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American Signal Intelligence in Northwest Africa and Western Europe

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American Signal Intelligence in Northwest Africa and Western Europe United States Cryptologic History American Signal Intelligence in Northwest Africa Series IV World War II Volume 1 American Signal Intelligence in Northwest Africa and Western Europe i46074 This publication is a product of the National Security Agency history program. It presents a historical perspective for informational and educational purposes, is the result of independent research, and does not necessarily reflect a position of NSA/CSS or any other U.S. government entity. UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY Sources in Cryptologic History Series IV Volume 1 American Signal Intelligence in Northwest Africa and Western Europe George F. Howe National Security Agency 2010 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Table of Contents Page Foreword . ix Author’s Note . x Introduction . .1 PART ONE: THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA Chapter 1: Situation Report . .7 Early Conditions . 7 Early British Experiences with Field SIGINT . 10 German Army and Air Force SIGINT Organizations . 11 U.S. Preparations for SIGINT Service in the West . 13 The Call of the Mediterranean . .16 Chapter 2: Beginnings in Northwest Africa . 19 Planning SIGINT Service in Operation TORCH . 19 Operation TORCH . 23 Tunisia: Organization for the Second Phase . 28 Action during January 1943 . 30 Chapter 3: Axis Initiative in February 1943 . 35 Axis Plans — Allied Expectations . 35 Allied Reversals, 14-17 February 1943 . 36 Through Kasserine Pass . 38 Recapitulation . 39 Two Opposing Army Groups . 40 Chapter 4: The March Offensives . 45 Expectations . 45 II Corps Attacks: Gafsa, Maknassy, and El Guettar . 46 The Enemy Retreat to the Bridgehead . 48 Chapter 5: The Final Phase of Tunisia . .51 Summary . .51 The Attack Begins . 51 The End in Tunisia . 52 Page iii Chapter 6: From Africa to Europe . .57 Decisions in 1943 . .57 French Aid . 58 Beginnings of the 849th Signal Intelligence Service . 58 Detachments and Detachments . 61 SIGINT Before Operation HUSKY . 64 “J” Service . 66 Invading Sicily . 66 Allies Push — Enemy Pulls Out . 69 Some Results . 71 Chapter 7: Salerno to Rome . 75 Preliminaries . 75 Operations AVALANCHE . 76 Enemy Strategy . 82 Tactical SIGINT Service . 82 In the “Winter Line” . 88 Operation SHINGLE at Anzio . 90 “Y” Service during the First Phase of Anzio . .91 From Landing to Stalemate . 93 The Liberation of Rome — 4 June 1944 . 95 Chapter 8: The Final Months in the Mediterranean Theater . .101 Pursuit to the Arno and Beyond . 101 Po Valley and Surrender . 102 Southern France: Operation DRAGOON . 105 PART TWO: WESTERN EUROPE Chapter 9: The Forming of Signal Intelligence Service, ETOUSA . 113 Derivation and Beginnings . 113 Planning in the Theater . 117 The Invasion Begins . .119 The Structure of SIS, ETOUSA . 120 Final Stage of Training in the United Kingdom . .124 Assignment of the SRI Companies . .125 Into Action . .126 Early Days for the Corps Signal Service Companies (RI) . 128 3rd Radio Squadron Mobile and Its Detachments . .133 Chapter 10: A Summary Version of the Campaigns in ETOUSA . .137 Page iv Chapter 11: Aspects of Collaboration in Special Intelligence . 143 Beginnings . .143 U.S. Navy Attempts to Produce Special Intelligence . .147 U.S. Army Preparations to Produce Special Intelligence . 150 The U.S. Army-GCCS Agreement in May 1943 . 152 The Friedman, McCormack, and Taylor Mission April to June 1943 . .157 Collaboration under the Army’s 17 May Agreement . .159 Later Collaboration between OP-20-G and GCCS . 164 Special Intelligence in the Invasion of Normandy — June 1944 . .165 Chapter 12: From Normandy to the Seine . 169 General Considerations . 169 The Breakout . .170 Circling the Enemy’s Southern Flank . 174 SIGINT and the Capture of Brest . 176 Chapter 13: To The Westwall . 179 Pursuit to the North . .179 Pursuit to the Moselle River . 182 Improvement in Enemy Cryptography . 185 Seventh Army . .187 Third Army Reaches Westwall . 187 Chapter 14: The Ardennes Offensive, 16 December 1944 to 20 January 1945 . 189 Situation at the Outset . 189 The Enemy Is Contained and Pushed Back . .191 SIGINT Coverage during the Ardennes Campaign . 192 Examples of SIGINT during the Enemy’s Advance . 195 Special Intelligence . 198 Example of “Y” SIGINT as the Attackers Withdrew . 199 Chapter 15: Winter and Spring Battles — 1944-1945 . 203 Through the Westwall to the Rhine . 203 The Bridge to Remagen . 204 Samples of Special Intelligence in March 1945 . 205 German Collapse . 205 Page v Chapter 16: Some General Considerations . 209 Appendixes A. Agreement between the War Department and G.C. & C.S. 17 May 1943 . 215 B. War Department Letter, “Intercept Directive,” 26 March 1943 . 221 C. HQ, ETOUSA Letter, “Operational Control of Signal Intelligence Service, ETOUSA,” 27 July 1943 . 223 D. War Department Letter, “Special Cryptanalytic Project in Signal Intelligence Service” . 225 E. HQ, ETOUSA Directive, “Organization of Field Detachments for Signal Intelligence Division,” 8 February 1944 . 229 F. HQ, ETOUSA Letter, “Operational Control and Technical Direction of Signal Intelligence and Signal Radio Intelligence Units,” 7 February 1945 . 231 G. U.S. Navy Department Agreement with the Admiralty, 1 October 1942 . 233 H. Excerpts from Reports by U.S. Army Ultra Representatives with Army field commands in the ETOUSA . 235 Part 1, Use of Ultra at 12th Army Group, 23 May 1945 . 235 Part 2, Ultra Intelligence at U.S. First Army, 21 May 1945 239 Part 3, Ultra and the Third Army, 28 May 1945 . 247 Part 4, Use of Ultra by Ninth U.S. Army, 27 May 1945 . 253 Part 5, Ultra and Its Use by XIX, TAC, 30 May 1945 . 257 Bibliography . 263 Illustrations Maps The Mediterranean Area . 6 Allied Invasion of Northwest Africa . 20 Battles in Tunisia . 34 The End in Tunisia . 50 Page vi Sicily . 55 Italy . 73 Operations in Italy . 92 Southern France — Operation DRAGOON . 106 Cross Channel Plan of Attack . 138 The Breakout from the Bocage Country . 173 Exploiting the Breakout . 175 Pursuit to the Westwall . 178 At the Westwall . 184 Ardennes and Roer River . 190 Across the Rhine . 207 Photographs Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke . 8 Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke and Colonel Alfred McCormack . 14 Captain Solomon Kullback . 15 Colonel George A. Bicher . 16 Captain Richard L. Downing . 59 First Lieutenant Herrick F. Bearce . 65 849th SIS Mediterranean Theater camouflaged intercept van 84 849th SIS Mediterranean Theater van interior intercept equipment . 87 849th SIS Mediterranean Theater intercept van with BG 342, BC 344, and S-36 receivers . 94 Brigadier General Telford Taylor . .116 Lieutenant Paul E. Neff . 117 Major Charles L. Allen . .124 U.S. Seventh Army van . 130 Captain Laurance F. Safford, USN . 145 Lieutenant Leo Rosen . 145 Captain Abraham Sinkov . 146 Alistair G. Denniston, Professior E.R. Vincent, and Brigadier John H. Tiltman . .147 Bombe deck, OP-20-G . 148 Commander Joseph Wenger . 149 Dr. Alan M. Turing . 151 William F. Friedman . 153 Brigadier General Harold G. Hayes . .154 Brigadier General W. Preston Corderman . .155 Sir Edward Travis . .156 Page vii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Page viii Historian’s Introduction The volume at hand, Dr. George F. Howe’s American Signals Intelligence in Northwest Africa and Western Europe is important professional reading for those interested in cryptologic history or in World War II. The first historian for the National Security Agency was Captain Thomas Dyer, USN, who had made significant contributions in cryptanalysis during the war. When Dyer retired in 1954, NSA decided to hire a professional historian as his replacement. That was Dr. George F. Howe. Dr. Howe was born in Vermont in 1901, and received his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1926. He was a professor of history at the University of Cincinnati for the next two decades. In 1945 he joined the research and writing staff of the Army’s Historical Division. While in that position, he wrote Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, published in 1957 as part of the official series on World War II, commonly known to historians as the “Army’s green books.” At NSA Dr. Howe supervised a small staff in preparing a number of specialized histories as well as a general study of the Armed Forces Security Agency, NSA’s predecessor. Dr. Howe retired in 1971, although he was called back to assist part-time with several history projects. He passed away in 1988. It is fitting that, for his own major project at NSA, Dr. Howe chose to write about signals intelligence support in North Africa (and Western Europe), drawing on the expertise developed for the “green books” and adding to it a dimension he could not write about for unclassified publication in the 1950s. Dr. Howe’s book deals primarily with organizational matters for providing SIGINT support in combat. Thus, the reader will not find stories of high-level cryptanalysis underlying big decisions by famous leaders. In my estimation, by concentrating on the less flashy aspects of wartime support in favor of the background work, Dr. Howe has again added a dimension of great worth to our knowledge of SIGINT and of the war. The study of World War II SIGINT has concentrated, by and large, on ULTRA, the exploitation of high-grade cryptographic systems used by Germany and Japan, and the use of ULTRA material by senior wartime decision makers. This effort unquestionably is important for understanding the decisions and events of that terrible era, but the overwhelming focus on this aspect has resulted in a slightly skewed understanding. The production of ULTRA and its effective use depended on a strong and well-organized structure working in conjunction with now-legendary.
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