• Abstract and Figures
• Public Full-text

he U.S. Army’s reputation for effectiveness during World War T II has not fared well over time, particularly regarding the European theater of operations. This is surprising given what the Army accomplished. Just to refresh the reader’s memory, the United States went to war with a small, impoverished Army that conducted maneuvers with wooden weapons and borrowed vehicles in the years leading up to World War II. Yet within 12 months of Germany declaring war on the United States, the Army invaded North Africa and knocked Vichy French forces out of the war. In another 12 months, it knocked Italy out of the war. And 12 months later, the Army was on the border of Germany, having just defeated Adolf Hitler’s last-gasp effort to stop the Allied onslaught. Nevertheless, these achievements seem to have diminished over time. By way of illustration, ask any military of- ficer which of the following factors best explains U.S. victories in the European theater during World War II: • Army leaders executed an organi- zational miracle in quickly creating Left to right, Henry H. Arnold, Joseph T. competent armies that won a series McNarney, George C. Marshall, Brehon of victories from North Africa to the B. Somervell, and Lesley J. McNair (NDU Special Collections) heart of Germany. • The Russians did the preponderance of fighting, leaving an exhausted Wehrmacht to be mopped up by the relatively incapable Army. • The American people tightened their Leadership and collective belt so U.S. and Russian forces together could overwhelm the German military with vastly superior Operational Art in numbers of . well, everything! Fifty years ago, most readers would have chosen the first statement; today, World War II few would. This sad fact is one reason all serious students of U.S. military per- formance should read Mark Calhoun’s The Case for General Lesley new biography General Lesley J. McNair: J. McNair Unsung Architect of the U.S. Army. By Christopher J. Lamb Dr. Christopher J. Lamb is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. 120 Recall / The Case for General Lesley J. McNair JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 “Should” is the key word, for as Calhoun I saw the creation of this mighty force—this European generals of the old school could points out, McNair is often overlooked mighty Army, victorious in every theater certainly have executed the invasion with or maligned by historians and even those against the enemy in so short a time and the forces available, but they could never within the Army to which he dedicated from such a very small parent stock. This have prepared it—neither technically, his life. is an achievement which the soldiers of organizationally, nor in the field of train- There are several reasons why McNair every other country will always study with ing. The functioning of the Allied fighting is not much appreciated today. Most im- admiration and with envy. But that is not machine, with all its complexity, surprised mediately, he spent most of his career in the whole story, nor even the greatest part even me, and I already had a fairly high staff assignments rather than command- of the story. To create great Armies is one opinion of their powers. ing forces in the field. For many observers thing; to lead them and to handle them this fact alone disqualifies McNair as a is another. It remains to me a mystery as Calhoun explains how the Army subject worthy of serious study. Even yet unexplained how the very small staffs achieved its successes and why they are Calhoun’s colleagues at the Army’s which the United States kept during the now so roundly dismissed. In answering School of Advanced Military Studies, years of peace were able not only to build up the latter question he rebuts supercilious where he is an associate professor, advised the Armies and Air Force units, but also to British historians and generals who, against his researching McNair. Most mil- find the leaders and vast staffs capable of he believes, have skewed the historical itary historians seem to agree there is little handling enormous masses and of moving record. He cites Gerhard Weinberg’s to learn from McNair since they ignore them faster and farther than masses have observation about British disappointment or disparage McNair without actually ever been moved in war before.1 in American performance at Kasserine: bothering to research his career and deci- “It is difficult to understand,” Weinberg sions. More broadly, Calhoun suspects Churchill attributed the Army’s stated, why the British “found it so hard the lack of interest in McNair’s career triumph of organization and arms to its to comprehend that the Americans’ tak- reflects the currently prevailing view professional officer corps, who were “able ing several months to learn what it had that the U.S. Army performed poorly in to preserve the art not only of creating taken [the British] army and its leaders World War II and that the United States mighty armies almost at the stroke of a three years” to learn “was a good, not a only won the war by sharing astounding wand—but of leading and guiding those bad, sign for the Allied cause.” materiel abundance with its Allies. Some armies upon a scale incomparably greater Calhoun also aligns his work with go even further, and argue the richly sup- than anything that was prepared for or growing scholarship that questions the plied Army was relatively incapable even even dreamed of.” “material preponderance thesis,” arguing compared to a war-weary Wehrmacht America’s enemies were also surprised that the Soldiers who: because it was led by men like McNair by the Army’s achievement. Erwin who got more wrong than they got right Rommel is often cited in this respect. The fought their way across Western Europe when preparing the Army for war. renowned German general acknowledged to defeat Germany did so in the face of Calhoun was undeterred by these the Americans could not be compared disadvantages that make the material narratives and his colleagues’ recom- to his own veteran troops but drew little preponderance argument seem like fan- mendation, and the result is a superb consolation from his early victory over tasy [and did so against] a tenacious . biography that contributes to the grow- the Army at Kasserine Pass in North German army that remained a competent ing literature that challenges the reigning Africa. He stated the Americans “made and determined foe, fighting to protect scholarship on Army performance in up for their lack of experience by their far its homeland and benefiting from shorter World War II. It is puzzling that McNair, better and more plentiful equipment and lines of communication and increasingly a man so respected by leaders as diverse their tactically more flexible command,” compact front lines. as Generals John Pershing and George noting that “the tactical conduct of the Marshall, should fall into disrepute. Our enemy’s defense had been first class. They Calhoun reviews the literature on Allies, and even our enemies, had much had recovered very quickly after the first comparative combat effectiveness of better things to say about McNair’s work shock and had soon succeeded in dam- U.S. and German units, citing some than contemporary historians. Keenly ming up our advance.” After D-Day, recent studies arguing the Army bested aware of how isolationist sentiments kept Rommel was even more impressed and, the Wehrmacht when they met on equal the Army prostrate during the interwar like Churchill, attributed the success to terms. He believes men like General years, both friends and foes were shocked stellar leadership: “The leaders of the McNair were largely responsible for the by its sudden emergence as a global force. American economy and the American solid Army performance: Winston Churchill considered the General Staff have achieved miracles,” sudden rise of the U.S. Army “a prodigy and “the organization, training, and The U.S. army could and did stand toe to of organization.” He thought the mass equipment of the U.S. Army all bear wit- toe against the German army and win, production of divisions was an unparal- ness to great imagination and foresight.” in battle after battle and campaign after leled “spectacle”: He claimed: campaign, [which] resulted largely from JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Lamb 121 the army’s logical organization and sound up (as a percentage of GDP) every year Division fought in North Africa in late doctrine, as well as the arduous training of the war.” For this startling tidbit and 1942 with light, under-gunned tanks that helped American citizen-soldiers learn other aspects of the national economic while the British at El Alamein several this doctrine and overcome their lack of mismanagement of the war, Calhoun months earlier had enough new U.S. combat experience. relies on compelling scholarship by Jim M4 Sherman medium tanks to equip Lacey.2 Americans wanted guns and but- an entire armored division.3 Calhoun Calhoun knows he has an uphill ter and they got them, but at some cost argues McNair understood the impact battle in challenging the established view to the Army, which endured personnel of all these key shortages and limitations of Army performance but optimisti- and material shortages that affected Army well before other officers, and necessarily cally asserts that “careful research and force design and mobilization plans. The adjusted force design to emphasize ef- compelling arguments can eventually Army halted most weapons develop- ficiency as well as effectiveness.

Load more

  7

Copy Link