The Commandant’s Introduction

By Michael H. Clemmesen

his issue of the Baltic Defence Re- It seems now to have been generally members seem to have realised this fact. view marks a change in the editorial recognized that the Alliance has to be To succeed, the transformation must line that is symbolised by the changed reformed thoroughly to remain relevant take the alliance forward and change it cover. The adjustment is not only caused to the leading member state. The U.S.A., from being a reactive self-defensive alli- by the fact that the three Baltic states have involved as she is in the drawn-out “War ance. The outlined “new NATO” is a po- succeeded in being invited to NATO as Against Terror” that was forced upon her litically much more demanding, divisive, well as to the EU and now have to adapt by the 11 September 2001 attacks, is not and risky framework for military co-op- to the new situation. It is also based on impressed by the contribution from most eration. Its missions will include opera- the realisation that the two organisations of the European allies. Only a small tions of coercion like the one against will change their character when the inte- progress has been made in the Yugoslavia with regard to Kosovo as well gration of the new members takes place. enhancement of the force structures of as pre-emptive Out-of-NATO area crisis The implementation of the new editorial the European members since the 1999 response operations – military activism line will only come gradually. However, a Kosovo Campaign and the Washington to counter emerging security challenges. third of the articles in this issue fit Summit, in spite of the formal political This does not mean that the basic mission completely within the new framework. agreement at that time. The fact that states of the Alliance disappears completely. As The NATO that the seven newly in- like Germany and the Netherlands have long as NATO is seen as relevant to the vited states are about to join in 2004 is further cut their defence spending makes Americans, Article 5 of the Washington either undergoing a fundamental trans- the requirement for a quick and visible Treaty will still be the foundation of future formation or is heading further towards structural reform even more important. collective defence against an external threat. irrelevance and eventual formal demise. The good news is that the new and invited However, the members of the Alliance are

4 presently convinced that it is highly un- With such a basic change of the secu- states’ development and their military likely that a threat of massive invasion rity environment and the framework for forces. against its area can emerge within the next the three Baltic states, everything that the The Review will, from now onwards, decade. They therefore have the option Baltic Defence College does must be deal with general issues related to the de- to change the focus of their armed forces’ adapted according to these changes. That, velopment of the Alliance, and it will do structure and readiness. They can proceed of course, also applies to its academic jour- so from the new member states’ point of further away from the former focus: de- nal, which has the purpose to reflect and view. terrence by territorial defence backed by inspire the thoughts and actions in the nuclear weapons - within civilian work- three states and to increase the knowledge We will deal with the dilemma facing ing hours. The increased participation in and understanding of the states outside the Baltic states in the further develop- peace support operations in the 1990s the region. ment of their forces. How do you main- could take place without fundamental During its first years of existence the tain the capability to participate in in- changes. The next step cannot. The more focus of the College’s activities was pri- ternational operations with valuable focused and modernised force contribu- marily on building and operation of an niche contributions, and at the same tions agreed on at the Prague Summit will, affordable territorial defence structure, time continue to develop an officer if implemented, be a useful first move, built on mobilisation, mainly using the corps with at least a minimal level of but the first move only. experience of the Nordic NATO mem- understanding of the various elements bers and neutral states. This was in order of their profession? For army officers In relation to the Baltic states one could to counter the argument against Baltic this means both a theoretical as well as argue that where the prevailing opinion NATO membership, especially among the a practical combined arms background in the Alliance used to be that it was Alliance military, that the three states could from at least the lowest tactical militarily impossible to defend their not be defended, even until NATO forces formation, brigade level. Understanding territory against an invasion, the present could come to their assistance. The Baltic of the relations between combat, com- opinion is that defence against invasion Defence Review’s editorial line supported bat support, and combat service sup- of their territory – and the territory of that line with articles about territorial port elements can only be developed if, all other member states – is an irrelevant defence. We also underlined the signifi- as a minimum, one national brigade issue. cant progress that was made in the Baltic structure exists. It is as important as it

5 is for the developing musician to have An area that will remain in focus of other types of musicians to practice the Review is the developments in Russia, with. Belarus and Ukraine, and, from now on, How can the balance between immedi- also increasingly the development on the ate and potential contributions be reached Russian Southern and Eastern borders, in small member states with very limited that eventually are likely to become the resources such as the Baltic countries? How borders of Europe. much of the combined arms structure needs Finally will security issues in other than to be a standing force, on high readiness, a military context be in focus. How should and able to contribute quickly in a balanced the Baltic and other Central and Eastern way to alliance operations? How is it European states proceed with the continu- possible to ensure a proper quality of ing “state building” and transition proc- manning for the force, taking into ess? consideration the problems of “military transition” described elsewhere in this issue? What future role, if any, is there for conscription? What are the possible future fields of the Baltic states’ military co- operation within the Alliance? Is speciali- sation or role sharing an acceptable idea? Another natural field to deal with is the legal, foreign policy, and domestic politic issues and risks that face the small NATO members if and when they follow and participate in an offensive use of a military action that is necessary to keep the Alliance relevant.

6 The Responsive State

By Lars Johannsen*

goals were set by elites who, in splendid autonomy of the state was thus increased The goals achieved isolation, could utilize the ‘extra-ordinary at the outset of the transition, making political capital’1 generated through the the consolidation of democracy and the The political goals set by the Baltic extrication, to carry out reforms in which state dependent on the resurrection of the countries at the time of the independence the state would retreat from its dominat- civil society as well as a gradual in 1992 have been achieved within a ing position and its almost total penetra- understanding by the elite how to decade. A pluralist democracy has been tion of the society. While this is under- cooperate with emerging interests. introduced with the power changing standable given the character of the previ- Theoretically these lines of questioning hands peacefully through several free and ous regime with an excessive governance, follow two trains of thought. First, the fair elections. The sought-after independ- little possibility for individual choice and work of Linz & Stepan5 concerning the ence has been secured by the invitation alternative views on politics2 , and a legacy development of a usable state and to join NATO and all three states have a of a flattened civil society,3 it was almost Przeworski’s6 focus on the generation of market economy today. The achievement forgotten that state retrenchment does not normatively desired policies as of these goals is not least reflected in the need to be the only goal, as the daunting requirements of consolidation and current negotiations to join the European task of change also requires a state that is sustainability of democracy. Second, the Union. capable to steer the process.4 works of Evans,7 Weiss8 and Leftwich,9 While there is much to congratulate One aspect of state’s capabilities is the who point out that in the West European with, it should be recalled that the political balance between state and society and the state type - in contrast to the minimalist * Lars Johannsen, Ph.D, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark

9 liberal state - societal actors are involved through the democratic processes.12 In this in the policy process from formulation perspective democracy is undermined not The value of involving interests to implementation. Thus the state becomes only by the preferential treatment of embedded in society and thereby a interests but also by the misuse of office The majority of the present and developmental state, in which policy and by politicians and officials. former ministers surveyed express participation increase the legitimacy and This article is the first in a series of opinions concurrent with participatory usability of the state, is possible. This two attempting to compare the democracy. A democracy in which the corresponds to Bernhard’s10 observation responsiveness and the capacity to im- citizens influence politics by means of that an effective and consolidated plement political decisions in the three political parties and associations (see table democracy is most likely when a strong Baltic countries. The emphasis is more 1). It is important to make a distinction state meets a strong civil society. In short, on surveying the present condition of between electoral participation and an effective democracy requires a usable the state(s) rather than explaining it. The participation between elections. Thus state that is responsive and efficient in focus in the present article is on the first while the electorate is to a fairly high adopting and implementing political part of the equation, gauging the extent degree active in Estonia and Latvia, Lithua- decisions. However, the reverse side of the to which the state, in the opinion and nian parliamentary elections seem to have involvement is that the state is at risk of experience of top decision makers13 , become an outing for about half the being captured by specific societal actors. involves social forces in decision-making electorate. In theory, the state is far more The process of a systemic change with its and implementation. Specifically, the anchored in society in a participatory than turbulent legal environment, massive wealth present article has a twofold objective: in an electoral democracy, in which the changing hands, and with a poor tradition (1) to discuss the expressed desirability public only exercises the right to express for making politicians and administrators among the executives to involve the pub- preferences at the election day. In the West accountable, has increased these risks.11 lic and interest organizations in the European participatory democracy the Thus the post-communist state, with the policy process and compare the intent citizens thus exercise influence both at legacies described above, is also vulnerable with the actual level of involvement and elections and between elections through to the extent that decisions are made to (2) to survey the perceived extent of parties and organized interests, whether appease specific interests as opposed to the misuse of positions in the three Baltic those are classical organizations like trade public interests aggregated and mediated countries. unions or single issues organizations like

10 environmental organizations. However, To the individual politician the in- get group. One example is the advantage given the weak political parties with few volvement of an organization into the of letting agricultural organizations members, the high degree of electoral policy process can also be said to have a participate in the formulation and the im- volatility, and the importance of specific cost-benefit function. In the first plementation of agricultural policy and recognizable candidates that are instance it could be that the interest or- services, given that these already have es- connected to a political party, this is ganizations can provide critical informa- tablished ties with the practitioners of the more common in Estonia and Latvia than tion improving the basis upon which a trade. Such involvement by interest or- in Lithuania14 , and the emphasis there- political decision is made. Furthermore, ganizations does naturally also benefit the fore is that the public should become en- it is also likely that the participation of organizations themselves as it provides gaged in these countries. Thus more than interest organizations in the implementa- individuals with incentives to join the evaluating a factual state of affairs it is tion can be of value, in particular where organizations.15 Second, the involvement rather an invitation and a preference for it is the interest organization that pos- of interest organization in the policy a model of democracy. sesses the infrastructure to reach the tar- process is an exchange of support or at least a possibility to lessen the severity of Table 1. Preference for public involvement in politics (pct.) criticism. A feature that is important for any politician that has an interest in re- Estonia Latvia Lithuania election. The problem then becomes of The public should become actively engaged in mediating and assigning value to the sup- parties, associations, local government, etc. in 754.0 795. 67. port of the different interests. However, order to gain greater influence on politics. besides the possibility of capturing, all The public should take an interest in politics and 20.0 18.4 17.0 politicians are interested in retaining a communicate their views to the representatives. degree of autonomy vis-à-vis interest or- The public should elect representatives and let 61.0 61. 15. ganizations. Probably one of the worst them run the country. accusations that can be made against a Total (percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 politician is the claim that the politician T0otal (N) 59435 is in the pocket of some interests and has Responses to question 45: ‘What role should the public primarily play in politics and government?’ lost his executive capability.

11 Table 2. Decisions are improved by involving interests. (pct.) some politicians in the Baltic countries, a negative nuance that is detected in our Estonia Latvia Lithuania questionnaire. When the ministers were Y0es, mostly 834. 821. 94. asked whether lobbyism is positive because Yes, sometimes 14.0 16.7 5.8 it provides information16 , a majority of N0o, worse 21. 2–. the ministers’ answers is in accordance with Total (percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 the structure in table 2, but fewer ministers T0otal (N) 58425 indicate the benefits of petition when this Responses to question 28: ‘Do you believe that decisions are improved when concerned interests are incorporated or heard is coined as lobbyism. With this in mind, in the process of formulation?’ the structure of the responses concerning the cost-benefit function relating to The ministers of the three Baltic coun- lobbyism as a political function, in which interest organizations in the policy process tries clearly see the advantage of involv- political support can be raised. Only in indicates that Estonian and Latvian ing interests to improve the political deci- Estonia the ministers see this form of ministers are more ready than their sions (Table 2). In our sample only two petition as a possibility to raise political Lithuanian colleagues to acknowledge the ministers, one in Estonia and one in Latvia, support (Table 4). Lobbying has, also to value of such involvement. believe that the participation of interests organizations makes the decisions worse. Table 3. Improving implementation by involving interests A majority of the ministers also believe that compliance will enhance by involving Estonia Latvia Lithuania concerned interest in the implementation S4trongly agree/agree 825. 671. 82. design (Table 3). This indicates that the Disagree/strongly disagree 14.6 38.8 17.3 ministers clearly see a value by giving in- T0otal (percent) 1000. 1000. 100. fluence on the policy to interest organiza- Total (N) 48 49 52 tions at stake through co-optation. Responses to question 41: ‘To what extent do you agree with the following proposition?: To ensure compliance in the However, a majority of the ministers process of implementation, it is better when organizations, private business or other concerned interests assist in in Lithuania and Latvia do not see formulating the implementation design.’

12 Table 4. Lobbyism provides political support. (pct.) The caveat is that communist politicians did their best not only to destroy the Estonia Latvia Lithuania civil society but also to stamp out socio- A0gree 750. 456. 27. economic differences. Previous research Disagree 30.0 53.5 72.5 have repeatedly found that attitude dif- T0otal (percent) 53404 ferences in the post-communist societies Total (N) 100.0 100.0 100.0 are more of an ideological nature and Responses to question 27.3:’ Lobbying is positive because you get support from the concerned groupings. linked to the agenda of the transition rather than reflecting deep social struc- The recognition of the cost-benefit with interest organizations either in the tures.17 Where evidence of cleavages ex- function of involving interest organiza- open or behind closed doors. It is possible ists as a result of differences in the social tions in the policy process is not only that the flip side of the coin, with capture structure, these cleavages are rooted in important because it itself is an indicator by sector interest or illicit interest making historical developments and specific cul- of the openness of the political system, their stamp on the policy, is the reality tural traits, such as nationality rather than that is the responsiveness of the state, but in which Lithuanian and Latvian ministers in a socio-economic differentiation.18 We also because the nature of such associa- live. We shall return to the issue of the have no reason to expect that the diffi- tion is a mutual exchange where the ac- nature of the association following a closer culties in developing a strong civil soci- knowledgment of the function can be- look upon the practical experience with ety by the gradual emergence of differen- come an awareness about the possibility interest organizations. tiated interests that are rooted in the out- of the state to provide incentives that come of the economic and political tran- foster the expansion of a mature civil so- A real experience? sition should be more different in the ciety with a stake in development. How- Baltic countries than in other Central and ever, it is also a possibility that the Lithua- Even if the state can do a lot to foster East European countries. Thus when ask- nian ministers (and Latvians, particularly a civil society by adopting a responsive ing ministers about the experience and with respect to implementation) place a stance, this development is preceded by the practice they have with the involving negative emphasis on the calculus because the emergence of differentiated attitudes societal interests, their responses have to of the factual experience of association that are rooted in a pluralistic economy. be evaluated against this background.

13 Table 5. Reliance on information from? (pct. multiple marking allowed) of those who ask the NGOs for advice does it often or always and other ministers Estonia Latvia Lithuania recall that they do it when important P0olitical advisors 206. 338. 28. issues are at stake (Table 6). However, in Political Parties 44.0 24.0 7.5 Estonia and in contrast to the recognition N0GO specialists (Employed by NGO's ) 404. 410. 49. of the of the cost-benefit structure, less Academic Specialists 72.0 72.0 86.8 than a half of the respondents have close O0thers 174. 461. 22. working relationships with business, Question: ‘On which external actors have you relied upon/prefer to rely upon for information?’ NGOs or other state agencies at the level of officials (Table 7). Thus it seems that In our questionnaire we asked the min- than in the two other countries but it the high degree of awareness and the prin- isters to identify the most important po- seems that they are less heard in the min- cipled support for participatory democ- litical actors in general as well as in rela- istries. This should be explained by the racy in Estonia have so far not been trans- tion to the ministers’ portfolio. Only a stronger tradition for single majority lated into routine relationships at shop- handful of ministers in the three coun- governments in Lithuania than in the two level. This situation can partly be ex- tries place interest organizations on the other countries. Thus for the individual plained by the development and establish- top three of influential actors, and that Lithuanian minister, in our sample, the ment of tripartite negotiations in Latvia implies that interest organizations do not need to broker political decisions among and Lithuania – leaving aside political have a role. When asked whom they rely coalition partners is less prevalent. In turn importance of these structures - and partly upon for external advice, NGO (Non- ministers prefer to rely upon academic by the fact that the first Estonian govern- Governmental Organization) specialists specialist for information and advice. ments came to be dominated by the ‘Tartu are more important than government Perhaps both because of the requirement Student Club’. As young neo-liberals these employed political advisors, and there is for specific know-how and the neutrality politicians did also have less developed also a preference for NGOs over political associated with academia. ties to other structures in society whether parties in Latvia and Lithuania (Table 5). The participation of the NGOs that that be emerging business interests, old Political parties are in general better have information in the policy process state business interests or various forms organized and developed in Lithuania does also seem quite intense. A majority of labour movements.

14 Table 6. Frequency of reliance. (pct. among those who mention type of actor)19 Sometimes, concerning Always Often Rarely Total important issues P7olitical Advisors 170. 305. 560. 30. 100. Political Parties 11.5 42.3 46.2 0.0 100.0 N4GO specialists (Employed by NGO's ) 69. 438. 348. 60. 100. Academic Specialists 7.5 43.8 42.5 6.3 100.0 O6thers 50. 540. 404. 00. 100. Only a few of the ministers in the NGOs may be more aggressive in pur- tries like the Baltic states often find them- sample have not experienced pressure suing their interests, and that they take selves under pressure from foreign in- from the outside in the form of peti- their role as interest organization terests, whether that be governments, or- tion for new legislation. The Estonian seriously or, on the other hand, may be ganizations, or business. In our survey, ministers more frequently report that the effect of having fewer routine ties half of the Estonians and above 80 per- they are under pressure than their south- with the administration. cent of the Lithuanian ministers report ern colleagues (see table 8). This can on It is, however, not only domestic in- that foreign actors have tried to influ- the one hand indicate that Estonian terests that seek influence. Small coun- ence policy and regulation. When they were asked who the foreign actors were, Table 7. Actual working relationships the structure of the responses clearly dif- ferentiates between the economic transi- Estonia Latvia Lithuania tions, the EU accession processes, and, Y9es 404. 820. 90. with respect to Estonia and Latvia, the No 55.1 20.0 9.8 naturalization process of the non-citizens. T0otal (percent) 1000. 1000. 100. In particular, it is interesting to note that Total (N) 49 50 51 Lithuanian ministers to a higher degree report attempts of foreign influence than Question: ‘In your own ministry, is/was it common practice that ministerial officials have close working relationships with significant organizations (business, NGO, or state) within the field of the ministry?’ their Estonian colleagues. It calls for fur-

15 ther research, but a promising hypoth- complex connection between negotiations esizes - judging from the comments - could and advices. The nature of involvement: be that a higher degree of responsiveness The analysis of the present link between capture, corruption from the Lithuanian government towards interest organizations and the administra- and co-optation domestic business interests for protection tion suggests that these are more developed from international market forces and the in Lithuania and Latvia, despite the Esto- We have to recall that the process of prolonged implementation of economic nian adherence to participatory democracy systematic change not only increased the reforms have developed into more con- and an understanding of the game of opportunities for illicit interests to gain tact points with international organiza- cooptation. Thus the Estonian ministers’ influence through bribery but also re- tions like the IMF, EU and the World support for a development-focused West duced the likelihood of getting caught, Bank. As such these relations can be con- Europe state type is principled whereas the and we have already noted a question mark sidered as natural and not as evidence that Latvian and Lithuanian, for better and for concerning the higher emphasis of the foreign interests have captured the gov- worse, have more factual experience in in- cost of including societal interest in ernments but rather that it reflects the volving social interests. Lithuanian and Latvia, suggesting that it could be the result of a factual learning Table 8. Pressure to initiate legislation process either because of capture or be- cause of bribery. Judging by the minis- Estonia Latvia Lithuania ters’ answers to whether misuse of posi- O0ften 360. 129. 13. tion is common and whether they per- Often, but not concerning really important issues 10.0 3.9 9.4 sonally have experienced attempts of brib- S0ometimes 418. 453. 41. ery, the influence of illicit interests is para- Rarely 8.0 13.7 22.6 mount in Latvia and Lithuania. Around N0ever 46. 129. 13. two thirds of the Latvian and Lithuanian ministers believe that misuse is common, Total (percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 and close to half have personally experi- T0otal (N) 51535 enced attempts to buy them off (Tables 9 Question: ‘Have you ever felt under pressure from outside actors to initiate new legislation?’ & 10). Thus it seems that “for better and

16 Table 9. Misuse of position Estonia than in the two other countries it will still be fair to characterize the situ- Estonia Latvia Lithuania ation as severe. Furthermore, mistrust S0trongly agree/agree 268. 762. 79. about the intentions, even of colleagues, Disagree/strongly disagree 70.0 25.5 16.3 is widespread in all three countries. It D0o not know 20. 21. 4. should be considered that not all influ- Total (percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 ence is direct. There exists a web of con- T0otal (N) 51594 tacts between ministries, which can be Responses to question 49: ‘Do you agree that misuse of status positions in common in the politics of your utilized to advance interests. Thus an in- country?’ terest organization or interests outside the realm of politics might prefer to go Table 10. Attempts of bribery, common through another ministry to advance its Estonia Latvia Lithuania influence. Y7es, did experience* 304. 414. 48. From table 11 it is evident that minis- Never 65.3 56.0 51.9 ters see illicit interests that are not organ- T0otal (percent) 1000. 1000. 100. ized politically behind many of the con- Total (N) 49 50 52 tacts they receive through other minis- Responses to question 46: ‘During your time as minister, did you experience attempts to bribe you into favoring specific tries. As expected from the patterns of groups or individuals’? corruption, Latvians and Lithuanians are * This category covers the responses “Often”, “Sometimes” and “A few times”. more distrustful than the Estonians. How- ever, with a question intentionally de- for worse” is the right phrase as the Esto- ministers’ evaluation and the differences signed to capture the loosely defined feel- nian ministers believe misuse to be less in severity of corruption among the coun- ing ‘that a Grey Cardinal or at least shady common and fewer have experience with tries correspond to other internationally forces exist’, the question not only taps attempts of bribery. recognized surveys regarding the level of awareness among the ministers that there The data presented in tables 9 & 10 corruption.20 While these data indicate are more to the story than official policy illustrate highly penetrated states. The corruption to be a lesser problem in and arguments, but also carry evidence

17 Table 11. The influence of parties outside the realm of politics. developing close networks and the windfall of rents in the transit trade (in Latvia) to Estonia Latvia Lithuania the widespread misuse of office. A0gree 508. 860. 69. Disagree 22.0 18.0 17.4 The principles and the present D0o not know 200. 20. 13. state of the state(s) Total (percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 T0otal (N) 51535 The ministers of all three Baltic coun- Question: ‘From your point of view, when other ministries or parties interfered in your business, could it be that a third tries do support the principles of partici- party outside the realm of politics has interfered in the decision-making?’ patory democracy and a majority recog- that little social capital21 is present. This told. Furthermore, the transactions costs nizes that political decisions can be im- will have ramifications for the extent of in building peak interest organizations is proved by developing a responsive state. inter-ministerial coordination,22 but is by far greater in economies dominated However, only among the Estonian min- also evidence that with respect to the de- by small and medium sized enterprises isters there is widespread appreciation of velopment of an open, responsive, and than in societies where industrial the possibility that such an involvement embedded state the mature civil society locomotives and/or sectors of the also can cause positive political gains in has not yet emerged. economy generate a relatively large share the form of support. Latvian and Lithua- Explanations as to the pattern that of revenues. This can help explain why nian ministers are sceptical about the emerges have, besides the argument con- Latvia (and to some extent Lithuania) political benefits of working together with cerning the structure and attachment of differs from Estonia to the extent that interest organizations, as they do not ex- elite advanced above, touched upon the the Latvian economy in the outset, in perience support in political terms. The structure of the economy and the relative addition to the huge rents generated by early rise of state autonomy in these coun- size of the shadow economy. With esti- the oil transit, was more dominated by tries, i.e. the heralded window of oppor- mates that the shadow economy amount large industrial conglomerates.24 Thus the tunity, has rather led to a situation in to about 11.8, 35.3 and 21.6 percent of economic structure of Estonia with small which the state has lost autonomy and GDP in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and medium sized enterprises contribute become penetrated and captured by illicit respectively23, part of the story can be to the explanation of the delay in interests through corruption and misuse.

18 The seclusion of the Estonian elite and 3 Linz, Juan J. & Alfred Stepan (1996). Problems of 11 Johannsen, Lars & Ole Nørgaard, (2001). the more gradual emergence of interests Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Governance and State Capacity in Post-commu- Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, nist States, paper prepared for the workshop on have properly shielded the state far more Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. ‘Political transformation in Soviet successor states: than in the two other countries 4 Suleiman, Ezra (1999). “Bureaucracy and the politics of the CIS States in comparative and While the comparison of three coun- Democratic Consolidation: Lessons from East- theoretical perspective’, ECPR Joint Sessions of ern Europe” pp. 141-167 in Lisa Anderson (edi- Workshops, 5-11 April 2001, Grenoble. Aarhus: tries reveals that Lithuania and Latvia ex- tor), Transitions to Democracy, New York: Columbia Department of Political Science, University of hibit more evidence of capture and cor- University Press. Aarhus. 25 pp. ruption than Estonia this does not imply 5 Op.cit 12 Hellman, Joel S., Geraint Jones and Daniel 6 that the pattern with respect to Estonia is Przeworski, Adam (1995). Sustainable Democ- Kaufmann (2000),’Seize the State, Seize the racy, with Pranab Bardham, Luiz Carlos Bresser without problems. Today, none of the Day: State Capture, Corruption and Influence Pereira, László Bruszt, Jang Jip Choi, Ellen Turk- in Transition’, Policy Research Working Pa- countries fall within the range of the West ish Comisso, Zhiyuan Cui, Torcunato di Tella, per 2444, Washington D.C.: The World Bank European state type but face distinct chal- Elemer Hankiss, Lena Kolarska-Bobi´nska, David Laitin, José María Marawall, Andranik Institute. lenges in the consolidation of democracy. Migranyan, Guillermo O´Donnell, Ergun 13 The elite surveys are part of the DEMSTAR In Estonia the problem is more of giving Ozbudun, John E. Roemer, Philippe C. Schmitter, program (www.demstar.dk) and have so far voice to interests whereas the two other Barbara Stallings, Alfred Stepan, Francisco Weffort been carried out among top-level governmen- countries suffer from particular interests & Jerzy J. Wiatr, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- tal executives in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuanian, sity Press. Hungary, The Kyrgyz Republic, and dominating the state, through illicit 7 Evans, Peter (1995), Embedded Autonomy, Kazakhstan. Similar surveys are on way in Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press means, at the expense of other interests Poland, the Czech Republic, Mongolia, Ar- in society. 8 Weiss, Linda (1998). The Myth of the Powerless State, Ithaca: Cornell University Press menia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova with 9 Leftwich, Adrian (1995) ‘Bringing Politics Back more planned. More information about the 1 Balcerowicz, Leszek (1995). “Understanding in: Towards a Model of the Development al State’, Baltic surveys can be found in Nørgaard, Ole Postcommunist Transitions” pp. 86-100 in Larry The Journal of Developmental Studies, vol. 31, no. 3, & Ole Hersted Hansen (2000). ”State of the Diamond & Marc F. Plattner (eds.), Economic Re- pp. 400-427 State in Latvia”, with Ilze Ostrovska and Luise form and Democracy, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 10 Bernhard, Michael (1996). “Civil society after Pape Møller, DEMSTAR Research Report, No.1, University Press the First Transition: Dilemmas of Post-Commu- University of Aarhus: Department of Politi- 2 Peters, B. Guy (1995). “The civil service in con- nist Democratization in Poland and Beyond”, cal Science; Nørgaard, Ole & Linda solidation of democracy”, International SocialScience Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 29, 3, pp. Journal, pp. 127-140. 309-330. Dregnsgaard (2003, forthcoming), ”State of

19 the State in Estonia”, DEMSTAR Research Re- petition, Representation and Inter-Party Coopera- port, University of Aarhus: Department of tion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Political Science; and Hansen, Ole Hersted & 18 Zarycki, Tomasz & Andrzej Nowak (2000). Lars Johannsen (2003, forthcoming), “State “Hidden Dimensions: the stability and struc- of the State in Lithuania”, DEMSTAR Research ture of regional political cleavages in Poland”, Report, University of Aarhus: Department of Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 33, pp. Political Science 331-354; Kubicek, Paul (2000). “Regional Po- 14 Nørgaard, Ole & Lars Johannsen (1999). larisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Vot- The Baltic States After Independence, with Mette ing and Legilsative Behaviour”, Europe-Asia Skak & Rene Hauge Sørensen, Second Edi- Studies, 52, 2, pp. 272-293. tion, Studies of Communism in Transition, 19 The question about the intensity of the Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.; Smith-Sivertsen, relation was only asked in Estonia and Lithua- Hermann (1996). “Mot elitepartier eller nia. massepartier”, Nordisk Østforum, (10) no. 3. 20 For a quick reference see Transparency 15 Olson, Macur (1965). The Logic of Collec- International at www.tranparency.de tive Action: Public Goods and The Theory of 21 Putnam, Robert D. (1993), Making Democ- Groups, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. racy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, 16 Question no. 27.1 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 17 Elster, Jon, Claus Offe & Ulrich K. Preuss 22 A subject for analysis in the forthcoming with Frank Boenker, Ulrike Goetting & article about implementation. Friedbert W. Rueb (1998). Institutional Design 23 Friedman, Johnson, Kaufman og Zoido- in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Lobaton (2000), ’Doging the grabbing hand: Sea, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 Evans, Geoffrey & Stephen Whitefield (1998). countries’, Journal of Public Economics, 76, pp. “The Structuring of Political Cleavages in Post- 459-493. Communist Societies: the Case of the Czech 24 World Bank (1998), ’Corruption in Latvia: Republic and Slovakia”, Political Studies, XLVI, Survey Evidence’. www.worldbank.org pp. 115-139; Kitshelt, Herbert, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski & Gábor Tóka (1999). Post-Communist Party Systems: Com-

20 Conscription Debate in Lithuania: How to Approach the Issue?1

By Tomas Jermalavicius*

Introduction been a nimble expeditionary force capa- accommodating the accelerated pace of ble of responding quickly to the threats change in their environment has been the As always at times of change and emanating from outside the traditionally choice of their format or, basically, the turbulence in the international system, the defined and anticipated theatre of war – type of manpower employed in the mili- armed services are forced to review the Europe. The range of contingencies and tary. The contemporary discourse is es- premises upon which their development threats requiring military response has sentially concerned with identifying and functioning are built. Sweeping expanded over the last decade or so, ne- whether modern and effective military changes in the nature of threats and secu- cessitating the readiness of the armed force implies doing away with rity environment after the end of the forces to act across a broader spectrum of conscription and switching to a full-time Cold War, accentuated by the atrocities missions, and thus forcing them to re- all-volunteer force.2 of 11 September 2001, have challenged consider their fixation upon war fight- Obviously, having become a part of a traditional roles of the military and the ing as the ‘core business’ of the military. Western security and defence community conventional notions of military capabili- One of the key facets of the debate on and system, Lithuania is entering this ties in the West. how to better re-organise the armed forces debate and, sooner or later, will have to The order of the day, underlined by to make them more relevant and effective articulate its own answer to this dilemma. the Prague summit of NATO, has long in dealing with contemporary threats and Some internal debate has already been tak- * Tomas Jermalavi²ius is a Vice Dean of the Baltic Defence College and a Senior National Representative of Lithuania at the College.

23 ing place for a while, and it intensified military considerations cannot be the sole 1. The origins of after the official invitation to join NATO determining factor in arriving at the de- conscription was received in November 2002. It remains cision. To avoid shallow and one-sided to be seen whether the issue comes to conclusions, we have to look into other The origins of conscription and the dominate the defence policy agenda in facets of conscription as well as how those ideas that it encapsulated can be traced the forthcoming years as much as in other facets interact with strategic-military im- back to the processes and developments Western countries, as its current priori- peratives. set in motion across Europe by the French ties lie elsewhere. On the other hand, the In adopting this comprehensive ap- Revolution and Napoleonic wars. With- pressure to address the matter is mounting, proach, the article will firstly dwell shortly out going much into historical details, which suggests that it is worthwhile defining on the origins of conscription, which the record can be set straight by observ- its scope and parameters. The purpose of are informing our debate and underly- ing that recruitment of all eligible male this paper is to set the main landmarks and ing general understanding of the role and population within certain age bracket to framework for the further effort of utility of military draft. Then it will do military service was prompted and identifying whether it is reasonable to phase move on to outline the trends in the sustained as much by military necessity as out conscription in Lithuania. West, which admittedly stand as an in- by the socio-political processes. The problem of choosing an adequate fluencing factor to Lithuania on its own Certainly, putting large numbers of format of the armed forces is not a sim- right, to see which imperatives and their people under arms always creates the com- ple one. We have to recognise which fac- configurations underlie those trends. In petitive advantage over the opponent as tors and processes can direct us one way doing this, the factors serving either as long as numbers matter on equal measure or another, and how. This article will not drivers or inhibitors of a complete move with tactical proficiency and strategic gen- pursue the pros and cons of military draft to a full-time all-volunteer force format ius. It goes without saying that the abil- specifically relevant to Lithuania, but will will be examined. In many respects, this ity of Napoleon to fall back upon a mass rather provide a basis for such assessments article is a broad overview with the aim army provoked symmetric responses by by casting some light on what has been of distilling the most important issues. its opponents. The very nature of war happening in Western military establish- Therefore the reader should not expect articulated an imperative to broaden the ments and why. The main argument es- much attention given to specific details basis of recruitment beyond social groups poused here is that sheer strategic and and hard data. which held monopoly over the military

24 establishments. However, levee en masse, and the Napoleonic wars, with disman- that country. But in general terms, for conscription being its pivotal element, was tling the mass armies being one of its instance, Catherine M. Kelleher reckons enabled primarily by the change of rela- thrusts, conscription bounced back and that ‘the political, economic and techno- tionship between the state and society remained a predominant format across logical environments which sustained the prompted by the French Revolution. much of continental Europe well into the levee en masse, which both made possible Military draft came to symbolise and 20th century. Essentially, it underpinned and dictated the needs for large standing cement such new features of this relation- the concept of a modern nation-state. armies dependent on conscript numbers, ship as mass participation in the political In addition, the industrial revolution seemed to be passing or to have already processes of the state, the people becom- of the 19th century, which has altered pro- passed.’3 ing the ultimate source of sovereign au- foundly the character of war, further ne- Arguably, strong parallels can be drawn thority, as well as national citizenship (con- cessitated reliance on manpower intensive between the trends in Lithuania, which fined only to male population at that format to offset the increased destructive rightfully claims to be a part of the West time). Military service became an incar- power of weapons and even facilitated its in social, cultural, economic and political nation of citizen’s status and rights, and use through such new measures as rail- terms, and the trends in other Western this link between conscription and citi- ways and telegraph communications. countries which have been emerging over zenship turned into one of the most pow- The bottom line of this short excur- the last decades. Certainly, analysis and erful sustaining factors. sion into history is that the origins of adjudication of drivers and inhibitors of Conscription was further legitimised conscription lie at a confluence of socio- change need to be highly customised to and reinforced by the rise of nationalism political, economic, technological and take into account the peculiarities of an as a defining ideology at the second half military-strategic factors, which enabled, individual country. However, although of the 19th – start of the 20th centuries, facilitated and sustained this format. being mindful of the need to look into when ‘peoples wars’ finally replaced Therefore, when looking into specific cases, the next chapter will un- ‘cabinet wars’, waged by the aristocratic contemporary trends, one has to identify pack the main general trends in the West, elites of the 19th century. So, regardless of how the same factors converge these days and offer an in-depth account of how the effort by the Vienna congress powers in the specific setting of a particular coun- those trends can be explained. The latter and their ruling classes to undo the far- try and what it spells for conscription as will essentially constitute the analytical reaching effects of the French Revolution a manpower procurement technique in framework to be applied when embark-

25 ing on the evaluation of the Lithuanian Furthermore, there has been a clear conscription was introduced only as a case – an endeavour this article will not trend towards the growing division of measure of national emergency there), the make. labour within the armed forces, which decade after the end of the Cold War stimulated decreasing reliance upon man- marked several complete (or near-com- 2. A Trend in the West power and the need for a wider spectrum plete) transitions to a full-time all-volun- and its causes of skills within the armies to operate teer force (the Netherlands, Belgium, highly sophisticated weapon systems. Spain, France), several declared intentions 2.1 Erosion of Conscription James Burk reckons that ‘the military di- with a definite deadline (Czech Republic, vision of labor has grown more complex, Portugal) and a number of cases where It is already conventional wisdom that encouraging reliance on highly-trained the debate has started in earnest (Germany, the end of the Cold War has prompted professional soldiers who serve for long for instance). the reductions of the armed forces both term and discouraging reliance on Even in the countries with traditional in the West and in the countries of the conscripts and reservists ’6 attachment to conscription such as Swe- former Warsaw Pact. Jan van der Meulen Increasing technological sophistication den or Denmark, the Conscript Ratio – and Philippe Manigart note that the of Western armed forces led to a shift from the proportion of conscripted personnel downsizing of the military, viewed as an a labour-intensive to capital-intensive or- in the total manpower – has been steadily expression of a so-called ‘peace dividend’, ganisation. This naturally precipitated the diminishing. Decreasing numbers of con- became one of the most important as- reductions in conscripted manpower and scripts in the military organisations led pects of defence policies in the post-Cold duration of obligatory service, if not abol- to a precipitous fall in the Military Par- War period.4 The process, however, ishment of draft altogether. Even a rather ticipation Ratio (a share of country’s started long before the end of the Cold formal and quick assessment suggests that population registered by the military as War. Jacques Van Doorn, for instance, the full-time all-volunteer format has been actives and reserve) and Military Partici- provided statistics on how the manpower emerging as more attractive alternative in pation Ratio of the Military Age Cohorts was decreasing from 1964 to 1973 in six an increasing number of countries. While (percentage of drafted individuals in a Western states (Belgium, the UK, during the Cold War a complete shift to particular age group) – two important Denmark, France, the Netherlands and this format occurred only in the USA and indicators which have direct implications Norway).5 the UK (or, rather, a return to it, since in a socio-political dimension: they re-

26 veal diminished pervasiveness of the soci- be born in mind. James Burk elaborates format should be retained or abolished eties by the military and increased bur- on political realist and social dominance are made on a basis of strategic calcula- den inequality of the military service with perspectives. Within his account: tions, encompassing assessments of the repercussions to the legitimacy of con- Political realists contend that decisions international environment, the security scription.7 about the military obligation of citizens situation of an individual country and Various researches showed that the reflect considerations of cost and techni- requirements of warfare (missions of the process was uneven and had different de- cal efficiency. Social dominance theorists armed forces, technological innovations parture points in different countries, as focus instead on whether citizens accept etc.), as well as cost analysis. In this view the degree of reliance on conscription compulsory military service as a legitimate such developments as nuclear weapons, varied. However, a trend is quite clear even value worth supporting.8 increasing reliance upon technology in with the individual peculiarities in mind These are the top-down and bottom- warfare and changes in the international – the conscript format is in decline. Hav- up explanations of the choices for a par- environment after the end of the Cold ing occupied a central position in defence ticular organisational format of the armed War would occupy a central position in policies for decades, conscription seems forces and its transformations. It can be elucidating the erosion of conscription. to have been pushed to the fringes in argued, that both approaches, while pos- Most of the literature makes a strong terms of building and maintaining mili- sessing insufficient explanatory power emphasis on these factors as both sustain- tary capabilities. Subsequently, there alone, carry a measure of truth, and it is ing this format and triggering its change. should be general drivers catalysing the their combination (or interaction), which For instance, Morris Janowitz points decline as well as inhibiting it across the helps to produce an acceptable account to an important factor of the arrival of whole spectrum of the countries. The next of the decline. The top-down approach nuclear weapons. He asserts that ‘ the part will be devoted to the discussion of will be scrutinised first. advent of nuclear weapons is crucial since such common denominators. it altered the strategic role of the military 2.2.1 Military-strategic factors as and called into question the validity of 2.2 Factors of decline ‘melters’ of conscription the mass armed force’.9 The scenarios of a nuclear stand-off between the Cold War In explaining the decline of conscrip- From the political realist perspective adversaries left little room for the employ- tion, two theoretical approaches should decisions on whether the conscription ment of large standing armies and time

27 consuming mobilisation of reserves, functional considerations. The first coun- and inadequate in the eyes of the decision- which relegated conscription and mobi- tries to abolish draft (USA, UK) did not makers. lisation reserves to a secondary role. On feel a residual threat to their homeland Growing heterogeneity and internal the other hand, this effect of nuclear weap- from the conventional forces of the So- division of labour of the forces, ons was far from universal. Van der viet Union and its satellites and focused downsizing and structural adaptation stem Meulen and Manigart reckon that ‘ the their military policies on expeditionary directly from these perceptions of the new strategic realities of the Cold War help tasks. At the same time, conscription domi- strategic realities and preoccupation with to explain why political and military elites nated continental Europe, because its na- military effectiveness. It is generally ac- looked upon the draft as indispensable.’10 tions had to plan for territorial defence knowledged, for instance, that a conscript A number of nations were still preparing due to the threat of ground invasion. In force cannot be trained properly for the for a prolonged non-nuclear military con- addition, most of the countries, which expeditionary missions and act effectively frontation, which made sense given a stra- moved to the format of a full-time all- once deployed. Karl Haltiner sums it up tegic imperative to push the nuclear volunteer force or contemplate such a step this way: ‘It may therefore be concluded threshold as high up the ladder of escala- in a post-Cold War setting, belong to that the combination of being a member tion as possible. Nonetheless, a large part NATO and can fall back on collective de- of a defence alliance and being far from a of van der Meulen’s and Manigart’s argu- fence provisions to fill in the gaps in ca- direct national military threat and par- ment talks about ‘how the change of size pabilities, including the ones which ticipating frequently in international mis- and mission of the military, generated by emerge as a result of ditching the mili- sions facilitates the abolishment of con- new international relations [end of the tary draft. Furthermore, a new threat en- scription and the change of the army for- Cold War-T.J.], structurally hampered a vironment in the wake of the Cold War mat ’12 continuation of conscription.’11 This un- stipulates the need for a smaller, rapidly On the other hand, one has to be derscores the importance of an interna- deployable force, manned by full-time mindful that different military-strategic tional and strategic environment as a career soldiers and officers, to conduct factors can be in conflict with each other driver or inhibitor of change. missions overseas. This new understand- as far as conscription is concerned. For Without a doubt, the geopolitical situ- ing of missions of the armed forces in a instance, while the transfer and applica- ation and threat environment of each new international environment also tion of the results of the information country stands as an important factor in renders the conscript format ineffective revolution in the military forces necessi-

28 tates the presence of long-serving and well- drawbacks stand as a short-term impedi- armed forces are neither the only nor the trained professionals to operate various ment, rather than an intractable obstacle. most important means to embody a systems, sometimes the only cost-effective It is because there is more to the choice nation’s will of self-assertion.’13 The fact way to access those with adequate skills of the format than the availability of fi- that women, who are not under obligation might be through draft only. In general nancial resources. to do military service, obtained equal civic terms, even reliance on contract person- Many authors stress that considering rights with men during the 20th century nel to accomplish the mission may require only the top-down arguments for the de- accentuated this disconnection very much. conscription as a pool, from which such cline is insufficient. Tremendous socio-po- Janowitz also points to the erosion of manpower can be drawn, especially if we litical developments have to be included if nationalism as a process which, in turn, talk about small states. On the other hand, a reasonable explanation is to be attained. undermines popular support to the all this does not invalidate the assertion conscription format.14 Given that many that conscription has become of secondary 2.2.2 Socio-political dimension diverse avenues for self-expression and self- importance and plays an auxiliary role of conscription identification are available, nationalism only. came to be often regarded as a liability The latter issue encapsulates the debate The socio-political (social dominance) rather than virtue, especially with a rather over the economic and demographic fac- perspective draws upon the transforma- destructive historical record in mind. The tors as underlying the military rationale tion of social values and its impact upon nationalist zeal, which is so easily for either abolishing or retaining con- public attitudes towards military service convertible into militarism, although still scription. The states which completed a and the role of the military in social life lurking in the margins of Western societies shift towards a full-time all-volunteer for- in general, which have been produced by and sometimes even mustering threatening mat often find it difficult to recruit and industrialisation, further democratisation, comebacks to the centre stage of politics, retain personnel in booming economies penetration of market economy and crea- fails to capture the hearts and minds. The and amongst ageing populations. Fiscal tion of the welfare state. ideological ingredient, which kept military costs of such a format may also be con- First of all, detachment of military serv- draft alive and popular, has largely sidered prohibitively high. However, de- ice from national self-identification and expended itself. spite these pitfalls of adopting a full-time civic rights occurred. As Jürgen Kuhlmann Secondly, a shift in perspectives on the all-volunteer force format, evidently those and Ekkehard Lippert put it, ‘today, the relationship between the state and the citi-

29 zens took place. Burk writes about ‘the of order, sense of duty, subordination tion of those eligible are called to do their progress from a militant society, in which have lost their attractiveness ’16 As a re- military service, while the rest further individual lives for the state, to an indus- sult, according to Janowitz, ‘hedonism and enjoy the benefits of civilian life. Essen- trial society, in which state exists to sup- the importance of self-expression supply tially, those not lucky enough to avoid port the individual.’15 This observation a new basis for resistance to military au- the service are placed in a disadvantageous reflects substantial deterioration of collec- thority among young people.’17 Burk adds position once they return to a highly tive consciousness and the rise of individu- that ‘high levels of education and material competitive labour market where they alism in post-modern societies, in the con- affluence increased the antipathy of young have to compete both with men who text of which military draft is being in- people for military service and supported stayed in this market and women who did creasingly interpreted as an unacceptable criticisms of the goals and style of military not have the obligation to serve. A sub- coercion by the state towards its citizens institutions ’18 This aspect is reinforced stantially increased female participation in rather than a tenacious and venerable duty. by the fact that, by and large, a so-called labour market is further highlighting the These days an individual, shaped by con- ‘threat-free’ generation came to dominate dangers of being drafted to military sumerist and pragmatic societies, increas- Western societies during the last decades. service. In many countries the argument ingly asks what the state can do for him or Without a pervasive perception of an over- that the state should either call all eligible her (in return to the taxes levied on him/ whelming threat to the survival of the state men, and even women, to do military serv- her), instead of what he or she can do for by the general public, it is an arduous task ice, or abolish the draft altogether, is very the state. Compulsory military service does to motivate its members to spend some of powerful, especially if the state and soci- not fit into this new equation. their time for military preparations. ety are dedicated to nurturing egalitarian Disapproval of obligatory military Finally, one direct consequence of the principles. service is further stimulated by a substan- post-Cold War restructuring and tial change of the dominant social values downsizing (prompted by strategic con- 2.2.3 A combination of both from being congruent with military cul- siderations) – selective and arbitrary con- approaches and the inhibitors ture to conflicting with it. According to scription – has raised moral questions of of change Kuhlmann & Lippert, ‘military-related social equality, further undermining le- characteristics, the so-called values of duty gitimacy of draft. It has become very dif- As we can see, strategic considerations and acceptance, namely obedience, love ficult to justify why only a small propor- and the security environment, which led

30 to a lesser emphasis on conscription, reflect only social values may be incapable of to a conscription format and also the stimulated the erosion of social legitimacy performing effectively their military function. On greater social pressure to fall back on the of conscription. So it is obvious, that the other hand, it may be impossible to contain full-time contract soldiers to do the job neither a top-down nor a bottom-up ap- within society military institutions shaped purely are. proach can work alone. Strategic, eco- by functional imperatives.20 Speaking in more general terms about nomic and technological factors, domi- Take, for instance, the earlier mentioned how the interaction of various factors nating the calculations of the decision- strategic impact of nuclear weapons, and dictate the organisational format, it can makers, and socio-political factors rein- specifically the presence of the US nuclear be concluded that absence of a favour- force each other and create the full set of umbrella over Western Europe. This able strategic, geo-political environment circumstances under which decisions to impact has also reverberated in a socio- will probably preclude a shift from the move away from conscription, or retain political dimension by accelerating the conscript force even at the presence of it, can be made. This is because, as Martin process of demilitarisation of the favourable socio-political conditions for Shaw puts it, ‘military institutions never societies, which, in turn, placed conscrip- doing so, and vice versa. This logic un- reflect only the political system of soci- tion under even more societal pressure. derpins the way the inhibitors prevent- ety: they are at the intersection between In a similar vein, strategic ineptness of ing or slowing down the change work. this society and the international system conscript forces in the expeditionary Strategic rationale and threat environ- of states.’19 Samuel Huntington captured missions is underlined by the societal dis- ment during the Cold War served as a this chief principle underlying the inter- approval of deploying the conscripts to major inhibitor preventing the shift to action between the military and society such missions, which is directly propor- a full-time all-volunteers format in very well and, therefore, deserves to be tionate to the risk of exposure to real continental Europe. Its removal (the end cited in full: combat. One of the greatest shocks to of the Cold War) opened the avenues The military institutions of any society are the states which ditched military draft for the restructuring in most of the shaped by two forces: a functional imperative very early came with heavy casualties countries. Concurrently, the already ripe stemming from the threats to the society’s security among conscripts in the overseas combat social conditions have facilitated this and societal imperative arising from the social operations. So, the more the force is restructuring immensely. forces, ideologies and institutions dominant oriented towards expeditionary missions, As it has been noted, however, the within the society. Military institutions which the less the strategic rationale for sticking trend of decline is uneven in terms of the

31 geographical scope, as not all of the west- tion killers’ can be singled out. As long ues and is also better held accountable to ern countries have announced their plans as the conscript feels that his time is be- a society. As a result, for instance, the to abolish conscription. Although their ing wasted and he serves as a cheap la- conscript-heavy military format may act reliance on conscripted manpower is de- bour force, the institution of draft is as a safeguard against military adventurism creasing, as evidence shows, there are cer- challenged even in a benign social envi- of the governments which are less con- tain factors which do not allow a com- ronment. strained in their use of the military in- plete shift to a professional force, even The experience of Denmark reveals that strument when the armed forces are though strategic rationale recommends this may even lead to an open revolt against manned by full-time career personnel. The exactly that. Shaw suggests that persistent conscription. However, a profound re- governments decision to go to war is more preservation of conscription is determined form of draft service has reversed the sen- likely to receive a widespread public mainly by tradition and history (Sweden, timent in this country. Basically it was scrutiny if a considerable number of men Finland, Norway or Denmark) as well as designed to keeping a conscript only as under arms are conscripts. by regional geopolitics (e.g. tensions long as necessary to train him and moti- On the other hand, such socio-politi- between Greece and Turkey).21 So, if the vating him by the service being an en- cal roles of military draft are a function society has favourable experience with riching experience, almost fun, rather than of public perceptions and experiences military draft and attaches high social value boredom or serfdom to the state. This rather than an objective and universal ef- to it, survival of this format is likely even strikes a chord with a new generation, fect of conscription. It would be difficult in the absence of strategic imperatives. which is always bored and keen to go at to contend that the British, Australian or In building such positive experience, great lengths to keep themselves enter- U.S. military are less democratic, less ac- which translates into prestige of service tained. countable and less controlled than their and a sustained tradition, not the least Catherine Kelleher also adds that do- counterparts in the countries with com- role is played by the way that conscripts mestic political requirements such as pre- pulsory military service. Conversely, con- are treated in the service. It goes without venting political intervention by the mili- scription in Turkey or Russia is appar- saying that dedovshchina – the Soviet-style tary may also sustain the institution of ently void of such positive effects. By the practice of hazing newcomers – draft.22 It is often regarded that because same token, military adventurism of the undermines any willingness to join the of conscription the military establishment government does not beset mature democ- military. However, even ‘softer motiva- is more exposed to democratic civil val- racies, which possess various mechanisms

32 other than conscription to keep it in tive can be strong enough to override pending NATO membership (and the check, to the extent as to require societal the societal pressure for change. Trends allied commitments it entails) affecting the burden in the form of a military draft. in the West clearly show that conscrip- issue? Will we be able to recruit and retain Therefore, such socio-political aspects tion is dwindling, as historical conditions sufficient numbers of contracted of conscription which inhibit its aboli- which brought it about do not exist personnel in our economic environment tion should be carefully assessed against anymore. However, we can arrive at a rea- without using military draft? Would our the aforementioned negative aspects of sonable and sensible decision about con- state be able to bankroll a full-time all- selective and arbitrary draft as well as scription in Lithuania only by putting volunteer service and how large can it be? societal values and perceptions in each the drivers and inhibitors of change into From a social dominance perspective, individual case, as history and develop- the local setting. Knowing what factors the key questions are: is our society un- ment of each political system or civil so- and their combinations affect the format dergoing the change of values which erode ciety inevitably leaves a print. It is clear, in general, and how, is a prerequisite, but the willingness of military participation? however, that just as in the case of strate- it is not sufficient to get a full and clear Is the relationship between the state and gic-military factors the socio-political fac- picture about where we stand in Lithua- society in transformation, which turns the tors alone can be pushing the issue in nia and where we should be heading. state merely into a supplier of services and completely different directions. In this respect, a number of questions pushes the boundaries of the state back? need to be answered, before we proceed What are the public threat perceptions Conclusions to discuss the feasibility of a full-time all- and how does this translate into their volunteer force in Lithuania. Starting with thinking about the necessity of military The decision of transforming the force a top-down approach, we have to look draft? What are the historical and con- is not a simple and easy one. It rests on a into the security environment and answer temporary experiences of society with the multifaceted and comprehensive analysis, the questions – what are the main threats institution of conscription in Lithuania? which should not be confined to assess- to our security and what kind of military How strong is its legitimacy and what are ing security environment and the missions response do they require? Will our Armed the prospects, given that conscription in that it dictates to the armed forces. Social Forces have to focus more and more on Lithuania is becoming more and more environment is equally important in this expeditionary missions as the main way selective? Is it being increasingly regarded respect, even though functional impera- of dealing with the threats? How is the as a state coercion or a waste of time

33 among the young people? What motivates Force’, in Kuhlmann, J. (ed.), SOWI Forum Van Doorn, Jacques (1975), ‘The Decline those who do their military service: a fear International, No. 9, pp. 3-35. of the Mass Army in the West – General Re- of state persecution, patriotism or purely Burk, James (1992), ‘The Decline of Mass flections’, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 1., No. enthusiasm about military life? Did con- Armed Forces and Compulsory Military Serv- 2, pp. 147-157. scription become indispensable in con- ice’, Defence Analysis, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 45-59. trolling the Lithuanian military establish- Haltiner, Karl W. (1998), ‘The Definite 1 The article was first delivered as a conference End of the Mass Army in Europe?’, Armed ment and keeping it transparent and ac- paper at a workshop ‘New Threats and Security: Forces and Society, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 7-36. New Missions of the Armed Forces and Prospects for countable? Huntington, Samuel P. (1957), The Soldier Professioanlization’ (Vilnius, 5-6 December 2002), Even if we discover at some juncture and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Mili- organised jointly by the Lithuanian War Acad- that functional imperatives for retaining tary Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The emy, the Baltic Defence College and the Centre of conscription are still at play, we should Civic Initiatives. The author is grateful to Brg. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press). Gen. Michael H. Clemmesen and Lt. Col. Andrew seriously consider whether conscription Janowitz, Morris (1973), ‘US Forces and Parrott for their valuable comments and remarks. is sustainable and justifiable in its cur- the Zero Draft’, Adelphi Paper, No. 94. 2 There is still much disagreement over the use rent shape. A serious reform of this insti- Kelleher, Catherine M. (1978), ‘Mass Ar- of terms to define the armed forces format, since tution might be required to accommo- mies in the 1970s’, Armed Forces and Society, ‘a professional force’ – the term most frequently date the societal imperatives. In the end Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 3-30. invoked to describe the employment of full-time Kuhlmann, Jürgen & Lippert, Ekkehard contract personnel – may have additional conno- of the day we may turn to the armed tations by implying the degree of professional forces format which, though still using (1994), ‘Farewell to Compulsory Military Serv- aptitude achieved by the personnel, including the conscription, is a very different concept ice? Arguments for and against Compulsory conscripts. The conscript-heavy Israeli force, for Military Service in Times of Peace – The Case from what a traditional military draft is. instance, may be deemed more professional than of Germany’, in Kuhlmann, J., Segal, D.R. certain armed forces without any conscripted sol- (eds.), SOWI Forum International, No. 16, pp. diers at all. To avoid such connotations, the au- Bibliography 215-258. thor of this article prefers using the term ‘a full- Shaw, Martin (1990), Post-Military Society time all-volunteer force’, which brings together two most important aspects of the described for- Burk, James (1989), ‘Debating the Draft (Cambridge: Polity Press). mat – the personnel operating under the employ- in America’, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 15, Van Der Meulen, Jan & Manigart, Philippe ment contract with the career prospects for the No. 3, pp. 431-448. (1997), ‘Zero Draft in the Low Countries: The enlisted individuals and the principle of a volun- Burk, James (1990), ‘National Attach- Final Shift to All-Volunteer Force’, Armed tary entry into the ranks and file. ments and the Decline of the Mass Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 315-332. 3 Kelleher, C. M. (1978), p. 26.

34 4 See Van Der Meulen, J. & Manigart, P. (1997), p. 320. 5 See Van Doorn, J. (1975), p. 148. 6 Burk, J. (1992), p.45. 7 The measurements of Conscript Ration (CR), Military Participation Ratio (MPR) and Military Participation Ratio of the Military Age Cohorts (MPRMAC) were proposed as indicators by Karl W. Haltiner (see Haltiner, K. W. (1998), p. 12). 8 Burk, J. (1992), p. 46. 9 Janowitz, M. (1973), p.4. 10 Van Der Meulen, J. & Manigart, P (1997), p. 316. 11 Ibid, p. 317. 12 Haltiner, K.W. (1998), p. 33. 13 Kuhlmann, J. & Lippert, E. (1994), p. 220. 14 See Janowitz, M. (1973), p. 4. 15 Burk, J. (1989), p. 442. 16 Kuhlmann, J. & Lippert, E. (1994), p. 221. 17 Janowitz, M. (1973), p. 4. 18 Burk, J. (1990), p. 9. 19 Shaw, M. (1990), p. 163. 20 Huntingont, S. (1957), p. 2. 21 See Shaw, M. (1990), p. 87. 22 See Kelleher, C.M. (1978), pp. 8-9.

35 Defining Terrorism in the Political and Academic Discourse

By Asta Maskaliunaite*

Introduction problems of post-Cold War international cians, lawmakers, administrators, etc. – and politics. However, the agreement on what on the side of social scientists. Hence, in In the end of 1970s terrorism appeared exactly this problem entails, on what ter- the first part of the article some of the defi- in the considerations of politicians and rorism actually is, is much more difficult nition problems as they appear in the po- social scientists as one of the global prob- to reach. While lengthy books have been litical milieu will be presented. The second, lems. The events of September 11, 2001 concentrated on the discussion of the lengthier part of the article, will deal with made it an even more important phenom- problem of its definition1 , these efforts did the definition of terrorism in a scientific enon, the eradication of which became not result in any substantial advances in the discourse, trying to assess critically the vari- one of the purposes of the strongest state resolution of this issue. ous elements associated with terrorism and of the world. The United States has hence The purpose of this article is not to cre- their possible usage in the definitions. given a new sense of purpose for its lead ate a different definition of terrorism, to of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisa- add it to the stockpile of the existing prod- Defining terrorism in the tion and has adopted a concept accord- ucts of the scientific efforts, but to high- political discourse ing to which friends and enemies are de- light the main ideas and problems in the cided upon. Now everybody seems to attempts to defining terrorism on the side The increased importance of terrorism agree that terrorism is one of the greatest of both representatives of the state – politi- for the policy stance of the governments * Asta Maskaliunaite, a graduate of Vilnius University, is currently a PhD student at the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest (Hungary).

36 as well as the need to legally pursue the sive definition of the phenomenon can- Palestinians are resisting the occupation perpetrators of the alleged terrorist acts not be reached. Two examples of concrete of their land. It is quite different from resulted in quite a few official definitions definitions influenced by conflicting in- the terror attacks that were carried out in of terrorism. The recent change in the struc- terests are the descriptions of the actions New York, which the Organization of the ture and purpose of the American foreign of the Palestinians and those of Israel. Islamic Conference and most of Muslim policy, aimed at wiping out terrorism from While in the West there was a great con- countries in the world condemned.” the face of the earth, has made this prob- troversy about how to call the actions of These two statements are a good exam- lem even more important. If friends and Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister, ple of how violence tends to appear more foes are distinguished according to their and Palestinian suicide bombers, to the legitimate if its ultimate goals are empha- stance vis-à-vis terrorism (as opponents or leaders of Islamic nations who gathered sized, while it seems to be less legitimate supporters of the terrorist groups), the in Kuala Lumpur at the beginning of when only used as means to attract atten- definition of terrorism is the crucial in- April, 2002, Israel is clearly a terrorist tion. The different ways of emphasising gredient of the formation of policy direc- state. The view on Palestinian actions, can be very well used for both trying to tions towards the countries of the world. however, is more ambiguous. On the one justify some people in their attacks and The ethics of politics would require that a hand, it is stated that all the attacks against to condemn others. neutral description of the phenomenon civilians should be considered terrorism. This particular example is not intended would apply, and according to that descrip- As Mohamad Mahathir, the Malaysian to show that the policy of Islamic coun- tion the division would be made. How- Prime Minister, stated: “Whether the tries towards terrorism and that their as- ever, as it is rather obvious, this is rarely attackers are acting on their own or on sessment of the phenomenon is exception- the case in the real world. The issue of de- the orders of their government; whether ally ambiguous and somewhat hypocriti- fining terrorism is one of the best examples they are regulars or irregulars, if the attack cal. In the West one can also find a great of the tendency to include particular in- is against civilians then they must be variety of such examples. The same con- terests in seemingly neutral descriptions of considered terrorists.” flict between Israelis and Palestinians is what is acceptable or not in politics. On the other hand, another statement, viewed pretty one-sidedly in this part of Relating the concept itself to the spe- that of Kamal Kharrazi, the Iranian For- the world; only the angle of this view is cific interest of defining parties is prob- eign Minister, implies that the Palestin- the opposite of that expressed by the ably the main reason why a comprehen- ians are fighting for the right cause: “The Conference of Islamic Nations.

37 The ongoing war on terrorism and the Some states devise a list of organiza- of the Northern Alliance killed tens of importance the United States put on the tions, which they consider being terror- thousands of civilians, engaged in rape, eradication of this phenomenon led some ist organisations, trying to avoid the prob- torture, summary executions, etc.5 . Thus, countries to present their struggle with lem of definition, but even here the in- in the political context saying that there internal problems as a fight against ter- terests of the state and their appraisal of are no “good” or “bad” terrorists (all of rorism. As Sonika Gupta writes, “the allies and foes sneak in. Brian Whitetaker them are bad) makes perfect sense. People Chinese have successfully renegotiated the gives some examples of such a “double- employing violence would not be called US definition of terrorism to include standard” game from the British anti-ter- “terrorists”, if their aims were approved. movements for self-determination”2 . Such rorism law, which lists the organisations In the official definitions, even if one a definition, according to the author, may considered to be terrorist and thus illegal looks only at the “technical” aspects of affect not only the country’s stance to- in Britain: terrorism, i.e. ignores the motives of its wards violent East Turkestan Islamic Mili- the Kurdistan Workers Party – active in perpetrators, the motives which are not tants but can have a very harmful effect Turkey – is banned, but not the KDP or PUK, always clear (when, for example, no one on the peaceful Tibetan self-rule movement which are Kurdish organizations active in Iraq. claimed the responsibility for the attacks) as well. Having in mind such examples, it Among opposition groups, the Iranian People’s or hard to classify (for example, whether seems that William Connolly has grasped Mujahedeen is banned, but not its Iraqi the act is committed because of political, the relations between the states and the equivalent, the INC, which happens to be religious or, actually, economic consid- terrorists the best, when writing that: financed by the United States.4 erations), the decision of what to include Terrorism allows, as the state system is According to some observers the same into a definition and what to leave aside constituted, the state and the interstate system to problem could be noticed in the United is influenced strongly by the interests of protect the logic of sovereignty in the international States’ treatment of Afghanistan. Dennis the states. Brian Whitaker, by analysing sphere while veiling their inability to modify Hans, for example, argued that the Bush the US government report on terrorism systemic conditions that generate violence by non- administration was using terrorists to win writes that: state agents; it also provides domestic constituen- over other terrorists in the recent Another essential ingredient [of terrorism] cies with agents of evil to explain the vague Afghanistan war. The author quotes a (you might think) is that terrorism is calculated experiences of danger, frustration, and Human Rights Watch report stating that to terrorise the public or a particular section of ineffectiveness in taming global contingency.3 in ten years since 1992 various factions it. The American definition does not mention

38 spreading terror at all, because that would as the actors of terrorism have spilled process of definition is in itself part of a exclude attacks against property. It is, after all, blood”8 in trying to assess different fea- wider contestation over ideologies or impossible to frighten inanimate object. Among tures of the phenomenon and of the state’s political objectives.”11 last year’s [1999] attacks, 152 were directed response to it since the 1970s, when the Such a statement is a weighty one and against a pipeline in Colombia, which is owned problem of terrorism became pretty it is proven by the fact that even though by multinational oil companies. Such attacks acute.9 However, as the term became used there are constant attempts to create a are of concern to the United States and so a for a wide range of spheres of activities comprehensive definition of terrorism, definition is required which allows them to be confusion over the question of what such an enterprise was not completely counted.6 terrorism really is increased substantially. successful. Such factors cause many authors to be And such confusion was sometimes affect- However, there is an argument in lit- very sceptical about the possibilities to ing research as well, a situation that could erature that, while it is hardly possible to define the terrorist phenomenon in a not be seen favourably. To quote Schmid get rid of the normative connotations of neutral manner, especially in political con- again: “While the language has political the term in everyday language, in the sci- text. As Richard Drake puts it: “As a rule, legitimacy functions – and legal and entific discourse it might be possible to terrorism is the name we give to the official definitions of terrorism as well as create a certain definition of the notion violence of people we do not like or public discourse reflect this – social science using more or less technical terms. This is support; for the violence of people we analysts in academia should attempt to what distinguishes scientific language from do like or support, we find other names.”7 create and project their own that of everyday life – it is a language terminology.”10 through which one can dispassionately Defining terrorism in As could be seen in the previous part, describe the most passionate events of social sciences the definition of terrorism in the politi- human life. Thus, an election campaign cal discourse is greatly influenced by the may acquire the meaning of life-and-death The scientific discourse did not escape interests of the states. These problems tend struggle for their participants, the same the problems associated with essentially to influence the scientific discourse as as football matches seem highly emotion- biased definitions of terrorism either. well. Some authors argue that “ no ally charged for the fans of the teams, but According to Schmid and Jongman the commonly agreed definition can in it is possible to narrate these events with- “authors have spilled almost as much ink principle be reached, because the very out such passions, using rather neutral

39 ideas. Terrorism itself is, of course, a more trying to force the moderate Jews into a lence to be a neutral weapon, in the sense problematic concept. Contrary to the fiercer opposition against occupation and that it could be used against the “enemies phenomena mentioned above, terrorism the Romans themselves to leave.12 Later the of freedom”, but also by them to sup- actually is connected to life-and-death phenomenon is said to have occurred in press its advances13 , robespierrists sought struggle, it actually implies the creation another sect – the Assassins (11th-13th c.) - to give a specific meaning to their terror. of deepest fears in the minds of the ones who were also using many techniques similar Out of this came the emphasis on the aims who encounter it. Therefore the need of to those of contemporary terrorists, and of this strategy as opposed to the means, a dispassionate conceptualisation of ter- who were attempting to reach their goals and the emphasis on its virtue, as the true rorism is even more acute. by a long campaign of intimidation. strategy of revolution with terror only as Hence, in this part of the article, the However, these situations describe a so- its emanation employed by necessity. As problem of conceptualising the phenom- called pre-history of the idea of terror, Robespierre put it: enon will be presented. For this reason, while the roots of modern terrorism and Terror is nothing else than swift, severe, firstly the historical understanding of the the appearance of the concept itself into inflexible justice, hence, it is an emanation of term “terrorism” will be shortly presented. the political lexicon lie in the events of virtue, it is not a particular principle, but a Next, I will analyse the main elements of a possible definition of terrorism and finally, the French Revolution. Like the revolu- consequence of a general principle of democracy some “normative” questions of the tion itself, the concept of terror gained a applied for the most pressing needs of the 14 definition of terrorism will be addressed. very controversial assessment from the very country. (my ranslation) beginning of its application. For the ad- Jacobins proudly called their rule “reign History of the term herents of revolution it was an unfortu- of terror” and themselves – terrorists. nate, but necessary part of a revolution- Their actions were meant to intimidate Some authors trace the appearance of ary struggle. For its adversaries it was a all the enemies of the revolution, to put terrorism back to Jewish Zealot’s move- brutality, as unnecessary as the revolution fear into their hearts and minds. This as- ment (66-73 AD) when the sicarii, in their itself. pect of the Jacobin terror made it inti- attempt to drive the Romans out of Pal- Nevertheless, it should be emphasized mately related to the generations of ter- estine, were using rather unorthodox that the primary conceptualisation of ter- rorists that were yet to come. means of violence for those times (like ror came from the revolutionaries them- In addition, terror, as the revolution murders in the midst of the crowds), while selves. Considering intimidation and vio- itself, had to stand the test of legality that

40 the adversaries of revolutionaries both become real prophets, allows a rather easy working of general will and an extra-legal inside and outside the country were legitimisation of the terrorist activities. phenomenon. It is to preserve these putting forward. A solution to this prob- Like the French revolutionaries in the 18th features in the minds of consecutive lem was found through envisioning ter- century, many contemporary terrorists see generations of terrorists as well. ror as an extra-legal endeavour. As David themselves as carrying out the will of God Not taking into much consideration Rapoport writes: or the prescription of History and this is the subtleties of the Jacobin philosophy The Revolution established a new principle supposed to legitimise their activities. of terror, the dictionaries of the time gave of legitimacy (“The Will of the People”) which Furthermore, belonging to the realm a definition of terrorism as a “système, did not simply absolved its agents from adhering of “historical necessity”, to use a Marxist régime de terreur”.17 Consequently, a ter- to existing moral and legal rules, even those term, any revolution (terrorism itself is rorist was seen as “anyone who attempted authorized by the People; it also obligated them “commonly, but not invariably revolu- to further his views by a system of coer- sometimes to do so. ... History sometimes sup- tionary”16 ) comes from outside the legal cive intimidation”.18 plants the People as the legitimising source; in system existing in any particular country. Unfortunately, the whole perception either case, the idea of a transcendent entity It is most commonly perceived as a non- of terrorism was substantially clouded by that cannot be subjected to the rules in the legal act, with its opponents calling it the political struggles both before and after ordinary sense of the term, even rules that the illegal while its adherents perceive it as the Thermidorian coup, which put an end entity supposedly creates, remains the same.15 extra-legal, beyond the legality of old codes to the so-called Robespierre’s dictatorship of laws. It cannot be put into the brackets and to the reign of terror itself. This dis- This new principle of legitimacy, to- of the system it opposes, because its cussion about the term followed the gether with the idea of general will, which legitimacy or illegitimacy comes from a concept along the lines of time, making is not the will of all people taken together very different level of justification. The it rather ambivalent at present. For it but something permanent and objective same circumstances that make terror seems to raise the obvious question about as it appears in the writings of Rousseau, necessary give it this kind of legitimacy, whose definition we are to take as our shapes many of the ideas of terrorists to- not that of laws, but a legitimacy of the guidance. Is it to be a robespierrist un- day as well. The idea that the general will will of the People. Terror, thus, appears derstanding of terror being intimately is not graspable by everyone but can be in the beginning as an emanation of related to virtue, an emanation of high- apprehended by some people who then virtue, a certain expression of the est principles of democracy, justice, and

41 freedom, an extra-legal activity, to be main elements of the concept of terror- of them are pretty closely related to each judged by different standards of legality ism in the social sciences will be critically other and do not bring essential insights as well as morality than the actions of the examined. into the problem, and others are rarely established authorities? Or is it to be an mentioned in the works. Therefore, only anti-robespierrist conceptualisation of the Main elements of the seven most commonly used ones will be notion as an illegal, unnecessary brutality definition of terrorism discussed, assessing the problems related to and a systematic use of violence to spread their inclusion into the definition. These someone’s views? Thus, while some authors While conducting his most comprehen- elements are presented in Table 1 together are proposing to use the historical devel- sive study so far on terrorism, Alex Schmid with the frequency of their use in different opment of the concept for the guide in paid considerable attention to the problem definitions. deciding what terrorism is, this endeav- of defining the phenomenon. He made a our may not be very successful. Further- summary of the twenty-two main elements Violence or force more, the structure as well as the rhetoric appearing in 109 scholarly definitions. of terrorism has changed significantly There is no need to discuss all the elements Violence is the most often used element over time, so that the usage of its histori- of these definitions in this article, for some and the one that is most clearly associated cal understanding may not be a good Table 1. Seven main elements used in the definitions of terrorism guidance for analysis. Hence, in defining terrorism we should Element Frequency concern ourselves more with the possi- 1. Violence, force 83.5% bility of depicting the contemporary 2. Political 65% phenomenon, instead of its historical 3. Fear, terror emphasized 51% provenance. The historicity of the con- 4. Threat 47% cept remains important and informative 5. (Psych.) effects and (anticipated) reactions 41.5% for the overall analysis of the phenom- 6. Victim-target differentiation 37.5% enon, but in definitions themselves a dif- 7. Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action 32% ferent strategy of assessment should be From: Schmid, Jongman et al. Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, databases, theories, and used. Therefore, in the next section the literature. Amsterdam: North Holland, Transaction Books, 1988, p.5.

42 with terrorism. Most of the definitions sen to describe the phenomenon of ter- emphasised, “terrorists want many people use this concept in their depictions of rorism. The choice between the two ele- watching, not many people dead.” There- terrorists. However, not all definitions ments depends, of course, on the research- fore, it seems that violence is not a neces- mention it, and not all those which do er’s opinion. However, considering the sary ingredient of the terrorist strategy. mention it use it in the same way. The combinations of words that appear in this For example, in a definition of R.P. first question that arises from a context, it should be possible to say which Hoffman, one finds neither violence nor characterisation as the one used by word would be preferable to another. In force. He defines terrorism as: Schmid is whether violence and force can many definitions the terms “violence” or a purposeful human political activity which be equated. If one goes deeper into the “force” are combined with “illegitimate”, is directed towards the creation of a general meaning of those two words, it becomes “unorthodox”, etc. These words say what climate of fear, and is designed to influence, in quite obvious that such an equation is the essence of the term “violence” already ways desired by the protagonist, other human hardly possible. The connotations of these implies. Therefore, it could be said that beings and, through them, some course of two words are different. While force the usage of the word “violence” could events.21 designates something which is in a sense be preferred in the definition of terror- According to this definition fear (from approved, the usage of a term “violence” ism, as it describes in one word what which the word “terrorism” itself derives gives a very different normative would otherwise have to be said in a com- its meaning) can be created also through suggestion. Violence by definition is illegal bination of at least two. other types of actions, not only through or unjust.19 As Adrian Guelke writes in The other question that arises in rela- violent ones. Threats, which appear as the this respect, “ characterisation of an tion to this element of the definition is fourth most often mentioned element in action as violent also usually entails whether it is a necessary element. There the definitions of terrorism, can be given disapproval and implies that it is seems to be little disagreement about that. as an example here. Engagement in violent illegitimate. Legitimate violence, if not Terrorism is seen as a form of violence, activities themselves is not necessary for quite an oxymoron, is usually described while the other characteristics of it are used the creation of a climate of fear, if the by another word, such as ‘force’.”20 essentially to distinguish it from other threat of violence is evident enough and Thus, it could be said that the rela- forms of violence. However, as mentioned is regarded as such by those the terrorists tionship between the two terms is hardly before, it does not appear in all the defini- want to terrorise. However, it could also synonymous. One of them has to be cho- tions. As one researcher on terrorism be claimed that the credibility of such

43 threats is more often than not based on language of their victims and use violent means in the definition of terrorism, however, the previous actions, which in this case to achieve political ends that are contestable but can be rather easily refuted. First of all, would be violent. Therefore, a certain not obscure.22 (Lukes, Urbinati, 2001) the so-called “new”, religious terrorists also agreement can be reached: that violence have very clear political goals (e.g. crea- is indeed a necessary ingredient in the It is also claimed that there can be tion of the Palestinian state and removal definition of terrorism. “criminal” terrorism, which is closely re- of the US troops from Saudi Arabia). Sec- lated to ordinary criminal activities. For ondly, it could be also said that terrorists “Political” violence instance, the idea of “narcoterrorism” belonging to the category of “old’ terror- could be related to such a notion. As ism develop something like a religious zeal The element of “political” appears quite David Campbell writes, this concept en- in their struggles against the state. There- often in the definitions of terrorism. There tails two things: fore, the whole difference between the two are, however, certain problems arising from The power of ‘narcoterrorism’ as a concept is types of terrorists, perceived by Lukes and the use of this term as well. Some authors that it subsumes under one banner a number of Urbinati, lays not so much in the reli- argue that stating that terrorism is only ideas, including the assertion that guerrilla gious wrapping of their perception, but “political” is not enough. They claim that movements finance their operations largely in their cultural background, which is there is also religious terrorism, which has through drug trafficking, and the more believable outside Western value system. different aims and reasons that are not argument that the principals in the drug industry Secondly, the emphasis on “criminal” political and therefore should be employ extreme violence.23 reasons can also be seen as rather exagger- distinguished from the so-called “old”, ated. It could be claimed that all violence ideological terrorism of the 1970s. Steven In this sense terrorism is not political is shocking and all violence is producing Lukes and Nadia Urbinati in their article but just criminal, e.g. a part of the drug a certain climate of anxiety. However, the “Words matter” claim that “[t]he new trafficking industry. Having in mind such difference between the action and its terrorism is completely different because of examples of the usage of the term, some effects of “mere criminals” and those of its religious character”. They also add that: authors claim that one needs to add the terrorists lies elsewhere. As Loren [t]hey [the al Qaeda] are unlike the terror- “criminal” to the definition of terrorism. Lomasky writes: ists of the past, such as the Red Brigades or the The argument that one has to include Criminal activity operates within the IRA (or even Hezbollah), who speak the the epithets of “religious” or “criminal” interstices of the political order and is parasitic

44 upon it. Terrorism is different. Terrorists do element, as they all relate to certain psy- These objections notwithstanding, it not aim to free ride but rather to destroy.24 chological aspects of the phenomenon. could be strongly argued that there is a As was mentioned before, violence is im- strong need to include the “terrorizing” Thus, including such elements into a portant for the whole terrorist enter- aspect of terrorism into a definition. Ter- definition could just create more confusion. prise only in so far as it provokes certain rorism without terror as a strong emo- They are often added in more comprehen- reactions. tional reaction to the events is actually a sive definitions, but actually, do not bring However, some objections are made to contradiction in terms. Even though ter- more clarity to the concept and can easily the inclusion of this element or at least rorist groups rarely manage to create a be subsumed under the “political” element. with the understanding of terror as such. sustainable atmosphere of fear, only the For instance, F. Ochberg writes: most spectacular attacks such as that of Fear and terror, psychological The equation of terror with a state of chronic September 11, 2001, achieve such results, effects and anticipated reactions fear is permissible in lay language, but in the aim of the terrorists is to produce psychiatry terror is an extreme form of anxiety, fear. 51% of the definitions emphasize often accompanied by aggression, denial, As Schmid argues: creation of the atmosphere of fear as an constricted affect, and followed by frightening There is a solid conceptual core of terrorism, important element of terrorism. Along imagery and intrusive, repetitive recollection. I differentiating it from ordinary violence. It consists with violence, this is probably one of would consider a person a terrorist if he attempted in the calculated production of a state of extreme the most important notions connected [certain] methods even if the targets did not fear of injury and death and, secondarily, the to the phenomenon. Even though not experience terror, as long as they were imperilled exploitation of this emotional reaction to all the definitions mention this element, or victimized.25 manipulate behaviour.26 its relevance for the concept of terror- Even though such an emotional reac- ism and subsequently the need to in- As it was mentioned in the first tion is rather hard to operationalize, it is clude it into a definition is consider- section of this article, fear and terror still to be considered one of the main able. In addition to that, the fifth ele- may not be included into the definition elements of terrorism, distinguishing it ment in the Schmid’s listing – that of also because of the fact that such an from the other forms of political violence psychological effects and reactions – can insertion would leave out the attacks on and allowing it to be seen as a distinct also be included in the analysis of this property. phenomenon.

45 this sense as well, the terrorist violence What could be problematic in this part Victim-target differentiation can be considered symbolic violence.28 of a definition is the notion of “system- Attacking a somewhat symbolic victim, it atic” actions. On the one hand, it might Victim-target differentiation is an ab- aims at producing the aforementioned be reasonable to agree with the point that breviation of the significant element of atmosphere of fear, as a part of population sporadic events do not have the same ef- the notion of terrorism, which empha- identifies itself with the victim and sees fect as do systematic attacks or a perceived sizes that the immediate victims of ter- itself in its place. danger of further attacks. On the other rorism are not the main targets of the hand, what is meant by a “singular ac- actions. This element, in contrast to most Organized, systematic actions tion” or “systematic actions” in this con- of the above-mentioned ones, is not con- text is not always completely clear. Both sidered to be very controversial. It actu- This element of a definition is again these characterizations refer more to the ally allows distinguishing terrorism from closely related to producing an groups and individuals engaged in ter- other forms of political violence, such as environment of fear. Singular actions, it rorist activities, but can hardly be used assassination. While in case of a murder, is claimed, do not have a strong terror- in general. For example, it could be committed for political reasons or not, izing effect. What is important, again, is claimed that a singular act by a certain the goal is death of a person, terrorism not that somebody would die in the at- group cannot create an atmosphere of “does not care about the victim itself.”27 tacks, but that the rest of the target popu- fear, which the terrorists want to attain, It is not what happens to the victim that lation would feel threatened and could but a singular act committed by a group is important, but how the fact of what perceive itself in the shoes of the victim. in the environment of the terrorist acts happens to it will affect the target audience Furthermore, “organized” actions appear may have a significant effect. Furthermore, and, through it, the authorities of the in a definition in order to distinguish as it could well be seen, one spectacular state. This factor is closely related to terrorism from instantaneous psycho- attack as the one we witnessed on creating the atmosphere of fear. Murder, pathic behaviour and from natural ca- September 11, 2001 can have a more sig- having as its target a certain concrete lamity-like events or from more nificant impact than a long and systematic person can rarely ignite a sense of anxiety spontaneous forms of political violence campaign. and fear in the target group. Anger or its as the ones encountered in street violence, Such objections, even though they equivalent is a more likely reaction. In etc. problematize significantly this specific

46 element of a definition, do not actually accepted definition in the milieu of so- phenomenon, which make it distinct make it less important. “Systematic” as well cial sciences was proposed by Alex Schmid, from the other types of activities, and also as “organized” are the labels used to dis- who sees terror as: of dealing with both state and insurgent tinguish the phenomenon of terrorism An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated types of terrorism. For the purposes of from spontaneous violence and to violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine most scientific inquiries a less emphasize again the importance of individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, encompassing and, therefore, sometimes generating a terror atmosphere in the criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast more operational definition can also come populace. The possibility of distinguish- to assassination – the direct targets of violence in handy. However, keeping in mind the ing this phenomenon from other types are not the main targets. The immediate human lack of agreement in the sphere, such a of political violence through adding this victims of violence are generally chosen randomly definition could be left for the choice of element makes it an important ingredi- (targets of opportunity) or selectively a researcher. ent in any definition of terrorism. (representative or symbolic targets) from the target population, and serve as message generators. Normative elements in definitions *** Threat- and violence-based communication of terrorism After having discussed seven elements processes between terrorist (organization), most often found in the definitions of (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used The definition elements analysed above, terrorism, it is now time to summarize to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), as well as Schmid’s definition itself, exclude the findings. From what was said above, turning it into a target of terror, a target of a certain type of elements used in some it becomes clear that a definition of demands, or a target of attention, depending on scientific inquiries. These elements could terrorism should include at least four whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda be seen as more or less “neutral” analytic elements: violence, political motives, an is primarily sought.29 concepts. However, there is another set of attempt to create a general atmosphere of elements that has not been analysed so far. fear and a systematic, organized character As it can be noticed, this definition is Some of the definitions used in analytical of actions. For the purposes of a clearer pretty long and contains elements which works on terrorism and especially in the and more encompassing understanding of might not be absolutely necessary. How- speeches and articles concerning the figures the phenomenon a more detailed defini- ever, it has the advantage of trying to deal of anti-terrorist campaigns all over the tion may also be useful. So far, the most with the most varied aspects of the world could be called “normative”. They

47 include not only an impassionate trialists returning home from work, po- the incessant drive of the moral claim to trivialize description of the phenomenon at hand, litical leaders or diplomats”. Additionally, contending discourses, in the choice of a non- but also an evaluation on moral grounds. terrorism is seen as “a form of political interpretive epistemology with its dogmatic sense The most common feature of these war”, but it “should also be distinguished of real, and in the performative nature of the definitions is the emphasis on the victims from conventional war, and terrorists text itself.34 of terrorism, on the innocence of the from soldiers” as “a soldier uses violence targets of the terrorist attacks. It is now in accordance with the legally constituted The argument is constructed in such a time to look at these definitions and to authorities of his society against the en- way that it is impossible not to take sides examine their advantages and disadvantages emies designated by those authorities”, in the eternal fight between the good and compared to the analytical ones.30 while a terrorist “engages in violence in the evil, and those sides are clearly indi- For the authors using such definitions, violation of law against people who do cated. Showing a reader as a potential vic- the conceptualisation itself serves as a tool not understand themselves to be at war”.32 tim, the text is paternalistic; it does not for strong condemnation of terrorist According to Fortin, such construction ask for the evaluation of its ideas. The actors. Alfred J. Fortin in his article of the argument has several important evaluation is pre-given in the definition “Notes on a Terrorist Text: A Critical Use implications for the analysis. First of all, it and, consequently, the article itself appears of Roland Barthes’ Textual Analysis in the is not so much a “building or structuration to be not so much the analysis of terrorism Interpretation of Political Meaning” of the terrorist, than it is a structuration but a condemnatory artefact and a tool of analyses a text of Jeane Kirkpatrick, a po- of the terrorist-victim relation”33 in which political struggle. This type of definition litical scientist and former representative the reader is encouraged to “identify with exhibits the same problems as political of the US to the United Nations, as an the victim status” and thereupon to adhere definitions presented in the first section; example of what he calls a “terrorist to the political agenda proposed by the they are influenced significantly by a certain text”.31 In her article in Harpers (Octo- authorities. Furthermore, opposition to stand that a researcher wants to take, not ber 1984), Kirkpatrick sees terrorists as this agenda, as well as a neutral analysis, only as a researcher, but as a defender of the ones who “kill, maim, kidnap, tor- becomes basically impossible and: the policies and ideas of the government. ture”, who “chooses violence as the in- [w]e see this constraint in the rigidities of the As Martha Crenshaw emphasizes: strument of first resort” whose victims dramatic oppositions created, in the marginal The danger inherent in the normative can be “schoolchildren, travellers, indus- and covert status of the hermeneutical code, in definition is that it verges on the polemical. If

48 “terrorist” is what one calls one’s opponent have often failed as well, because of the 3 Connolly, William. Identity/Difference. Demo- (regardless of whether or not one’s friend is a variable nature of the phenomenon and cratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1991, p.207. freedom fighter), then the word is more of an the diversity of approaches. As with most 4 Brian Whitaker. The definition of Terrorism. epithet or a debating stratagem than a label of the notions of social sciences, it is diffi- 5 See Dennis Hans. Bush’s Definition of Terror- that enables all who read it, whatever their cult to define anything using the usual ism Fits Northern Alliance Like a Glove; TV Inter- viewers Don’t Notice. In http://www.common ideological affiliation, to know what terrorism methods. Even more so as the term dreams.org/views01/1123-05.htm And http:// is and what it is not.35 “terrorism”, in contrast to other www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghan- phenomena, carries in itself a strong emo- bck1005.htm for Human Rights Watch assess- Conclusions ment of the situation in Afghanistan. tional component, making a neutral 6 Brian Whitaker. The definition of Terrorism. 7 The aim of this article was to present scientific definition of the concept very Drake, Richard. Revolutionary Mystique and difficult to attain. Yet, the objective Terror in Contemporary Italy. – Bloomington: the problems regarding the concept of ter- Indiana University Press, 1989. – p.xv rorism and various attempts to define it. remains, as Laqueur argues, “ a 8 Schmid, Jongman et al. Political terrorism: a Two areas in which such attempts take place comprehensive, generally accepted new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, definition of terrorism does not exist and theories, and literature. Amsterdam: North Hol- were taken into consideration: the political land, Transaction Books, 1988. – p.xiii and the academic arena. From what was is unlikely to come into existence, if only 9 Although the tactics resembling terrorism is said above it could be argued that the because terrorists and their victims will not traced as far back as the Jewish struggle against failure of overarching definitions in the agree on the matter. But a working defini- the Roman empire, it is the end of the 1960s that marks the beginning of the contemporary terror- 36 political sphere is related to the strong play tion is certainly not beyond our reach.” ist activities, an era of what has been called “age of interests in presenting the concept. The of terrorism” (see Laqueur, Walter. The Age of states are trying to define the phenomenon 1 “A recent book discussing attempts by the UN Terrorism. Boston: Little Brown and Company, in their laws and reports in such a way and other international bodies to define terror- 1987). Several events of that time influenced both the increasing usage of terrorist tactics to influ- that would allow them to include certain ism runs to three volumes and 1866 pages with- out reaching any firm conclusion” (Brian ence the political agenda and the appearance of types of attacks and to exclude others, ac- Whitaker. The definition of Terrorism. Guardian, May the word “terrorism” in everyday language, espe- cording to their needs. The neutrality of 7, 2001. In http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/ cially in the media. These events include death of such definitions is rather dubious. journalist/story/0,7792,487098,00.html ) Che Guevara in 1967, which revealed the short- comings of guerrilla warfare, student uprisings Attempted conceptualisations of the 2 Sonika Gupta. “September 11 and Definitions of Terrorism” in http://www.ipcs.org/issues/800/ of 1968, which had a similar influence on shap- notion of terrorism in the social sciences 871-ter-sonika.html ing the view of impact of revolts, and the Six Day

49 War of June 1967, which gave an impetus for an 16 Gilbert, Paul. Terrorism, Security and Nation- cepts, data bases, theories, and literature. – p.19. increasing use of the term “terrorism” by Western ality. An Introductory Study in Applied Political 26 Ibid. p.21 media (See, for example, Guelke, Adrian. The age Philosophy. London: Routledge.,1994. – p.26. 27 Ibid., p.8 of terrorism and the international political system. 17 Dictionnaire de l’Académie Française of 1798. 28 Notion of terrorism as a symbolic violence London: I.B.Tauris. 1995. – p.2-3). Quoted in Laqueur, Walter. The Age of Terror- was introduced in 1964 by Th. P. Thornton 10 Schmid, Jongman et al. Political terrorism: a ism. – p.11 29 Schmid, Jongman. Political terrorism: a new new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, 18 James Murray’ New English Dictionary on guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theo- theories, and literature. – p.27 Historical Principles, published in 1919 in Ox- ries, and literature. – p.28. 11 Quoted in Schmid, Jongman et al. Political ford. Quoted in Laqueur, Walter. The Age of Ter- 30 The distinction between normative and ana- terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, con- rorism. – p.11. lytical definitions of terrorism was proposed by cepts, data bases, theories, and literature. – p.27. 19 For example, the third understanding of “vio- Martha Crenshaw (see Crenshaw, Martha. Reflec- 12 See, for example, Laqueur, Walter. The Age of lence” in the Webster dictionary reads that vio- tions on the Effects of Terrorism // Martha Crenshaw Terrorism. – p.12-13. lence is an “unjust or callous use of force or ed. Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power. Conse- 13 “Que le despote gouverne par la terreur ses power, as in violating another’s rights, sensibili- quences of Political Violence. Middletown: sujets abrutis ; il a raison, comme despote : ties, etc” (Webster’s New World College Diction- Wesleyan University Press. 1983. – p.1) domptez par la terreur les ennemis de la liberté ; ary, 3rd Edition. NY: Macmillan, 1996. – p.1490). 31 “The text is not a quest, but an act of combat. et vous aurez raison, comme fondateurs de la 20 Guelke, Adrian. The age of terrorism and the And to the extent that it strikes without notice, République” (When a despot governs by terror international political system. London. – p.20. trades on fear, and is impatient with process, it is his stupefied subjects, he is right as a despot; 21 Quoted in Schmid, Jongman et al. Political a terrorist text” See Fortin, Alfred. Notes on a Terror- overcome by terror enemies of freedom and you terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, con- ist Text: A Critical Use of Roland Barthes’ Textual will be right as the founders of the Republic) cepts, data bases, theories, and literature. – p.4. Analysis in the Interpretation of Political Meaning // from Robespierre, Maximillien. Pour le bonheur 22 Lukes, Steven and Urbinati, Nadia (2001) Der Derian, Shapiro, eds. International/ et pour la liberté. Discours. – Paris: La fabrique “Words matter” in http://www.opendemocracy. Intertextual Relations. Postmodern Readings of editions, 2000 – p.297. net/document_store/Doc862-5.pdf World Politics. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington 14 La terreur n’est que la justice prompte, sévère, 23 Campbell, David. Writing Security. United Books, 1989. – p.203 inflexible; elle est donc une émanation de la vertu; States foreign policy and the politics of identity. 32 The text is taken from Fortin, Alfred. Notes on elle est moins un principe particulier qu’une Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992. – a Terrorist Text: A Critical Use of Roland Barthes’ conséquence du principe général de la democracie p.212. Textual Analysis in the Interpretation of Political Mean- appliqué aux plus pressants besoins de la patrie. 24 Lomasky, Loren. The political significance of ter- ing – p.205-206. (Quoted from ibid., p.296-297) rorism // Frey, Morris eds. Violence, Terrorism 33 ibid., p.203. 15 Rapoport, David. Introduction // Rapoport, and Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 34 ibid. D. and Alexander Y. The Morality of Terrorism: Press, 1991. – p. 100. 35 Crenshaw, Martha. Reflections on the Effects of Religious and Secular Justifications. – New York: 25 Quoted in Schmid, Jongman et al. Political Terrorism – p.2 Pergamo Press, 1982. – p.xiv) terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, con- 36 Laqueur, Walter. The Age of Terrorism. – p.149.

50 Lithuanian Airspace Management In Times of Crisis and War

By Antanas Jucius*

I. Introduction dressed is compatibility with ICAO1, and Defence as a military authority as well. NATO systems and procedures. Such an idea brings in the requirements Since 1991 Lithuania has moved rap- In October 2000 a new Law on Avia- for interdependence and close co-opera- idly to modernise and improve civil and tion was adopted in Lithuania. Accord- tion between these two authorities in re- military communications, navigation, ing to it, “the Government is responsible gard to airspace management in peacetime surveillance, and Air Traffic Management for efficient organisation, assignment and and especially in times of crisis and war. (ATM) equipment and systems. On the management of Lithuanian airspace, in The purpose of this article is to ana- military side, progress has been signifi- order to achieve effective use of airspace lyse the Lithuanian Airspace Management cantly slower, constrained by limited by civilian aircraft considering airspace system in order to determine its adequacy budgets and deliberations over ATM al- needs for national security of Lithuania.”2 in time of crisis and war and to recom- ternatives and their impacts on cockpit However, the responsibilities concerning mend its further development. equipment. An important problem is the development of communications, naviga- The increased demand for airspace use incompatibility between civil and mili- tion, surveillance, and ATM equipment from all airspace user groups3 is expected tary systems, which restricts military op- and systems, have to be assigned for both to continue. The existing ATM system in erations and impacts training. Another the Civil Aviation Administration (CAA) Lithuania is unlikely to cope with this significant problem that must be ad- as a civil authority and the Ministry of demand. One of the main areas for change

* Maj Antanas Jucius, a graduate of the Baltic Defence College, is currently with the Staff of the Lithuanian Air Force.

51 concerns the organization and use of air- • Airspace Management (ASM), which structures and assignment of airspace re- space. A major obstacle to produce more assigns airspace efficiently to its main us- quires close co-operation between all air- airspace capacity is that the effective use ers (civil and military). space users. From the military point of of Lithuanian airspace has not been Thus, in order to analyse Lithuanian view, the efficient design, assignment and optimised to date. The requirements of Airspace Management we have to answer control of airspace have a decisive impact all airspace user groups and ATM provid- the question what Airspace Management on airspace surveillance, detection of air- ers are the main driving forces in further System has to be developed to ensure a craft and defence of sovereignty of the development of airspace management strat- proper flow of traffic and national secu- country. In order to fulfil this mission, egy, which shall be oriented towards rity in Lithuanian airspace in times of military forces require freedom of action optimizing and simplifying the airspace crisis and war. for their assets in the air to conduct proper structure. Furthermore, future national This article does not explain the ICAO training in peacetime. This freedom is es- ATM strategies cannot realistically be or NATO requirements, standards and pro- pecially essential in time of crisis and war. developed in isolation, as each individual cedures in detail because of limitations in This chapter provides general informa- state is an integral element of the European size of the article. However, all necessary tion about the airspace use concept imple- ATM system. references to original documents are pro- mented by most of the European coun- vided. Moreover, this article does not in- tries, including the current Lithuania’s air- From the ICAO approach, ATM con- clude any assessments in terms of the finan- space design and the ASM system. Further- sists of three functions: cial costs required, as it suggests possible more, it provides an analysis of what au- • Air Traffic Control (ATC), which is solutions but not an implementation plan. thority shall have responsibility for the air responsible for sufficient separation be- traffic control in Lithuania in time of peace, tween aircraft in the air and between air- II. Legislation and crisis and war, and what are the Lithua- craft and the ground, to avoid collisions, responsibilities of the nian Armed Forces’ demands on ATC. while ensuring a proper flow of traffic. authorities • Air Traffic Flow Management Flexible use of airspace (ATFM), which regulates the flow of air- The objective of ASM is to achieve the craft as efficiently as possible to avoid the most efficient use of airspace based on The document “The Concept of the congestion at certain control sectors. actual needs. A proper design of airspace Flexible Use of Airspace” (the FUA Con-

52 cept) has been developed by the more closely into line with the military military air combat exercises and military EUROCONTROL4 for the European Air operational requirements. flight training. The military Regulator is Traffic Control Harmonisation and Inte- responsible for establishing the rules and gration Programme (EATCHIP) Project Airspace structure standards for military flights within a TSA. Board and the NATO Committee for According to the ICAO definition, Officers in the Air Force (Fighter Con- European Airspace Co-ordination controlled airspace is divided into four trollers) normally control flights within a (CEAC). In June 1994 the FUA document different parts: Control Zone (CTR), Ter- TSA. An important consideration has to was endorsed by the 4th Meeting of the minal Area (TMA), Control Area (CTA) be given to flight safety standards on sepa- European Ministers of Transport. and Temporary Segregated Area (TSA). ration between flights within and flights The basis for the FUA Concept is that The FUA Concept provides that nor- outside a TSA. “airspace should no longer be designated mally both the civil and military airspace as either military or civil airspace but users have access to CTR, TMA and CTA. Assigning airspace should be considered as one continuum In principle the ICAO standards, such as According to the FUA Concept, a na- and used flexibly on a day-to-day basis. separation minima, required equipment, tional order for assigning airspace has to Consequently, any necessary airspace seg- flight safety requirements etc., apply to be established. This order must be in ac- regation should be only of a temporary all traffic. Any other national standards cordance with law (Law on Aviation). In nature ”5 It is of importance that the can be established via the Law on Avia- order to reassess a national airspace, to application of the FUA Concept is ad- tion and published in the Aeronautical establish new flexible airspace structures vantageous for both civil and military Information Publication (AIP). Further- and to introduce the procedures for the airspace users, because it will lead to an more, in the integrated ASM system the allocation of these airspace structures on increase in ATC capacity, more efficient Regulator of military aviation can, day-by-day basis, a high-level National ways to separate Operational and General through the Regulator of civil aviation, Airspace Policy Body with representatives Air Traffics (OAT/GAT), improved real- establish national standards for military from the civil and military authorities time civil-military co-ordination and a ATC. should be established. The high-level civil/ significant reduction in airspace segrega- TSAs are established for activities of a military national body “formulates the tion needs as well as the use of Tempo- temporary nature, which need specific national ASM policy and carries out the rary Segregated Areas (TSA) being brought protection. Normally they are used for necessary strategic planning work, taking

53 into account national and international lished for controlling military aircraft reached the TMA, handed over to the ATC airspace users requirements ”6 Other air- during the intercept missions and tacti- of that specific airbase for landing. space users (e.g. firing ranges) must have cal training flight exercises in peacetime In air policing scenario, when a mili- guaranteed influence on the airspace struc- and for the air combat missions in war- tary aircraft is conducting the mission to ture. For that purpose they shall be called time. identify and/or take other actions towards as members of the national airspace policy A typical scenario for a military train- an unknown aircraft, the flight can be body when issues within their field of ing flight in the integrated ATM system handed over to the fighter controller at interests are decided. can be described as follows: a military air- an earlier stage in order to conduct the For the daily allocation and promul- craft is departing from a military airbase interception in an optimal way. By close gation of the flexible airspace structures for a mission and is first handled by the co-operation between the ACC and/or the and for communication of the airspace ATC of this particular airbase. When leav- ATC of the airbase and the fighter con- status to the EUROCONTROL (a so-called ing the Terminal Area (TMA), the flight troller in the CAOC, flight safety stand- Centralised Airspace Data Function is handed over to the Area Control Cen- ards will be maintained during all phases (CADF)), a national Airspace Management tre (ACC) for the en-route phase of the of the flight. Cell (AMC) should be established. Au- flight. When the flight reaches the TSA thorisation, responsibilities for manning allocated for the mission, the aircraft is Current situation in Lithuania and relevant instructions must be issued handed over to a fighter controller (lo- and described in such a manner, that the cated in the Combined Air Operations The present Lithuanian ASM system is decision-making levels can be identified Centre (CAOC)) who will be controlling designed in accordance with two main easily by every responsible authority, and the exercise within the TSA. During this legal acts – The Law on Aviation of Lithua- in a manner, that can guarantee levels of phase of the mission there is a close co- nia from 17 October 2000 and The De- influence for both the military and civil operation between the ACC and the cree of the Government of the Republic airspace users. fighter controller in the CAOC regard- of Lithuania on the approval of the Air ing information on flight safety issues. Space Structure of the Republic of Lithua- Fighter control Finally, when the exercise is completed, nia from 22 January 1997. All relevant Not being part of the ATM system, a the aircraft is handed over to the ACC information as well as other regulations fighter control system normally is estab- for the flight back to a base and, having and requirements of air navigation are

54 published in AIP of the Republic of field in Kazlu Ruda was closed in 2001, try of Transport is the Regulator and Lithuania issued by the Civil Aviation but restricted areas (R) related to it still Supervisor for civil aviation, while the Administration (CAA). “The Rules of the exist, as well as several D areas above the governmental enterprise “Air Navigation Air and procedures applicable to air traf- firing grounds, which are not in use Services” is the Provider. The Ministry fic in the territory of the Republic of anymore. At the same time, the main Air of National Defence plays the role of a Lithuania conform to Annex 2 – Rules of Force base in ¨iauliai has only one small Regulator, Provider and Supervisor for the Air and Annex 11 – Air Traffic Serv- R area to conduct military flight train- military aviation, however the “Air Navi- ice to the Convention of International ing. These simple examples show that the gation Services” usually provide support Civil Aviation and to the Regional Sup- Airspace Structure has to be reviewed and for the military users in peacetime as well. plementary Procedures applicable to the all necessary changes have to be done in The main problem to be solved is that at European Region.”7 co-operation between civil and military present time, due to the Lithuanian avia- According to the Aeronautical Infor- airspace users. tion sector’s size and available resources mation Publication, the Lithuanian Air- Concerning responsibilities of the au- as well as the already established structure, space Structure includes Controlled Air- thorities for ASM, which are stated in the the involved authorities are not able to space, Air Traffic Services (ATS) Route, above-mentioned legal acts as well, the fully carry out their responsibilities. Danger Area (D), Restricted Area (R) and Lithuanian aviation sector system is based Regarding the above-mentioned prob- Prohibited Area (P). The Controlled Air- on the conceptual structure of a Regula- lem, there is a need for improvements and space or ATS Airspace, respectively, in- tor, Provider and Supervisor. In such a reorganisations in the Lithuanian ASM cludes CTA, TMA and CTR. ATS airspaces structure the Regulator is responsible for system. It is necessary to mention here are classified as Class A to G. setting standards and regulations, the Pro- that in order to achieve the more effi- Airspace restrictions - D, R, and P Ar- vider’s task is to serve the customer in cient use of airspace by both the civil and eas - are mainly related to various mili- accordance with standards and regulations military users and to increase the capac- tary activities in peacetime, therefore a set by the Regulator and the Supervisor ity of the air traffic, the Lithuanian ASM proper design and use of them are very has to monitor that the Provider applies system is under continuous development important. However, there are some in- standards and regulations set by the Regu- and modernization in close co-operation accuracies and areas to be changed in the lator. According to the Law on Aviation between responsible civil and military structure. For example, the military air- of Lithuania, the CAA under the Minis- authorities. The latest results of the co-

55 operation show that one of solutions is a matic and guarantees the uninterrupted Forces, has to be established. This ap- development of an Integrated Civil/Mili- functioning of the ASM system during proach will ensure a strong influence by tary Airspace Management System in all the above-mentioned phases. Prepara- the Lithuanian Armed Forces upon ASM, Lithuania. The integrated system shall, tion and planning must be made by the thus meeting all requirements for national wherever relevant, be based on the Airspace Management Cell (AMC) and security. The Government should define EATCHIP “Concept of the Flexible Use other responsible authorities in peacetime subordination structure during raised of Airspace”. to ensure that ASM continues during cri- alert or under war conditions through ses and can be adapted to a possible war its decrees. Any other details of such situ- A responsible air traffic control situation. Good examples for such a prepa- ations should be regulated by various (ATC) authority in Lithuania in ration are military war planning, training inter-agency agreements. peacetime, crisis and war for special war tasks and development of The effect of transferring responsibil- special equipment and procedures for mili- ity is that the Air Traffic Management Efficient Airspace Management (ASM) tary purposes. The Lithuanian Armed Forces (ATM) elements and services would cease is essential for successful and safe tactical would set the tactical demands, however the to exist as a part of the civil structure. missions during different levels of raised CAA shall conduct some of these prepara- Equipment and facilities would be trans- alert or war situations. For that reason it tion tasks, the remaining tasks being respon- ferred to the military structure, and civil- is necessary to decide how the overall re- sibility of the Lithuanian Air Force. A sys- ian employees would become subordi- sponsibility for providing ATC shall be tem, which ensures necessary military influ- nated to the military staff. ATM would distributed during various alert or war ence and division of responsibilities between continue uninterruptedly in the same situations. It is of importance that a trans- the authorities, should be established via manner as before the transfer and there fer point is defined and stated in a law agreements at different levels. would be no necessity to replace either similar to other laws entering into force the employees or equipment. The ATC’s under such circumstances. The responsi- Responsibility transfer system function at military airbases would con- bilities should be regulated via legislation In order to achieve the above-men- tinue providing services to both the mili- and agreements through the high-level tioned objective, a system, in which the tary and civil customers under control of civil/military national airspace policy responsibility during crisis and war is the Lithuanian Armed Forces, while con- body. By doing so, the transfer is auto- transferred to the Lithuanian Armed currently the ATC units not located at

56 the military airbases would continue pro- Ministry of Transport for distribution • Establishment of an organisation, or viding services to all aviation under sub- of costs for investments in training, nec- assigning of a part of an already existing ordination of the Lithuanian Armed essary infrastructure and procurement of organisation within the Lithuanian Forces as well. equipment according to the special de- Armed Forces, to hold responsibility of Since the system of transferring respon- mands set by the Lithuanian Armed preparing for the wartime ATM duties. sibility is usually prepared in advance and Forces. Those agreements will be based on interacts with similar laws for war situa- the principle that the Ministry of National Demands of the Lithuanian tions, the transfer would be automatic and Defence accepts to share or compensate Armed Forces on air traffic not affecting the services provided to ei- costs for the special services, equipment, management ther military or civil aviation. buildings and facilities necessary for the military purposes. An integrated ATM system is designed Areas for agreements and contracts • Establishment of a system where the to give civil and military aviation an in- With the system of transferring respon- air traffic controllers at military facilities tegrated access to controlled airspace dur- sibility the ATM elements, such as equip- can fulfil specific military duties. If the ing raised alert and war. At the same time, ment and facilities, and service provid- air traffic controllers are to be transferred it ensures tactical freedom for defence ing employees would become a part of to serve in the Lithuanian Armed Forces, aviation flights during exercises, for inci- the Lithuanian Armed Forces after the probably a reservists system should be dent readiness flights and in wartime. transfer and would be subordinated to established for that purpose. Additional Different parts of the aviation sector in- the Lithuanian Air Force. In this case there costs for exercise and training of the re- teract with each other in accordance with are a number of areas, which need to be servists should be part of the financial the same principles in peacetime as well as regulated through different agreements agreements between the Ministry of Na- during raised alert and war. To ensure an and contracts between the above-men- tional Defence and the Ministry of Trans- uninterrupted and well-functioning ATM tioned parties. port. system during raised alert, when the CAA • Establishment of working procedures is maintaining responsibility, as well as Examples of such areas are: between different relevant organisations during war, when responsibility is trans- • Financial agreements between the to ensure an uninterrupted transition ferred to the Lithuanian Armed Forces, a Ministry of National Defence and the from peacetime to a war situation. Regulation on ATM for war should be

57 established. This regulation should cover has to be immediately transferred to the tally different nature where special skills a number of different areas during the Lithuanian Armed Forces, and the ATM of the ATM personnel are useful to the two different phases and include items such personnel shall act in accordance with what defence. The purpose is to ensure required as readiness, airspace organization and has been planned in advance. quality, flexibility and continuity of com- classification, and ATM organization. The airspace organisation has to en- mand and control at fighter control units, It is important that the Lithuanian Air sure the priority to and safety of combat airbases, headquarters, Area Control Cen- Force should have an incident readiness flights. In wartime, a priority to combat tre (ACC) and Combined Air Operations at all times. Moreover, the ATM person- flights is an imperative, however it can Centre (CAOC). Another important task nel at airbases have to be a part of this also be given to important civil transpor- is a co-ordination with air defence units readiness as well. If the Government raises tation flights on defence missions. Air- to ensure their ability to perform their alert for whatever the reason, the ATM space classification definitions in accord- duties and prevent accidental fire at personnel shall remain employees of the ance with the AIP are valid through all friendly aircraft. Those tasks require an CAA until the transferring point. Dur- phases of raised alert and war, therefore ATM organisation that is properly ing this phase, orders concerning ATM any changes of airspace classification have equipped and trained. At wartime all should be passed from the Lithuanian to be planned by the Airspace Manage- flights shall have the best possible service Armed Forces to them for execution. Af- ment Cell, in close co-operation between as long as possible. Therefore peacetime ter the transferring point the ATM per- the Lithuanian Armed Forces and the investments have to be adapted whenever sonnel will become employees of the CAA. The planning and implementation possible to wartime demands as well as Lithuanian Armed Forces or conscripts. of changes to airspace classification has planning and development have to secure The important consideration here is that to be done taking into account the Land the ability to adapt to war. Moreover, the CAA has to be ready to take back the Force and Navy air defence assets as well. recruitment and training of personnel responsibility when alert level is decreased The ATM organisation has to be able have to meet the necessary military re- or war is terminated. If the State authori- to provide professional services adapted quirements and, in order to have an effi- ties have not declared a state of war, but to the requirements of the Lithuanian cient military organisation, the ATM per- there is war de facto, it should be consid- Armed Forces for civil and military avia- sonnel shall be prepared to fulfil not only ered as an automatic state of war. In such tion as well as a number of special tasks. their professional duties but also other, a situation, the responsibility for ATM Those tasks mean duties of partly or to- defence related ones, as well.

58 neutral air. ASC provides a commander for ASC in the area. The ACA is to plan, Wartime airspace management with the operational flexibility to effec- coordinate and organise the Airspace considerations tively employ forces ”8 . Control System (ACS) and to be respon- The keystone document for ASC is sible for its operation in order to sup- Modern warfare is characterised by the NATO ATP-40(B) “Doctrine for Airspace port the higher commander’s campaign fact that all military forces become air- Control in Times of Crisis and War”. The objectives. All other commanders are to space users either to a full or certain ex- doctrine is designed for all NATO forces integrate all their weapon systems within tent. This leads to high level of complex- as well as PfP nation’s forces. Therefore, the Airspace Control Plan (ACP), which ity of ASM not only in peacetime but the suggested Lithuanian regulation on has to be approved by ACA. also especially in times of crisis and war. wartime ATM, which was discussed in the The examples of combat operations when previous chapter, should be designed in Planning of the airspace control aircraft are engaged by their own air de- accordance with the requirements of this system fences or inadvertently damaged by doctrine. The following is not a detailed In order to reach the effective ASC friendly fire prove this fact. In order to description of the doctrine, but a sum- during the military operations the re- minimise the risks of losing air assets being mary of the main principles and areas quirements of all commanders should be engaged by friendly fire on the one hand covered by the document. considered during the ASC planning and to maximise their freedom of action process. Therefore, “each commander who in combat on the other hand, special Airspace control authority operates aerial vehicles, weapons systems measures have to be taken. These measures The doctrine provides a command or electronic means to perform his as- are known as Airspace Control (ASC). structure for all kind of military opera- signed mission within the ASC-Area, must “The objective of ASC is to maximise the tions, chain of command as well as clear participate in planning the use of that effectiveness of military operations by pro- responsibilities of each commander. The airspace ”9 . Furthermore, the require- moting the ability of air, land, and mari- most important principle for command ments for civilian aircraft flights and any time forces to operate in efficient, inte- and control is that one commander - Air- other host nation military and civil avia- grated and flexible manner with minimum space Control Authority (ACA) should tion impacts must be taken into account. mutual interference and without undue be designated for each area of operations The results of the ASC planning must be restraint and risk to friendly forces and and should assume overall responsibility implemented into ACP. The ACP will list

59 the responsibilities of the authorities, rules where necessary, identify additional of engagement (ROE), instructions and means as well. Conclusion any specified procedures for ASC, and As mentioned before, in order to max- will detail the boundaries of the ASC-Area imise operational effectiveness, friendly As it is mentioned in this chapter there and any sub-areas. Finally, the ACA will air assets must be able to operate with a are some indicators that the present Lithua- implement the ACP by issuing the Air- minimum risk of engagement by own nian ASM system has to be modernised space Control Orders (ACO), which by air defences. Furthermore, those air de- and developed in order to achieve more their character may be standing or based fences must be able to identify friendly efficient use of airspace by both civilian on the threat, operations tempo or other air assets in order to engage the hostile and military users. The most adequate planning factors. ones. To achieve these aims, the opera- solution is to develop an integrated civil/ tional commander must ensure that an military ASM system. This system shall, Structure and methods of the airspace appropriate system of ASC exists. Two wherever relevant, be based on the control main methods are used for exercising EATCHIP “Concept of the Flexible Use All airspace users and their control- ASC – positive ASC and procedural ASC. of Airspace”. ling elements should possess interoperable The positive method relies on positive In accordance with the FUA Concept, communications, information systems identification and control of an aircraft entire airspace is considered to be one and equipment to fulfil their duties in by electronic means, while procedural continuum and is designated as both the ACS. The whole of airspace control relies on a combination of previously military and civil airspace. This approach facilities, communications and automa- agreed orders and procedures. Opera- is advantageous for both types of users, tion capabilities, surveillance and iden- tional situations, however, in general because the airspace is used flexibly on a tification resources, and procedures is could demand a mixture of those two day-by-day basis with necessary airspace known as Airspace Control Means methods. It is of importance that, when segregation being of temporary nature (ACM). The ACA is responsible to se- the control of an aircraft is transferred only. Establishment of the TSAs, which lect, in coordination with subordinate between two control authorities in com- should replace or modify, wherever pos- commanders, those ACM, which are bat, the responsibility assuming author- sible, the D, P and R areas currently used most suitable for the ASC-Area and ac- ity must positively identify the aircraft in Lithuania, would bring the ASM sys- complishment of the mission. He may, as friendly. tem more closely into line with the mili-

60 tary operational requirements. Therefore eas, areas of personnel training, establish- as military defence of the airspace have to a high-level national airspace policy body ment of facilities, procurement of systems be developed to fulfil this mission. The with representatives from the civil and and equipment, establishment of common Air Surveillance is purely a military func- military airspace authorities needs to be regulations and procedures. Therefore, a tion and, as such, is not part of ATM. established. Furthermore, a National Air- regulation on wartime ATM, which shall This function normally does not imply space Management Cell needs to be set up cover readiness, airspace and ATM organi- controlling air traffic but rather deals with to serve all users in the daily allocation of zation and other military demands, has identification and tracking of aircraft the airspace structures. to be produced. within the Area of Operations (AOO). The main principle of an integrated In wartime, Lithuania must combine The air surveillance in crisis or wartime ASM system is that the provider’s respon- defence resources and means from vari- is a mission for detection and identifica- sibility is given to one authority. This ous levels - national, regional, and multi- tion of the aircraft, particularly the Iden- has to be regulated through the high-level national. That requires a close co-opera- tification of Friend or Foe (IFF). civil/military national airspace policy tion between all the participants. Thus the The following chapter provides a gen- body at different levels of raised alert and Lithuanian ASM system in times of crisis eral description of the requirements for in war situations. Because responsible and war has to be developed in accord- the identification systems, which are used authorities are different in peacetime and ance with the NATO requirements for by the ICAO and NATO countries, as well wartime, it is of importance to establish a ASC, which are prescribed in NATO ATP- as interrelations between them. The system of transferring the responsibility 40 (B) “Doctrine for Airspace Control in proper development of the identification of ATM, which guarantees the uninter- Times of Crisis and War”. capabilities of air defence assets and air rupted provision of services during cri- surveillance systems is a crucial issue in sis and war. A transfer point has to be III. Air surveillance terms of risk to friendly forces and neu- clearly defined by the Government and tral aircraft being engaged by own air stated in a law coming into force under One of the top priorities for the defences or damaged by friendly fire. such a situation. The successful transfer Lithuanian Air Force is exercising con- Furthermore, this chapter provides a requires close co-operation between civil trol over Lithuanian airspace. Efficient air description of capabilities of the current and military authorities through agree- surveillance above all territory, territorial Lithuanian Air Surveillance System and ments and contracts in legal, financial ar- waters and at all altitudes of flights as well introduces a so far quite well developed

61 and still ongoing co-operation between trol Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS). The tion to NATO Air Defence authorities all three Baltic countries in regional air- Mode S ground sensors periodically trans- that will aid compilation of the Recog- space surveillance – the BALTNET10 . The mit ATCRBS Mode A identity and Mode nised Air Picture (RAP); to be able to areas for improvement of the Air Sur- C altitude interrogations and, vice versa, assume management and control of the veillance System and the BALTNET are the Mode S transponders will respond to civil ATM system in times of crisis. discussed in this chapter as well. interrogations from the ATCRBS ground NATO Mode S requirements are de- sensors. Mode C is a common civil/mili- fined by STANAG11 4193 “Technical The ICAO and NATO tary mode that allows an aircraft to re- Characteristics of IFF Mk XA and Mk XII requirements for identification port its altimeter-reported altitude. Interrogators and Transponders” Part IV In previous years NATO saw no mili- – Technical Characteristics of Mode S in ICAO Mode S tary requirement for Mode S procurement Military Interrogators and Transponders. The latest development and the ICAO as a military IFF system. This view was NATO recommendations can be summa- requirement for identification systems is taken, because Mode S is a civil ATS sys- rised as follows: a Mode S capability. Mode S is a beacon tem that would not meet the military • Tactical fixed and rotary wing aircraft system used for aircraft surveillance in operational requirement for a question that do not make regular use of controlled terminal areas as well as for en-route traf- and answer component of the NATO Iden- airspace are to be fitted to Mode S level 2 fic. It has several features that represent tification System. Specifically, Mode S is (Basic Surveillance functionality). significant capability improvements (e.g. neither secure nor jam-resistant. • Fixed and rotary wing aircraft that azimuth accuracy, separation of responses Nevertheless, NATO recognises that are regular users of the civil route struc- from two very close aircraft) over the military aircraft and authorities will have ture are to be fitted to meet the require- current system. As it is a beacon system, to make use of Mode S for the following ments of ICAO Europe; these have yet to there is a ground sensor transmitting in- reasons: to enable the military to access/ be finalized. terrogations to a special transponder, car- penetrate the civilian route structure or • Aircraft addresses should be easily ried on an aircraft. The transponders for- terminal control areas; to facilitate the safe changeable by ground crews prior to mulate replies that are transmitted to the coordination of military/civilian air traf- flight. ground sensor. The Mode S system is com- fic; to facilitate the use of civil airfields • Mode S transponders must be at least patible with the current Air Traffic Con- by military aircraft; to provide informa- on-off selectable from the cockpit or ap-

62 propriate aircrew station while in flight. is used in support of both military and progresses along its journey, this infor- Where technically feasible, aircrew should civil ATC. Mode 4 is a crypto-secure mode mation will allow the ATC centres to fol- be able to control the Level of Mode S of Mk XII IFF that is used to provide a low its flight trough the FIR for which being transmitted from their aircraft to high confidence, beyond visual range, they are responsible and to hand it over Level 2 Basic Surveillance functionality. identification of friendly aircraft to avoid to its neighbouring FIR. misidentification. IFF systems may also NATO is developing a new IFF system, NATO IFF support Mode C operations. known as IFF Mode 5. All Mode 4 avionics NATO requires the use of compatible Mode 4 transponders can provide a will be updated when IFF Mode 5 is fielded. IFF systems in support of ATC and NATO valid reply only if they and the interro- STANAG 4193 Mk XIIA Parts V and VI Integrated Air Defence (NATINADS) gator are properly keyed. Interrogator define Mode 5 and the document has been operations. All aircraft participating in systems interface with a KIR-1C released for ratification so far. NATO operations and/or flying in cryptographic computer. Transponder NATO member airspace must be equipped systems interface with a KIT-1C Lithuanian air surveillance with NATO-compatible IFF equipment. cryptographic computer. To insure the system and the BALTNET National air defence elements of security of the encryption, the variables NATINADS and military ATC systems (keys) that are used in the encryption and Lithuanian air surveillance system must be equipped with appropriate IFF decryption processes are changed daily. Together with the development of the interrogator sets to interact with the air- For ATC purposes, the non-secure air- airborne part of identification capabili- borne elements. craft identification codes (modes 1, 2 and/ ties, the ground-based part of the system NATO requires IFF systems to support or 3) should be included in the flight has to be taken into account as well. The operations in modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. Tech- plan information (route, height, speed, first step of such development is to reach nical characteristics of these modes are time of arrival, etc.) provided to military the proper and efficient coverage of area defined in STANAG 4193, Part I – Gen- and/or civilian ATC centres located across by air surveillance sensors (radars). Cur- eral Description of the System. Modes 1 flight information region (FIR) bounda- rently, the military radars used are the and 2 provide a non-encrypted, military- ries. All ATC centres that will have respon- radar types P-18, P-37, P-40, “Jawor” and only identification of aircraft. Mode 3 sibility for the flight need to know the “Korenj” as well as altimeters PRV-11 and corresponds to the civilian Mode A and relevant identity code. As the aircraft PRV-16. These radars are deployed

63 throughout the country. The P-18 and P- BALTNET it should be connected to the NATINADS 37 medium range radars are used for The BALTNET project was conceived as well as other early warning systems. The medium and high altitude air surveillance. from the U.S. sponsored Regional Air- USA, Denmark, Norway and Poland have The P-18 radars have an extractor fitted space Initiative (RAI) to the Central Eu- been actively supporting the project. that digitises the signal, while the P-37 ropean countries. Officially, the RASCC radars have major system upgrades was inaugurated on June 1, 2000. Since Conclusion planned. As a result their digitised signals then, it has been serving the airspace sur- can be used within the BALTNET. veillance for 24 hours per day. The In order to reach control over Lithua- Against low (300 m above the ground BALTNET objective is to produce a Rec- nian airspace, an efficient air surveillance level, AGL) flying aircraft the military ognized Air Picture (RAP) over the Bal- and defence systems have to be developed. radar sites in Lithuania provide good tic states and their approaches and to com- ICAO and NATO requirements clearly coverage over the western half of the coun- municate it to the national air surveil- outline the common civil/military inter- try, but limited coverage in the east. lance centres in Estonia, Latvia and Lithua- est in this area. NATO requires the use Lithuania has 3 primary civilian radars nia, and, if needed, also to other states as of compatible IFF systems in support of that are integrated with the military radars. may be agreed. It will allow the Baltic states ATC and NATINADS operations. All air- At higher altitudes the radars provide to survey effectively and co-ordinate their craft participating in NATO-led opera- continuous radar coverage over the en- sovereign air space and to ensure safety tions must be equipped with NATO-com- tire country, but have limited radar cov- of the air traffic. patible IFF equipment while air defence erage beyond the south-eastern border. The BALTNET system consists of na- elements and military ATC systems must Information from the radars flows into tional air surveillance centres in Estonia, be equipped with appropriate IFF inter- the Airspace Control Centre (ACC) of Latvia and Lithuania, an internationally rogators to interact with the airborne el- the Lithuanian Airspace Surveillance and staffed RASCC (the core of the system) ements. The goal of taking such measures Control Command (ASCC) and the Re- in Karmelava, near Kaunas, Lithuania as is to minimise the risks to the air assets gional Air Surveillance Coordination well as communication lines and air sur- from friendly fire while at the same time Centre (RASCC) of the BALTNET veillance radars. maximising freedom of action. through a microwave communication and The BALTNET has been designed as a The current Lithuanian Air Surveillance information network in real time. NATO-interoperable system. In the future and Control System provides a complete

64 coverage over Lithuania against aircraft duce the effectiveness of hostile air ac- The following chapter provides a de- flying at high altitudes, however signifi- tion”12 . As it was already mentioned, all scription of active and passive AD meth- cant parts of eastern Lithuania are left military forces in modern warfare become ods as well as NATO requirements for the without coverage against aircraft at low- airspace users either to a full or certain AD planning, employment of the AD as- level altitude. Therefore further develop- extent, which leads to high level of com- sets, co-ordination and control of the AD ment of the system is required. An effi- plexity of above-mentioned measures. missions in times of crisis and war. This cient system might be reached through Development and implementation of chapter also covers several issues, which modernisation of existing assets, procure- more sophisticated AD weapons is aimed should be taken into consideration by the ment of new ones, as well as through en- at increasing defence effectiveness on the Lithuanian Armed Forces’ authorities, in hanced cooperation with the civil ATM one hand, but, on the other hand, has order to develop the appropriate regula- and the Navy by using their air surveil- raised the risk to neutral or friendly forces tions for integrating current and planned lance assets as well. being engaged by their own air defences. air, naval and land AD assets. Regional cooperation between the three Furthermore, air assets, both fixed and Air defence methods Baltic states in order to improve air sur- rotary wing, manned and unmanned, are veillance capability is extremely important not only at risk from the AD weapons There are two main methods of air to Lithuania. The BALTNET is a tool for aimed at them, but also from inadvertent defence: active AD and passive AD. Ac- developing regional security and national contact with rounds from surface-to-sur- defence capability. The project is an ex- tive AD operations are conducted to de- face weapons. Therefore, these systems ample of a successful implementation of tect, identify, intercept and destroy hos- should be regarded as additional users of foreign military assistance and co-opera- tile airborne vehicles, which threaten airspace and should also be considered tion between the Baltic states, between the friendly forces or installations. Passive AD during airspace planning. It is essential that civil and military ASM, and between the includes all measures, other than active all users of the airspace are aware of these Baltic states and NATO. AD, taken to minimise the effectiveness problems. As for the Lithuanian Armed of hostile air action. IV. Air defence Forces, which are at the very beginning of the development of its AD capability, it is Active air defence Air defence (AD) is defined by NATO of importance to consider proper design Active AD is direct defensive action as “all measures designed to nullify or re- and management of the AD system. taken to nullify or reduce the effective-

65 ness of hostile air action. It is conducted tion, mobility of forces, emission con- eral summary of NATO requirements for using aircraft, AD weapons and missile trol, monitoring for nuclear, biological, the AD operational considerations. systems, electronic warfare, ground-based chemical (NBC) contamination and de- or airborne surveillance systems, sup- contamination. All above-mentioned and Air defence planning ported by secure and highly responsive any other possible measures are taken to Although the AD planning process is communications. In peacetime, active AD provide the maximum protection for conducted in accordance with standard involves continuous surveillance of coun- friendly assets and to complicate the en- planning procedures at all levels of com- try’s airspace and its approaches, lines of emy’s targeting process. mand, there are several specific areas to sea communications and hostile forces in be taken into consideration. On the basis order to provide early warning of attack Air defence planning, of air threat analysis, the adversary’s of- and to deny enemy’s freedom to conduct co-ordination and control fensive capabilities as well as own resources reconnaissance and harassment missions and the geographical characteristics of the over the sovereign territory. In wartime, It is of importance for all command- area, a commander should decide the active AD operations are conducted, to- ers of all forces to understand the com- structure and the type (area, point or self- gether with offensive counter air opera- plexity of the AD operations. “Air de- defence) of AD. Here an early warning tions, to achieve air superiority. fence is conducted through the whole capability plays a vital role, because it depth of airspace, within which other defines reaction time available for own Passive air defence types of aircraft operate and missiles and forces. The enemy should be detected as During the war it is seldom possible guns are fired”13 . Thus, in order to max- early as possible and engaged as far for- to stop hostile air actions completely, but imise efficiency and safety, the various AD ward as possible. Therefore characteristics passive defence measures taken by all mili- weapon systems must not only be inte- of the own AD weapons have to be taken tary forces will lessen the impact of such grated with each other, but must also be into account. Hostile air targets may be actions. These measures include dispersal, fully co-ordinated with all other airspace engaged by aircraft or surface-to-air weap- the use of protective constructions for users. The main principles and procedures ons (missiles or guns). personnel and material, Airfield Damage are prescribed at NATO ATP-40(B) “Doc- Aircraft, because of their flexibility and Repair (ADR) capability, tone-down and trine for Airspace Control in Times of high mobility, can be used to protect very camouflage, physical and electronic decep- Crisis and War”. The following is a gen- large areas or they can be concentrated

66 rapidly for point defence if required. On alert is “that status in which aircraft on way of using them is point air defence. the other hand, aircraft may have limited the ground/deck are fully serviced and In wartime, in order to exploit the capa- employment since they cannot be re- armed, with combat crews in readiness to bilities of ground-based air defence sys- armed, re-crewed or serviced in the air, take off within a specified short period tems to the maximum possible extent, the except of an air-to-air refuelling (AAR) of time (usually 15 minutes) after receipt decisions about their employment and possibility. However, “no single weapons of a mission order”15 . CAP is “an aircraft command and control should normally system can fulfil effectively all the require- patrol provided over an objective area, be delegated to the levels as close as possi- ments of air defence. Therefore, to meet over the force protected, over the critical ble to the commanders of fire units. the full range of the enemy air threat a area of a combat zone, or over an air de- balance of weapon types must be de- fence area, for the purpose of intercept- Control and co-ordination ployed”14 . ing and destroying hostile aircraft before In order to ensure the optimum use Consequently, the commander makes they reach their target”16 . CAP may be of resources available against the air threat, a decision on AD and integrates it into the best way of using fighters when there all the various elements of the weapons the Airspace Control Plan (ACP), which is no early warning. and detection systems should be integrated has to be approved by a higher authority Another task for interceptors can be into a co-ordinated entity by a proper – the Airspace Control Authority (ACA) an air escort for offensive air missions, control and co-ordination system. Usu- in the airspace control area. air reconnaissance, evacuation, and com- ally, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) bat search and rescue (CSAR). designates one commander - the Air De- Air defence assets employment Surface-to-air defences consist of sur- fence Commander (ADC) - responsible It is obvious, that different AD assets face-to-air missiles (SAM) and anti-aircraft for integrating all available assets. If the can be employed in different ways. Nor- artillery (AAA) and may be used for the area for defence is large, a number of de- mally, an air defence weapon system will AD missions as the assets at a very high fence sectors can be established. In this consist of two components: fighter air- state of readiness with a quick response case a Sector Commander may be desig- craft and surface-to-air defences. AD fight- capability to the whole spectrum of the nated for each sector. He is responsible ers basically can be employed from ground air threat. However, in comparison with for sector AD and reports to the ADC. or deck alert as well as for the Combat fighter aircraft, they have limited range Where applicable, co-ordination with the Air Patrol (CAP) missions. Ground/deck and often low mobility, therefore the best NATINADS and the Regional Air Defence

67 Commander (RADC) may be required as systems may only be fired in self defence defence of strategically important object well. or in response to a formal order; “Weap- by using AAA guns. The Lithuanian Navy All levels of commanders should be ons Tight” – weapon systems may be fired has ships with the AD capability (SAM provided with suitable command and only at targets recognised as hostile; and and AAA) as well. control systems to enable them to exer- “Weapons Free” – weapon systems may be Certainly, all the necessary regulations cise the AD. Normally the composition fired at any target not positively recog- for airspace management, Rules of Engage- of the system includes control agencies nised as friendly. It is of importance to ment (ROE), command and control rela- and components with appropriate staff. exercise WCS between every air, land and tions regarding these missions are made It will include a communications and in- maritime user of airspace. and approved by respective authorities. formation processing equipment as well However, so far there is no common as situation display facilities. If it is re- Air defence development policy or doctrine covering the princi- quired functionally, it may also include considerations for Lithuania ples, requirements and regulations for the active and passive sensors for identifica- AD missions when several forces are in- tion, air surveillance and weapons con- Although in accordance with the tar- volved. That becomes a vital issue in times trol. The number and size of the systems get force structure17 the Lithuanian of crisis or war as soon as, on the one may be different for different areas and Armed Forces possess a quite well devel- hand, several services employ the AD as- depends on the nature of the task and oped AD capability, it is necessary here sets and, on the other hand, the interna- number of force components involved in to discuss several practical issues, which tional forces are involved. the AD. the Lithuanian Armed Forces are facing Development of the AD capability of In times of crisis or war, in order to in reality at present time. the Reaction Brigade of the Lithuanian provide control of the weapon systems, The air surveillance and identification Land Forces, which is a top priority at the Weapons Control Order (WCO) has requirements and functions were already present time, definitely requires an estab- to be issued. The WCO promulgates the discussed in the previous chapter. Moreo- lishment of appropriate regulations for Weapons Control Status (WCS). The fol- ver, the Lithuanian Air Force currently employment of the procured AD assets. lowing WCS’ are used to communicate is carrying two missions related to AD – Therefore, the regulations on wartime the criteria an AD unit must use to en- a limited air policing function using light ATM should cover all demands on inte- gage a target: “Weapons Hold” – weapon attack aircraft and a function of point grating the air, naval and land AD assets,

68 air surveillance as well as command and Complexity of the AD operations re- crisis and war and to recommend further control systems into a co-ordinated entity. quires efficient allocation of the AD development of the system. Therefore, the weapon systems, which normally consist number of relevant factors such as legisla- Conclusion of two complementary components - tion and responsibility of authorities for fighter aircraft and surface-to-air defences. airspace management, potential threats for Air defence consists of important meas- The designated ADC is responsible for Lithuania’s sovereignty, air surveillance ures taken by all forces to certain extent, prioritising and integrating all of the as- and air defence were analysed. The fol- in order to protect themselves or others sets available for a particular AD opera- lowing is a summary and final conclusion against any kind of an air threat. The aim tion as well as co-ordinating them within of this analysis as well as recommendations of developing more efficient AD weapon the ACP. for development of ASM system for systems is to increase the effectiveness of Since the Lithuanian Armed Forces have Lithuania in times of crisis and war. this protection. Such development, how- moved rapidly to develop their AD capa- ever, has raised the risk for own air assets bility, it is of great importance that all units Summary being engaged by friendly air defences. involved in the AD operations are aware This ambivalent situation requires proper of the requirements and regulations for Analysis of the present Lithuanian ASM planning, employment, co-ordination and these operations. Therefore, the regulations system shows that there is a need to estab- control of the AD assets. on wartime ATM should be developed as lish a more efficient and flexible ASM NATO has issued publications, which well as respective education and training system in the country. The principal rec- define basic characteristics, principles, should be done prior to procuring any ommendations for a design of such a sys- requirements and procedures for the AD modern AD weapon systems. tem can be summarised as follows: operations conducted by NATO forces. • Establish an integrated civil/military Every commander who is involved in an V. Summary and ASM system with divided areas of respon- AD operation should be familiar with the Way Ahead sibilities according to the conceptual prin- requirements of these documents and to ciples of “Regulator, Provider and Super- follow them when integrating the AD as- The purpose of this article is to ana- visor”. One authority (the CAA of the sets of his unit into the Airspace Control lyse Lithuanian ASM system in order to Republic of Lithuania) shall fulfil the Plan (ACP) of a higher authority. determine its conformability for times of mission of providing ATM for all the

69 users in peacetime. Responsibility for a national Airspace Management Cell gration of new ones, and co-operation providing ATM during crisis or war, should be established. with the Navy and civil ATC. however, shall be transferred from the • Develop a regulation on ATM for • Develop the Identification Friend or CAA to the Lithuanian Armed Forces (Air war, which would cover legal aspects of Foe (IFF) capability of both ground sen- Force) at a specific time point defined by the airspace organisation, ASM, readiness, sors and flying assets in order to fulfil an the Government. air surveillance and defence, command and air surveillance mission in times of crisis • The organisation and use of airspace control, co-ordination between the de- and war. The IFF system should be com- shall, wherever relevant, be based on the fence forces’ components, and co-opera- patible with the ICAO standards and European Air Traffic Control Harmoni- tion with international forces. interoperable with NATO to be able to sation and Integration Programme • The Airspace Control (ASC) shall be interact with ATC and the NATINADS. (EATCHIP) “Concept of Flexible Use of based on NATO ATP-40 (B) “Doctrine • Improve regional security and na- Airspace” (FUA Concept), which has been for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis tional air defence capability through co- supported by the EUROCONTROL and and War”. Development of the Lithua- operation with the Baltic states and inter- NATO Committee for European Airspace nian Airspace Control Means (ACM) in nationally. The BALTNET should remain Co-ordination and implemented in Eu- accordance with above-mentioned docu- the chief tool for this development, and ropean countries. The implementation of ment is a keystone of success on the way it should be integrated into the the FUA Concept should start with the of developing NATO compatible and NATINADS and other early warning sys- establishment of a national high-level air- interoperable communications, informa- tems in the future. space policy body. This body should be tion systems and equipment for ASM in • Establish a common AD policy and tasked with the reassessment of national times of crisis and war, especially when relevant doctrines. These regulations airspace, the progressive establishment of defence of country’s sovereignty requires should meet the requirements for ASM, new flexible airspace structures and the involvement of international forces. AD planning, employment of the AD as- introduction of procedures for the allo- • Improve surveillance of Lithuanian sets, co-ordination and control of air de- cation of these airspace structures on a airspace, especially the low-level coverage. fence set by NATO air doctrines. All de- day-by-day basis. Furthermore, for the The Air Surveillance System shall continue fence forces’ components should integrate daily allocation of the airspace structures developing through modernisation of air their weapons and detection systems into and real-time civil/military co-ordination, surveillance assets, procurement and inte- a co-ordinated entity. Therefore, a proper

70 command and control system should be The main players in the implementa- In order to start and effectively run developed. tion process, however, are the governmen- the implementation process, the first im- tal agencies, particularly the Ministry of mediate step should be an assignment of Recommendations for National Defence and the Ministry of personnel from the concerned state au- implementation Transport, and the appropriate Depart- thorities for the establishment of a na- ments of under these authorities. Their tional high-level airspace policy body. This The suggested Lithuanian ASM system responsibility should be the development organisation should investigate what de- development covers quite wide areas of of requirements and implementation cisions to take in the main areas of the influence and responsibility of different plans, agreements between different au- implementation process as well as what authorities within the Lithuanian Armed thorities, and internal regulations and resources to allocate. The following is a Forces and outside them domestically and instructions within the areas of their re- suggested summary of the areas for the even internationally. This fact makes the sponsibilities. Therefore, in order to short-term actions: system implementation relatively complex. achieve the above-mentioned objectives, • Reassessment of national airspace and Therefore, during the implementation the suitable committees and working the design of the Airspace Structure. process different levels of authority and groups, consisting of representatives of • Review of both military and civil means of their execution should be ap- the parties concerned as well as independ- aviation structures concerning ASM. plied. Certainly, all levels are coherent and ent experts, should be established. • Review of laws and regulations related shall interact with each other. Furthermore, NATO membership will to ASM and development of necessary The highest authority of the State, the have a huge, if not a decisive, impact on changes. Seimas of Lithuania, legislates internally the implementation process. As soon as • Development of international co-op- and ratifies international agreements if Lithuania becomes a member of NATO, eration plans in the ASM area. required. The Government sets regula- new tasks or responsibilities may emerge, • Assignment of responsibilities and tions following from laws, approves State consequently necessitating a review of areas to be developed by state authorities authorities, delegates power or responsi- priorities and development plans. On the and their departments. bility to States authorities, and approves other hand, the membership will certainly • Preparation of agreements between their decisions and agreements between simplify many areas for decisions, actions the state authorities. them. and developments to be implemented. • Development of an implementation plan.

71 Actions recommended in a long-term 12 Allied Administrative Publication APP-6 (V). perspective should cover identification of 1998. Glossary of Terms and Definitions Used in NATO Documents and Publications. NATO MAS. Page 2-A-5. long-term political decisions, areas related 13 Allied Tactical Publication ATP-33 (B). 1986. to international co-operation, and long NATO Tactical Air Doctrine. NATO MAS. Page 4- term plans and financial agreements be- 10. tween the governmental agencies on mod- 14 Ibid. Page 4-7. 15 Allied Administrative Publication APP-6 (V). ernisation and procurement of efficient 1998. Glossary of Terms and Definitions Used in NATO airspace control means. Documents and Publications. NATO MAS. Page 2-G-2. 16 Allied Administrative Publication APP-6 (V). 1 ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organi- 1998. Glossary of Terms and Definitions Used in NATO sation Documents and Publications. NATO MAS. Page 2-C-6. 17 2 Law on Aviation of Lithuania, No VII-2066, Target force structure of the Lithuanian Armed 17 Oct, 2000 Forces is not presented in this article. 3 “Airspace user group” is used to denote ALL users of airspace, including military air, sea and ground forces, airlines, civil aviation organisa- tions and sport aviation. EUROCONTROL – European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation 5 EACHIP ASM Handbook. 1996. EURO-CON- TROL. Page 2-1 6 EACHIP ASM Handbook. 1996. EUROCONTROL. Page 2-3 7 Aeronautical Information Publication. Repub- lic of Lithuania. General Rules. ENR 1.1. 8 ATP-40(B). 1998. Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War. NATO MAS. Page1-1. 9 Ibid. Page 3-1. 10 BALTNET - Baltic Air Surveillance Network. 11 STANAG – NATO Standardization Agree- ment

72 Leadership in the Polish Armed Forces From Idea to Practice

By Captain (Navy) Piotr Gawliczek and Lieutenant Colonel Leszek Kanarski*

n the past, the Polish Armed Forces leadership for a modern force that is strug- have not focused on how a leader gling for its proper place in the structures Areas of interest for leadership should behave. The leaders were often created of a democratic state, and at the same time in the Polish Armed Forces by stereotypes and were associated with au- is trying to optimise its own possibilities tocratic activities of superiors, and leader- for collective activities and coalition coop- We are convinced that the necessity of ship was also based on the principles of one- eration, for example during joint opera- having a modern leadership, as far as way communication aimed at maximizing tions. NATO is concerned, does not have its profits. The leaders didn’t care about the The Polish Leadership Concept touches only source in the offices of superiors, social losses of their subordinates. Such an upon the basic foundations of, and ten- lecture rooms or in the minds of theorists image of leadership is for many people, dencies in the shaping of modern educa- and researchers. It also appears in the especially today, not encouraging and not tional and training forms, and a practice practice of training and military activi- worthy of following, even in situations of command. It is also the synthesis of ties - in circumstances of enlarged risks where it is possible to choose one’s followers. our national approaches, designed with and in situations in which usual rules of Furthermore, it is not the desired model of the military leader in mind. formal subordination are not sufficient. * Captain (Navy) Piotr Gawliczek is a PhD candidate and serves with the Joint Operation Division, Strategic- Defensive Department, National Defence University, Warsaw. Lieutenant Colonel Leszek Kanarski holds a doctorate degree and serves with Psychology of Command Division, Institute of the Human Sciences, National Defence University, Warsaw

73 It is the result of searching for more socially • Emerging signs, from the middle of As far as the first phase of this research, effective forms of influence on subordi- the 1970s, confirming the crisis within at the beginning of the 1990s, is nates, and simultaneously ensuring the the command system, which is historically concerned, the special value of developing highest reliability.1 Current interest in based on formalization and autocratic an interest in this problem was shown by leadership in the Armed Forces is also due procedures of relations between the leader the visits of our representatives to the to other developments, including: and the subordinate, training centres, schools and academies of • Changes of the present world and • A current need for “step by step” other NATO member-states (among changed tasks for the national Armed reduction of the Armed Forces, and the others, the United States, Germany, the Forces. Recent experiences – over the last need for efficient re-conversion of per- Netherlands, and France). This was decade – show that if the Armed Forces sonnel being retired, especially interesting for officers from the are deployed to support political aims, • Creation of an attractive military highest organizational levels of schools, then the only effective and coherent way image of contemporary commanders (lead- academies, staffs, and the Ministry of is through the joint forces, ers), not only efficient, but also effective Defence.1 We had the opportunity to join • A wider range of tasks for the Armed from the social point of view. and assess educational and training Forces, especially tasks connected to the programs that were implemented at the aspect of MOOTW (Military Operations One can say, that these points consti- institutions, and as a result we were able to Other Than War), tute a wide framework of efforts in the prepare analyses on how we should educate • Predictions related to the character of field of redefining leadership, which and train our Armed Forces, especially at and vision on future conflicts and started a few years ago in the Polish Armed the National Defence University. The subsequent operations, as well as the expec- Forces. institutions that we visited were situated tations regarding competence of the future Ever since, the heart of leadership in our in Europe as well as in the U.S.A. commanders. In future operations the Armed Forces gains more and more in- Armed Forces are not supposed to be terest of the practitioners.2 Research con- Furthermore, professional soldiers gathered along the lines, operations will cerning the educational concept for the (mostly officers) had the possibility to have a “non-linear” dimension, and mis- military system of different levels and participate in various leadership courses sions will be executed simultaneously in all programs of instruction are taking organized by the educational and train- areas of operations (the theatre of war), place.3 ing centres of the Armed Forces of the

74 NATO member-countries. The experience Forces (e.g. Denmark and Germany), for • Necessary leadership traits on each they gained, supported by analyses of components of the Armed Forces (e.g. the level of the organizational structure of the educational and training programmes, United States and the Netherlands), for a Armed Forces, manuals, and periodicals proved our con- specific level of military education (e.g. • Leadership qualities of commanders viction regarding several aspects: officers, non-commissioned officers), or and possibilities for developments, 1. Acquiring leadership has become a for specific types of education (in many • Stages of implementation of the lead- very important undertaking in many Armed Forces, as separate courses, ership concept in the Polish Armed Armed Forces, mostly in the West. It programmes, and profiles). Forces. requires intensive education and training These aspects will be discussed later in specifically aimed at increasing the com- Based on the assumptions mentioned this article. petence of commanders beyond their above and the gained experience we man- known boundaries. aged to develop a basic foundation for Basic assumptions of the 2. The concept of leadership is very the concept of leadership in the Polish leadership concept in the Polish similar in most of western Armed Forces, Armed Forces. We have to mention that Armed Forces even though each country has specific the Armed Forces have been dealing with approaches due to its national traditions the problems of leadership for several years. Leadership and each of its components and experiences. At that time Poland was not a member of are expressed by the deeds of many 3. Implementation of the leadership NATO. A special interest in developing the national heroes that are more or less concept takes place at every level of the concept of leadership stemmed from the known. Addressing the glorious tradition, educational and training process; however, on-going developments mentioned above. famous acts, and examples enables us to the impact of this implementation on the In searching (mainly in the NDU5 ) for prepare an education that is not just an lower levels of the chain of command can the Polish concept we identified, among empty shell, a theoretical set of leadership be identified as the most direct. other things: traits, and procedures of efficient activi- 4. In many countries, special education • Examples of leadership from the his- ties. It is a lively and dynamic set of ex- and training structures were prepared for tory of the Polish Armed Forces, amples of leadership. the implementation of leadership • Our comprehension and essence of We assume that the tradition of the programmes either for the entire Armed leadership, also theoretical foundations, Polish Armed Forces of its historical fig-

75 ures, description of historical context, that the concept of command also dealt • It facilitates command, when it is con- features and personal values, and facts with leadership. In both cases, one nected to the character and competence could testify the dimension of leadership. associated them with rank and social po- of the leader, but on the other hand, it This aspect also includes the legacy of sition. can impede command when applied to the military institutions and units of the The notion of organizational leader- certain relations outside the formal struc- Polish Armed Forces,6 named after na- ship within groups is determined espe- ture of organization, tional heroes, mostly qualified for the cially by two elements: the ability for effi- • It is dynamic and can be measured leaders.7 cient and common realization of tasks and by the number of real or potential sup- Leadership as a notion in the context the gift of gaining followers. We can state porters. of the Polish Armed Forces has a long that the notion of leadership is transform- and fruitful tradition, including in the ing from being a synonym of command As far as a better understanding of the fights for independence, not only in Po- to the characteristic of the command’s notion of leadership in the Armed Forces land but also in foreign countries. This is efficiency and its social effectiveness. It is concerned, we can address two illustrated by a famous proverb in Po- becomes one of the most important skills, approaches dealing with organizational land: “For your and our freedom”. predisposition, or features, which are leadership: the transactional theory and Now let us explain what our present perceived and desired in the sphere of the transformational theory.8 The first perception of leadership is. We define it command. The essence of leadership can approach can serve as a preliminary base as the ability to get subordinates to ac- be described as follows: that we have to “keep in mind”, whereas complish a specified mission (goal). Until • It is a distinguishing combination second approach can be the standard de- recently leadership was associated with of skills of every person in the Armed terminant of the relations between the domination in spontaneous (non-formal) Forces, superiors and their subordinates, or the groups, whereas the command was con- • It can be both of formal character, leader and his followers. nected with a position in the institutional while connected with the activities of com- In the Polish Armed Forces, in spite (formal) structure. For many years the manders, and of informal character, when of increased awareness of a necessity to leadership in Poland was identified as the characterizing abilities of each person to develop the leaders’ competence, we are same concept as command. One used them get support by exerting the leadership aware that leadership differs at each level as synonyms, or at least it was assumed skills, of the organizational structure of the

76 Armed Forces. We assume that leadership of leadership, skills and experiences are place. It is focused, on the one hand, on a takes place on three levels (Figure 1): more important than theoretical knowl- creation of common vision of the coor- • Level one – direct leadership (influ- edge. It is characterized by: skilfully con- dinated activities and, on the other hand, ence towards individuals), centrating subordinates around a com- on making efficient working groups (task • Level two – leadership in small groups mon goal, providing a vision of success, teams). (direct and indirect influences), instructing, coaching, and helping. It also The upper level of organizational lead- • Level three – organizational leadership embraces the necessity of joint work and ership (level 3), contains both macro and (direct, indirect and structural influence). the ability of an optimal utilization of micro dimensions: it has both a direct, an As far as the lowest level of command individual’s possibilities. indirect, and an organizational influence. is concerned (level 1), this deals with lead- As far as the middle level of command Its highest goal is based on the develop- ership towards the individuals, “face to is concerned (level 2), we have to deal with ment and presentation of an organizational face” relations, joint realization of mis- leadership towards small groups or teams vision. It is also creation of a value system, sions, and burden sharing. At this level where indirect and direct influences take modelling and adapting of structures, co- ordination of activities, and cooperation Figure 1 – Three levels of leadership of structures. For the commander, the interaction of leadership competences on each level is the reason for a steady development. Simultaneously, it is also the source of necessity to develop specific programmes for applying the leadership at each level of the organizational structure of the Armed Forces. It also gives a chance for preparing an efficient selection mecha- nism for prospective commanders and it facilitates the estimations of leadership competence on each level.

77 perience, which can be applied to the As means to achieve these objectives, Characterization of selected principles of teaching, and also to other and the number of implied tasks with elements of leadership practices. It is possible to develop, to regard to leadership in the Polish Armed competence of commanders and modify and to shape leadership. The Forces, we can address among other possibilities for development inborn talent is, just like in case of other things: popularisation of the idea of lead- capabilities, an important asset, but not a ership, agreement on the principles and Leadership requires a combination of singular determinant of what we call the definitions, development of a detailed experience, knowledge, and skills, accom- process “to get the followers”. education and training concept for the panied by the commander’s own compe- A search for and the development of Polish Armed Forces and institutions. tence, to improve efficiency and effective- the leadership predisposition of the We are convinced that there is a need ness. commanders and of the educational-train- for joint discussion and especially coop- As far as the important aspects of deal- ing system should be extended according eration related to the concepts and experi- ing with the development of leadership to the needs stemming from each organi- ences from the different NATO countries. are concerned, we can enumerate, for zational level of the Armed Forces. Leader- From our perspective such cooperation is example, the following: knowledge, skills, ship cannot be learned and developed only important, because it would give us the predispositions and some indispensable by using traditional form of lectures or possibility to discuss and exchange experi- abilities: to get followers, to understand seminars. In such case we are talking only ences with other countries which have their characters and needs, to influence “about leadership”, which is important only greater traditions. But we must be aware individuals and groups, to communicate from the perspective of preliminary that we are having a common future while verbal and non verbal, to create and de- touching the idea, but is of no value for working together in the NATO or EU velop teams, to work jointly and cooper- practicing command. The only solution framework. Cooperation is also important ate, to solve individual and joint prob- is to meet the expectations of the patricians because it could refer to: lems, to develop and communicate visions, as well as to educate and train “towards • Activities in an international frame- and to behave properly in crisis situations. leadership”. They should be based upon work (the examples are: the Gulf War, situ- acquiring, confirming and developing ex- ation in Bosnia, in Kosovo); Leadership is also a combination of periences, and the procedures of activities • Activities in multinational task groups predisposition, knowledge, skills and ex- and skills. and forces (from the Polish perspective:

78 Multinational Corps North East MC NE our intentions towards specific educa- As far as the students of various forms in Szczecin, also multinational brigades tional groups. For example, as far as aca- of education are concerned, we want them and battalions); demic personnel and students are con- to develop the knowledge of leadership, • Needs that are connected with the cerned, we want to teach them and stress skills and abilities especially by carefully future staff structures dealing with joint the essence of leadership. However, only preparing training and exercises. operations (Combined Joint Task Force) using traditional forms of lectures or A special task for so called “senior” including aspects of Civil Military Co- seminars is not adequate to develop this officers (but not only!) is to arm them operation - CIMIC. process. If this is the case our considera- with the ability to spot the leaders among tions are focused only on talking “about a group or a team. On the other hand, Implementation of the leadership leadership”, what is important from the such activities also deal with the under- idea at the NDU perspective of preliminary touching the standing of leadership predispositions of idea, but not very important for practis- the students. Above all, as far as the implementation ing the command. We would like to train Reaching this point of the article, we of the leadership idea in the Polish Armed and educate all of our officers “towards would like to ask an important question, Forces is concerned, we must underline the leadership”, and this area should be based often raised by the NDU personnel: “Is it activities that are taking place at the National on acquiring, confirming and developing possible to teach leadership”? We, how- Defence University, Warsaw9 . We could experiences, and the procedures of ever, have the opinion that it would be divide our considerations into three groups: activities and skills. better to ask the question “How is it pos- 1) objectives connected with the background We are fully aware that in the 21st cen- sible to teach leadership”? The answer is of educational system, 2) current activities, tury, the principles of “education towards not easily found because of many preju- and 3) intentions for the future. leadership” are of special importance, and dices related to commanders-posts and In spite of the increased conviction of it is not only the set of functions or charisma stemming from them. the necessity of developing leadership principles. On the contrary, the future Let us proceed to the second part of competence, we are aware that the leader- battlefield commanders should be able to the considerations that are related to our ship differs at each level of organizational respond actively to the emerging threats current activities. First of all we must ad- structure. This is of special importance while adjusting their leadership skills to a mit, that the heart of leadership in our mili- for us, because we are able to formulate given situation. tary environment gains more and more

79 interest of the ones who practise possible to present preliminary results of courses in leadership, for the duration of leadership. In order to achieve these ob- this scientific approach to leadership. 20 lessons, for the students of Masters’ jectives and number of implied tasks, as As far as the third item - the inten- studies and the most important far as leadership in the National Defence tions - is concerned, we can mention a postgraduate course for Polish officers at University is concerned, we can address few examples. The base for searching and the Operational-Strategic level. It is also the popularisation of the leadership idea developing the leadership predisposition worth mentioning that in the nearest and the development of a detailed educa- of commanders, educational-training sys- future we are going to inaugurate, after a tion and training concept for the Polish tem will be extended, due to the needs few years break, specialized courses in Armed Forces and its institutions. It is stemming from each organizational level pedagogy for commanders of a battalion, also a review of the structure of the of the armed forces. It will be based on regiment and brigade level. The important programmes for shaping leadership on such forms of joint activities as: seminars, part of the educational programme deals each level, group and structure. It is conferences, lectures, workshops, com- with the development of leadership skills important to add that in November 2001, manding exercises, and simulations. Also and social competences. the NDU hosted a two-day conference intellectual and physical training should The National Defence University is, at “Theory and practice of leadership at the facilitate the recognition of personal pos- present, an important educational centre scope of educational system”. Military and sibilities and limitations. in the field of Polish military science and civilian experts discussed many problems It is the idea to establish, within the is a leading force behind the development related to the field of management and NDU structure, a Centre of Leadership, of leadership. We are convinced that in leadership. as the leading institution regarding the the near future it will become the main Research and projects concerning the development of leadership in the Polish centre to provide education and training educational concept are also taking place. Armed Forces. The aim is to give the per- on leadership from the Polish (or At the moment a dissertation thesis is sonnel and students a possibility for better common) perspective. being prepared at the NDU, and it re- knowledge of educational and training Summing up the considerations we lates directly to the problems of develop- processes in the armed forces, service would like to underline that in the Polish ing a leadership education, especially in components, centres and schools. considerations in relation to the prob- the context of combined and joint op- Starting with the current academic year lem of leadership we must also take into erations. Probably next year, it will be we are going to introduce specialized account the fact that at present the condi-

80 tions connected with NATO and future among other things the aspects of leadership in 8 L. Kanarski and R. Peksa and A. Zak, „Mili- EU membership will determine that we the armed forces. See: “Citizen’s education and tary leadership”, Warsaw 1997 (Przywodztwo information activity in the Polish Armed Forces wojskowe, Warszawa 1997) in principle will act in a multinational in face of the integration with NATO”, Warsaw, 9 See: L. Balcerowicz, P. Gawliczek, L. Kanarski, dimension. Analyses concerning the 1997. (Edukacja obywatelska i dzialalnosc “The perspective of the leadership education at achievements in current conflicts confirm informacyjna w wojsku wobec perspektyw the National Defence University”, presentation that they have never been realized exclu- integracji z NATO, Warszawa 1997) delivered by Major General Boleslaw Balcerowicz 3 A. Balasiewicz and W. Chojnacki, „The funda- (Commandant-Rector of the NDU, Warsaw) dur- sively by one actor, for example by the mentals of preparations of the educational pro- ing Conference of Commandants held at NATO Polish Armed Forces. In different phases grams in the face of integration with NATO”, Defence College Rome on the 21st of June 2002 and different range, the organizations and Warsaw 1997. (Podstawy projektowania non-military institutions also partici- programow ksztalcenia w perspektywie integracji z NATO, Warszawa, 1997). pated. Therefore the problem of 4 L. Kanarski and B. Rokicki and J. Swiniarski, leadership exceeds the issue of leadership „Personal and structural security in the face of of the Armed Forces and the ethos of challenges posed by contemporary world”, War- “leadership” expands beyond the pure saw, 2000. (Bezpieczenstwo personalne i strukturalne wobec wyzwan wspolczesnego swiata, military realm. Warszawa 2000). 5 B. Szulc, “Possibilities of the implementation 1 See i.e.: P. E. Blockwell, G. J. Bozek, Leadership of NATO leadership concept in the Polish Army”, for the New Millennium, /in:/ Military Review, Warsaw, 2000, (Mozliwosci zastosowania koncepcji przywodztwa NATO w Wojskach May - June 1998; W. Kaczmarek and Z. Scibiorek, Ladowych RP, Warszawa 2000). “Future war – which one?” Warsaw 1995. (Przyszla 6 See: “Outstanding commanders. Famous citi- wojna – jaka?, Warszawa 1995); L. Kanarski and J. zens”, special edition of Military and education, Swiniarski, „Changes in the way of thinking in Warsaw 1993. (Wybitni dowodcy. Slawni the armed forces”, Warsaw 1997. (Przemiany obywatele, „Wojsko i wychowanie”, dodatek myslenia w wojsku, Warszawa 1997; M. Wiatr, specjalny, Warszawa 1993). „Between strategy and tactics”, Torun 1999. 7 See: J. Cieciara and D. Radziwillowicz and J. (Miedzy strategia a taktyka, Torun 1999) Slipiec and W. J. Wysocki, A. Cz. Zak „Patrons of 2 For example, in 1997 the international semi- contemporary military units of the Polish Armed nar was organized. It touched upon selected prob- Forces”, Warsaw 1998. (Patroni wspolczesnych lems of the prospective Polish accession to NATO, jednostek Wojska Polskiego, Warszawa, 1998)

81 Executive Summary of the Military Transition Seminar, Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia, 18 Oct 2002

By Marc Remillard*

he Baltic Defence College held a re- military officers themselves, BG Clemmesen Poland, for instance, was the length of time search seminar on the issues of believed that they should demonstrate their it took to create a new constitution (five military transition on 18 October 2002. professionalism, and be able to think years). Only by 2001 was the General Staff The following executive summary presents “outside the box”. fully adopted into G1, G2, and G3 NATO an outline of the various contributions The first presentation was given by structures. In his conclusion, Major Gen- and findings of this seminar. Major General Andrzej Tyszkiewicz, the eral Tyszkiewicz provided an evaluation of Brigadier General Michael H. Clemme- title being “The development of effective the Polish experience, elaborating on a sen, the Commandant of the Baltic De- central staffs – focus, ethos, organisation, number of “lessons learned”, which included fence College (BDCOL), gave the welcome procedures, links between the units and the importance of stable budgets, realistic address to the participants of the Military central staffs”. Drawing on his experience goals and timelines, and the need to estab- Transition Seminar. In his speech, he stressed at NATO’s HQ, the “kitchen of NATO’s lish training links. the importance of NATO membership as strategic planning”, Major General Commenting on this first presentation, an objective of defence reform, and argued Tyszkiewicz described the process of tran- Ambassador Jüri Luik, former Estonian that such a goal makes it imperative that sition, as it has occurred in Poland. Re- Defence Minister, pointed out the paral- politicians work closely with the military, form has been in the direction of NATO’s lels between the Polish and the Estonian given that the former are elected, and are basic standards, but implementation has experiences. Following independence, answerable to the domestic population. For not been easy. A problem in the case of Estonia created what Ambassador Luik * Marc Remillard is Head of International Projects, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

85 called a “small replica of the Warsaw Pact”, lem tied to demographic trends in Rus- process schematically, Col. Siposne which had to be changed once NATO sia. Kecskemethy defined the needs of mili- membership became the country’s goal. In his comments on Dr Nurick’s pres- tary reform in terms of “concept, re- The subject of the next presentation entation, retired Brigadier General Janis sources, and willingness”. For Hungary, was “Reforming the Body of the Army: a Kazocins, former UK advisor to the the concept developed has been that of Perspective from Russia”, which was de- Slovak CHOD, quoted the Wall Street Jour- “lean, light and lethal” armed forces. livered by Robert Nurick, the Director nal as saying that “the problem behind Human resources have been the focus of of the Carnegie Moscow Centre. In his the Russia-West tension is the military”. reform in Hungary (“the main reform outline of the state of military reform in This he felt was a little exaggerated, but to resource in Hungary is the human re- Russia, Mr Nurick noted that there has be taken into account nonetheless. On the source”), and have been organised in line been little real progress. Attempts have difficulties of reform, BG Kazocins with a new career management system. been made by past defence ministers, but pointed out that the military is conserva- This system has involved the attachment with only very limited success: for exam- tive by nature, and tends to favour exist- of rank to positions and making progress ple, poor attendance remains a problem, ing structures and resource planning. based on regular evaluations. with approximately 1/3 of junior offic- Such an outlook should be replaced with Representing the Czech Ministry of ers’ positions currently vacant. In spite the recognition that plans and structures Defence, and in particular its human re- of events such as the sinking of the Kursk, tend not to “survive contact with the en- source division, Mr Zdenek Dvorak and the renewed military engagements in emy”. For this reason, they must be able concurred with the Hungarian focus on Chechnya, nothing has managed to gal- to adapt to changing situations. human resource management as the key vanize military reform in Russia. As key Following presentations on the Polish to defence reform. In his own words, factors explaining this failure, Mr Nurick and Russian experiences, Colonel Klara “the devil is indeed hidden in the details”. pointed to over-sized requirements (“Too Siposne Kecskemethy, of the Hungar- Continuing with this focus on human big a bite, all at once”), and perception ian Ministry of Defence, spoke about “The resource management, BG Michael H. that events in Kosovo indicated the Creation of an effective cadre develop- Clemmesen gave a presentation on “Of- strength of the threat still posed by the ment and management system”, in the ficer Cadre Education Reform”. Build- West. Also cited was the lack of political context of Hungary’s experience of de- ing on the comments of BG Kazocins, support for reform, and a conscript prob- fence reform. Setting out the reform BG Clemmesen emphasized the centrality

86 of change to military education. Rather central executive structures”. Accepting armed forces being able to understand than focus on doctrinal issues, and fitting that politicians and the military do not each other. Such is the lesson to be learnt the theory onto the practice, education and always “speak the same language”, Ambas- from events such as General Jackson’s re- training systems must be given by leaders sador Luik argued for active interaction fusal of General Clark’s order to retake and managers, who can themselves stand as between the two spheres, notably in the Pristina Airport (Kosovo) in 1999. professional role models. In addition to form of strategic guidance documents and As respondent, Commander David ordinary officers, military academics must the educating of politicians in military Clarke pointed out that problems of civil- also think “out of the box”. affairs. Essential also is a proper dialogue military relations are not particular to the This stress on adapting training and edu- with the public, one that would inform East, but exist in the West also. Examples cation to changing rather than static secu- the public of what demands are necessary, given included the U.S., where Donald rity environments was present in Colonel and what hurdles are to be overcome. Rumsfeld recently over-ruled, as Secretary Algis Vai²eliunas’ response to the presen- Reform planning is driven by a correct of Defence, a decision made by the Joint tation by BG Clemmesen. As Comman- assessment of threat perceptions, and the Chief of Staff on the identity of the next dant of the Lithuanian Military Academy, public must be informed of what threats Chief of Operations. Commander Clarke Col. Vai²eliunas spoke about Lithuania’s the government is focusing its efforts on. also made the points that Ministry of De- approach to reform, which involves always In addition to public understanding, fence activities today are about planning, thinking about the future. Thinking “out there is a need for the military to under- programming and budgeting, and that con- of the box” should make the soldier to con- stand exactly what demands are to be made temporary security is less about soldiering, sider “non-military scenarios”, and orient- of it by governments. Any misunder- and more about National Security. By that, ing education to the consideration of chang- standings are likely to lead to objections Commander Clarke indicated that issues to ing environments should imply a break with on the side of the military. In the light be addressed are those of Law Enforcement, the old heritage. According to Col. of clarifying objectives and demands, Finance, Border Security and Asymmetric Vai²eliunas, this can only be done with a Ambassador Luik cited PfP and NATO threats, all of which demand inter-operabil- group of newly trained instructors. documents as particularly informative, ity, international coordination, and the in- In the last presentation before the break and he suggested that as international ac- creasing contributions of “other” armed for lunch, Ambassador Jüri Luik spoke tivities increase, the success of coopera- forces, notably the police and other non- on “Political-Military Cooperation at the tive efforts would depend upon different military structures.

87 The Path of Transition: from the Past towards Efficient Armed Forces

By Michael H. Clemmesen BG

ithuania, Latvia and Estonia have similar to that required everywhere in The initial building-up of now succeeded in their security the Central and Eastern European armed the Baltic states’ armed policy aspirations. All three have been forces to make them focused and cost- forces invited to join NATO at the November effective. Prague Summit. This article will cover different key The build-up of the armed forces was The mature political and economic aspects of the reform needs in all these seen as urgent. During the first few years, development in the three, very differ- states thereby, indirectly, covering the there was an acute perception of the ent, states has made this step natural. situation in the Baltic states since 1991 threat. The Russian occupation troops During the last 5 years or so the three and the coming years. It is built on 8 were still around, and statements from a have also gradually accelerated their ef- years of observations, studies, conver- variety of sources in the Russian Federa- forts to prepare their developing armed sations and work in the three states as tion reinforced the inherent problem of forces for a role in the Alliance. This an insider with the perspective of an their presence. Something had to be task has not been and will not be easy. outsider. In the last 3 years the regional done, quickly, to develop the ability to One of the reasons is that this task in- perspective has been supplemented and fight back. cluded both a build-up from the scratch enriched with observations and conver- This was not easy. Cadres for the armed and thereafter a total reform of the first sations in several other Central and forces had to be recruited. Some were new structures. The latter challenge is Eastern European countries. found among the limited number of rela-

88 tively untainted professionals from the ing the Independence Period had been The reform requirements Soviet Armed Forces. Others came from undermined by bad maintenance, and needed everywhere in the volunteer cadres of the home guard what had been built in the last Soviet Central and Eastern forces created or recreated in 1990-91. The decades was in an even worse shape. latter group was supplemented with of- Parallel to the armed forces build-up, Europe ficers, normally retired, from the Baltic the national economy had to be re- It is important to understand, and ac- Diaspora in the U.S. and elsewhere. A formed and revitalised, and the state had cept, that the transition outlined in the strained relationship between these two to justify taxing it for common projects rest of the article is necessary for the crea- groups and their political friends added by developing a new “social contract”, tion of “best practice” Western type armed to the problems on several occasions. the legitimacy of the political system and forces for the Post Cold War variety of None had any experience of how to build trust in its leadership. This is still an un- missions. The process is likely to be pro- and operate armed forces in small democ- finished process, and it was and remains tracted before completed, spanning a cou- racies. far from obvious that a significant part ple of decades in most cases. It is relevant The forces had to be armed and of the limited available state resources not only for the CEE states that aspire and equipped. The withdrawing colonial forces should go to the development of the prepare for NATO membership, but also took everything with them, and initially armed forces. Both a majority of the for new NATO member states that want to no states dared to donate and few were population and most politicians consid- develop effective contributions to the alli- willing to sell armaments, concerned as all ered it futile to attempt to create inde- ance and to international operations in were with the possible response of Rus- pendent self-defence forces. The maxi- other frameworks. It is, however, also rel- sia. mum that most considered possible and evant for the states with a Soviet or Yugo- The military infrastructure was delib- desirable was the marking of the national slav heritage that only want to create effec- erately destroyed by the departing Rus- will to exist by a fight at the border fol- tive, future-oriented armed forces. The re- sians and thereafter used as quarries by lowed by guerrilla actions in the forests. forms described are relevant no matter what the local population. What was destroyed Only a potential NATO-framework for main tasks the forces are given, the degree and what was left was of very low qual- the armed forces could justify giving a of specialisation, and the level of resources ity. What had initially been well con- high priority to their development be- made available for the creation and main- structed in the Russian Empire or dur- yond that basic level. tenance of the structures.

89 The Baltic states and nearly all other opments. This understanding will only be CEE states are on some path towards the At the political-military developed by a combination of gaining outlined situation. However, the CEE co-operation level professional and personal maturity during countries have much work to do before a protracted and varied service. It needs to they reach a “best practice” level. They are A focused development and use of the be created and maintained by actively seek- not alone. Several Western European states armed forces of a state depends on an ef- ing to be updated about the condition of have apparently found it difficult to ad- fective and trustful dialogue between the the forces, and by having developed a posi- just their militaries and the political-mili- elected state politicians and the formally tive empathy with both the role and situa- tary co-operation pattern away from the appointed, senior officers. In a reformed tion of the politicians he is serving, and the Cold War optimisation, aiming at meet- situation, the following relationship has situation in the different armed services ing the one and only threat. been established. under his command. The chief and his The required reforms go far beyond the The directly responsible politician, associates must accept deep in their hearts creation of basic interoperability to ensure normally the defence minister, will in an that they have to serve the elected politicians a reasonable level of English language un- open and effective way communicate the in the government loyally, no matter what derstanding in the cadre, effective technical political priorities and limitations. He they think of them or their policies. In a communications interfaces, as well as com- understands that he is totally dependent mature democracy military leaders have no mon communication, reporting and on the advice from and effective imple- formal or informal direct responsibilities command formats. They even go beyond mentation of decisions by the armed to the nation. creating the “human interoperability” that forces represented by their senior repre- This – reformed – situation is not easy comes from the ability to accept and under- sentative, the chief of defence. to generate. A legacy of the past was that stand different national and organisational The latter understands and accepts that the new post-1989 politicians deeply mis- cultures well enough to co-operate with a his role is limited to the subordinate one trusted the leading military, and tended minimum of friction. What is required is a of advice and implementation. He will, to to seek the advice they wanted to hear by deep transformation of structures that ensures be efficient, have a deep professional un- bypassing the formal leaders, or by get- the largest and most effective force derstanding of the capabilities and limita- ting it from foreign advisors. In some contribution that can be created on the basis tions of the existing armed forces and the cases the advice, if any, from the existing of the available limited resources. potential of any planned or possible devel- professional military was so remote from

90 the requirements, and so irrelevant, that operate. They were also handicapped by a opment of the armed forces. Thus there no advice was sought thereafter. The rea- dictatorial and centralistic management style were two groups of senior military per- son for not seeking an advice could, in that hindered effective interaction with sonnel, none of them with a background some instances, be that the politician sim- talented subordinates. that prepared them very well for their part ply did not think that he needed it. A precondition for the easy creation in the political-military dialogue in a small The professional military on their side of a dialogue based on trust is, however, democratic state. In these three states the were normally unsuited to play their role that the politicians chosen, as defence transition depends on the leading profes- in the new relationship. Very few accepted ministers, are eager to develop the co- sional positions being filled by officers that the government, made up of “ama- operation, and that they understand the with most of their service experience and teurs” who served a party group rather than need for good interaction. Another ob- education from the post-1991 period. A the nation, could have any real authority vious requirement is that they, and the full generation change must take place over national security matters. Subordina- civil servants that assist them, are trust- within the next few years to ensure the tion to the state president might be ac- worthy, honest, decent, capable, and ma- proper use of state resources and an effec- cepted, but not to a “politician” from the ture persons. It would be very difficult tive integration in NATO. parliament. Having developed profession- for a senior, grizzled professional, who, In all CEE countries successful transi- ally in a dictatorship, where the armed by definition, is willing to lay down his tion requires an accelerated generation forces had to worry only about the prepa- life for the nation, to respect a corrupt, change in the leadership from colonel level ration for total war, senior officers found self-serving character as his boss. It does upwards combined with a drastic slim- it close to impossible to understand more not help co-operation either, if he rou- ming of the bloated number of officers limited roles for the armed forces and ac- tinely transmits his decisions indirectly, of high rank. A well organised and sup- cept that a dialogue with the “amateurs” via unjustifiably self-confident, newly ported retirement scheme is thus a pre- was necessary. The smaller the state, the more employed, young civil servants. condition for reform. difficult it was for ex-Soviet officers to In the Baltic states the situation was adjust. Nearly all senior army and many often even more complex. As mentioned The unit level air force officers simply lacked the profes- above, persons from the volunteer and sional depth to create other types of forces paramilitary forces without regular officer The problems of the unreformed than those they had been programmed to education gained a key role in the devel- armed force structure are clearly visible

91 at the bottom of the structure, the unit by common-sense regulations so that the and decisions at that centre. Their life and level. families of the best officers feel reason- that of their officers mirrored the pro- The key purpose of a peacetime mili- ably well supported. vincial garrison life of Chekov’s plays, just tary structure is to develop and maintain The unit should have a very high and without the more charming fin-de-siecle high-quality units (battalions, ships, air demanding activity level in order to en- elements. If they were lucky or well con- force squadrons) at various states of readi- sure that the officer develops and is tested nected they escaped early to a position in ness. The first step in fulfilling that pur- as unit commander. The commander the “centre” and to higher military edu- pose is to ensure high-quality, profession- should have considerable freedom of ac- cation. Most stayed in the centre, quickly ally and personally mature unit leadership. tion, even if his performance in all fields becoming bureaucrats or teachers with The structure must ensure that the very is evaluated continuously. In good West- only a faint, very theoretical link to the best mid-career officers are rotated out ern armies, a senior officer with recent, reality in the units, abhorring the very of the central staff and training elements very successful unit command experience, idea of ever returning to these units. into command units. This is necessary to in the army normally a brigade com- Creating a well-functioning rotation ensure that the units have the best leader- mander, carries out the key role in the system in the CEE armed forces is very ship possible and to create a professional evaluation. As the future leadership is often undermined by the following four foundation for later work in senior staff, serving as unit commanders, the central factors: military education, and command posi- staffs keep in close contact with the units • The officers see no reason why they tions. The personnel management system to ensure that their administration is sup- and their families should suffer, when the should make certain that the very best porting unit effectiveness. politicians, civil servants, and senior of- compete hard to get unit command, know- This situation is very far from the ficers above and around them act with ing that without a successful period as a unreformed situation in the Central and little or no public or professional spirit. commander, their career will be limited Eastern European armed forces. The units • The politicians and senior command- to specialist fields, and they will not reach were commanded by very young officers ers do not want to let their best and most high command posts. The system, in the army, normally captains. They had intelligent military assistants depart for however, should also ensure that rotation little or no freedom of action. The “cen- the provinces. between posts in different parts of the tre” inspected their work, but they had • There is little or no understanding country is supported economically and absolutely no influence on developments of the fact that practice is more impor-

92 tant than theory in creating military ef- or elements. On the other hand, it is also work for operations inside and outside fectiveness. close to impossible for a central joint plan- the region now creates new professional • In a world where the Potemkin fa- ning and administrative staff to develop requirements. cade is much more important than the and conduct a realistic field-training pro- The training of the unit level officers reality, the units do not count. gramme, because the focus and main ac- in the Baltic states has so far suffered from tivities of such a staff makes it unsuitable. the lack of formation level training ac- At the basic combined arms A special central service training staff – an tivities. The Lithuanian “Iron Wolf” Bri- formation level Army Training Command - may be used, gade Staff is only now developing into a but it is likely to lack that organic com- tactical formation HQ. The Latvian Mo- Western armies have found that the munication framework and relevant pro- torised Brigade HQ existed only in name existence of the basic combined arms for- fessional mix of expertise and direct unit and was abolished thereafter. The Esto- mation headquarters level, normally the focus that is inherent to tactical level for- nian General Staff did not realise the need brigade, is necessary for the development mation headquarters. for mid-level tactical HQs until recently, of an officer corps in the units with a Most CEE armed forces had tactical under political pressure. practical, professional understanding of formation HQs; they only needed to be All CEE armed forces should in fact combined armed tactics. reformed in focus and activities. How- understand that a tactical formation staff The unit, the battalion, will, in its train- ever, that was not the case with the Baltic should be seen and built as a small team ing programme, have to concentrate on states. This was due to the fact that they of flexible professional generalists that the training of the sub-units, the compa- started force development from scratch operates with the support of a few watch- nies, specialising in developing effective and did not consider combined armed keepers, communicators, as well as secu- handling of the “tools” organic to the unit. tactics relevant. The maximum the initially rity and transport personnel, unlike now Therefore it is nearly impossible for the created forces would be able to do against when such a headquarters is merely unit itself to create and conduct realistic the overwhelming Russian threat was a perceived as a bureaucracy of specialists training, developing the ability of the marking of the national sovereignty at the that support the commander when or- reinforced unit staff to operate effectively border – followed by guerrilla actions with dered to do so. together with other combat, combat sup- light infantry and engineers in the for- The effectiveness of a tactical HQ does port and combat service support units ests. Only the new NATO mission frame- not depend on the size of the peacetime

93 manning, but rather on the quality and tended period without rest. However, tional procedures. These augmentation relevant practical professional experience keeping such a large fully manned tactical staff officers may come from the reserve - and ability to work as a team - of its staff during normal peacetime training cadre or from the regular training struc- core personnel. There is an unfortunate conditions makes certain that the staff ture cadre. In the British case, the aug- tendency to create a staff by the immedi- “rot” due to lack of meaningful work. mentation consists of 14 officers (1 sen- ate filling of office space with officers This is what happened in the past. ior liaison officer and 13 watch keepers) (defined as persons in uniform carrying In the West, only formations like the plus 6 officers attached from the combat officer’s rank), rather that the gradual U.S. immediate reaction formations that support units. building-up of staff as experience is gained combine an intensive exercise level (both and real workload is increasing. by higher headquarters of the formation The Central Staff level A fully manned basic tactical forma- and the formation conducting training tion HQ is organised as a pool of small with its subordinate units) with constant Another side of the problem was the functional teams, each of a couple of plan- contingency planning for possible world- situation in the central (“General”) staffs. ners and a few assistants. The teams either wide deployments may avoid bureaucratic The Soviet/Warsaw Treaty Organisa- conduct current operations or they rec- rot of the staff. In all other cases, a fully tion experience led to the creation/main- onnoitre and plan future operations, the wartime manned staff will quickly dete- tenance of structures that saw their role immediately following operation or pos- riorate through formalism and laziness. as both narrow and total. sible contingencies. In order to reduce Therefore the only solution is to limit The staff should control the prepara- vulnerability and plan simultaneously the daily manning to those who can be tion of the forces (land forces and sup- conducting current operations, the fully properly occupied at the defined activity porting air force elements) for war, a to- manned staff should be large enough to and readiness level. In a British mecha- tal war that justified high priority access establish two to three command posts nised or the armoured brigade staff, the to all resources of society. The role of the manned by a combination of these small peacetime manning is limited to 9 offic- politicians was to make sure that the re- functional teams. The manning should ers and 27 other ranks. The staff will, how- sources would be made available, as the also ensure that there are enough assist- ever, need to exercise regularly with the only role of the armed forces was to de- ant watch keepers to control intensive augmentation of watch keepers and liai- fend the future existence of the nation. operations for 24 hours a day for an ex- son officers to properly practice opera- Within that mission framework, the only

94 military-political dialogue necessary was the staff and with other authorities and co-operation and make continued dupli- the military answering questions from the staffs at the state centre were often ham- cation of effort less likely. At the same political side about how the defence re- pered by a lack of clear lines of responsi- time, collocation will underline the re- quirements could be met in the best pos- bility, detracting from the creation and quirement for strict discipline in the sible way. maintenance of a quality product. maintenance of good staff procedures and The staffs tried to cover all aspects of Seen from the outside, and from the clear responsibilities on both sides. The defence related planning and administra- units, the central staff was a very large central staffs should be drastically reduced tion, but the focus was on the creation of group of inert, ineffective, self-serving in size, emphasising quality of personnel army units, rather unrelated to the avail- bureaucrats, selected on the basis of rather rather than number, in order to become able resources, and the theoretical con- empty “high education” diplomas rather focused and effective. cepts for their use in war. There was very than proven professional, analytical and Control of operational planning and little interest in the more mundane ad- administrative ability. control of operations is to be done by a ministrative work of developing effective commander with a small joint service use of finances, accounting, materiel and In order to lead and implement re- operations staff. To minimise duplication personnel, and the development of proper, forms effectively, these central staffs have of effort and reduce the size (and increase supporting logistic structures. The other to be transformed in every sense. The end- the effectiveness) of the central staff, the services - air force and any navy – were state of the reconstruction should be a operations staff may only be a partly sepa- formally under the central staff, but in flat hierarchical network of co-operating rate organisation, in a location close to reality left to develop as separate entities. small teams, each team with a well-defined the central staff, supporting the joint plan- The Soviet bureaucratic tradition – at responsibility and delegated authority. ning and administrative staff with staff the same time – led to these staffs being These should be joint service, and the main work in the purely operational field. bloated in personnel, unfocused, totally function should be planning of develop- Both these two joint central staffs will centralised, decision and responsibility ment, general administration, and control keep a close link with reality in the units aversive, with activities unrelated to the of implementation at the highest policy by regular rotation of key personnel and reality in the units, interested in planning level, in direct support of the chief of by a new organisational ethos emphasis- and concepts rather than in learning defence and in close interaction with the ing humility to the two level of clients: through implementation. Relations within MoD. Collocation with the MoD will ease the political masters and the units.

95 Such much smaller staff elements will or unsuccessful, political battle for re- or fly in an aircraft where the training be much more able to deliver high qual- sources. directives and standards do not reflect a ity, realistic “products” on time. With a combination of a joint central combination of a high level of service Presently very few CEE armed forces staff and a joint operational staff the professionalism and a clear and acute feel- have come close to having such small and remaining very important task of the in- ing of responsibility by the issuing au- focused central staff structures. It seems dividual services (commander/inspector thority. The development of joint Train- to be very difficult to get rid of the idea with staff) is to maintain and develop the ing Commands is a result of an inap- that bigger is better and that keeping all training and readiness of the units, as well propriate imitation of a successful U. S. responsibilities and functions directly un- as being a centre of service-related profes- service institution: the U.S. Army der control of one person and in one sional understanding that can be used as TRADOC. staff is the right solution. The users, the a platform for the development of tacti- cal structure and procedures. In order not A special problem in the central staff politicians and units, are suffering as a to have overlap with the work of the joint structures has been the establishment of a result. staff structure planning elements, the serv- proper logistic system. When the logistic One problem has been the uncertainty ice staffs should be closely collocated with system has been both reformed and de- about the roles of the service staffs. The that central staff. Such a development of veloped, it will ensure effective, timely, central “General” Staff was also the army small focused service staffs would be hin- and sufficient support to the units in both staff – as that staff was mainly seen as an dered by the creation of an independent peacetime garrisons and on international operational staff concentrating on using joint Training Command. operations or after mobilisation. The serv- the main armed service, the army. If an If a joint Training Command is made ice will be given by a transparent system air force with a fighting capability existed, responsible to the chief of defence and that ensures honesty and minimises waste it might be partly integrated and given a operational commander for the delivery by constant outside scrutiny. reasonable priority. Otherwise, the air of unit quality and readiness, this then This is a long way from the chaotic force as well as the navy would be seen as takes away that core responsibility from and sometimes corrupt logistic systems that fairly irrelevant to the defence effort, and the senior officer of each service, and were left as part of the Soviet legacy of therefore left as orphans to develop on removes accountability for quality from wasteful managerial methods and normally their own, fighting their own, successful expertise. It is not safe to sail in a ship self-serving attitude among officials.

96 tem was supporting its continuation, even of regular long contract NCOs, regular The approach to the manning if the changing spectrum of missions and contract soldiers on high readiness, and of the armed forces readiness requirements underlined the in technically very demanding jobs, some need for change. of these volunteering for contract service In Soviet style armed forces, manpower In an effective, reformed armed force, during their training as conscripts. Units was recruited by conscription of, in prin- able to conduct a variety of operations may have a strong component of regular ciple, all young men for a long period of rather than the large scale war that the reserve personnel with a high readiness service in the military. In those forces the mass conscription based forces prepared force contract, personnel that normally individual was deliberately suppressed for, the manning strategy must be very has a full conscript training plus the ex- through a combination of collective pres- different. This does not necessarily mean perience from six months or more serv- sure and punishment as well as a brutal that conscription should be completely ice on international operations. Only the formal discipline. Service of the private abandoned in favour of a contract sol- parts of the armed forces needed for the soldiers had the character of time-limited dier system. However, a reformed struc- purely territorial self-defence mission will slavery. Sons of the privileged classes would ture must have a very strong presence of have a strong component of conscript normally stay separate from the serving regular NCOs and technical specialists, reserve personnel. In order to make such majority, only participating in “reserve and elite units on high deployment readi- a “professionals via conscript training” officer” training and camps, linked to their ness must be fully manned by regulars. system workable, the conscript training diploma studies in universities or other The possibilities for recruiting a suffi- should be thoroughly reformed so that “high schools”. cient number of high quality young men, regular service and a high readiness force A gradual development away from that and women, to man and sustain the nec- contract is seen as an attractive option, system started early in many CEE coun- essary force structure at home and on creating a high number of qualified vol- tries. However, even if the treatment of deployment may rule out a straightfor- unteers. the soldiers improved in many states, ward solution. A high youth employment One benefit of a mixed system is the armed forces manning was still dominated rate makes a situation with serious recruit- ability to sustain long deployments of a by the group of draftees from the less ing problems likely. A reformed manning relatively large number of personnel. In privileged part of the male society in the structure could – as in some Nordic States such a system it can be done without hav- nation. The relatively low cost of the sys- – consist of a mixture of a strong cadre ing to increase the size of the standing

97 force or wearing the existing force down had served there 15-20 years. They were a mix of officers and academics. However, by too frequent absence from the fami- supplemented by a group of civilian aca- the officers must be persons with recent lies. This burden on the families of regu- demics, totally dominated by natural sci- practical experience in the units or staffs, lar military personnel has been a major entists. The study programme of the full who can pass on updated knowledge and issue in several European armies during officer education system had many levels: skills from these. They should come from the last decade. company-battalion, regiment, division, the best end of their class, relatively close However, the key is also a high per- army, front, staff, general staff, the pur- to the cadets or students in terms of age, centage of good regulars who can absorb pose of each was to ensure the mastering able to act effectively as professional role and train the gradual influx to the re- of the scientifically correct command or models, and after their 2-4 years period quired high level. Therefore it is impor- staff procedures of that level. The educa- as teachers, rotated back into the forces tant that the “net” for recruiting quality tion, even the highest, focused on purely to an enhanced career. Career persons regulars is cast as wide as possible, includ- military matters, related to preparing for should likewise dominate the group of ing deliberate attempts to attract national and winning a major war and then hand- civilian academic faculty members, some minorities, in Latvia and Estonia the ing that successful result back to the politi- university academics on a part-time Russian-speaking non-citizens. cians. The purpose of the education was contract with the school, others on time- not so much that of learning to think and limited contracts with the institutions. In the officer education system work professionally in a general sense, but Some may have natural science back- that of ensuring that the officer would be grounds, but academics with a back- The typical officer education institu- well drilled and indoctrinated to fit well ground in political or social sciences and tion of the Soviet tradition had two types into the next higher position. The post- humanities should form the largest part of faculty members, whether it was a mili- graduate study programmes had either a of the group. The education system will tary academy or a general staff academy. natural science or a military science focus, tend to have three or four levels: the ba- The leading group consisted of ageing the latter preparing the future professors sic officer education, a short “junior staff professors of military science, colonels or that could sustain the institutions. course” and a “command and staff generals who had been conducting post- This system is totally different from course”. The first level will prepare the graduate and doctoral studies in this or the military education system of Western young officer generally and for their first similarly organised institutions and who type armed forces. The faculty will also be practical assignment. The second will sup-

98 plement the basic education and be given The very close links and constant inter- box” and to present the findings in spite to all regular officers. The third level will action between the military and the civil- of these being less than popular, at the only be relevant for the best 10-30 per- ian and political sides make the field of an same time as he remains a loyal and effec- cent. It will build on the professional exclusive “military science” – other than tive implementer of any decision taken understanding generated by around 10 professional understanding – meaningless. by the commander. He/she will actively years of practical service and will encour- The two structures, their purpose, and seek development and results rather than age and assist the officers in developing their products could not be more differ- privilege. He/she will interact closely with themselves during the rest of their career. ent, and the Soviet type indoctrination the units as he also sees himself as their The course will endeavour to deepen the structures must be thoroughly changed servant. understanding and acceptance of the way and reformed to help other development. The personality profile and education that the armed forces of a democracy must is fundamentally different from that of a interact with the civilian structures, sub- In relation to general staff officers: Soviet type general staff officer who is ordinated to political control. Any seen as a long serving specialist, awaiting fourth-level education will normally con- The system for developing, educating, orders to act, even if the results are clearly centrate on that specific issue as it is seen and training officers reflects basic differ- “inside the box”. He/she is not supposed at the time of the course to prepare the ences in how an ideal general staff officer to think or act without authority. He/ course members for high command. In is seen, what profile a representative of she is basically a “staff technician”. their attitude to the general and academic the intellectual elite of the service has. In civilian education of the officers, the so- a thinking armed force, the ideal is an In the personnel cieties and the elected politicians must officer with a thorough practical service management system: develop to understand the rather limited background. That background interacts relevance of civilian academic “credits” to with theoretical schooling and a developed In a normal good quality armed force, the quality and loyalty of the officer corps. character to create a holistic thinking there is a clear and generally accepted con- A good democratically oriented officer generalist with a deep sense of responsi- nection between rank and position on one corps is developed by its constant inter- bility towards the defence mission. He/ side and ability on the other. action – during education and service – she has a well-developed tendency and The foundation of the personnel man- with the civilian society that it serves. ability to seek and analyse “outside the agement system is based on a clear defini-

99 tion of the education, practical experi- why that focus was lost. Therefore a proper Conclusion ence, age, and personality requirement of system has to be developed from scratch, each cadre and specialist position in the including a focused and Western type The transition to effective, “best-prac- peacetime structure and fully mobilised understanding of the education and serv- tice” Western type armed forces will achieve force. Recruiting and formal training take ice background as well as personality re- the following results: place and individuals are rotated between quirement of each position. • Military-political co-operation with different positions and practical The evaluation and selection system a military leadership that combines a deep experiences to fulfil the requirements. must be reformed completely to remove and updated professional foundation with Independent selection boards that must favouritism and clientism. Selection must an acceptance and understanding of its insure against favouritism administer a be based on demonstrated high quality. role in relation to the political leadership personnel evaluation system that endeav- Rotation must be enforced and supported, of their country. ours to give an objective picture of the as must early retirement. The system must • A generation change in the now very development of each member of the cadre ensure the right combination of relative reduced group of senior officers. or specialist. The salary and social system youth and practical professional experi- • The existence of a truly professional must make certain that the rotation be- ence throughout the structure. There must officer corps managed by a personnel tween jobs, necessary to create practical be a balance between the number of of- management system that aims at absolute professionalism in the cadre, can take place ficers graduated from the basic officer fairness, give high priority to service in without undermining the welfare and education and the positions, mainly pla- units, and demands and supports rotation cohesion of the families. The retirement toon leader and other subaltern officer of key officer cadre personnel every 2-3 system ensures that the armed forces avoid positions where they can get practical ex- years. carrying a burden of persons who do not perience. • A firmly rooted understanding in the fit into the current and foreseen require- Without a system that bases promo- central staff structures that their main task ments for cadre and specialists. tion and employment on proven quality, is to develop and maintain effective units, Such a system may have existed in the the officer corps will remain a “battle- within the important context of the tac- CEE armed forces a generation or two field”, dominated by loyalty and favour- tical formation level in the army. ago. However, the general development itism linked to persons, and political • Drastically slimmed and task-oriented in society has probably been the reason manoeuvring among cliques. central staff structures.

100 • The existence of service chiefs/inspec- West confrontation. It dominated all The armed forces were specialised for tors who have a clear responsibility to structures, all thinking, all education and the foreseen missions of “the big war”: the joint operational commander and via training. territorial self-defence and reinforcement him to the chief of defence for unit As the task of the armed forces became of the territorial defence of the front-line quality. clear during the 1950s, the actual organi- states. The forces depended on the deep • A reformed manning system, adjusted sation of defence could be and was del- mobilisation of civilian resources, includ- to the size and mission of the armed egated by the politicians to the profes- ing reserve cadres and other manpower, forces. sional military led by the defence chiefs. and the effectiveness of the expanded • A reformed, pragmatic and practical There was no need for a constant and close forces depended on the thorough, com- officer education structure. interaction between the defence minister mon tactical indoctrination of both regu- • A dynamic general staff officer corps and the chief of defence except in matters lar and reserve cadre. The mission, the with sizable group of members with the of the future budget, relations to the actual terrain where the defence would be ability and moral courage to think and alliance partners (for the NATO mem- conducted, and the available forces were debate “outside the box” – with the un- bers), length of conscript service and the all known in advance. Even the enemy was derstanding of the political and profes- role of the national defence industries. thought to be well-known, including his sional leadership which is crucial in a Thus there was no need to collocate standard tactical and operational drill. democracy. and integrate the ministry and the defence As the Cold War became a routine in staff, and the minister of defence was the early 1970s, preparations to fight for Finally: a look at the normally considered as one of the junior freedom and survival became less urgent. West cabinet posts. The need for close The mission of the armed forces became interaction between the political leaders first and foremost to contribute to the Some elements of the development and defence agencies in crisis and war was, deterrence of an attack. In many Western challenges discussed above are also relevant however, realised as a result of the Cuban European armed forces this led to the stag- for many Continental Western European Missile Crisis in 1962. It was exercised in nation of professional studies and debate, states. During the last half-century, their special inter-ministry and department and then of force structure and doctrinal armed forces have developed strictly contact groups. However, the daily inter- development. The regular cadre obtained within the tight framework of the East- action was weak. rights and service conditions that mir-

101 rored those of the civilian environment Ministry and the Defence Staff and the Operation as it is for the designated task rather than the requirements of their cho- creation of a national joint operations HQ force commander interacting with the sen profession. The requirement for in- has demonstrated its potential for the co- political leadership in the preparation of dependent professional thinking was un- ordination of the political and military a new mission. Education and training derstated in both the professional educa- leadership at the same time allowing for must develop the understanding of the tion and in the service of regular offic- the integration of all relevant joint exper- strengths and weaknesses of the different ers. tise in a professional environment. military tools under various conditions UN-mission service was the only source • The operational forces must be or- rather than supply a ready made set of of “out-of-the box” operational experi- ganised as flexible “tool boxes”, where the doctrinally correct responses. ence. However, as these operations often elements are equipped for and well exer- took place in low-intensity, stable confron- cised in co-operation between themselves tations, had a low prestige and were and with forces from other states. guided by well-established Standard Op- • Even the mission of defending the erating Procedures (SOP), service here did state territory against threats is seen as a not inspire professional development. complex task, calling for flexibility in both direct response and in force expansion as This has led to a situation where well as the ability to co-operate effectively many Western European military struc- with other national and other states’ agen- tures face challenges; which are similar cies. in some areas to those of the CEE • The education of the regular cadre states: needs to develop the will and ability to • Relations between the political and adapt the use of the available personnel professional leadership must be adapted and equipment to the actual task and situ- to mirror the requirements of conduct- ation, if necessary without guidance from ing and managing current and (militarily above. The requirement is as relevant for as well as politically) risky operations. A a platoon leader, at his level, command- combination of the amalgamation of the ing a detachment in a Crisis Response

102 From Hardware to Software Reforms in Romania’s Civil-Military Relations The Policies of Personnel Management

By George Christian Maior and Sebastian Huluban*

garding the reformation in Romania of human resources is managed will deter- Introduction civil-military relations based on demo- mine, in great measure, the success of the cratic principles. Its main goal is to set reform and the achievements of its objec- One of the successful ways in assuring the theoretical context in order to un- tives, namely a modern army that is truly a strong democratic consolidation is to derstand the general issues in the Roma- capable of fulfilling its traditional mis- find an appropriate democratic institu- nian civil–military relations after 1989, and sions and assuming new ones, as a conse- tional balance between the civilian and additionally, to draw the lines for the main quence of its adaptation to a profoundly security sectors, especially between the leg- feature of the military transformation, changed security environment. The man- islative and executive bodies on the one namely the personnel management. agement of personnel thus represents both hand, and the armed forces the other The management of personnel consti- an instrument and a vehicle of reform. In hand. This article is an attempt to offer tutes the basis of any reform in the mili- addition, the personnel policies are one an insight into one of the debates re- tary domain. The way that the issue of of the reform’s most important final

* George Christian Maior is State Secretary and Head of the Euroatlantic Integration and Defense Policies Department, Romanian Ministry of Defence. Sebastian Huluban is Civilian Expert, Political and Military Analysis Office, Romanian Ministry of Defence, [email protected]

103 products and indispensable for creating nian civil-military relations with a par- In contrast, the objective model is a system that is functioning. ticular emphasis on the policies of per- based on maximizing military profession- This multiple significance of the issue sonnel management implemented until alism: “More precisely, it is that distribu- at stake requires a special responsibility now. tion of political power between the upon the political-military leadership in military and civilian groups which is most the army. Leadership must not only treat Civil versus democratic control conducive to the emergence of profes- this issue as a priority, but also approach over the military sional attitudes and behaviour among the it with special care, in order to avoid members of the officer corps” dysfunctional experiments within an area Regarding the theoretical models of (Huntington 1957, 83). The objective so critical to the substance of reform and civil-military relations Samuel model reflects a situation in which the the civil-military relations. Huntington, in his already classical work, officer’s body is “politically sterile and We will evaluate the basic tenets of the The Soldier and the State, argues that there neutral”, prepared to carry out whatever academic literature related to civil-mili- are two main types of the civilian control orders it receives, regardless of who is in tary relations, and the literature related over the military branch: the subjective charge of the government. Furthermore, to the post-communist military transfor- and the objective. Thus, he argues that in contrast to the subjective model, this mation and achievement of democratic the subjective way of control over the mili- approach asserts that civilian control is oversight over the military during the tary is based on maximizing the civilian assured through the recognition of mili- main stages of the process, the hardware, influence with the risk of diluting the co- tary professionalism rather than civilian and the software periods, in particular. hesion and professionalism of the armed interference. Then we will assess the way that the mili- forces: “The simplest way of minimizing But Huntington (1968) also describes tary transformation occurred in Roma- military power would appear to be the another situation relative to the relations nia after 1989. A special attention will be maximizing of the power of civilian between civilians and the military. Hence, given to the peculiarities that the com- groups in relation to the military con- praetorianism1 refers to situations of munist period created in the Romanian sequently the maximizing of civilian military involvement in political affairs civil-military relations, in contrast with power always means the maximizing of (a kind of converse situation of subjective other Warsaw Pact countries. Finally, we the power of some particular civilian control), either using the classical means will present the main stages in the Roma- group or groups” (Huntington 1957, 80). of overthrowing the civilian government

104 through a coup d’etat, or through the ing the military is based on the idea to use gests “a unified theory” of civil-military re- permanent involvement in a political de- military force either to attack others or lations based on the idea of “shared re- cision-making process behind the scenes just to “ward off attacks by others”. The sponsibility”, derived mainly from the (Herspring 1992, 100). As the argument second principle is both logically related assumptions of the theory of regimes. has been put forward by another scholar: and in tension with the first: “ just as the Thus, instead of the concept of “control” “An authoritarian military regime may be military must protect the polity from the author advances the concept of “shar- composed of civilian and military offic- enemies, so must it conduct its own affairs ing”: “ Experience shows that civil au- ers and may be even headed by a civilian in order not to destroy the society it is thorities depend on military experts not who does not posses military skills” intended to protect” (Feaver 1996, 152). only to provide technical advice and to (Perlmutter 1989, 97). In short, the ap- On the other hand, Douglas Bland direct operations, but also to assist in the pearance of a praetorian regime is deter- (1999) maintains that the changes of the civil control of the armed forces. Even in mined mainly by two factors: a weaken- regimes and the advance towards democ- mature democracies, there is an expecta- ing of the political and institutional struc- ratisation in the late twentieth century tion that military leaders will share in ture of the society, and, a cohesive and requires a re-evaluation of the theory and decision-making regarding the national autonomous military (Huntington 1968, models of civil-military relations. The defense and the employment of the armed Perlmutter 1989). author identifies at least four possible forces with their civilian superiors” From a pure theoretical standpoint, models developed in the literature: the (Bland 1999, 10). Peter Feaver argues that the balance2 be- mission model (more compliance in the case Once we move beyond the classical tween the civilian and the military influ- of militaries facing external threats rather concepts and models of civil-military re- ence is based on a paradox and two gen- than internal), the institutional model lations, such as objective, subjective or eral principles. The paradox refers to the (strong civilian-led institutions as the re- praetorian, the legitimate question may fact that because we fear others we create ceipt for the best civilian control), the be: What do we mean by civilian when an institution of violence to protect us, civilian supremacy (active civilian involve- we refer to “civil-military relations”? What but then we fear the very institution that ment at every level of the military deci- does “civilian control over the military” we created for protection. Additionally, the sion-making process), and the humanitar- (security sector) mean in the context of first principle refers to the fact that the ian model (harmony among civilian and democratisation? What about civil-mili- need, “or perceived need”, for establish- military elites). Beyond these, Bland sug- tary relations within regimes rather than

105 democracy, authoritarianism or non-West- to detect, for instance, the difference be- constitutional and other legal provisions ern settings? For instance, Huntington’s tween the Communist Party’s control over regarding the non-involvement of mili- theoretical models have been accepted as the armies in Eastern Europe and the com- tary in domestic politics do not repre- describing the civil-military relations bined legislative, executive and judicial sent the achievement of full democratic within the communist regimes best control over the militaries in the coun- control. As Douglas Bland (1999) asserts, (Herspring 1992). However, others have tries of the European Union or the there is a difference between the democratic argued that the models developed by United States. All these instances denote institutional model, which means “strong Samuel Huntington are not appropriate civilian control of the military (security civilian-led institutions as the path to as- at all for analysing the communist type of sector), even if one is subjective and the sured civilian control” and the civilian civil-military relations: “Throughout his other objective (Huntington 1957). But supremacy that “reflects the ideas of those writings, Huntington tended to dismiss the between these two extreme instances of who believe that control demands the ac- role of civil-military relations in civilian control, we have to understand tive intervention of political leaders at communist states by arguing that relations how the civilian control over the mili- every level of the process” (7). In addi- in such states were always in crisis” tary is exercised in situations of transi- tion Bland (2001) maintains that: (Herspring 1999, 560). The author argues tion from one form of control to the Although in most cases the hardware is at that Huntingon’s models are too static, other (Coughlan 1998). Thus, it becomes least adequate, problems emerge because the civil- whereas reality proves that there are evident relevant to make the point that regarding military relations software has not been installed shifts from subjective to objective and vice transition, setting the concept of civilian in the new structures for the civil control of the verse, especially in the case of some of the control over the military should be un- military. That is to say, the framework of ideas, communist countries (Soviet Union, East derstood as the achievement of democratic principles and norms that shape civil-military Germany) where the 1980’s, for instance, oversight over the security sector. behavior in liberal democracies has not been signified important autonomy for the From another standpoint, this dy- adequately explained or incorporated into the military branch without an obvious namic refers to the stages that should be officer corps, the political culture, and the defense involvement of the civilians (the party) in reached for a sound democratic oversight. establishments of new democracies. There are military politics. A basic assumption is that democratic reasons, particular to states, why this is so. But The lack of a precise definition of what control over the security sector has a generally, the sources of the problem is the ab- “civilian control” means3 may lead us not strong institutional dimension. Thus, sence of a clear model of the software (525).

106 Instead of “hardware” and “software”, ism from a cultural perspective, the social state or government (the President, the Forster (2000) identifies the dynamics of origins of the officers and other variables Prime Minister, rarely the monarch) as democratic control of the security sector, of this type, we will deal with the distinc- the commander-in-chief of the armed in the case of transition of post-commu- tion between “hardware” and “software” forces. Although as a necessary condition nist countries, in terms of first genera- only from an institutional point of view. for implementing civilian-democratic con- tion and second-generation reforms. Thus, the main question is how it is pos- trol over the security sector it is rather Thus, the first generation issues encom- sible to structure and delineate the main insufficient. The head of state pass the basic institutional provisions such stages of the democratic oversight? What (government) lacks usually the time and as the drafting and approval of the new makes democratic control different from the expertise to direct the enforcement constitutional structures and the alloca- the classical “civilian” control? Whereas the of the defence policy personally. As a tion of clear lines of responsibility. The “hardware” is relatively simply evaluated result, he/she will delegate responsibility second-generation set of issues “is emerging in terms of constitutional and main legal and authority to civilian ministers of as being central to the on-going reform provisions, the other part of the defence, interior, and intelligence and law process” (Forster 2000, 7), and refers to institutional stage, the “software” or enforcement agencies who, advised by the effective operation of institutions and “second generation” reforms, are more ministries and staffed with both civilian procedures, change in attitudes, and complex because they encompass the and military experts, should oversee the democratic shared norms and values. The implementation of sound procedures, defence and national security policies. difference between these two stages is enor- institutional reflexes, and mainly interest Secondly, considering that democratic mous: “Whilst institutional structure have and knowledge. A strategic community control of the security sector implies a changed rather rapidly created on paper, cannot be constructed only on empty balanced share and expertise among mili- attitudinal change appears to be taking constitutional and legal provisions. tary and civilians, democratic reforms (es- place over a longer time horizon than Regarding the executive branch rela- pecially in the case of countries that are institutional or structural change” (7). tions with the military under the auspices undergoing a transition from totalitar- It is beyond the scope of this article to of democratisation, three main points ian regimes) are aimed at strengthening analyse the attitudes’ change and demo- should be emphasized. Firstly, democratic the civilian capacity of expertise. One way cratic norms and values (Fitch 2001). In- constitutions enforce the principle of ci- to tackle this issue would be to ensure stead of issues of military professional- vilian supremacy by naming the head of that the collective bodies with strong

107 military representation should be relegated authoritarianism (Tismaneanu 1998), and armed forces, dissolving the main politi- to advisory roles with reduced command the praetorian military might become a cal departments and corresponding bod- or policy authority, such was the case with dominant force in the countries of Eastern ies, radically changing or eliminating the the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. and Central Europe (Nelson 1991, Snyder responsibilities of military political offic- Thirdly, as a consequence of the sec- 1990). As one of the early articles written ers, cutting the links between political ond issue, within the security sector min- on the civil-military relations in post-com- (party) military officials, military security, istries (agencies), the responsibilities ac- munist Europe emphasized, “a close inspec- military prosecutors and the military ju- corded to civilians should be specifically tion of developments in the region suggests diciary, establishing clear rules for the defined. The so-called division of labour that while the fear of praetorianism may armed forces’ disengagement as an institu- between the military and civilian person- be valid in some cases, it is very unlikely tion from political competition for power, nel within these ministries and agencies in the majority of instances” (Herspring clear subordination of the military to on issues like policy, administration and 1992, 99). One of the cited exceptions was effective parliamentary control, and human resources may vary, but it is Romania. Thus, despite of the fact that some redefining the understanding of military generally assumed that the more civilians of the Eastern European countries professionalism (Bebler 1994, 28-29). are placed in top policy-making posts, the experienced military rule (Hungary, Ro- On the other hand, the success of the more effective civilian control is likely to mania, Bulgaria) before the “totalitarian transfer of civilian control over the secu- be (Bland 2001, Kohn 1997). winter”, after 1989 none of the East Euro- rity sector was possible due to the special pean countries has experienced military type of communist civil-military relations. The intricacies of the coups or a dangerous ascension of the As Perlmutter and LeoGrande show: “The communist past military’s influence within politics. Leninist party is anchored in the In an attempt to overview the success- Clausewitzian dictum that politics is su- After the annus mirabilis 1989, there was ful receipt for such a performance, given preme to military action, and communist a relatively shared concern that the sud- the difficult economic, social and politi- states have ideological proscriptions den collapse of the Leninist regimes, the cal conditions, Anton Bebler asserted the against military interference in civil economic problems, the intensified ethnic followings changes implemented by post- politics, which are as strong as those in unrest, and a weak emerging political center communist governments: severing the link Western pluralist systems” (1982, 778). would lead to the resurgence of new between the Communist party and the Thus, some of the authors consider

108 communist civil-military relations were the help of the armed forces), the Soviet Communist elites were unprepared for the best described by the total control of the Union did not keep a tight control over revolutionary uproar of citizens and the military through the subjective tools of the relations between civilian and some of ‘politicised’ type of civil-military relations the Party and ideology (Herspring and the military branches4 . Thus, Zoltan prevailed (Barany 1997, 25-26). Barany also Volgyes 1980). Others consider the Barany argues that, like the political re- considers that Hungary and Romania ideological dimensions of the system gimes, civil-military relations varied con- appear to have the most dissimilar patterns (Kolkowicz 1978). Thus it has been siderably among Eastern European coun- of civil-military relations. assumed that there was not necessarily a tries and, furthermore, these differences strong control of the military because the have tended to persist in the first stages of From whence we came: political two branches were united by their elitist political transformation. In addition, the control over the army under and nationalist feelings, and in addition, peculiarities among the Eastern European communism the military accepted benevolent the countries in terms of the degree of the primacy of ideology and, consequently, repression that was practiced by the Com- Before 1989, the Romanian Armed of the Communist Party. Beyond these munist regime, influenced not only the type Forces (RAF) presented a somewhat ex- approaches, the conclusion was that the of extrication from totalitarian, or post- traordinary paradox. Although a mem- party-dominant authority structure, a totalitarian rule, but also the degree of the ber of the Warsaw Pact Alliance, the RAF high level of elite integration, and a military involvement in the process of the did not share the Pact’s warfare doctrine. complex institutional relation that transfer of power. Thus, it is assumed that On the contrary, the RAF had character- combined elements of both subordination the armed forces played the least active role istics generated from Romania’s national and autonomy, and the details of this in the transition in Hungary and Poland, defence doctrine – “War of the Entire relationship depend upon the specific where the liberalisation process was gradual, People” – with all the consequences regard- historical circumstances under which the civil-military relations were ing military organisation and the exer- revolutionary elite seizes power ‘professionalised’, and communist elites gave cise of military functions that flowed from (Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982, Odom up their power voluntarily. In contrast, it. The substance of military professional- 1973). the armed forces played an active role in ism also found a greater expression in the But despite the violent way of impos- the transition in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, RAF for a variety of reasons. Among the ing its own political model (mainly with and Romania, where conservative most relevant fields, were the military inde-

109 pendence gained from the Soviet Union their side of the Iron Curtain. Conse- Romanian officers before their promotion during the 1960’s, is the large degree of mili- quently, the model of Communist party to a senior rank. A series of officers who tary autonomy, granted by the Romanian control by cells and committees as had studied in Moscow were marginalised, communist authorities, necessary for it to practiced in the USSR was extended to all and there was even an attempt to partially become a fully field-capable and credible institutions, at all levels, including mili- recuperate the interwar officer corps by force, and the rather different manner in tary commands and units. The officer selecting and recruiting personnel from the which the purely military dimension of the corps was purged of the Royal Romanian traditional military families7 . RAF interacted with the political-ideologi- Army and mass promotions were made Likewise, although the party commit- cal dimension. Paradoxically, this created an in the officer corps directly from the tees were maintained down to the basic isolationist mentality centered on the idea “working class”5 . This resulted in a coun- units, the effective components of those of professionalism and an attitude of “how ter-selection of weakly qualified person- committees were entirely made up of pro- it must be done”, which later generated nel from a “class” that was proved as be- fessional officers from different service certain difficulties for the re-integration of ing incapable of producing its own elites6 . branches in order to ensure that there the system and for the implementation of Along with these measures, during 1945- was no significant perception internally civilian control. 1947, many propagandistic military-cul- that committees represented a foreign Initial conditions, however, had been tural institutions were introduced in the body, exogenous to military functions, quite similar. By the end of the 1940’s, a armed forces, and some of them remained within the armed forces. This was under- Communist government aligned and sub- until the December 1989 revolution. scored by the organisation of the Main jected to the policies of Moscow sought The separation from the Soviet policies, Political Administration, into the Higher to politicise the entire social system along especially regarding economy, foreign re- Political Directorate, abolishing career parameters required for the creation of lations, and military spheres, and the inde- political officers (Alexiev 1979, 21-23). the “New Man” or “Homo Sovieticus” pendent policies promoted within the Even the Higher Political Council was (Zinoviev 1986). In order to achieve the Communist Bloc by Romania in the be- composed exclusively of professional mili- combined purposes of political control ginning of 1960s, generated a number of tary officers. With certain notable excep- and ideological indoctrination, Soviet transformations in the military system. tions, one could no longer speak of the authorities imposed a process of institu- Officers were no longer trained in the Soviet existence of a significant category of mili- tional duplication upon the countries on Union nor was Moscow permitted to vet tary “politruks”.

110 This allowed the RAF to maintain a its inertial elements, became problematic plication of cadre policies. Additionally, form of internal cohesion that later was for the relations between the army and before 1989, the military retained all the reinforced, because the army as an insti- the political leadership in the beginning standard characteristics of a mass army, tution was marginalised by the Romanian of the 1990s, as the RAF continued to including the wasteful consumption of communist authorities that were in favour view any non-professional military in- resources. The RAF numbered well over of the Ministry of the Interior and the volvement in its affairs akin to party po- 300,000 soldiers, in spite of significantly secret police forces (Securitate). The prin- litical intrusion. lower manning tables, including over cipal impact of party policies on the mili- Of course, the intrusion of politics in 40,000 manual labourers pressed into serv- tary was essentially limited to a degree of military affairs during the communist ice and put in a uniform solely because control over the social origins of the of- period was felt in many areas. However, of Ceaucescu’s prestige projects (as well as ficer corps and to the direct employment in spite of constant pressure, the commu- the foreign and domestic intelligence of the army in supporting the national nist networks could not systematically pen- organisations that were subordinated to economy. There was no control over the etrate the generic concept of the military the military at the height of the revolution composition and the dimension of the career, in which the RAF, with consider- and for several months thereafter)8 . military structures and forces, since these able self-sacrifice, was able to preserve im- were considered as being strictly military portant elements of autonomy and insula- Early stages of reform: problems. tion. The end result of these evolutionary two steps forward, one step back Regarding the impact of the pure differences was demonstrated clearly and politruk variable in its traditional sense, it unambiguously in the position adopted The reform of the Romanian Armed was to a lesser degree present in the RAF by the army during the anti-Communist Forces was launched already in the begin- than elsewhere in the Pact, because of the Revolution of December 1989. ning of the 1990s. Its first goal, besides professional autonomy requirements of These relative advantages notwithstand- from clearing the non-military dross from an independent military. What remained ing, the military system in Romania was the RAF, was the “depoliticisation of mili- of that influence was confronted by a also infected with a significant degree of tary structures”, even though in natural professional resistance; unorgan- nepotism and corruption, inner charac- Romania’s case this phenomenon lacked ised, but nonetheless powerful. Paradoxi- teristics of the communist administration the drama that it created among the rest cally, this rather healthy resistance, through as manifested in the conception and ap- of the members of the Warsaw Pact, due

111 to mentioned considerations9 . A number 1957). This process of professionalising number of promotions were made on the of measures taken with a remedial intent the RAF and implementing objective con- basis of improved criteria, higher ranks had untended negative consequences. For trol (understood as the democratic-insti- were unnecessarily required for a variety instance, a number of officers that were tutional control) still continues – although of functions, and the number of posts previously frozen in rank during the in a different dimensions and aspects – was increased rather arbitrarily, mainly in Communist regime were rapidly pro- up to the present. the organisational charts of the central moted. Likewise, the minimum stage in An important, but costly lesson was structures. grade was reduced, further accelerating learned in this process. The appointment Partly, these counterproductive devel- promotion. At the beginning, however, of officers was based on their “healthy” opments can be attributed to the accu- there was no clear concept of the reform social background, and it could not have mulation of an important number of the and the mentioned promotions were been corrected simply by promoting of- officers’ functions that were subordinate aimed solely at discretely eliminating in- ficers whose careers had previously suf- to their rank during the Communist re- justices within the officer corps rather than fered because of their “unhealthy” social gime. These officers were frozen at this level to correct evident systemic dysfunctions. background. It has been assumed from by the military hierarchy, which blocked The process of depoliticisation that was the start that the character and professional their normal resignation from the system. supposed to transform the previous po- skills that are necessary for good officers This process, in turn, generated an evolu- litical, subjective control into a democratic are individual attributes, which are not tion that was difficult to control. At one one, was based on a clear separation be- dependent on class or status. point, the rapid and aggressive promotion tween the political and the military field The lack of an articulated personnel of officers to a higher rank, particularly to of responsibilities. In Samuel Hunting- management concept and procedures, to- the rank of colonel, became a generalised ton’s terms, we were beginning to imple- gether with the post-revolutionary exu- pattern. Obviously, this “colonelisation” of ment “objective civilian control” by berance generated a number of contra- the officer corps produced serious distor- “militarising the military, and making dictions in the personnel domain. Moreo- tions in what should have been the con- them the tool of the state”, rather than ver, phenomena and tendencies from the struction of a rank pyramid and a mod- subjective control, which “achieves its end past continued to influence the trajectory ern system of command. by civilianising the military, making them of attempts to outline useful concepts of Together, these processes generated an the mirror of the state” (Huntington human resource management. Thus, a increase in the bureaucratic structures of

112 the ministry while accentuating the dis- torate for Human Resource Management of regiments into brigades, and divisions equilibria of the rank pyramid, which was in 1999, clearly illustrate that the failure into army corps, respectively. Proceeding rapidly transformed into a series of “rank to act was not due to any lack of under- in this manner led inexorably to a dra- cylinders” and even an inverse pyramid with standing of the problem: matic growth of military cadre in the sen- higher ranks outnumbering the subordi- “If we connect the number of 112,000 with ior ranks that damaged the primary com- nates. By the beginning of 2000 it was the structure laws that provide a pyramid con- bat levels – the officerisation of the army. generally recognized that the elimination figuration you will see that we will have to get of “exceptional” promotions had become to a number of 15,000 officers – this means The empirical approach to an imperious necessity, but political con- that an equal number of them has to leave personnel management siderations permitted this dysfunctional within a certain period of time. The military practices to continue until 2001, when category surplus in the Romanian Army does Concurrent with these suboptimal re- exceptional promotion were eliminated not start with generals, it does not even get there. form efforts, modern approaches to the in extenso throughout the military. Let us go further, we now have 2,300 colonels proffesionalisation of the army were also During 1998-1999 a number of con- and there needs to be 630. You can see how present in this early transformations con- cepts were elaborated at the ministerial drastic the cuts are (Bãlan 1999, 85)”. cept. For example beginning in 1993, the level with the assistance of specialists from first military personnel were hired on a NATO, but the process was hindered by The counterproductive nature of these contract basis. This was quite remarkable the lack of concrete plans and an inabil- tendencies was exacerbated by the essen- in Romania at that time, where conscrip- ity to implement policies. Although the tially quantitative method through which tion had important symbolic roots in the need for a fundamental reform was gen- the Soviet-inspired triad of regiment-divi- collective mentality stretching back be- erally recognised, restructuring the per- sion-army had been replaced by the West- yond the Communist period and into sonnel was limited to reducing – or rather ern-style organizational structures of bat- the pre-national past. incorporating fewer – conscripts. While talion-brigade-army and corps-army in The process of attracting civilian spe- this permitted a degree of financial 1991-1992. Although absolutely necessary, cialists was also initiated during this pe- economy, it did not contribute to the this was accomplished not on the basis of riod. From at least one perspective, that construction of viable military system. a well-grounded planning vision but of legitimacy, civil-military relations in The statements of the Chief of the Direc- rather through the gross transformation Romania were significantly advantaged by

113 the traditionally supportive relationship the total of the civilian personnel. Civil- ing civilian personnel in all leadership between the society and the military that ian specialists were confined in their ac- positions that did not require strict mili- also existed during the Communist period tivities to military projections, the medi- tary expertise were employed within a (Watts forthcoming). Because of that Ro- cal field, and scientific research. They were “top-down” framework extending over a mania differed from the other states of not placed in functions that were related period of many years. Central and Eastern Europe that were still to leadership but in functions that were in the early stages of constructing this related to implementation. The modern system of human basic relationship. As noted above, how- Civilian control made its debut resources management ever, the exercise of civilian-democratic through the use of existing “reigns of control was influenced by a series of is- power” in the higher structures of the At the same time as the maturation of sues. Paradoxically, these issues derived not army by personalities from the scientific the Romanian democracy and the effec- only from the lack of real civilian exper- community, academia, and diplomacy. tive institutionalisation of democratic tise in the military domain at the begin- These personalities were generally chosen control over the armed forces, and faced ning of the reform process – a universal on the combined basis of their acquaint- with extremely limited resources and the problem in the post-communist space – ance with defence issues and their likeli- pressure to use them effectively, a number but also from the two advantages of Ro- hood of being accepted by the military of modern personnel management con- mania’s military independence within the community. In the beginning of 1993, cepts were introduced in departmental Warsaw Pact: The resistance to the first civilian – a professor of national personnel management policies. This proc- politicisation during the Communist security and international relations – was ess was greatly supported by the decision period and the relegation of military af- appointed to a leadership position as state to seek NATO membership in 1993, and fairs to the exclusive sphere of specialists. secretary (deputy minister) for defence the signing of the Partnership for Peace On the other hand, an important policy10 . Approximately one year later, agreement in 1994, both of which accel- number of civilians were hired in the the first civilian defence minister since erated the first conceptual reform, and armed forces since the early 1960s. Prior the Second World War – a diplomat who then the organizational and operative re- to 1989, however, the relative quota of had a background in arms control nego- forms in the military domain. those with higher studies was insignifi- tiations – was appointed11 . Once this proc- “Rationalizing” the management of cant (approximately 8.5%) compared to ess had been started, the model of appoint- human resources was an immediate pri-

114 ority given that the system in its entirety tion), initial formation, employment and Romania’s NATO candidacy, including was evolving under the auspices of development, to subsequent specialization, the adoption of the Military Career Guide. decisions and policies that were essentially reconversion, and retirement or depar- Parallel with the assessment of this con- unsystematic, and in a manner that con- ture from the system. The theory takes ception, traditional personnel structures tinued to require an extremely wasteful into account both the current practices were replaced with a newly constituted consumption of resources. After a period of NATO member states and the tradi- Directorate of Human Resources Manage- of experimentation and transition, the tions of the Romanian Army in this area. ment - the central Ministry of Defence clarification, crystallization, and assimila- It is worth repeating that the major structure authorized to elaborate the strat- tion of some reform concepts regarding breakthrough in this process was possi- egy, policies, and procedures regarding the system of human resource management ble because of the necessity of achieving the restructuring and the modernizing of were adopted as a priority by the leader- the full compatibility of the RAF with the management of professional human ship of the Ministry of Defence. An im- the NATO forces. Initially received with resources. This Directorate maintains con- portant role in the assessment of these scepticism and followed by Romania’s trol over the entrance-exit flux of the sys- concepts regarding a new system of hu- failure to gain an invitation to the Alliance tem, including advances in the rank, pro- man resource management has been in Madrid in 1997, the NATO motions in position, education statistics, adopted as a priority by the leadership membership Action Plan (MAP) process transfer to reserve status, retirement, etc. of the Ministry of Defence. An impor- and the system of consultations with In this respect, a clear separation within tant role in the elaboration of these con- NATO that was developed in order to the system was established between the level cepts was played by the direct support implement this process, have played a criti- of conception and that of execution and, received from the USA, Great Britain, cal role in distinguishing priorities of not less important, between the benefici- France, and other states. For the first time, personnel management. When, in Febru- ary – the army as a whole, with specific all of the activities related to the manage- ary 2001, a profound and pragmatic re- application to the general staff – and the ment of professional personnel were based view of the national accession plan was planner – the Directorate of Human Re- upon rigorous adherence to a coherent completed, personnel management reform sources Management in cooperation with theory of human resource management, constituted, either directly or indirectly, specialized military structures. including the complete personnel cycle three of the twelve priorities considered The restructuring of human resources from procurement (recruitment and selec- vital for reestablishing the credibility of was carried out quite quickly. It has from

115 the beginning been defined as a systemic human resources management system, as by 2007, special attention will be given to reform with a direct impact on the entire specialists in military actions, at the plan- the management of departures and en- military sphere in regards to its capacity ning level, in training, and in the execu- trances into the system and that must be for action and its professional prepara- tion of military tasks. Within the new managed appropriately and in respect to tion. In this manner, the entire system concept, the corps of the NCOs represent the planning cycles. has been re-projected on the new princi- the backbone of the army. According to The main objectives of the concept ples where the place and role of every cat- a pre-established model, NCOs will be regarding the management of human re- egory of personnel has been redefined. experts in various military domains, com- sources in the Romanian Army include An important feature of this strategy manders of the structures at the base of the following: the rehabilitation of the is the definition of the officer as being a the military hierarchy (teams, groups, pla- military career; increased transparency and military leader, and that the officer corps toons), instructors, workers in the gen- equal opportunity in the promotion of are the functional centre of the entire eral staff, administrators, and managers of military cadres through the use of the military organism. The preparation of this material resources. There is also a need Military Career Guide (enacted since 2001) professional officer corps primarily con- for intelligent action in this area in or- and by optimising the performance of cern the management of military organi- der to change the attitudes of the officer the selection committee; the definition of zation and action in times of peace, cri- corps regarding the role of the NCOs, posts according to military rank as re- sis, and war, and the capacity for utiliz- and break down the clichés rooted in the quired in a pyramidal system and the ing resources for attaining the objectives past regarding the military status of NCOs implementation of a system of personnel of the military organization. The strat- and warrant officers. data management. egy’s implementation will also lead to the Whether the military professional is elimination of the (ab)use of officers in hired on a contract basis or have to do The structure of functions the bureaucratic sense; which creates the obligatory military service12 , he is the in the pyramidal system and risk of de-professionalising the officer executor of military actions, and the one the military career corps up to the level of central structures who fulfils the tasks and carry out both over time. experience and personal initiatives into The pyramidal system is a method of Non-commissioned officers (NCO) are practice. Given the aim of achieving a 90% structuring functions by category of pro- assigned an important role under the new professional soldiers in the armed forces fessional personnel such that the ratio of

116 officers to NCOs tends toward its ing the rank structure of functions. These regulations and conditions for filling in optimum value according to the model combined shortcomings led to the accu- these positions - an officer career guide. used by the NATO member states. The mulation over time of structural and func- In order to improve the deficiency, the system is also a method for organizing tional deficiencies in the management of Military Career Guide was adopted in the officers, NCOs, and professional grades the officer corps, and to the depreciation spring of 2001. The adoption of this fun- according to military ranks and types of of the military career in general. Officers damental document that defines the evo- career. The Programme Force 2003 concept were used in every domain of military lutionary parameters of military person- adopted in 1998 foresaw the structuring activity, not only in the quality of mili- nel management constituted one of the of armed forces personnel into 112.000 tary leader but also in execution (subor- most significant achievements in military military positions, including 18.000 offic- dinate) functions. Consequently, year af- reform since 1989. The experience of ers, 40.200 NCOs and warrant officers, ter year, pressure was built up and pushed NATO states, and especially of those re- 22.300 professional grades, and 31.500 the officers toward the top of the hierar- cently invited into the Alliance, shows how conscripts. In 2001, a strategic review of chy. This resulted in a surplus of supe- difficult it is to develop a precise termi- missions and force requirements was initi- rior officers – majors, lieutenant colonels, nology, time scales, and legal regulations ated. According to the preliminary results and colonels - and a concurrently increas- within this vital domain. Without any of that review, the new Objective Force to ing deficit of second lieutenants, lieuten- exaggeration, the adoption of the Guide be achieved by 2007 will maintain the ants, and captains. Together with the in- immediately created a shock wave that same relationship of ranks and functions efficient use of these junior officers this echoed throughout the system’s struc- based on a predicted uniformed military led to the superior ranks being regarded tures, and whose consequences and effects personnel level of 75.000. The Objective Force as demonic. will continue to mark the modern evolu- will be composed of at least 90% profes- One the one hand the lack of transpar- tion of the RAF over the long term. sional military personnel. ency in the management of both posts The Guide defines the military career Until 2001, there were no normative and officers illustrated the absence of a as a succession of functions (positions) acts that established the career evolution- basic document setting out all of the posts that an officer could fulfil, beginning with ary principles for military cadres in a that could be occupied by officers - a chart the first function of a second lieutenant coherent and unitary manner. Nor was of positions - and, on the other hand, and terminating with the functions of a there any theoretical model for determin- the lack of a document describing the general at the highest rang in the military

117 hierarchy. Similarly, the officer’s career Summing up, professional preparation reer Guide, with the goal of obtaining a was delineated according to the natural and promotion are governed on the ba- higher level of professionalism and a trans- requirements of the various posts, the lev- sis of the two instruments mentioned parent system for the advancement of ci- els of competences that was necessary for above: the Military Career Guide, and the vilian personnel. each one, and by the existence of obliga- Selection Committees. The Military Career Concurrently, a series of concrete meas- tory postings in the junior career - corre- Guide imposes regulations that ensure: ures have been taken regarding the con- sponding to the second lieutenant - cap- • The direct correlation between the ceptual integration of the preparedness tain ranks; in the mid-level career - corre- rank of the post and the rank of the of- and employment of civilian personnel sponding to the major - lieutenant colo- ficer who will be appointed, with those of other ministries, such as nel ranks; and in the senior career - corre- • A promotion after the minimum time the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with sponding to the colonel - general ranks. in grade, and after the graduation from which an efficient exchange of experts and The military careers that are different the career course ensuring the necessary senior civil servants has already taken place. in length was also introduced and adopted. competence for the new function. These efforts are being made in order to Thus officers may pursue a long-term ca- achieve a more coherent and effective reer at the end of which the officer ben- Improving civilian defence development of basic military missions, efits from a military service pension, or a management specialists especially military diplomacy, its coordi- short-term career that is followed by a nation with the security policy-making, second career in the civil service. At the beginning of 2002, a process and more generally, with the Romanian In order to manage entrance into the was initiated in order to design a system foreign policy. system, two channels of access to the mili- of civilian careers within the RAF. This The conceptualisation of the role of civil tary career already operate. The direct initiative was driven by the necessity of servants within the military system also seeks channel assumes graduation from a mili- managing the careers of both a uniformed to generate a positive trend for the further tary institution of higher learning. The and civilian personnel in an integrated development and empowerment of a indirect channel, on the other hand, is manner. The fundamental principles of civilian defence community. As part of its effort open to graduates from civil institutions this conception, currently in the incipi- to attract students from different domains of higher learning and to the active serv- ent stages of the development, will be simi- into the military, the Ministry of National ice of NCO cadres. lar to those expressed in the Military Ca- Defence recently launched a program

118 providing flexible internships within the Bland (1999), in his attempt to develop a anti-terrorism) and even NATO and UN Ministry to students. unified theory of civil-military relations, procedures and terminology. Once a “pool” of security experts is consoli- calls “the shared responsibility” model dated, whether they are graduates from between civilians and the military. In this Conclusion specialized Romanian or NATO member respect, “the principal purpose of civil- states schools and institutions, the premise ian oversight would be to develop stand- The reform of human resources man- will exist for the application for long-term ards and criteria for evaluating military agement in the Romanian Armed Forces civilian career management, and a network performance” (Larson 1974), which as- is an integral part of the process of trans- of institutions and NGOs will offer both sumes the development of civil personnel formation and democratisation of civil- expertise and qualified personnel in this careers, together with education and train- military relations. The most important domain. An important role will also be ing programs13 with an emphasis on com- goals that remain to be achieved in the played by the new approach to training munication and evaluation abilities suited nearest future are the development of and education courses offered by NATO to the military system. programs to attract civilian experts toward members that have changed the focus Similar forms of coordination are be- a defence system and a military career, and from quantity to quality, and who also ing developed with the forces of the Min- the creation of a rotation system of per- have added a system of monitoring the istry of the Interior (Gendarmes, Police, sonnel at the central level in order to subsequent careers of their graduates. Border Police) in order to connect per- improve the individual level of expertise, This model presupposes both a con- sonnel reform to the larger process of and the consolidation of a group of ceptual transformation (at the level of reforming the security sector. In this re- NATO personnel14 . Romania’s defence policies) and a legisla- spect, the training centres of the army were Two of the most important objectives tive transition, as well as the implementa- recently opened up to a number of sen- of human resources management - increas- tion of the macro-level (hardware) frame- ior public servants, uniformed and civil- ing transparency and ensuring equal op- work for democratic control to the much ian, from the Ministry of the Interior, portunities in the promotion of military more detailed focus on the development and a special emphasis is put on the cadres - can only be comprehended of permanent cooperation between po- transfer of “know how” in areas of through the full application of the Mili- litical elites, civilian experts, and military common interest such as resource tary Career Guide. As long as the provi- professionals (software). Or as Douglas planning, crisis management (including sions of the Guide are rigorously imple-

119 mented, the modern system of human ering the cost of personnel (which ac- Los Angeles: Center for Strategic and Inter- resource management will continue to be count for more than a half of the defence national Affairs, UCLA. a success, and so will Romanian military budget). 1982. “Party-Military Relations in Eastern reform. The application of the Guide’s The next stage of transformation will Europe: The Case of Romania.” In Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats. Civil-Military Relations rules and criteria - individual perform- involve the adaptation of the system as a in Communist and Modernizing Societies. Ed. ance, professional competence, experience, whole to the educational and operational Roman Kolkowicz and A. Korbonski. Lon- and potential for development - deter- requirements, moving to certain standard don: George Allen&Unwin. mines whether we successfully negotiate of operating procedures for the prepara- Bacon, Walter M., Jr. 1978. “The Military the transition period, where shortcom- tion of various categories of personnel, and the Party in Romania.” In Civil-Military ings and internal convulsions are easily ensuring the functional entrance and exit Relations in Communist Systems. Ed. Dale generated and the probability for loosing flow in the military system and the man- Herspring and Ivan Volgyes. Boulder, Colo: valuable resources are high, or whether agement of larger problems connected to Westview Press. we become mired in that transition. It is Balan, Neculai. 1999. Intervention in Re- the role and motivation of the professional building the Armed Forces for the XXI Century. thus imperative that we develop the moni- soldier in ensuring national and collective Bucharest, Military Publishing House. toring mechanisms that will permit the defence. Once the software reforms are Barany, Zoltan. 1997. “Democratic Con- identification and application of viable implemented, there is hope that the or- solidation and the Military: The East Euro- solutions to dysfunctions as they arise. ganizational culture it will create, together pean Experience”. Comparative Politics. 30(1) As noted above, preparation for with the general attitudes already influenced October: 21-43. NATO proved to be an important cata- by the implementation of the hardware Bebler, Anton. 1994. “The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Central and East- lyst for the personnel reform process. No reforms, will finally draw the framework ern Europe”. NATO Review. 42(4): 28-32. less important was the dedication of re- of the “shared responsibility” model in sources and greater sophistication regard- Bland, Douglas. 1999. “A Unified Theory Romanian civil-military relations. of Civil-Military Relations”. Armed Forces and ing the need to use them wisely. Although Society, 26(1): 7-25. the defence budget has increased in the References 2001. “Patterns in Liberal Democratic last two fiscal years, this period also wit- Civil-Military Relations.” Armed Forces and nessed a broader understanding of the Alexiev, Alexander. 1979. Party-Military Society. 27(4): 525-540. financial limits and the necessity for low- Relations in Eastern Europe: The Case of Romania. Couglan, Elizabeth P. 1998. “Democratizing

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121 Szemerkenyi, Reka A. 1997. Central Euro- sake of national security and stability. It was even while, by mid 1946, almost 16.000 officers and pean Civil-Military Reforms at Risk. Adephi Pa- argued that military skills (notably discipline) NCOs were promoted (Ghermani, 1964, 1976). per #306. International Institute for Strate- could be utilized for the wider national benefit”. 6 A statistic from 1955 notes that: “90% of the gic Studies. 2 As Sigmund argues: “Rather than overarching officers come from the ranks of the working class”. 7 Tismaneanu, Vladimir. 1998. Phantasies of theories, a careful analysis of the bargaining rela- This process actually began shortly after Sta- tionship between the military and the civilians lin’s death, indicating that military independence Salvation. Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in will be the appropriate focus of the analysis, ac- was a goal in and of itself, in parallel with the Post-Communist Europe. Princeton> Princeton companied by an awareness that the civil-mili- push for economic independence that first caused University Press. tary relationship is dynamic and is affected by an open break between Bucharest and Moscow in Watts, Larry L. 1992. “The Romanian societal consensus on democratic legitimacy as 1964 (de Sola Poole 1955, 94 -100). Military in the December Revolution and well as by the varying effectiveness, not least in the 8 There were only 220.000 personnel according Beyond.” In Romania After Tyranny. Ed. Dan- area of economics, of the elected governments” to the official manning tables: 38.045 officers, iel Nelson. Boulder : Westview. (Sigmund 1993, 122). 36.747 NCOs, 115.837 conscripts, and 31.879 ci- Watts, Larry L. 2001a. “The Crisis in Ro- 3 Michael Desch points out that civil-military vilians (Rebuilding the Armed Forces 1999, 85). manian Civil-Military Relations.” Problems of relations represent a complicated issue to deal 9 Ironically, there was a drama connected witt the Post-Communism. 48(4): 14-27. with: “Analysts disagree about how to define and de-politicization of the Romanian army in 1990- measure civil-military relations as the dependent 1991, but not because of the need to free the army 2001b. “Reform and Crisis in Romanian variable. These disagreements have two causes. of the Communist party’s influence. Rather, the Civil-Military Relations.” Armed Forces and First, it is not always clear when issues involve appointment of General Nicolae Militaru – an Society. 27(4): 597-623. civil-military conflict rather than intracivilian officer cashiered by Ceausescu in 1978 – in the struggles, intramilitary fights, or civil-military midst of the revolution, and his reactivation of 20 1 During the 60’s some of the studies assumed coalitional wars A second cause of disagreement retired generals into senior military leadership that praetorian regimes might be factors that ac- in analyses of relations between civil and military positions, signaled a different sort of politicization. celerate the process of modernization. As Chris establishments is that even when we are sure the This determined a reaction within the military in Smith (2001) shows, “The role of the military issue is one of civil-military relations, it is often the form of the Committee for the Democratiza- institutions was the original focus of the analysts not clear whether these relations are good or bad. tion of the Army, the CADA (Watts 1992). who set out to comprehend the dynamics of the There is a remarkably broad range of ideas on 10 The professor, current Defence Minister Ioan Third World An emerging consensus, especially what constitutes ‘good’ or ‘bad’ civil-military re- Mircea Pascu, had also served as the President’s in Washington, on the role of the military in lations.” (Desch 1998, 3). Foreign Affairs Advisor in 1990-1993 and was a development was largely positive. It was always 4 A special case was constituted by the intelli- founder of the National Defense College in 1991- thought that the army could play a part in the gence services, which, in countries like Romania, 1992. development, although, increasingly, it was tacitly East Germany or USSR enjoyed large privileges. 11 The diplomat, Ghoerghe Tinca, has repre- accepted – yet never fully admitted – that political 5 For instance, in August 1946 alone, 9.000 offic- sented Romania in arms control, negotiations at institutions might have to be sacrificed for the ers and 5.000 NCOs were purged for disloyalty the United Nations in the 1970s and 1980s.

122 12 As of 2002, Romania still had universal male conscription, However, there is broad institutional and public support for a professional military and, in March 2002, the Ministry of Defence pro- posed an amendment to the Romanian Constitu- tion that would phase out conscription begin- ning in 2003. 13 In the immediate future (probably next aca- demic year) the National Defence University in Bucharest will be opened where, following the successful experience of the National Defense Col- lege, the future Romanian civilian and military personnel will be trained together. 14 Starting with January 2003, the National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest, the NSPAS, a civilian academic in- stitution, will open, under the assistance of NATO Headquarters in Bruxelles, NATO Defense Col- lege in Rome, and George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies in Germany, the NATO Senior Executive Master. The main goal of the pro- gram is to develop a professional group of per- sonnel for NATO related problems.

123 The Military Reform Process: Recommendations Based on the Lessons Learned from Central, Eastern and Western Europe, and the United States

By Marc Remillard*

he first step in the military reform dispensable, because the reform process military. These challenges cannot be over- process is the needs assessment. On is a lengthy one - usually lasting as long as come without broad political and public the political side, agreement must be eight to ten years. If there is no consen- support. reached on the reform’s principles and sus, the reform will almost certainly be After starting with basic principles, on the necessary laws and institutions to reviewed and modified with each change reform process should continue with enact those principles. In the case of the of the government, thus ensuring the translating these into legislation and in- military itself, the needs’ assessment means reform’s failure. But there are additional stitutions: in order to lay the foundations determination of what are the roles which reasons why strong political and public for a successful reform process, agreement the country’s political elites expect the mili- support is essential: the reform will at must be established on the basic princi- tary to play. some points alienate certain groups of the ples of reform, such as: Therefore it is necessary to build a society, it will cost taxpayers’ money, and • The military must not be given an broad consensus on basic principles and it will require that men and women find internal role, except in extreme cases and key elements of reform: consensus is in- attractive and necessary to serve in the upon the decision of the Parliament only

* Marc Remillard is Head of International Projects, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

124 and in case of natural or man-made disas- and adequately staffed by a mix of civil- assessment, which in turn, must be based ters, when the military acts in civilian ian and military personnel. on the evaluation of the country’s secu- functions of disaster relief; military and The most important legislation includes: rity situation, the region and the trans- police functions must be clearly separated. • The relevant parts of the constitution Atlantic region, as in the case of a Euro- • The military must be placed under and pean country. strong democratic civilian control, and • Laws on national defence and the sta- The conclusion is that any reform proc- effective oversight by parliament. tus of military personnel, including pro- ess must start with the elaboration of a • The military must become transpar- fessionals and conscripts. National Security Strategy (or Policy) for ent to the public, including the planning The institutions needed include: the country. The National Security Strat- and the use of its budget. • Parliamentary oversight committees for egy, in simple terms, determines the secu- • The rule of law must apply to the defence, intelligence, foreign affairs, etc. rity situation of the country, against the military as well. • Relevant institutions of the executive background of the security situation in • The military should be open to in- branch ensuring the smooth integration the immediate neighbourhood and ternational cooperation, especially with of the military in the governmental broader region where the country is situ- neighbouring countries. structures within the military to manage ated. In elaborating such a strategy, the cooperation of the military with Parlia- notion of security must be based on a Next step is to determine the roles of mentary committees and other non-mili- modern understanding of security, which the military in the context of an overall tary structures. is comprehensive, cooperative, coherent, national security strategy: the executive common, collective and/or indivisible. branch must lead the efforts to introduce This should lead to developing a Na- Seven key elements of a military reform, legislation ensuring that these principles tional Security Strategy: the starting point include: are enshrined in the constitution and the in thinking about reform of the military • Establishing a comprehensive and laws of the country, and that the neces- itself must be the determination of the appropriate legal framework, sary institutions of the parliament and role the military will be expected to play • Creating a modern and flexible com- the government, such as parliamentary in the security equation of any given mand structure, oversight committee(s) and the inter- country. These roles can only be deter- • Developing an efficient defence plan- agency coordination body(ies) are created mined on the basis of a realistic threat ning system,

125 • Creating a new system of human re- tion, since the armed forces are decisively which does not mean that all employees sources management, different from the rest of the society. The of the Ministry must be civilians from • Matching resources to missions and necessary legislation should cover, in addi- the very beginning. However, the insti- ensuring transparency of the military tion to the “logical” ones, major areas of tution itself and its legal status must be budget, law: policing (for the military police), the civilian, and a significant number of its • Pursuing technical modernisation and judiciary system (for the court-martial sys- employees should also be civilians. The at the right time, tem), healthcare and pensions (for the spe- command, planning and organisational • Making a careful decision regarding cific needs of the military in military functions should be separated and should conscription vs. all-volunteer forces. healthcare and the special retirement rules be reflected institutionally as well. for the military), education (for military 1. Establishing a comprehensive training schools), etc. 3. Developing an efficient defence and appropriate legal framework planning system 2. Creating a modern and flexible An adequate legal framework is indis- command structure There is a need for a serious defence pensable for the reform. First, effective planning system, which should be created democratic political and civilian control It is essential to create a modern and under the leadership of the Ministry of must be established, including the intro- flexible command structure, paying spe- Defence. The former monopoly of the duction of the concept of „citizen in uni- cial attention to maintain the unity of General Staff in planning must be replaced form”, which ensures that the human rights command, which will make it possible to by a cooperative effort, in which the civil- of every soldier are protected and ensured command the forces in peacetime and, ian element takes the lead in determining without endangering the effective function- with few changes, in wartime. The com- the capabilities needed and cooperates with ing of the force – a huge task in itself. mand structure must take into account the military element in translating these Next comes the necessary legislation regard- the perspective of an eventual international capabilities into forces, as well as determin- ing the peacetime functioning of the force, cooperation both in peacetime and in ing the price tag for all projects. mobilisation and wartime use. This is a time of conflicts and will make it possi- The defence planning process starts with vital and, at the same time, daunting task, ble, easy and effective. Creation of a civil- the needs’ determination. These needs which covers close to all aspects of legisla- ian Ministry of Defence is important, must then be translated into specific pro-

126 grams, with a rigorous determination of The role of NGOs in this system is lim- of the military must be fulfilled. Suffi- the amount of resources necessary to im- ited to auxiliary roles; they are not part ciency of means, in this context, means that plement these programs. The results of this of the real command structures at all. only those objectives can be set which are process must be compared and harmo- The new human resources management supported by budgetary means. Should the nised with the budgetary and other re- system must provide for a sound and budget be limited, the objectives should sources available. Such a process provides predictable career model with enough also be limited: balance is essential. a clear picture of the costs of certain ca- incentives to attract the quality of people It is also important to ensure that the pabilities, and this information enables needed for the modern military. It must budget is transparent. The budget is one of the Parliament to make informed deci- also be flexible enough to provide the the most important means in the hands of sions on which capabilities will eventu- necessary mix of long-term commanders the political leadership, including the ex- ally be sacrificed, if budgetary constraints and experts and shorter-term foot soldiers. ecutive and the legislative, to exercise con- have to be imposed. The budget itself All of this must be achieved in strong trol over the military. It is also essential in should be centred on these needs and competition with other employers in a terms of establishing and maintaining public programs and must be transparent. competitive labour market. support, which is indispensable for the reform and the long-term maintenance of 4. Creating a new system of 5. The military budget: matching defence forces in any country. human resources management resources to missions and As mentioned above, the budgetary ensuring transparency system should provide clear information An essential element of any reform is about what different military capabilities the reform of the human resource man- The military budget is an essential ele- cost in reality and in their entirety. This agement system. The heritage of Commu- ment of reform: budgetary means avail- will make budgetary decisions easier to nist human resource management is usu- able must be sufficient or otherwise the make, since decision-makers and the ally an army, which is top-heavy, mean- reform will fail. A failed reform produces public will know what are the real conse- ing that it is overburdened by high-rank- worse results than no reform, therefore it quences of cuts or increases. Not only ing officers (generals, colonels and lieu- must be approached with extreme care. does transparency enable the political lead- tenant-colonels) and lacks junior officers This is not to suggest that all require- ership to make decisions based on more and especially non-commissioned officers. ments, expectations, demands, and wishes complete information, it also places the

127 responsibility for these decisions where diverts financial resources from other ar- cons must be considered, including the it belongs: on elected politicians. This eas, like personnel; on the other hand, it budgetary implications. relieves the military of taking decisions, creates the impression that reform is in- which must be reserved for the political deed happening and thus provides an Conclusion leadership and Parliament. excuse not to do anything else. The overview demonstrates that the 6. Pursue technical modernisa- 7. Make a careful decision time-demanding process of military reform tion, but at the right time regarding conscription requires persistence and a penetration into vs. all-volunteer forces the entire system. The energy of the whole Technical modernisation is an impor- society is needed to make the transforma- tant element of reform, but it is not the The decision between conscription or tion successful. A broad discussion on the reform itself. The military tends to equate all-volunteer armed forces is an impor- needs of the military and necessity of re- modernisation with the acquisition of new tant one: public pressure will mount in shaping its legislation and institutions will weapons and other systems: this is simply every democracy to get rid of conscrip- ensure transparency, civilian control and not true. Technical modernisation, of tion. This is also supported by the tech- rule of law. The reform has to be backed course, is an important pre-requisite for nical argument that modern armed forces with sufficient financial means in order to establishing and maintaining modern hardly can rely on short-term conscripts. meet the challenges of technical moderni- armed forces. Technology, however, can An all-volunteer force is, however, very sation, which includes not only high-tech only work if the environment is capable difficult to establish and maintain. Mov- equipment but also clear role determina- of using it properly. This means that re- ing to an all-volunteer force cannot be tion, defence planning, and command forms aimed at the “software” of the mili- seen as a way to save money! A real sense structure. On the other hand, the public tary (training, doctrine, etc.) must pre- of the force’s purpose is required for re- has to be kept regularly informed about cede technical modernisation, otherwise cruiting the necessary quality and quantity military spending. The main purpose and the old structures will never be able to of personnel. Finally, strong political con- guideline is that the military should be make use of new technology. Pursuing trol is necessary to ensure that the forces fully integrated within the society when technological modernisation too early is would act loyally. This decision should developing human resources management counterproductive: on the one hand it not be taken hastily. All of the pros and and international cooperation.

128 The Baltic States from 1914 to 1923: The First World War and the Wars of Independence

By LtCol Andrew Parrott*

lands the Republic of Latvia was created relations with Lithuania. This article aims Introduction from the southern parts of the Governorate to describe the events of the First World of Livonia, the Governorate of Kurland War in the Baltic region and the Wars of In the aftermath of the First World War and the western parts of the Governorate Independence in each of the Baltic states. five new states were created out of what of Vitebsk. Further south the Republic of The routes to independence for the four had been Tsarist Russia on the shores of Lithuania, formed from the Governorates Baltic states that will be considered here the Baltic Sea. In the north the Republic of Vilnius, Kaunas and Suwalki, recreated were all similar to the extent that the same of Finland emerged as an independent state a separate Lithuanian state for the first time factors were involved for each state. Where after just over a century as the Grand Duchy in over five hundred years. The Republic their routes to independence differ is in of Finland. South of the Gulf of Finland of Poland also came into being at this time, the relative importance of the various fac- the northern parts of the Governorate of more than a century after its earlier final tors. The first factor is the impact of Rus- Livonia and the Governorate of Estonia division between Russia, Prussia and Aus- sian political control. At the start of the became the Republic of Estonia. Combin- tria. Poland, though, is not considered period in question all of the Baltic states ing former Swedish, Polish and Russian further here other than in the context of were part of Tsarist Russia and the “His- * LtCol Parrott is the Head of Defence Administration and Management Department at the Baltic Defence College.

131 torical Background” section below relates Tsarist regime and the rise of the Bolshe- White Russians and others opposed to the how that came to be. The second factor is viks provided a narrow window of op- Bolsheviks and in this circuitous way gave the impact of the First World War and portunity for those wishing to escape from strength to the Baltic states. German influences in the Baltic area. The Russian domination. In the context of “First World War” section examines the Eastern Europe at the time Russia was weak Background political and military impact of that war. but Germany was militarily strong. In a A section entitled “The Treaties” looks at wider context though Germany was po- Throughout history the lands of the the treaties that concluded the First World litically, militarily and economically weak Baltic states have been much fought over. War and notes how the Baltic states were and the Allies were strong. At the end of Until the twentieth century the Finns, Es- excluded from consideration in these vari- the First World War the Allies had no wish tonians and Latvians were never masters ous treaties. The third factor is Baltic na- to allow the Germans, defeated in the west, in their own lands. Previously the Russians, tionalism and identity and sections for each to profit from their success in the east. Swedes, Danes, Poles and Germans had of the Baltic states consider the struggle Again German weakness offered opportu- continuously contested control of the area. for national independence. There is a gen- nities to the Baltic states. The growth of The situation for the Lithuanians was some- eral pattern of cultural nationalism centred national identity in the Baltic states might what different. Lithuania had previously on language, giving way to a more asser- be seen not so much as a strength but as a been an independent state and then a part tive political nationalism in each state, but source of determination for exploiting the of the Polish-Lithuanian Union. the details of the development of national weaknesses and opportunities that arose. The power of Sweden waned during the identity vary from state to state. Finally There is no doubt that the intervention of Great Northern War after 1700 and in 1721 the impact of other actors, notably those the Allies gave strength to the Baltic states peace was made between Russia and Swe- allied against Germany in the First World but this was essentially a by-product of other den at the Treaty of Nystad. This treaty War, must be considered and this is done concerns. The Allies concerns in respect of incorporated the former Swedish posses- in the section entitled “Intervention”. Germany have already been mentioned but sions on the Eastern coast of the Baltic Sea That the Baltic states were able to assert the Allies had no wish either to see the Rus- into the Russian Empire as the provinces their national identities and achieve state- sian Bolsheviks prosper. Generally it can be of Estonia and Livonia. Estonia, with its hood is a product of the overall balance said that, exhausted after the First World capital at Tallinn, consisted of what is now of the factors described above. Fundamen- War, the Allies had no wish to fight the the northern half of Estonia and the is- tally Russia was weak. The collapse of the Bolsheviks. They did however support the land of Hiiumaa. Livonia, with its capital

132 at Riga, consisted of what is now the south- order to seize the Danish fleet. Tsar Alex- cember what remained of the French Army ern half of Estonia and the island of ander I also agreed to attempt to mediate a was back in Vilnius and here Napoleon Saaremaa and southeastern Latvia. peace with Britain but when these attempts left his army to return to Paris. Mass graves The Polish-Lithuanian Union was di- failed Russia, seeking to exclude the Brit- recently discovered in Vilnius emphasise vided between Russia, Prussia and Austria ish Navy from the Baltic Sea demanded of the total defeat of the French Army on in three stages starting in 1772. At the first Sweden the closure of Swedish ports to this ill-fated Russian campaign. division Latgale, now eastern Latvia, was the British Navy. The Swedes refused to At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, fol- absorbed into Russia, ultimately as part of comply with the Russian demands and this lowing the Napoleonic Wars, certain parts the Vitebsk province. The second division led to the invasion by Russia of Finland, of Prussia, which are now in modern in 1793 did not affect lands now part of then part of Sweden, in February 1808. Lithuania, were awarded to Russia.1 These the Baltic states but at the third and final By November 1808 Russia had occupied areas became part of the province of division in 1795 what is now southern and Finland and in return for certain assur- Suwalki. At this point, with one exception, western Latvia and nearly all of modern ances the Finns agreed to annexation by all the lands that now make up the Baltic Lithuania became part of the Russian Em- Russia at Porvoo in March 1809. At the states had become a part of the Russian pire. The parts that are now Latvia were Treaty of Hamina in September 1809 Swed- Empire. The one exception is the Klaipeda incorporated into the province of Kurland ish sovereignty over Finland was surren- area of Lithuania, which remained part of with its capital at Jelgava. The parts that dered, and the Grand Duchy of Finland, Prussia, as the better-known Memel Terri- are now Lithuania were divided between with the Russian Tsar as Grand Duke, was tory2 , and only became part of Lithuania the provinces of Vilnius and Kaunas with established. In 1812 the Tsar restored to at the very end of the period being dis- their capitals in the cities of the same name. Finland certain Finnish territories that had cussed in 1923. Russia was defeated by Napoleon in been ceded by Sweden to Russia at the The provisions of the Treaty of Nystad 1807 but then at the Treaty of Tilsit en- Treaty of Nystad in 1721 and the Treaty ensured that, even though they were in- tered into an alliance with France. Russia of Turku in 1743. corporated into the Russian Empire, the recognised French supremacy in western On 24 June 1812 Napoleon invaded provinces of Estonia and Livonia retained and central Europe but was given a free Russia capturing Vilnius before the end distinctive systems of local administration, hand in the Baltic area and it was the Treaty of June. Moscow was occupied on 14 Sep- related to those of the previous Swedish of Tilsit that caused the pre-emptive strike tember but abandoned on 19 October at administration and different from those by the British Navy on Copenhagen in the start of the long retreat. By early De- in other parts of the Russian Empire.

133 When Kurland became a part of the Rus- Latvia, Estonia and Finland that are de- sian Empire this province, too, obtained The First World War scribed later. essentially the same status as Estonia and Germany declared war on Russia on 1 Livonia. The provinces of Vilnius and As the First World War progressed the August 1914 but then, in accordance with Kaunas also initially retained distinct sys- Baltic area was by degrees involved in the the Schlieffen plan, declared war on France tems of local government related to those conflict between Russian and German two days later and commenced the inva- of the former Polish-Lithuanian Union. forces. As the Russian position weakened, sion of that country via neutral Belgium. The highest representative of Tsarist power so the Germans came to occupy and domi- The German declaration of war on Russia was the Governor-General. The Governor- nate the entire Baltic area. In the first year was the result of the Russian mobilisation General of the Baltic area comprising Es- of the war the Germans occupied all of designed to discourage the Austro-Hun- tonia, Livonia and Kurland resided in Riga. Lithuania and half of Latvia. For the next garian Empire from taking action against The Governor-General of Lithuania, includ- two years the situation in the Baltic area Serbia. In Sarajevo on 28 Jun 1914, Ser- ing Vilnius and Kaunas, was based in was almost static, but then in the last six bian-backed Bosnian nationalists opposed Vilnius. Suwalki was subordinate to the months of the war in the east the Ger- to Habsburg rule had murdered the heir Governor-General in Warsaw in the Rus- mans completed their occupation of to the Austro-Hungarian throne, the Arch- sian controlled Kingdom of Poland. The Latvia and Estonia before the signing of duke Franz Ferdinand and his wife. area that was subject to the most the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The fighting The idea of the German Schlieffen plan Russification was the Latgale area of Latvia in the Baltic area was rarely if at all cen- was to avoid fighting on two fronts by that was incorporated into Vitebsk prov- tral to events on the Eastern Front. The achieving a rapid victory against France ince as a part of Russia with no distinct description that follows aims to put events before turning against Russia, where it was local status. As a Grand Duchy and not in the Baltic area into the context of mili- thought mobilisation would be slow and part of Russia proper, Finland enjoyed tary operations on the Eastern Front and ponderous. In fact Russian mobilisation considerable autonomy, including the the development of the political situation allowed the Russians, responding to French maintenance of its own military units, al- in Russia more generally. Understanding pleas for assistance, to invade East Prussia though as Finnish nationalism developed the development of the situation on the on 12 August 1914. However initial Rus- the Tsar sought to increasingly weaken Finn- Eastern Front will hopefully aid an un- sian success against both the Germans and ish autonomy and assert Russian control. derstanding of the events in Lithuania, the Austro-Hungarians was not followed

134 up. Against the Germans in East Prussia, but were pre-empted by the Germans who offensive in Galicia the Germans launched Russian success at the Battle of Gumbinnen attacked in the area of the Masurian Lakes a successful diversionary operation with on 20 August 1914 was quickly followed on 7 February 1915. The Germans achieved twelve divisions towards Riga on 26 April by defeat at the Battle of Tannenberg, end- considerable tactical success but two things 1915. By the start of May 1915 in the Bal- ing on 31 August 1914. The Germans fol- denied them strategic success. Firstly con- tic area the German front line ran from lowed up their victory at Tannenberg with siderable Russian forces preparing for their the sea between Liepâja and Ventspils east victory at the Battle of the Masurian Lakes offensive in East Prussia were able to act as to the line of the River Venta. The line some two weeks later. Against the Austro- reserves, and secondly simultaneous Austro- then ran southeast along the line of the Hungarians the Russians achieved some- Hungarian attacks in the south, designed River Venta and the River Dubysa to the what greater success in Galicia in Septem- to relieve the garrison of Przemysl besieged confluence of the River Dubysa with the ber 1914. After their victory in East Prussia since the Russian offensive of September River Nemunas. South of here the Rus- though, the Germans were able to come to 1914, failed. Przemysl surrendered on 22 sians retained a frontline on the west bank the assistance of their Austro-Hungarian March 1915. of the River Nemunas to the west of allies, and in fighting around Warsaw and By the end of the first seven months of Kaunas, Alytus and Grodno. In these first Lodz in October and November 1914 the the war on the Eastern Front, therefore, few months of the war in the east the Bal- Russians were stopped. The Russians, when the Russians were very firmly on the de- tic area was very much on the periphery it comes to tactical victories, successfully fensive. Interestingly, poor Russian radio with the focus of events further to the defended both Warsaw and Lodz but stra- security is known to have given the Cen- south and west. tegically victory belonged to the Germans. tral Powers advance notice of Russian plans On the night of 1 May 1915 a joint In December the Russians resumed their and intentions on a number of occasions. German – Austro-Hungarian offensive was offensive against Krakow but were out- The German High Command’s priority launched in Galicia between Tarnow and flanked by the Austro-Hungarians attack- for 1915 became the provision of such as- Gorlice and fourteen days later the attack ing from the Carpathian Mountains in the sistance to the Austro-Hungarians as was had reached the line of the River San over south, and forced to give up much of the needed to knock Russia out of the war, 130 kilometres (80 miles) from the start ground gained earlier in the autumn. The before Italy entered the war against the line. The Italians entered the war on 25 Russians planned to renew the offensive Austro-Hungarians, while containing the May 1915 and, although some of the against the Germans in East Prussia with situation in the west. To divert attention Austro-Hungarian forces had to be rede- an attack scheduled for 20 February 1915, from preparations for the forthcoming ployed to meet the new threat, further gains

135 were made against the Russians. On 4 June all the guns. The Germans captured Brest Baltic area were now to remain almost static 1915 the fortress of Przemysl was recap- Litovsk on 25 August 1915, and continu- until January 1917. tured from the Russians. On 17 June 1915 ing their advance they took Grodno on On 22 October 1915, the Russians the Russian High Command ordered a 2 September 1915 and Vilnius on 19 Sep- mounted an amphibious attack involving general retreat, which became known as the tember 1915. Now, however, the German over 500 troops behind German lines west “Great Retreat”, and in the south the for- offensive ran out of steam, and Russian of the Bay of Riga at Pitrags. The raid was tress of Lviv (Lemberg), abandoned by the counterattacks in the vicinity of a success causing German withdrawal in the Austro-Hungarians in September 1914, was ¨ven²ioneliai midway between Vilnius and area but the landing force was withdrawn retaken on 22 June 1915. Daugavpils helped to restore the Russian later the same day in the absence of rein- Further north the Germans resumed position. By 26 September 1915, when forcements to support the landing. The raid the offensive on 13 July 1915 in the Bat- the German offensive halted, the German caused the Germans to devote additional tle of the River Narev and the Russians front line in the Baltic area ran from Riga, troops to coastal defence and perhaps in- abandoned Warsaw on 4 August 1915. The where the Russians still retained positions fluenced their thinking for Operation important Russian fortress of Novogeor- on the west bank of the River Daugava, Albion in October 1917. gievsk on the River Vistula 30 kilometres along the line of the River Daugava to While the scale of the Russian defeat in (20 miles) northwest of Warsaw was sur- Daugavpils and then roughly due south 1915 was huge with over one million casu- rounded by the Germans in early August to Pinsk. alties, the Russian command performed 1915, and surrendered on 19 August 1915. Whereas in the spring of 1915 the Ger- well in keeping their armies from disinte- Kaunas, heavily fortified and considered mans had occupied only a small corner of grating, and through the winter of 1915 the key to Russian defences on the north- southwest Latvia and parts of western and spring of 1916 the Russian forces staged ern sector of the front, was first attacked Lithuania, by the end of September they a remarkable recovery. A Russian attack to on 8 August 1915. The Russians repelled had taken control of all of Lithuania and coincide with British and French summer a major infantry attack the next day but about half of Latvia. Vilnius, the focus of offensives in the west was being planned, after their own artillery, some thirteen Lithuanian nationalism, was in German when the Germans struck at Verdun on 21 hundred guns in all, inadvertently de- hands and Riga, a similar focus for the February 1916. Coming to the aid of the stroyed some of the outer defences the Latvians, was in the front line with the French an ill conceived, hastily prepared, garrison surrendered on 17 August 1915 Russian forward positions in the western and poorly executed attack was launched giving up huge stocks of ammunition and suburbs of the city. The front lines in the by the Russians in the area of Lake Naroch,

136 some 100 kilometres (60 miles) north east the Italians. On 15 May 1916 the Austro- Germans too brought reinforcements from of Vilnius, on 18 March 1916. Attacking Hungarians launched their Trentino offen- the west but the Central Powers benefited on a narrow front, and after an ineffective sive. On 4 June 1916 the commander of from a better railway network than was artillery preparation the Russians suffered the Russian South Western Front, Brusilov, available to the Russians, and by mid-July 15,000 casualties in the first few hours. launched the offensive that now normally the balance of forces had shifted in favour Further assaults in the Lake Naroch area bears his name. Attacking, after a short but of the Central Powers. Urged on by the were made on 19 and 21 March 1916, in intense artillery bombardment of selected high command Brusilov persisted with his the mud of the spring thaw, and support- points, with all four of his armies simulta- offensive until the end of August 1916, by ing attacks in the area of Riga were aban- neously on a 480 kilometres (300 miles) which time further Russian progress had doned after 10,000 casualties on the first long front Brusilov made considerable become impossible. day. gains during June. The Austro-Hungarians The Brusilov offensive achieved a con- These attacks achieved very little success were driven back some 100 kilometres (60 siderable measure of success, but it was and certainly did not divert German forces miles) all along the front, a number of stra- bought at a very high price, a price that from the west. The Russians suffered 100,000 tegically important towns were captured the Russians could not afford. By the time casualties, and within a month the Ger- and the Russians took some 350,000 pris- the offensive was over the Russians had mans had recaptured the little ground they oners and 400 artillery pieces. suffered over one million casualties to add had given up. Despite its unfamiliarity in The Russians were as surprised by their to the five million they had already suf- the west, it has been suggested that this was success as the Central Powers were dis- fered during the war. These losses seriously one of the decisive battles of the First mayed. Russian plans to renew the offen- damaged the morale of the Russian Army, World War. Their failure in an area where sive in the Lake Naroch area towards Vilnius and in the absence of a strategic break- they had built up a considerable superior- were dropped, and instead reinforcements through it can be argued, that while the ity over the Germans convinced many in were directed towards Brusilov, but the Brusilov offensive did not cause the Rus- the Russian high command of their in- Russians were hampered in their efforts sian Revolution it did much to make it ability to defeat the Germans. by the inadequacy of the railway and road possible. Once again the Russians began planning systems. To stabilise the situation the On 7 January 1917 the Russian Twelfth a summer offensive but once again felt Austro-Hungarians had no option but to Army launched an offensive, known as the obliged to bring their plans forward to halt their offensive against the Italians and Battle of the River Aa, west from the vicin- come to the aid of western allies, this time return troops to the Eastern Front. The ity of Riga. In a surprise attack, without a

137 preliminary bombardment, the Russians mained unstable, and never in full control the Central Powers had gained over 160 achieved some success and by 9 January of the country, while still attempting to kilometres (100 miles) in the south, their 1917 both Jelgava and Tukums had been continue the war against the Central Pow- advance halted more by supply difficulties recaptured. German counterattacks from ers, until the Bolshevik October Revolu- than by Russian resistance. At the height 22 January 1917 lasted until the end of the tion. of this offensive Kerensky formally re- month, but the Russians retained the Following the February Revolution the placed Prince Lvov as head of the Provi- ground they had gained. Although this Central Powers ceased offensive action on sional Government in a move that under- limited attack improved the Russian posi- the Eastern Front and took advantage of lined the instability of the Russian Gov- tion in the vicinity of Riga it had and the turmoil in Russia to transfer troops to ernment and its weakening position. achieved no strategic objective. the west. Kerensky, though, sought to keep During the “July Days” in 1917 a Ma- In Russia a strike call on 22 January 1917 faith with Russia’s western allies and hav- chine Gun Regiment based in Petrograd led to the events of the February Revolu- ing taken over the War Ministry on 16 started an uprising on 16 July 1917 in pro- tion. Troops refused orders to fire on dem- May 1917, attempted to renew the offen- test at the failure of the Kerensky Offen- onstrators on 11 March 1917, and by 13 sive against the Central Powers. On 1 July sive. The uprising attracted support from March 1917 most of the Petrograd garri- 1917 Brusilov’s South Western Front at- the Anti-War Bolsheviks, spread to sailors son had joined forces with the rebel work- tacked, with two of its four armies, the at the Kronstadt naval base, and to civil- ers. The Imperial Government resigned en Austro-Hungarian forces east of Lviv ians in major cities and towns all over masse on 12 March 1917, and Tsar Nicholas (Lemberg). Again considerable initial suc- Russia. Although the Provisional Govern- II of Russia abdicated on 15 March 1917. cess was achieved and gains of 50 kilome- ment was able to restore order within a The Russian monarchy ended the next day tres (30 miles) were made on a 160 kilome- few days, the incident improved the stand- when his brother, Grand Duke Michael, tres (100 miles) front, but Russian resolve ing of the Bolsheviks with an increasingly declined the crown. A Provisional Gov- weakened as their supply lines broke down pacifist population, and undermined the ernment headed nominally by Prince Lvov, and enemy resistance stiffened. On 19 July credibility of the Provisional Government including Kerensky as Justice Minister, was 1917 the Germans launched a powerful and the moderate socialists in control of formed, partly in response to the perceived counterattack that broke the Russians, and the Petrograd Soviet. Lenin fled to Fin- challenge from the newly formed Petrograd brought about their withdrawal in panic land where he remained until the October Soviet. The government of Russia re- and disorder. By the start of September Revolution.

138 The Battle of Riga was the final full-scale to force the Irben Straits and trap the the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March battle between Russian and German forces Russian fleet in the Bay of Riga. Although 1918, but it was to be another three years on the Eastern Front. The German attack the German fleet successfully forced its way before the end of the Russian Civil War was launched on 1 September 1917 to clear into the Bay of Riga, the Russian fleet was and the consolidation of communist power the Russian salient west of Riga, and by able to escape through the Muhu Strait to in Russia. suggesting a German drive towards the north and the Gulf of Finland, before Operation Faustschlag was launched on Petrograd encouraged the collapse of the the Germans completed their occupation 18 February 1918 in response to the halt- faltering Russian war effort. German forces of the islands to dominate the Muhu Strait. ing of the Brest-Litovsk peace talks, by the quickly established a bridgehead over the Starting on 5 November 19173 and over Russian Bolsheviks. Against minimal Rus- River Daugava south of Riga on the first the next three days, the Bolsheviks led by sian opposition the Germans quickly occu- day of the operation, and quickly followed Lenin and Trotsky in what became known pied considerable areas of territory, and up the Russian retreat from the city on 2 as the October Revolution, seized power advanced 240 kilometres (150 miles) on some September 1917. The Russian forces, in Petrograd from the Provisional Gov- fronts. Tallinn was occupied on 25 Febru- though, were not pursued more than ernment of Kerensky. On 29 October 1917 ary 1918, and by 3 March 1918 when the about 30 kilometres (20 miles) beyond the the Petrograd Soviet had created a Mili- Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed the Ger- city. tary Revolutionary Committee, effectively mans had taken control of all parts of Latvia On 11 October 1917 the Germans, fol- headed by Trotsky. This rapidly gained the and Estonia that they had not already occu- lowing up the success of their Riga opera- allegiance of the Petrograd garrison, work- pied. The passage of the First World War in tion, launched Operation Albion. In an ers militias, and naval personnel. Loyal the east saw Russian political authority re- amphibious assault involving some 20,000 troops, summoned by Kerensky to arrest placed by German military authority. The troops the Estonian islands of Saaremaa, leading Bolsheviks, were unable to dislodge Baltic economies, damaged though they Hiiumaa and Muhu were attacked. The the revolutionary forces that had occupied were, still remained largely in German hands 13,000 Russian defenders put up little seri- key strategic points. On 8 November 1917 but, still fighting in the west, the Germans ous resistance, and by 20 Oct 1917 all three members of the Provisional Government faced a rising tide of Baltic nationalism. In islands were in German hands. A simulta- were arrested in the Tsar’s Winter Palace. all of the Baltic states a growing sense of neous naval operation, led by ten battle- The Bolsheviks, seeking peace, eventually national identity underpinned movements ships of the German High Seas Fleet, aimed agreed terms with the Central Powers at seeking independence.

139 cepted the original German terms on 19 USA seeking peace talks and made a formal The Treaties February 1918 and new German terms on request for a cease-fire on 4 October 1918. 24 February 1918 the day after they were Cease-fires with Turkey and the Austro- The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed presented. The Treaty extended German Hungarian Empire came into effect on 30 on 3 March 1918 between the Central Pow- influence over Finland, Estonia, Latvia, October 1918 and 3 November 1918 re- ers and the Russian Bolshevik Government. Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. The Rus- spectively. The final cease-fire with Ger- After the October Revolution in 1917 the sians also had to accept Turkish control many came into effect on 11 November new Bolshevik Government in Russia had over the Caucasus Provinces and under- 1918. Wilson insisted that his “Fourteen no wish to continue the war and the Cen- took not to interfere in the internal affairs Points” serve as the basis for Armistice tral Powers were keen to transfer troops to of the lost territories. The Treaty was de- discussions, although Point Ten was modi- the west. Armistice negotiations began on nounced by the Allies, ignored at every fied to provide full independence for the 3 December 1917 and a ceasefire was an- opportunity by the Bolsheviks, and for- subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian nounced on 16 December 1917. The peace mally annulled as part of the 11 Novem- Empire, and Point One was interpreted to talks began in Brest-Litovsk on 22 Decem- ber 1918 Armistice agreement. Eager to allow secret negotiations at the Paris Peace ber 1917. The Russian Bolshevik Foreign maintain political and economic control Conference. The “Fourteen Points” had Minister, Trotsky, took charge of the Rus- in Eastern Europe, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty originally been presented to Congress in sian delegation on 9 January 1918 and, did not give the Germans the opportu- the USA on 8 January 1918, as an outline hoping for an early socialist revolution in nity to withdraw as many troops from the statement of American war aims. The points Europe to strengthen his negotiating po- east as they had hoped. In the “Brotfrieden” were accepted by the Allies with certain sition, employed delaying tactics. Follow- agreement, with the newly independent but accepted reservations on 4 November 1918, ing a separate treaty, the “Brotfrieden” German-supported Ukrainian government, and finally agreed to by the Germans on agreement signed between the Central Pow- the Germans were eager to secure supplies 10 November 1918, although they still ers and Ukraine on 9 February 1918, the of Ukrainian grain and agreed readily to contained many ambiguities.4 Russians halted talks the following day. The the inclusion of certain Polish areas under The Paris Peace Conference opened on Germans responded with a rapid resump- Ukrainian administration. 12 January 1919 to formulate a peace set- tion of hostilities in Operation Faustschlag In late September 1918 the Central Pow- tlement following the armistice. Although on 18 February 1918. The Bolsheviks ac- ers approached President Wilson of the thirty-two allied countries took part, the

140 interests of the USA, United Kingdom, and Rhineland were placed under allied con- man possessions in the Middle East. The France, Italy and Japan dominated the pro- trol. In the north territory was ceded to treaty was rejected by republican Turks and ceedings. No representatives of the Cen- Denmark, and in the east former German substantially revised at the Treaty of tral Powers were invited, and the Russian territory was given up to Poland, Lithua- Lausanne in 1923. Bolshevik Government refused to attend. nia, and Czechoslovakia. The treaty became The Treaty of St Germain was signed In March 1919 a Council of Four was es- a focus for discontent in Germany that between the Allies and the new Austrian tablished to enable the USA, British, was fully exploited by the national social- Republic on 10 September 1920. The treaty French, and Italian leaders to deliberate in ists. confirmed the break up of the Austrian private. These deliberations saw confron- The Treaty of Neuilly was signed on 27 parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and tation between the liberal American Presi- Nov 1919 between the Allied Powers and banned political union with Germany. dent Wilson and the nationalist French Bulgaria. Bulgaria lost territory to all of The various treaties dealt only with the Prime Minister Clemenceau with media- Romania, Yugoslavia, and Greece, as the Central Powers and their allies. Russia was tion attempted by the British Prime Min- price for siding with the Central Powers an ally of the Western Allies, and the break ister Lloyd George, the Italian Prime Min- in the First World War. away from Russia of the four Baltic states ister Orlando involving himself only in The Treaty of Trianon was signed on 4 and Poland was essentially a matter for matters of direct Italian interest. Although June 1920 between the Allied Powers and Russia, despite the opposition of the West- five treaties, the Treaties of Versailles, St Hungary. This treaty confirmed the break ern Allies to the Bolshevik regime, which Germain, Trianon, Neuilly, and Sèvres, up of the Hungarian parts of the Austro- came to power following the collapse of emerged from the Paris Peace Conference, Hungarian Empire and caused long-term the Tsarist Russian Empire. All of the Bal- the conference closed in an atmosphere of resentment, which dominated the foreign tic states achieved independence as a result failure and the US Congress refused to policy of the new Hungarian republic. of the turmoil of the First World War. It ratify the Versailles Treaty in November The Treaty of Sèvres between Turkey might be said, though, that the treaties that 1919. and the Allies was signed on 10 August concluded the First World War not only The Treaty of Versailles was signed be- 1920. It placed the Bosporus and Darda- ignored the Baltic states, but also gave rise tween Germany and the Allies on 28 June nelles under international control, placed to the stresses and strains that led to the 1919. In the west, Germany lost territory Smyrna under Greek control, and con- Second World War. These treaties, there- to France and Belgium, and the Saarland firmed the independence of former Otto- fore, set the scene for the loss of independ-

141 ence suffered by three of the Baltic states they assumed the Tsar’s rights in respect of worker’s militias had formed and these at the time of the Second World War. Finland, but a majority in Finland believed sometimes found themselves confronted by that with the abdication of the Tsar the civil guards recruited from among the Finland Russian Provisional Government could bourgeoisie and often supported from make no claim to being the supreme au- Germany. In 1914 some in Finland had The territory of the Grand Duchy of thority in Finland. looked to Germany for support in the Finland was not directly involved in fight- On 20 March 1917 the Russian Provi- struggle for independence and significant ing during the First World War, and the sional Government proclaimed the resto- numbers of Finns had received military impact of the war was mainly an economic ration of Finland’s constitutional rights, training in Germany during the course of one. Of course Finland had no option but rights that over a long period of years had the war. to follow Russia into the war and while been increasingly ignored by an ever more On 18 July 1917 the Eduskunta approved some areas of the economy suffered badly authoritarian Tsarist regime. The more lib- an act making Finland independent in all others prospered. The forestry industry eral Mikhail Stakhovich replaced Von Seyn, respects except foreign affairs and defence. with export markets in the United King- the much-disliked Russian Governor Gen- The Finnish cabinet was evenly divided on dom and Western Europe was badly hit eral, and many political exiles were allowed the issue but controversially Stakhovich on but the metalworking, chemical, and tex- to return. Elections for the Finnish parlia- the instructions of Kerensky, head of the tile industries all prospered in satisfying ment, the Eduskunta, had taken place in Russian Provisional Government, voted the demands of the Russian war effort. 1916, but parliament was not allowed to against the measure, dissolved the Thousands of Finns too were in the Rus- meet until March 1917, when a new Social Eduskunta, and called new elections for sian armies, involved in the defence of Democrat government was formed and October. The Social Democrats lost their Finland as well as more distant operations. took office on 27 March 1917. overall majority in the October elections The February 1917 revolution in Rus- The new government was immediately but did not accept the validity of the elec- sia caused the collapse of the Russian war confronted with both internal law and or- tions, regarding the Russian Provisional effort, leading to economic hardship for der problems and external problems regard- Government as having no right to dissolve many in Finland, and fuelled the process ing its relationship with the Russian Pro- the parliament. In the turmoil, exacerbated of progress towards independence. The visional Government. With regard to the by the events of the October Revolution in Russian Provisional Government believed internal problems in a number of towns Russia, a Central Revolutionary Council was

142 formed on 8 November 1917 and called a sian troops on Finnish territory, and re- north towards Lahti to cut the railway line general strike for 14 November 1917. quested help from those countries that had between Helsinki and Petrograd. At around The strike and the violence that accom- recognised Finland. The next day the Gov- the same time White forces advancing from panied this strike alienated many Social ernment formally constituted the Civil the north captured Tampere. Helsinki fell Democrats. In the absence of any clear lead Guards as the state force responsible for to the German forces of General von der from Russia, the Eduskunta voted in a law and order. The civil war started on the Goltz on 13 April 1918 and two weeks later government headed by the champion of night of 27 January when Red Guards for- prominent members of the Red Guards Finnish rights P. Svinhufvud, who pre- mally took control of Helsinki and estab- and leaders of the Revolutionary Govern- sented to the Eduskunta a declaration of lished a revolutionary government. By the ment fled to Russia. On 16 May Finnish independence on 6 December beginning of February a front line ran Mannerheim led a victory parade through 1917. Svinhufvud met Lenin in Petrograd north of Pori, Tampere, Lahti and Helsinki. on 31 December, and was told that Russia Lappeenranta with the Red Guards in con- On 18 May the Eduskunta met and ap- would recognise Finnish independence and trol of all the major urban centres. The pointed Svinhufvud as Regent with the the right wing government in Helsinki. “Whites”, however, were better organised same powers as those previously vested in Finland slid towards civil war in Janu- and equipped and more united.The Whites the Tsar. Still expecting a German victory, ary 1919. On 18 January, General received significant reinforcement when the Svinhufvud sought to create a monarchy Mannerheim, charged by the government Finnish Jaeger battalion arrived back in for Finland from within Germany. These with establishing a military headquarters, Finland on 25 February 1918. The Ger- plans came to nought with the collapse of left Helsinki for Vaasa to establish such a mans also provided very significant assist- Germany and the withdrawal of German headquarters, since both Helsinki and ance to the Whites. In March German na- troops from Finland, and Svinhufvud re- Tampere were largely under the control of val units landed on and occupied the signed being replaced by Mannerheim as the Red Guards, as the worker’s militias Aaland Islands. On 3 April a German expe- Regent in late 1918. Mannerheim had re- had become. On 19 January the Govern- ditionary force commanded by General signed in May in protest at the degree of ment asked Germany to return to Finland Count von der Goltz landed at Hanko on influence being allowed to the Germans, the Finnish Jaeger battalion that had been the southwest coast, and started to advance and on being appointed Regent had to be fighting for Germany. Five days later they on Helsinki. A few days later another Ger- recalled from London where he had been demanded the removal of the 40,000 Rus- man force landed at Loviisa, and advanced engaged on an unofficial mission to im-

143 prove relations between Finland and the War until 1918, Estonia was obviously af- In February 1917 revolution in Russia Western Allies. fected by the conflict from an early stage. resulted in the abdication of Tsar Nicholas New elections to the Eduskunta were While it was feared that German victory II and the formation of the Provisional held in March 1919 and the Eduskunta would involve a process of “Germanifi- Government. The unrest in Russia was elected Professor K. Stahlberg as first presi- cation”, there was no enthusiasm for fight- mirrored by unrest in Estonia particularly dent of the Republic of Finland on 25 July ing for the Tsar, if “Russification” was to amongst the Russian population. The Pro- 1919. In July 1920 Finland started peace be the result of Russian victory. The Esto- visional Government appointed Jaan Poska, negotiations with the Bolsheviks, once it nian economy was disrupted, Estonia be- an Estonian lawyer and Mayor of Tallinn, was clear that the White Russians, who were came a base area for operations in Latvia as their Governor General in Tallinn. De- opposed to Finnish independence, had and many refugees from Latvia arrived in mands for Estonian autonomy within been defeated. Agreement was reached at Estonia. About 100,000 Estonians were Russia reached a climax with a demonstra- the Treaty of Tartu signed on 14 October conscripted into the Tsarist Army and tion by 40,000 Estonians, 12,000 of them 1920, and by the terms of this treaty the about 10,000 were killed. The Russians armed soldiers, in Petrograd on 26 March Petsamo district, giving Finland access to moved quickly to limit the influence of 1917. At the end of March the Provisional the Arctic Ocean, was ceded to Finland. the Baltic Germans but as before, it was Government granted autonomy within a Tsar Alexander II had promised this area Russians that replaced Germans in the ad- new Estonian province, including Estonian to Finland in 1864, in exchange for two ministration not Estonians. German ideas speaking northern Livonia but excluding districts in the Karelian Isthmus that Fin- for a joint Estonian-German provincial both the Narva and Setu areas. Elections land had ceded to Russia. The Tsar had council involving concessions to the Esto- to a new provincial council were held in not kept his word though and it was left nians were not widely supported. The May 1917, and the council assembled for to the Bolsheviks to honour the promise Northern Baltic Committee based in Tartu, the first time in July when a government made by the Tsar over half a century later. but with branches all over Estonia, was was elected. Tensions between Tallinn and formed as a voluntary organisation. It Petrograd grew. The replacement of Rus- Estonia sought to help refugees, support the Rus- sians and the Russian language by Estoni- sian Army and help meet the economic ans and the Estonian language in the new While Estonian territory was not in- needs of Estonia but it was also active in administration was much resented by the volved in the fighting of the First World spreading Estonian nationalist ideas. previous office-holders. The attempts of the

144 new administration to limit the influence vik rule became increasingly dictatorial. The to Estonia in May 1918. In accordance with of the Bolshevik Soviets that had formed Estonian national army units posed a prob- the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in Estonia were opposed by many work- lem for the Bolsheviks. They were com- while the Bolsheviks ceded sovereignty of ers. Finally the formation of all Estonian bined into an Estonian Division, com- the Estonian islands they retained jurisdic- military units, amidst the turmoil of the manded by Johan Laidoner, after the Oc- tion in Livonia and Estonia although Ger- collapse of the Tsarist Russian Army, al- tober Revolution, but it was not until Janu- man troops were to be stationed here for though supported by the Provisional Gov- ary 1918 that their replacement by Esto- security. ernment, was opposed within the Army nian Red Guards began. The Germans had no wish to encour- itself. Essentially the Provisional Govern- After the Bolshevik revolution the Bal- age independence in the form desired by ment in Petrograd was powerless to con- tic Germans sought assistance from Ger- the Estonians. Konstantin Päts, who had trol events, and the main opposition to many. The Bolsheviks, in response, began been declared Prime Minister, was impris- the new Estonian provincial government to deport the Baltic Germans. This pro- oned, Germans were reinstated in all posi- came from the Estonian Bolsheviks. gramme of deportations lent weight to the tions of high office, political parties were In Tallinn the Bolsheviks seized power German decision to resume their offen- banned, and strict censorship was insti- on 27 October 1917 as soon as they had sive against Russia following the breakdown tuted. On 5 November 1918 the Baltic news of the success of the revolution in of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. As has Dukedom was proclaimed in Riga. For- Petrograd. Viktor Kingisepp, the Vice- already been related the Germans occupied mally independent the Baltic Dukedom Chairman of the Bolshevik Estonian Revo- Estonia during Operation Faustschlag included both Estonia and Latvia, and was lutionary War Committee, replaced Jaan from 18 February 1918 to 4 March 1918. intended to perpetuate German economic Poska. The ousted Provincial Government The Germans occupied Tallinn on 25 Feb domination of the area in a close political continued to meet illegally and at the end 1918 but on the previous day the Provi- relationship with Germany. of 1917 decided to seek independence for sional Government had declared Estonia On 11 November 1918 the Armistice Estonia and recognition from western independent. In the days before with the brought the First World War to an end in countries. Bolshevik elections, planned for help of national armed units the Provi- the west, at the same time as economic col- January 1918, were cancelled when it be- sional Government had taken power from lapse and social turmoil swept Germany. came clear that the Bolsheviks would not the Bolsheviks. The United Kingdom, The Provisional Government of Estonia achieve an absolute majority, and Bolshe- France and Italy gave de facto recognition resumed its activities on the same day. On

145 13 November 1918 Soviet Russia annulled fell to forces that had been landed on the White Russian forces, the North-Western the Treaty of Brest Litovsk and prepared coast. In the southeast Tartu was recaptured Army. While the White Russians were op- for offensive action in the Baltic region. on 14 January 1919, Valga and Võru were posed to the Soviets, they were also op- On 22 November 1918 Soviet forces at- both retaken on 1 February 1919, and posed to Estonian independence. Initially tacked Narva but met stiff German resist- three days later Petseri was secured, leaving the offensive fared well. Pskov in the south ance and withdrew. However on 25 No- Estonia free of Soviet forces. Throughout was captured, as were Jamburg, Gdov, and vember 1918 the Germans withdrew from this period the Estonian Bolsheviks con- Luga to the north. The White Russian Pskov, and the Soviet forces followed in tinued to make trouble. An attempted forces, supported by small British detach- their wake quickly capturing Võru, Valga uprising in Tallinn in December 1918 was ments, advanced to within a few miles of and Tartu, and most of southern Estonia. successfully countered, and a rebellion on Petrograd. 28 November 1918 is formally regarded as the island of Saaremaa in February 1919 To the south in Latvia, Estonian forces the start of the Estonian War of Independ- was put down. From February to May 1919 secured Aluksne on 28 May 1919, and ence when Soviet forces resumed their at- the situation on the Narva front remained Jekabpils on the River Daugava in early tack on Narva, this time against Estonian static although Soviet artillery fire de- June. Cesis on the road to Riga was taken opposition. The Bolshevik Estonian Work- stroyed much of Narva. To the southeast on 31 May 1919, but retaken by the Baltic er’s Commune was declared in Narva on the Soviets launched a major counterattack German Landeswehr on 6 June 1919. In 29 November 1918. By the end of Decem- and recaptured Petseri on 11 March 1919. April 1919 the Latvian Provisional Gov- ber Tapa had fallen to the Soviets, whose The Estonians, however, fought successful ernment had been ousted in a coup d’état forces were only twenty miles east of Tallinn. defensive battles south and east of Võru in by a pro-German Government, backed by To the southeast and south Paide, Viljandi, the second half of March, and Petseri fell the Landeswehr that preferred to turn and Pärnu were all threatened with cap- again to the Estonians on 29 March 1919. north against the Estonians rather than east ture. By mid-May the Estonians had completely against the Soviet forces. In a fierce battle On 6 January 1919 the Estonians coun- regained the initiative. lasting four days the Estonians defeated the terattacked, reinforced by a British naval In May 1919 the Estonian army com- Landeswehr, and the date on which Cesis presence and Finnish volunteers. In the mand decided to advance into Russia to was recaptured, 23 June 1919, has since been north on 12 January 1919 Rakvere was re- secure the frontiers of Estonia. This move celebrated in Estonia as Victory Day. Once captured, and on 19 January 1919 Narva required an uneasy alliance with the local again in October 1919 the Latvians sought

146 Estonian help for the defence of Riga. Vääska, and threatened to surround Narva. the recapture of the towns of Tukums and In late August the Estonians were of- In very heavy fighting the Estonians man- Jelgava, which were held by the Russians fered peace talks by the Soviets and these aged to restore the situation. With the through the summer of 1917. On 1 Sep- took place in September in Pskov, which defeat of the attack on Petrograd the Allies tember 1917 the Germans launched an of- had been retaken by the Soviets at the end had lost hope of defeating the Soviets and fensive against Riga, very quickly captur- of August. No agreement was reached, no longer opposed peace talks. On 31 De- ing the city and a considerable salient to partly as a result of Allied pressure to con- cember 1919 an armistice was agreed which the east of the city on the east bank of the tinue fighting the Soviets, but the talks came into effect on 3 January 1920. Dur- River Daugava. The front line then re- did demonstrate that the Russians no longer ing January 1920 talks agreed the border mained static, until in February 1918 the regarded the conflict as a civil war, but as between Russia and Estonia, and the Treaty Germans advanced against minimal oppo- one between two sovereign states. In Octo- of Tartu was signed on 2 February 1920. sition to occupy all of the rest of Latvia. ber the White Russian North Western The presence of the German front line in Army launched an attack on Petrograd. This Latvia Latvia, and the perceived unwillingness of failed and the North Western Army col- Russian soldiers to defend what many of lapsed. By mid-November Soviet forces The First World War had a very severe them considered a German province, led were once again threatening Narva. The impact on Latvia, as the front line between to the creation of local Latvian Regiments Estonians disarmed the North Western German and Russian forces bisected Latvia authorised by the Russian government. By Army as it retreated into Estonia, but many for most of the duration of the war. By November 1915 eight Latvian battalions of its members joined the Estonian forces May 1915 the Germans had captured the had been formed, and during the course defending Narva. southwestern corner of Latvia, including of the war a total of over 130,000 men At the start of December peace talks re- the port of Liepaja. By September 1915 joined these local Latvian forces. In May commenced in Tartu. To strengthen their the Germans had advanced to the line of 1917 the Latvian Regiments transferred their negotiating position, the Soviets mounted the River Daugava, occupying all of Latvia loyalty to the Bolsheviks, partly through a heavy attacks on Narva. In the middle of south and west of the river, except for a sense of having been betrayed by the Tsar- the month the Soviet forces managed to Russian held salient on the west bank of ist forces in the fight against the Germans. create a bridgehead over the Narva River the river at Riga. In January 1917 a Rus- In March 1917 the Provisional Livonian to the southwest of Narva at Krivasoo and sian offensive from this salient ended with Council was formed at Valmiera with au-

147 thority over the Latvian parts of Livonia, Latvia excluding Riga after early Septem- of the treaty the Germans continued to the Estonian parts having been absorbed ber 1917, banks and businesses were na- occupy adjacent parts of Russia in the into the new autonomous Estonia. In May tionalised, land was confiscated, civil rights Governorates of Pskov and Vitebsk. As has 1917 a provisional council for Latgale was and press freedom were restricted, politi- been related in the section on Estonia the formed at Rezekne. In the same month a cal activity was banned, nationalists were Germans had no desire to see the creation provisional council was formed for arrested, and religious freedom was not of genuinely independent Baltic states and Kurland in Tartu, as at that time the Ger- respected. The Bolshevik policies soon instead created a Baltic Dukedom, domi- mans occupied Kurland. On 5 July 1917 caused unrest amongst the majority of the nated by the Baltic Germans, incorporat- the Provisional Livonian Council was de- population and brought about renewed ing Estonia and Latvia whose “independ- clared the regional government by the Pro- support for independence. In Valka on 16 ence” was proclaimed in Riga on 5 No- visional Government of Russia, which at November 1917 nationalist Latvian politi- vember 1918. Acting illegally during the the same time strongly opposed the unifi- cians formed a Provisional National Coun- German occupation the Provisional Na- cation of Latgale with the other regions of cil, which began to make preparations for tional Council united with the Democratic Latvia. On 12 August the Latvian authori- forming a constituent assembly and send- Bloc functioning in Riga to form the ties demanded total self-determination, and ing representatives to gather support in Latvian People’s Council. those closest to power decided that if the the west. A second sitting of the council in The armistice signed by Germany on Germans occupied Riga independence January 1918 confirmed the intention of 11 November 1918 at Compiègne in from Russia would be sought. separating Latvia from Russia and creat- France annulled the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk The first democratic elections to the ing an independent state but, at this time, and on 13 November the Bolsheviks started Livonian Council were held in August the council had no power to act. preparations for an offensive against the 1917, when the Bolsheviks gained a major- By the end of February 1918 the Ger- Germans in the east. The United Kingdom ity. After the October revolution in Rus- mans occupied all of Latvia. In accordance gave de facto recognition to Latvia on 11 sia the position of the Bolsheviks was much with the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk November 1918 but it was not until 17 strengthened, and the Executive Commit- while the Bolsheviks ceded sovereignty of November 1918 that the first sitting of tee of Latvian Soviets wielded absolute Kurland they retained jurisdiction in the Latvian People’s Council, presided over power. In the areas not occupied by Ger- Livonia, although German troops were to by J. Cakste, took place. The People’s Coun- many, essentially northern and eastern be stationed here for security. Regardless cil appointed the Latvian Provisional Gov-

148 ernment headed by K. Ulmanis and the sea at Ventspils to the Lithuanian border. of March 1919 the German forces of Count declaration of independence of the Repub- With the advance of the Bolshevik forces von der Goltz with the South Latvian Bri- lic of Latvia was made in Riga Theatre on came the restoration of Bolshevik govern- gade were able to resume the offensive from 18 November 1918. ment, with the Latvian Soviet Republic the line of the River Venta. Tukums was The Latvian Provisional Government being declared in Valka shortly after its recaptured from the Bolsheviks on 15 had no armed forces at its disposal with capture. The situation was complicated by March, and Jelgava on 18 March 1919 and which to defend Latvia, and as the Ger- the fact that the Bolshevik forces included by 26 March 1919 the German and Latvian man forces withdrew the Bolsheviks occu- amongst their numbers the Latvian Regi- forces had closed on Riga, which remained, pied Latvia. The Germans were willing to ments, who now found themselves fight- though, for the time being in Bolshevik give up Latvia east of a line from Riga to ing for the Bolsheviks against not just hands. Bauska, and the Bolsheviks progressively German forces, but also the forces of the Count von der Goltz, however, har- occupied eastern Latvia without opposi- Latvian Provisional Government. boured aspirations still for the restoration tion. In the north Aluksne was taken on 7 In January 1919 the Landeswehr, formed of Baltic German dominance in the Baltic December, Valka on 18 December, and from the local Baltic Germans and the Iron area. On 16 April 1919 a coup backed by Cesis on 23 December 1918. In the south Division, formed from German volunteers, German units ousted the Latvian Provi- Daugavpils was taken on 9 December, were placed under the command of the sional Government and the regime of K. Plavinas on 17 December, and Skriveri on German General Count von der Goltz. In Ulmanis in Liepaja. While the Germans 27 December 1918. Riga fell to the Bolshe- January also the Latvian Provisional Gov- were able to arrest some ministers the ma- viks on 3 January 1919, and the Latvian ernment was able to form the South Latvian jority and the leadership, including Provisional Government moved to Liepaja. Brigade commanded by Colonel Balodis, Ulmanis, found refuge on the Latvian The Bolsheviks now engaged the Germans and by agreement with the Estonians was freighter “Saratov” under British protec- on the line they had chosen for their de- able to start forming the North Latvian tion in Liepaja harbour. On 10 May a fence. On 7 January Bauska fell to the Bol- Brigade, commanded by Colonel Zemitans puppet German-Latvian regime under the sheviks followed by Tukums and Jelgava in southern Estonia. Estonian forces re- leadership of A. Niedra was formed, but on 10 January 1919. The Bolshevik advance captured Valka and Rujiena from the Bol- this regime was recognised neither by the was only halted at the end of January 1919 sheviks on 1 February 1919, gaining a foot- Western Allies nor by the majority of the on the line of the River Venta from the hold in northern Latvia. At the beginning people of Latvia. In the areas under their

149 control the Landeswehr and the Iron Di- on 27 May 1919, further east Aluksne was forces began to retreat and were pursued vision took part in repressive measures to retaken by forces advancing from Valka on to Riga where they prepared to defend the force acceptance of the new regime. The 29 May 1919, and on 31 May 1919 Cesis city on 26 June. Under pressure though South Latvian Brigade did not accept the was retaken by forces advancing from from the Allies an armistice was agreed at new regime either but continued to co- Rujiena. In a very rapid advance south, Strazdumuiza on 3 July 1919. By its terms operate with the German forces, in oppos- forces from Aluksne reached Jekabpils on the legitimate government of Ulmanis was ing the Bolshevik forces and continuing 5 June 1919, linking up shortly afterwards to be restored, the Baltic German the liberation of Latvia from the Bolshe- with the South Latvian Brigade advancing Landeswehr was to be placed under the viks. from Riga. By the middle of June the Bol- command of the British officer, Lt Col On 22 May Riga was liberated from the sheviks retained control only of Latgale east Alexander (later Field Marshal Lord Alex- Bolsheviks by the German forces of Count of a line from Subate on the Lithuanian ander of Tunis), and the Volunteer Ger- von der Goltz, which then continued their border to Aluksne in the north. However, man Iron Division was to leave Latvia. The advance northeast towards Cesis. The South there remained to be resolved the conflict government of K. Ulmanis returned to Riga Latvian Brigade was denied a major role between the largely German forces of on 8 July 1919 and the Landeswehr, under in the recapture of Riga, and was then Count von der Goltz loyal to the puppet British command, became a component directed to the southeast to pursue the Niedra regime and the Latvian and Esto- of the Latvian National Army. The Iron Bolsheviks along the banks of the River nian forces loyal to and supporting the Division, however, did not leave Latvia, Daugava. By ensuring that the German legitimate Ulmanis regime. despite a meeting between General Gough forces recaptured Riga Count von der On 19 June 1919 the German of the Allied Military Mission and Count Goltz was able to ensure the re-establish- Landeswehr and Iron Division opened the von der Goltz on 19 July, remaining in- ment of German authority in Riga. By his attack on the Latvian and Estonian forces stead at Jelgava. Allied pressure however subsequent dispositions he was able to en- around Cesis. By 21 June 1919 the Ger- did ensure that Count von der Goltz was sure that the German forces were so posi- mans had achieved considerable success, but recalled to Germany by the German gov- tioned that they were able to engage the the timely arrival of reinforcements ena- ernment on 3 October 1919. Estonian backed Latvian forces to the north. bled the Latvians and Estonians to coun- Allied support for the Baltic states was In the north of Latvia Limba¿i was cap- ter-attack and regain the initiative on 22 not motivated by any particular wish to tured by forces advancing from Estonia June 1919. Shortly afterwards the German see the Baltic states gain independence.

150 Instead allied support was motivated more Daugava. In fighting between 16 and 19 With the threat posed by the White by a wish to see that the Germans did not October at Jaunjelgava the Latvian National Russian forces extinguished and the depar- win territory in the east, having lost in Army defeated White Russian forces mov- ture of the last German forces on Latvian the west, and a wish to see the Russian ing east along the line of the River Daugava. territory, the Latvians could now look to Bolsheviks defeated and the Tsarist regime, Only in Kurland did the White Russians the liberation of Latgale where the situa- their ally in the war, restored to power. achieve any great success. The Latvians were tion had remained largely static since the For this reason the Allies supported the able only to hold the ports of Liepaja and summer. Plans were made in co-operation raising of the White Russian Western Ventspils and a narrow strip of the coast- with the Lithuanians and the Poles and an Army under the command of Colonel line east of Ventspils. The counter-attack offensive was launched on 3 January 1920, Bermondt-Avalov at Jelgava in late sum- of the Latvian National Army started on the same day as the Estonians agreed an mer and early autumn 1919, for opera- 11 October, and on 15 October the for- armistice with the Bolsheviks. The Lithua- tions against the Bolsheviks. The White tress of Daugagriva at the mouth of the nians and the Poles advanced on Daugavpils Russians, however, were no supporters of River Daugava was captured. With Allied from the south, and after the capture of the idea of independence for the Baltic naval gunfire support, the Latvians started the city the Poles advanced east to and states, and Germans who had previously to clear the parts of Riga on the west bank beyond Kraslava. To the north the Latvians served in the Iron Division of German of the River Daugava on 3 November, and advanced east on a broad front. Rezekne volunteers made more than three-quarters the whole of the city was back in Latvian was captured on 21 January 1920 and on 1 of Bermondt-Avalov’s force up. It should hands by 10 November 1919. On the night February 1920 an armistice was agreed with perhaps then have come as no surprise of 19 November Colonel Bermondt- the Bolsheviks. By this time, with the ex- when on 8 October 1919 the Russian Avalov placed his forces under the protec- ception of one small area in the north-east, Western Army commenced operations tion of General Eberhardt, the successor all Latvian speaking areas had been freed against the Republic of Latvia. to Count von der Goltz, who sought an from Bolshevik control and, although spo- Bermondt-Avalov’s forces marched on early truce. On 21 November the Latvians radic fighting took place for some time Riga from Jelgava but the Latvian National recaptured Jelgava. On the orders of the after the agreement of the armistice the Army, helped by volunteers from the popu- Allied Military Commission the whole of war of independence was over. A Peace lation of Riga, was able to prevent the Latvia was cleared of Bermondt-Avalov’s Treaty was finally agreed with Moscow on White Russians from crossing the River forces by 29 November 1919. 11 August 1920.

151 By the end of September the German sia in 1917 did not directly affect Lithua- Lithuania front line had stabilised along the line of nia although as a result the Germans re- the River Daugava in Latvia and south viewed their policy with regard to Lithua- The Germans occupied the area of mod- from Daugavpils to Pinsk. All of modern nia forming a Lithuanian council with lim- ern Lithuania in three stages during World Lithuania was now in German hands and ited powers. On 18 September 1917 a War One. Some seven months after the start would remain so for the rest of World War Lithuanian conference assembled in Vilnius of the war the Germans had regained the One. In spring 1916 the Russians mounted with J. Basanavi²ius as its elected Chair- initiative on their eastern front and, ad- an offensive northeast of Vilnius in the man. This conference stated the determi- vancing from Prussia, had occupied the vicinity of Lake Naroch but achieved no nation of the Lithuanian people to achieve border regions of the Russian Empire to a success, and thereafter the German occu- independence, and elected a 20 member maximum depth of some thirty miles in pation of Lithuania went unchallenged. Taryba or council chaired by A. Smetona the areas west of Kaunas and Alytus. As early as 1915 the political leadership to draw up a constitution. Germany pro- in Vilnius began to discuss the restoration In April 1915 the Germans launched an posed a conference of Lithuanian politi- of Lithuanian independence. In Switzer- offensive in Lithuania to draw attention cians and this took place in Bern in No- land in 1916 the idea was first openly dis- away from their offensive being planned vember 1917, where agreement was reached cussed, and the desire for independence in Galicia. By the end of April 1915 all of on an independent Lithuanian state under was stressed in an appeal to the American western Lithuania had been occupied, and President Wilson. Lithuanians were encour- German protection. The Taryba presented the front line ran from north-west to south- aged during the spring of 1916 after the a document to the Germans on 11 Decem- east along the line of the Venta and Dubysa declaration of the formation of a Polish ber 1917 proclaiming the restoration of rivers, and then south just to the west of Republic under German and Austro-Hun- an independent Lithuanian state, but Ger- Kaunas, Alytus, and Grodno. In August garian protection, although there were fears many did not react to this document. 1915 the Germans resumed their offensive that the Poles might lay claim to Lithua- The Taryba, losing popularity, decided in Lithuania following up the success they nian territory. The Germans postponed to act decisively, and on 16 February 1918 had achieved further to the south. Kaunas any decision on the status of Lithuania the Independence Manifesto was signed and was attacked on 8 August 1915 and was until after the end of the war. Lithuania was declared independent. This captured nine days later. Vilnius fell to the Entirely occupied by Germany the time the Germans did react and recognised Germans on 19 September 1915. February and October revolutions in Rus- the Independence Manifesto on 23 March

152 1918, but only on the basis of the docu- The Bolsheviks captured Vilnius on 6 At the same time as the White Russian ment of 11 December 1917. On 13 July January 1919, and by the end of the same forces of Colonel Bermont-Avalov 1918 the Taryba elected the German Duke month only western Lithuania remained marched on Riga in October 1919, they Wilhelm von Urach as the King of Lithua- in Lithuanian and German hands. The invaded northwestern Lithuania and nia, in accordance with wishes expressed front line ran west and south of Tel¸iai, marched towards Vilnius. The Lithuanians in Berlin to link Lithuania to Germany as south of ¨iauliai and curved south east decisively defeated the Bermont-Avalov closely as possible. of Kaunas and just east of Alytus. On 5 forces at Radvili¸kis on 21 November Following the German armistice with the March 1919 the Lithuanian government 1919. Many of Bermont-Avalov’s forces Allies on 11 November 1918 and the annul- resorted to compulsory conscription to were German volunteers, and as a result ling of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk the Bol- sustain their army. In April 1919 Polish of his actions the Western Allies demanded sheviks resumed their offensive against the forces liberated Vilnius from the Bolshe- the withdrawal of all remaining German Germans in the east. The Germans fell back viks, and Lithuanian and German forces forces from the Baltic States and the last from the forward positions they had occu- went onto the offensive against the Bol- German troops left Lithuania on 15 De- pied in February 1918, but were determined sheviks elsewhere in Lithuania, soon lib- cember 1919. to hold positions in Lithuania to the east erating Paneve¿ys and Ukmerge. By the During July 1920 the Bolsheviks of their frontiers. The Lithuanian govern- end of June 1919 all of Lithuania had been mounted a major offensive during which ment started to organise a Lithuanian Army cleared of Bolshevik forces, and in Au- the Poles were driven from eastern Lithua- on 23 November 1918, but in early Decem- gust 1919 a ceasefire with the Bolsheviks nia, and Vilnius was captured on 14 July ber 1918 the Bolsheviks invaded Lithuania. took effect although this had not been 1920. The Lithuanians concluded a peace On 8 December the Provisional Lithuanian formally agreed and much of eastern treaty with the Bolsheviks on 12 July 1920 Government of Workers and Peasants was Lithuania remained in Polish hands. A that established eastern and southern bor- proclaimed. On 16 January 1919 it was de- Polish backed coup to unite Lithuania ders for Lithuania. (These borders were cided in Moscow to abolish the Belarussian with Poland was discovered and foiled in further east and further south than those Soviet Republic, absorb most of it into Kaunas in August 1919. A demarcation given to the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Russia, and amalgamate the rest with Lithua- line had been established with the Poles Republic in 1944 and accepted today.) nia as the Lithuanian-Belarussian Soviet in July 1919 but border clashes contin- Vilnius was handed back to the Lithuanians Republic. ued for the next year. by the Bolsheviks on 27 August 1920.

153 At the gates of Warsaw, with Warsaw Poland on 8 April 1922 and remained in already reported as having fallen to the Polish hands until 1939, causing continu- Intervention Bolsheviks in some newspapers, the Poles ing ill feeling between Lithuania and Po- inflicted a massive defeat on the Bolshe- land. The intervention of the Western Allies viks, who started to retreat in disorder with Settling the borders of Germany fol- in the Baltic area at the end of the First the Poles advancing close behind them. On lowing the end of the First World War World War was not motivated by any par- 7 October 1920, with the Western Allies the territory of Memel (Klaipeda), that ticular policy to assist the Baltic states participating in the negotiations, an agree- part of Prussia north of the River achieve independence. Instead the allies did ment was signed between Lithuania and Nemunas, was detached from Germany as not wish to see the Germans profit in the Poland that, although it left certain issues a Free City. French forces occupied the east when they had lost in the west, and unresolved, left Vilnius in Lithuanian area but civil administration remained in sought to support the White Russians in hands. Two days later Polish forces led by German hands. The local German popu- the Russian Civil War. The Russian Tsarist General Zeligowski re-occupied Vilnius and lation, just under half of the total, aimed Regime had been a good ally and the west- the surrounding areas. The Polish govern- for reunion with Germany and the Poles ern powers had no wish to see the Bolshe- ment accepted no responsibility for the also made claims to the territory. In Janu- viks become established in Russia. How- actions of General Zeligowski who, they ary 1923 Lithuanian troops occupied ever following the losses of the First World Klaipeda in support of an uprising by claimed, was leading a force of local inhab- War the western allies had no wish to be- the local Lithuanian inhabitants. At first itants. In November 1920 the Lithuanians come involved in an expensive conflict in the French occupation forces resisted the inflicted a defeat on the forces of General Russia. Support for the White Russians Lithuanian occupation but soon gave way Zeligowski at ¨irvintos north of Vilnius went as far as the provision of materiel and were returned to France. On 8 May support and volunteers, and the securing and started to advance towards Vilnius, but 1924 the League of Nations in Paris for- of base areas for them but not as far, ex- agreed to a League of Nations brokered mally agreed to the incorporation of cept on isolated occasions, as actually tak- ceasefire before having retaken Vilnius. A Klaipeda into Lithuania. The status of neutral zone was established between Klaipeda soured Lithuania’s relations with ing part in fighting against the Bolshevik Lithuania and Poland on 29 November Germany, and on 22 March 1939 Lithua- forces. 1920. After a plebiscite Vilnius and the nia gave in to German demands that Allied forces supported the White Rus- surrounding area was incorporated into Memel be returned to them. sians from all points of the compass. In

154 the north, from the Arctic Ocean, British, Although the task of the British and Navy supported the Estonians, who had American, Italian, and Serbian forces op- French naval forces was essentially to block- gone over to the offensive, with naval gun- erated from Moermansk and Archangel. In ade the Bolshevik forces they maintained fire against the Bolshevik forces. the south, in the Black Sea area, French an offensive posture and provided con- Vessels of the Royal Navy arrived in Riga and Rumanian forces operated from siderable support to the authorities and on 19 December 1918. Stores were landed, Odessa, and British forces operated from forces of the Baltic states. (By contrast the training was provided to Latvian volun- Batumi. In the east American, British, allied land forces committed in other parts teers, and naval gunfire was provided in Czech, and Japanese forces were present in of Russia maintained an essentially defen- support of the forces of the Ulmanis gov- Siberia. These land forces numbered in sive posture.) The British Royal Navy, com- ernment. However the Royal Navy could excess of 100,000 men. In the west mainly manded by Rear-Admiral Sinclair arrived not by itself prevent the fall of Riga to the naval forces lent assistance to the anti-Bol- in Estonian waters in the early days of Bolsheviks, it withdrew carrying refugees shevik forces, including the forces of the December 1918. One early act of support on 3 January 1919 and Sinclair’s force with- emerging Baltic nations. In the first half involved the bombardment of the only drew from the Baltic Sea. of 1919 the British Royal Navy had an bridge across the Narva River, destroying Sinclair was replaced by a force under average of just fewer than thirty ships com- it and creating severe difficulties for the the command of Rear-Admiral Cowan. mitted to operations in the Baltic Sea, in Bolshevik forces to the west of it in Esto- This force, in February 1919, was able to the second half of the year this figure in- nia. The Royal Navy also acted as a cover- provide additional materiel support to creased threefold. The French Navy, which ing force to a small Estonian amphibious the Latvians at Liepaja, and with the use worked in close co-operation with the Royal assault to the rear of the Bolshevik front of naval gunfire support the Latvians in Navy, had twenty-six ships involved in line, and provided over 5,000 rifles and the defence of Ventspils. In April addi- Baltic operations. The Americans had four- other stores to the Estonian forces. Before tional support in the shape of artillery teen ships present, and the Italians con- the end of December 1918 the Royal Navy guns and transport was provided to the tributed two ships. Direct assistance, both had captured two Bolshevik destroyers, Latvians at Liepaja, and the Royal Navy in terms of volunteer personnel and which were handed over to the Estonian played an active part in preventing the materiel, was also given to the Baltic states Navy and assisted in the transport of over capture of Ulmanis and the Latvian Gov- in limited amounts by a number of other 500 Finnish volunteers from Helsinki to ernment at the time of the German backed states, in particular the Scandinavians. Tallinn. Early in January 1919 the Royal coup.

155 May 1919 found the Royal Navy in the French Navy gave significant support sought a renewal of union with Russia, to Estonian waters where cover was once again to the Latvian forces. Both at Riga and at dispute the style of government of Fin- provided for Estonian amphibious opera- Liepaja naval gunfire supported the efforts land with the “White” Finns. Without tions and a close watch was kept on the of the Latvian government forces oppos- doubt the Germans contributed in large Bolshevik fleet at Kronstadt. Operations ing the White Russian forces of Bermondt- measure to the victory of the “White” against Kronstadt involved elements of the Avalov. Finns. Since the civil war in Finland took recently formed Royal Air Force. May 1919 British operations in the Baltic Region place before the end of the First World also saw the establishment of a British were not carried out without losses. A to- War the Western Allies played, essentially, Military Mission in the Baltic Region tal of 17 ships were sunk, with mines claim- no role in the independence of Finland. headquartered at Helsinki. ing a large number, and 37 aircraft were In Estonia the decisive events leading Following the defeat of the German also lost. 123 Royal Navy and 5 Royal Air to independence started some months later Landeswehr at Cesis, the Royal Navy played Force personnel were killed. than in Finland. In essence the Germans an important role in the negotiations at played no military role in the independ- Riga that led to the restoration in Latvia Conclusion ence of Estonia and left the field early. In of the government of Ulmanis. It was at large measure the Estonians achieved inde- this time that an officer from the British In the introduction four factors were pendence by themselves in opposition to Mission, Lt Col Alexander, was appointed identified as being relevant to the route to the Bolsheviks. The Western Allies, mainly to command the Landeswehr in support independence for all of the Baltic states, the British and in particular the Royal Navy, of Latvian objectives. Later, at the start of their relative importance being different did play a role in the independence of 1920, the Landeswehr were to play a major for each of the four states. Estonia. It is easy to overestimate that role role in the liberation of Latgale that con- In Finland the war of independence was if only because the assistance given was just cluded the Latvian War of Independence. more of a civil war than in the other states. enough at a crucial time, rather than sus- October 1919 saw the White Russian The Russian Bolsheviks recognised Finn- tained and substantial assistance over a forces of Bermondt-Avalov, with consid- ish independence at an early stage and did period of time. erable German support, commence their not openly play an active role in events in It is in Latvia that the situation is most operations against the Latvian government Finland. It was therefore left to Finnish complex. But for German assistance and forces. Again the British Royal Navy and Bolsheviks, who might or might not have resistance in the early stages Latvia might

156 have succumbed to the Bolsheviks. It was, And so for some twenty years the Baltic though, allied intervention, without a states enjoyed independence until the on- Annex doubt, that thereafter thwarted German set of the Second World War, a war with intentions in favour of Latvian aspirations. its origins in the imperfections of the trea- President Wilson’s “Fourteen Points”: Beyond that, allied intervention played a ties that concluded the First World War. 1. Point One renounced secret treaties role in defeating Russian aspirations, both Finland resisted the Soviet Union fight- demanding, “open covenants openly ar- Bolshevik and White. The Estonians too ing later with, but not for, Germany. Fin- rived at”. played a part in Latvia, playing a consider- land retained her sovereignty, although 2. Point Two required freedom of the able role in the defeat of the Bolsheviks in she lost much in terms of territory and seas outside territorial waters and an end northern Latvia, a decisive role in the de- limitations on her freedom of action. The to “blockade” tactics. feat of Baltic German aspirations, and giv- governments of Estonia, Latvia and 3. Point Three called for the removal, ing assistance to the Latvians in the defeat Lithuania chose not to resist the Soviet wherever possible, of trade barriers. of the White Russians. Union, although later many of their peo- 4. Point Four called for arms reductions As in Latvia, in Lithuania too the Ger- ple did, and sovereignty was lost. What 5. Point Five called for impartial arbi- mans played a role in keeping the Lithua- might have been the ultimate outcome if tration of all colonial disputes nians in the field against the Bolsheviks in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had resisted 6. Point Six called for the evacuation, the early stages. The western allies played a in 1939? It is, at this stage of history, of by the Central Powers, of all former Rus- minimal role in Lithuania, and indeed lat- course impossible to say. Perhaps occu- sian territory. terly, in the case of Memel (Klaipeda), the pation and incorporation into the So- 7. Point Seven dealt with the restora- Lithuanians found themselves opposed to viet Union would have happened anyway, tion of Belgium. the French. Ultimately in Lithuania, where but there has to be a chance that their 8. Point Eight admitted French claims the struggle for independence lasted long- fate would have mirrored that of Finland, to Alsace and Lorraine. est, the Lithuanians, having played their and there is perhaps a bigger chance that 9. Point Nine gave some recognition part in defeating the White Russian forces, their fate would have mirrored that of to Italian territorial claims. found themselves sharing cause with the Poland. Perhaps the 1990s could have seen 10. Point Ten provided “autonomous Russian Bolsheviks against a common en- democratic government restored instead development” for the various nationalities emy, the Poles. of sovereignty. within the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

157 11. Point Eleven demanded the evacua- and balance of power. The desire to construct an but local Lithuanians responded by forming a tion of occupied Romania, Montenegro effective balance of power remained at the centre of Committee for the Salvation of Lithuania Minor. the Congress’ attention. Each power, however, had Lithuanian sovereignty over Memel (Lithuanian and Serbia with the latter having access to its own idea of what constituted a proper balance. Klaipeda) was internationally recognized when the Adriatic Coast. Russia’s ambitions in Poland almost broke up France, Britain, Italy, and Japan signed the Memel 12. Point Twelve guaranteed Turkish the conference: Britain believed that an enlarged Statute in December 1923. Memel was formally sovereignty over its heartlands but de- Russia threatened peace. Prussia wanted all of incorporated as an autonomous region of Lithua- Saxony: Austria feared a growing Prussia. While nia on March 8, 1924. The local assembly (Landtag) manded autonomy for subject peoples and the four wartime allies split, the clever French rep- was given extensive power over internal affairs sub- the opening of the Dardanelles to interna- resentative, Talleyrand, negotiated a secret treaty ject to the approval of a governor appointed by tional traffic. among the French, Austrians, and British that the President of Lithuania. Memel was returned to pledged mutual assistance to restrain the Russians the Germans on March 23, 1939. The Lithuanians 13. Point Thirteen recognized an inde- and Prussians. Russia and Prussia eventually re- had bowed to Hitler’s inevitable demands and pendent Poland with access to the sea. duced their demands for land in Poland and turned the region over without a fight. Memel was 14. Point Fourteen recommended a Saxony, and the sought-after balance of power was heavily defended throughout the Second World “general association” of nations. achieved. War. The Red Army captured the heavily damaged 2 The city and region of Memel lies on the Baltic city on January 28, 1945. Memel was renamed at the mouth of the River Niemen. The region Klaipeda and incorporated into the Lithuanian 1 After the Napoleonic War representatives of all came under Swedish control and, following the Soviet Socialist Republic in 1947. the European powers, except the Ottoman Empire, Napoleonic wars under Prussia. It remained within 3 At the time of the October Revolution Russia gathered in September 1815 at Vienna. They had the German Reich until the end of World War I. still used the Julian calendar, so to find the Gregorian the imposing task of building a new political and Germans constituted a majority of the city’s popu- date we use the “rule of thumb” that after February diplomatic structure for Europe after a quarter lation while Lithuanians predominated in the sur- 1900 the Julian calendar was 13 days behind the century of wars and revolutions. Work went slowly rounding countryside. The Treaty of Versailles sev- Gregorian Calendar. This means that on 5 Novem- during the ten-month span of the Congress of Vi- ered Memel and the surrounding district from ber 1917 Gregorian calendar, it was 23 October enna. The leaders who gathered at Vienna - Lord Germany. Lithuanian representatives to the Paris 1917 according to the Julian calendar. Different parts Castlereagh of Great Britain, Count von Peace Conference had asked the Allied Powers to of Russia changed from the Julian (JU) to the Gregorian Hardenberg of Prussia, Prince Klemens von grant them possession of the Memel area, but in- calendar (GR) on different times during and after the Metternich of Austria, Tsar Alexander I of Russia, stead it was placed under a French administration revolution. Most sources refer to the change in Feb- and Prince Charles Maurice de Talleyrand of that governed under a League of Nations man- ruary 1918 where 31 January 1918 JU, was succeeded France - met in small secret conferences to decide date. An Allied commission recommended estab- by 14 February 1918 GR. This law was signed on 26 the future of Europe. In an attempt to restore some lishing a “Free City” under League of Nations January 1918 JU. balance, the Congress followed four principles: le- supervision in the fall of 1922. Memel’s German 4 Please find the full text of the “Fourteen Points” gitimacy, encirclement of France, compensation, and Polish communities favoured the proposal in the annex to this article.

158