The War in the Ether: Tannenberg: Finale And

ASA REVIEW - September 1952,, aEl"-9ID:.. A592 l.8 The War 1n the Ether: TANNENBERG: FINALE AND DISCUSSION (8onfidautlal) The battle of Tannenberg was the first in the history of man in which the interception of enemy radio traffic played a decisive role, although the intercept service of the victorious Germana was poorly coordinated and some of the vital radiograms, sent jn plain text, were intercepted by chance. A previous article in the June 1952 issue covered this battle aga1nat the Russians to the point where the Germana were ready for the kill. Gen eral Hindenburg had learned from intercept that the left wing of his for ces consisting of the lat Reserve Corps and the XVII Corps was still unop posed by the First Russian Army of ,General Rennenkampf because the Rus sians had not yet come up into line and was able to use these forces with his right wing, consisting chiefly of XX Corps, which was op-posed by the Russian Second Army under General Samsonov, consisting of XX:III Corps and other units. The forces which General Hindenburg took from his left and used wjth XX Corps were the lat Reserve Corps and XVII Corps. Badia deception was used to give the impression the left wing was still in strength, as will be noted in the following article. The Russian XVII Corps and XV Corps mentioned below had come to the support of the Russian Second Army. The Russian II Corps was additional reenforcement which had not yet arrived. On 28 August at 0700 hours Hindenburg regardless of everything,and on the short and his Staff arrived in Froegenau to di est possible route, to the Stabigotten rect the battle from there. Great tension Grieslienen Line (northeastward of Hohen prevailed in the Army Staff Headquarters. stein). They were entirely in the dark as to the enemy's purpose at Allenstein. This group The final encirclement on the part of still had complete freedom of action. the Germans ended in the we 11-known result. The Russian Ill! and XV Army Corps,as well At 0800 hours radiograms of the Russian as large portions of the XX:III Corps, were XIII Corps disclosed that it was marching captured and forced to lay down their wea from Allenstein southward to Hohenstein, pons. and that its vanguard would arrive at 1200 hours in Griealienen, five kilometers Even while the battle against the Rus north of Hohenstein. Its purpose was to sian Second Army was still at its height, lend the XV Army Corps a hand. the attention of the Germana was called to the pending operations against the Niemen On the basis of this knowledge, the or Army. On the 28th a Russian radiogram an der was immediately sent by airplane to nounced that the II Corps (left flank the German Corps of I Reserve Translated from orisinal German materials lly the !Army) Corps to was to be proceed at Dr. Ray W. Pettensi II gin the re all speed, treat to- September 1952 7 Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-30-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a REF. ID:A59218' 'lilard the frontier and be transported by loving days." Ludendorf'f' forgot that railroad. Thia transportation, however, there was not only "one" radiogram but did not take place. several dozen which were intercepted dur ing the course of operations and which re Early in the morning of 29 August, an vealed the situation of the enemy. incomplete radiogram was intercepted,which stated as follows: Hindenburg himself, in his book, "Aus meinem Leben," which appeared in September Because of heavy battles of Second Army 1919, did not devote even one word to the Command orders supporting reenforcements •• radiograms ; on the contrary, he described and advance of cavalry to •• " the course of the Battle of Tannenberg wi1h the definite emphasis that he was in the (General Rennenkempf had received orders dark as to the enemy's objectives and or on the morning of 28 August to proceed ganization. with his left flank to the support of the Second Army. This radiogram was apparent The Russian General Danilov spoke of an ly an order of Rennenkempf to one of his "unpardonable negligence" in the Russian Army Corps. A later radiogram, however, radio service, and declared that the im interrupted the advance march a.gain.) perfect communication service had been the chief reason for the catastrophic outcome The above-cited radiogram confirmed what of the battle. they had been e:x-pecting in the German Eighth Army Staff Headquarters. During The German Archives publication declares: the night of the 29th a number of radio " ••••• On the who le the German Army Command grams were again intercepted which men viewed the intercepted radiograms as an tioned the encirclement of Koenigsberg extremely welcome source of intelligence. from the south. On the morning of the 30th The Army Staff Headquarters, because of one such radiogram communicated that the them, was temporarily,and even immediately head of the Russian II Army Corps on his before the beginning of the B~ttle of Tan countermarch (which thus had been ordered nenberg, advised of the objectives of the for a second time) was to demolish com enemy in a way such as happens only seldom pletely the railroads and telegraph wires in wartime." And in connection therewith, west of the Koenigsberg-Bastenburg line, the German Archives publication immediately including Korshen and Bastenburg. This strives to save the face of the German last-mentioned radiogram brought it about Command by continuing to say: ''But the that the German Eighth Army Staff Head critical decisions and orders for the bat quarters could now devote further atten tle according to the unanimous statements tion to the remnants of Samsonov's Army. of all participants were made independ ently of the information which became known All these Russian radiograms were in on the morning of 25 August through the tercepted by the German garrison radio radiograms. One cannot assume that with stations at Thorn and Koenigsberg, which out these radiograms the course of the were we 11 behind the German lines, but battle would have been different." also in part by the radio stations of the Eighth Army Staff, and were immediately To this one can only reply: the general translated and transmitted to the German has not yet been born, who after winning a Army Command. The German Command there battle, would admit that he had won it fore knew not only the strength and organ thanks to a well-functioning intelligence ization of the enemy, but also his objec service. Since the victory at Tannenberg tives. had become a symbol for Germany, the "un animous statements of all participants" should not of course be any different. Un It is very interesting to note how dif doubtedly the dispositions for the battle ferently the importance of these intercep were made before the first radiograms were ted Russian radiograms was estimated in tre intercepted. But <luring the course of the 'postwar period. Ludendorff mentioned this battle the knowledge of the contents of fact very casually in a subordinate sen the intercepted radiograms played a de tence: " ••• ·•• we had received an interce"Pt oi sive role. The development of the bat ed enemy telegram which gave us a clear tle without these radiograms would very picture of the enemy's moves for the fol- definitely have been entirely different. 8 ASA Review REF ID:A59218 Now we shall try to find out why the Russians sent their communications in plafn text. To use plain text for such tmpor tant communications as the two radiograms of 28 August was a mistake of the gravest kind. However, when one examines the cir cumstances on the aide of the Russians, one obtains a picture which gives the ex -planation for it. The Russian communica tion system operated very imperfectly dur int the battle. As a result, the army orders for the staff corps at the front arrived too late. Many times these did not receive their orders until about 1000 hours of the same day on which the orders were effective; under such circumstances the troo-ps could not begin to enter action in the designated formation until almost noon. Very seldom 'W'ere there tale-phone connections, which was -partly due to the ~ !f Tpn•t•"I~ fact that there 'W'ere insufficient cables. o 10 to )' "° I• For this reason, where there were radio Sula i NilH stations, these were preferred for the moved toward the south where the German case between the army leaders and the army attack was in progress. Since no troop corps. contingents were available to hold this large enemy reserve, the German E1ghth A:rm.y Staff Headquarters resorted to stra The radiogram of General Samsonov to the tegy. In the forenoon of 7 September, the XIII A:rm.y Cor-ps at 0600 hours, 25 August radio station at Koenigsberg sent a radio was of an urgent nature since it pertained gram in plain text as follows: to the operations for the same day. It was sent as a priority message. There were "To the Corps Chief, no wire connections. One can assume that Guard Corpe, time did not permit the enci-pherment of Priority telegram. this message; in the last analysis, how Tomorrow the Guard Corps will Join the •.•• ever, the reason seems to be that in the immediately west of Labiau,parts of V A:rm.y XIII Corps no radiograms could be decip unloaded •••• (here follows a series of gar hered; they had no cipher key.

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