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Home , Adolf Hitler, Arms industry in Romania, Army Group South, Axis Powers, December 1940, Der Angriff

The German Military Mission to , 1940–1941

By Richard L. Di Nardo

hen one thinks of security assistance and the train- ing of foreign troops, W Hitler’s is not a country that typically comes to mind. Yet there were two instances in II when Germany did indeed deploy troops to other countries that were in noncombat cir- cumstances. The countries in question were and Romania, and the German mili- tary mission to Romania is the subject of this article. The activities of the German mission to Romania are discussed and analyzed, and some conclusions and hopefully a few take- aways are offered that could be relevant for military professionals today.

Creation of the Mission The matter of how the German military mission to Romania came into being can be covered relatively quickly. In late 1940, the demanded from Romania the cession of both and Northern . The only advice Germany could give to the Romanian government was to agree to surrender the territory.1 Fearful of further Soviet encroachments, the Roma- nian government made a series of pleas to Germany including a personal appeal from

Wikimedia Commons King Carol II to Hitler for German military assistance in the summer of 1940. Hitler, Finnish Volunteer Battalion of German Waffen-SS return home from front in 1943 however, was not yet willing to undertake such a step. Thus, all Romanian requests were rebuffed with Hitler telling Carol that Romania brought its own problems upon itself by its prior pro-Allied policy. Hitler also

92 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu DiNARDO urged the Romanian government to settle its The next element was the German air German Me 109E, German Hs 112B, and problems with peaceably.2 force mission (Deutsches Mission Romanian IAR 80A fighters. The Having been urged by Hitler to attain in Rümanien, or DLM), commanded by Luft- fleet included German He 111s, French Bloch a peaceful solution, Romania and Hungary waffe Wilhelm Speidel. 210s and Potez 63s, Italian SM 84s, Polish then asked Hitler and ’s The final part of the military mission was the PZL 37Bs, and Romanian IAR 37s. The to act as arbitrators in their dispute over the mission, headed by used several of their own aircraft contested of .3 Much to W. Tillesen.7 This article looks at the activi- models for reconnaissance as well as British Romania’s chagrin, however, Hitler and Mus- ties of the DLM to a small degree, but the Blenheims. Under these circumstances, the solini tried to split the difference but in Hun- major focus will be on the DHM. best the were able to do was to gary’s favor. On , 1940, Germany, Hitler laid out the chains of command train ground troops extensively in aircraft Italy, Hungary, and Romania signed the for the elements of the German military identification and make sure the Romanians Second Award. By the terms of that mission in his directive of 10, 1940. received British aircraft and parts captured in agreement, Romania had to cede about half Each service mission traced its administra- in 1941.10 of Transylvania to Hungary.4 tive chain of command to its respective The territorial losses incurred during headquarters in Germany. Hansen, as head The DHM and Romanian the summer of 1940 caused considerable of the military mission, would decide matters The major effort in Romania was made political instability in Romania. The Second of common concern. Political matters would by the mission, the DHM, Vienna Award, coming after Romania’s be turned over to the German minister in first commanded by Hansen and later by agreeing to conduct a pro-Axis foreign Romania, who looked after German foreign General Eugen Ritter von Schobert. Aside policy, completed the discrediting of Carol’s policy interests there.8 from Schobert’s own , the presence of government. Carol appointed Romania’s the DHM would be manifested initially in top military leader, General Ion , as prime minister on September 4, 1940. Antonescu promptly forced Carol’s abdica- with Antonescu’s ascension to power, the relationship between tion on , with exile following Germany and Romania warmed considerably soon thereafter. The now vacant Romanian throne was then occupied by King Michael, a callow youth of 19, while Antonescu assumed The DLM and the Aerial Defense of the form of a -size unit. At first, this dictatorial powers and the title of “Leader,” Romania was to be Friedrich Wilhelm von Rothkirch’s much in keeping with his Nazi and The DLM had two principal missions. und Panthen’s 13th Motorized Divi- colleagues.5 The first was to create air defenses around the sion, but was later expanded to include Hans With Antonescu’s ascension to power, vital oil of Romania in the vicinity of Valentin Hube’s 16th Panzer Division as well. the relationship between Germany and Ploesti and the Sea port of Constanta. Several infantry divisions were added in the Romania warmed considerably. Antonescu Also involved was the regulation of air space course of 1941 as German plans first for the began by promising closer collaboration with over the defended areas. The second mission invasion of and later the Soviet Union Germany. He also renewed the request for was to modernize the Romanian . took shape.11 German military assistance, with the idea The DLM was successful in completing Like the DLM, the DHM had two mis- of having Germans train and reorganize the the first mission. Speidel and his staff were sions. Aside from the training mission, the Romanian army. This time, Hitler agreed able to use both Romanian and German German units were to assist the Romanian and on September 19, 1940, he decided to materiel and procedures to make Ploesti one force in erecting defenses against a possible send a military mission to Romania. The of the most heavily defended targets against Soviet invasion, although the mere presence improvement in relations would culminate air attacks. This was to prove invaluable in of German units in Romania did act as a on November 23, 1940, with Romania’s the initial Romanian participation in Opera- guarantee against further Soviet encroach- adherence to the .6 tion Barbarossa. Between late June and mid- ments. The second mission was to train the To be precise, Germany actually sent October 1941, Ploesti and Constanta were Romanian army up to a level that was as close four missions to Romania. The umbrella attacked 91 times by Soviet aircraft. Led by to German standards as possible. These units organization was the German military the efforts of the Luftwaffe’s Jagd Geschwader would play a part in the invasion of the Soviet mission, commanded by Army General Erik 52, the combined Romanian-German defense Union. Hitler had distinctly mentioned Hansen, who was also the military attaché brought down some 81 Soviet aircraft.9 this in his 5, 1940, speech to the to . Hansen also commanded the Modernizing the heads of the . Both Finland and German army mission (Deutsches Heeres proved a bridge too far for the DLM to travel. Romania are mentioned as possible allies in Mission in Rümanien, or DHM) to Romania. Bringing the air force up to date assumed the execution of in growing importance for Germany as Roma- Hitler’s first official directive on the subject nian participation in Barbarossa became a issued , 1940.12 Richard L. DiNardo is Professor of National Security certainty. The most notable problem was The DHM’s ability to carry out its Affairs at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff the veritable plethora of aircraft used by the training mission was hampered by several College in Quantico, Virginia. Romanian air force. This mélange included factors outside of its control. The first was an ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 93 RECALL | The German Military Mission to Romania earthquake that struck Romania on the Aside from these problems, lowed by Himmler’s recall of all SS officials of November 9–10, 1940. German soldiers in members of the German military mission from Romania.18 the 13th Motorized Infantry Division found in Romania, especially in the DHM, had As these problems were dealt with by themselves in the unaccustomed position of to avoid stepping into the minefield of Germans or Romanians or both, the DHM rendering humanitarian assistance to Roma- ethnic minority . For the DHM, got on with the business of training the nian civil authorities, which did yield some this centered around the Romanian army. Training was conducted at dividends in terms of goodwill.13 (ethnic German) community in Romania. the tactical and operational levels, at least in a The second factor that disrupted Like all ethnic German communities in theoretical sense. There was also an ideologi- DHM activity was the tension between the that part of , the Volksdeutsche in cal aspect to the training. Antonescu government and Romania’s contri- Romania had major connections to the Tactically, set up training bution to , the . By , and the Nazis had newspapers centers for the Romanian 5th, 6th, 13th, 18th, and 1941, Antonescu decided that cooperation and political organizations in Romania. 20th infantry divisions as well as for the Roma- between his government and the leader of the Not surprisingly, nian Panzer Division. These centers aimed at Iron Guard, , was no longer pos- newspapers ran articles welcoming the training Romanian soldiers in both German sible and that the Iron Guard would have to be German military presence.17 and tactics. Later on in the spring of dealt with decisively. For his part, although he A sticky issue for the DHM was the 1941, the Germans extended the training in a had more affinity ideologically with the Iron fact that the Volksdeutsche in Romania limited way to .19 They also sought to Guard, Hitler decided that Antonescu was a were subject to and service improve the quality of Romanian general offi- much more reliable ally with whom to deal. in the Romanian army, which they were cers through education. The DHM set up the The result was the suppression of the Iron resistant to for a variety of reasons. Matters equivalent of the German Kriegsakademie in Guard by the Romanian army, in some cases were made more complex by the pres- Romania. All aspirants for rank with German support. Horia Sima and some ence of the (SS) recruiters in were to take a 2-year course of instruction. of his principal followers fled to Germany, Romania who were eagerly seeking ever Like its German counterpart, the Romanian where they were offered safe haven.14 more members for ’s war college was tactically oriented and focused Third, DHM efforts were interrupted expanding SS empire. The Romanians on division-sized operations. The course was by the German and naturally objected because they sought also aimed at producing officers who could Greece, an operation that had to be mounted this manpower for their own army, and undertake all staff and administrative func- from Romania. The German High Command avoiding in Romania was tions associated with division and had already indicated to Antonescu that some in fact a crime. Both issues were eventu- operations. A course was also set up for 500,000 German troops slated for the inva- ally solved. When a local Volksdeutsche general officers and older staff officers as well, sion of Greece would pass through Romania. leader, Fromm, came to Hans lasting from 1 to 3 months.20 While the troops would be under the tactical command of Field , the Twelfth Army commander, List would be sub- like its German counterpart, the Romanian war college was ordinate to the head of the DHM for the pur- tactically oriented and focused on division-sized operations poses of the preparation and conduct of the Twelfth Army’s passage. As head of the DHM, Hansen would keep Romanian headquarters Valentin Hube on January 28, 1941, he As might be expected of such an effort informed of the army’s progress.15 complained about Romanian conscription mounted by a country such as , Since there were large numbers of and recounted all manner of mistreatment there was the previously mentioned ideo- German troops passing through Romanian of Volksdeutsche by Romanian authorities. logical component to DHM activities. In a territory, the DHM also had to negoti- Hube sidestepped Fromm’s complaints situation report, Hube noted that, in addition ate a status-of-forces agreement with the first by expressing skepticism of his tales to the need for measures to be taken against Romanian government. German troops of Romanian mistreatment, and then got corruption in the officer corps, friendly were instructed not to buy too many goods around the conscription issue by telling attitudes toward and the from the Romanians, especially items from Fromm that service in the Romanian army had to be eliminated. To aid this, German the countryside, since it would weaken the was also service to the Führer. The activities was disseminated that found a Romanian economy. Romania was already of Himmler’s SS recruiters were also curbed degree of receptivity in Romania, although paying for the two initial instruction units after the SS was able to recruit about 1,000 not as much as the Germans hoped.21 that would conduct the training of its army men from the Romanian Volksdeutsche. The various endeavors of the DHM for the DHM. German soldiers were told to The German minister to Romania, Manfred brought about a record of mixed success. The present as friendly a face to the Romanians Killinger, wrote to Himmler that if so many biggest problem the DHM had was a lack of as possible and to help the Romanian people young German men were removed from time. Given all of the issues discussed above when circumstances required. Finally, train- Romania, the remaining female - and the ever-looming onset of Operation ing of the Romanian army by the DHM was deutsche in Romania would have no choice Barbarossa, the DHM had at best 4 months set back by the hard winter of 1940–1941, but to marry Romanians, thus polluting to train with the Romanians before they especially in .16 German blood lines. This was fol- would be committed to combat against the

94 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu DiNARDO

Soviets.22 This was particularly important The final problem faced by the DHM Italian, Russian, Czech, Romanian, and Aus- regarding the issue of mindset. During the in conducting its activities was lack of trian artillery pieces, all of varying calibers. , Romania’s closest ally had standardization in the Romanian army. Although the Romanian army tried to miti- been . Naturally, such a relationship Like many of the in that part of the gate this situation by minimizing the number had a military component. Romanian officers world, Romania did not have an armaments of different weapons allocated to specific attended French schools, and, institutionally, industry sufficient to equip the army by itself. divisions, the lack of standardization made the Romanian army was greatly influenced To make up the difference, the army made training difficult.27 by French doctrine and thinking. If it proved all manner of weapons purchases. The result difficult to get more senior Romanian offi- was that by the time the German military The Test of Combat cers to abandon what the Germans saw as the mission arrived in Romania, the Romanian The ultimate outcome of DHM activi- overly “schematic” and methodical was using a bewildering variety of ties was the record of the Romanian army in approach to combat operations, the younger weapons including Czech, Russian, French, combat. In this regard, the Romanian record officers, in contrast, proved more receptive to and Austrian rifles; French, Russian, and was mixed. Broadly put, Romanian participa- German concepts and doctrine.23 Czech machineguns; and German, French, tion in Barbarossa could be divided into two A major problem faced by the DHM involved the lack of interpreters. To be sure, the mastery of a foreign language was a requirement for graduation from the Krieg- sakademie. The vast majority of German officers who studied a foreign language gen- erally gravitated toward French or English. German Federal Archive In 1932, for example, a language examination was administered by Wehrkreis (Military District) III in . Some 178 officers took examinations, the great majority of which were in French or English. Only 34 took the examination in Russian, and no one took it in Romanian. Examinations administered by the Luftwaffe showed a somewhat wider variation, but again Romanian was well down on the list.24 Consequently, the German divisions with the DHM had relatively few inter- preters available to provide instruction and training to the Romanians. The 16th Panzer Division, for example, had only two interpreters on its staff, a wholly inadequate number given the tasks set for the unit. The Romanians did not have the resources to make up the shortfall. They were able to provide only one interpreter to the German 170th Infantry Division.25 Another major problem the Germans saw in trying to train the Romanian army was the lack of a professional noncommis- sioned officer (NCO) corps able to carry out its responsibilities. In the German army, the day-to-day conduct of training and, indeed, the daily running of the army at the lowest levels were often left to its NCOs and junior officers. In the Romanian army, however, such positions were not held in the same degree of esteem. In the eyes of DHM liaison officers, too many Romanian NCOs looked upon their positions as chances for personal monetary gain.26 with in , , 1941

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 95 RECALL | The German Military Mission to Romania phases. The first phase extended from the start which was also operating on that part of the by the fact that liaison staffs were small. An of the invasion on , 1941, up through front, thanks to the efforts of German liaison army-level liaison staff, headed by a general the first week of July. During this time, the officers with both formations.32 officer, usually did not exceed 18 members, Romanian army was tasked by Hitler to The siege of proved long and while a corps-liaison staff, normally led by a defend the Pruth and then gain some costly to the Romanians. The Soviet High , would be no more than 10. Division bridgeheads across it. The army would also Command was able to keep and brigade staffs were tiny, consisting of no defend the Romanian oil-producing areas Coastal Army, garrisoning Odessa, supplied by more than an officer, a major or even a , and the port of Constanta.28 The sea. That allowed the garrison to conduct an plus an interpreter and a driver. This made it second phase of the Romanian army’s part in active and energetic defense. Several successful difficult for liaison officers to be absent from the invasion would begin with the crossing Soviet sorties forced the to fight their units for any length of time, whether for of the Dniestr River once Army South repeatedly over the same ground in bloody official or personal business.34 In addition, it penetrated the Soviet defenses to the north. assaults. It was only after the Romanians did not take into account the fact that liaison Ultimately, the army would advance across officers, like other beings, were subject the Dniestr and Bug into what would to problems such as sickness or sheer exhaus- become , and the Romanians tion. The difficulties associated with the small would eventually besiege and finally occupy size of German liaison staffs mirror the com- the port of Odessa on October 16, 1941.29 plaints of many involved with Mobile Training Radu Mihai Crisan Since the main Romanian effort was Team efforts in during the 2005–2008 to be made by General Petre Dumitrescu’s timeframe and more recently in .35 Romanian , Romanian head- The structure of liaison teams is also quarters concentrated the majority of an issue. Some current critics, such as T.X. divisions that had German training under Hammes, suggest that the Army replace Dumitrescu’s command. In addition, field-grade officers on staffs with skilled the German-trained divisions enjoyed a and professional NCOs. This would allow greater degree of standardization in terms company-grade officers to spend more time of weapons and equipment. For the basic at the company level, and reduce the number small arm, for example, these divisions used of field-grade officers. At the same time, he the Czech 7.92mm rifle, which could take calls for the creation of larger advisory teams German ammunition. Reserve units would to work with allies against fourth- have to make do with the previously noted warfare opponents.36 plethora of Russian-, Austrian-, and French- While Hammes’s call for larger advisory made weapons.30 teams is correct, the German experience In the first phase of the campaign, detailed above suggests that more officers, not Romanian performance might be regarded as fewer, are needed, especially when it comes to satisfactory. The army was able to accomplish working with foreign partners. Hammes, like its task even though, in a number of places, his German counterparts in the DHM, comes the Romanians’ Soviet opponents were often from a military culture that values the NCO. better armed and equipped. Even Colonel Such was not the case in Romania. German General , the chief of the reports consistently noted that capable Roma- German Army General Staff and no particu- Ion Antonescu nian NCOs were rare. Too often, Romanian lar admirer of Romanian military prowess, NCOs were corrupt and abusive. On the other confessed pleasant surprise at the initial hand, it does seem clear that Romanian offi- performance of the Romanians. The liaison secured key points in the fortress’s defense cers regarded NCOs as not much more than staff with the Romanian 1st Border Division system, combined with the threat of interven- privates who had a bit more rank.37 Getting a thought well enough of the division’s conduct tion by German airpower on a massive scale, military culture to create a professional NCO to submit the names of some 37 members for that the Soviets evacuated the city on October corps where one has not existed previously German military awards.31 15, 1941. Odessa’s occupation marked a clear involves a profound change in mindset, a Things were much tougher in the end of the campaign for what was by that time process that would require great invest- second phase of the 1941 campaign. The an exhausted Romanian army.33 ments of time and patience. This was true in Romanian Third and Fourth Armies were Romania in 1940 and it is just as true today. now required to undertake missions well Takeaways for Today Rank also becomes an issue here. As beyond their normal operational radius. That So what can be drawn from the experi- noted previously, both the German military often left them requiring logistical support ences of the German army mission to Romania culture of II and contemporary from the Germans, who were not always in a that would be of use to today’s military profes- American military culture value the judgment position to deliver it when needed. Dumitres- sional? The first takeaway concerns the size as well as the independence of NCOs and cu’s Third Army narrowly avoided a deadly and composition of liaison staffs. The German relatively junior officers. In other cultures, clash with the Hungarian Mobile Corps, effort in this regard was consistently hindered this is not the case. In Germany, sending rela-

96 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu DiNARDO tively lower-ranking officers to units as liaison continue to impact our efforts in a negative 9 Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), officers was at times regarded as an insult by sense, and it will not yield to the type of quick “Defense of Constanza and Oil Area,” February the commanders of those units, who believed fix so desired by both American military 20, 1941, Bundesarchiv-Militäarchiv File 2 II/271, Freiburg, Germany (hereafter cited as BA-MA); that their status demanded that they deal with culture and the broader society it represents. Deutsches Luftwaffe Mission in Rümanien (DLM), a liaison officer of higher rank.38 This is still The experience of the German “Report on the Defense of the Romanian Oil true today, and using short-term expedients military mission to Romania holds a good Area,” , 1941, BA-MA RL 9/62; such as frocking NCOs with field-grade ranks many lessons useful for today’s military DLM, “Defended Air Space in Romania,” July 16, and sending them out as liaison officers, as we professional. Like so many other events 1941, National Archives Records Administra- did in the , will simply not do. from history, when placed in the context tion, Microfilm Series T-405, Roll 49, Frame 4888173, College Park, MD (hereafter cited as NARA T-405/49/4888173); and Alexander Statiev, the German effort was consistently hindered by the “Antonescu’s Eagles Against Stalin’s Falcons: The fact that liaison staffs were small Romanian Air Force, 1920–1941,” The Journal of 66, no. 4 (October 2002), 1102. 10 Statiev, 1094; and DLM to Luftwaffe High A third takeaway concerns language. of contemporary events, the story of the Command, “Yugoslavian Booty for Romania,” July As noted previously, German officers who German mission once again shows the 5, 1941, NARA T-405/49/4888254. were attendees of the Kriegsakademie were wisdom of William Shakespeare’s words 11 DGFP, vol. XI, no. 80, 136; Deutsches Heeres required to study a foreign language. The carved outside of the National Archives in Mission in Rümanien (DHM), “Build-Up and vast majority of them, however, took French , DC, “What Is Past Is Prologue.” Action of the Romanian Army Since the Start of or English, the foreign languages they were JFQ the German Army Mission,” January 18, 1942, most familiar with and had probably already NARA T-501/269/000069; and Förster, 337. had some knowledge of from their days as 12 DGFP, vol. XI, no. 532, 900; and Förster, 338. students in the German educational system. Nos te 13 DHM, “Build-Up and Action of the Roma- French and English were also, as the biog- nian Army”; DGFP, vol. XI, no. 84, 145; DHM, 1 Documents on German Foreign Policy rapher of one of Germany’s most successful “Order of the Day No. 4,” November 12, 1940, 1918–1945 (Washington, DC: Government Print- field commanders noted, the languages of NARA T-501/272/000418; and DiNardo, 98. ing Office, 1949–1956), Series D, vol. X, document 14 DGFP, vol. XI, nos. 9, 652 and 691, 11, Germany’s two most likely enemies. This had no. 28, 27–28. Hereafter cited as DGFP, vol. X, no. 1090–1091 and 1169, respectively; and Förster, 339. also been the case for an extended time.39 27, 27–28. Unless otherwise noted, all references to 15 DGFP, vol. XI, no. 664, 1114; and Oberkom- Not much thought, however, had DGFP are from Series D. mondo des Heeres (OKH), “Instructions on 2 apparently been given to training people in DGFP, vol. X, nos. 51, 56, 80, and 171, 52–53, Command Relationships in Romania,” December the languages of those countries that might 58, 91, and 218–219, respectively. 28, 1940, BA-MA RL 2 II/271. 3 be allies. Thus, while cultural and historical Romania was awarded Transylvania as part 16 OKW, “Instructions for the Behavior of factors alleviated a need for the Germans to of the in 1919. Prior to that, German Soldiers in Romania,” January 11, 1941, have interpreters when dealing with the Finns Transylvania was part of the dual monarchy of NARA T-501/281/000230; Förster, 338; and DHM, -Hungary. “Build-Up and Action of the Romanian Army.” and , the Romanians and 4 DGFP, vol. X, no. 413, 583. The First Vienna 17 were another story.40 Consequently, Germany, See, for example, the Banater Deutsche Award was allocated on November 2, 1938, when Zeitung, December 14, 1940, NARA especially the army, found itself consistently Hungary was given a piece of the rump Slovak T-315/680/000045. short of Romanian and Italian interpreters. state that had survived the . See 18 German 16th Panzer Division, “Partial Complaining that the allies were not doing Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Record of Conversation Between Gauleiter Fromm their parts, as the Germans did in regard to Germany, vol. 2 (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humani- and General Hube,” January 28, 1941, NARA the Romanians, although gratifying emotion- ties Press, 1994), 472. T-315/680/000088; DGFP, vol. XII, no. 258, 444; 5 ally, was not a solution to the problem.41 DGFP, vol. X, no. 57, 60; Mark Axworthy, and “Killinger to Himmler,” , 1941, Solving the problem of language, especially Cornel Scafes, and Cristian Craciunoiu, Third Axis/ NARA T-175/128/2653688. the more difficult ones, again requires Fourth Ally: in the - 19 DHM, “Build-Up and Action of the a long-term attempt at a solution, while pean War, 1941–1945 (: Arms and Armor Romanian Army”; DHM, “Course of Instruction Press, 1995), 23; and Richard L. DiNardo, Germany understanding that the problem may remain for Romanian Artillery Officers,” , 1941, and the : From Coalition to Collapse insoluble. Providing language instruction NARA T-315/1516/000402; and Artillery Com- (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 96. mander 20, “Report on the Establishing of Liaison to field-grade officers at intermediate-level 6 Franz Halder, The Halder Diaries, vol. 4 with the Romanian II Corps and the Romanian professional military education institutions, (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal, 1950), 201; 10th Division on 21/22 ,” , 1941, as the U.S. military has been doing over the DGFP, vol. XI, nos. 19 and 80, 25 and 136–137, NARA T-501/275/000329. past few years, frankly yields too little return respectively; Jürgen Förster, “Die Gewinnung von 20 DHM, “Build-Up and Action of the Roma- for the size of the investment made. A longer Verbündeten in Südosteuropa,” Das Deutsche nian Army”; DHM, “Handbook for German term solution would be to improve the type Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, vol. 4, Trainers in Romania,” September 23, 1942, NARA of education in language afforded students in auf die Sowjetunion (: Deutsche Verlags T-501/286/000522; and Chief of the General Staff the education system generally, but this is too Anstalt, 1983), 338. of the DHM, “Training of General Officers,” Feb- 7 problematic to ensure the desired outcome. Axworthy, Scafes, and Craciunoiu, 26. ruary 1, 1941, NARA T-581/281/000216. 8 DGFP, vol. XI, no. 171, 281–282. In short, the issue of language will most likely ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 97 RECALL | The German Military Mission to Romania

21 Commander of Training Staff II to DHM, Headquarters, “Final Report of the German 13th “Situation Report,” , 1941, NARA Liaison Headquarters,” October 29, 1941, NARA T-315/680/000134; and Radu Ioanid, The Sword T-501/275/000706; Halder, 214; and German of the Archangel: Fascist Ideology in Romania 37th Liaison Command to German 2nd Liaison (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1990), Command, “German Awards for Romanian NEW 193–194. 1st Border Division,” , 1941, NARA from NDU Press 22 Adolph Hitler’s initial military directive T-501/280/000854. for the made it quite clear that the invasion of the Soviet 32 “Inspection Report of Major (General Center for Strategic Research Union would involve Romanian participation. Staff) Stephanus of 25 and 26 July 1941 to German Institute for National Strategic Studies DGFP, vol. XI, no. 532, 900. XXX and XI Corps, Romanian Third Army,” July 23 DHM, “Build-Up and Action of the 26, 1941, NARA T-312/359/7933496; Romanian Romanian Army”; German 13th Liaison Third Army to German Quar- Command, “Final Report of the German 13th termaster, “Memo on Supply of Romanian Third Liaison Command,” October 29, 1941, NARA Army East of the Bug River,” August 21, 1941, Strategic Perspectives, No. 12 T-501/275/000706; and DHM, “Report and Map NARA T-312/354/7927680; and “Dumitrescu to Annexes of the German 2nd Liaison Command German Eleventh Army,” , 1941, NARA James J. Przystup’s on the Campaign of the Romanian Fourth Army,” T-312/360/7934785. 33 - Rela- Strategic PerSPectiveS October 25, 1941, NARA T-501/275/000605. Hitler’s Table Talk 1941–1944, trans. 12 Japan-China Relations 2005–2010: 24 tions 2005–2010: Managing Between a Rock and a Hard Place Wehrkreis III Foreign Language Examina- and R.H. Stevens (: An Interpretative Essay Managing Between by James J. Przystup tion (Oral), Berlin, October 7, 1932, Nachlass Enigma Books, 2000), 66; and DHM, “Build-Up a Rock and a Hard Freytag von Loringhoven, BA-MA N 362/1; James and Action of the Romanian Army.” Place, An Interpreta- S. Corum, The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational 34 DiNardo, 105; and “Second German Liaison tive Essay, examines Air War, 1918–1940 (Lawrence: University Press of Command to Subordinate Liaison Commands, the metafactors Kansas, 1997), 253; and DiNardo, 21. Official Operation of German Liaison Com- 25 th Center for Strategic Research German 16 Panzer Division, “List of Offi- mands,” July 30, 1941, NARA T-501/280/000971. shaping the China- Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Japan relationship: cers for the Staff of the 16th Panzer Division from 1 35 This is an observation made to the author by the rise of China, November–11 ,” , 1940, one of his students, an Army major with consider- a competition for regional leadership within NARA T-315/680/000013; and DHM, “Course of able experience in this duty. a shifting balance of power, and history. At the Instruction for Romanian Artillery Officers,” May 36 Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the strategic level, there is intense, but quiet politi- 12, 1941, NARA T-315/1516/000402. Stone: On War in the (St. , MN: cal competition for the mantle of leadership in 26 Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: Zenith Press, 2004), 244, 264–265. the Asia-Pacific region. The author discusses German and US Army Performance, 1939–1945 37 German 13th Liaison Headquarters, “Final the increasing integration of the two econo- (Westport: CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 121–123; Report of the German 13th Liaison Headquarters,” mies—for example, within Japan’s business DHM, “Build-Up and Action of the Romanian October 29, 1941, NARA T-501/275/000706; community, the China boom is widely recog- Army”; and Commander of Training Staff II of the DHM, Build-Up and Action of the Romanian nized as the driving force behind Japan’s recov- DHM in Romania, “Situation Report,” February 7, Army”; and DHM, “Handbook for German Train- ery from its “lost decade” in the 1990s. Nev- 1941, NARA T-315/680/000134. ers in Romania,” September 23, 1942, NARA ertheless, the Japan-China relationship is also 27 OKH, Foreign Armies East, Taschenbuch T-501/286/000522. marked by a number of combustible political Rümanisches Heer, , NARA 38 An excellent example of this comes from issues including conflicting territorial claims, a T-501/281/000004; and German Liaison Staff the German experience working with the Italians disputed maritime boundary in the East China with the Romanian I Mountain Corps and the in . See German Liaison Officer to Sea, and security anxieties in both countries. Romanian 4th Mountain Brigade to the Chief of the Italian Fifth Air Fleet, “Report of Liaison Officer Moreover, highly nationalistic, zero-sum issues General Staff of the DHM, , 1941, NARA to Italian Fifth Air Fleet in North Africa to Com- relating to sovereignty, such as the September T-501/275/000284. manding General of German X Air Corps,” May 2010 Senkaku incident, have the potential to 28 DGFP, vol. XII, nos. 614 and 644, 1004–1005 19, 1941, BA-MA RL 2 II/38; and DiNardo, 62. derail the relationship at significant cost to both and 1048, respectively. 39 Wehrkreis III Foreign Language Examina- nations. These issues must be managed with 29 DGFP, vol. XI, no. 532, 901; Friedrich tions; and Charles Messenger, The Last Prussian: care if Sino-Japanese relations are to reach their Forstmeier, Odessa 1941: Der Kampf um Stadt und A Biography of full potential. Hafen und der Räumung der Seefestung 15 August 1875–1953 (London: Brassey’s, 1991), 13. bis 16 Oktober 1941 (Freiburg: Verlag Rombach, 40 German was taught as a in 1967), 18; and DiNardo, 112. the Finnish school system from early on, while all 30 DHM, “Build-Up and Action of the officers who graduated from the Hungarian General Romanian Army”; OKH, Foreign Armies East, Staff College had to know German since about Taschenbuch Rümanisches Heer, February 1940, half of the school library books were in German. NARA T-501/281/000004; and German Liaison DiNardo, 108; and telephone interview with Bela Staff with the Romanian I Mountain Corps and Kiraly, , 1993. Kiraly was a Hungarian the Romanian 4th Mountain Brigade to the Chief officer who served on the eastern front in World War of the General Staff of the DHM, April 23, 1941, II and one of my professors in graduate school. NARA T-501/275/000284. 41 DiNardo, 100; and German 107th Liaison Visit the NDU Press Web site 31 German XXX Corps to German Elev- Command, “Annex to War Diary of German 107th for more information on publications enth Army, “Evening Report,” June 22, 1941, Liaison Command, Experiences,” September 17, at ndupress.ndu.edu NARA T-314/823/000258; German 13th Liaison 1942, NARA T-501/282/000184.

98 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu