British 8Th Infantry Division on the Western Front, 1914-1918

Centre for First World War Studies British 8th Infantry Division on the Western Front, 1914-18 by Alun Miles THOMAS Thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of History and Cultures College of Arts & Law January 2010 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT Recent years have seen an increasingly sophisticated debate take place with regard to the armies on the Western Front during the Great War. Some argue that the British and Imperial armies underwent a ‘learning curve’ coupled with an increasingly lavish supply of munitions, which meant that during the last three months of fighting the BEF was able to defeat the German Army as its ability to conduct operations was faster than the enemy’s ability to react. This thesis argues that 8th Division, a war-raised formation made up of units recalled from overseas, became a much more effective and sophisticated organisation by the war’s end. It further argues that the formation did not use one solution to problems but adopted a sophisticated approach dependent on the tactical situation. This is supported by using original sources including war diaries, after-action reports and the post-war correspondence with the British official historian. From its first acquaintance with the peculiar nature of trench-warfare following its arrival in France in late 1914, 8th Division undertook a series of operations that attempted to break the deadlock. Incorrect lessons were learnt, culminating in failure on the Somme in 1916. The Division became ineffective and required rejuvenation. This was accomplished by a new command team. Involvement in the semi-open warfare during the advance to the Hindenburg Line reinforced the efficiency of the Division. Thus, despite enduring torrid fighting at 3rd Ypres and during the German Spring offensives of 1918, by the ‘advance to victory’ of late 1918, 8th Division was able to operate at a tempo far higher than it had achieved before. CONTENTS Introduction 1 Chapter 1 1914 – A New Way of War 25 Chapter 2 1915 – Faltering Steps 66 Chapter 3 1916 – “The Big Push” 134 Chapter 4 Early 1917 - A New Weapon is Forged 216 Chapter 5 Late 1917 and Early 1918 – Stresses and Strains 262 Chapter 6 Summer and Autumn 1918 – Upwards and Onward 328 Conclusion 358 Appendices 370 Bibliography 387 Maps LIST OF MAPS Following p. 400 Map 1: Neuve Chapelle - 10-14 March 1915 Map 2: The Action Before Bois Grenier - 25 September 1915 Map 3: Battle of the Somme - 1 July 1916 Map 4: Le Transloy - 23 October 1916 Map 5: Bouchavesnes - 4 March 1917 Map 6: Passchendaele Ridge (Teal Cottage) - 1-2 December 1917 Map 7: Line of Retreat of 8th Division in the German Offensive – March 1918 Map 8: The Action at Villers Bretonneux (the German Attack) – morning 24 April 1918 Map 9: The Action at Villers Bretonneux (the Counter-attack) – evening 25 April 1918 Map 10: The Rouvroy – Fresnes Line – 7-8 October 1918 LIST OF TABLES Table 1.1: Pre-war Postings of 8th Division’s Infantry Battalions 28 Table 1.2: Pre-war Postings of 8th Division’s Artillery Units 31 Table 2.1: 8th Division casualties at Neuve Chapelle: 10 – 13 March 1915 86 Table 2.2: British casualties at Neuve Chapelle: 10 – 13 March 1915 87 Table 2.3: British casualties at Fromelles / Aubers Ridge: 10–13 March 1915 115 Table 3.1: 8th Division infantry unit casualties as known at 5 July 1916 184 Table 5.1: Reorganisation of 8th Division’s infantry – January/February 1918 274 Table 5.2: Reinforcement drafts received by 8th Division 12- 15 April 1918 293 Table 5.3: Main German units attacking Villers-Bretonneux, April 24 1918 301 Table 5.4: 8th Division casualties - Villers-Bretonneux - 23-28 April 1918 324 LIST OF DIAGRAMS Table 6.1: The Double Barrages employed at Biache-St. Vaast – 7 October 1918 343 1 INTRODUCTION This is a study of the British 8th Infantry Division on the Western Front between 1914 and 1918. The study is set in the context of the dominant historiography of the last thirty years – that the BEF’s operations on the Western Front between 1914 and 1918 were subject to a ‘learning curve’, whereby it learned in a progressive fashion how to fight a skilled enemy. The learning process involved post-battle analysis, dissemination of ‘lessons learned’ and revised training. These activities meant that the BEF was far more effective at the end of the war than it had been at the beginning. The questions asked about 8th Division’s operational effectiveness are informed by this debate, but also seek to illuminate and carry the debate forward by an examination of 8th Division at various phases of its wartime experiences. The academic study of the British Army’s experience on the Western Front in the Great War has been bedevilled by a plethora of vastly different interpretations, many of which have been uncomplimentary to its leadership and sparing in praise of its achievements. From the 1930s the historiography was coloured by the literature produced by and about the ‘hostilities only’ poets, writers and memoirists.1 The seeds sown by them found fertile ground in a climate where veterans had become embittered by the post-war miseries caused by British economic decline.2 This air of disillusionment was augmented by the memoirs of David Lloyd George, who was 1 See, for example, Robert Graves, Goodbye to All That (London: Jonathan Cape, 1929); Wilfred Owen, Poems (London: Chatto & Windus, 1920); Siegfried Sassoon, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer (London: Faber, 1930). 2 See Rudyard Kipling’s comments, quoted in Keith Grieves, ‘Making Sense of the Great War: Regimental Histories 1918-1923’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, LXIX, No. 277 (Spring 1991), pp.6-15 2 vituperative in his assessments of the British commanders.3 How representative were they of the millions who served in the British Army between 1914 and 1918? It is worth noting that one battalion officer, who served with 8th Division in 1918 wrote long afterwards that their perspective was not his nor of the majority of his generation.4 The attacks on the BEF’s commanders’ conduct of operations were continued from a different direction by particularists having their own axe to grind. The apostles of armoured warfare, such as J.F.C. Fuller, castigated the high command, Haig in particular, for failing to use tanks more widely. It was in their interest to represent that there were few, if any, developments in British command and tactical methodology in contrast to the cascade of ideas that issued forth from them, however impractical. The advocates of colonial superiority contrasted the success of the Dominion forces, the Australians especially, against the lumpensoldieritat of the British formations on the Western Front. The successes of the Anzacs were increasingly seen to be as much as an indictment of the lack of initiative and dash displayed by the British as well as a celebration of antipodean achievements Above all, the inability of the British to achieve a decisive breakthrough until August 1918 was contrasted with the successful German use of storm troop tactics, especially between March and May 1918. The proponents of German excellence, often 3 D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs (London: Nicholson & Watson, 1933). 4 Hubert Essame, The Battle for Europe (London: Batsford, 1972), p. 2. 3 Americans, have portrayed, for example, British junior leaders as ‘…enthusiastic but tactically incompetent schoolboys…’5 The views of those who disparage the British Army between 1914 and 1918 have in recent years been countered by what has been called the ‘revisionist’ school. Though the earlier efforts of historians such as Cyril Falls had often been disregarded, an increasing number of historians challenged the hostile view of the British Army’s achievements. A change came with the release of the war diaries and reports held by the UK national archives, the Public Record Office, in the late 1960s. The modern study of the tactical and operational development of the British Army in the First World War was led by Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham’s Fire-Power.6 This study examined the methods whereby artillery and tactical airpower became the dominant systems on the battlefield and the response of the British Army to these developments. Jonathan Bailey has argued that the combination of firepower and improved command led to a revolution in military affairs [RMA] that is still the basis for modern war fighting.7 Paddy Griffith has shown how innovative the BEF was in attack and how the ideas were disseminated, especially by the use of the SS series of training pamphlets and, very importantly, how tactical decision making was devolved to increasingly lower levels of rank and responsibility.8 One of the most important recent works has been Andy Simpson’s examination of Corps command. He argues that British use of the broad principles of fire and movement, that the commander at the front was the appropriate decision maker, put forward in the pre-war Field Service 5 Bruce Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics (New York: Praeger), p.

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