Why the Axis Lost

Richard L. DiNardo. Germany and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005. 282 pp. $34.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7006-1412-7. Reviewed by Michael Anklin Published on H-German (July, 2006) Richard L. DiNardo's book will be of great in‐ differently from its sister service" (p. 192). The terest to military and other historians, as well as Luftwaffe, the German army and the navy all op‐ the general public. Interest in World War II and erated along different lines. In DiNardo's view, the especially Nazi Germany's war conduct remains navy was the most successful and the army failed at an all-time high. Some consensus on why the most miserably in their conduct of coalition war‐ Allies won and the Axis lost has been reached in fare (p. 192). Among the problems preventing the the wake of an innumerable quantity of studies. It successful execution of Axis coalition warfare is clear, for example, that the United States simply were unnecessarily complex command struc‐ outproduced the Axis and that the sacrifice of the tures, the often arrogant attitude (with some ex‐ Red Army contributed significantly to the Allied ceptions) of Germans toward their allies and the victory.[1] However, numerous details and ques‐ failure of Germany to share military technology tions remain open to debate. DiNardo addresses appropriately with partners. The outcome was of‐ such an issue: Nazi Germany's method of conduct‐ ten the fghting of "parallel wars," which severely ing coalition warfare. DiNardo skillfully dissects weakened the overall war effort. the structure of the Axis coalition forces during DiNardo's study starts with a welcome inves‐ World War II and presents a detailed analysis of tigation of Germany's experience with coalition Germany's fawed relationship with its European warfare before World War II, in a chapter reach‐ military allies. ing all the way back to 1740. He then proceeds to DiNardo agrees with Jürgen Förster that the discuss Hitler and Mussolini's relationship and its Axis was "hardly a coalition at all," but comes to repercussions for coalition warfare. The remain‐ what he calls "a slightly more nuanced conclu‐ ing chapters are dedicated to a meticulous explo‐ sion" (p. 192). The main reason for the failure of ration of Axis war conduct in terms of coalition Axis strategy, according to DiNardo, was "that warfare in North Africa, the Balkans and the Sovi‐ each service conducted coalition warfare a little et Union. DiNardo's description of the war in H-Net Reviews North Africa is especially rewarding. He skillfully For instance: one of the most interesting and synthesizes older and newer scholarship and adds perhaps seemingly straightforward problems the interesting details to provide a clearer picture of members of the Axis encountered was the prob‐ the situation. At times the anecdotal nature of his lem of language. Rarely did German officers speak descriptions provides amusing details. When Italy the languages necessary to enable smooth mili‐ presented a list of supplies it would need to fght tary cooperation. DiNardo provides an interesting alongside the Reich--including seven million tons discussion of the Kriegsakademie, where officers of oil and two million tons of steel--Mussolini's could choose from a variety of languages. Most foreign minister Ciano noted in his diary that the preferred English to French, and most never list was "enough to kill a bull--if a bull could read learned Spanish, Italian or Romanian. This omis‐ it" (p. 32). DiNardo presents a wealth of other de‐ sion led to all sorts of impasses during the war. tails that will interest professional historians and Toward the end of the war, the Germans fnally laypeople alike. Some are well-known; others add introduced a German-Italian military dictionary. to our understanding of the history of German Such details are important; however, they open war conduct. For example, DiNardo reminds us up further questions. After all, translation in‐ what a rampant antisemite Kaiser Wilhelm II was. volves much more than fnding the equivalent of This attitude affected his willingness to cooperate a set of words in another language. The cultural with Austria-Hungary, which he considered context of language determines much of its mean‐ "racially corrupt" (p. 17). Decades after the ing. A discussion of this problematic in the con‐ Kaiser's doomed coalition, Germany was prepar‐ text of coalition warfare would have been inter‐ ing secretly to fght again. DiNardo tells the inter‐ esting to read. esting but little-known story of the emerging co‐ Furthermore, although DiNardo's frst chap‐ operation between the Luftwaffe (at that point ter on nineteenth-century and World War I Ger‐ still a secret) and the Italian Regia Aeronautica in man coalition warfare is enlightening, it falls the early 1930s. Göring frst traveled to Rome in short. When he proceeds to discuss "Hitler, Diplo‐ 1931 and became close friends with Italian Air macy, and Coalition Warfare" in chapter 2, there Marshall Italo Balbo. The two worked out plans to is somewhat of a discontinuity between the two train Luftwaffe pilots in Italy secretly. chapters. This is partially due to the fact, as Di‐ Despite and sometimes because of details Nardo explains, that coalition warfare was rarely such as these, DiNardo's book works best when discussed among the German military establish‐ used as one source among many about Hitler, ment during the interwar years. This fact in itself Nazi Germany and World War II. The book's nar‐ is intriguing, and one wonders whether a more row focus on coalition warfare makes it a splen‐ in-depth discussion of German military culture in did work for military historians and for readers the interwar years would not have been benefi‐ already very familiar with details about World cial here. In other words, did the devastating de‐ War II. Those who expect more are likely to be feat in World War I and the fragile republic that disappointed. And in all fairness to the author, Di‐ followed it make the prospect of future coalition Nardo makes it clear at the beginning of his work warfare seem unlikely or undesirable? that he had not set out to write more than a histo‐ DiNardo describes the uneasy alliance be‐ ry of coalition warfare. Nevertheless, throughout tween Germany and Austria-Hungary in World the book, instances occur where one would have War I and the at times devastatingly bad coopera‐ welcomed another paragraph or two elaborating tion between the two powers. If the European al‐ on some of the statements made. liance system--the diplomatic precursor to what 2 H-Net Reviews in the case of war will lead to a coalition ef‐ the Italian people smacked more of Ernst Jünger fort--"forced" Germany to attack frst and led to than the völkisch ideology espoused by Hitler" (p. the faulty execution of the Schlieffen Plan, its fail‐ 25). This judgment certainly seems accurate, but ure and a horrific two-front war, did the idea of deserves to be discussed somewhat more at cooperation with anyone seem highly question‐ length. The ideological differences between Ital‐ able after World War I? To put it differently, did ian Fascism and German National Socialism had the memory and the mourning Jay Winter has de‐ far-reaching repercussions for the two major Axis scribed influence the idea of ever going to war partners, as DiNardo shows. A closer comparison again, much less with unreliable allies? [2] How of the two ideologies would thus have been wel‐ did German World War I veterans view coalition come. DiNardo also mentions how Hitler reacted warfare? Omer Bartov has described the German with "utter contempt" to Mussolini's plan to veteran community after World War I as a present a declaration of war to France in 1940 (p. Kampfgemeinschaft, a "community of struggle," 36). This deeply ideological reaction on Hitler's willing to fght again in the future.[3] Would this part revealed his disgust for adherence to any future struggle be fought in a coalition? Did that conventional (not to mention lawful) conduct of seem desirable? war. This kind of attitude inevitably affected Ger‐ DiNardo of course focuses on generals and many's coalition partners and the manner in other decision makers, and his discussion of the which coalition warfare would be waged. relationships between different axis commanders The Holocaust was of course the gruesome is very enlightening. Ordinary soldiers could not conclusion of Hitler's ideology. Here, too, DiNar‐ have decided whether or not they wanted to fght do's analysis falls short. He does provide very in‐ in a coalition. Yet, the attitude of every single sol‐ teresting information about the widely different dier toward his counterparts in a coalition would degrees to which German allies such as Hungary have affected the success of such efforts. DiNardo and Romania cooperated in the Holocaust. Anoth‐ mentions that Wehrmacht soldiers and officers er interesting detail is the fact that Axis partner were to various degrees committed to Nazi ideolo‐ Finland was not an overtly antisemitic nation and gy. He also writes that the Nazis failed completely even had Jews serving in its military. DiNardo also in terms of ideologically indoctrinating the sol‐ briefly touches on the Odessa Massacre and the diers of their allies. However, he regrettably does tragic and late repercussions of the Holocaust in not go into any more detail than this. How and Hungary. But, again, the book includes no detailed why exactly did they fail, and what were the con‐ discussion about how the Holocaust and its un‐ sequences of the failure? derlying ideology affected coalition warfare.

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