bosnian cav- Meanwhile, also the Lithuanian cavalry of Radziwiłł was alry and forced it to retreat further into the camp37. pushed away towards the bridge. During the attack they At that time, the overall tactical situation was as follows: were pushed away from the crossing by the Bosnian cav- inside the Turkish camp, just outside the line of defences, alry, who with a strong attack forced the Lithuanian’s out there were groups of Polish and Lithuanian cavalry and past the northern gorge. Soon, a subsequent counter-at- infantry, while the Ottoman cavalry gathered in the area tack of Radziwiłł’s cavalry troops broke the Bosnian Sipahi bordering on Dniester and partially moving towards the group, forcing them into the camp39. Ultimately, only 2–3 crossing. A unitary command was already lacking in the thousand of the fleeing managed to escape on to the enemy’s army, since Hüseyin Pasha, after the attack of the other river bank, and the bridge collapsed preventing the Russian Voivode’ cavalry, retreated in the direction of the Turks from further escape40. Dniester crossing. The cavalry squadrons and companies of infantry re- Around 2 p.m., the battle entered in its final stage, but maining in the Turkish camp, while still plundering and there are only partial accounts about its exact course. It robbing, were moving systematically towards Dniester is known that the groups of cavalry aimed to seize the forcing the crowded Ottomans onto the bank of the river, Chocim bridge going from the outskirts to the centre, taking them into captivity or killing them in the vicinity of which is why they moved closer to the river. The rest of the the bridge, which sealed the defeat of the corps of Hüseyin camp was occupied by loose groups of Polish cavalry and Pasha41. infantry. Probably around 2 p.m., Bosnian Suleiman Pasha The final stage of the battle of Chocim was the chase gathered a group of 2–3 thousand Turkish cavalrymen and after escaping Turks by the light squadrons of Atanazy for the last time attempted to break through to the south, Miączyński and Jerzy Ruszczy, because their several-thou- reaching without difficulty near the Jaska gate (the Bukov- sand group managed to cross the bridge, while heading ina gate was already seized by the Lithuanians). However, towards Kamieniec. The remaining Hetman units returned after crossing it, already on the outskirts the Pasha was to the military camp. On the 12 November, in the morn- stopped by the cavalry of Wiśniowiecki and Potocki, which ing, a very formal thanksgiving service was performed with forced the Turks back into the camp. At that time, another a speech from Sobieski directed at the soldiers42. encounter with the Polish cavalry took place, which ended In the morning offensive actions were continued. Kąt- with the charge of several hussar and pancerni squadrons, ski’s artillery began firing at the Chocim castle, and the as well as with breaking the group of Suleiman Pasha into Janissaries’ garrison send a trumpeter with conditions few smaller groups of cavalry38. of capitulation – possibility of an exit with weapons and Arguably, also around 2 p.m. the flanking groups of equipment, lending them a convoy and proceeding to Iași Bidziński and Radziwiłł entered the camp, moving along or to Cecora, and swearing by the Sobieski on the gos- the bank of Dniester towards the bridge with the intent of pel. However, the offensive operations were continued. cutting off the retreat of the escaping Turks. Many minor In the morning of 13 November, the infantry regiment of clashes and encounters happened there, e.g. the Crown Jan Tedtwin sized the bulwark before the bridge on the infantry sized the battery of Turkish cannons which were left bank of Dniester, and later also the fortifications in fired against those escaping from the battlefield, and Żwaniec, which caused the capitulation of the janissaries a large group of Ottoman cavalry run into a part of the in the Chocim castle43. Bidziński’s corps, causing many Poles and Turks to fall The losses on the Turkish side were tremendous – from a high Dniester slope. Defensive operations of the 20 thou­sand dead and wounded soldiers, including 8 thou­ scattered groups of Sipahi were possible thanks to the maze of tents and smaller buildings, causing significant 39 K. Bobiatyński, Michał Kazimierz Pac…, pp. 291–292. troubles for the attacking Poles and Lithuanians. 40 “Victoria pod Chocimiem…’ Chocim 12 November 1673, ibid., no. 6283, pp. 1v–2. 41 [Relacja włoska, Warszawa po 11 listopada 1673], ANK Cra- 37 “De data 11 Novembris z obozu…’, Chocim 11 November cow, Pinocchi archive, no. 372, pp. 434–435. 1673, B.PAU-PAN, no. 1070, p. 656. 42 M. Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka…, vol. 1, pp. 391–392. 38 “Spod Chocimia’ [November 1673], NBU Kiev, Chreptowicz 43 J. Sobieski, do NN, Chocim after 11 November 1673, NBU Kiev, archive, no. 5985, p. 116v. Chreptowicz archive, no. 5985, pp. 120–120v.

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sand dead janissaries, further 5 thousand drowned in – because of the numerous military and logistic diffi- Dniester, many of the Ottoman higher commanders died. culties, as well as the real possibility of rescue, Sobieski The Poles took several dozen cannons, supply of ammuni- abandoned the long term camp blockage and conducted tion and gunpowder, many banners and bunchuks, horses successful offensive operations against the Chocim corps, and camels, among the rich military equipment, which was finished with their complete defeat. Thirdly – Sobieski skil- given to the “infantry and rabble’ already on the battlefield. fully used the climate conditions, the rules of economy of On the Polish side, the loses were amounting to 2 thousand force and cooperation of different types of military, the dead and wounded, especially among the soldiers and effectiveness of infantry and artillery, swiftness of the officers of infantry and dragoon regiments44. cavalry attack, and when he obtained the initiative and Sobieski owed the tactical success in the second day tactical advantage over the Ottomans, he lead to a spec- of the battle, as well as during the whole encounter, to nu- tacular failure of the Turkish force45. merous factors which were discussed many times in Pol- ish and foreign literature of the subject. Firstly – the march 45 K. von Clausewitz, Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von of the Hetman army towards Chocim from the southwest Clausewitz über Krieg und Kriegführung, vol. X ‘Strategische Beleuchtung mehrerer Feldzüge von Sobieski, Münnich, Frie- were described in historiography as ̒ inside actions’ to­ drich dem Grossen und dem Herzog Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand wards the position of the Kaplan Basha’s corps. Secondly von und andere historische Materialien zur Strategie. Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Karl von Clause- 44 M. Wagner, Wojona polsko-turecka…, vol. 1, p. 392. witz über Krieg und Kriegführung’, 1837, pp. 11–14.

Bibliography Primary sources K. von Clausewitz, Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von Scientific Library of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences and Clausewitz über Krieg und Kriegführung, vol. X ‘Strategische of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Cracow (B. PAU-PAN) Beleuchtung mehrerer Feldzuge von Sobieski, Münnich, Frie- The Gdańsk Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences drich dem Grossen und dem Herzog Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand The National Archives in Krakow (ANK Cracow) von Braunschweig und andere historische Materialien zur The Princes Czartoryski Library (B. Czart) Strategie. Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Karl von Clause- The Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine in Kiev (NBU Kiev) witz über Krieg und Kriegführung’, Berlin 1837 W. Kochowski, Roczników Polskich Klimakter IV, ed. J.N. Bobro- W. Majewski, Wojny polsko-tureckie 1672–1699, in Polskie tradycje wicz, Lipsk 1853 wojskowe, vol. 1, ed. by J. Sikorski, Warsaw 1990 Books M. Wagner, Stanisław Jabłonowski (1634–1702). Polityk i do­wódca, Chocim, Encyklopedia Wojskowa, vol. 1–2, Warsaw 1931 vol. 1, Siedlce 1997 K. Bobiatyński, Michał Kazimierz Pac, wojewoda wileński, hetman M. Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka w latach 1672–1676, vol. 1, wielki litewski, Warsaw 2008 Zabrze 2009

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– Mirosław Nagielski – University of Warsaw

Vienna Campaign 1683

The threat to Europe from Turkey ruled by the viziers strike will be directed at the Empire. From this moment from the Köprülü family increased since Sultan Ibrahim the Austrian side began to consider an offensive-defens- I had started a war for Crete with Venice in 1645. Right ive alliance with John III against Turkey more seriously. when Crete had been conquered in 1669, Turkey regained Still, efforts were made, so that the attack is directed freedom of manoeuvre in other theatres of war. Between at the Commonwealth. In a message from 6 June 1682 the years 1672–1676 it waged war against the Common- Caprara supposedly reported that ‘it would be possible wealth of Both Nations and afterwards with Russia until to redirect the war from us onto Poland for a substantial 1681. A treaty signed with the tsar on 23 January 1681 in amount of money. But even such a turn of events would gave sultan Mehmed IV the liberty to choose greatly harm Your Majesty’s lands’1. It seems reasonable, a new direction of strike in south-eastern Europe. It would then, that Sobieski hesitated for so long before making be either the Empire or the Commonwealth. The latter a final decision about an alliance with Austria. In Septem- deemed the peace negotiated in 1678 by Jan Gniński, ber 1682 a draft of a Polish-Austrian treaty was accepted the voivode of Chełmno (Culm), as greatly unfavourable. in Vienna along with instructions for deputy Karol Ferdyn- It left Kamyanets-Podilsky (Kamieniec Podolski) along and Waldstein authorizing him to make minor corrections with a fragment of Ukraine within Turkish borders. The during the Sejm (Parliament) in Warsaw in 1683. Finally, situation was getting even more complicated because of on 31 March an agreement with the emperor was accep- battles fought in Hungary since 1672 by Imre Thököly’s ted by the parliament and the treaty between Leopold insurgents, who rebelled against the rule of emperor Leo- I and Sobieski was signed on 1 April (it was antedated to pold I. In May 1681, when Thököly was assured of Turk- 31 March, because the date was feared to be wrongly in- ish help, he decided to broaden the scope of his uprising terpreted – April’s Fools!) 2. against the Habsburgs. John III Sobieski, faced with the The signed treaty described an offensive-defensive al- demise of ‘Baltic’ plans and Gniński’s unsuccessful mis- liance directed against Turkey alone. The emperor had to sion, decided to commence talks with Vienna because of put out an army of 60 thousand men, including about 20 the rising threat of Turkey and its new vizier Kara Mustafa thousand reinforcements from the Reich and Sobieski an (since 1676). It was under his reign, that Turkey began to army 40 thousand strong. At the same time Leopold I took threaten Habsburg countries. A long time passed before the Viennese royal court 1 After: K. Konaski, Polska przed odsieczą wiedeńską, Warsaw became interested in an alliance with Sobieski against 1914, pp. 112–113. the Ottoman Porte, because after signing the Nijmegen 2 The following authors wrote about Polish-Austrian relations in treaty, the Habsburgs could relocate their troops from great detail: J. Wimmer, Wiedeń 1683. Dzieje kampanii i bitwy, Warsaw 1983, pp. 15–61; Z. Wójcik, Traktaty polsko-austriackie the western theatre to Hungary, which strengthened z drugiej połowy XVII wieku, Warsaw 1985; C. Reichl-Ham, their position in the negotiations with the sultan. Since Österreichisch-polnische Militärbündnisse in der 2. Hälfte des April 1682 imperial diplomats in Istanbul (messages from 17.Jahrhunderts, [w:] Polnisch-österreichische Kontakte sowie count Alberto Caprara) were convinced, that the Sultan’s Militärbündnisse 1618 –1918, Wien 2009, pp. 77–120.

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on the obligation to pay 1.200.000 zlotych in Polish coin the Rába river. In order to avoid being cut off from Vienna, for the recruitment of Polish-Lithuanian forces. According the prince retreated along with his cavalry in the direction to the calculations by J. Wimmer, the financial strain on of Magyaróvár, to defend the centre of the country from the Crown went beyond 8 million zlotych, excluding dona- destructive Tatar raids which arrived under the command tions from abroad, whereas the Lithuanian’s – 3 million of khan Murad Giray. Up until 7 July the imperial cavalry zlotych. The Commonwealth, in total, paid about 11 mil- withdrew in the direction of Vienna and only the inform- lion zlotych for the Vienna campaign, which constituted ation about the Turks reaching the Leitha river crossing 78% of its total war expenditures3. The royal army, led by accelerated the decision to withdraw the wagons and John III to relief Vienna, outnumbered the imperial forces infantry to the endangered capital. On 9 July near Pet- under the command of Prince Charles V of Lorraine, which ronell the prince fought a bloody battle with the Turkish didn’t exceed 18 thousand soldiers during the direct oper- vanguard while retreating and suffered defeat. The Tatars ation of unblocking the Empire’s capital. So how did the especially took their toll on the imperial forces spread- allied forces achieve victory under the walls of Vienna? ing fear among the soldiers unfamiliar with fighting with In June 1683 an enormous Turkish army headed by viz- such an enemy. The Tatar czambuls plundered the direct ier Kara Mustafa reached the walls of Vienna and began hinterland of Vienna and intimidated the populace unac- the siege. Since May the fights with Turkish forces were led customed to such fast moving units. After strengthening by the imperial army under prince Charles V of Lorraine. the garrison in Vienna, the prince traversed to the right During war councils preceding field manoeuvres in Hun- bank of the Danube river, burning the bridges behind him. gary, the prince had been an advocate of offence, which It was the last moment to relocate the cavalry, because was not only supposed to surprise Turkish units heading since 14 July Vienna was surrounded by Turkish-Tatar toward Vienna, but also raise the morale among Austrian forces on all sides. soldiers. Thus, the Lorrainer introduced a few modifica- We have to negatively judge the actions delaying the tions to the imperial defence plans, which had been ori- Lorrainer due to the reluctance of his commanders to ginally conceived by Johann Georg Rimpler and the head more active operations against Kara Mustafa’s army. Al- of the Court Council of War – Herman von Baden. Near though, the fact that he didn’t get surprised and managed Kittsee, where the imperial forces were concentrating, to lead a large amount of infantrymen into besieged Vi- prince Charles had 32 thousand infantry and cavalrymen enna was a positive. Already during the siege the prince and 72 cannons at his disposal. On 11 May he commenced managed to organize an effective resistance throughout manoeuvres along the right bank of the Danube, reaching Austria against roaming Tatar czambuls, which lowered the stronghold of Győr and Komárno afterwards. After losses and protected the supply base for active imperial performing reconnaissance near Esztergom and reach- forces. Until the allied forces arrived the Lorrainer could ing the heavy artillery camp, the prince began the siege boast with great achievements: of Nové Zámky on 3 June. Slow advance of the imperial – protecting the high roads leading the relief army army wasn’t the effect of prince Charles’s negligence, towards Vienna; including the defence of an important rather than the resistance among lower ranked com- bridge on the Danuve river, near the city of Krems, through manders and members of the Court Council of War, who which reinforcements from the Reich were to arrive. were against offensive manoeuvres towards the incoming – protection the regions of Lower Austria and Turkish forces. They feared that prince Charles will waste from Tatar czambuls and Imre Thököly’s Hungarian forces the best imperial units even before the confrontation with (the leader of a Hungarian uprising directed against the the main Kara Mustafa’s forces. This insistence caused emperor); that prince had to break the successfully developing siege – a successful relief of Bratislava near the end of July of Nové Zámky on 9 June and once again set camp near 1683, along with a Polish corps led by prince Hieronim Komárno, waiting for enemy movement. After reaching Lubomirski; Győr and strengthening the stronghold’s garrison, on 30 – securing bridge crossings near Tulln for Sobieski’s June the first fights with the Turkish vanguard began on army marching to relieve Vienna; – building bridges near Tulln, in close vicinity to active 3 J. Wimmer, Wiedeń 1683…, p. 232. enemy forces;

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– victory against beylerbey of Eger Abaza Kör Hussein’s his ally with experience. Born in 1629, was 54 years old dur- corps near Bisamberg. ing the relief of Vienna. The prince managed to stop the Turkish offensive on Since 1649, that is since the Zboriv campaign against the left bank of the Danube river twice, which allowed the the Cossacks, he served in the royal army starting as reinforcements both from the Commonwealth and from a (‘rotmistrz’) of armoured cavalrymen, then the Reich to arrive at Tulln peacefully. If we include imper- a commander of big cavalry raids and finally – Field Het- ial soldiers burning the bridge under construction by the man in 1666 and Great Hetman in 1668. He gained ex- Vlachs and Moldovans and securing the approaches to perience under the service of such seasoned masters as Vienna for allies from the Reich and Poland, we have give Stefan Czarniecki or Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski on several him a high grade as a commander-in-chief. theatres of war against the Cossacks, Tatars, Transylvani- Prince Charles V was born in 1643, so he was 14 years ans, Moscow, Sweden and Turkey. As an independent younger than Sobieski. He was the son of Nicholas Fran- leader Sobieski brilliantly used the speed of cavalry at- cis, the younger brother of Charles IV, prince of Lorraine tacks, which he demonstrated in campaigns against the and Bar. At first he was raised in the French court of Louis Tatar Horde in 1667 during the Podhajce campaign and XIV, who strived for the restitution of the Duchy since 1658 also between the years 1671 and 1672 during the fights in without success. Estranged from , he abandoned Ukraine. Since 1672 he fought against Turkish-Tatar forces his duty at Louis XIV’s court. Since 1663 he served the stopping Tatars in strongholds in the battles of Podhajce Austrian Habsburgs and as a lieutenant colonel of cavalry (1667), Lvov, (1675) or Zhuravno (Żurawno) (1676). In 1673 distinguished himself in a fight against the Turks in the he took Turkish fortifications of Hussain Pasha by storm in battle of Saint Gottard. In 1669 and 1674 he was a can- the (Chocim), which resulted in the utter didate to the Polish throne and Sobieski’s competitor, destruction of the Turkish army. Sobieski was a master of at the same time. However, it didn’t affect the relations using cavalry not only on strategic and tactical scale, but between the two commanders during the Vienna cam- also could lead various types of units, including marksmen paign. Beginning in 1674, he fought under the command and artillery. Sobieski’s pursuit to not only defeat but des- of general de Souches against the army of duke Condé in troy the enemy’s personnel is apparent not only in the the battle of Seneffe. In 1675 he was promoted to lieuten- Khotyn campaign, but also in the Vienna campaign, in ant of marshal Raimondo Monecuccoli in the fight against which he tried to flank Kara Mustafa’s army. Among the the French forces led by Turenne. In 1676, as an independ- allied leaders marching towards Vienna, Sobieski had the ent commander, he conquered Philippsburg on the River biggest experience in fighting Turkish forces. Nobody knew while leading an army of 30 thousand soldiers. In Turkish and Tatar tactics better than him. In 1683, against the following year he failed to deliver reinforcements to many of his advisers, he was determined to help the im- Freiburg on time, causing the opposition to criticize him. perial forces and, while leading the allied army, crush the In 1678 he operated without much success in the upper Turks before Kara Mustafa ends the . He ut- Rhein region against the Frenchmen led by marshal de terly convinced the doubtful to participate in the Vienna Créquy, and afterwards was appointed governor of Upper campaign in a famous letter to the Crown’s Field Hetman Austria, based in Innsbruck. The prince of Lorraine was Mikołaj in which, on 28 July 1683, he wrote: an apprentice of Montecuccoli and called an advocate of ‘it’s better to fight on foreign soil, eating foreign bread, in manoeuvre warfare by his contemporaries; he was a brave assistance of all of the Empire’s forces, not only the Em- man, man of consequence, a good tactician adored by peror himself, than to defend ourselves, while eating our his soldiers, with whom he often spent time in the camp, own bread when all our friends and neighbours have left similarly to his future ally – John III Sobieski. In meetings us if we don’t give them a hasty succour’4. Sobieski man- with Sobieski and his entourage it turned out, that he had aged to compel his army to a strenuous march, as the left a big sense of humour and wasn’t able to hold his liquor, column (led by Hetman M. Sieniawski) traversed 320 kilo- when old Polish hospitality treated him with Polish drinks in the camp. 4 John III to M. Sieniawski, Field Hetman of the Crown, from The Polish relief forces were led by John III Sobieski, Częstochowa on 25 July 1683; B. Czart., manuscript 2757, king of the Commonwealth since 1674, who certainly beat p. 87.

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metres in 12 days, whereas the right (Sobieski’s main force) ant, they had as much as 14 thousand cavalrymen at their over 400 kilometres in 15 days, which was a good result for disposal, which Charles was severely lacking during his that time, especially considering that infantry, artillery and fight with Kara Mustafa before the siege of Vienna. In ac- supply wagons travelled along with the cavalry. cordance with the previous arrangements, the allied forces For the last three hundred years the matter of who, in began their march from Tulln through the fact, commanded the allied army in the on 9 September. It was Charles’s merit to provide recon- had been raising controversy. Formally it shouldn’t pique naissance of the roads leading from the northern part of any interest, because when Leopold I got ahold of the news the Vienna Woods towards the Danube River; moreover, of Sobieski approaching the walls of Vienna, he sent Her- the Austrian forces had to travel the longest way the line man von Baden and Count Rabatta to carry the marshal’s of departure near Weidling and whereas baton as a symbol of supreme command to Sobieski. He the remaining units made their way towards Kirchbach also appointed Sobieski as the commander-in-chief of the and Rosskopf. First victories in fighting the Turks were also allied army in an instruction to Schaffgotsch on 3 Septem- the work imperial units led by prince Charles. In the early ber. We will show how the matter of command during the morning of 11 September the hills of and battle presented itself below. The authorship of the accep- were overrun by imperial infantry. Both com- ted plan of Vienna’s relief is another case entirely. Both manders attended the mass said by Marco d’Aviano and Austrian and Polish historians attribute it to either Charles afterwards went to Leopoldsberg, where further decisions V or Sobieski. A detailed analysis of sources pertaining to were made concerning the actions of the prince of Wal- this campaign indicate that the plan of directing the attack deck in the centre and the Polish forces continuing their from the west through the Vienna Woods was developed march through the Vienna Woods. by both commanders at the same time and independently In Kahlenberg at 3 a.m. in the morning on 12 Septem- from each other. A council in Stettelsdorf on 3 September ber JohnIII wrote a letter to Marie Casimire (Queen acknowledged this scenario. The plans to march towards Marysieńka) in which he emphasized his satisfaction Wiener Neustadt or to strike the Turkish Forces through about good cooperation with prince Charles V of Lorraine, Bratislava were rejected, instead the operation including the electors and the commanders of Reich’s contingents, Vienna Woods was chosen. Both commanders of the al- who complied with his orders. Of special importance is lied Christian forces accepted this plan unanimously. It the opinion of the Polish monarch about the Lorrainer, was also settled, that supreme command will be given to expressed three days earlier in a letter to Marie Casimire the Polish monarch whereas each of the contingent com- just after crossing the Danube near Tulln. ‘With the prince manders will order his units. Polish and imperial forces will of Lorraine I’m contended inexpressibly, he acts exemplar- cross at Tulln and Saxon at Krems in order to concentrate ily towards me, he’s a just and noble man, and knows the on the right bank of the Danube River and begin marching craft of war better than others’5. At 6 a.m. in the morning towards Vienna. The differences emerged from the inter- prince Charles gave his soldiers the order to move out pretation of the order of battle assumed by both com- from camp to the line of departure. Both leaders met at manders. Kahlenberg with commanders of the allied forces accom- Charles intended to free Vienna as soon as possible. panying them. It was here, where the prince of Waldeck, With Turks preparing for a general assault, its situation who led the Reich’s contingents in the centre, received was getting worse by the minute. That’s why the imperials his orders. The commanders proceeded to their units. took position on the left flank of the forces which were to The battle of Vienna was beginning. The imperials com- attack from the north, along the Danube. At the same time menced assault on Nussberg, the Saxons on Heiligenstadt Sobieski wanted to cut off the Turkish retreat and lay a de- and Waldeck’s units moved towards Grinzing. Sobieski, on cisive battle, so to destroy enemy personnel. Polish units the other hand, after hearing out the holy mass on Kah- along with German reinforcements took the right flank, lenberg said by father d’Aviano began to slowly move to- which was to operate along the Vienna River in order to block Turkish withdrawal to the south. 5 John III to Queen Marie Casimire at he bridge on the Danube Forces used in the Vienna operation exceeded 65 thou- near Tulln on 9 September 1683, in Sobieski. Listy do Mary- sand men, of which almost 1/3 were Poles. What’s import- sieńki, ed. L. Kukulski, Warsaw 1970, p. 515.

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– 143 – – Mirosław Nagielski –

wards Schafberg, where first companies (‘chorągiew’, lit- The events of 12 September confirm this fully. The com- erally a ‘banner’, Polish cavalry unit comprised of 100–150 manders of respective German and imperial army units mounted soldiers) of Polish cavalry were to emerge from like clockwork executed the assumptions of the order of Vienna Woods. battle prepared in the early days of September, correcting Many historian’s works, including Thomas Barker, them during the march of the allied forces towards Vienna. emphasize the main role of prince Charles in the battle Sobieski carried out reconnaissance on his flank by of Vienna, without negating the nominal leadership of sending prince Alexander’s hussars commanded by lieu- Sobieski6. After all it was the Lorrainer who, since 6 in tenant Zygmunt Zbierzchowski and from Hetman Sieni- the morning, led his infantry and pushed the Turks away awski’s group two further Potocki companies: Szczęsny’s from the fortifications of Vienna, conquering respectively hussars and Stanisław’s armoured cavalry. Despite Nussberg, Nussdorf, Heiligenstadt and finally Döbling. heavy losses, the attack of these companies which re- Waldeck himself emphasized that the generals of specific turned to the line of departure showed that an assault allied armies acted depending on the course of events and on Türkenschanz is, in fact, possible. The losses of prince Sobieski, because of the size of the front (8–10km) and ter- Alexander’s company totalled 19 knights (‘towarzysz’) and rain conditions, simply wasn’t able to perform the duty of 35 subordinates (‘pocztowy’), which was circa 35% of the the supreme commander. Prince Charles determined the whole company’s manpower); a senator accompany- outcome of the battle of Vienna on the left flank by keeping ing this company – Court Treasurer of the Crown Andrzej most of the Turkish forces led by Ibrahim Pasha on himself Modrzewski died. The Potocki companies sent for recon- almost until 4 p.m. Reading the combat itinerary of the naissance suffered similar losses, but their return showed prince, who was constantly accompanying his troops, it’s that a cavalry charge en masse could succeed. It was in worth to mention that Nussberg had been seized at circa that moment, that Sobieski, acting as the supreme leader, 10 a.m. and afterwards a strong enemy attack between made a decision of dire consequences. Considering that the Nesselbach and Schreiberbach creeks was countered. only about 1,5 hour left till dusk and the onrush of prince Bloody fights between the dwellings of Nussdorf lasted for Charles’s imperial forces’ left flank would inevitably push almost two hours and not before 1 p.m. the Prince suspen- the Turks beyond the Vienna River, he ordered an imme- ded operations in order to organise the left flank, when the diate attack with the whole right flank and centre. We’re imperials were taking position in front of Döbling. Until 6 doubtful that the dispatched couriers reached all of the p.m. the imperial forces were pushing the Turks towards allied groups but Sobieski, fearing that the Turks will re- the walls of Vienna and entered the city at dusk. At this treat from Vienna, tried to flank Kara Mustafa’s forces by time Sobieski along with his accompanying companies using a cavalry attack along the Vienna River. 20 thousand was already in the conquered Kara Mustafa’s camp. How Polish, imperial and Bavarian cavalry rushed at Abaza Sari did it come to that? Hussein’s positions. It was the biggest cavalry charge of the A difficult terrain, cut by numerous ravines, made it im- 17th century. This onslaught couldn’t be stopped by Turk- possible for the supreme commander to directly interfere ish units reinforced by Ibrahim Pasha’s troops from the with the actions of individual groups of allied forces. It back and from the right flank. Right before 6 p.m. Sobieski also wasn’t possible for Sobieski who was present at Leo- marched into abandoned tents of Kara Mustafa. The battle poldsberg and later on at Michaelerberg and Schafberg, of Vienna was a victory. even though he used a field glass. A constantly changing As the supreme commander Sobieski bore full respons- situation caused that the commanders of big concentra- ibility for the outcome of the battle of Vienna. The victory tions of coalition forces had to make decisions individu- on 12 September was ascribed to the Polish monarch, as ally, taking into consideration the directives settled down state congratulatory letters from many European rulers on war councils preceding the battle of Vienna. It doesn’t and the . Polish historian Jan Wimmer rightly deemed mean that John III didn’t act as a supreme commander. Brandenburgian and German, not Polish, accounts of the relief of Vienna and the matter of supreme command reli-

6 T.M. Barker, Double Eagle and Crescent. Vienna’s second Tur- able. According to Johann Georg von Anhalt, who repor- kish siege and its historical setting, New York 1967, pp. 322– ted the battle of Vienna to an elector (13 September) ‘Der 324. König von Pohlen commandirte en cheff und war überall

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wo das grösste Feüer wahr’. In turn, baron Schlick-Görtz, alry on the slopes of Schafberg made Kara Mustafa realize a resident of Frederic William wrote: ‘der König von Poh- from where the Christians will carry out the decisive strike. len hirinnen alles ordinirte’7. Even prince Charles himself That’s why he began to relocate reinforcements from the confirmed in his letters, that throughout the campaign he right flank to Abaza Sari Husseins’s position, thus weak- acted in accordance with John III’s directives. Three days ening forces blocking prince Charles’s march. This gave after the battle of Vienna he wrote in one of his letters: the Lorrainer an incentive to resume operations along ‘The Polish king gained eternal fame during this fight, as the Danube River after regrouping his own forces. German he came from his kingdom and acted as a great king and troops from the centre, in turn, helped Sieniawski’s cavalry a great leader. I have only given orders, which were accep- unit, when it was having a hard time fighting the Turks. ted and executed’8. In this matter the Turkish accounts of Keeping the Turkish forces busy by these units made it the battle of Vienna are most important. They saw Sobieski possible for Sobieski to commence a decisive strike with as the obiggest contributor to their defeat at the Habs- all might of his right wing and some units from the centre, burg capital’s walls. Hussain Hezarfenn wrote in his war which allowed to break through Abaza Sari Husseins’s pos- journal: ‘The great vizier barely stepped into his tent when itions and cause Kara Mustafa’s army to flee the battlefield. the Poles came after his trail, overran the military camp The basic objective laid by the allied command during and surrounded the tents of the great vizier. When they the council in Stettelsdorf was fulfilled – Vienna was set free captured the royal treasury, the great vizier took the holy and rescued from inevitable doom. However, the second banner and left the encampment’9. Defterdar Sari Mehmed objective, primary in the eyes of the supreme commander, Pasha noted: ‘the Polish king became the head of all the wasn’t completed. Kara Mustafa’s army was defeated, giaours because of his dignity’ He had with him both the but not destroyed, and was retreating through the cross- Great and Field Hetmans and twenty four thousand Pol- ing at Vienna River in the direction of Győr. Almost 60.000 ish cavalry and infantrymen’10. These accounts attest, that soldiers, not including about 15.000 Tatars, Vlachs and the Turkish side was utterly convinced that the reinforce- Moldovans who didn’t participate in the battle, fled the ments acquired by the emperor from the Polish monarch battlefield in panic. Turkish losses, mainly among infantry, decided about their defeat in the campaign of 1683. didn’t exceed 15.000 people, including many taken pris- How to judge the effort of the commanders and the oner. The biggest death toll and prisoner count was among forces accompanying them during the battle of Vienna? infantry, which stayed in the approaches among Vienna The Viennese success was the work of all allied soldiers and received the order to retreat from its walls too late. and their commanders, among whom John III and Charles Because soldiers began to pillage the Turkish camp, the V indeed played a superior role. A combined effort of the pursuit after escaping Turks wasn’t organised well. Would whole coalition army was needed to beat the Turks; none of the Poles chase Kara Mustafa’s entourage, Turkish losses the participants would achieve success alone. Indeed, the would be much bigger. Turkish sources confirm it, as Sil- left flank, comprised of imperial and Saxon forces, carried ahdar Mehmed Aga writes: ‘[The allied forces] didn’t care the weight of fighting Ibrahim Pasha’s units, which allowed much for chasing the Muslim army. If it weren’t for this, our the remaining allied forces, including the Polish cavalry, to situation would be much more dire!’11. The allies looted cross the Vienna Woods and position themselves on the great treasures, rich robes, items belonging to the vizier line of departure. In turn, the appearance of Polish cav- and Turkish dignitaries, horses and camp equipment. Apart from that, almost whole Turkish artillery, large amounts of 7 After: J. Wimmer, Wiedeń 1683…, p. 350. gunpowder, cannonballs, siege equipment and lots of food 8 O. Forst de Battaglia, Jan Sobieski król Polski, Warsaw 1983, p. brought for the Turkish army from Hungary were taken. 217. Most of the cannons were given to Viennese arsenal, des- 9 Husajn Hezarfenn, ‘Historia wyprawy wiedeńskiej’, in Kara Mu- pite the fact that it were Polish soldier who captured them. stafa pod Wiedniem. Źródła muzułmańskie do dziejów wypra- Sobieski complained to the Lorrainer about it five days after wy wiedeńskiej 1683 roku, ed. Z. Abrahamowicz, Cracow 1973, p. 256. 11 Silahdar Mehmed Aga from Findiklili, ‘Diariusz wyprawy wie- 10 Defterdar Sary Mehmed Pasza, ‘Wyprawa wiedeńska i związa- deńskiej i kronika związanych z nią wydarzeń w państwie ne z nią wydarzenia w państwie osmańskim od lutego 1681 r. osmańskim od 21 stycznia 1681 r. do 28 lutego 1684 r.’, in Kara do lutego 1684 r.’, in Kara Mustafa pod Wiedniem…, p. 294. Mustafa pod Wiedniem…, p. 164.

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the battle of Vienna without much success: cannons ‘which Sobieski didn’t neglect to emphasize in one of his letters we promised ourselves to collect and evenly split, I have that victory at Vienna didn’t change the Lorrainer, as was grabbed almost in entirety beforehand’ 12. Many incidents the case with many commanders of the allied force. He happened between the Poles and German and imperial wrote in a camp over the Danube River in front of Brat- soldiers when it came to divide the loot. The fact, that the islava: ‘The prince of Lorraine does not know sorrow nor part of the camp in which the vizier’s tent and the tents of pride, nor the Emperor’s grace’13. Sobieski was able to ap- his dignitaries were located along with many valuables preciate his ally’s skills, military experience and esteem, fell to the Poles caused envy and animosity both among which he had among imperial troops. Nonetheless, it commanders and soldiers of the allied armies. Sobieski doesn’t change the fact that the victory at Vienna had two himself tried to relieve the tension by giving numerous gifts fathers; these were John III Sobieski and prince Charles to emperor Leopold I (a couple of Turkish horses with rich V of Lorraine, who on separate fronts executed the order saddles), prince Charles V of Lorraine and his command- of battle developed a few days earlier. Glory also covered ers, electors present in the camp and other officers. For numerous nameless Polish, German and Austrian soldiers, example, he gave a horse ‘with full equipment’ to Johann among whom many stayed on the imperial soil etern- Georg von Anhalt and to Saxon elector Jan Jerzy III a two- ally. The losses of the whole army of the Commonwealth horse retinue, two Turkish banners, 4 prisoners and a rich marching to rescue Vienna are hard to estimate. Out of 25 curtain for the wife. It didn’t repair the relations between thousand crown soldiers accompanying Sobieski, about the allies and hostile incidents began to multiply since the 3 thousand didn’t return to the country, some died of meeting with Leopold I on 15 September in Schwechat. wounds and exhaustion later. For example, while crossing Relations between Sobieski and the Lorrainer began to the borders of the Commonwealth a freshly appointed degrade as supply problems plaguing both armies caused Court Treasurer of the Crown Dominik Potocki died, and constant disagreements with Poles, who complained to 15 December in the same year Field Hetman of the Crown Charles about being stripped of their trophies. Mentions of Mikołaj Sieniawski died in Lubowla. Aside from that, circa even more frequent conflicts between the soldiers of both 1000 volunteers accompanying the army died or were nations began to show up in John III’s letters. It’s telling, killed, including a few hundred camp servants. All in all, that after successfully relieving of Vienna Austrian com- excluding Lithuanian soldiers who were operating in Slov- manders treated Sobieski and his soldiers with much less akia, the losses totalled circa 5 thousand people. The goal esteem, even hostility in some cases. which motivated the allies was achieved and both mon- Until the end of the campaign both leaders held each archs, Sobieski and Leopold I could continue their great other in high regard, praising cooperation in Upper Hun- plan of recapturing Hungary, Transylvania and Podolia gary until the troops separated on 4 November 1683. from Turkish hands.

12 Letter of John III to Marie Casimire in a camp near Szenau vil- lage on the road to near the Danube River, three 13 Letter of John III to Marie Casimire at the Danube River near miles from Vienna on 17 September 1683, in Sobieski. Listy do Bratislava on 24 September 1683; in Sobieski. Listy do Mary- Marysieńki…, p. 530. sieńki…, p. 542.

Bibliography Primary sources -1918: Symposium und Abendvortrag 11. und 12. September The Princes Czartoryski Library (B. Czart) 2008 , Wien 2009 Traktaty polsko-austriackie z drugiej połowy XVII wieku, ed. Sobieski. Listy do Marysieńki, ed. L. Kukulski, Warsaw 1970 Z. Wojcik, Warsaw 1985 T. M. Barker, Double Eagle and Crescent. Vienna’s second Turkish Books siege and its historical setting, New York 1967 Kara Mustafa pod Wiedniem. Źrodła muzułmańskie do dziejów O. Forst de Battaglia, Jan Sobieski król Polski, Warsaw 1983 wyprawy wiedeńskiej 1683 roku, ed. Z. Abrahamowicz, K. Konaski, Polska przed odsieczą wiedeńską, Warsaw 1914 Cracow 1973 J. Wimmer, Wiedeń 1683. Dzieje kampanii i bitwy, Warsaw Polnisch-österreichische Kontakte sowie Militärbündnisse 1618– 1983

– 146 – – Janusz Wojtasik – University of Finance and Management in Warsaw

The Battle of Racławice, 4th April 1794

Decisions made by the parties Russia in 1792, was chosen to be the leader of the uprising. before the uprising. The scheme of the uprising was brought forth during a war Plans, forces and means council which took place in September 1793 in Podgórze with the participation of Gen. Tadeusz Kościuszko and The 1793 Second Partition of Poland effectuated by Gen. Józef Zajączek, who had come from . The Russia and Prussia on the pretext of annihilation of the plan was to commence the operation in Greater Poland spreading plague of Jacobins was a direct threat to the while simultaneously attacking the occupying armies sta- Polish Commonwealth. Under the St. Petersburg Con- tioned in Warsaw and Cracow Voivodeship with part of the vention of 1793 Russia obtained lands to the east of the forces. After liberating the capital, offensive actions were Zbruch River and Druya, the majority of Belarussia to- to commence on the right bank of the Vistula River. In the gether with Kamyanets-Podilsky, Bratslav, and territory of Lithuania, the Lithuanian army (12 000 men) Minsk – 250 thousand km2 altogether. Prussia seized Trouń would fight on its own. The ‘Podgórze’ scheme was not and Gdańsk, all of Greater Poland together with Poznań, realised because Kościuszko considered the preparations and , with Inowrocław and Brześć made to be unsatisfactory. According to the second plan, Kujawski, part of Mazovia with Płock, Sieradz and Łęczyce developed in far worse conditions, in the face of army re- lands – altogether comprising 58 thousand km2. The par- duction and imprisonments which posed a major threat to titions changed the formerly vast country into the rump the conspiracy, the uprising was to commence in Cracow Polish Commonwealth, virtually occupied by the Russian and ‘attract’ Russian forces from Warsaw, which would fa- army and comprising less than 200 thousand km2 with ap- cilitate the liberation of the capital. However, the date of prox. 4 million citizens. the uprising was yet to be established. Polish patriots were fully aware that the treacherous powers would have no qualms about partitioning the The uprising and first steps Commonwealth for the third and last time in the future. of the opponents However, they did not want to give in to the perspective of wiping their country off the political map of Europe. The Meanwhile, unforeseen circumstances quickened up- feeling of active resistance was heightened by the news rising actions. This was due to the 1st Greater Poland Na- from revolution-ridden France. As early as in May 1793, tional Cavalry Brigade commanded by brigadier Antoni this atmosphere of tension brought forward a conspiracy Madaliński who, as a member of the uprising conspiracy to organise an armed uprising. There were several centres as well as a commander of a brigade which was to be which spurred uprising plans within the country and demobilised (approx. 1200 men), decided to disobey the a gathering of exiled leading activists of the Four-Year Sejm orders and advanced his troops south from Ostrołęka to in Dresden attempted to act as their controlling centre. Cracow Voivodeship via Mława and Wyszogród. This law- General Tadeusz Kościuszko, the Polish national hero who less act prematurely raised alarm among Russians, who fought in the American Revolutionary War and against commenced to strengthen their military forces by the

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Vistula, as well as Prussians, who began to mobilise their mented by 8 squadrons of 2nd Lesser Poland National troops in order to thwart the uprising. A Russian ambas- Cavalry Brigade of Gen. Ludwik Manget. With these forces, sador, Gen. Osip Igelström, ordered a regrouping in the oc- on 1st April 1794 the Commander-in-Chief left Cracow for cupying Russian army, theretofore calculated to maintain Warsaw via Mogiła – Pleszów – Wadów – Kocmyszów to control over the main routes in Poland, in aid of reinforcing Luborzyca, where he joined 1st Greater Poland National Warsaw’s defence and blocking . Cavalry Brigade of Maj. Gen. Antoni Madaliński, which had To this end, those Russian troops which were stationed been reduced to approx. 1000 horses. outside Warsaw were drawn to the capital, together with On 3rd April 1794 the forces reached Koniusza, situated several divisions of the Słonimska and Brzeska groups, by the river Szreniawa, where they were joined by Maj. led by Gen. Alesei Khrushchyov. Those divisions who were Gen. Jan Ślaski, leading 2000 peasants-recruits armed instructed to defeat Madaliński’s brigade were also drawn with scythes. At that moment the number of Kościuszko’s to Warsaw via Northern Mazovia. In total, Gen. Igelström troops reached 3500 regular soldiers and 2000 scythemen. gathered over 16 000 men in the capital. Kościuszko also had the artillery composed of 12 cannons Sandomierz Voivodeship was blocked by troops of Gen. (4 six pounders and 8 three pounders) at his disposal. Nikolai Rakhmanov from Lublin and Gen. Fiodor Denisov On 3rd April in the Polish forces under Koś- from Łuck. They were supposed to cross the Vistula River ciuszko’s command encountered Russian corps led by near Kazimierz and later join forces from Cracow and Gens. Tormasov, Rakhmanov and Denisov, numbering Opatów. In order to join Rakhmanov and Denisov who approx. 5000 men. On the morning of 4th April, upon arri­ were blocking Sandomierz Voivodeship, a battalion of ving at Skalbmierz, Kościuszko assessed that the route commanded by Lieut. Col. Łykoszyn left Cracow. leading to Warsaw had already been blocked by the Rus- Taking advantage of these circumstances, on the night sians. Therefore, he decided to bypass the Russian forces of 22th to 23rd March, Gen. Tadeusz Kościuszko arrived in by leading his troops on a route to Działoszyce. It turned Wiatowice near Cracow, and on the evening of 23rd March out, however, that the route had also been successfully he held the final council in the Wodzicki Palace in Cracow. blocked by the Russians. This could attest to the com- As a consequence, on 24th March 1794, at the Main Square plete determination of the Russian command to defeat in the presence of the citizens of Cracow and few military the opponent in a general battle, which would decide the forces, the Polish leader announced the general uprising fate of the Polish uprising. Upon learning that the Polish by reading a proclamation in which he stated the object- army gathered in Koniusza, on the night of 3rd to 4th April ive of the struggle: ‘The liberation of Poland from the for- Denisov, the chief commander of the Russian camp, had eign soldier, recuperation and protection of the entirety of ordered Gen. Tormasov’s group to go to Koniusza, and he its borders, withdrawal of all forms of usurpation, foreign himself had marched towards Płaszowie, intending to at- as well as domestic, consolidation of national freedom tack the Polish camp from south east. and Nation’s sovereignty’1. At the same time, he was pro- claimed ‘the highest and only Commander-in-Chief of the Kościuszko’s march towards Racławice. whole uprising’2. The battle Upon commencing the dramatic uprising as a means of struggle for freedom, integrity and sovereignty of the Pol- When Kościuszko approached Racławice, ‘his vanguard ish Commonwealth, Commander-in-Chief of the National met the vanguard of the Russians […]. The Poles, mov- Armed Force Tadeusz Kościuszko had only one battalion of ing farther towards the hills near Racławice discerned the 2nd (Wodzicki’s) regiment and one battalion of 3rd (Czapski’s) Moskals, stationed in a very strong position, for indeed, they regiment, i.e. 800 men in total. This number was supple- took up quite an impassable mountain’3. In the clash of the vanguards both sides took captives, which made the Com- 1 Tadeusz Kościuszko, jego odezwy i raporta uzupełnione cel- mander-in-Chief realise that what he saw was only a part of niejszymi aktami odnoszącymi się do powstania narodowego 1794, ed. L. Nabielak, Cracow 1918, pp. 32–33; Powstanie koś- 3 ‘Józefa Zajączka Pamiętniki albo Historia rewolucji czyli Po- ciuszkowskie 1794 Dzieje militarne, ed. T. Rawski, vol. 1,Warsaw wstanie roku 1792, przekład Hugona Kołłataja’, in Pamiętniki 1994, p. 78. z ośmnastego wieku, Poznań 1862, p. 25; Powstanie kościusz- 2 Ibid. kowskie 1794… p. 178.

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Russian forces under the command of Gen. Tormasov. He ciejowskie hills, 300 m high and with a steep hillside on the immediately decided to attack the slightly weaker oppon- side of the spring. ent by ordering his troops forward toward the formation. On these hills, east of Racławice, Gen. Tormasov posi- But Tormasov did not intend to commence the fight in an tioned his army. The main forces, made up of battalions unfavourable position, so he withdrew to the Kościejowskie of riflemen and artillery, were arranged in the centre of the hills, past the Janowiczki–Racławice route, where he took track on the ridge. Their flanks were comprised of the cav- his defensive position. The Polish troops followed the Rus- alry, whereas Maj. Adrian Denisov’s Cossacks stood on the sian withdrawal until they reached the aforementioned hillside. The Russian forces numbered 3 infantry battalions, hills. However, after a reconnaissance of the hostile posi- 6 cavalry squadrons and one regiment of Cossacks, which in tions, the Commander-in-Chief decided that the perspect- total amounted to 3000 men and 12 guns. As was previously ive of a frontal attack on the Russians was not promising, mentioned, this was a highly defensive position, for both as it meant that the Polish soldiers would have to climb a frontal assault as well as an attempt to bypass the enemy a steep slope without artillery support. On the other hand, from the north or south would end in failure. bypassing the hostile army from the north through the The Poles were deployed opposite, i.e. on the crest of Klonów–Racławice route would mean dividing Kościuszko’s Dziemierzyce hills, approx. 2000m from the Russians. The forces, not to mention that the amount of time needed for positions of both hostile armies were divided by a valley completing the operation would easily draw the opponent’s and the eastern Ścieklec. Polish positions were as de- attention. Tomosov could not be bypassed from the south fensive as Russian. ‘The Polish infantry under Gen. Józef either, as that was the direction from which the rest of Gen. Zajączek was arranged in one line of 450–500 m’, on the Denisov’s troops would be coming. right flank the infantry formation was based on a 306.2 m In this situation the Commander-in-Chief made a de- hill and on the left flank it went beyond the Dziemierzyce– cision to take a defensive position on the top of a hill on Janowiczki route. Two artillery batteries, 6 cannons each, the Dziemierzyce–Janowiczki route, which created favour- were positioned in the following manner: first next to the able conditions for both offensive and defensive battle, 306.2m hill, second by the ravine of the road. The cavalry as the hostile army had to climb a steep hill. On the other commanded by Gen. Antoni Madaliński, composed of two hand, any potential attempts made by the opponent to brigades – 1st Greater Poland Brigade and bypass the Polish positions from the north or south would 2nd Lesser Polish National Cavalry Brigade, took position allow the Commander-in-Chief to rearrange his forces. on the right flank between the 306.2 m and 300.3 m hills. In The area in which the battle was to take place was a part the forest, on the extension of the left flank on the hillside of the Cracow–Częstochowa Upland, a mountainous terrain facing Janowiczki there were 100 riflemen and half of bat- furrowed with valleys. A stream, from the 19th century on- talion of infantry. Because they were untrained for battle, ward known as Ścieklec, encompasses the whole area with the scythemen were arranged on the opposite hillside fa- its branches, creating a U-shape. In spring these branches, cing Dziemierzyce, shielded from artillery fire; the Polish also known as Ścieklecs, fill with water and flow in deep supply train was situated on the same slope. Overall, the valleys which divide ranges of hills. Between them, there width of the Polish line could have amounted to 800 m.4 is a hilly terrain reminiscent of a long tongue stuck out to From 11 a.m. both sides were fully prepared, but re- south-east, 11 km long and raised 40 m above ground level. luctant to start the battle, as though they did not want to A number of ravines which plough into the hillside divide its leave their positions prematurely. However, that was only wavy ridge into distinctively outlined sections. On the crest pretence. Gen. Tormasov was awaiting Gen. Denisov’s or- of this hilly terrain with an average height of 300 m above der in response to his report about the presence of Poles sea level, there was a route that went from Wrocimowice on Dziemierzyce hills. Upon receiving the order to attack through a 300.3 m hill and then turned north-west to Mar- his opponent, supported by reinforcement in the form chocice. In the middle of the hilly crest, the Wrocimowice– of a battalion of and 4 additional cannons, Marchocice route crossed Dziemierzyce–Janowiczki track he promptly proceeded to commence the battle. After that partly went through a several-metre long gully. There a council held in the afternoon of th4 April 1794, at 5 p.m. was a forest north of the road, and to the east of the eastern Ścieklec, behind the Janowiczki–Racławice route, lied Koś- 4 Powstanie kościuszkowskie 1794…, vol. 1, p. 180.

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the Russian side decided to attack the Polish positions ing marched through Racławice, the group bypassed the with two groups. The first one was to attack from the forest from the north and ascended the Dziemierzyce hill. front and bind the Polish forces while the second would Tormasov wanted to use Pustovalov’s success to win the bypass the Polish positions and the forest from the north fight, so he ordered another part of his half battalion of and emerge through the base of the Dziemierzyce crest to- riflemen to the forest in order to take over that area and wards the left Polish flank which was bent and based in establish tactical connection with Pustovalov’s group. the valley of the Marchocice brook. The group which was He also ordered Muromcev’s mounted squadrons in that charging from the front, composed of a battalion of gren- direction. Upon receiving reinforcements, Lieut. Col. adiers, half a battalion of riflemen and 5 mounted squad- Pustovalov developed the front of his division to the left rons under the command of Col. Muromcev, supported by with greater eagerness, ordering it south and attacking field artillery fire, descended from Kościejowskie hills into the left Polish flank under the command of Gen. Józef Za- the valley of eastern Ścieklec near Zakościele, from where, jączek. The struggle between the troops of Gen. Zajączek sheltered by the forest in which it had left a part of rifle- and the Russian column of Lieut. Col. Pustovalov was men, it advanced towards the Dziemierzyce–Janowiczki– fierce. Wrocimowice crossroads. The left Polish battery (6 can- The Polish side was rather tardy in discerning serious nons) was situated on the bank of the road ravine through threat coming from the north in the form of Pustovalov’s which the Russians were descending and delayed their group. In great haste the Greater Poland Cavalry Brigade march successfully with fire, which resulted in a great deal was transferred in that direction in the attempt to block the of losses on the Russian side. The Polish cavalry (2nd bri- exit from the forest. The move turned to be unsuccessful gade) also descended from the Dziemierzyce hill, attack- due to the cooperation between the Russian cavalry and ing, with varying degrees of success, Muromcev’s squad- riflemen. Surely, after the initial failure Gen. Madaliński’s rons north of the crossroads. The Polish side experienced cavalry managed to repel the Cossack attack, but eventu- some commotion and signs of panic due to the hostile ally it was broken by a decisive charge of the Russian cav- fire. Two squadrons fled the battlefield and those which alry and partly fled the battlefield. The attempts of Lieut. remained withdrew to the Dziemierzyce hill. Col. Pustovalov’s flanking group turned out to be ineffect- When the Polish cavalry found itself within the range ive notwithstanding, as Gen. Zajączek’s left flank was too of the Russian artillery, the latter successfully fired at the strong to be broken. Thus, the battle temporarily trans- centre of the Polish formation. In this tense situation, formed into a mutual shoot-out. when the Russian side was beginning to gain the upper Meanwhile, the battle was settled at a different part of hand, the Polish battery fired, which helped balance the the front and it was not the Russians who settled it. It was battle. Eventually, the Polish managed to maintain their the Polish Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Tadeusz Kościuszko, position on the Dziemierzyce crest. Even Tormasov him- who, having noticed substantial attenuation of the Rus- self praised the Polish artillery after the battle: ‘The actions sian centre, decided to take advantage of his opponent’s of the hostile artillery,’ he wrote, ‘held back our charge. It mistake. He arranged an assault group in order to attack was simply ruthless’5. the Russian artillery positions in the centre of the oppon- Having faced the determined resistance of the Polish ent’s formation. The assault group consisted of 320 peas- centre and having realised that repeating his attack uphill ants armed with scythes, having 2 companies of 3rd and 6th and in the fire of Polish artillery did not constitute a prom- regiments on both flanks. ‘One company of 6th regiment ising perspective, Gen. Tormasov decided to seek the set- remained in the initial position and constituted support in tlement in the north. He had high hopes for the bypassing case of failure. One company of 2nd regiment and the cav- group led by Lieut. Col. Pustovalov. During the persistent alry were to stand on the left in order to allow the enemy struggle in the centre of the Polish formation, the Rus- to join Pustovalov’s group beyond the forest and to cover sian flanking group, composed of 3rd battalion of riflemen the withdrawal in case of failure’6. and one regiment of Cossacks under the command of The attack of the assault column was preceded by ar- Lieut. Col. Dmitriy Pustovalov, was quite successful. Hav- tillery fire to overpower the opponent. After the barrage

5 Quote: Powstanie kościuszkowskie 1794…, vol. 1, p. 182. 6 Ibid.

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Gen. Kościuszko advanced a group of scythemen from be- rest of Gen. Tormasov’s forces and whence the two Rus- hind the 306.2 m hill through a gully, flanked with infantry sian groups set off for Skalbmierz. from 3rd and 6th regiments, towards the Russian cannons. Thus, on 4th April 1794, after 5 hours of struggle the The enemy managed to fire once or twice with canister battle of Racławice resulted in a decisive victory of the shots, but the power and momentum of the assault was Polish army. The Poles remained on the battlefield. On unbreakable. First the peasants and then the infantry the Polish side, the battle took 100 lives, with the same crushed with gunners and after a fierce hand-to-hand number of injured. It is said that the Russians lost as combat they broke the Russian grenadiers arrayed behind many as 600 soldiers and 12 cannons. However, after the battery; at the same time they seized all Russian can- midnight on 5th April Kościuszko ordered retreat to Słom- nons (12) together with carriages, horses and artillery am- niki and on 6th April he retreated even farther to Bosutów munition. Gen. Tormasov tried to avoid the disaster by or- by the river Dłubnica and took to deploying defence on dering back 3 squadrons of Muromcev’s cavalry, but they the riverbank. seemed to have been unable to come, held back by Gen. Zajączkowski’s cavalry on the left wing. During the battle Assessment of the battle of Racławice Col. Muromcev was injured and taken captive. Thanks to his decisive assault, not only did Kościuszko Although the battle of Racławice was a rather tactical destroy the Russian centre by capturing all the enemy meeting engagement between two minor forces, it played cannons, but he also gained the opportunity to cut off a pivotal role in the history of the Kościuszko Uprising of Pustovalov’s column on his left flank and to raise fear in 1794. It was the first victorious battle that substantially the advancing column led by Gen. Denisov. After a roar- raised the Polish morale. The news of the victorious battle ing success in the centre, the Commander-in-Chief re- of Racławice sparked off an uprising in Cracow, which turned to the crest of the Dziemierzyce hill to the aid of spread to other parts of the Crown to flare up on the Gen. Zajączkowski, whose troops were still fighting with Lithuanian lands of the former Commonwealth. On the Pustovalov’s column on the left flank. Kościuszko ordered fields of Racławice, a new army had appeared. The Polish all the infantry and scythemen that had not yet taken act- soldier was joined by a peasant armed with nothing but ive part in the battle to the left wing to fight Pustovalov’s melee weapon (scythe or ) as part of a newly formed column. In a fierce hand-to-hand combat, 3rd battalion of militia. It was those untrained peasants who constituted riflemen under Lieut. Col. Pustovalov was almost com- the majority of the striking force that overpowered the op- pletely destroyed, together with the commander himself. ponent in the centre and on the Polish left flank. The remaining part of the column, including Maj. Ardian From ‘the tactical point of view, due to the combination Denisov’s Cossacks, fled towards Racławice. The fight with of regular and irregular (scythe) formations, Racławice was separated enemy groups lasted the longest in the forest, a novelty on the European war scene’. In this respect, Koś- but again the peasants’ full commitment led to a complete ciuszko splendidly implemented the previous theoretical defeat of the hostile army. stipulations (of Jean Charles Folard) on the effectiveness The battle of Racławice had not yet ended when Gen. of charges made by columns armed with melee weapons, Fiodor Denisov’s group approached the battlefield, com- surrounded by regular formations. Here, the historians posed of 3 infantry battalions, 6 mounted squadrons, one emphasise the experience gained by Kościuszko in the regiment of Cossacks and 6 cannons, altogether 3000 men. American war for independence. The commander had the The Russian leader even ascended the Dziemierzyce hill opportunity to observe manoeuvres made by the regular from the south and approached the Polish stations. It is American units with the use of untrained and diffident said that only a gully divided the Russian troops from the militia. The regular units, trained after the fashion of the Polish, but Gen. Denisov did not attempt to cross it. Only English, fought in a linear formation, leading organised sub-divisions of the Russian cavalry tried to come closer assault. The untrained and somewhat timid militia, also to the Polish positions. Ultimately, having decided not to armed with firearms and most often positioned in the fore- resume the battle, the Russian leader descended from front, fired one or two shots, after which it withdrew in an the hill in quadrilaterals and ascended Kościejowskie hills organised way, with the use of camouflage. The practical between Podmłyn and Wrocimowice, where he joined the lesson learnt in the southern states of America allowed

– 152 – Kościuszko to notice possibilities of a diversified army. trained infantry was resilient to fatigue and discomfort; Thanks to his bravery and experience combined with this the cavalry overshadowed the Polish one in hand-to- new type of army, upon considering its specifications and hand combat and carried out effective reconnaissance possibilities, the commander was able to win battles. and hit-and-run tactics. Such a diversified army was led by Kościuszko near As the Commander-in-Chief of the 1974 uprising, Gen. Racławice. The untrained scythemen armed with melee Tadeusz Kościuszko deserves a separate overview. In the weapons were arranged into column on the Dziemierzyce battle of Racławice the Polish leader showed great initi- hillside, shielded against the enemy’s artillery fire. Only ative in his use of the infantry for charging. He demon- after the Polish artillery had managed to partly over- strated his skill of redeploying the forces during the battle, power the Russian artillery did the Commander-in-Chief his great orientation and quick thinking. But most import- order the scythemen forward. The column of scythe-bear- antly, he proved to be extremely confident in his actions ers, framed with regular infantry, approach the enemy and skilful in the economical use of his troops. Apart until they reach an attacking distance, after which ‘the from the mentioned assets, Kościuszko showed personal scythemen scatter and begin assault in a wide front line, bravery. He single-handedly, and before the eyes of his whereas the flanked line infantry accelerates’. Such an im- soldiers (both regular and peasant), led columns to attack petuous attack brought about the decisive effect. the Russian cannons in the centre and on the left flank, Kościuszko used scythemen in a similar manner on the which raised the morale of the whole army. ‘The legend left flank in the last stage of the battle. When the Polish that had surrounded this person after 1792 was con- line infantry was in a fire fight and could not break the firmed in the eyes of his soldiers. It became an essential opponent’s ranks, the Commander-in-Chief decided to factor that shaped the morale of the Polish army during use scythe-bearers. He ordered them to the centre, creat- the uprising’8. Such characteristics could not be found in ing a column core, surrounded with regular infantry. The Russian leaders. column was then instructed to charge, and it broke the opponent. Apart from the scythe-bearers, the well-trained and 8 Quote: Powstanie kościuszkowskie…, p. 186. Further reading disciplined artillery also stood out with its marksman- on Battle of Racławice: K. Bauer, Wojsko koronne powstania ship. The infantry showed good attacking skills. The kościuszkowskiego, Warsaw 1981; S. Herbst, Z dziejów woj- skowych powstania kościuszkowskiego 1794, Warsaw 1983; cavalry was the weakest link in the Polish armed forces. M. Kukiel, Zarys historii wojskowości w Polsce, 5th ed. London Both 2nd Lesser Polish National Cavalry Brigade under 1949; J. Lubicz–Pachoński, Kościuszko na ziemi krakowskiej, st Gen. Ludwik Manget and 1 Greater Polish National Cav- Warsaw 1984; idem, Wojciech Bartosz Głowacki, Warsaw– alry Brigade of Gen. Antoni Madaliński turned out to be Cracow 1987; J. Nadzieja, Generał Józef Zajączek 1752–1826, a disappointment. Cavalry was successful only when in Warsaw 1975; Powstanie kościuszkowskie 1794 Dzieje mili- preponderance and did not ‘manifest its former superior- tarne, vol. 1, ed. T. Rawski, Warsaw 1994; T. Rawski, ‘Bitwa ity over the corresponding foreign weapon’7. The hostile Racławicka’, in W kręgu panoramy Racławickiej, Wrocław– Warsaw–Cracow–Gdańsk 1984; W. Tokarz, Marsz Madaliń- army demonstrated its traditional advantages: the well- skiego, Warsaw 1926; Zarys dziejów wojskowości polskiej do roku 1864, vol. 2 1648–1864, Warsaw 1966; W. Zienkiewicz, 7 M. Kukiel, Zarys historii wojskowości w Polsce, 5th ed., London ‘Manewr i bitwa pod Racławicami’, in Nauka i Sztuka, vol. 3, 1949, p. 140. 1946, no. 4. Bibliography Primary sources K. Bauer, Wojsko koronne powstania kościuszkowskiego, Warsaw 1981 Pamiętniki z ośmnastego wieku, ed. Hugo Kołłataj, Poznań 1862 S. Herbst, Z dziejów wojskowych powstania kościuszkowskiego Tadeusz Kościuszko, jego odezwy i raporta uzupełnione celniejszy- 1794, Warsaw 1983 mi aktami odnoszącymi się do powstania narodowego 1794, M. Kukiel, Zarys historii wojskowości w Polsce, London 1949 ed. L. Nabielak, Cracow 1918 J. Lubicz-Pachoński, Kościuszko na ziemi krakowskiej, Warsaw 1984 Books J. Lubicz-Pachoński, Wojciech Bartosz Głowacki, Warsaw–Cracow Powstanie kościuszkowskie 1794. Dzieje militarne, ed. T. Rawski, 1987 vol. 1, Warsaw 1994 J. Nadzieja, Generał Józef Zajączek 1752–1826, Warsaw 1975 W kręgu panoramy Racławickiej, Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow– W. Tokarz, Marsz Madalińskiego, Warsaw 1926 –Gdańsk 1984 Articles Zarys dziejów wojskowości polskiej do roku 1864, vol. 2 1648–1864, W. Zienkiewicz, ‘Manewr i bitwa pod Racławicami’, in Nauka Warsaw 1966 i Sztuka, 1946, vol. 3, no. 4 – Tomasz Malarski – Military Bureau for Historical Research in Military Centre for Civic Education

The Napoleon’s Polish Troop in 1815

The participation of Polish formations in the last cam- from Napoleon’s circles, such as Jerzy Despot-Zenowicz3 paign of Napoleon in June 1815 is not widely known and and Fryderyk Piątkowski4. Robert Bielecki’s study called only a few Polish historians took up this topic. These were: ‘Szwoleżerowie Gwardii’ and published in 1996, was inten- Adam Skałkowski, Stanisław Kirkor and Robert Bielecki. ded by its author to be a collection of chevau-légers’ bio- Adam Skałkowski’s study ‘Oficerowie polscy stu dni’, which graphies, based on documents located in the collection of was published in 1915 in Warsaw and Lvov was dedic- the former archive of the French Ministry of War, currently ated to the history of Polish formations, which were be- called Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre and located in ing organised during the Empire’s restoration. Skałkowski the Parisian suburb of Vincennes. presented only selected biographies of Polish officers By including a list of chevau-légers in his study, Robert standing by the Emperor’s side until the last days of his Bielecki complements a valuable two-volume study writ- reign and the history of Polish troops. A substantial part ten by Aleksander Rembowski and published in 1899 under of Skałkowski’s study is devoted to Polish chevau-légers the title ‘Źródła do historii polskiego pułku lekkokonnego and their participation in the Belgian campaign. The au- gwardii Napoleona I’5. That the tomes of the 1st Chev- thor also mentions Napoleon’s plans to conscript two bat- au-légers and Lancers Regiment of the Guard survived talions of Polish infantry, which were at that time in Sois- the wartime destruction can only be due to the fact that sons, personally visited by the Emperor1. The Emperor’s this regiment was a unit of the French army throughout its plan, as mentioned by Skałkowski, to restore the famous existence, it was on French payroll6 and under French mil- 7th Lancer Regiment did not follow through due to the lack 2 of a sufficient number of cavalry mounts . Only a handful 3 Jerzy Despot-Zenowicz on 18 June 1815, around 11.00 A.M. of these cavalrymen took part in the battles in the Sévres was sent by the Emperor (before the ) with and Saint-Cloud region. orders to Marshal Grouchy, so that he aids the right flank of The issue of Poles participating in the 1815 campaign the French Army in the afternoon of the same day. For un- was taken up by Stanisław Kirkor, a Polish emigrant histor- known reasons, Zenowicz arrived at Grouchy’s position at late afternoon crossing out the chance to support Napoleon at ian, who died in London in 1983. He devoted a lot of space Waterloo. to the Elba Squadron and its officers in a study published in 4 Fryderyk Piątkowski was the only Pole in the entourage of the London in 1974. It was dedicated to Napoleon’s donations Emperor during his on the island of St. Helena. His stay to Polish officers and soldiers. This valuable work contains at Longwood ended in October 1816 at the express request of a large number of facts about the very interesting Poles the British. S. Kirkor, Polscy Donatariusze Napoleona, London 1974, p. 287. 1 A.Skałkowski, Oficerowie polscy stu dni, Warsaw, Lvov 1915, p. 5 Rembowski’s work was translated and published in 2012, 31. more than a hundred years later by the publishing company: 2 The 7th Lancers Regiment originated in a straight line from Napoleon V from Oświęcim. the legionary cavalry regiment and a regiment of the legion of 6 The aforementioned archives have in their collections also the Vistula. It was formed on July 18, 1811, and was on French registers of the Vistula Lancers while being the Polish unit in payroll. the French army.

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– 156 – – The Napoleon’s Polish Troop in 1815 –

itary administration. The documentation of the regiment commander with considerable experience. He was born remained intact in French archives. on the 25th of June 1779 in Mniewo, current Koło County, in The regimental registers of the Polish army from the a family of impoverished nobility. Franciszek Dołęga-Jerz- years 1806–1831, which included the periods of the Duchy manowski, an envoy from Łęczyca, was his father and Fran- of Warsaw, the Kingdom of Poland and the November ciszka Jerzmanowska of the Dobrscy family, his mother. Uprising were all burned by German soldiers after the Old He left his family home at the age of twenty, snuck Town fell in September 19447. All the invaluable docu- into the west, where General Karol Kniaziewicz created mentation has thus been irretrievably lost. the Danube Legion. During that time, many young Poles glared at revolutionary France with interest and hope. The road to Elba Many of them decided to take the long journey west, to join the army and either fight in the Polish legions or in the The abdication treaty signed on the 11th of April 1814 in French army, believing in the imminent rebirth of Poland. granted Napoleon the right to take four hundred vo- Jerzmanowski joined the Legion in the rank of second lunteers serving as bodyguards and honour assist to Elba. lieutenant. He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant The Emperor has decided that, apart from a battalion of after the battle of Hohenlinden9, where Kniaziewicz’s infantry guard grenadiers, a Polish troop of chevau‑légers Danube Legion earned well-deserved fame. He received lancers commanded by thirty-five year old Major Baron the nomination to lieutenant on the 21st of January 1801. Jan Paweł Jerzmanowski will be incorporated into his sub- The young officer began his career on the battlefield, as ordinate formation. The volunteers were to be recruited many soldiers similar to him. Unfortunately, the signing of from the soldiers of the 1st Chevau-légers Lancer Regi- the peace treaty between Austria and France on the 9th of ment of the Guard and the 3rd Éclaireurs Regiment. February 1801 in Lunéville negatively affected the mood The selection of volunteers formally started even ear- of the Poles. Years of fighting and huge losses suffered by lier in Fontainebleau, in accordance with the daily orders Polish formations proved futile. The Italian and Danube signed on the 8th of April 1814. The order notified both regi- Legions became unnecessary and were disbanded. Three ments of the Guard about the plans to create a light cavalry half-brigades were formed in their place, they had French volunteer troop, with respect to chevau-léger tradition, in- organization and remained on French payroll. This situ- cluding chevau-léger colours and uniforms. The existing, ation was followed by numerous resignations requested tricolour regiment flag from 1812 was replaced by a white by many Polish officers, including Jerzmanowski. Initially, pennant with a diagonal, crimson inset with three golden, he decided to return to the country, but the way turned out imperial bees embroidered within. The main side of the to be barred form him, just as it was for the many similar pennant was complemented by the embroidered words: to him. Chevau-Légeres Polones Escadron Napoleon (Light Cav- For some time Jerzmanowski has stayed an officer alry Polish Troop of Napoleon). The reverse had a golden without allocation, although attempts were made to find ‘N’ letter under a golden imperial crown. The heading of him a suitable post. He was assigned to the regiment of the pennant was similar to a gold-plated spearhead. The mounted grenadiers of the Guard as late as on the 14th of referred pennant is present in the collection of the Musée November 1804, where he became aide-de-camp to the de l’Armée in Les Invalides in Paris8. Commander. This was not a prestigious job, but the sole The commander of the troop, Baron Jan Paweł Jerz- fact of serving in such an elite unit put him among the manowski of Dołęga coat of arms was a brilliant cavalry elite. The regiment of mounted grenadiers of the Guard, along with the mounted riflemen gave rise to the cavalry 7 Regimental registers were a major source of information of the Guard, originating from the times of the Consulate. about the history of individual units, including the service of At that time Jean-Baptiste Bessiéres was the com- the officers and soldiers. Relying on this type of sources Bron- mander of the Guard Cavalry. He was promoted to the isław Gembarzewski wrote his two most important works on the history of the Polish Army in the years 1806–1830. 9 At the battle of Hohenlinden in , the French General 8 The image of the pennant was included in the book of A. Jean Moreau on the 3rd of December 1800 defeated the Aus- Jouineau, Officers and Soldiers of The French Imperial Guards, trian army of the Archduke John. Karol Kniaziewicz’s Danube Paris 2005, p. 38. Legions distinguished themselves during the battle.

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rank of Marshal after the imperial coronation of Napoleon. izing his severity, but also care for the soldiers and the Bessiéres enjoyed the well-deserved fame of a brilliant ability to maintain the unit in full combat readiness. Due to cavalry commander, as has been demonstrated during the such an attitude of the commander, the Polish guardsmen on the 14th of June 1800. were admired not only by their brothers in arms, but also On the 23rd of September 1806 Jerzmanowski became by their enemies. As the memoirists emphasize, they tried aide-de-camp of Duroc, the Marshal of the Imperial Court, to avoid clashing with the Poles, seeing as they never falter thus becoming a member of the imperial entourage. from combat11. The Emperor Napoleon appreciated the In the following years he took part in the campaign of merits of his squadron’s commander. In the spring of 1813, 1805 and 1806 and on the 7th of April 1807 he entered the he became an officer of the League of Honor and received officer team of the 1st Regiment of Chevau-légers of the the title of Baron of the Empire. In 1813, Jerzmanowski, Guard in the rank of captain. along with his regiment, took part in the battles of Lützen Since then, his career was associated with the elite light (May 2nd), Budziszyn (May 21st), Dresden (August 26th) and cavalry regiment. Jerzmanowski became the commander Leipzig (October 16th – 19th). In 1814 Jerzmanowski parti- of the 2nd Company, of the 2nd Squadron, with Jan Hipolit cipated in the battles in French, when the coalition forces Kozietulski as its head. were advancing towards Paris. He spent 1808 in , participating in the fights on its Many recruits answered the call after the announce- territory. On the 10th of March 1809, Paweł Jerzmanowski ment of the recruitment to the ‘Elba Squadron’, a number received the Legion of Honour in recognition for his milit- far exceeding the expected capacity of the unit. Many che- ary services. vau-légers and eclaireurs went through the office of Major In 1809 the chevau-légers took part in the campaign Jerzmanowski in Fontainebleau on the 9th and 10th of April. against Austria, concluded by a bloody two-day battle of All of them wanted the honour of accompanying the Em- Wagram, in which Jerzmanowski was injured. After the peror in his exile. The recruitment concluded on the 10th of campaign of 1809 Polish chevau-légers received lances April, and the results were announced immediately during as part of their equipment, thus becoming a light lancer the morning assembly. The list of qualified personnel was regiment. After Wagram the chevau-légers returned to opened by officers: Major Jan Paweł Jerzmanowski, Cap- the Iberian Peninsula where the situation was becom- tain Kajetan Baliński, Lieutenants Marcin Fiutowski, Kazi- ing increasingly difficult, and the French military slowly mierz Koch and Second Lieutenants Tomasz Skowroński lost control over transport routes and felt most secure in and Józef Piotrowski.12Stanisław Kirkor notes that in ac- locked garrisons. In 1810 Jerzmanowski received the Vir- cordance to the abdication treaty, Napoleon had guaran- tuti Military Cross, and on the 15th of March of the same teed funds in the amount of 2,000,000 francs in exchange year he was made a Knight of the Empire. On the 17th of for imperial funds seized by the French treasury. On the February 1811, Captain Jerzmanowski took over as head 13th of April 1814, Napoleon allocated 170,000 francs out of a squadron10. of this sum for the officers staffing the squadron. However, Jerzmanowski left Spain with his regiment, when Na- the list lacks the name of Lieutenant Kazimierz Koch, who poleon began preparing to march on Moscow. During the was at that time replaced by Captain Jan Szulc. Captain Moscow campaign of 1812, the chevau-légers lancers of Jan Szulc has not served in the Guard up to that point. He the Guard became the direct bodyguards of the Emperor, was an officer in the Polish, albeit remaining on the French clashing with numerous units of Cossack cavalry. payroll, 7th Regiment of Chevau-légers Lancers. This regi- During the excursion to Moscow, and especially during ment, as a line unit of the French army, became famous by the tragic retreat, Paweł Jerzmanowski established himself participating in the fights in Spain, where it wreaked havoc as an excellent, determined and brave commander, cap- on the battlefield under the command of Colonel Jan able of keeping discipline among the ranks of his troop. Konopka. The lancers of the 7th Regiment used uniforms Jerzmanowski’s subordinate, Lieutenant Józef Załuski, in 11 J. Załuski, Wspomnienia, Cracow 1976, p. 260. his memoirs, issues Jerzmanowski a high grade, emphas- 12 The list of officers is cited in the studies by: A. Rembowski, Źródła do historii Pułku Polskiego Lekkokonnego Gwardii 10 M. Karpowicz, M. Filipiak, Elita jazdy polskiej, Warsaw 1995, p. Napoleona I, vol. II Oświęcim 2013, pp. 276–277 and S. Kirkor, 176. Polscy donatariusze Napoleona London 1974, p. 250.

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of Polish cut and a lance was their main weapon. The served at the Empeor’s side on Elba15. After Napoleon’s re- fame of this unit and its valour matched the chevau-légers turn to France in March 1815, this number quickly grew to of the Guard, and the enemy called it ‘The Hell Lancers’. 226, as highlighted by Robert Bielecki in his study dedic- On the 24th of March 1809, in the unfortunate battle of ated to the chevau-légers16. During the preparations to the Yevenes, the Poles had lost some of their banners; Szulc Belgian campaign, those who did not return to Poland in was heavily wounded and taken prisoner. The Spanish 1814 and stayed in France joined the soldiers who arrived handed over the wounded officer to the Englishmen, who from Elba. The squadron soldiers names list was pub- transported him to England. After almost 4 years of Eng- lished by Robert Bielecki, it was based on records present lish captivity, Captain Szulc was released on the 10th of in French archives17. After arriving to Elba, the Emperor ap- October 1813 due to permanent disability, as the military pointed Jerzmanowski as commander of Porto Longone, medics assessed, and was allowed to return to France. and Captain Jan Szulc, in effect of his attitude during the The British stated that despite treatment and long recov- aforementioned Marmont’s treason, received the nomin- ery, the clearly limping Pole is not suitable for active front- ation to squadron commander on the 5th of June 1814. The line service. A month later, on the 10th of November 1813, rank, which Szulc had (captain) corresponded to the rank Jan Szulc reported in his old 7th chevau-légers lanciers of lieutenant in the Guard. That is why Baliński, Captain of regiment in Sedan. His superiors decided that he would the Guard since the 2nd of September 1813, albeit younger take command of the squadron. During the French cam- than Szulc, had priority to this nomination.18 The Emperor, paign of 1814, Captain Szulc and his squadron particip- however, has decided to grant Szulc the command. The ated in the fights, until Marshal Marmont’s betrayal. Dur- officer corps was very stable during the entire stay on the ing the night of the 4th of April, his squadron covered the island. Similarly, in the case of non-commissioned officers march of the VI Corps, commanded by Marshal Marmont, and common soldiers. There were also two Frenchmen which was to surrender the corps to the Austrians. Lan- in the squadron. They worked as trumpeters19. Both ap- cier patrols sent by Szulc discovered enemy units hidden parently spoke Polish well and became familiar with their in the darkness and managed to warn their commander Polish colleagues. The officers and soldiers of the squad- just in time to move out his lancers out of the trap. The ron distinguished themselves with discipline, presence Poles broke through the tightening enemy ring and, led by and good manners during their entire service. This won Szulc, reached the Emperor in Fontainebleau with news the kindness and respect among not only the Emperor’s about the fate of the VI Corps. We can assume that Szulc’s entourage, but also the residents of Elba. Cases of low dis- merits earned him the inclusion to the officer corps of the cipline or even maraudership occured in many European newly established Elba Squadron.13 The aforementioned armies, especially in times of war. Jerzmanowski, how- Lieutenant Franciszek Koch, already in the squadron, ever, was known from his high requirements in relation travelled to Elba on the 14th of April 1814 but, as Robert to his subordinates, that is why his soldiers distinguished Bielecki states, left he squadron and returned to Poland themselves with their attitude. after having an argument with Szulc.14 Throughout the whole stay on Elba, the Emperor and On the 28th of May 1814 the Guard landed in Portoferraio, his miniature state were under constant surveillance by on Elba. However, a part of the Polish squadron stayed on spies from countries of the, until recently, firm anti-Napo- the peninsula, in Parma, where Captain Kajetan Baliński, leonic coalition. Meanwhile, the Emperor reigned over an the unit’s commander, was responsible for escorting the island of 223,5km², inhabited by about 12,000 people. He Empress Maria Louise and the young son of the Emperor tried to get to know the new environment and reorganize on their way to Elba. When it turned out that the Empress will not come, Captain Baliński joined the rest of the che- 15 A. Skałkowski, op. cit., p. 3. vau-légers already on the island on the 3rd of October 1814, 16 R. Bielecki, op. cit., p. 73. 17 along with his unit of 55 soldiers. Since October 1814 until Ibid.; SHAT 20 YC 166. Ex-Garde Imperiale, Cavalerie. Régis- tre-Matricule du Régiment des Chévau-Légers Lanciers, Vol- the end of February the following year, 109 chevau-légers ume du No 1 au No 2400, pp. 354–368. 18 S. Kirkor, op. cit., p. 252. 13 S. Kirkor, op. cit., p. 251. 19 It was Plaut Duvelte and Augusta Ramones, cf. S. Kirkor, op. 14 R. Bielecki, Szwoleżerowie Gwardii, Warsaw 1996, p. 88 pos.69. cit., p.266.

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his state with characteristic energy. Intelligence reports received from Maret ultimately convinced the Emperor to arriving in capitals of the recent enemies of the Emperor return. Napoleon believed Maret and valued his opinions, did not cause anxiety and strengthened rulers in the con- and the received information only confirmed what the Em- viction that the emperor is no longer a threat. Initially, peror already knew. The Emperor has made his decision Napoleon intended to make a number of investments and gave the necessary orders. on the island. It quickly became clear that his financial Preparations have been made very discreetly, so that resources are too thin, given that the new French govern- no outsiders could get a hold of the information about the ment did not live up to their obligations under the abdic- date and location of the planned landing on the French ation treaty. The costs of maintaining the manor house coast. and a miniature army outgrew the income from fishing, The pompous carnival celebrations on the island were mining and agriculture collected from these activities of utter importance, as they lulled the vigilance of spies on the island. The emperor gave the impression of being and observers of the imperial entourage. completely occupied by the affairs of Elba. His attention The presence of Princess Pauline, the Emperor’s beau- was divided, however, and despite appearances, he was tiful sister and his mother Letitia was supposed to evid- interested in the information coming from Vienna, and ence Napoleon’s plans to create a friendly environment above all, from France. Conflicts growing in Vienna filled based on the members of his family, with whom he was him with hope that the, thus far, firm anti-Napoleonic co- very close, on one hand, and on the group of civilian and alition may disintegrate at any moment leading to a new military personnel, whom he granted special trust, on the war in Europe. other. It was common knowledge that Napoleon loved his mother Letitia, who was truly supportive for him, similarly The return to France to his sister Pauline, well known for her unconventional ideas and controversial manners, but always loyal to her The tensions in France slowly increased. The aristocracy brother and the whole Bonaparte family. It was decided and gentry, with the acceptance and passivity of Louis that the preparations, carried out in total secrecy, would XVIII, introduced their own reign, striving to return to the be completed on the 25th of February 1815. pre-revolutionary order. The growing reluctance towards On the following day, around 5 P.M., Napoleon and the the Bourbons, especially among former soldiers, the intel- infantry guardsmen boarded a brig moored in the harbour. ligence and all those for whom the rule of Napoleon was The rest, including the Polish chevau-légers lancers squad- a time of prosperity caused an increase in pro-Napoleonic ron lugged their equipment onto other ships. Poles did not moods. Many cruel wars of the previous years were for- take their horses, as the limited travel resources were not gotten. They have caused the French much suffering, but able to provide sufficient space for almost 120 animals. It they were also the beginning of many brilliant careers. His was planned that after landing on the French coast, horses former soldiers and officers, who were expelled from army will be purchased at first opportunity. The whole prepar- ranks by the Bourbon regime, remembered Napoleon ations and the loading itself were led by General Antoine fondly. Drouot, who was the governor of Elba at that time. General Information about the growing discontent in France Antoine Drouot will soon become the head of the Imper- reached Napoleon in the early weeks of 1815, accelerat- ial Guard in Belgium. The miniature flotilla reached the ing the preparations for his return. The Emperor no longer French coast on 1 March and entered the Jouan Bay, a few felt bound by any obligations. Louis XVIII did not pay the kilometres from the Antibes Cape. Horses were bought promised two million francs, and Emperor Francis I de- in the nearby Cannes and soon the Polish squadron op- prived him of his wife (not without her participation) and erated in accordance with its intended purpose21. During his beloved son. In mid-February, Fleury de Chaboulon, Napoleon’s march to Paris Polish officers performed their envoy of Hugues Bernard Maret, Duke of Bessano, reached duty at the Emperor’s side at all times, directly protecting the island. He presented the situation in France accurately him22. Only a small garrison of 12 chevau-légers stayed at and objectively20. One can suspect, that the information 21 A. Skałkowski, op. cit., p. 10. 20 E. Tarle, Napoleon, Warsaw 1950, p. 427. 22 S. Kirkor, op. cit., p. 258.

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Elba, commanded by Lieutenant Marcin Fiutowski. They renamed to Corps Royal des Chevau‑Légeres de France. It were all to join the rest of the squadron soon23. returned to its original name in 1815. Since 1812, the regi- A manifesto to the army and the French nation was ment was commanded by an excellent cavalryman, Baron printed in Grasse and distributed over a large area, and Édouard de Colbert-Chabanais26. Józef Załuski also gives met with an enthusiastic reception wherever the residents Colbert a high grade, comparing him with many other had the opportunity to get acquainted with its contents. French commanders and praises him for the foresight Its impact on the military and the civilians was so signi- and energy, which he showed in 1812.27 During the pre- ficant that the imperial forces got bigger the closer they parations to strike Belgium, Colbert’s Chevau-légers Lan- got to the capital. On 20 March Emperor Napoleon entered cers Regiment became part of the light cavalry division of Fontainebleau, where he noticed a guard post consisting the guard, commanded by Count Charles Lefebvre-Des- of Polish chevau-légers24. A few months earlier, a touching noëttes. In addition to Colbert’s regiment, the excellent farewell between the Emperor and his Guard took place in Mounted Rifles of the Guard Regiment, commanded at the courtyard of the palace. that time by General François Antoine ‘Charles’ Lallemand In the late evening of the 20th of March, the Emperor was included into the division. This regiment was the elite rode into Paris under Polish escort and went into Tuileries. of the imperial guard and was one of the oldest and best cavalry units in the whole of the French army28. Preparation to war In the evening of the 14th of June 1815, the French army under the command of Napoleon was a few hours’ walk By a decree of the 11th of April 1815 the Emperor gave from the strategic bridge on the River in . Jerzmanowski the Commander’s Cross of the Legion of The main force was to cross it and march towards Brussels, Honour. On the 30th of April, after his return from Elba, Lieu- as per the Emperor’s order. The Emperor hoped that dur- tenant Fiutowski received the Officer’s Cross25. Ever since ing the march the enemy will cross his way and start the the Emperor took over his reign over France, he began to battle before the English and Prussian armies fully concen- energetically reorganize the army and prepare the country trate. On the night between the 14th and 15th of June, the for war. The reorganization also included the Polish che- French cavalry patrols effectively covered the concentra- vau-léger squadron, which was included in to the (Dutch) tion, which thus was not noticed by the opposite party. 2nd Chevau-légers Lancier Regiment of the Guard (2e régi- ment de chevau-légers lanciers de la Garde Impériale), as its The belgian campaign; first squadron. The Dutch Chevau-léger Lancer Regiment the 15th–18th of June 1815 of the Guard was formed by the imperial decree of the 13th of September 1810, and was based on the Dutch Royal The strike, which came in the morning through Charleroi Hussar Regiment of the Royal Guard. Its structure, training was a big surprise for both Wellington and Blücher’s staffs. system and equipment was modelled after the – already Their forces were scattered over a large area and their con- existing Polish Chevau-légers Regiment of the Guard. The centration would require time. Napoleon used the disloca- uniforms and equipment of the Dutch were identical to tion of the coalition troops to his advantage, inserting his Polish in terms of their cut. The only differences concerned forces between them. He tried to engage in two battles by the colours of the uniforms, as the Polish uniform was dark manoeuvring from a middle position and then defeat both blue with crimson lapels and stripes, whereas the Dutch coalition partners. ones were red with dark blue lapels and stripes. The Dutch During the campaign of 1815, Colbert’s chevau-légers regiment was colloquially called Red Lancers (Lanciers regiment and the Mounted Riflemen of the Guard lost their rouges) among the Guard. It initially consisted mostly of earlier role of honourable escort of the Emperor and be- Dutchmen, who were replaced with French soldiers, in came a combat unit. In the early phase of the operation time. After the first Bourbon restoration, the regiment was its tasks included conducting reconnaissance, covering

26 C. Summerville, Who was Who at Waterloo A Biography Of The 23 Ibid., p. 258. Battle, Edinburgh 2007, p. 86. 24 Ibid., p. 258. 27 J. Załuski, op.cit., p. 224. 25 Ibid., p. 258. 28 F. Masson, Kawalerzyści Napoleona, Oświęcim 2012, p. 156.

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activities and fighting enemy patrols. The chevau-légers firmly defended the approaches to the intersection. Duke and were a right fit to this tasks and had consid- Wellington arrived at Quatre-Bras already around 11.00 erable experience in this area from the years 1812–1814. A.M. and noted the absence of any activity on the part of On the 16th of June, which was the second day of the cam- the Frenchmen. It took Ney over three hours to prepare an paign, the Light Cavalry Division of the Imperial Guard attack, and when it happened, he encountered a strong had a total of 106 officers and 1971 soldiers, including 47 defence of the perfectly prepared General Thomas Pic- officers and 833 soldiers, who belonged to Colbert’s 2nd ton’s 5th Division. Ultimately, the English maintained their Regiment of Chevau-légers Lancers.29 The list of Polish of- positions thereby negating Ney’s plans to march towards ficers and soldiers who formed the 1st squadron includes Brussels on that day. a total of 226 names30. It has been published by Robert D’Erlon’s corps did not participate in any of the battles Bielecki and based on French documents. One can as- on the 16th of June, which made it impossible for Napo- sume that the Polish Jerzmanowski’s squadron went to leon to achieve final conclusion at , although the fight in Belgium in the strength of not less than 200 people. Prussians suffered defeat there. The division of the cavalry After forcing through the Sambre River and passing of the Guard and the Poles serving in it did not participate Charleroi, Napoleon immediately began to implement the in this phase of the fighting, and remained in the area of proposed plan. To this end, he gave forth the left flank of Frasnes. the army to Marshal Ney and he himself advanced towards There were two battles on Friday, June the 16th, 1815: Blücher’s Prussians along the road to and Som- one at Ligny, which ended up with Blücher’s Prussians de- breffe. Ney took under his command the II Corps of Gen. feat, who – defeated, but not crushed – began their night Count of Honoré Joseph Reille and the of General retreat in the direction of , the second one at Quatre- Count Jean Baptiste Drouet d’Erlon, which at that time Bras, where Wellington managed to stop Ney’s attacks and was located north of Charleroi in the Gosselies region. gain time needed to concentrate his forces. In addition, Ney had at his disposal Count Charles Lefe- On the morning of the following day, the 17th of June, bvre-Desnouettes’s division of light cavalry of the Guard, the left flank of the French Army, commanded by Ney, still which was sent to the vicinity of the Bossu Forest and the held their existing position after Quatre-Bras. Ney’s unit crossroads in Quatre-Bras by the Emperor as early as on still had a division of light cavalry of the guard, serving as the 15th of June. The guardsmen came to the designated reinforcement to Kellermann’s III Corps, consisting solely area and during reconnaissance saw only a weak presence of heavy cavalry. of British forces of Prince William of Orange’s I Corps31. As Duke Wellington waited for the information about the soon as on the morning of the 16th of June, Ney’s formation result of the throughout the night. The Prus- would have disposed of them easily. The Marshal, how- sians did not notify their coalition partners about their ever, wanted to achieve success in one hit and decided loss, and most importantly, did not specify their retreat to wait for the arrival of d’Erlon’s corps. It soon became route, placing the Englishmen in a very difficult spot with clear that this decision was entirely incorrect. Wellington’s Ney at their front and Napoleon in a position to the east of forces at Quatre-Bras increased over time and allowed their own left flank, but difficult to pinpoint. him to maintain their positions until the next morning32. In the morning, when the British patrols have brought D’Erlon, so much awaited by Ney, did not come, because reliable information about the result of the battle of Ligny, at that time he was marching towards Ligna, at the Em- Duke Wellington gave the order to retreat to a position at peror’s request. Ney took offensive action at 1.40 P.M., but Mont Saint Jean, which began after 11 A.M. The retreat and it was too late to achieve success, as the fortified enemy subsequent chase happened in pouring rain and looked more like a slow march, with the highroad to Brussels as 29 P. Haythornthwaite, The Waterloo Armies, Men, Organization & its axis. In the evening, the Englishmen reached Mont Saint Tactics, Barnsley 2007, p. 220. Jean, whereas the French set camp to the north of - 30 R. Bielecki op.cit., pp. 369–384. somme. The whole night was filled with heavy rain and 31 A. Skałkowski, op. cit., p.32. 32 Wellington, when planning future actions, took into account strong wind that tore away tents and blew out campfires. the possibility of a decisive battle at Quatre-Bras, counting on The Guard, including the regiment Colbert’s chevau‑lé- the general concentration of coalition troops in the area. gers lancers spent the night near the Le Caillou tavern,

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where the Emperor slept along with some of his staff mem- ation at once and will lead to the utter defeat of Welling- bers. In the garden of the inn, behind the stone wall and ton’s army. just under the Emperor’s window, there were rain-soaked Witnessing the progress of d’Erlon’s division, Ney called tents belonging to riflemen and grenadiers of the Guard. General Wathier’s 13th heavy cavalry division36 in order to In the morning of the 18th of June, after the overnight finish off the shocked Englishmen at the right moment. downpour, the future battlefield turned into a quagmire33. Duke Wellington saw the hesitation of his left wing and Both sides rolled their camps and took designated posi- decided to use two brigades of heavy cavalry in order to tions. To the east of the highroad, the French formation restore its tightness. These were: Lord Edward Somer- consisting of units from d’Erlon’s I Corps descended in set’s guard brigade (Life Guards), consisting of three Dra- a gentle curve in the direction of the town of Frichermont, goon Guard regiments and two brigades (Union Brigade) having the Papelotte and La Haye farms in front of it, both of General William Ponsonby37. Somerset’s brigade struck taken by the Dutch infantry of Prince Bernard from General along the highroad to Brussels, leaving behind the farm Perponcher’s division. General Edouard Jean Baptiste Mil- buildings of La Haye Sainte on their left, and marching to- haud’s IV Corps cavalry was located in the second wave of wards the French . Ponsonby’s regiments struck the right flank. In total eight regiments typically directly at the expanded divisions of d’Erlon and their ar- used for decisive strikes on enemy formations. A division tillery support. Both brigades achieved success, but the of light cavalry of the Guard, which included the 1st squad- costs of their attacks were very high. The charging brigades ron of the Polish chevau-légers lancers of the 2nd regiment, lost their formation and did not react to the retreat signal, was located just behind the cuirassiers. Polish soldiers engaging in individual skirmishes and trying to break the were in their dress uniforms and all officers in dress, white line of French squares. Some troops went into gallop, uniform jackets34. loosening their formation and losing the ability to perform The battle of Waterloo started around 11.30 A.M. when any manoeuvre. This was not the end of the tragedy, as the fields on both sides of the highroad to Brussels began the line of the stretched-out Colbert’s chevau-légers lan- to dry up and became passable for artillery teams. The cers regiment and Lallemand’s mounted rifles regiment first French attack was directed at the fortified farm of appeared on the flank of attacking British brigades. The Hougomount, located at the end of Wellington’s right lancers bowed their lances and rushed at the scattered flank. The infantry strike was supported by heavy artillery Englishmen, quickly defeating them in a direct clash. The fire, but the farm itself was not captured, despite heavy advantage lances had over heavy cavalry broadswords losses. Seeing the futility of fighting in the region, Napo- was incontestable. Seeing as Somerset and Ponsonby’s leon decided to seek conclusion on the right flank, using heavy brigades were routed, light cavalry brigades staying the force of d’Erlon’s I Corps. The attack, supported by ar- in the north of Papelotte joined the battle. Richard Hus- tillery fire, advanced on a wide front, stretching from the sey Vivan’s 6th brigade clashed with the lancers first, but La Haye Sainte farm up until Papelotte. It was 1:30 P.M. they quickly broke its formation38. The French artillery also when the French forces reached the region defended by went into action, raining the English cavalry with gunfire. a light battalion commanded by Major Baring35. It seemed 36 as if the strong attack will break the British infantry’s form- The division consisted of two brigades: the first of Gen. Char- les Dubois (1 and 4 regiment of cuirassiers), the second of Gen. Jacques Traverse (7th and 12th regiment of cuirassiers). 33 After even slight rain the field to the south of the La Haye Saint 37 Both brigades were the best cavalry formation of the Napo- Farm on both sides of the highroad to Brussels is difficult to leonic days. Somerset’s brigade consisted of two regiments traverse up to this day. (1st and 2nd) of the guard (Life Guards) and the 1st regiment of 34 S. Kirkor, op.cit., p., 262. dragoons of the guard (King’s Blues). The 2nd 35 Major Baring commanded the defence of La Haye Sainte with Ponsonby’s brigade consisted of dragoon regiments: the 1st the force of two battalions of the King German Legion, con- (British), the 2nd (Scottish, commonly named the Scots Greys) sisting mostly of citizens of Hanover in British service. The and the 6th Dragoon regiment (Irish). P. Haythornthwaite, farm was manned by 365 people. The Hanover light infantry op.cit., pp. 66–69 battalions were equipped with excellent Baker rifles, the same 38 Vivian’s brigade consisted of three hussar regiments, two of that were used by the 95th Riflement Regiment and the light them (the 10th and the 18th) were English, one was German. In companies of the royal guard. total about 1400 men, P. Haythornthwaite, op. cit., p.71.

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The attempt to repel the victorious Frenchmen and cenoit, which lasted until the very end and involved sub- Poles by the English 4th light brigade under the command stantial forces on both sides. of General John Ormsby Vandeleur, which clashed with At the same time, the 2nd regiment of chevau-légers lan- the French lancers of General Martin Charles Gobrecht, cers of the guard participated in the desperate attacks on ended with a similar result. The French attacked the Eng- the left flank, which were supposed to ultimately break the lishmen the moment they were changing the front, which British resistance and scatter their squares. It was most resulted in collapsing their formation and scattering the probably at this time that Jerzmanowski and Baliński were entire light dragoon brigade39. The cavalry battle, in which wounded or injured41. the Polish lancer squadron under Jerzmanowski’s com- The arrival of Bülow has changed little in Wellington’s mand participated, brought heavy losses to the English army position. However, it had a significant impact on Na- cavalry, both in men and horses. Duke Wellington moved poleon, who involved bigger forces at Plancenoit. Only the the decimated brigades to the second line (the vicinity of arrival of the Prussian I Corps’ vanguard under the com- the Mont-Saint-Jean farm) in order to restore some of their mand of Gen. Hans Ernst Karl von Zieten strengthened the combat readiness. British left flank and made the French defeat unavoidable. The Polish chevau-légers, along with their regiment, Undoubtedly, the last attack of the imperial guard was participated in massive cavalry attacks, which were led by the turning point of the battle. It was utterly repulsed by Ney unto the formation of English infantry squares in the the royal guardsmen of Gen. Peregrine Maitland’s brigade later part of the battle. Despite heavy losses they did not and the soldiers of Colonel Colborn’s 1st battalion of the bring conclusion. These attacks were conducted at ap- 52nd regiment who supported them42. The retreat of the proximately 16.00 with the participation of the IV cavalry imperial guardsmen ultimately led to the retreat of the corps led by Gen. Milhaud and almost worn out a signific- French army, which turned into a panicked escape in the ant part of the French Cavalry, especially the regiments of darkness. The Polish chevau-légers along with the rest of cuirassiers. This will have a significant impact on the final the regiment began to retreat after the French army col- outcome of the battle. Persistent defence line of Welling- lapsed. During their retreat, the English and Prussian cav- ton and the arrival of the Prussians, whose first troops went alry did not dare to attack them, seeing the units retreating after the right flank of Napoleon’s army at about 4 P.M. put in battle order43. It was also important that the coalition the French in a very difficult tactical position. The VI Corps troops were exhausted and that the march took place in of Blücher’s army, led by General Count Wilhelm Bülow complete darkness. The Polish chevau-légers after the fall von Dennewitz had a total of approximately 30,000 bayon- of Paris and the abdication of the Emperor, signed by him ets and was supported by 80 guns. Its appearance at the on the 22nd of June 1815, crossed the Loire along with the rear and on the right flank of the French troops caused an retreating army of Marshal Nicholas Davout, who was still immediate reaction of the Emperor, who initially sent two Minister of War. On the 1st of October the Napoleon’s squad- divisions of Gen. Baron Jean Simon Domon’s light cavalry ron was crossed of from the French army checklists and and a division of Gen. Baron Jacques Garvais Subervie’s went under the commands of Tsar Alexander I. The head line lancers and mounted riflemen against the Prussians. of the squadron, Kajetan Baliński, led the chevau-légers They were supposed to delay Bülow’s march. During this back to the homeland. They did not receive warm recep- time the Prussians continued their march towards Plan- tion from Duke Constantine. Ultimately, Baliński himself cenoit in order to capture this town and attack the rear left the army ranks on the 24th of February 1816. of Napoleon’s army. The Emperor directed a part of Gen. Count. Mouton de Lobau’s VI Corps against the marching Prussians, and then a division of Gen. Count Charles Alexis 41 R. Bielecki, op. cit., p. 87, 373. Morand’s guard40. Thus began the bloody battle of Plan- 42 Colonel John Colborne commanded a brigade of infantry at the on the 16th of May 1811, the year that it 39 Vandeleur had three light dragoon regiments (the 11th, the 12th was shattered by the 7th regiment of Polish lancers. At Water- and the 16th), together around 1300 people. P. Haythornth- loo he was the commander of the 52nd light infantry regiment wait, op. cit., p. 216. (Oxfordshire Light Infantry), which belonged to the elite of the 40 It was a division of the ‘Middle guard’, consisting of two regi- English army. ments of Fusiliers Division. 43 S. Kirkor, op. cit., p.263.

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The reluctance of the Grand Duke to the veterans of the associated with numerous nominations for the cross of was associated on one side with their the Legion of Honour and financial donations. The return considerable combat experience and, often manifested, of the Emperor from Elba and reorganization of the army loose attitude towards the forms of military discipline, preparing it for war in Belgium was associated with nu- which were favoured by Constantine. Jerzmanowski met merous nominations for the cross of the Legion of Hon- a similar fate, as he returned to the Kingdom of Poland, our and financial donations. This group included a large counting on being drafted to the newly established Polish number of Poles, mostly officers and soldiers serving in Army. the ‘ Squadron’. Colonel Paweł Jerzmanowski joined the ranks of the On the 27th of February 1815, that is, already on his army of the Kingdom of Poland at the end of February 1816, way to France, Napoleon signed a certain number of but similarly to other participants, did not receive neither nominations for the cross of the Legion of Honour, thirty assignment nor command, despite common opinions of which went to Poles. On the 1st of March he signed about his merits and experience. In the annual ‘Roczniki another 6 nominations, and on the 13th of March the Woyskowe Królestwa Polskiego’ (‘Military Annals of the chevau-léger Andrzej Swarocki received his cross of the Kingdom of Poland’) from the years 1817, 1818, 1819, 1820 Legion of Honour47. On the 6th of April another 13 Poles and 1821 he is listed as an ‘inactive’ colonel44. Eventually, received the Legion of Honour, all of them are present on he left the army in 1812 and travelled to France45. He raised the list published in R. Bielecki and Z. Dunin-Wilczyński’s a family there and died on the 15th of April 1862 in Paris. His studies. On the 11th of April the Emperor signed the nom- grave is located in the Parisian cemetery of Montmartre46. ination of Colonel Jerzmanowski48. On the 8th of May 1815 Jerzmanowski’s funeral was held on the 17th of April and only one nomination was signed. It went to Colonel Józef included a celebration. Apart from numerous representat- Ksawery Giedroyc49 (Colonel Józef Giedroyc served in ives of the , the funeral ceremony was at- the headquarters of the French army during the Belgian tended by many Frenchmen, as the general was a known campaign50). Most likely, this was the last nomination to and respected person in France. Because the deceased the Legion of Honour before the arrival of the imperial was a senior officer of the French army, he was accompan- army in Belgium. ied during his final journey to the Montmartre cemetery by ceremonial guard from a Parisian garrison. Napoleon’s donations during the 100 days

Polish knights of the Legion of Honour Apart from the distinctions given to the Poles during in 1815 the 100 days, the Emperor gave financial donations to all officers and soldiers who were with him on Elba, and The return of the Emperor from Elba and reorgan- signed the donation decrees on the 10th and the 27th of ization of the army preparing it for war in Belgium was April 1815. The donations which the emperor granted since 1806 were a form of financial rewards associated 44 Cf. Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego 1817, p. 23; Rocznik initially with the income from goods specified in the Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego 1818, p. 22; Rocznik Woyskowy donation decree51. Donations granted by the Emperor Królestwa Polskiego 1819, p. 25; Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa in decrees from the 10th and the 27th of April 1815 did Polskiego 1820, p. 27; Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego 1821, p. 26. 45 Information about Jerzmanowski’s resignation was found in 47 R. Bielecki, op.cit., p. 361 position 4535. the Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego 1822 p. 29. 48 Jerzmanowski was awarded with Commander cross of the Le- 46 Montmartre cemetery: quarter 7, 4 line from the wall, third gion of Honour, nomination no. 23033, cf. Z. Dunin-Wilczyński, tomb grave (Avenue des Carriéres) no. 444cc1861 (the grave A. Chojnacki, op. cit., pp. 44–46. is located close to the first resting place of Juliusz Słowacki, 49 J. Załuski, op. cit., p. 226. famous Polish Romantic poet; since 1927 the artist`s remains 50 Z. Dunin-Wilczyński, A. Chojnacki, Legia Honorowa od I Re- rest in in Cracow, Poland). Collective work stauracji do II cesarstwa, Historia Orderu, Słownik biograficz- ed. by A. Biernat i S. Górzyński, Polacy pochowani na cmenta- ny uhonorowanych Polaków (typescript) Warsaw 2013, pp. rzu Montmart oraz Saint-Vincent i Batignoles w Paryżu, Warsaw 42–43. 1999 p. 57. 51 S. Kirkor, op. cit., pp. 14–26.

– 165 – not specify what goods and estates had to generate the Conclusion income on which the donation was based. Thus, such donation had the form of an annual pension and, in ac- Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo and his abdication on the cordance with the will of the Emperor, could be inher- 22nd of June 1815 was an end of an epic for Poles, and the ited. The value of donations attributable to each of the end of the dreams about the restoration of the Kingdom of beneficiaries was 200 francs in the case of the decree of Poland in alliance with France. The end of the dream was the 27th of April 1815. Paweł Jerzmanowski, mentioned also the birth of the Napoleonic legend, which helped the in the earlier donation decree dated the 10th of April, was Poles survive during the next hundred years of servitude. to receive a donation of 1000 francs, whereas the value Out of 226 officers and soldiers of the 1st Polish squadron of the remaining four donations granted to four squad- of the 2nd regiment of chevau-légers lanciers of the im- ron officers was specified in the decree of the 15th of May perial guard, most returned to the Kingdom of Poland im- 181552 at 500 francs per person. mediately after the unit was disbanded in October 181554. After the second abdication, only those donations were The rest were killed during the fight or ‘remained behind’, kept, which the Emperor gave before his first abdication which could mean they separated from the squadron dur- and those, which were based on estates located within the ing the retreat or were taken prisoner55. A handful of Polish borders of France. All others were forfeit, including those chevau-légers accompanying the Emperor in his last battle granted in 181553. gave evidence not only to courage, but also the fidelity, loy- alty and the defence of honour until the very end.

52 Donations in the amount of 500 francs annualy received: 54 R. Bielecki states, that basing on official French sources, af- Head of the squadron K. Balinski, Captain J. Szulc, lieutenant ter the regiment was disbanded, 206 soldiers and officers M. Fiutowski lieutenant and second lieutenant T. Skowroński, returned to the Kingdom of Poland. R. Bielecki, op. cit., pp. cf. Ibid., s. 30. 354–366. 53 Ibid., 30–31. 55 R. Bielecki, basing of French sources, states that the wacht- meister from 2nd company Michał Szultz (Szulc) poz. 4507 (S. Kirkor gives the name Schultz Michel in his study, p. 265) was taken prisoner at Waterloo. R. Bielecki, op. cit., p. 358.

Bibliography Primary sources Books The Archives of the French Army Historical Service (SHAT) Polacy pochowani na cmentarzu Montmart oraz Saint-Vincent Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego, na rok 1817, Warszawa i Batignoles w Paryżu, ed. A. Biernat i S. Górzyński, Warsaw 1999 1817 R. Bielecki, Szwoleżerowie Gwardii, Warsaw 1996 Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego, na rok 1818, Warszawa Z. Dunin-Wilczyński, A. Chojnacki, Legia Honorowa od I Restau- 1818 racji do II cesarstwa, Historia Orderu, Słownik biograficzny Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego, na rok 1819, Warszawa uhonorowanych Polakow (typescript), Warsaw 2013 1819 P. Haythornthwaite, The Waterloo Armies, Men, Organization & Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego, na rok 1820, Warszawa Tactics, Barnsley 2007 1820 A. Jouineau, Officers and Soldiers of The French Imperial Guards, Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego, na rok 1821, Warszawa Paris 2005 1821 M. Karpowicz, M. Filipiak, Elita jazdy polskiej, Warsaw 1995 Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego, na rok 1822, Warszawa S. Kirkor, Polscy Donatariusze Napoleona, London 1974 1822 F. Masson, Kawalerzyści Napoleona, Oświęcim 2012 A. Rembowski, Źrodła do historii polskiego pułku lekkokonne- A. Skałkowski, Oficerowie polscy stu dni, Warsaw, Lvov 1915 go gwardii Napoleona, transl. A. Heberko, vol. II, Oświęcim C. Summerville, Who was Who at Waterloo. A Biography of the 2013 Battle, Edinburgh 2007 J. Załuski, Wspomnienia, ed. A. A. Polarczykowa, Cracow 1976 E. Tarle, Napoleon, Warsaw 1950 – Tomasz Strzeżek – University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn

Battle of Iganie, April 10, 1831

Nothing is more exciting for historians and history In February of 1831, the outnumbered Polish army3, enthusiasts than the fight between the weak and the commanded by General Józef Chłopicki4 managed to stop strong, especially when the weaker defends himself the offensive of the Field-Marshal Ivan Dibich5 at the line persistently and skilfully, striking the strong severely. of the Vistula River. Although the Russians occupied large Such a situation occurred in 1831, when the Polish areas of the Polish Kingdom between the Bug and Vistula Kingdom, a small country in Eastern Europe fought for Rivers, they neither could subdue Warsaw, the primary its survival against Russia, a military power at this time. military objective of both warring parties, nor break the The struggle lasted nine months, which is admirable1. Polish army. The Russian army suffered significant losses6 Poles, raising against Russia, prevented it from per- and in March stopped at the right bank of the Vistula River, forming a military intervention in the Western Europe, at the winter quarters to the east of Warsaw. Dibich was where, as a result of revolutionary events of 1830 (the preparing to cross the Vistula River. He planned the be- revolution in France and Belgium) a new political order ginning of the operations for March 29, 18317. However, he was forming. From the point of view of a military historian, the Pol- 3 On February 8, 1831, that is more than two months after the ish-Russian war of 1831 is interesting, because it was outbreak of the , it had about 65 thousand waged by senior officers who participated in the Napo- soldiers and 144 cannons. 4 leonic Wars, standing on both sides of the barricade2. Józef Chłopicki commanded an army as an advisor to the commander in chief, Gen. Michał Radziwill. They acquired skills and experience there. The War re- 5 On February 5–6, 1831, the borders of the Polish Kingdom sembled the struggles of the years 1803–1815 due to were crossed by 112 thousand Russian soldiers and 326 can- the current tactics and types of equipment, which, from nons. The entire active army which was to suppress the Polish the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, uprising consisted of at least 180 thousand soldiers and 664 changed very little. It is even safe to say that this was the cannons (without Cossacs, i.e., irregular cavalry). 6 last Napoleonic war in Europe. From the beginning it was For several days, until February 28, in bloody battles such as at Stoczek (February 14), at Dobre (15 February) and of War- not a confrontation of equal opponents. saw (February 19–25 Battle of Wawer, Bialołęka and Grochów) the ranks of the army were reduced by more than 20 thou- sand soldiers, including 2.5 thousand killed, 11.4 thousand wounded. At the time the Polish Army lost about 11 thousand 1 Russia occupied the area of 343 thousand square miles, had soldiers. A. Puzyrewski, Wojna polsko-ruska 1831, Warsaw 52 million inhabitants, and its army amounted to about 744 1899, p. 131. thousand soldiers. The Kingdom, respectively: 2.2 thousand 7 The main army (about 50 thousand soldiers and 220 cannons) square miles, 4.2 million people and about 42 thousand sol- after concentrating at the mouth of the and Vistula Riv- diers. ers, was to cross it on 4–5 April, and then, in the second half 2 The Army of , where the Polish officers of April, attack Warsaw, gradually reinforcing itself with the served, supported Napoleon in his battles against successive troops brought from the right bank. The entire active forces coalitions. involved were estimated at 80 thousand soldiers and 294

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did not foresee that the Poles would not passively watch intervention of France, England and Austria would be able the actions of the Russian army. His self-confidence and to persuade Russia to a compromise and restoration of the belief in the insurgents’ inability to act was beyond all the political status of the Polish Kingdom, in accordance reason. The operation began before the end of concen- with the provisions of the . To survive tration of the forces. A considerable gap in the formation until an intervention Skrzynecki was not going to under- of the Russian army in the Polish Kingdom developed take risky ventures. He wanted keep a strong army and between the right wing stationed between the Warsaw as long as possible. For him, the army and the and Bug Rivers (30 thousand soldiers and 86 cannons)8 capital were the assets in the negotiations with Russia10. and the main army and the left wing distributed on both The war strategy he adopted, reminded a risk strategy sides of the Wieprz River (about 81 thousand soldiers and characteristic of the eighteenth century. He was not going 298 cannons). The space separating these two forma- to meet Dibich in a general battle, but rather harass him tions amounted to about 120 km. It was guarded by the by attacking smaller, isolated corps or begin uprisings in VI Corps of General Georg von Rosen (about 18 thousand the western Russian provinces (the former territory of the soldiers and 49 cannons). The troops that were to support Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth). him were either approaching the borders of the Kingdom In the month that passed since the battle of Grochów, of Poland (23 thousand soldiers and 100 cannons), or just the Polish side increased the army to 95 thousand soldiers, crossed it (10.4 thousand soldiers and 33 cannons). Only including 69 thousand and 152 cannon which could be the VI Corp was guarding the route crucial to the Russi- used in the field activities. It should be added that in terms ans – the road connecting Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk on of training the insurgent army prevailed over the Russian the Bug. This road served as the main line of operations army11. The morale of soldiers was excellent. They were of the Russian army. Warehouses and hospitals were es- ready for the greatest sacrifices. Nevertheless, Skrzynecki tablished along it. It united the operational basis of the was not able to exploit this potential. Active Army (warehouses in the border areas of the con- Faced with the threat that was caused by the prepara- temporary Lithuania and ) with an intermediate tion of the Russian offensive, Skrzynecki was determined operational basis created by Dibich in the Polish Kingdom. to defend the line of the Vistula River. He was opposed The key role in this system was played by Siedlce, lying by the Chief of Staff, Colonel Wojciech Chrzanowski and on the Brest road approximately halfway between Brest Quartermaster General, Colonel Ignacy Prądzyński. Both and Warsaw. The city acted as a communication junction were the supporters of the Napoleonic art of war. They connecting three operational areas of the Russian army preferred the manoeuvre and the active defence over the separated by Bug and Wieprz. The Brest road with Siedlce static and passive positional defence. For Chrzanowski the was the key to controlling large areas of the Polish King- objective of the offensive operations was to beat the corps dom situated on the right bank of the Vistula River9. of the Russian Guards, and for Prądzyński, the Rosen’s The Polish high command was aware of the intentions VI Corps. of Dibich. The Supreme Commander Gen. Jan Skrzynecki At the end of March, Skrzynecki agreed to pursue the was unable to carry out activities in a Napoleonic style. plan of the Quartermaster General, which assumed attack- Not only because of mediocre abilities that did not pre- ing the vanguard of the IV corps (6 thousand soldiers and dispose him to command an army, but also due to the lack of faith in the success of a military uprising. Skrzy- 10 Tsar Nicholas I (up to January 25, 1831, King of Poland) was necki, just as the majority of the representatives of the not willing to negotiate with the ‘rebel’ Poles. The political Polish ruling elite, was convinced that only a diplomatic elite of Russia also had no supporters of a compromise. For the Russia, the war of 1831 was the war for preservation of cannons. T. Strzeżek, Polska ofensywa wiosenna w 1831 roku. the status of Russia, which she gained in the second half of Zaprzepaszczona szansa powstania listopadowego, wydawni- the eighteenth century, participating in the partitions of the ctwo Napoleon V, Oświęcim 2010, pp. 59, 63–64. Republic of Poland and defeating Napoleon. According to the 8 The Guards Corps and the division designated from the main Russians, the war of 1831 was even compared to the struggles army. of 1812. 9 T. Strzeżek, Polska ofensywa wiosenna w 1831 roku…, pp. 50– 11 T. Strzeżek, Polska ofensywa wiosenna w 1831 roku…, pp. 43– –51, 88. –47.

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10 cannons)12 in Wawer, near Warsaw, and threatening the a turning point in the war of 183116. From the occupied Russian operational lines13. Commander in chief was not positions by the Kostrzyń river, the Polish army was loc- thinking about challenging the main Russian army. The ated less than 20 km from Siedlce, the area defended by purpose of the operations was actually reduced only to the survivors of the Rosen’s army and about 11 thousand a demonstration, aimed at forcing Dibich to abandon the fresh Russian soldiers with 55 cannons, who have not yet offensive against Warsaw. The limited nature of the opera- experienced failure. Skrzynecki feared that Dibich could tion resulted in the fact that Skrzynecki used only 39 thou- strike the Polish army engaged in a struggle for the Siedlce sand soldiers with 92 cannons (he assigned 30 thousand from the south (from Wieprz). In his calculations he did not soldiers and 39 cannons for protective actions). take into account the fact that, in order to accomplish this The Polish offensive begun on March 31 in the area of​​ move, the main Russian army would have to concentrate the Brest road surprised with its results, both, the Polish, and then travel the 40 km separating it from the Brest road and Russian side. On the first day, in two battles of Wawer in terrible conditions (there was a thaw), in an area without and Dębe Wielkie, the insurgents defeated the VI corps, convenient roads. Still, the corps of the Russian Guards de- causing it serious losses14. It was increased the next day in ployed in the quarters between the Narew and Bug rivers the battles of Stojadła, , and Minsk, and many would have a longer way to travel from the North17. minor engagements, by at least 3–4 thousand. That even- In the face of the exaggerated threats Skrzynecki settled ing, Rosen had only about five thousand soldiers avail- only for the control of the liberated area, delimited to the able. Those who did not die or fall into the hands of the north by the Bug river, to the east by the Kostrzyń and Li- Poles, were scattered and did not return to the ranks for wiec rivers, and to the south by the Świder river. He dis- a long time. persed the Army. Then turned its core part towards south The great victory did not stimulate Skrzynecki to con- from the Brest road, its front to Dibich, and threatened the tinue the operation. He could continue to pursue Rosen communication lines connecting the main Russian army and get Siedlce or concentrate all the forces he had, and with Siedlce. The disengaged Polish troops (of generals K. hit the main army of Dibich. The general battle, which Skarżyński and W. Chrzanowski), crossing the Świder line, would obliterate the memory of Tadeusz Kosciuszko’s fail- simulated the willingness of Skrzynecki to deliver a battle. ure in in 1794, undoubtedly would determine With these demonstrations Skrzynecki wanted to dis- the fate of the uprising in 1831. It could happen in the re- suade Dibich from crossing of the Vistula and the offensive gion of Ryki and Żelechów on 3 or 5–6 April. The result was against Warsaw. When it turned out that it did not produce not certain, but surely it would be a very bloody and fierce the desired effect, he decided to do what he should have battle, because both sides would be aware of its import- done a few days earlier – defeat Rosen and seize Siedlce. ance15. To continue the offensive activities in Siedlce was On 5 April gen. Ignacy Prądzyński presented the first much safer for the Polish side. Capturing the city with its plan of operations. He planned to flank and defeat Rosen’s warehouses would force Dibich to retreat, if not behind VI corps18 at the confluence of Kostrzyń and Muchawka Bug, then to border areas near the operation basis. rivers, and seize Siedlce. The plan referred to the Napo- However, on 2 April Skrzynecki did not opt for this vari- leonic legacy of the art of war. He planned the division of ant of activities. For Wacław Tokarz, a prominent Polish the army into three groups – engaging, supporting and military historian of this war, the events of that day were

16 W. Tokarz, Wojna polsko-rosyjska 1830–1831, Warsaw 1993, 12 It was commanded by Gen. Fiodor Geismar. pp. 253–254. 13 Źródła do dziejów wojny polsko-rosyjskiej 1830–1831, vol. 2, 17 The Polish high command did not know that in the spring of Warsaw 1931, pp. 56, 169. 1831 Dibich was not be able to make use of this Corps in the 14 On March 31, the VI corps lost 5–6 thousand killed, wounded military action. The Guards Corps was a symbol of the military and prisoners, that is 30% of its numbers, at least 10 cannons, power of Russia. Its officers corps consisted mostly of children and several thousand pieces of arms. The Poles have paid for of the ruling elite and aristocracy. Tsar wanted to keep it for an the success with 200–300 soldiers. intervention in the Western Europe. 15 F. Smit, Istoriya polskogo vozstaniya i voyny 1830–1831 godov, 18 On April 5, after six days of the Polish offensive operations, his vol. 2, S. Peterburg 1863, p. 48; T. Strzeżek, Polska ofensywa loss were estimated at 2 thousand killed, 9 thousand prison- wiosenna w 1831 roku…, pp. 303–307. ers, 5 banners, 12 cannons and 6 thousand pieces of arms.

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flanking19. The flanking group, under the command of the the north of the Brest road in Stanisławów and prepared to Commander in Chief, would amount to about 20 thousand march on Liw, was summoned from Narew. It was to pro- soldiers with 18–20 cannons. The most important task tect the main Polish army against the alleged attack. On was assigned to it by Prądzyński. It was to circumvent the the other hand, the southern wing of the insurgent army southern position of the first wave of the Rosen’s troops troops was secured by an extensive cordon of troops along (6.4 thousand soldiers and 14 cannons) over the Kostrzyń the Świder river. river, and seize Siedlce, going along the Muchawka river on On , in the afternoon, Skrzynecki decided to re- the left or right bank. A second wave of the Rosen’s troops, sume the offensive operations in accordance with the deployed by Muchawka and in Siedlce (about 10 thousand plan of Prądzyński of April 5. He was persuaded to do it soldiers and 47 cannons), would be its adversary. The en- by the information that Dibich did not yet resign from the gaging group of Gen. Tomasz Łubieński (about 8 thousand crossing of the Vistula River. The pressure exerted by the soldiers and 10 cannons) should attack the first Rosen’s President of the National Government, Prince Adam Czar- wave by Kostrzyń, engage it in a battle and block (with toryski and staff officers also contributed to the change of the cavalry) its way of retreat due north. The third group the commander in chief’s attitude. Inactivity and a grow- (about 4 thousand soldiers and 8 cannons) would weaken ing awareness of the missed opportunities of the previous the entire operation from the south. It could be supported days was a heavy burden on everybody. by additional 4 thousand soldiers and 20 cannons20. Dibich, who with great difficulty concentrated the main Skrzynecki suspended execution of the operation. He army, on April 8 decided to move with it through Żelechów felt that it was too risky because of the presence of the and Garwolin, to the rear of the Polish army. If he real- Russian Guard and the main army on the wings of the Pol- ized this intention, the main forces of the warring parties ish forces. The latter in particular caused his concern, due would perform actions in divergent directions – Polish to to the battle fought by Skarżyński and Chrzanowski with the southeast and east, and the Russian to the northwest. the Russians in Żelechów. In addition, the activity of the Nevertheless, Dibich resigned from the offensive towards Russian cavalry was reported. the Brest road. The lack of food and feed was its main Dibich, surprised by the offensive actions of the Poles cause. The Russians had to rebuild stocks to even think and Rosen’s defeat, from April 4 begun to abandon various about continuing the fight. In the war-ravaged country and elements of the operation plan. He postponed his crossing with the uprisings breaking out in Lithuania and Volyn, of the Vistula River, and proceeded with concentration of paralyzing supplies for the army in the Polish Kingdom, the main army 10 km to the south of Żelechow (in Wylezin). this was not easy. Dibich ordered the main army retreat He expected the Polish army to attack him first, so he even between Łuków and for April 9. At the same time, the considered a formation that his army was to assume in Poles gained some time to defeat Rosen. battle21. Meanwhile, Skrzynecki did not even think about To some extent the plan of operations coincided with such a radical action. On April 7, he even expect that it was Prądzyński’s initial assumptions. Nevertheless, Skrzynecki Dibich, who intended to deliver a general battle. reduced the forces assigned for basic tasks and limited the The Polish side wasted several days to identify the exact purpose of the offensive. location of the main Russian army and the Guard corps. Skrzynecki reduced the flanking group to 10 thousand The corps of Gen. Jan Nepomucen Umiński (about 6 thou- soldiers with 16 cannons. He entrusted the command over sand soldiers and 8 cannons), who assumed position to it to General Ignacy Prądzyński, and ordered him to flank the first wave of the Rosen’s troops from the south through 19 W. Majewski, ‘Sztuka wojenna powstania listopadowego na tle Skórzec (during the operation, the group went through Trz- sztuki wojennej przełomu XVIII i XIX wieku’, in Powstanie listopa- ciniec and Domanice). Prądzyński was to come out on the dowe 1830–1831. Geneza – uwarunkowania – bilans – porów- Brest road near Iganie (a village located 4 km to the west of nania, Warsaw 1983, p. 65. Siedlce, over the Muchawka river). The engaging group of 20 Źródła do dziejów wojny polsko-rosyjskiej…, vol. 2, pp. 105, Gen. T. Łubieński (6.5 thousand soldiers and 12 cannons) 112, 115; I. Prądzyński, Pamiętniki, vol. 2, Cracow 1909, p. 90– –91; T. Strzeżek, Polska ofensywa wiosenna w 1831 roku…, pp. deployed in Bojmie over the Kostrzyń kept original tasks. 197–198. It’s command was taken by Skrzynecki. In accordance to 21 National Library of Poland, manuscript 1812, p. 127. the plan, after hearing the cannon shots of the Prądzyński

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group or after the first sign of the Russians’ preparations gun. It did not even occur to Dibich that Skrzynecki had to retreat from Kostrzyń, it was to begin the march east, no intention to seize the city. The Polish commander in towards Siedlce, along the Brest road. Some of the tasks of chief, the commander of the engaging group, slowed the group, associated with cutting off the survivors’ escape down the march of the units that were subordinate to routes due north, was taken over by the corps of General him so much that he reached Iganie in the evening on Umiński, which was to seize Liw and cross the Liwiec22. At April 10, when Prądzyński defeated the opponent alone. the expense of the first two major groups, Skrzynecki rein- It was not easy to achieve. forced the support – the group of General Chrzanowski (4.9 Even during the march to Iganie the group of Prądzyński thousand soldiers and 8 cannons), which was to secure engaged in small battles with the enemy. At Domanice, the the rear of Prądzyński, and a cordon of troops over Swider Polish cavalry (2nd Cavalry Regiment25) supported by the (15 thousand soldiers)23. artillery and infantry defeated the squad of the Russian As a consequence of the performed transfers of forces, cavalry of almost 2.8 thousand hussars and lancers. This the objectives of the operation have changed. Defeating magnificent victory only confirmed the qualitative advant- the first-line of the Rosen’s troops commanded by General age of the Polish cavalry over the Russian. The talent and Gustav Igelström (6.4 thousand soldiers and 14 cannons) abilities of General Ludwik Kicki26, called by his contem- became the primary objective. Taking into consideration poraries ‘Polish Ajax’ or ‘second Bayard’27, shined in this that near Siedlce the Russians could gather 12 thousand fight. Prądzyński was fortunate in the selection of his com- soldiers (without the forces of gen Igelström) under the manders. Among others, colonels Hieronim Ramorino, command of General Geismar and General Rosen, the Emilian Węgierski and the commander of the horse artil- group of Prądzyński, without the support of the Skrzy- lery battery, Maj. Józef Bem, were his subordinates. necki’s group, could neither defeat the Russian army un- Prądzyński appeared at Iganie with a group weakened der Iganie, nor attempt to seize Siedlce. The success of the in numbers (6.8 thousand soldiers and 14 cannons)28. The plan depended on the close coordination between the forces, which Geismar and Rosen managed to gather to two groups, and the efficiency and capacity of their com- defend the crossing of the Muchawka, totalled 12 thou- manders. Only Prądzyński demonstrated those character- sand soldiers and 52 cannons. In addition, the first wave of istics. He started the day of 10 April as a theorist of warfare, troops from the VI Corps of Gen. Igelstrom (6.4 thousand and ended as a field commander, combining theory with soldiers and 14 cannons) from Kostrzyń was approaching, practice. as General Skrzynecki failed to stop them with his sluggish The march of Prądzyński and his troops to Iganie was and protective actions. The distribution of Russian forces not safe. There were no signs of success. On the right wing was beneficial for Prądzyński. The majority of Rosen’s di- and in the rear, the main Russian army moved, which vision (7.8 thousand Infantry, 1.1 thousand Cavalry and under the new dispositions of Dibich headed through 46 cannons) was on the right bank of the Muchawka. The Łuków to Siedlce, where it was to appear on April 1124. artillery stationed along the river (28 heavy and light guns) Between the Poles and the Russians a race to Siedlce be- covered the foreground of the village of Iganie with their fire, which Prądzyński had to take to get to the Brest road 22 Already on April 9, the ​​division of General W. Andrychiew- and cut off the face of the troops of General Igelstrom from icz (2.8 thousand soldiers and 2 cannons), subordinate to Umiński, fought for bridges under Liw against the division of 25 ‘White ’, by the Russians were called ‘white devils’. General Pinabel (1.8 thousand soldiers, 4 cannons), and on 26 T. Strzeżek, ‘Bitwa pod Domanicami 10 kwietnia 1831 – epizod April 10, in the morning, with a division of General Nasaken z dziejów kawalerii polskiej w powstaniu listopadowym’, in (3.1 thousand soldiers and 6 cannons). T. Strzeżek, ‘Zapo- Czyn zbrojny w dziejach narodu polskiego. Studia ofiarowane mniane bitwy powstania listopadowego. Zmagania o prze- Profesorowi Januszowi Wojtasikowi w siedemdziesiątą roczni- prawę pod Liwem w lutym i pierwszej dekadzie kwietnia 1831 cę urodzin, ed. P. Matusak, M. Plewczyński, M. Wagner, Siedl- roku’, Echa Przeszłości, no. 11, 2010, pp. 181–192 (http://www. ce 2004, pp. 157–164; T. Strzeżek, Polska ofensywa wiosenna uwm.edu.pl/historia/echa/echa11.pdf, access 2011-02-03). w 1831 roku…, pp. 242–247. 23 Idem, Polska ofensywa wiosenna w 1831 roku…, pp. 228–231. 27 Pierre du Terri de Bayard, the French commander of the sixte- 24 In the evening of April 9, Dibich guessed the Skrzynecki’s in- enth century, nicknamed ‘the knight without fear and flaws.’ tentions. He resigned from the crossing of the Vistula and 28 He separated about 3 thousand soldiers with two cannons as started for the rescue of Rosen and Siedlce. covering force.

– 171 – – Tomasz Strzeżek –

the safety of Siedlce. On the left bank of Muchawka Russi- of the 1st and 5th infantry regiment formed a compact ans initially did not have many forces (a total of about 2.7 block of squares, shielding the back of the front line. thousand Soldiers and six cannons). An infantry battalion Russian artillery (at least 30 guns) fired bullets and gren- (about 800 soldiers) with four cannons was occupying Ig- ades at the Polish troops. Kicki quickened their march, and anie away to the south of the Brest road by approximately with the support of Bem’s battery, which cleared his path 300–500 m. Before the buildings of the mansion and farm with grape shots, at approx. 5 p.m. approached Iganie. (lying west of the village) the host of numerous Russian Soldiers of the 8th regiment, singing ‘Poland has not yet cavalry of General J. Sievers has developed (about two perished’, captured a part of the village and captured four thousand hussars and lancers with two cannons). Dur- Russian cannons. Russian Cavalry of General Sievers tried ing the battle the position of cavalry was occupied by the to attack Kicki’s troops from the rear, but the Regi- infantry of General Igelstrom, as they were coming from ment and ‘fire-breathing’ squares of the 1st infantry Regi- Kostrzyń. Thus, the Russian forces on the left bank were in- ment managed to counter the attack. creasing. Rosen was able to further strengthen them with At this point Polish troops formed a diagonal formation the troops from the right bank. In this situation, it seemed – from Iganie to the hill 78.7. Bem’s battery began to strike that Prądzyński would not be able to do anything. The en- the Brest road and the Russian supply train, advancing to- emy was stronger, and besides in order to even approach wards the bridge with projectiles more effectively. Iganie and the court, he had to lead his troops onto the Rosen had to regain control of Iganie, as the units of plain, and cross a few hundred meters (about 800–900) General Igelstrom have not yet arrived from Kostrzyń. under the fire of the Russian artillery from the right bank For the counterattack he threw three battalions (about of Muchawka29. It is no wonder, therefore, that Prądzyński 2.4 thousand soldiers) of the 13th and 14th regiment of hesitated whether or not to attack. He had less forces at jagers commanded by Gen. Dobrowolski. These regi- his disposal than the Russians. In the headquarters there ments were called ‘lions of Varna’ as they distinguished were voices (General Kicks) calling for a retreat. However, themselves in the battles for Varna in 1829 during the Rus- Prądzyński could not allow such a solution. Most of the of- so-Turkish War. It seemed that they will uphold their fame ficers, especially Major Bem, called for a fight. in the fight against the Poles. Backed by the cavalry regi- For two hours (1 to 3 p.m.) Prądzyński waited for signs ments they recovered Iganie and the cannons, and then in of activity of Skrzynecki. When he saw the Russian supply a long column moved after the retreating Polish battalions train going along the Brest road from Kostrzyń to Siedlce, of the 8th Infantry Regiment. The march of the jagers was he gave the signal to start the battle. Polish troops emerged slowed by the grapeshots fired by the Major Bem’s artillery from the forest onto the plain. The battery of horse artillery battery. One of the participants of the events mentioned of Major Bem opened fire on the Russian cavalry of Gen- that it was no longer a battle, but ‘… a slaughter. The Rus- eral Sievers and the artillery. Under his cover Poles formed sians fell to the ground like apples from an apple tree’30. attack formation. Four foot artillery cannons placed on the However, the Polish artillery did not manage to eliminate left wing (hill 78.7) joined in the shelling of Russian posi- the column of jagers completely, because the ammunition tions. was running out. The battery had to limit its activities. The In the centre six battalions of the 1st and 5th Infantry Polish division was now faced the risk of annihilation31. Regiment stood in square formations (about 4.5 thousand General Geismar, seeing the progress of the jagers, en- soldiers), and before them, Bem’s battery (10 cannons) couraged by their success, wanted to transfer a brigade of supported by the second Uhlan Regiment (600 soldiers). grenadiers to the left bank (3.6 thousand soldiers). At the Right wing was formed by two battalions of the 8th In- same time the Russian infantry troops (about two thou- fantry Regiment (about 1.2 thousand soldiers). sand Soldiers) from the right bank approached the fords The assault was launched by the first line led by General on Muchawka to the south of the bridge, getting ready for Kicki. Bem’s battery, Uhlan Regiment and the battalions of the crossing. On the left bank, near the Iganie first infantry the 8th Infantry Regiment moved towards Iganie under fire 30 S. Jabłonowski, Wspomnienia o baterii artylerii konnej gwardii of the Russian guns from behind Muchawka. Six battalions Królestwa Polskiego, Cracow 1860, pp. 26–27. 31 T. Strzeżek, Polska ofensywa wiosenna w 1831 roku…, pp. 256– 29 In addition, the right bank dominated over the left bank. –261.

– 172 – – Battle of Iganie, April 10, 1831 –

– 173 – – Tomasz Strzeżek –

troops of General Igelstrom, retreating from Kostrzyń, into battalion columns and led this mass ‘to the sound of began to emerge from the woods (about one thousand drums and regimental music’ towards the Russian posi- Soldiers). Everything pointed to the fact that the Russians tions34. The 1st Infantry Regiment under the command of were preparing for the general attack on the Polish regi- General Ramorino struck the right wing, took the manor35 ment. and began fighting with the regiments of General Igel- In fact, Rosen had other plans. He stopped the cross- strom. At the same time Prądzyński at the head of three ing of the grenadiers brigade, because as his main object- battalions of the 5th Infantry Regiment took Iganie and the ive was the defence of Siedlce and the crossing over the attacked the causeway and the bridge on Muchawka. Pol- Muchawka. He feared that the Polish troops who attacked ish infantry raced towards the designated goals so quickly him, were only the avant-garde of the main body of the that Prądzyński, to keep up, had to ride on horseback in Polish army. In this situation, engaging in battle would a decent trot. Gen. Dobrowolski – commander of the ‘lions be unwise. General Sievers used the same reasoning and of Varna’ saw the movement of the insurgent infantry and began to withdraw his cavalry over the bridge to the right turned back his jagers. Polish and Russian infantry without bank of Muchawka as soon as the troops of General Igel- firing a shot raced for the causeway and the bridge. Jagers strom appeared32. got there first, but Polish soldiers drove into the centre of Prądzyński and his officers did not know Rosen’s inten- the column. A fierce battle broke out with bayonets and tions. Seeing the movements of the Russian infantry and butt-ends. One of the Polish participants in the struggle, cavalry, they were expecting a strong enemy attack. In the wrote that ‘… the fifth regiment fought the same way as Polish headquarters once again there appeared voices once the Romans and the Greeks fought, when there were calling for a retreat (General Kicki). Prądzyński could not no firearm weapons in the world’. In the battle the com- condone such a course of action because he was con- mander of one of the jager regiments was killed, and the vinced that also at his rear there was a strong concentra- commander of the second, along with General Dobrowol- tion of Russian troops from the main army of Dibich. Re- ski were injured. Their regiments lost about 50% of the treat in this situation could lead to the disintegration of the state from before the battle. Poles took the causeway and regiment entrusted to him and expose other groups to the even drove to the right bank of Muchawka. Ramorino, at risk of defeat. that time, overtook the manor in Iganie and pushed north State of emergency, paradoxically served Prądzyński. the troops of gen. Igelstrom, which have failed to reach the In this difficult situation, he devised a plan to complete bridge. Their escape route should have been cut off by the the battle. Only unconventional behaviour could give cavalry from the column of General Skrzynecki, but they him victory and he decided to do so. He decided to at- failed to do so as a result of mistakes made by the com- tack alone to save the situation through a ‘brave deed’33. mander General Zygmunt Stryjeński36. He noticed two errors committed by the Russians. Para- Prądzyński became the master of the Iganie battlefield. lyzing the traffic on the bridge and the causeway, through Skrzynecki and his troops arrived at Iganie, after the battle. which ran the Brest road, by the retreating Sievers cavalry Rosen, on his part did not take any steps (except artil- and supply train and the and the remoteness from Iganie lery fire) to regain control of the bridge. Poles thus gained of the column of jagers of General Dobrowolski. The gap an excellent foothold to fight for Siedlce on April 11. Skrzy- between the latter and the Brest road was increasing. The necki, however, decided not to take such a risky step37. retreating 8th Regiment dragged gen. Dobrowolski further south. Even the Russian artillery went silent on the right 34 Ibid., p. 124. bank of Muchawka, not wanting to hurt their own soldiers. 35 Tomasz Potocki, a witness to the Polish infantry attack on the The road to Iganie was open. Prądzyński took personal manor, wrote that the palisade surrounding the buildings ‘[…] command of the six battalions of the 1st and 5th Infantry collapsed as a result of the efforts of the column that marched Regiment (about 4.5 thousand soldiers). He formed them as one man […] the battalion crossed the yard in such order, as though they were on parade’. Cf. University Library of the Catholic University of Lublin, manuscript 58, p. 327. 32 F. Smit, Istorija pol’skogo vozstanija i vojny…, vol. 2, pp. 79– 80; 36 T. Strzeżek, Polska ofensywa wiosenna w 1831 roku…, pp. 266– A. Puzyrewski, Wojna polsko-ruska…, p. 170. –267. 33 I. Prądzyński, Pamiętniki…, vol. 2, p. 123. 37 Ibid., pp. 271–273.

– 174 – – Battle of Iganie, April 10, 1831 –

All three groups of Polish forces participating in the op- Dibich paid for that by abandoning the crossing of the Vis- eration quietly withdrew to their initial positions across the tula and the retreat of the army to the line Siedlce–Kock. river Kostrzyń38. The Battle of Iganie, became just a small This was exactly Skrzynecki’s intention and, therefore, he episode, in consequence of which the Russians lost about considered himself to be the winner. He pushed Russians 3.5–5 thousand soldiers, but kept something more sub- away from the Vistula River and ensured the safety of the stantial – Siedlce, and the control over the Polish Kingdom. capital. General Ignacy Prądzyński, the hero of the battle of Iganie won fame and experience, but Skrzynecki, did not 38 General Umiński, who seized Liw on April 10, the next day entrust the command in the field to him ever again, see- crossed the Liwiec and seized Sokołów Podlaski. He was sure that Siedlce were already in the hands of Skrzynecki. On ing him as an opponent to the position of commander in April 12 he retreated behind Liwiec. T. Strzeżek, Zapomniane chief. Success does not always pay, especially in the eyes bitwy…, pp. 188–191. of an ambitious superior.

Bibliography National Library of Poland W. Majewski, ‘Sztuka wojenna powstania listopadowego na tle University Library of the Catholic University of Lublin sztuki wojennej przełomu XVIII i XIX wieku’, in Powstanie listo- Primary sources padowe 1830–1831. Geneza – uwarunkowania – bilans – po- I. Prądzyński, Pamiętniki, vol. 2, Cracow 1909 równania, Warsaw 1983 F. Smit, Istoriya polskogo vozstaniya i voyny 1830–1831 godov, A. Puzyrewski, Wojna polsko-ruska 1831, Warsaw 1899 vol. 2, S. Peterburg 1863 T. Strzeżek, Polska ofensywa wiosenna w 1831 roku. Zaprzepasz- Źródła do dziejów wojny polsko-rosyjskiej 1830–1831, vol. 2, War- czona szansa powstania listopadowego, wydawnictwo Napo- saw 1931 leon V, Oświęcim 2010 Books W. Tokarz, Wojna polsko-rosyjska 1830–1831, Warsaw 1993 Czyn zbrojny w dziejach narodu polskiego. Studia ofiarowane Profe- Articles sorowi Januszowi Wojtasikowi w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę uro- T. Strzeżek, ‘Zapomniane bitwy powstania listopadowego. dzin, ed. P. Matusak, M. Plewczyński, M. Wagner, Siedlce 2004 Zmagania o przeprawę pod Liwem w lutym i pierwszej S. Jabłonowski, Wspomnienia o baterii artylerii konnej gwardii dekadzie kwietnia 1831 roku’, in Echa Przeszłości, 2010, Królestwa Polskiego, Cracow 1860 no. 11

– 175 –

– Zbigniew Moszumański – Military Bureau for Historical Research in Military Centre for Civic Education

Battle in the Kobylanka Forest, 1–6 May 1863

Due to the outbreak of the January Uprising, Grand ficial for the insurgents, who had gained greater freedom Duke Constantine announced in the whole of action and easy access to the borders of the Kingdom of Kingdom of Poland on 24th of January 18631. The com- Poland. However, since the advantage of both Russian sol- mander of the Russian troops in the Kingdom of Poland, diers and weaponry was very clear, the Poles adopted the General Anders Edvard Ramsay2 ordered the troops to tactics of , performing raids, harassing the concentrate in larger towns, reducing the number of gar- enemy with surprise attacks, usually not in open battle. risons, in which the Russians were stationed, from 180 to In the province of Lublin, the main insurgent forces 42. For example, in the Lublin province, where Aleksandr P. were concentrated in the region of Lublin and Lubartow. In Khrushchëv was the head of the Military Division and the the border region most of the battles and skirmishes were commander of the 5th Infantry Division stationed there3, fought by troops formed in Eastern and forcing Russian forces were dislocated at the end of January 1864, their way through towards Lublin. This was influenced by except for Ivanogrod and Zamosc fortresses, only in eight two factors: firstly – vast forests were a convenient area to other garrisons (Garwolin, Janow, , Kurów, carry out activities by the insurgents; secondly – the prox- Lublin, Radzyń, Siedlce i Węgrów)4. When the Russian imity of the border of the Kingdom of Poland and not very military closed a garrison, they also took the disabled, re- difficult conditions for illegal crossing facilitated the smug- cruits, money and some officials with them5. It was bene- gling of people, arms and supplies6. The role of Galicia was limited mainly to delivering 1 Dziennik Powszechny, 1863, 24 January, No. 19, p. 1. troops, weapons, ammunition and material resources for 2 Anders Edvard Ramsay (1808–1877) – Russian general, baron. He was born in a Scottish family, took part in the campaign of the fighters in the . Thanks to the zeal of 1831 and the . From July 1862 to March 1863, he the organizers and the dedication of the Galician citizens commanded the armies of the Warsaw Military District. Dis- in the border counties, they managed to successfully break missed because of he did not suppress the uprising vigorously through the border. enough. In 1867 he was appointed deputy commander of that district. Cf. Russkiy biograficheskiy slovar, vol. 15, Pritvits – Rejs, Plans Petersburg 1910, pp. 489–490. 3 Aleksandr P. Khrushchëv (1806–1875) – Russian general, a participant of the Crimean War. In years 1861–1863 he The failure of the first insurgent troops sent from East- commanded the 5 Infantry Division and was the head of the ern Galicia into the Lublin province led to the decision that Military Division in the province of Lublin. After the January the next unit had to be better armed and equipped.7 On Uprising he became the acting commander of the Military District of Vilnius, in the years 1866–1874 – Governor-General 6 Zbigniew Moszumański, Jeszcze o powstaniu styczniowym of Western , and a member of the Council of State. Cf. w Leżajskiem, ‘Almanach Leżajski’ 2013, No. 9, p. 89. ibid., vol. 21, Faber–Tsavlovskiy, Petersburg 1901, pp. 442–444. 7 Cf.: Krzysztof Klikicki, Oddziały galicyjskie w walkach na Za- 4 Sergej D. Gesket, Voyennyye deystviya v Tsarstve Polskom mojszczyźnie w 1863 r., in: Galicja a powstanie styczniowe, v 1863 godu, Warsaw 1894, pp. 160–161. edited by Mariola Hoszowska, Agnieszka Kawalec, Leonid 5 , Powstanie styczniowe, Warsaw 1983, p. 374. Zaszkilniak, Warsaw, Rzeszów 2013, pp. 89–99.

– 177 – – Zbigniew Moszumański –

March 24th, 1863, the Director of the Department of War of The intention of the commander-in-chief of the armed the Interim National Government, General Józef Wysocki8 forces of the Lublin province was to gather a few units on appointed Gen. Antoni Jeziorański9 the commander in the territory of Galicia and penetrate Lublin Land at sev- chief of the armed forces of the province of Lublin10, repla- eral points simultaneously. These units, however, were not cing Colonel Leon Czechowski11 on this position. expected to be combined into one, but kept at […] a con- tinuous contact between each other and used against the 12 8 Józef Wysocki (1809–1873) – an officer of the November enemy . Uprising of 1831, an emigrant in France and activist of the Therefore, Gen. Antoni Jeziorański appointed Major Polish Democratic Society. In years 1848–1849, the organizer Jan Żalplachta13 as the leader of a squad to be formed and commander of the Polish Legion in Hungary, and the of the soldiers of the former unit of Colonel Leon Hungarian army corps commander. Appointed General in Czechowski, who retreated to Galicia. In turn, Capt. Ed- 1849. During the Crimean War he tried to form the Polish Le- mund Ślaski was entrusted with the task of collecting gion in Turkey. Since March 1862, the commander of the Pol- 14 ish Military School in . Since February 1863, he was firstly volunteers in the vicinity of Sanok. In addition, he sent the director of the War Department of the Interim National a few officers nominated as squad leaders into the Lublin Government, then the commander in chief of the armed area, ordering them to form units from the local popula- forces of the province of Lublin and the Russian lands. He commanded the attack on Radziwillow (2 July), among oth- ers. After the uprising he emigrated back to France, where treat to Galicia. Brought before a court-martial, he was he died in Paris. See. Henryk Piotr Kosk, Generalicja polska. acquitted of all charges by General Antoni Jeziorański. Popularny słownik biograficzny, vol. 2, M – Ż, Pruszków 2001, After the uprising he settled in Jaroslaw, where he died. pp. 265–266. Cf. Józef Białynia Chołodecki, Pamiętnik powstania sty- 9 Antoni Jeziorański aka. Antoni Jovanovic (1827–1882) – Pol- czniowego. W pięćdziesiątą rocznicę wypadków, Lvov 1913, ish General of the January Uprising, a participant of the pp. 192–193. Hungarian uprising 1848–1849, conservator and restorer 12 Tomasz Winnicki, Wspomnienia z powstania 1863 roku. Na of the fortress in , he fought against Russia in the marginesie pamiętników generała Antoniego Jeziorańskiego, Crimean War 1854–1855. In 1861 he returned to Warsaw, in: Zapomniane wspomnienia, ed. Eligiusz Kozłowski, Warsaw where he joined the independence conspiracy. After the out- 1981, p. 348. break of the January Uprising, he was the chief commander 13 Jan Żalplachta, aka. Zapałowicz (1834–1894) – since 1852 in of the armed forces – firstly in the province, then in the Austrian army, where he served as an artillery lieutenant. the Lublin province. He fought at Pieskowa Skala and Rawa, In 1863 he left the army and joined Colonel Leon Czechows- achieved victory in the battle of the Kobylanka Forest and ki’s unit, where he commanded a battalion in the rank of Ma- was defeated in battle of Huta Krzeszowska. Imprisoned by jor. After the withdrawal of the unit to Galicia, he formed his the Austrian authorities in Kufstein and Merani. Released own unit (May 1863), which was disbanded during the fights in 1865, he moved to Paris, then settled in Lvov, where he at and Tuczapy (15–19 May). Subsequently, he par- died. Cf. Henryk Piotr Kosk, Generalicja polska…, vol. 1, A – Ł, ticipated in an excursion to Volyn (July 2) as a subordinate of Pruszków 1998, p. 207. Colonel Franciszek Horodyński. After the uprising he was im- 10 January Uprising. Materiały i dokumenty, vol. 8, Dokumenty prisoned by the Austrians. He died in Bucharest. Cf. further: Wydziału Wojny Rządu Narodowego 1863–1864, Wrocław–War- Józef Białynia Chołodecki, Dąb-Dąbczańscy i Jan Żalplachta- saw–Cracow–Gdańsk 1973, doc. 42 and 43, p. 137; Pamiętniki -Zapałowicz. Przyczynek do dziejów powstania styczniowego, jenerała Jeziorańskiego. Powstanie r. 1863, part 2, Lvov 1913, Lvov 1913, pp. 14–37. pp. 15–16. 14 Edmund Slaski (1831–1863) – a participant of the Hungarian 11 Leon Czechowski (1797–1887) – an officer of the November uprising of 1848, and later an officer in the Austrian army, and Uprising. After the uprising fell, he settled in Galicia; where after his release from the army – a high school teacher in Lvov. in 1846 he commanded the uprising in the Tarnow prov- After the outbreak of the January Uprising of 1863, he fought ince. Released from prison after the revolution of 1848, he as a captain in the unit of Colonel Leon Czechowski in Lu- fought in Hungary under the command of General Józef blin Land, among others in the battles of Huta Krzeszowska Bem and was promoted to the rank of colonel. Since 1853 (March 21), then in the rank of Major as commander of his own he lived in Paris. In March 1863, he was appointed com- unit. He died in Chwałowice as a result of injuries sustained mander in chief of the armed forces of the province of Lu- in the battle at Łążek, he was buried in a parish cemetery in blin, at the same time taking command of the excursion Zaleszany. Cf. Dora Kacnelson, István Kovács, Pamiętniki Ed- from Galicia to Lublin Land. Despite initial success, after munda Ślaskiego a legion polski w Siedmiogrodzie, ‘Akcent’ the last clash in Huta Krzeszowska (21 March) had to re- 1992, No. 2/3, pp. 331–334.

– 178 – – Battle in the Kobylanka Forest, 1–6 May 1863 –

tion15. Major Józef Rucki16 had to form a unit in the region Jan Czerwinski22 and Tytus O’Byrne (aka ‘Grzymała’)23, of Krasnystaw and Chełm17. Major Zygmunt Koskowski18 forces were already being organized under the command of was directed near Lubartow, where he was to form a unit Major Józef Rucki and Major Zygmunt Koskowski. It should in the Luków area19. be mentioned that while the unit of General Jeziorański en- The Lublin province was to be simultaneously entered by tered Lubelskie, the cavalry of Józef Leniecki24 was the units of: Major Jan Żalplachta and Capt. Edmund Ślaski. to conceal the true movements of these forces25. In Lublin, in addition to the operating units of Marcin Bore- The formed insurgent troops, in addition to their own lowski (aka ‘Lelewel’)20, Kajetan Cieszkowski (aka ‘Ćwiek’)21, cavalry units, were to have about 200 scythe bearers, which if needed, could be equipped with firearms. As a res- 15 According to information received from Lublin, there has been ult of these plans the insurgent forces in Lublin could be sufficient equipment for 1,000–1,500 people, with volunteers reinforced with 5 units, which would also enter the Lublin only waiting for their commanders. Cf. Tomasz Winnicki, area under the command of Gen. Jeziorański. Wspomnienia…, p. 349. 16 Wladyslaw Jozef Rucki (1815 – after 1866) – an officer in the Units were to be divided into operating on the right Austrian army, in 1849 he was an adjutant of General Józef and the left flank and in the centre. They were to be led Bem in Transylvania. In the January Uprising he commanded by Gen. Aleksander Waligórski26 (the right flank), Gen. Józef units in Podlasie and Lublin land, he was the chief of the mil- itary district Krasnystaw, the acting commander in chief of to a sickness, he left the unit after the Battle of Panasowka the armed forces of the province of Lublin for a few months, (3 September), he then left for France. Chief of Staff Walery he fought, among others, in the battles of Urszulin (7 July) Kozlowski took over his unit. In 1873, he came to Galicia and and Chelm (July 9). After the uprising he escaped to Munich. died in Cracow. Cf. Zapomniane wspomnienia…, p. 447. Cf. Józef Białynia Chołodecki, Pamiętnik powstania…, pp. 22 John Czerwinski (? – after 1890) – the commander of the in- 347–348. surgent unit in the Lublin region. For a time he worked with 17 The National Library of Poland, mf 11995/III, Papers of col. a unit of Major Jan Żalplachta, but he left it before the battle Józef W. Rucki, commander of III Department in Lublin voi- of Tuczapy. He refused to cooperate with the division of Gen. vodeship in 1863/64. Antoni Jeziorański during his excursion in the May into the 18 Zygmunt Koskowski (1820–?) – Captain of the Russian army, Lublin region (Kobylanka May 1–6, 1863), explaining it by the under the orders of , he commanded lack of weapons. After the uprising, he worked in the judiciary a battalion in the rank of Major, among others: in the bat- in Monasterzyska. Cf. ibid., p. 448. tles of Chrobrze (17 March) and Grochowiska (March 18). He 23 Tytus Jan O’Byrn de Lassy, aka. Grzymała (1837–1897) – a Rus- fought under the command of Colonel Marcin Borelowski sian army officer, a member of the Sierakowski’s Circle of Of- and afterwards General Józef Hauke, among others, in the ficers. During the January Uprising he first commanded the battles of Sobolewo (May 24) and Róża (23 June). Cf. Zapo- of Death, then in the rank of colonel and became mniane wspomnienia…, p. 462. a squad leader and the commander in chief of the armed 19 January Uprising. Materiały…, vol. 8a, Dokumenty terenowych forces of the Podlaskie province. After the uprising, he emi- władz wojskowych powstania styczniowego 1863–1864, Wroc- grated to France. After 1871 he returned to Galicia and died in ław–Warsaw–Cracow–Gdańsk 1976, doc. 130, p. 136. Nowy Targ. Cf. Józef Białynia Chołodecki, Pamiętnik powsta- 20 Maciej Marcin Borelowski, aka. Lelewel (1829–1863), a Polish nia…, p. 316. social and patriotic activist, a tinsmith by profession, a well 24 Józef Leniecki (1839–1909) – an officer of the Russian army. foreman. Participant of revolutionary speeches in Cracow in During the uprising he fought in the unit of General Antoni 1846 and 1848, co-organizer of patriotic demonstrations in Jeziorański, and then Marian Langiewicz, in April and May, Warsaw in 1862 Appointed by the National Government to again under the command of Gen. Jeziorański (Kobylanka). the rank of Colonel and commander in chief of the armed Until March 1864 he fought in Podlasie and in Lublin province. forces in the Podlasie and Lublin regions. A good organizer, After escaping from Olomuniec, he emigrated to France and he formed new insurgent troops, he fought, among others, at afterwards to Turkey. After 1880, he settled in Galicia and took Krasnobród, Borowe Młyny, Chruslina, Panasówka and Ba- up oil prospecting. He died in Tustanowice. Cf. ibid., p. 280– torz, where he was mortally wounded on September 6, 1863. –281. Cf. further: K. Dunin-Wąsowicz, Marcin Borelowski-Lelewel, 25 Tomasz Winnicki, Wspomnienia…, p. 350. Warsaw 1964, passim. 26 Aleksander Waligórski (1802–1873) – an officer of the Novem- 21 Kajetan Cieszkowski aka. Ćwiek (1826–1877) – a Colonel in ber Uprising. He emigrated to and France, where he the January Uprising of 1863, commander of a unit in the worked as an engineer and cartographer. A participant of Sandomierz and Lublin regions. He fought, e.g., at Depuł- the Crimean War and in the years 1861–1862 a lecturer at the tycze (5 August), Ilza (20 August) and Irena (29 August). Due Polish Military School in Italy. In 1863 he organized troops for

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Śmiechowski27 and Colonel Marcin Borelowski (on the left came to , where in the nearby Wysocko he spoke flank) and Gen. Antoni Jeziorański (in the centre). This ex- with Stefan Zamoyski30 – civil governor of the circuit of plains the real reason why as many as three generals par- Przemysl about the recruitment of volunteers to the newly ticipated in the battles in the Kobylanka Forest on 1 and 6 formed insurgent unit and the capabilities of the recruit- May 1863. All of these units were to operate according to ment base in Przemysl Land31. The headquarters of the a uniform plan. For this purpose it was intended to main- formed unit was in Wojtkowski’s manor in Żurawiczki, con- tain a permanent contact with the commander in chief, verted into a recruitment office for insurgent volunteers.32 General Antoni Jeziorański and, according to the orders On 6 April General Jeziorański gave the order to begin and instructions received from him, to act on the desig- the concentration of volunteers in the main assembly point nated operation line28. in the Zerwankowskie Woods near Żołynia in the Rzeszów The action plans of the insurgent troops in Lublin re- County33. Captain Ignacy Kucz became its commander. mained on paper only. The main reason for the failure was Somewhat earlier, on 25 March 1863, he appointed Major the lack of coordination, weapons and ammunition, as Bronislaw Ryx to an accredited deputy for finance and req- well as the lack of cavalry equipment. uisition34. He then strived for financial assistance, as well as weapons and equipment, including necessary surgical Preparations instruments, for the unit. Unfortunately, equipment and ammunition shortages After receiving the appointment for the position of com- remained a major problem for the unit. Although the com- mander in chief of the armed forces of the province of Lu- mander was able to buy some ammunition, it was still blin on March 24, 1863, Gen. Antoni Jeziorański along with not enough. The help promised by General Wysocki was Gen. Aleksander Waligórski and Colonel Tomasz Winnicki29 nowhere to be seen35. From 20 April the insurgent unit began forming in Zer- Marian Langiewicz, by whom he was promoted to the rank wankowskie Woods in Rzeszów County. Battalion, com- of general. He took part in the excursion of Gen. Antoni Jez- pany and platoon commanders were appointed. The unit iorański into Lublin province and fought in battles of the consisted of 8 companies (‘rot’) of infantry, a squadron of Kobylanka Forest (1–6 May). In June 1863 he became com- mander in chief of the armed forces of the province of Lublin. cavalrymen (‘Krakusi’), one hundred Cossacks and two On 16 October, 1863 his squad entered Lublin area. His unit was disbanded at the battle of Łążek (22 October). He emi- and Lublin provinces. After merging with Marian Langiewicz’s grated after the uprising. He took part in the French-Prus- units, he received stewardship and temporarily became chief sian war (1870–1871) He died. Died in Paris. Cf. further: Jacek of staff of the joint insurgent forces. He fought, i.a. at Chrobrze, Juniszewski, Generał Waligórski, inżynier i żołnierz, Brzezia Grochowiska and in the Kobylanka Forest. Promoted to the Łąka 2013, passim. rank of colonel, severely wounded twice. He settled in Galicia. 27 Józef Śmiechowski (1798–1875) – an officer of the November He died in Berehy and was buried in Jasien. Cf. Józef Białynia Uprising. In 1863, he fought under the command of Gen. An- Chołodecki, Pamiętnik powstania…, p. 398. toni Jeziorański and Marian Langiewicz, by whom he was pro- 30 Stefan Zamoyski, Count of the Jelita crest (1837–1899) – Civil moted to the rank of general. After the meeting in Welcz, he Head of the Przemysl district during the January Uprising in took command over Langiewicz’s squad and with its remains 1863 and an Austrian prisoner, after the uprising he became crossed the border of Galicia. Afterwards he participated a member of parliament in Galicia, a lifetime member of the in General Jezioranski’s excursion into Lublin province. He House of Lords, economic activist. Cf. Teresa Zielińska, Poczet fought in the battles of the Kobylanka Forest (1–6 May). From polskich rodów arystokratycznych, Warsaw 1997, passim. 11 May he commanded Jeziorański’s troops, he was defeated 31 Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 32. in the battle of Huta Krzeszowska and retreated to Galicia. 32 Eligiusz Kozłowski, Od Węgrowa do Opatowa 3 II 1863 – 21 II After the uprising he lived in Lvov, where he died. Cf. Henryk 1864. Wybrane bitwy z powstania styczniowego, Warsaw 1962, Piotr Kosk, Generalicja polska…, vol. 2, p. 213. p. 102–103. 28 Tomasz Winnicki, Wspomnienia…, p. 350. 33 January Uprising. Materiały…, vol. 12, Dokumenty terenowych 29 Tomasz Winnicki (1828–1883) – from 1860, in a secret orga- władz cywilnych powstania styczniowego 1862–1864, Wroc- nization, imprisoned in the X Pavilion of the Warsaw Cita- ław–Warsaw–Cracow–Gdańsk–Łódź 1986, doc. 53, pp. 34–35. del (1861–1862), exiled to the province of Tambov. After the 34 Ibid., vol. 8a, doc. 118, p. 130. outbreak of the January Uprising he became chief of staff 35 January Uprising. Materiały…, vol. 8a, doc. 131, p. 137; Pamięt- in the unit of General Antoni Jeziorański in the Sandomierz niki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 42.

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companies of sappers36 – a total of about 740 soldiers37. The next day, the main column of the unit moved out The well-armed and sufficiently-equipped unit included, towards the border of the Kingdom of Poland. After some i.a.: General Aleksander Waligórski and General Józef trials and tribulations the unit crossed the San River and Śmiechowski, chief of staff Colonel Tomasz Winnicki, bat- after two days of marching reached the area of Ruda taltion commanders – Major Kazimierz Grudziński38 and Różaniecka. After resting, the column moved towards Major Leszek Dąbczański39, sapper commander – Ma- the Kutnie farm, which belonged to baron Piotr Brunicki jor Adam Bobowski, Cossack – Józef Leniecki (about 2 km from Ruda Różaniecka), where they inten- and Adam Wyleżyński, cavalry squadron commander ded to stock up on ammunition. Each soldier had only – Maliszewski, doctor Adam Stanisławski and chaplain 8 rounds and the stock totalled 800 for the entire unit. Un- Father Berard Bulsiewicz40. The company Commanders fortunately, there was no ammunition, however they did were: 1 – Cpt. Kazimierz Wyszomirski, 2 – Ignacy Zawadzki, acquire some tools for the sappers. Therefore, they sent 3 – Cpt. Leonard Komodziński, 4 – Cpt. Emil Lampe, 7 – messengers to the chief of the civil and military organisa- Cpt. Mieczyslaw Czechowicz, and Zygmunt Horn, Wla- tion in Galicia, with the request to provide ammunition as dyslaw Kazanecki, Kurek, Leonard Łepkowicz (Lepkowski) soon as possible. On 28 April the unit crossed the border and Wiktor Wisniewski. of the Kingdom of Poland and Lubliniec41 and stopped in Gen. Anthony Jeziorański, came to the camp in the a well-hidden position at Borowe Młyny. Woods Zerwankowskich on 25 April in order to review the At this time, the cavalry subdivision of Ataman Józef Le- troops. Earlier a cavalry subdivision under the command niecki, accompanied by Major Bronislaw Ryx, acquired in of ataman Józef Leniecki was sent to mask the movement Krzeszow some Russian money, which amounted to about of the unit’s main column. 1000 rubles.42 They spent the night in Dabrowka near Po- tok43. In the night of 27 and 28 April, the unit lost a cash box containing almost 50 thousand Polish zlotys, including al- 36 Col. Tomasz Winnicki claimed that there was only one most 33 thousand taken from the salt warehouse in Brzesk company of sappers. Cf. idem, Wspomnienia…, p. 356, foot­- on 18 March 1863.44 note. g1. Upon learning about the insurgent unit crossing the 37 Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 42. Cpt. Wiktor Wiś- niewski mentioned that the unit had about 600 soldiers Austrian border near Borowe Młyny, the military chief of (idem, Wspomnienia kapitana wojsk polskich z roku 1863, the Janowski county, Colonel Georgy Miednikov45, not Leipzig 1866, p. 58). This is also confirmed by Colonel Tomasz Winnicki (idem, Wspomnienia…, p. 321). 41 Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 42. Gen. Antoni Jez- 38 Kazimierz Grudzinski (1835–?) – Russian army officer in the ioranski’s unit reportedly crossed the Russian border a day rank of major in command of battalions in Marian Langiew- earlier, as stated in Czas, 1863, 2 May, No. 100, p. 2, as well as icz and Gen. Antoni Jeziorański’s units, promoted to the rank Stanisław Zieliński (Bitwy i potyczki 1863–1864, Rapperswil of colonel. Afterwards in the Mazovia Corps of Gen. Józef 1913, p. 88). Karol Miniewski. He participated in all battles fought by these 42 January Uprising. Materiały…, vol. 8a, doc. 131, p. 137. troops. After the uprising he stayed in Galicia, and later took 43 Czas, 1863, 3 May, No. 101, p. 3. advantage of the amnesty and returned to the Kingdom of 44 January Uprising. Materiały…, vol. 8a, doc. 127, p. 135 and Poland. Cf. Józef Białynia Chołodecki, Pamiętnik powstania…, doc. 134, p. 139. pp. 225–226. 45 In accordance with the order of 14 May 1863, Colonel Georgy 39 Leszek Dabczanski (1836–1909) – graduated from the mili- Miednikov was appointed commander of the Arkhangel- tary academy in Weisskirchen, an Austrian artillery officer. ogorodski Infantry Regiment in place of Colonel Yegor Bie- In 1863, in the rank of major, he commanded a battalion in driagi, who commanded this regiment since 1856 and at the Colonel Leon Czechowski’s unit, and later had the same po- same time was the military chief of the Zamość district since sition in General Antoni Jeziorański’s unit. He fought at Huta January 1863. Cf. Nikolaj G. Nikolaev, Istoriya 17-go Pekh. Krzeszowska and at the Kobylanka Forest, where he was Arkhangelogorodskogo yego imperatorskogo vysochestva wounded. After the uprising he settled in Czortkowo county, velikogo knyazya Vladimira Aleksandrovicha polka, 1700 – 25 then in Lvov, where he died.Cf. further: Józef Białynia Choło- iûna 1900, Petersburg 1900, pp. 382, 387; A. B. Sirokorad, Dav- decki, Dąb-Dąbczańscy and Jan Żalplachta-Zapałowicz…, pp. niy spor slavan. Rossia. Polsha. Litva, Moscow 2006, http:// 38–46. www.e-reading-lib.com/chapter.php/144943/35/Shiroko- 40 Józef Stanisław Pietrzak, Księża powstańcy 1863, Cracow rad_-_Davniii_spor_slavyan._Rossiya._Pol%27sha._Lit- 1916, p. 64. va_%28ill%29.html [access 21-07-2013]. Cracow’s Czas (1863,

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knowing its strength, sent there a unit commanded by Ma- work. Two companies of riflemen working in shifts man- jor Ivan Sternberg46 composed of: an infantry battalion of aged to adapt during the night about 1,800 rifle rounds the Archangelogorod Infantry Regiment, reinforced by two and cast about 2000 bullets50. cannons, the uhlan platoon of the Kharkov Uhlan Cavalry Regiment of Captain Antulayev, a platoon of Cossacks and Battle half a hundred of border guards – about a 1000 soldiers in total. The march towards Borowe Młyny began on 26 April, On 1st of May the weather had improved somewhat. at approximately 8 P.M. However, they reached their des- Major Sternberg decided to send the subunits to search tination after three days. Muddy road, heavy continuous for the insurgents in the Gluchowski Forest. In a short time rains and low temperatures strained the marching soldiers the Cossacks signalled that at the nearby border, which and horses so much, that Major Sternberg had to stop for goes along a 10-meter-wide forest clearing, one could see two days and rest in the area of Borowe Młyny.47 During a group of insurgents. Soon it became clear that it was the this time, no new credible information about the insur- commander of the 14 Hussar Regiment, Colonel Olivier gents reached him48. Wallis51 together with an escort, and his soldiers acted at Meanwhile, on 30 April, in a camp in Łysa Góra, General the time as the border guard. Jeziorański received information that a column of Rus- After a short rest, the Russians began to search through sian soldiers moved out of Janow to meet the insurgents. the Kobylanka Forest. Shortly after 9 A.M. the first shots Therefore he chose to position his troops in an advanta- were fired. The Russian forces, scattered in battle order geous position in the Kobylanka Forest, between Borowe throughout the marshy woods, attacked the defensive Młyny and Tepiły. On one side it reached the Austro-Rus- positions of the vanguard. After a short fight Capt. Ignacy sian border and was surrounded by swamps on the other. Zawadzki’s company stopped their march. The Russians, Such a position allowed the enemy to attack only from due to the difficult terrain, used only one cannon52, while two sides: a broad road from Łysa Góra and a narrow for- the other remained at the wagons53. Soon, the enemy’s est road from Janow. Therefore, at some distance from the the right wing was attacked by two companies under the camp on both these roads defensive positions were taken command of Major Ignacy Grudzinski, forcing the Russi- by the half-company strong front guards, and in front of ans to retreat in the direction of Borowe Młyny. A strike to them put forward guards consisting of several horsemen49. the side of the retreating enemy column, led to mixing the They also started sorting and processing possessed am- formation and a subsequent strike of the insurgent cav- munition, including casting bullets for rifles. Major Feliks alry caused complete panic. After a two-hour battle the Obniski, former captain of the Russian army, oversaw this Russians fled and left one cannon with a broken tow and lost 90 wounded and killed men, 23 of whom54 were left 28 March, No. 71, p. 1 and 2 April, No. 75, p. 1) reported errone- ously that it was Colonel Mielnikov. on the battlefield. Polish losses totalled only 5 killed and 55 46 Major Ivan Sternberg – since 1860 the commander of the 18 wounded . II Battalion 17 Arkhangelogorodski Infantry Regiment, mil- itary chief of the following counties: Zamość (1864–1867), 50 Tomasz Winnicki, Wspomnienia…, pp. 352–353. Lubartów (1867–1872) and Biłgoraj (1872–1879). Cf. Nikolaj 51 Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 48. Cf. Militär-Sche- G. Nikolaev, Istoriya 17-go…, appendix XIV, p. 42; Krzysztof matismus des Österreichischen Kaiserthumes, 1863, Wien Latawiec, Naczelnicy powiatów guberni lubelskiej w latach 1863, pp. 104, 416. Evgenij A. Albovskij (Kharkovskiye kazaki…, 1867–1915. ‘Próba charakterystyki grupy’, in Annales Universi- p. 387) suggests that he was a general. tatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, 2003, vol. LVIII, p. 79, 91. Polish 52 In order to stop artillery fire, Captain Leonard Łepkowicz, with historiography also knows different spelling of this name ‘Sz- a group of volunteers, organized a successful foray to the fir- ternberg’ and ‘Sztiernbierg’. ing position of Russian cannon. Cf. Tomasz Winnicki, Wspo- 47 It rained for several days, sometimes even with snow, the mnienia…, p. 357. air temperature dropped even below 5 degrees. Cf. Gazeta 53 Evgenij A. Albovskij, Kharkovskiye kazaki…, p. 388. Lwowska, 1863, 29 April – 2 May, No. 98–100; Czas, 1863, 29 54 Cracow’s Czas from 3 May (1863, No. 101, p. 3) reported that 26 April – 2 May, No. 97–100. Russians were buried, and on 5 May (1863, No. 102, p. 3) and 7 48 Evgenij A. Albovskij, Kharkovskiye kazaki. Istoriya Kharkovsko- May (1863, No. 104, p. 2) – that there was 27 of them. go Polka, part 5, Minsk 1897, p. 387. 55 Stanisław Zieliński, Bitwy i potyczki…, p. 88. Evgenij A. Albov- 49 Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, pp. 43–44. skij (Kharkovskiye kazaki…, p. 388) reports that Russians had

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– 183 – – Zbigniew Moszumański –

After the withdrawal of Russian forces to Borowe In the morning of 6th of May, the Russian forces com- Młyny, Major Sternberg immediately sent a report to manded by Colonel Georgiy Miednikov, began surround- Lublin about the outcome of the battle, at the same time ing the insurgent camp. About 8.30 A.M. they first at- asking for help. The Head of the Military Department of tacked vanguard positions put forward on the left flank, the Lublin Province, General Aleksandr P. Khrushchev, which, after a slight resistance retreated to the main ordered to reinforce Major Sternberg with troops sta- position. This section of the defence was led by General tioned in Janow and Tomaszow. Colonel Georgy Mied- Józef Śmiechowski. On the adjacent section, the Russian nikov, the military head of the Janowski County, took skirmishers were stopped in wetland forest, followed by command of all Russian forces. Their ranks included: an exchange of fire, but with little effect, because the Archangelogorod Infantry Regiment, the independent trees protected the riflemen from both warring parties 5th Riflemen Battalion, 6 cannons, half a squadron of against larger losses. About 10.30 A.M. the Russian forces Uhlans of Uhlan Regiment, half a hundred of attacked the centre of the defensive position, but good Cossacks and half hundred of border guardsmen56. They spacing and masked companies caused them significant counted a total of more than 2000 people. For five days, losses, forcing them to withdraw. however, the Russians did not dare to attack the insur- There was an hour-long break, after which the in- gent unit. surgents were attacked from the side of Galicia. The In turn, General Jeziorański ordered the sapper com- defenders of this section, Major Adam Bobowski’s sap- mander, Maj. Adam Bobowski, to strengthen the fortific- pers, hidden behind a barricade, initially successfully ation of the camp and barricade all roads leading to the repelled the attack the Russians. During the second camp with logs. The depleted ammunition supply had attack of the Russians surrounded the entrenched been partially supplemented by a transport from (sev- engineers. Seeing the ineffectiveness of the sappers’s eral thousand rounds). Injured insurgents were provided resistance, General Jeziorański came to their rescue by care on site, and the more heavily injured were transported sending the 4 Company of Captain Wiktor Wisniewski, to hospitals in Galicia. On 3rd of May the camp was visited located in reserve. The rapid counterattack at the en- by Duke Adam Sapieha, who took part in the ceremony of emy’s side has caused some confusion in their ranks. burial of the fallen insurgents, and ordered an increase in Witnessing this, major Leszek Dąbczański led the insur- the supply of food and ammunition. On this day they were gents to attack with bayonets, causing a chaotic with- also joined by two cavalry units of captain Albert Potocki drawal of the Russians. and Karol Liniewicz (in total 85 cavalrymen), as well as in- For nearly an hour the Russians gathered to attack surgents from a broken unit of Marcin Borelowski, among the camp again. At the same time, Colonel Miednikov re- which was, inter alia, Kalikst Ujejski57. On the 5th of May grouped some of his forces from the left wing, strength- about 50 thousand rounds were transported to the camp, ening the attack in the centre. Major Leonard Łepkowicz which were distributed until late evening58. received an order from General Jeziorański compelling him to repel the two companies of the Russian assault. The skirmishers of Captain Wiktor Wisniewski stopped the only 20 people killed and 40 injured. In turn, Gen. Antoni Jez- enemy, and Captain Władysław Kazanecki’s 7 Company iorański (Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p.47) argues sent to help Major Łepkowicz, at the same time the last that the losses of the insurgents amounted to 5 killed and 28 rear guard59 of General Jeziorański, forced the Russians to wounded. In contrast, Cracow’s Czas on 3 May (1863, No 101, 60 p. 3) and 7 May (1863, No 104, p. 2) reported that 3 insurgents retreat in a fierce bayonet battle. were killed and 20 wounded were transported to the hospital in Cieszanów, and on 5 May (1863, No 102, p. 3) – that there were only 11 wounded. Gazeta Lwowska from 4 May (1863, No. 59 Fourty two uhlans under the command of rittmeister Ludwik 101, p. 411) contains even more different information. Czerminski came from Galicia during the battle. They were 56 Evgenij A. Albovskij, Kharkovskiye kazaki…, p. 389. used to distribute rounds to infantry positions and later to 57 He later took command over the company after Captain escort transports with the wounded. Cf.: ibid., p. 56; Halina Wiktor Wisniewski. Cf. Stanisław Zieliński, Bitwy i potyczki…, Matławska, Lasy – nasze fortece, Zwierzyniec 1993, p. 61. p. 89. 60 Stanislaw Zielinski (Bitwy i potyczki…, p. 89) states that after 58 Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, pp. 47–50. a three-hour fight, at noon, General Jezioranski, after having

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After 3 P.M. the Russians, pushed away on the whole Wladyslaw Kazanecki, Lt. Franciszek Szubartowski and line, retreated without a fight. Only Colonel Wyleżyński Józef Łucki died of wounds. Col. Tomasz Winnicki, Colonel and Leniecki’s Cossacks chased the retreating enemy61. It Adam Wylezynski, Major Leszek Dabczanski, Major Emilian was one of the most spectacular forest battles in the Janu- Sokolnicki, Captains: Kurek, Wladyslaw Litwicki, Wictor ary Uprising. Austrian officers who stood at the border, Wisniewski, Kazimierz Wyszomirski and Ignacy Zawadzki witnessing the fight, could not praise the courage of the in- and chaplain Father Berard Bulsiewicz, as well as doctor surgents enough and began applauding them. The afore- Adam Stanislawski were injured67. mentioned commander of the 14th Hussar Regiment, Col- onel Olivier Wallis, said that he was not able to resist the Further steps […] desire to see the soldiers fighting so valiantly62. This victory, however, was at the big cost. It is esti- The enemy did not give up. After forming their ranks, mated that the Russian side would have a total of up to they began preparations to attack the insurgent camp. In 400 injured and killed in this battle63. Warrant officer Te- anticipation of the Russians resuming their actions, Gen- ofil Bilewicz died from suffered wounds and Major Ivan eral Jeziorański shifted the defensive positions to the very Sternberg was injured64. Forty eight insurgents were killed border with Austria, to be provided with a way to retreat, on the field of battle, including Captain Emil Lampe and if necessary68. Reconnaissance confirmed the Russian in- the son of General Waligorski – Wladyslaw, quartermas- tention to attack the camp. Therefore, General Jeziorański ter Stanislaw Urbanowski. They were buried on the same ordered, keeping silence and caution, to leave the camp. day. Sixty injured insurgents and several wounded Rus- Only intensely burning campfires were left. After the in- sian Cossacks were transported to a makeshift hospital in surgent unit withdrew, the Russians, believing that Poles Cieszanów65, not counting those sent to Narol, Lubaczow are still in the camp, fired at it at dawn with artillery fire and Oleszyce66. Until 10 May Lt. Kazimierz Tyszkiewicz, Cpt. from two sides. Only when called to attack, the Russians learned that the camp was abandoned69. given command over the unit to General Aleksander Waligór- Meanwhile, Gen. Jeziorański, fleeing with a unit num- ski, personally led a bold charge with a bayonet in his hand. bering less than 600 people and almost without any am- 61 Description of the fight according to Gen. Antoni Jeziorański. 70 Cf. Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 52–56. Cf. Zyg- munition, through Tepily and Ułazów , moved to the munt Kubrak, Powstanie styczniowe. Pogranicze cieszanow- Galician side about 20 miles west and on 9 May at approx. sko-lubaczowskie, Lubaczów 2003, p. 22–25. The battle of the 2 P.M., allowing the soldiers to rest and handing out provi- Kobylanka Forest was also described in a popular ‘spirit-rai- sions, crossed back into Lublin Landprovince at Mielniki.71 sing’ fashion by Józef K. Zajączkowski: W rocznicę styczniową Having passed a few kilometres into the province, General (Bitwa pod Kobylanką w roku 1863), Lvov 1911. Jeziorański, under the guise of terrain reconnaissance, 62 Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 48; Jan Stella-Sawi- cki, [Col. Struś], Galicya w powstaniu styczniowem, Lvov 1913, left the squad, handing over the command to Gen. Józef p. 60; Czas, 1863, 8 May, No. 105, p. 3. Śmiechowski, and went to Galicia, motivating his trip by 63 Cracow’s Czas (1863, 12 May, No. 107, p. 2); Stanisław Zieliń- a makeshift-illness72. He spent the night in Naklik, and ski, Bitwy i potyczki…, p. 89. Evgenij A. Albovskij (Kharkovskie kazaki…, p. 389) reports that the Russians lost 100 killed and cf.: Zygmunt Kubrak, Powstanie styczniowe…, pp. 45–51. wounded. According to Gen. Antoni Jezioranski, the Russian 67 Cracow`s Czas (1863, 12 May, No. 107, p. 2) and Stanisław losses amounted to 273 killed and 432 wounded. Cf. Pamięt- Zieliński (Bitwy i potyczki…, p. 89) both claim that Gen. An- niki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 57. toni Jezioranski was also wounded in the battle, however the 64 Nikolaj G. Nikolaev, Istoriya 17-go…, p. 385. author of the memoirs does not confirm this. Cf. Pamiętniki 65 Gen. Antoni Jeziorański states that the losses among the in- jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, passim. surgents amounted to 59 killed and 47 wounded. Cf. Pamięt- 68 Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 56. niki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 57. On 10 May 1863, there 69 Czas, 1863, 13 May, No. 108, p. 3 and 14 May, No. 109, p. 1. were 24 lightly wounded, 11 heavily wounded and 8 mortally 70 ‘From Warsaw secret archives’, in Czas, 1923, 15 September, wounded insurgents at the hospital in Cieszanow. How- No. 206, p. 2. ever, there were 20 lightly wounded in Oleszyce and 12 in 71 Stefan Kieniewicz, Powstanie…, p. 485; Pamiętniki jenerała Je- Lubaczów. A total of 75. Cf. Czas, 1863, 14 May, No. 109, p. 1. ziorańskiego…, p. 62. 66 More information about the medical care provided to the in- 72 Jan Stella-Sawicki, Galicya…, pp. 60–61. Cf. Pamiętniki jenera- surgents participating in the battles of the Kobylanka Forest, ła Jeziorańskiego…, pp. 63–65.

– 185 – – Zbigniew Moszumański –

then in the morning went north73 to Lipiny and Harasiuki estimated that 30–40 people managed to evade arrest78. and stopped in the evening to rest at Huta Krzeszowska74. Some weapons were buried by insurgents (and retrieved Gen. Śmiechowski had horses unsaddled and ordered later by Colonel Marcin Borelowski while forming a new the supper to be prepared. The vanguard of the Russian insurgent unit). forces, commanded by Major Yakov Ogolina, surprised To conclude, one has to state that General Antoni Jezi- the unprepared insurgents. Gen. Śmiechowski placed the oranski’s unit remained at the borderland strip for almost riflemen in the bushes, the attack was blocked with diffi- two weeks, longer than any Galician unit and he caused culty. Afterwards Captain Ludwik Czerminski led the Pol- significant losses to the Russians, defeating them in both ish cavalry charge, which allowed the infantry to escape battles of the Kobylanka Forest. General Jezioranski could into the woods, along with the wagons75. After 9 P.M. the expect support from both Jan Czerwinski’s unit, stationed insurgents crossed the Austrian border in small groups at less than a mile from Borowe Młyny, and a second unit, Kurzyna Wielka and Golce76. Gen. Śmiechowski also with- formed in Galicia, commanded by Major Jan Żalplachta’s. drew to Austrian territory. General Jeziorański was found Lack of coordination resulted in Major Żalplachta’s unit not in the nearby Galician Wymyslow77. Out of the units com- being armed and dispatched in time, so it did not reach manded by him, counting less than 300 people at the end Gen Jezioranski in time. It was a common mistake of the of the action, the Austrian patrols arrested 208 insurgents, organizers of the Galician excursions, who could not coor- 49 horses, 220 guns (rifles) and 300 kg of gunpowder. It is dinate the activities of individual departments. They were formed near the border and observed by Russian spies from the very beginning, thus were quickly disbanded be- 73 Gazeta Lwowska, 1863, 11 May, No. 107, pp. 435–436. fore even starting any tasks deeper in the country engulfed 74 Stefan Kieniewicz, Powstanie…, p. 485. 75 Halina Matławska, Lasy…, p. 64. by the uprising. 76 Gazeta Lwowska, 1863, 12 May, p. 108, p. 440. 77 January Uprising. Materiały…, vol. 8a, doc. 136, p. 140. 78 Gazeta Lwowska, 1863, 23 May, No. 117, p. 473.

Bibliography Primary sources J. Białynia Chołodecki, Pamiętnik powstania styczniowego. The National Library of Poland W pięćdziesiątą rocznicę wypadków, Lvov 1913 Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, 2003, vol. LVIII Books Czas, 1863 Galicja a powstanie styczniowe, ed. M. Hoszowska, A. Kawalec, Dziennik Powszechny, 1863 L. Zaszkilniak, Warsaw, Rzeszow 2013 Gazeta Lwowska, 1863 Russkiy biograficheskiy slovar, vol. 15, 21, Petersburg 1910 Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego. Powstanie r. 1863, vol. 2, Lvov E. A. Albovskij, Kharkovskiye kazaki. Istoriya Kharkovskogo Polka, 1913, vol. 5, Minsk 1897 Powstanie styczniowe. Materiały i dokumenty, vol. 8, Doku- J. Białynia Chołodecki, Dąb-Dąbczańscy i Jan Żalplachta-Zapa- menty Wydziału Wojny Rządu Narodowego 1863–1864, ed. łowicz. Przyczynek do dziejów powstania styczniowego, Lvov S. Kieniewicz, I. Miller, Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow–Gdańsk 1913 1973 K. Dunin-Wąsowicz, Marcin Borelowski-Lelewel, Warsaw 1964 Zapomniane wspomnienia, ed. Eligiusz Kozłowski, Warsaw S. D. Gesket, Voyennyye deystviya v Tsarstve Polskom v 1863 godu, 1981 Warsaw 1894

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J. Juniszewski, Generał Waligórski, inżynier i żołnierz, Brzezia Łąka J. Stella-Sawicki, [Col. Struś], Galicya w powstaniu styczniowem, 2013 Lvov 1913 S. Kieniewicz, Powstanie styczniowe, Warsaw 1983 A. B. Sirokorad, Davniy spor slavan. Rossia. Polsha. Litva, Moscow H. P. Kosk, Generalicja polska. Popularny słownik biograficzny, vol. 2006 1–2, Pruszków 2001 J. K. Zajączkowski, W rocznicę styczniową (Bitwa pod Kobylanką E. Kozłowski, Od Węgrowa do Opatowa 3 II 1863 – 21 II 1864. w roku 1863), Lvov 1911 Wy­bra­ne bitwy z powstania styczniowego, Warsaw 1962 T. Zielińska, Poczet polskich rodów arystokratycznych, Warsaw Z. Kubrak, Powstanie styczniowe. Pogranicze cieszanowsko- 1997 lubaczowskie, Lubaczów 2003, S. Zieliński, Bitwy i potyczki 1863–1864, Rapperswil 1913 H. Matławska, Lasy – nasze fortece, Zwierzyniec 1993 Articles N. G. Nikolaev, Istoriya 17-go Pekh. Arkhangelogorodskogo yego D. Kacnelson, I. Kovacs, ‘Pamiętniki Edmunda Śląskiego a legion imperatorskogo vysochestva velikogo knyazya Vladimira Alek- polski w Siedmiogrodzie’, in Akcent, 1992 sandrovicha polka, 1700 – 25 iuna 1900, Petersburg 1900 Z. Moszumański, ‘Jeszcze o powstaniu styczniowym w Leżaj- J. S. Pietrzak, Księża powstańcy 1863, Cracow 1916 skiem’, in Almanach Leżajski, 2013, No. 9

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