The Operational Role of British Corps Command on the Western Front, 1914-18 Andrew Simpson University College, London Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy © Abstract British corps command having been neglected in the literature, this thesis sets out to assess what British corps did, and how they did it, on the Western Front during the Great War. It attempts to avoid anecdotal sources as much as possible, drawing its evidence instead as much as possible from contemporary official documents. It is a central argument here that Field Service Regulations, Part 1 (1909), was found by commanders in the BEF to be applicable throughout the war, because it was designed to be as flexible as possible, its broad principles being supplemented by training and manuals. Corps began the war in a minor role, as an extra level of command to help the C-in-C control the divisions of the BEF. With the growth in numbers and importance of artilleiy in 1915, divisions could not cope with the quantity of artilleiy allotted theni, and by early 1916, the corps BGRA became the corps artilleiy commander (GOCRA). In addition to its crucial role in artillery control, corps was important as the highest level of operational command, discussing attack plans with Armies and divisions and being responsible for putting Army schemes into practice. Though corps tended to be prescnptive towards divisions in 1916, and Armies towards corps, a more hands-off style of command was generally practised in 1917, within the framework of FSR and the pamphlet SS13S (and others - to be used with FSR). However, the vital role of artillery still led corps to control divisions more closely than in 1915. In 1918, once the BEF had recovered from the sethacks of March and April (caused mainly by low levels of manpower facing overwhelming German infantry and aililleiy forces), the BEF as much as possible devolved command - even of hea\y artillety - to divisions, In the Hundred Days, acting flexibly, corps only assumed a co-ordinaling role when set-piece attacks were required. 2 Contents Acronyms and Glossaiy 5 Introduction 7 Chapter 1 - Field Service Regulations and Operational Doctrine in I Corps, 1914-15 20 Chapter 2 - Corps Command and the Baffle of the Somme 44 Chapter 3 - Corps Command between the Somme and Third Ypres: April to June, 1917 84 Chapter 4 - Corps at Third Ypres. May to November, 1917 113 Chapter 5 - Corps Command at the Battle of Cambrai 144 Chapter 6 - Corps in defence: January to July 1918 159 Chapter 7 - Corps in the Hundred Days: August to November, 1918 184 Conclusion 211 Appendix 1 - Corps Commanders on the Western Front 225 Appendix 2 - Composition of Corps Headquarters in the BEF, 1914-18 228 Bibliography 233 3 Acknowledgements Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor David French, without whose considerable help and encouragement this thesis could not have been written. In addition, the following have made helpful suggestions and comments during the lengthy production process: John Bourne, Tony Cowan, Chris McCarthy, Biyn Hammond, Sanders Marble and Gaiy Sheffield. And I owe special debts to my wife, Krisztina Robert, and to my parents for their generous support over many years. I would also like to thank the following and their staffs: the Imperial War Museum; the National Army Museum; Churchill College, Cambridge; the British Library; the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives; West Sussex County Record Office. Acronyms and Glossary A&QMG - Adjutant and Quartennaster-General ADC - Aide de Camp. AG - Adjutant-General. AIF - Austrahan hnperial Force. ANZAC - Australia and New Zealand Corps. ASC - Army Service Corps. BEF - British Expeditionary Force. BGGS - Bngadier-General, General Staff (the chief staff officer of a corps). BG (0) - Brigadier-General (Operations) at GHQ. BGRA - Brigadier General, Royal Artillery (the term by which the GOCRA was known until approximately late 1915). C2 - In modern nulitary parlance, Command and Control. C3 - In modern military parlance, Command, Control and Comniumcations. CBSO - Counter-Battery Staff Officer (attached to corps artillery HQ). CEF - Canadian Expeditionary Force. CGS - Chief of the General Staff (the chief staff Officer at GHQ). CHA - Commander, Heavy Artillery (at corps level). CIGS - Chief of the Imperial General Stafi CMGO - Corps Machine-Gun Officer. CRA - Commander, Royal Artillery (the usual term for a divisional artillery commander). CRE - Commander, Royal Engineers of any formation from division to Army. DD Signals - Deputy Director of Signals (senior signals officer of an Army). DGT - Director-General of Transportation. DGT Line - The adniimstrative boundary between Army and corps. DHQ - Divisional Headquarters. DLI - Durham Light Infantry. DM0 - Director of Military Operations. DMT - Director of Military Training. DSD - Director of Staff Duties. Eingref division - A counter-attack division in the Gennan 1917 defensive model. FOO - Forward Observation Officer (artillery), placed to spot the fall of shot and report back to his batteiy GHQ - General Headquarters, the main Expeditionary Force staff GOC - General Officer Commanding GOCRA - General Officer Commanding, Royal Aitilleiy (the usual term for a coips artilleiy commander from 1916). GS - General Staff. The GS branch of a staff was concerned with the planning and execution of operations. GSO1, 2, 3 (1)1(0) - General Staff Officer, Grade 1, 2 or 3, belonging to the (Intelligence) or (Operations) branch of the Staff HAG - Heavy Artillery Group. HAR - Heavy Artillery Reserve. MEF - Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. MGC - Machine-Gun Corps. MGO - Machine Gun Officer of a formation. MUGS - Major-General, General Staff (the chief staff officer of an Army). MGRA - Major-General, Royal Artillery (the adviser for that arm at Army HQ). psc - Passed Staff College (and hence a trained staff officer). QMG - Quartermaster-General. RA - Royal Artillery. RAF - Royal Air Force. RE - Royal Engineers. RFC - Royal Flying Corps. RGA - Royal Garrison Artillery (heavy artillery). 6 Introduction This Introduction addresses three points: firstly, what the thesis sets out to demonstrate; secondly, how the operational role of British corps command on the Western Front is treated in the literature; and thirdly, to justify the sample of corps selected as being suitable for research in depth. The Australian and Canadian Corps are not included here, having a literature of their own (which is discussed below) and being special cases anyway. This was because their staff stmctures differed somewhat from British corps and, more importantly, they were usually composed of the same divisions, whereas British corps tended to have divisions rotated through them. Furthermore, in 1918 they retained the 12-battalion division when the British went down to nine battalions per division. It should be noted that the term 'operational command' is not used in its modern sense (the level of command "concerned with the direction of military resources to achieve military strategic objectives"). it is used in the way in which it was employed during the Great War, where it connoted operations involving any formation from a brigade upwards. Usually it will refer to corps- or Army-level operations, depending upon the context The object of this study is to assess how important the corps level of command on the Western Front was, and to establish what Bntish corps did, and how they did it An important part of this is to establish the doctrinal basis (if any) of the BEF's activities, for which some clarification of the term 'doctrine' is required. John Gooch defined doctrine as "a set of beliefs about the nature of war and the keys to success on the battlefield." 2 Brian Holden Reid observed that for much of the twentieth century the British Army lacked "a coherent doctrinal philosophy," though it was not lacking military thinkers. However, he argued, doctrine must establish an institutionalised, general framework for thought and action, rather than simply being a set of ideas, however widely disseminated.3 A number of themes have emerged during this research. One is the continuity of thought in the 'British Defence Doctrine. Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01 (London, MOD, 1996), 1.9. 2 GOOCh, John, 'Military Doctrine and Military History' in Gooch, John (ed.) Challenges of High Command in the Twentieth Centui'y (The Strategic and Combat Studies Institute. The Occasional, No. 30, September 1997), 5. 3 Reid, Brian Flolden, 'War Fighting Doctrine and the British Army' in Reid, Brian Holden, A Doctrinal Perspective 1988-1998 (The Strategic and Combat Studies Institute. The Occasional, No. 33, May 1998), 12-28. 7 British Army from before the war through to its conclusion, which was expressed by the application of Field Service Regulations (1909) Part 1 (Operations), which will henceforth be refened to as FSR. Although it might be thought that pm-war thinking would necessarily become obsolete during the militaiy revolution which took place during the Great War, this was not the case, because of the way in which FR was designed to be used. At the 1913 General Staff conference, Colonel Whigham (a GSO1 under the DSD) raised the point that FSR should state the principles under which the army should operate, and that these might therefore be omitted from training manuals. In reply, Br.-Gen. du Cane (Staff Officer to the Inspector-General of the Forces) observed that the General Staff favoured the amplification of FSR's principles "to a certain extent in the manuals of the anus concerned..."4 The point was further emphasised by Br.-Cien. Kiggell (the DSD), who said that: Thereisnodoubtastothedangerwhich,Ithink,alladniit;oflayingdowntoomuchdetailin official regulations. Human nature loves details of that sort to be laid down: it makes it very much easier for instructors in peace to be able to say, "You are song: them is the book," and it makes it very much easier for the pupil to be able to say, "Please, Sir, I think I am right there is the book" But we know that the problems of war cannc4 be solved by rules, but by judgement based on a knowledge of general principles.