Issue 84, 1st Quarter 2017 JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY
Trust in Joint Operations ISSUE EIGHTY-FOUR, 1 An Interview with Robert O. Work
ST 2016 Essay QUARTER 2017 Competition Winners Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 84, 1st Quarter 2017 http://ndupress.ndu.edu
Gen Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Publisher MajGen Frederick M. Padilla, USMC, President, NDU
Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Production Editor John J. Church, D.M.A.
Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich
Book Review Editor Frank G. Hoffman, Ph.D.
Associate Editor Patricia Strait, Ph.D.
Art Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Printing Office
Advisory Committee COL Michael S. Bell, USA (Ret.), Ph.D./College of International Security Affairs; LTG Robert B. Brown, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Brig Gen Christopher A. Coffelt, USAF/Air War College; Col Keil Gentry, USMC/Marine Corps War College; BGen Thomas A. Gorry, USMC/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Col Steven J. Grass, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Brig Gen Darren E. Hartford, USAF/National War College; Col Brian E. Hastings, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; RADM P. Gardner Howe III/U.S. Naval War College; LTG William C. Mayville, Jr., USA/The Joint Staff; MG William E. Rapp, USA/U.S. Army War College; LtGen Thomas D. Waldhauser, USMC/The Joint Staff; RDML Brad Williamson/Joint Forces Staff College
Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Stephen D. Chiabotti/ School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/ National War College; Mark J. Conversino/Air War College; Thomas P. Ehrhard/Office of the Secretary of Defense; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Bryon Greenwald/Joint Forces Staff College; Col Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.)/Office of the Secretary of Defense; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Mark H. Jacobsen/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Thomas L. McNaugher/Georgetown University; Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.)/ National War College; James A. Schear/Office of the Secretary of Defense; LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)
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Cover 2 images (top to bottom): President Barack Obama has picture taken with member of U.S. Navy on flight deck of USS Carl Vinson, docked at North Island Naval Station in San Diego, California, November 2011 (The White House/Pete Souza); Two F-22 Raptors from 3rd Wing at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, conduct approach training, March 2016 (U.S. Air Force/ Justin Connaher); New Soldiers arriving for first day of Basic Combat Training with Company F, 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment, are “welcomed” by drill sergeants from U.S. Army and U.S. Army Reserve on Fort Jackson, South Carolina, August 2016 (U.S. Army Reserve/Brian Hamilton) About the Cover In this Issue Field artillery cannoneers Lance Corporal John R. Chiri, left, and Corporal John J. Stubbs ram Dialogue 155mm high-explosive round into 2 From the Chairman breech of M777A2 lightweight howitzer at Combined Arms Training Center Camp Fuji, in Forum Shizuoka, Japan, October 2, 2013, 4 Executive Summary as part of Artillery Relocation Training Program 13-3 (U.S. Marine 6 An Interview with Corps/Henry J. Antenor) Robert O. Work 12 Trust: The Sine Qua Non of Effective Joint Operations By Stanley A. Springer, John A. Schommer, and Sean S. Jones 59 The National War College: 113 The Case for a Joint Evaluation 18 Searching for Digital Marking 70 Years of By Wilson T. VornDick Hilltops: A Doctrinal Strategic Education Approach to Identifying Key By Janet Breslin-Smith Terrain in Cyberspace Recall By Scott Douglas Applegate, 65 Meaningful Metrics for 120 Leadership and Operational Christopher L. Carpenter, Professional Military Education Art in World War II: The Case and David C. West By Joan Johnson-Freese for General Lesley J. McNair 24 Expanding Zeus’s Shield: A and Kevin P. Kelley By Christopher J. Lamb New Approach for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense in Commentary Book Reviews the Asia-Pacific Region 72 The Urgent Necessity to 127 Red Team By Kevin Ayers Reverse Service AirLand Roles Reviewed by Matthew Cancian By Price T. Bingham Essay Competitions 128 Forgotten 81 Center of Gravity Analysis Reviewed by Bryon Greenwald 32 Winners of the 2016 “Down Under”: The Australian Essay Competitions Defence Force’s New Approach 130 Regional Missile Defense By Aaron P. Jackson from a Global Perspective 34 The Viability of Moral Dissent Reviewed by William A. Taylor by the Military (or, Chapter 86 Hybrid Threat COG Analysis: 6 of the U.S. Truth and Taking a Fresh Look at ISIL Reconciliation Commission: By Michael D. Reilly Joint Doctrine Conclusions Regarding 131 Mentoring: Civilian the Second Internment 93 Toward a Future National Contributions to the Joint Force of American Citizens) Strategy: A Review Essay By Kevin D. Scott By Lee M. Turcotte By Joseph J. Collins 134 Joint Concept for Access 43 Civil Order and Governance and Maneuver in the Global as Military Responsibilities Features Commons: A New Joint By David A. Mueller 99 Breaking Through with Your Operational Concept Breakthrough: How Science- By Michael E. Hutchens, William 51 The Palestinian Authority Based Communication Can D. Dries, Jason C. Perdew, Vincent Security Force: Future Prospects Accelerate Innovation and D. Bryant, and Kerry E. Moores By Jeffrey Dean McCoy Technological Advantage By Dave Nystrom and Joseph 140 Joint Doctrine Update Wojtecki, Jr., with Mat Winter JPME Today 54 The National War College: 107 The Imperative for a Health Celebrating 70 Years of Systems Approach to Global Developing Strategic Health Engagement Practitioners By Tracey Koehlmoos, Linda Kimsey, By Darren Hartford and David Bishai, and David Lane David A. Tretler M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks, AAVP7 RAM/RS amphibious assault vehicles, and M88A1 Hercules from 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit train during exercise in 5th Fleet area of responsibility, April 23, 2013 (U.S. Marine Corps/Edward Guevara)
The Pace of Change
he ability of the Joint Force to to veterans of World War II and, to be I was reminded of this several years anticipate, recognize, and adapt honest, so would the tactics. Despite in- ago when I visited a Marine lieutenant T to change—and to innovate cremental improvements in weapons and in Afghanistan. It took nearly an hour within a rapidly changing environ- the dawn of the nuclear age, a lieutenant by helicopter to travel from the battalion ment—is absolutely critical to mission from World War II or Korea would have headquarters to his outpost in Golestan, success. been comfortable with the exercises I in Farah Province. This platoon com- As I reflect back on four decades of participated in during the 1970s. My mander and his 60 Marines were 40 miles service in uniform, it is clear that the infantry company still attacked two-up from the adjacent platoons on their left pace of change has accelerated signifi- and one-back on a 300-meter frontage and right. His Marines were wearing cantly. Few things illustrate this more and defended across 1,500 meters. If state-of-the-art protective equipment than when I compare my experiences as things were not going as planned, I could and driving vehicles unrecognizable to a lieutenant to those of today’s young quickly find my subordinate leaders, look Marines or Soldiers discharged just 5 officers. As a lieutenant, I used the same them in the eye, and make the necessary years earlier. They were supported by the cold weather gear my dad had in Korea corrections. High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, 27 years earlier. The radios I used as This is not the case on today’s bat- which provided precision fires at a range a platoon commander were the same tlefield. In fact, there are very few things of 60 kilometers. The standard for me as uncovered PRC-25s from Vietnam. The that have not changed dramatically in the a lieutenant was a 105-millimeter cannon jeeps we drove would have been familiar Joint Force since I was a lieutenant. at a range of 11 kilometers. Moreover,
2 Dialogue / From the Chairman JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 the platoon at Golestan received and Korea requires the Joint Force to be ca- 21st century has changed, and if we fail to transmitted voice, data, and imagery via pable of nearly instant integration across keep pace with the speed of war, we will a satellite in real time. Compared to my regions, domains, and functions. lose the ability to compete. experience as a regimental commander This means more than just fielding The Joint Force is full of the most in Iraq just 5 years earlier, this was hard cutting-edge technologies that ensure talented men and women in the world, to believe. When we crossed the line of a competitive advantage across all do- and it is our responsibility as leaders to departure in 2003, there were only four mains—something we must continue to unleash their initiative to adapt and inno- systems in an entire Marine division that do. Keeping pace with the speed of war vate to meet tomorrow’s challenges. We provided that capability. means changing the way we approach will get no credit tomorrow for what we Similar examples can be found across challenges, build strategy, make decisions, did yesterday. JFQ the Joint Force. New technologies are and develop leaders. fielded faster than ever before. Leaders As we approach challenges, we can no General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. at lower and lower levels utilize enabling longer consider capabilities such as infor- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff capabilities once reserved for the highest mation operations, space, and cyber as an echelons of command. Tactics, tech- afterthought. These essential aspects of niques, and procedures are adapted from today’s dynamic environment cannot be one deployment cycle to the next. laminated on to the plans we have already This accelerated pace of change developed. They must be mainstreamed is inextricably linked to the speed of in all we do and built into our thinking war today. Proliferation of advanced from the ground up. technologies that transcend geographic The Joint Force must also develop boundaries and span multiple domains integrated strategies that address transre- makes the character of conflict extraordi- gional, multidomain, and multifunctional narily dynamic. Information operations, threats. By viewing challenges holistically, space and cyber capabilities, and ballistic we can identify gaps and seams early and missile technology have accelerated the develop strategies to mitigate risk before speed of war, making conflict today faster the onset of a crisis. We have adapted and more complex than at any point in the next version of the National Military history. Strategy to guide these initiatives. While the cost of failure at the outset Our decisionmaking processes and of conflict has always been high, in past planning constructs must also be flexible conflicts there were opportunities to enough to deliver options at the speed recover if something went wrong. In of war. This begins with developing a World War I and II, despite slow starts common understanding of the threat, by the Allies, we adapted throughout providing a clear understanding of the both wars and emerged victorious. The capabilities and limitations of the Joint same was true in Korea. Today, the ability Force, and then establishing a framework to recover from early missteps is greatly that enables senior leaders to make deci- reduced. The speed of war has changed, sions in a timely manner. and the nature of these changes makes Underpinning our ability to keep the global security environment even pace with the speed of war are adaptive more unpredictable, dangerous, and and creative leaders. In today’s complex unforgiving. Decision space has collapsed and dynamic environment, the Joint and so our processes must adapt to keep Force depends on leaders who anticipate pace with the speed of war. change, recognize opportunity, and adapt The challenge we face with North to meet new challenges. That is why we Korea highlights this point. There was continue to prioritize leader development a time, not long ago, when we planned by adapting doctrine, integrating exercise for a conflict that might be contained to plans, revising training guidance, and the peninsula. But today, North Korea’s retooling the learning continuum. These intercontinental ballistic missile, cyber, efforts are designed to change the face and space capabilities could quickly of military learning and develop leaders threaten the homeland and our allies in capable of thriving at the speed of war. the Asia-Pacific region. Deterring and, if Adaptation is an imperative for the necessary, defeating a threat from North Joint Force. The character of war in the
JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Dunford 3 Captain of amphibious transport dock ship USS Green Bay speaks with Australian journalists while participating in Talisman Sabre 2015 (U.S. Navy/Derek A. Harkins)
Executive Summary
n my view, our Constitution and the most cynical citizen would wish the to petition the Government for a redress the Bill of Rights are two of the Constitution did not exist. of grievances.” As a people, we are fre- I most important contributions to our One of the most important features of quently challenged by those who disagree collective human experience. The men our Constitution is the First Amendment, with our personal views, right down to who debated and wrestled, word by without which this journal might not how we see this Amendment functioning word, over the contents of these two exist. Even as we now debate the value in our society. Members of the military founding documents used great imagi- of mass media on a range of points from have some additional restrictions on their nation and creativity. Over the follow- how to deal with fake news, the slow ability to participate in these debates for ing 228 years since the Constitutional decline of local journalism and investiga- very reasonable and important reasons, Convention that constructed these tive reporting, and the role of alternative but they can and should speak their works, they have been tested and, when media in our lives, the simple words of minds when the circumstances require found weak, amended, or in the case of this Amendment allow for a wide and them to do so. the Civil War, fought over or adapted even yet-to-be-discovered set of means The American military has long by our Federal system of laws in which and ways for us to communicate with and functioned to work to solve some of our three branches of government all about each other. “Congress shall make our national crises, especially when our play important roles. While the exact no law respecting an establishment of interests are at risk. And as citizens in meaning of the Constitution remains religion, or prohibiting the free exercise uniform, their freedom to speak on issues in the eye of each citizen to debate and thereof; or abridging the freedom of of the day is not completely taken from seek change as needed, I doubt even speech, or of the press; or the right of them when they take an oath to support the people peaceably to assemble, and and defend the Constitution. In fact, in
4 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 times of great stress, the Nation relies USMC, discusses the military’s respon- way to improve how the military judges on the ability of military leaders of all sibilities during operations to achieve its Servicemembers’ performance and ranks to use their talents—both physical post-conflict civil order and governance. potential. and mental—to help defend itself. After Leveraging his personal experiences in Originally an extended book review, many years of being in the military, I Palestine, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey I asked my NDU teammate Christopher have come to appreciate what makes the Dean McCoy, USA, won the Chairman’s Lamb to develop this edition’s Recall better military leaders stand out from Strategy Article competition by dis- article, which focuses on one of the lesser the rest: the ability to think critically, cre- cussing options for the future of the known but key leaders of our successes in atively, and often originally under great Palestinian Security Force. World War II and the man for whom the pressure; the ability to speak with an In JPME Today, two articles celebrate fort where JFQ is produced was named, informed and measured voice; the ability the 70th anniversary of the National War Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair. In to “take the heat” from all directions for College (NWC). NWC Commandant Joint Doctrine, the Joint Staff’s Director what you believe works or could be done Darren Hartford and Dean of Faculty of Joint Force Development (DJ7), to meet the mission; and the ability to David Tretler give us an insider’s view Kevin Scott, discusses a relatively new learn from the past to make the future of an enduring institution here at NDU, and important process for developing better. Without these unique aspects of with a very modern focus on educating civilians in joint military organizations the American military “mind,” I believe the next generation of our most senior through mentoring. In addition, Michael the American “experiment” would have joint force, interagency, and international Hutchens, William Dries, Jason Perdew, ended long ago. military leaders. Janet Breslin-Smith takes Vincent Bryant, and Kerry Moores This issue of JFQ brings you the best us back through National War College’s introduce a new Joint Operational new ideas from and for the Joint Force. rich 70-year past. On PME itself, Joan Concept, the Joint Concept for Access My interview with Deputy Secretary Johnson-Freese and Kevin Kelley continue and Maneuver in the Global Commons. of Defense Robert Work leads off this the discussion on how to gauge the value We also have three excellent book re- issue’s Forum section. Stanley Springer, of today’s professional military education. views and, as always, our Joint Doctrine John Schommer, and Sean Jones bring In Commentary, suggesting it is Update for your consideration. us an interesting piece on trust as the real time for a reversal of the current rela- One of the enduring aspects of the glue that holds joint operations together. tionship between Army and Air Force thinking of James Madison, widely Continuing our efforts to bring new forces in combat, Price T. Bingham acknowledged as the father of the thinking on cyber issues, Scott Applegate, offers an important discussion on the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, was Christopher Carpenter, and David West future of integrated AirLand operations. his view of the power of public opinion. recommend a way to adapt existing con- Extending the discussion of center of Madison saw public opinion as best ex- cepts from the real world of warfighting gravity as an operational concept, Aaron pressed by a knowledgeable and strong to the terrain of cyberspace. Returning to P. Jackson takes us inside the thinking of public through its elected representatives another popular discussion area in these our Australian partners as he details their as the basis for effective government. In pages, Kevin Ayers provides his take on Defence Force’s new approach. As the today’s Internet-empowered opinion how to best provide theater ballistic de- battle against ISIL continues, Michael world with an often anonymous “pub- fense in the Asia-Pacific Region. Reilly has developed a different way to lic,” which can include someone who is JFQ next presents the winning es- consider the value of center of gravity not a U.S. citizen or even a person, it is says from the 10th annual Secretary of approaches to defeat these hybrid threats. increasingly hard to know what the pub- Defense and 35th annual Chairman of the And reviving an old form of commentary lic thinks. In the military, there are few Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions, JFQ used in the past, Joseph Collins avenues for expression of thought that held here at National Defense University provides us with an extended review of can reach its decisionmakers. JFQ will (NDU). In May, 23 judges from 14 three important current books on general continue to offer a way for strong and participating joint professional military officer leadership. knowledgeable people to express their education (JPME) institutions met In Features, Dave Nystrom and very best ideas. I am looking forward to to determine the best JPME student Joseph Wojtecki, Jr., with Mat Winter, hearing from you. JFQ entries among the three categories. discuss the importance of how to com- The Secretary of Defense National municate to gain trust in any effort to William T. Eliason Security Essay winner, Major Lee M. accelerate innovation. Regarding global Editor in Chief Turcotte, USAF, reviews the history of health engagement, Tracey Koehlmoos, the internment of Japanese-Americans Linda Kimsey, David Bishai, and David during World War II. Winning the Lane stress the importance of a systems Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approach to achieving healthcare success Strategic Research Paper competition, overseas. Wilson VornDick suggests Lieutenant Colonel David A. Mueller, using joint performance evaluations as a
JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Eliason 5 is strategic deterrence, which has both a nuclear and a cyber aspect. For cyber, in this regard, cyber capabilities that can be used against another nation’s cyber structure that can cause major damage to that nation’s social fabric or social functioning of the state. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons are probably in that same category. Next, conventional deter- rence is focused on large state powers as well as medium-sized revisionist powers. Conventional deterrence is designed to keep us from having a state-on-state war. The third pillar is managing the strategic environment or the strategic competi- tion. The link between managing the strategic competition and conventional deterrence is crisis management; and the link between conventional deterrence and strategic deterrence is escalation control. So, the Third Offset Strategy is really focused on conventional deterrence. It is future-focused on large state powers such as China and Russia. It is designed primarily to make sure that we never have a nuclear confrontation with those two countries and that we would prevail in any conventional confrontation regardless of the opponent. We are trying to offset three things that all of us can see in the operational environment. First, because most of our combat power rests in the United States, our adversaries would have an advan- tage in time and space and initial force correlations. As a result, this is about counter-power projection against states that would push out from their own An Interview with territory, especially against our own allies, partners, and friends. So, how do we get there and how do we arrest power projec- Robert O. Work tion when we are not in the theater ready to fight? That is a tough problem. Second, there are two pacing com- petitors—not adversaries—and they have JFQ: You have become well known for DepSecDef Work: Essentially what we very nearly achieved what we would your efforts to develop a Third Offset for are trying to do is reestablish our overall consider to be parity in the ability to the United States military. Is the overall deterrent position. The Nation aspires to put together theater-level battle net- intent behind this effort to reestablish achieve comprehensive strategic stability works with a sensor, a C4I [command, conventional deterrence against major in which the likelihood of a major war control, communications, computers, competitors or is it something more? between large state powers or a destabili- intelligence] grid, an effects grid, and a zation of the global system is avoided. To logistics and support grid, and be able do so our strategy must be comprehen- to fire guided munitions as far as we Robert O. Work was confirmed as the 32nd sive from top to bottom, and, in my view, can. Third, our pacing competitors have Deputy Secretary of Defense on April 30, 2014. such a strategy has three big pillars. One spent a lot of money on taking apart our
6 Forum / An Interview with Robert O. Work JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 battle networks because they know how a certain way and to make judgments, or at them that way. So, it is not enough powerful they are. They have invested a highlight things that are happening in the to have a combatant commander build lot of money in cyber, electronic warfare, environment. The machines are talking a plan for a particular conflict or crisis, and counter-space capabilities. When you to each other and the human literally just you actually have to attend all the other add those three together, you have anti- watches the information flow, but then supporting operations that are conducted access/area-denial [A2/AD] capabilities, can say, “I need to intervene now to make by the other combatant commanders. making it hard to get into the theater a decision,” and it really happens fast. It’s Currently, we are working on this idea and, once you are in theater, making it really something. So, it is not only learning of revising the war plans to address the hard to maintain freedom of action. That machines and big data analytics, it is con- global problem sets we see, labeled the is what we are trying to offset. It focuses necting the machines with common data “4+1,” which refers to Russia, China, on our pacing competitors, China and standards. That is critical. It allows seam- Iran, North Korea, and violent extrem- Russia, with the understanding that if we less machine-to-machine communication ism. The Secretary and the Chairman are able to solve that problem, we could so that the human operator can make rel- agreed on the need to start revising the solve any regional state problem. evant decisions and more timely decisions, war plans to make them consistent with You can have a battle network focused and can achieve effects on the battlefield our national security strategy. They also on the fight against global extremists faster than expected. It is not just about wanted these plans to consider the areas and you can have battle network focused making faster decisions; it is about achiev- that the DSB said are likely to emerge as against a regional power, and you can ing effects on the battlefield faster. the most significant technologies over have a battle network focused against a the next 20 to 30 years. For example, great state power. This ability to have combining artificial intelligence and battle networks is transferable across the JFQ: Can you describe how the Defense machines that can help humans is a huge range of military operations. This drive Reform Agenda relates to the so-called step forward, and right now we have the to enhance and expand battle networks Third Offset and what you intend it to technological advantage. It is not the is about trying to offset the fact that our accomplish? 30 to 40-year advantage we had when big state adversaries can put together we developed the Joint Surveillance networks like this already. The Defense DepSecDef Work: What Secretary of Target Attack Radar System, airborne Science Board [DSB] said the way you Defense Ashton Carter talks about now early warning and control, stealth, offset those competitor networks is to as the “Defense Reform Agenda” has precision-guided missiles, and all the inject artificial intelligence [AI] and four main items. The first agenda item, if maneuvering forces to take advantage autonomous systems into your battle you will, was to take a look at the future of them, but it is an advantage that we network. The result should be a step of the force, in which he said, “I’ve got hold into the near future. We need to function increase in effectiveness, which the greatest fighting organization that be thinking about how to capitalize on in turn should increase your effectiveness the world has ever seen, and I want to that advantage to move the joint force relative to your potential competitors. As make sure my successors do too.” So, the forward over the course of the next 10 some have said publically, these competi- Force of the Future was designed on the to 15 years. So, these two pieces of the tor networks are composed of technology personnel aspects of the force. The sec- four pillars, emerging technology and that everyone has access to. So, we need ond thing he wanted to do was talk about their role in our war plans, contribute to build better networks. upgrading or revamping our war plans to significantly to this idea of a potential This isn’t going to be a one-time pro- reflect the new defense strategy. The third offsetting strategy, or Third Offset, for cess of innovation. We won’t just inject item was to take a look at technology what we have called for years A2/AD, autonomy and all of a sudden it’s going to and study how it was having an effect which may be better described as efforts be great for 40 years. This is going to be on the character, but not the nature, of to counter U.S. power projection capa- a tough competition—we’re in a world of war. And, finally, we needed to take a bilities. That is the path that we are trying fast followers. We are a good, fast leader, look inside the business operation of the to move DOD down, to think about the but we should be prepared for operational department and identify ways to become strategic imperatives that are imbedded in and technological surprise. The force of more efficient. these “agenda items” and then develop the future is designed to get a force that is On the issue of reexamining war plans the organizational changes that might agile enough to adapt to surprise, because in the context of the notion that all of be required both inside our operational in the next 20 to 30 years, that may be them are global, you have probably heard plans for war and inside the Services— endemic. We just don’t know, and that is Chairman Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., talk and DOD itself—as we take advantage another aspect of the offset. about how no war plan is just a theater of those developments. The framework The introduction of AI and autono- war plan, as each plan has effects and for the development of our war plans is mous systems is key to this concept. It’s connections to the other combatant com- focused on ensuring they consider and unbelievable when the machines have mands. Therefore, all our plans contain account for transregional, multidomain, been taught to perceive the environment global problem sets, and we need to look and multifunctional aspects.
JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Work 7 JFQ: What kind of management archi- as they develop new concepts. That over- Government labs. It includes Big Data, tecture was set up to bring all the stake arching process is the basic governance. advanced computing, miniaturization, holders involved in this effort and guide it Below that level there are several other robotics, AI, and nanotechnology, among to success? subordinate groups that do very detailed others, and all these things are being maintenance of things like demonstrations driven by the commercial sector. So, DepSecDef Work: We established several or wargames or warfighting lab work; but, an important aspect of the Force of the mechanisms. The principal one, called the fundamentally, it is the three of us who Future is providing new avenues for ideas Advanced Capabilities and Deterrence provide the oversight for the process. from the outside to permeate into DOD Panel (ACDP), is actually a partnership and the defense enterprise. Equally im- between the Deputy Secretary, the Vice portant is the need for ideas from DOD Chairman, and the Deputy Director JFQ: What is the relationship between the to permeate to people in the commercial of National Intelligence. The three of DOD Force of the Future and the Third sector so they understand the problems us chair an oversight panel that tries to Offset? that we are interested in and might be manage all the moving parts that exist able to find a solution that industry within this journey in how to implement DepSecDef Work: One very interesting would not otherwise have pursued. In the Third Offset Stragey. Deterrence is intersection has to do with the ability addition to recruiting and retaining embedded right in the title, which em- to recruit and retain the people who the right personnel—and that’s the key phasizes that this is about deterrence. We are going to be required to fight in this focus—we want to be well positioned to chose the word capabilities rather than new environment. If you believe as a take advantage of one of the key aspects technology because this is much more proposition that there is going to be a of the Third Offset, which is human-ma- than just technology, it is the operational competition for talent between commer- chine teaming. We need to answer some and organizational constructs and also cial industry and the military, then we key questions. What type of commander the capabilities that we can bring to have to be able to compete for the same do you need to best lead in a world of improve conventional deterrence and talent. As we move into some of these advanced human-machine teaming? Are warfighting effectiveness of the joint areas that are actually analogues to what you going to have younger command- force. The key thing about the Third is happening in the commercial sector, ers? Are you going to look for seasoned Offset Strategy that I hope all of your DOD is going to have to be able to com- commanders who have worked through a readers will understand is that this is not pete for the very talented young men and wide variety of human-machine teaming about technology per say; it is about women who are educated in the kinds of relationships? How you pick for com- technology enabled operational and technology we are looking to acquire and mand, how you train your forces, all of organizational constructs that give us an understand how to organize around that this is part of the Force of the Future. advantage at the operational level of war, type of technology. We are looking to which is the surest way to underwrite take advantage of the intersection of the conventional deterrence. Force of the Future and the Third Offset. JFQ: Where do DARPA [Defense What we sought with ACDP was For the future force, the key is continuing Advanced Research Projects Agency], a partnership between a number of in- to bring in the right talent we need and Secretary Carter’s Special Capabilities terested agencies whose work overlaps to retain that talent over time. This is Office [SCO], and the Defense Innovation in the areas of policy, operations, and not an indictment of current processes Unit Experimental [DIUx] fit within this intelligence, and would assist in defining and certainly not an indictment of the overall initiative and is this how DOD gets and managing the different interests and willingness of young men and women to the commercial industry to actually work capabilities that might be potentially join and stay in the Service today; but it on things that might be useful for DOD’s useful for a Third Offset Strategy. The is a realization that, over time, we have to yet-to-emerge requirements? three of us meet no less than quarterly have the tools to compete for that talent, and review the progress of groups like the in the open marketplace, as we have inter- DepSecDef Work: To advance the Rapid Capability Offices in the Services, nally since the late 1970s. journey toward bringing in innovative the DOD Rapid Capability Office, and Another important aspect of the software and hardware solutions to the the wargaming initiatives that are now Force of the Future is what the Secretary problem sets we are trying to solve, we embedded throughout the force. The refers to as improving the “permeability” need to make room for the small com- Office of Cost Assessment and Program of the Department, and in this competi- panies that do the sort of niche things Evaluation [CAPE] presents their war- tive environment, the thing that is really that DOD will find useful. In general, the game outcomes as well as the way forward driving the technologies that are going companies are able to scale their products for the next quarter as we look at the war- to have applicability to a Third Offset within the boundaries of their own capac- fighting lab initiatives. It is that panel of Strategy—if we decide to pursue one—is ity, but they generally aren’t comfortable three that approves the warfighting lab in- the commercial sector. The commer- working with the Defense Department. novative grants that go out to the Services cial sector is not being driven by U.S. Having an intermediary such as DIUx,
8 Forum / An Interview with Robert O. Work JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Maryland transits St. Marys River, August 2012 (U.S. Navy/James Kimber) which can go out and actually examine learn the processes they use and bring missions across the depth and breadth of what is available, allows them to bring to some of those processes back to DOD. the battlefield, and to achieve effects such those software and hardware developers To answer your question more di- as maneuver and kinetic operations and unique military problems that they can rectly regarding how do DARPA, SCO, electronic warfare operations very quickly. begin to solve, and then offers them an and DIUx fit together, they are on a The coin of the realm during the Cold avenue to scalability. That avenue to scal- continuum where DARPA is experiment- War was armored brigades, mechanized ability might be a partnership with a larger ing with the most advanced technologies infantry brigades, multiple launch rocket company, which would function as a nor- that we can get our hands on, and devel- system battalions, self-propelled artillery mal defense contract. DIUx is supposed oping them at the same time. DARPA battalions, tactical fighter squadrons, to be a place where DOD could identify is looking out on the 20-year horizon among others. Now, the coin of the the pieces of potential future capabilities and beyond for whatever technologies realm is going to be learning machines that are of interest. Moreover, DIUx can might empower military operations in the and human-machine collaborations, ask industry if there are any commercial future. SCO is looking at taking current which allows machines to allow humans products that it might bring to the table capabilities and mixing them in different to make better decisions; assisted human for consideration. DIUx is also a means ways and doing demonstrations of capa- operations, which means bringing the by which a commercial entity could come bilities that could emerge in the next 5 power of the network to the individual; to DOD and present a new technology to 10 years, but which are not here today human-machine combat teaming; and the it thinks might be useful, but needs because of the way we choose to organize autonomous network. Network-enabled, the Department to help them think it and mix weapons systems. DIUx, as I’ve autonomous, hypersonic, and directed through. The whole idea of DIUx, which already discussed, is looking for the best energy weapons, and electromagnetic now has three points of presence, one on minds in the commercial sector who are rail guns, inserted into the grid, are the the West Coast, one on the East Coast, willing to work on military problems, and five things we are really focused on. and one in Texas, is designed to allow that we have already given them some very Furthermore, any ally can create an ap- connection to the commercial industry. compelling military problems to work on. plication or an algorithm that improves It might be that a company can do the whole battle network, so even a small some new process or technology on its country that has a vibrant technological own, but until we can understand what JFQ: How are the allies going to be in- sector can improve the entire network. that might mean to DOD, DIUx is a terfaced with this effort and what would So, the Third Offset, in our view, is useful intermediary. We can bring the you expect from them as partners to this extremely coalition friendly. It allows knowledge those commercial companies enterprise? nations to avoid building up large forces, have into DOD, and that could mean which they can’t afford, but to focus on bringing them in as advisors, as civilian DepSecDef Work: In the Second Offset, applications in the network that would employees, or it could mean sending where we created theater-wide battle allow the entire coalition to operate military members to those companies to networks designed to employ guided better. For example, Sweden, which is an
JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Work 9 Soldier adjusts M7 Spider Networked Munitions during Network Integration Evaluation 16.2 at training village Kamal Jabul, Fort Bliss, Texas, May 2016 (U.S. Army/Chenee’ Brooks) enhanced opportunity NATO [North Warfighting Lab Incentive Fund, which true. There was a lot of wargaming activ- Atlantic Treaty Organization] partner, is designed to assist the concept and ity going on, but the leaders had no idea. does a lot of cutting-edge, state-of-the-art doctrine developers of each of the four Importantly, a new classified reposi- work concerning unmanned underwater Services to conceive new operational tory was created where wargame results vehicles. They were anxious to say that concepts. For example, if the U.S. Marine can be shared across DOD, and which this is how they might contribute, so you Corps said they’d like to do a Hunter so far contains the results of more than could easily see an underwater network Warrior II, based on the Hunter Warrior 250 games. The repository has allowed in the Baltic sea region that, for example, series of exercises they ran in the late CAPE to brief us on a periodic basis in the would keep an eye on things. So, no mat- 1990s, to inject more AI and autonomy, Deputy Secretary’s Management Action ter how large or small the country, they and said they could fund it for $1 million Group and say, “Here are the broad will be able to operate in this Third Offset but to run it right they really needed $2.1 themes that are coming across in terms battle network, and we really want to million, the Warfighting Lab Incentive of the transregional, multidomain, multi- make this as coalition-friendly as possible. Fund is designed to allow the concept de- functional aspect of warfare.” All of these velopers and doctrine developers to look things together—the wargame repository, at concepts. Then, hopefully, you can the Warfighting Lab Incentive Fund, the JFQ: How is the wargaming element of run the concepts through scenario-based wargaming incentive fund—are designed this effort being implemented and will wargames. If it’s something we want to to help us think of the operational and or- experimentation become an extension to the explore further, the next step would be ganizational constructs. Furthermore, the analytical components to explore new ideas to test it in an exercise. Then we could repository not only tells us what happened and how systems perform? So, is it more go from doctrine and concept, to war- in past wargames, it tells us which warga- than just ideas that we are looking for? gaming, to exercise, to refinement, to mes are coming up, and has now become additional refinement, and so on, and you a function that all 4 of the Services and all DepSecDef Work: This is about new would keep it in this virtual circle, much the combatant commanders are looking operational and organizational concepts like the scenarios the U.S. Navy and Navy at, saying, “This is something I want to that provide much better battlefield War College put together in the interwar participate in.” So, it not only connects performance and, therefore, underwrite period. I came into this thinking warga- the leadership, it also starts to help syn- conventional deterrence. You have the ming had kind of atrophied, but it wasn’t chronize wargaming across DOD.
10 Forum / An Interview with Robert O. Work JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 JFQ: Can you discuss your views on how Our conception of autonomy is to em- major changes in the DOD program. We autonomous and robotic systems are likely power the human, and that’s why we are have a $3 trillion DOD program in the to influence the outcomes of these innova- focused on human-machine collaboration Future Years Defense Program, which is tions in years ahead? and human-machine combat teaming. about $600 billion a year when you add The human is central in our conception in the Overseas Contingency Funds. Over DepSecDef Work: I think it is a bit of a of the use of AI and autonomy. An au- the course of fiscal year 2016 through fis- double-edged sword. On the upside, we thoritarian regime might approach this cal year 2018, we have probably injected have built the theory that AI and auton- in an entirely different way, in which they about $25 billion of new conceptual omous systems can empower humans to might view humans with decision au- demonstrations and capability develop- be much more effective and efficient in thority as a potential impediment to the ment, so it is a relatively small part of the cultivating all the tactical and operational achievement of the master plan and field program. But this is like a snowball. Once details they have to deal with in order to capabilities that take people out of the you start the demonstrations and these make decisions. Whether that means you decision loop in favor of algorithms that new capabilities developments moving, partner a human with a piece of software the regime leadership prefers. things start to propagate very quickly that makes them more effective or you In fact, we know that the Soviet across these portfolios. What I would partner a unit with machines that are Union thought exactly this way expect to see over the course of the next embedded in the unit that makes them because their theater-wide battle net- 3 to 4 years are major kinds of muscle more effective in combat is still debatable, works—known as reconnaissance-strike moves in directions that are very useful but there is growing evidence that both complexes—were fashioned as a totally and often unexpected. are actually true. One of the big debates automated system. They would press the In just a short period, these demon- we have is if you build robotic systems that “I believe button” and let the machine strations have shown us that capabilities have robotic autonomy built in, how will make the decisions. That’s not what we we had thought were useful in a par- you keep humans in the decision cycle to are seeking. In movie analogy terms, in- ticular way are actually more useful in use lethal force? I think that is a debate we stead of Skynet and Terminator, we think another—an unexpected but welcome have to have. It is a command and control in terms of Iron Man, where a human advancement. For example, we started function that we have to understand. It is empowered by AI and a learning machine off thinking electromagnetic rail guns a process that we have to put some doctri- is making better decisions, resulting in a were the right way to go for a certain new nal limits around so the idea of advanced more effective fighting force. projectile, but we learned it could be fired robotics being autonomous and capable We know, for example, that we have from an existing conventional gun. We of lethal force all at the same time, without to rely on machines in cyber warfare, now have a whole new set of options by building in some checks and balances electronic warfare, and probably missile combining new and existing capabilities where humans make decisions, is a process defense. These are primarily defensive that we can explore. Such discoveries that we are going to have to understand applications because the attacks are com- can lead us to ask questions such as what better. Many would argue that it’s a step ing so fast human reaction would be too would a capability as I just described do we shouldn’t take. I have a different slow to prevent unacceptable damage. In for a NATO operational fires network take. Building in autonomy in advanced some situations, there is no way a human that also was leveraging artificial intelli- robotics means that you could possibly can keep up with everything. Currently, gence? I think it would revolutionize it. It make a partnership between a human and in primarily defensive situations, we could allow small empowered teams, the a machine that allows the human to be might consider delegating the authority hunter warrior teams, along the forward in control, and that allows the machine to machines to make those decisions. But line of troops to be able to call in fires to use lethal force at the behest of the regarding offensive lethal action, in which from the entire NATO battle network. human. I think that is a path we have to we are taking action on the battlefield So, over the course of the next 3 to 4 explore and understand, and we are not in an offensive, proactive way, our con- years, you will start to see us explore such there yet. This is a 20- or 30-year journey. ception is that human beings will always ideas further. But we have chosen an Most of the advanced robotics people be making those decisions. But 30 years approach that isn’t just about technol- will tell you that what we are doing with from now, they’ll need to check in and ogy. In our view the work on the Third advanced robotics today is in the infancy see how this goes. Offset is about operational and organi- of the technology, and we are 20 or 30 zational constructs to achieve innovative years from completely understanding battlefield effects that will improve our how robots could change the way we JFQ: What are the likely impacts on the conventional war fighting, which in turn live, work, and fight. Will we ever build a DOD research and development as a result strengthens our conventional deterrence, robot that is completely autonomous that to this effort? allowing us to meet the challenges we see will exert lethal force? I think the answer in the future. JFQ to that is no. Such a concept is part of DepSecDef Work: As I said, we are just the wargaming process we are exploring. starting this journey, so you haven’t seen
JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Work 11 Air Force pararescuemen and West Coast–based Navy SEALs leap from ramp of Air Force C-17 transport aircraft during free-fall parachute training over Marine Corps Base Hawaii, January 2011 (U.S. Marine Corps/Reece E. Lodder)
Trust The Sine Qua Non of Effective Joint Operations
By Stanley A. Springer, John A. Schommer, and Sean S. Jones
erriam-Webster defines trust tions entailing risk.”2 These definitions Mutual trust is a tenet of command as the “assured reliance on the offer a starting point to examine trust and control that strengthens unity of M character, ability, strength, within the context of joint operations. command and “expands the Joint Force or truth of someone or something.” Trust is referenced broadly both Commander’s options and enhances Within academic literature, trust is in joint doctrine and in key position flexibility, agility, and the freedom to take often defined as “the willingness to be papers. Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the initiative when conditions warrant.”3 vulnerable.”1 One functional definition the Armed Forces of the United States, Recognized as a key component of the that captures the uncertainty of mili- describes trust in various ways: as a key profession of arms, joint doctrine states tary operations calls it “a state involving component of mission command and that “trust and confidence are central to confident predictions about another’s an output of military engagement with unity of effort.”4 motives with respect to oneself in situa- other armed forces and civilian agencies. In describing his vision for the Joint Force–Global Integrated Operations (GIO), former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey Colonel Stanley A. Springer, USAF, was recently Commander, 309th Aircraft Maintenance Group, Ogden pointed out that GIO would “exploit the Air Logistics Complex, Hill Air Force Base, Utah. Rear Admiral John A. Schommer, USNR, is Deputy Commander of the U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command. Lieutenant Colonel Sean S. Jones, USAF, is human element in joint operations, em- Chief of the Personnel Readiness Division on the Joint Staff, J1 Manpower and Personnel Directorate. phasizing trust . . . among other traits.”5
12 Forum / The Sine Qua Non of Effective Joint Operations JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Similarly, in a white paper, Dempsey ac- Trust in Joint unified effort in an attempt to subdue knowledged trust as a key attribute in the Operational History many areas in South Vietnam that had joint conception of mission command.6 Incidents of successful joint and unified once resisted pacification. Though the Indeed, he noted that “building trust action underpinned by interpersonal program was canceled after just 3 years with subordinates and partners may be and even interorganizational trust as the war drew to a close, its unified the most important action a commander pepper U.S. military history. George military-civilian framework enabled will perform. Given our projected need Washington’s victory at the Battle of novel utilization of several instruments for superior speed in competitive cycles of Yorktown had much to do with the of power toward a common objective decision-making, it is clear that in Joint personal trust between Washington at the tactical and operational levels of Force 2020, operations will move at the and the French commanders General war. Despite these mixed results, with- speed of trust.”7 Rochambeau and Admiral Francois-Jo- out a doctrinal or legal framework to Trust, it would seem, is an essential seph de Grasse. The cornerstone of the foster mutual confidence, the success element in joint operations. Put another Union’s pivotal Vicksburg campaign of any joint and unified operations de- way, trust can be considered the sine qua (1862–1863) in the Civil War was pended on leaders slowly building trust non of successful joint operations, and the warm relationship between the between themselves and their organiza- the growing complexity of future oper- commander of the Mississippi River tions—often as bullets were flying and ations will further increase the central Squadron, Rear Admiral David Dixon opportunities escaping. significance of the concept. Its joint value Porter, and Generals Ulysses S. Grant On the other end of the spectrum, appears in two forms: interpersonal and and William T. Sherman. Indeed, Grant there are an equal number of failures in interorganizational. General Dempsey’s assumed command of the main Vicks- U.S. history that can be attributed to exultation of the value of trust under the burg operation in lieu of Major General systemic trust issues between the Services concept of mission command alludes to John McClernand due, in part, to the as well as between the Services and in- these two forms, especially as he discusses Navy’s lack of trust in McClernand.10 In teragency. During the Civil War, “when “building trust with one’s subordinates World War II, the performance of the officers of the army and navy managed and partners.”8 From a commander’s Pacific island-hopping campaigns led by to work together effectively, the Union perspective, trust is needed on a personal Chester Nimitz and Douglas MacAr- generally found success; when they did level with one’s subordinates and supe- thur—who were initially skeptical of the not, the result was disappointment and riors and—on another, arguably more strategy, but generally followed its basic failure.”13 An example of a good working complex level—with one’s partners, be tenets—improved steadily as the leaders, relationship is between Rear Admiral they people or organizations. In the organizations, and men of all Services Andrew Foote and General Grant during study “Trust in Small Military Teams,” learned the business of war and learned the Union attack on Fort Henry, at these two concepts are referenced as per- to trust each other. Furthermore, in which Grant’s forces attacked by land son-based trust and category-based trust. the European theater, Army Air Corps while Foote’s flotilla attacked from the Person-based trust is the “idea of trust General Elwood R. “Pete” Quesada Tennessee River.14 The 19th-century mil- conferred directly on a known person, as forged relationships of trust and confi- itary-interagency relationship struggled a result of direct interaction with this per- dence with his generals, especially Omar as well. To wit, as often as the Bureau of son,” whereas category-based trust arises Bradley, which significantly improved Indian Affairs and the Army coordinated when one person perceives that another tactical air–ground relations and laid the actions to implement the Indian policy belongs to an organization or group of groundwork for a successful Normandy of the day, they seemingly managed people that he or she has come to trust.9 campaign.11 to find other ways to cause each other In the crucible of conflict, trust within Often, the relationships of mutual problems. Poor coordination resulting the military Services and between the trust and confidence that led to mil- from a general lack of mutual trust and Services and interagency has served as the itary-interagency cooperation were confidence between the Army and Navy requisite condition for unity of effort and forged ad hoc. During the Second in the Spanish-American War’s Caribbean action in successful joint operations. That Seminole Indian War, the U.S. Treasury operations helped lead to the creation said, we cannot take for granted the bonds Department’s Revenue Cutter Service of the Joint Army and Navy Board in of trust forged during the wars in Iraq and (originally “Revenue-Marine”) assisted 1903, but it had no legal authority, and Afghanistan, especially as new challenges the Army and Navy in the Seminole joint operations remained dependent on continue to emerge. The effectiveness of Indian campaigns and were involved in commander-level, person-based trust at 21st-century joint operations will depend the other wars of the 19th century.12 Later all levels of war. Finally, in spite of the on maintaining and improving the trust in the 20th century, the U.S.–Republic relative success of joint and even unified within the joint force while simultaneously of Vietnam Civil Operations and operations in World War II, the trust expanding joint-interagency operational Revolutionary Development Support earned in global combat did not carry bonds to enable unity of effort and action program combined military and civilian over as a systemic feature of postwar across the spectrum of possible conflicts. elements from both countries in a single, operations.
JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Springer, Schommer, and Jones 13 The Services’ perpetual rivalry over and further enhanced joint operations solutions eluded senior leaders. Indeed, budget and missions after 1945 and into under a single unified combatant com- senior leaders and commanders are ex- the 1980s did nothing to improve inter- mander. Eventually, as the legislation pending enormous resources to counter organizational trust. Consequently, the took hold, interorganizational trust the deleterious effects of these trust efficacy of joint warfighting and unified between the Services (and, consequently, issues on joint effectiveness and unified action varied wildly according to the joint operations) steadily improved. In action. In his “Initial Thoughts” to the circumstances of the operation. In 1947, turn, as joint operations became more Army, former Chief of Staff General the newly formed Department of Defense systemic within DOD, mutual trust and Raymond Odierno touted trust as “the (DOD) and National Security Council confidence between the military and bedrock of our honored Profession.”17 (NSC) established the legal framework interagency seemingly improved as clear The 2015 National Military Strategy also that promised unified action in the sec- chains of command facilitated interagency promoted a “campaign of trust” that ond half of the 20th century. That said, cooperation from the theater to tactical emphasizes mutual respect and addresses significant headwinds slowed efforts to level. From the late 1980s onward, mul- serious issues, including sexual assault.18 improve the government’s unified perfor- tiple operations to include Just Cause, Consequently, mandatory training, work- mance in both peace and war. The NSC, Desert Storm, Allied Force, numerous shops, new initiatives, and inspections while increasingly useful for coordinating humanitarian relief missions, as well as to mitigate the various forms of internal high-level cross-agency policy decisions, the early days of Enduring Freedom and trust issues have seemingly become the evolved very slowly, did not incorporate Iraqi Freedom, incrementally displayed focus of warfighting units, instead of the entire interagency, and did not neces- the increasing ability of the joint force to warfighting. Nevertheless, it is not clear sarily drive mutual trust and confidence conduct unified action. that our efforts are working or that the between the military and interagency at joint force even understands how to fix the theater level and below. Trust in Today’s Joint Force their challenges. Indeed, one study noted Of course, the United States did not At the dawn of the 21st century, as several threats to trust within the Army abandon joint and unified warfighting as military operations in Afghanistan and and observed that leaders lacked an un- a fundamental precept. There were, in Iraq wore on, so did the pressure on derstanding of the topic, which impeded fact, isolated areas of improved jointness, the bonds of trust. Both personal-based their ability to discuss it effectively with including various battles in Korea and and interorganizational trust issues have their troops.19 Vietnam as well as the Air Force–Army’s become increasingly apparent. Whether Looking ahead, as the military faces AirLand Battle concept in the 1970s and due to a force strained from over a potentially $1 trillion in defense cuts over 1980s. Nevertheless, the steps needed decade of combat, changing cultural 10 years, DOD will be driven to make to improve unified action through norms, or other factors, the degradation tough decisions on force structure size policy and processes that institution- of trust and our overall performance and resource prioritization. People—the alize personal and interorganizational appear to go hand in hand. most important and most expensive category-based trust were not taken. Trust issues seemingly pervade today’s assets—are often the first casualties in a Operations Eagle Claw (the failed rescue joint force. Newspaper stories abound fiscally austere environment. As resources of U.S. hostages in Iran in 1980) and about toxic leaders, and retention surveys become increasingly constrained and the Urgent Fury (the invasion of Grenada cite “widespread distrust of senior leader- competition for those resources increases, in 1983) amply illustrated these issues. ship” or integrity issues among the officer personnel support programs will likely The Goldwater-Nichols Department of corps.15 In parallel, the scourge of sexual be viewed as low-hanging fruit. As the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 assault has frayed internal bonds of trust Services examine tradeoffs between sought to mitigate these joint challenges within units in all Services while straining modern weapons and personnel support, and almost incidentally improved mili- relations between Congress and military the risk to the morale of the force will tary-interagency cooperation, which had leadership. As reports of military sexual increase. This unpredictable environment been slowly growing under the aegis of assault have risen over the years, political may lead Servicemembers to question the NSC system. leaders have argued to take these cases whether they can trust the organiza- Goldwater-Nichols heralded a new out of the hands of military commanders tion to act in their best interests.20 If era of imbedded structural trust within because alleged victims “do not trust the Servicemembers lose trust and confidence DOD and, to a lesser degree, between chain of command.”16 This may indicate in the military institution, their commit- the military and interagency. Under that some Members of Congress have lost ment to the organization will fade along this landmark legislation, planning and trust in the military justice system’s ability with joint readiness. operational control of the joint force to address this serious crime. Similarly, inter-Service rivalries and a shifted to the combatant commander Of course, DOD has worked hard subsequent decrease in interorganizational from the Service chiefs. The law also to combat all of these issues, but often trust are starting to emerge. As the coun- restructured the Joint Staff to facilitate with marginal success as the number try resets its military after 15 years of war interoperability of the Services’ forces of problems seemingly multiplied and in Afghanistan and Iraq, the reduction
14 Forum / The Sine Qua Non of Effective Joint Operations JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Maritime special operations forces prepare for mission during training exercise aboard Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George Washington, September 2014 (U.S. Navy/Everett Allen)
in manpower and budget constraints in 2010—as primarily an Air Force and 21st century, we offer the following has triggered inter-Service rivalries that Navy strategy to integrate capabilities and recommendations. were always present but kept somewhat ensure freedom of action against a poten- First, each of the Services must con- in check by a common enemy and large tial adversary, such as China in the Pacific. tinue to develop leaders who are skilled contingency operations funding from The Army’s subsequent realization that in building trust, both interpersonal and Congress. For example, the Army and Air the new doctrine would mean less budget interorganizational, and measure their Force’s perpetual battle over close air sup- money to reset itself following the war performance in doing so. Of course, port simmered throughout the latter half chilled relations between the Army Chief commanders must inculcate internal, per- of the war on terror, spilling into the open of Staff and his fellow Service chiefs.22 son-based trust within their organizations briefly in 2007 in the fight over unmanned Put another way, at the same time the to achieve operational excellence on and aerial vehicle support. In today’s fiscally Services should be trying to do more off the battlefield. However, these leaders constrained environment the problem has with less to fight the next enemy, they are should also possess an understanding of reemerged, with one author noting that expending time and resources chipping the role that trust plays in joint opera- Army aviation officers do not believe that away at the interorganizational trust that tions and ensure that their personnel and the Air Force, when employing Predator should underpin the future joint force. organizations execute in a manner that and Reaper aircraft, is responsive to the engenders trust with the rest of the joint needs of the ground forces.21 Recommendations force. In reality, this recommendation is The inter-Service rivalries and lack The history of joint warfare in the not new—it is a core concept of mission of trust also extend to the strategic level United States clearly demonstrates command and identified as a Desired as detailed by Mark Perry in a Politico the key role trust plays in ensuring Leader Attribute.23 Our suggestion, article. In particular, Perry described the unity of action in joint operations. To however, that the Services document a release of the AirSea Battle doctrine— reinvigorate this trust as the character commander’s ability to build trust inter- which became part of Pentagon policy of war and the Services change in the nally and externally, is new.
JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Springer, Schommer, and Jones 15 Commanding officer of USS Ronald Reagan talks to Reagan Sailors at Stomp Out Sexual Assault 5k run on Naval Air Station North Island, April 2013 (U.S. Navy/Omar Powell)
Second, the topic of trust should be its “campaign of trust” to address poten- and their allies to live, trust, and fight stressed in the curriculum at every level tial challenges within the joint force. By together—before they went to war. of professional military education. While emphasizing mutual respect and trust, Fourth, senior leadership should con- commanders set the tone for their orga- we will have a more ready and resilient tinue to promote policies and programs nizations, educating Soldiers, Marines, joint force. Ideally, this campaign should that sustain our all-volunteer force, the Sailors, and Airmen on the value of trust identify the key components or guiding singular advantage for our nation. During in successful joint actions should inject principles for policies and programs that and following the Vietnam war, public the concept into the sinew of U.S. mil- foster interpersonal and interorganiza- trust in the U.S. military was at an all- itary might. To wit, redoubling efforts tional trust with the joint force. This time low. A significant number of draftees to integrate and expand interagency per- would be a comprehensive campaign did not want to serve and faced hostile sonnel in military education and training that promotes trust across the Armed environments when they returned home. programs emphasizing the importance Forces, interagency, and other partners The all-volunteer force changed that. of trust will lay the groundwork for to enhance interoperability and interde- By building trust and keeping faith with unified actions of the future. Building a pendence. Additionally, the campaign our current Servicemembers and their government capable of unified action on should serve as a gatekeeper of sorts families, we will inspire the next genera- the 21st-century battlefield depends on to make sure we do not abandon the tion of joint leaders to join our ranks in the military and interagency categorically processes that have served us so well in service to their country. By caring for our trusting each other, and a professional building today’s joint force. For example, military family today, we will ensure a vi- military education system should facilitate in these challenging economic times, the able joint force tomorrow. Operating on this vision from the ground up. campaign would remind leaders of the a foundation of trust, these policies and Third, as outlined in the 2015 importance of large-scale, and expensive, programs will support our military family National Military Strategy, the Joint Staff joint exercises that have so effectively throughout the military life cycle—from should continue to develop and expand taught generations of Servicemembers the time they enter service until they
16 Forum / The Sine Qua Non of Effective Joint Operations JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 transition and reintegrate back into ci- Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Pro- fession (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, vilian life. How we care for our military 2015); Kris Osborn, “Navy Survey: Sailors New from family will not only build trust among Unhappy, Don’t Trust Brass,” Military.com, our Servicemembers but should also en- September 4, 2014, available at
JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Springer, Schommer, and Jones 17 U.S. Air Force B-52 Stratofortress, B-1 Lancer, and B-2 Spirit launch from Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, for integrated bomber operation, August 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Richard P. Ebensberger)
Searching for Digital Hilltops A Doctrinal Approach to Identifying Key Terrain in Cyberspace
By Scott Douglas Applegate, Christopher L. Carpenter, and David C. West
uring the 1991 Gulf War, the functional area of operations, which vulnerabilities. The need to defend or U.S. military delivered a crushing can increase performance, enhance exploit these systems eventually led the defeat to the Iraqi army in one of intelligence, and improve efficiencies Department of Defense (DOD) to des- D 1 the most one-sided battles in history. in order to greatly increase combat ignate cyberspace as a new warfighting A concept known as net-centric warfare power.2 While still in its infancy, domain through which combatants are was partially responsible for this victory net-centric warfare increased command- able to conduct a new breed of military and marked the first real integration ers’ situational awareness and enhanced operations. of information technology (IT) into their ability to deliver overwhelming Just as planners must characterize combat systems on a large-scale basis. combat power to decisive points on the operational environment in the Net-centric warfare is characterized the battlefield. However, the pervasive physical domains, cyberspace operators by the integration of computer and introduction of IT into combat systems and planners must do so in this new networking technologies into every has created both opportunities and warfighting domain. Defining the oper- ational environment includes identifying critical assets, centers of gravity, avenues Lieutenant Colonel Scott Douglas Applegate, USA, is a Joint Action Officer and Strategic Planner for the of approach, decisive points, and key ter- Cyber Policy Division, Joint Staff J5. Major Christopher L. Carpenter, USA, is a Joint Staff Officer, J35, rain. Particularly problematic issues such United States Forces, Korea. Lieutenant Commander David C. West, USN, is an Information Professional as the misidentification of key terrain serving as the N6 to Naval Special Warfare Group One.
18 Forum / Searching for Digital Hilltops JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 in cyberspace, the absence of effective concert with other warfighting func- personas, and processes that constitute cyberspace doctrine that defines concepts tions.4 The U.S. military concentrates cyber key terrain. In the article “The Key and terms in coordination with the other offensive efforts under U.S. Cyber Terrain of Cyber,” John Mills identifies warfighting domains, and the lack of Command (USCYBERCOM), while eight areas of focus in his efforts to define cyberspace knowledge by operational Defensive Cyberspace Operations are the terrain of cyberspace: data centers, planners within the joint force have spread at echelon between the Defense commercial Internet service providers, greatly stymied the ability of the U.S. Information Systems Agency and the undersea cables, international standards military to operate effectively in this do- Services’ chains of command.5 This bodies, basic input/output systems, main. To do so, the military must create a dispersed responsibility requires coor- supply chains, cyber workforce, and common lexicon and clarify the concepts dination in order to be successful, but innovation. Mills identifies all of these and processes of identifying key terrain in the inability to identify key terrain in focus areas as key terrain, which leaves cyberspace within joint doctrine. cyberspace and the lack of mature joint the reader with the impression all terrain cyberspace doctrine create gaps, redun- is key.6 In the article “Key Terrain in Background dancies, and confusion between the Cyberspace: Seeking the High Ground,” Cyberspace is different from the physical Services and across the different echelons the authors argue that key terrain exists warfighting domains of land, sea, air, of command. Ultimately, the absence in the geographic, physical, logical, cy- and space. It is a nonphysical realm con- of a common CO lexicon and multiple ber-persona, and supervisory planes of sisting of the interdependent networks interpretations of operational concepts cyberspace. Furthermore, the authors of IT infrastructures and resident data, lead to a waste of resources and an overall define cyber key terrain as systems, de- including the Internet, telecommuni- degraded operational posture in cyber- vices, protocols, data, software, processes, cations networks, computer systems space. We now turn to an examination of cyber-personas, or other network entities, and embedded processors, controllers, overlooked and misunderstood aspects of the control of which offers a marked and even the individuals who interact cyberspace operations. advantage to an attacker or defender.7 with these systems.3 It is home to a new The problem with these laundry lists of kind of warfare that seeks to disrupt, Previous Efforts to Identify items is that they lack context and leave deny, degrade, distort, or destroy the Key Terrain in Cyberspace the reader with the impression, again, information and/or systems neces- Numerous researchers, planners, and that absolutely everything in cyberspace sary to employ military power in the practitioners have attempted to define is key terrain. The lists tell a reader what physical domains. As IT creates a more cyber key terrain in cyberspace as the to look at rather than teaching them interconnected world, operations in military has increasingly integrated how to look for key terrain. A planner cyberspace are shifting from a secondary cyberspace into its operations over cannot determine what constitutes key defensive role to an alternate means of the last three decades. These previous terrain in cyberspace outside the context applying military power parallel to or in efforts suffered from three key flaws of the mission and the objectives of that conjunction with the other warfighting or omissions in their methodologies. mission. domains. A new battlespace is emerging First, in almost every case, the research- A critical omission in previous where attribution is difficult and the ers focused on what items should be research efforts is the failure to tie players range from nation-states and considered key terrain rather than on key terrain to objectives or missions. military commands to criminal organiza- how to identify key terrain in a contex- Researchers consistently attempt to iden- tions and lone operators. The relatively tual manner. Second, previous efforts tify key terrain in a vacuum. Key terrain low cost of entry to this battlespace omitted the planning concepts of objec- is only key because it gives an advantage compared to the physical warfighting tive and mission, which are essential to an attacker or defender in relation to domains can allow small nation-states to identifying key terrain for a military the achievement of mission objectives. and even nonstate actors to compete. operation. Finally, these efforts often Deborah Bodeau, Richard Graubart, and Additionally, cyberspace operations confused or misidentified key terrain William Heinbockel touch on the need (CO) asymmetrically favor the attacker. with critical assets. These flaws left to identify “key cyber terrain, critical Defenders must secure their entire infra- planners struggling to grasp the concept assets, or crown jewels” and discuss the structure and every system, whereas an of key terrain in cyberspace and, more importance of context in their 2013 work adversary need only find a single weak- importantly, grappling with how to on the subject. However, they never ness in a target’s defenses to employ implement this concept in an efficient define that context in terms of specific cyberspace effects. and effective manner during planning military missions or mission objectives. CO can deliver unique capabilities and operations. Instead, they suggest a series of questions and combat power through cyberspace, The most consistent trend noted and potential sources for information but the U.S. military does not act in a across the research efforts to identify that planners could use across a variety of unified manner when conducting these key terrain in cyberspace was a desire to topics to identify key terrain.8 operations, especially when acting in create lists of devices, logical constructs,
JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Applegate, Carpenter, and West 19 vendor training DOD Cyber Protection better understanding and better solutions Key Military Definitions Teams to identify key terrain during their to seemingly wicked problems. Mission: The task, together with missions, also uses the terms key terrain the purpose, that clearly indicates and crown jewels interchangeably.10 The Key Terrain in the the action to be taken and the imprecise use of these terms by academics Physical Domains reason therefore. and trainers implies a lack of understand- It is important to define key terrain ing of the difference between critical and the process for identifying it in Objective: The clearly defined, assets and key terrain. DOD defines a the physical domain. One of the best decisive, and attainable goal critical asset as “a specific entity that is tactical explanations for identifying toward which every operation is of such extraordinary importance that key terrain can be found in Army directed; the specific target of the its incapacitation or destruction would Field Manual 3-21, The Infantry Rifle action taken that is essential to the have a very serious, debilitating effect Company. The manual first discusses commander’s plan. on the ability of a nation to continue to key terrain in the third step of the Key Terrain: Any locality, or area, function effectively.”11 There are almost company commander’s Troop Leading the seizure or retention of which certainly assets in the cyberspace domain Procedures (TLP), which is the plan- affords a marked advantage to that could be defined as critical, and their ning process conducted by tactical-level either combatant. identification should be prioritized due to commanders. The TLP process runs the potential impact on national security. parallel to the higher echelon’s mili- Critical Asset: A specific entity However, defining and protecting critical tary decisionmaking process. Because that is of such extraordinary assets should not be confused with iden- company commanders lack a planning importance that its incapacitation tifying key terrain. Understanding how staff, the TLP process is tailored to or destruction would have a very the identification of critical assets shapes simplify the planning process without serious, debilitating effect on the the identification of key terrain during missing the necessary steps for mission ability of a nation to continue to a mission is important to the success of accomplishment.13 function effectively. our cyberspace planners. This process One of the most important aspects Critical Asset List: A prioritized allows planners to prioritize critical assets, for any commander is to understand list of assets or areas, normally create a Critical Asset List, determine their operational environment. Army identified by phase of the oper- which assets should be defended, develop commanders have historically used the ation and approved by the joint a Defended Asset List, and then identify acronym OAKOC, which stands for force commander, that should be key terrain in relation to these assets and Observation and Fields of Fire, Avenues defended against air and missile mission objectives. Defining these terms of Approach, Key Terrain, Observation, threats. and imparting a common understanding and Cover and Concealment, to help to practitioners and planners will better in identifying the categories needed to Defended Asset List: A listing of enable the identification of key terrain in analyze terrain.14 Commanders must those assets from the critical asset the context of mission objectives. To that understand what terrain is important to list prioritized by the joint force end, this article provides a list of key joint their mission accomplishment. Properly commander to be defended with doctrinal definitions of the relevant terms identifying key terrain can mean the the resources available. to the reader (see sidebar).12 success or failure of missions at all levels Flaws and omissions in previous of war. Focusing on the tactical-level research efforts imply that planners and doctrine best explains the process of The third flaw noted is the lack of practitioners working in cyberspace may identifying key terrain, as strategic-level a common lexicon and the consistent lack understanding or knowledge of doctrine tends to tackle this process too misuse of doctrinal terms in relation to doctrinal planning processes used in the abstractly and assumes a level of under- key terrain in cyberspace. A number of physical domain. Planners in these other standing that is often absent. authors use the terms critical assets and domains, especially Army and Marine Once commanders are given their key terrain synonymously, implying these Corps planners, have efficient and effec- mission and begin their analysis to un- terms are interchangeable when they are tive processes for identifying key terrain derstand the operational environment in not. Bodeau, Graubart, and Heinbockel that are integrated into both the Services’ which their element will fight, they will discuss the importance of identifying “key and the joint planning processes. It is naturally focus on certain areas of terrain. cyber terrain,” yet when they describe thus important for planners working A continued analysis will lead the com- their process, they substitute the term in cyberspace to understand how these manders to determining whether there is critical assets for key terrain and lump processes are accomplished in the physical key terrain to their mission success. The together “key terrain, critical assets or warfighting domains. Often, simply re- other factors of OAKOC will help com- crown jewels” as though they have iden- moving the cyber concept from complex manders gain a better understanding of tical meanings.9 IdeaScale, a commercial problems in the cyberspace field leads to their environment and will ultimately aid
20 Forum / Searching for Digital Hilltops JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Cyber Flag 14-1 participants analyze exercise scenario in red flag building at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, November 2013 (U.S. Air Force/Christopher Tam) them in their ability to define what terrain be able to transition from strategic and objectives at each level of war will result is worth fighting to control. The com- operational to tactical objectives and in the identification of different critical manders will continue planning but at all vice versa. assets and key terrain at each level. In times will ensure that they are protecting When planners receive a mission, the many instances, the key terrain identified or dominating the areas that they defined planning process begins with gaining an at the tactical level may be some of the as key. They will tie these pieces of terrain understanding of the operational envi- same features identified at the operational to objectives and task their subordinate ronment. This step is critical throughout level, but tactical-level commanders elements to ensure that their force owns all levels of war, but one can argue that will always focus on terrain within their these areas or a combination of these depending on the level at which the areas of operation specifically identified areas throughout the operation. operation occurs, the key terrain will be to increase their advantages for mission different. The major difference originates accomplishment. Context Matters in the narrowing scope, span of control, When defining key terrain, planners and objectives resident at each level of Key Terrain Is Key Terrain must understand that context matters. war: strategic, operational, or tactical.15 The importance of context highlights Key terrain is situation- and context-de- Tactical-level operations will identify two key problems in the cyberspace pendent, or relative to specific objec- specific requirements and capabilities domain. First, there is significant con- tives of a given mission. Understanding needed to achieve their objectives, which fusion in terminology within the CO this point will aid in joint planners’ are nested under the achievement of community. The definition for key ability to remain involved throughout the operational and strategic objectives. terrain is specifically defined in joint the entire Joint Operations Planning Although the desired endstates may be doctrine, but the CO community as a Process (JOPP). It is important for similar, if not the same, the objectives will whole has spent a substantial amount planners, regardless of function or be substantially different as commanders of time and effort trying to create a expertise, to understand where they fit at each level of war focus on objectives separate definition just for cyberspace. into the planning process. It is equally, within their scope and areas of responsi- Additionally, there is a tendency to if not more, important for planners to bility and influence. The difference in the use terms such as critical assets and
JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Applegate, Carpenter, and West 21 Two U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey tiltrotor aircraft participate in Valiant Shield 2014 in Tinian, Northern Mariana Islands, September 2014 (DOD/Alex Walters) key terrain interchangeably. Second, in any of the other warfighting domains. cyberspace from this perspective should there is a tendency to focus on tacti- There is no need to create a separate help planners at all levels to better under- cal terrain at all levels within the CO definition for cyber key terrain, as the stand and frame the problem. community. USCYBERCOM, a sub- joint definition for key terrain is ade- unified command that should arguably quate and applicable across all domains. Recommendations be operating at the operational and Planners at the appropriate levels should The Joint Chiefs of Staff should add strategic levels of war, is often focused seek to identify key terrain in relation to guidance to Joint Publication 3-12, at the tactical level. The technical the specific objectives of their missions. Cyberspace Operations, to assist plan- complexity and vast size of cyberspace This involves developing an understand- ners in the identification of key terrain push one to think that key terrain must ing of the operational environment, to within the context of missions and be more complicated. This leads to a include the cyberspace aspects of that objectives. This will prevent cyberspace single organization trying to define environment, evaluating terrain from planners from operating in a vacuum key terrain across an entire warfighting an OAKOC perspective, determining and failing to align their operations to domain. That belief is flawed and could critical assets, and identifying terrain the overall mission. Additionally, the be simplified if the community focused that gives the attackers or defenders a Joint Chiefs should consider updating on specific, mission-related objectives marked advantage in relation to achiev- doctrine to emphasize the use of the within its span of control. These efforts ing their mission objectives. What makes joint functions to evaluate operations in must be decentralized and pushed down key terrain key terrain is the context of cyberspace at all levels of planning, just to the appropriate headquarters at each the feature in relation to mission and as they do in the physical domains. level of war. objectives. The terrain may be any of A joint lexicon should be immediately Defining key terrain in cyberspace the features listed earlier, but it is the established to enable the synchronization should follow the same doctrinal pro- context that really matters. Approaching of CO across the joint force. This would cesses as the identification of key terrain the problem of identifying key terrain in include updating the definition of the
22 Forum / Searching for Digital Hilltops JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Critical Asset List to include cyberspace terrain and critical assets in order to rain-enabling-cyber-defensibility-claims-and>. 9 Ibid. threats. A suggested definition is: a pri- synchronize efforts between the stra- 10 IdeaScale, “Design Defense Around oritized list of assets or areas, normally tegic, operational, and tactical levels of Your Mission or Business Cyber Key Terrain,” identified by phase of the operation and planning. They must also realize that key ACT-IAC Cybersecurity Innovation Initiative, approved by the joint force commander, terrain at one level of war may be differ- September 2015. that should be defended against air, mis- ent from that of another. 11 JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictio- nary of Military and Associated Terms (Wash- sile, and cyberspace threats. The lack of a common CO lexicon ington, DC: The Joint Staff, November 2010, A final recommendation is that and the misidentification of key terrain as amended through February 15, 2016). CO should be integrated into both the in cyberspace indicate that the real prob- 12 Ibid. joint education process and JOPP as a lem is that the planning process lacks 13 Field Manual 3-21.10 (7-10), The Infan- standard part of an operations planning unification and the inclusion of CO rep- try Rifle Company (Washington, DC: Head- quarters Department of the Army, 2006). team. Cyberspace operations affect all the resentation. The JOPP forces planners to 14 Ibid. physical domains and every joint func- consider the joint functions during plan 15 George J. Franz, “Effective Synchro- tion. Planners must be familiar with the development but does not go beyond nization and Integration of Effects Through effect that cyberspace consequences can command and control when considering Cyberspace for the Joint Warfighter,” U.S. have on their domain and with how the cyberspace. Since cyberspace touches all Cyber Command, 2012. operations in their domain can affect CO. the joint functions, serious consideration While CO may be a highly technical field, must be given to cyberspace operations a joint planner only needs to understand to create a truly comprehensive plan. the what to look for of CO and not the This can only be done if cyberspace how to look. When CO is properly repre- operators have a seat at the planning sented in the joint planning process, the table from beginning to end of the joint planning group will rely on its cyberspace planning process. JFQ planner to determine the how. Only when planners firmly understand the role and potential impact of cyberspace in the Notes planning process can the true value of 1 CO be leveraged. Frederick W. Kagan, Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy (New York: Encounter Books, 2006). Conclusion 2 Jeffrey R. Witsken, “Network-Centric Although the technology and environ- Warfare: Implications for Operational Design,” ment of cyberspace are vastly different U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col- from those of the physical domains, lege, 2002. 3 Joint Publication (JP) 3-12 (R), Cyber- the process of identifying key terrain in space Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint cyberspace is the same as the process Staff, 2010). used in the other domains. Cyberspace 4 Ben FitzGerald and Parker Wright, “De- planners mistakenly try to create a centralizing Cyber Command and Control,” process isolated from the other domains Disruptive Defense Papers, April 2014. 5 Jared Serbu, “U.S. Cyber Command and ignore key integrated planning Wants DISA to Take Greater Role in DOD concepts. Instead, the foundations of Cyber Defense,” Federal News Radio, May 29, JOPP must be used during cyberspace 2014. planning and the identification of key 6 John R. Mills, “The Key Terrain of terrain to ensure that cyberspace oper- Cyber,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, March 23, 2013, 99–107. ations are aligned with the objectives 7 David Raymond et al., “Key Terrain in throughout the levels of war. While the Cyberspace: Seeking the High Ground,” 6th first inclination of cyberspace operators International Conference on Cyber Conflict, is to defend everything, the context of 2014, Tallinn, Estonia, 287–300, available at the mission should be the driving factor JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Applegate, Carpenter, and West 23 Standard Missile-3 is launched from Pearl Harbor–based Aegis cruiser USS Lake Erie enroute to intercept as part of Missile Defense Agency test of sea-based capability under development, yet tactically certified and deployed with U.S. Navy, November 2007 (U.S. Navy) Expanding Zeus’s Shield A New Approach for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region By Kevin Ayers n September 17, 2009, President Missile Defense Report, the European Europe by 2015. Phase three, scheduled Barack Obama approved the Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for 2018, would deploy more capable O creation of a “phased adap- was developed to provide guidance on systems against longer range Iranian tive approach” to European missile which and where certain ballistic missile missiles and have both a land- and sea- defense, at the recommendation of defense capabilities would be deployed based capability.3 The final phase was Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and to the European theater. According to canceled in 2013 but was rescheduled the Joint Chiefs of Staff.1 As outlined the overall plan, the approach would for deployment in the 2020 timeframe in the original White House 2009 be executed in four phases. The first and would have added defense capabil- press release and in the 2010 Ballistic phase protected southern Europe from ity against long-range ballistic missile attack from Iran with sea-based Aegis threats from the Middle East. Weapons Systems by 2011.2 Phase two In many ways, the European model is Kevin Ayers is Director of the Engagement focused on deploying land-based missile a unique situation. The components of a Division of the Commercial GEOINT Activity. defense capabilities to defend southern ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) 24 Forum / Expanding Zeus’s Shield JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 have been developed by the United the range of the missile, this phase can core system for tracking incoming missile States and are being deployed within a be within the atmosphere—endo-atmo- raids is the AN/TPY-2 mobile radar, as longstanding multilateral security alliance. spheric—or outside the atmosphere— well as fixed terrestrial and space-based Other areas, like Southwest Asia or East exo-atmospheric. The Aegis Weapons assets. These sensors are integrated into Asia, lack such an alliance or even agree- System is primarily focused on short- to the global Command and Control, Battle ment on the utility of ballistic missile intermediate-range missiles in their mid- Management, and Communication defenses. Therefore, the phased adaptive course and terminal phases. (C2BMC) system. C2BMC ties together approach would require new diplomatic Aegis is a sea-based air defense system these BMDS capabilities into a coherent and security agreements for each region based on phased array radar technology whole with the ground-based, mid- to meet its unique requirements. In the and linked to missile interceptors with course defense system that is used for waning days of the Obama administra- advanced targeting seekers. The Aegis defending against limited intercontinental tion, no policy for how to deploy the Weapons System—named after the ballistic missile attack on the United BMDS in other regions has been clearly shield used by the god Zeus in Greek States. articulated. mythology—was originally deployed by While many countries around the To extend its protections to other the U.S. Navy in 1983 on Ticonderoga world have developed theater ballistic regions, the phased adaptive approach (CG-47)-class cruisers and Arleigh Burke missiles—including Iran and North should shift its focus from capability (DDG-51)-class destroyers.4 The system’s Korea, the countries against which the development to security alliance interop- interceptor, the Standard Missile (SM), BMDS is designed to defend—China’s erability development. The United States emerged from the Navy Theater Area sophistication in ballistic missile tech- continues to develop a multilayered Wide program in the 1990s as the SM-3.5 nology is second to none. In a BMD ballistic missile defense capability against The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) context, its history of regionally ranged long-range missile threats from the and the Japanese are developing the next missile proliferation and technolo- Middle East. The need in the East Asian generation of SM-3 interceptors, known gy-sharing would reasonably make its region, for example, is not to phase in as the Block IIA. regional-missile developments a primary a new BMDS capability but to create a Shorter range theater-based ballistic concern. According to the Department strong security alliance structure that can missile defense has focused on the final of Defense (DOD) 2015 annual report deploy and execute the ballistic missile phase of the missile’s trajectory, the to Congress, China has developed the defense mission. This will maintain terminal phase. Work on intercepting technology to hold maritime forces at an extended deterrence capability for shorter range systems stems back to significant threat through its land-, sea-, the United States and sustain regional 1949 with Project Pluto, which eventu- space-, cyber-, and electromagnetic-based security and stability. However, the key ally evolved into the Army Air Defense weapons; a significant portion of those challenge will be to incentivize Japan and System in the 1970s and the Phased threats come from China’s robust the- South Korea to join the United States Array Tracking Radar Intercept on Target ater and strategic ballistic missile force.7 in a new security alliance to effectively (PATRIOT) program in 1976.6 The China’s primary threat is regionally implement this approach. PATRIOT system made a name for itself based, though, and likely focused on when Iraqi Scud short-range ballistic mis- protecting what it views as its center of Introduction siles were fired at Saudi Arabia and Israel influence. Both Japan and South Korea A ballistic missile defense architecture during the Gulf War in 1991. While the have seen the need to protect themselves operates in three key phases. Ballistic new PATRIOT Advanced Capability–2 from China’s increasing theater ballistic missiles can be targeted before launch (PAC-2) interceptors demonstrated missile capability over the years, as its on the launcher. Once launched, the mixed results in intercepting the incom- aggressive moves in the South China Sea ballistic missile is under powered flight ing Scuds in their terminal phase, they have increased their concern. What would and considered to be in its boost phase. did highlight the requirement for theater entice Japan and South Korea to partner This phase will vary, depending on ballistic missile defense capabilities for with the United States in the BMDS? the size of the missile and how much Army units in the field. Current systems fuel and oxidizer it has to burn. If a such as the PAC-3 and Theater High- Developing Co-Production BMDS can intercept ballistic missiles Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems Incentives: An SM-3 either before they are launched or in provide a layered defense capability for Block IIA Case Study this boost or early intercept phase, the the terminal phase. THAAD is capable of If we assume that a trilateral security missile cannot deploy its countermea- intercepting ballistic missiles earlier in the alliance built around a BMDS provides sures. Once the ballistic missile has terminal phase at higher altitudes than enhanced security, technology, geo- achieved its engine or motor cut-off PAC-3 systems. graphic, and economic value to the point and is beginning to reach the Core to the success of any BMDS is United States, then there must be sig- apex of its ballistic arc, it has entered the ability to identify, track, target, and nificant incentives for Japan and South the mid-course phase. Depending on intercept ballistic missile threats. The Korea to agree to enter into such an alli- JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Ayers 25 ance. Both countries have demonstrated the United States was to create a two-way Mitsubishi Heavy Industries likely had at least an interest in U.S. BMDS, have technology transfer between Japanese the most experience in systems integra- existing bilateral security alliances with commercial and U.S. defense companies. tion, it also had a long history in dealing the United States, and have developed However, by that time, the United States with the United States in co-develop- defense industry relationships within was more interested in Japan developing ment, beginning with the FS-X aircraft the framework of each bilateral alliance. ballistic missile defense than the Japanese program in the 1980s.20 Therefore, by Therefore, creating a trilateral alliance government was for itself.12 2007, a memorandum of agreement be- for ballistic missile defense should be In 1998, the Japanese suffered what tween Lockheed Martin and Mitsubishi self-evident from these relationships. is known as the “Taepodong shock”; Heavy Industries for licensed production However, in fact, such an alliance has North Korea launched a developmental of the PAC-3s had been signed, PAC-3 not grown organically from the current long-range ballistic missile over Japan’s firing units purchased through foreign security environment. main island, Honshu.13 From that point military sales had been deployed, and Much of South Korea’s and Japan’s on, Japan’s public and government offi- the Aegis Weapons System along with preference for remaining in bilateral cials were acutely aware of the potential the SM Block I capability had been security alliances with the United States ballistic missile threat from North Korea purchased for $458 million.21 The next appears to originate from historical and actively sought a ballistic missile stage in this process was to create a more and diplomatic issues that have created shield. By December 2003, Japan had capable interceptor for the Japanese suspicion between the two countries.8 agreed to move from just research and to defend against longer-range North To create a trilateral security alliance, development with the United States Korean missiles. it is imperative that the United States to active development of a two-tiered The Japan Defense Agency and create an incentive framework for both ballistic missile defense system with DOD signed a memorandum of under- countries to work together in an inte- PAC-3 firing units, the Aegis Weapons standing in December 2004 agreeing to grated and interoperable ballistic missile System, and SM-3 interceptors.14 These develop a BMDS for Japan, which led defense architecture. The United States capabilities were purchased through to the co-development agreement to has deep experience working with Japan foreign military sales from Lockheed produce the next generation of SM-3 on co-development projects, including Martin and Raytheon and deployed interceptors in 2006.22 According to the the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor program, between 2006 and 2007.15 The dramatic agreement, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and has similar co-development experi- shift in emphasis by the Japan Defense and Raytheon would be the prime con- ence with South Korea in other defense Agency was highlighted in their National tractors for each country and responsible industry projects. Therefore, if a segment Defense Program Outline—similar to the for overall management. Both the United of the BMDS can be identified that U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review—in States and Japan would split the overall complements South Korea’s comparative December 2004, which focused attention development costs of what was to be the advantage within its defense industrial on ballistic missile shields as the highest SM-3 Block IIA interceptor.23 base and provides added value to the military priority and on China and North Beginning with fiscal year (FY) 2007, ballistic missile defense architecture with Korea as their primary security threats.16 the Japanese Ministry of Defense appro- Japan and the United States, then the In addition, Japan also saw an advantage priated approximately ¥2 billion a year system will create enhanced deterrence in to lifting its ban on military exports to for the Joint Cooperative Development other security domains. The process for the United States, which would facil- Program to produce the next generation how the United States struck a deal with itate the co-development deals in the SM-3 interceptor, the Block IIA.24 By the Japanese to co-develop the SM-3 negotiation stage.17 Elements within the FY16, according to MDA budget sub- Block IIA interceptor provides a useful Japanese government viewed the shift in mission documents, the program had an case study on this issue. focus as violating the interpretation of average cost of $273 million for research The Japanese first expressed an the Japanese constitution’s provisions for and development in the United States. interest in U.S. ballistic missile defense collective self-defense.18 Overall, the development program was research activities in the 1980s with On the commercial side, Japan’s estimated to cost $3.1 billion total (once their participation in the Western Pacific largest defense corporations were looking Lockheed Martin’s Multiple Kill Vehicle Missile Defense Architecture Study to gain significant revenue from these program had been canceled, which in- (WestPac) with U.S. defense companies.9 potential missile defense research and creased technology development costs for The WestPac study looked at potential production contracts. By 2005, Japan the SM-3 Block IIA).25 ballistic missile threats to Japan and was preparing to invest $1.2 billion into Flight testing for the SM-3 Block likely system solutions.10 By the mid- missile defense, much of which would IIA began in 2015, with two tests of 1990s, the United States and Japan flow to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries the system’s operations in June and were working through possible dual-use and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, which December.26 To meet the EPAA schedule technology deals in the “Technology for combined made up 35 percent of the for deployment, the system will need to Technology” program.11 The hope for total defense market in Japan.19 While be tested for intercepts against at least 26 Forum / Expanding Zeus’s Shield JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 USS Donald Cook transits Black Sea as part of President Obama’s European phased adaptive approach to ballistic missile defense in Europe, April 2014 (U.S. Navy/Edward Guttierrez III) medium- and intermediate-range target of the right of collective self-defense Asia.30 Japan’s experience with Lockheed missiles before 2018, when the next and ballistic missile defense—in the Martin during the FS-X program led combined MDA integration test is sched- fall of 2002, the formal organizational to deeper expertise in system design, uled.27 In addition, the system will need inertia in Japan began to fall away.28 By development, and integration.31 The to be tested for interoperability between 2003, the majority of the general public corporation that gained the most from the U.S. and Japanese navies, which have believed that North Korea was a threat, this experience was Mitsubishi Heavy had previous success with joint operations and members of the opposition party saw Industries, which would become the during similar integration tests. the feasibility of a missile defense system lead co-producer of the SM-3 Block IIA Four key themes led to the success of for Japan.29 Therefore, by 2003, Japan’s interceptor. the SM-3 Block IIA Joint Cooperative national interests shifted toward ballistic Third, the flexibility of the ballis- Development Program. First, Japan’s missile defense. tic missile defense architecture in the national interests were realigned from a Second, Japan’s defense industrial 1990s and early 2000s allowed for the conservative constitutional interpretation base was technologically advanced integration of foreign partners. MDA’s of its right for collective self-defense and had experience working with the flexible acquisition capability, outside the toward a more progressive interpretation. United States in weapons technology normal Defense Department acquisition Much of this realignment was driven co-development. According to the U.S. process, enabled flexible contracting for by North Korea’s nuclear declarations Government Accountability Office, Japan emerging defensive systems.32 In addi- in 1993 and its Taepodong 1 launch was a world leader in aeronautics sub- tion, the Japanese agreed to participate in in 1998. Once Japan Defense Agency system manufacturing and had the best research, development, and procurement Director-General Gen Nakatani was re- developed aeronautical research, devel- of an existing capability that they had placed with Shigeru Ishiba—a supporter opment, and production infrastructure in been helping with since the program JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Ayers 27 was known as the Navy Theater Wide missile defense assets, such as THAAD, an opening toward future discussions Defense program.33 from the United States. However, North with both Japan and China. South Finally, the presence of U.S. military Korea’s space launch seemed to push Korea also has a longstanding bilateral bases in Japan and their geographic the conversation with the United States partnership with the United States in proximity to key threats in Asia-Pacific toward purchasing and deploying South defending its homeland. For example, provided incentives for both countries to Korea’s own and/or U.S. THAAD units South Korea participated in co-devel- collaborate over ballistic missile defense. on the peninsula.39 opment agreements with the United In the event of a ballistic missile attack Up until February 2016, South States in the Korean Fighter Program in against Japan, potential targets include Korea procured and developed air and the late 1980s. In that particular case, U.S. forces and Japanese civilian and mili- missile defense systems for its point South Korea gained from the transfer of tary targets. The impetus to create a more and area defense requirements, while aerospace manufacturing and assembly integrated and interoperable system likely balancing its perceived diplomatic needs know-how.45 Much like with the Japanese gave both countries added incentives for the region. South Korea has made co-production programs, the Koreans to create the cooperative development significant investments in building benefitted from their in-depth and in- program. Also, deploying PAC-3 and three KDX-III cruisers with the Aegis valuable experience working with U.S. Aegis systems within Japan extended and Weapons System and has approved the aerospace firms. All of these elements expanded the range and number of avail- upgrade of its PAC-2 batteries to PAC-3 appear to parallel Japan’s situation in the able ships and units to intercept potential by 2020. In addition, South Korea’s late 1990s and early 2000s with regard ballistic missile threats. Agency for Defense Development has to ballistic missile defense co-production developed a medium-range surface-to-air partnerships. South Korea’s Theater Missile missile system with capabilities against Defense Orientation and the ballistic missile and air targets—based South Korea’s Comparative Prospects of Partnership on the Russian S-300 and S-400 sur- Advantage and the Needs The United States and the Republic face-to-air missile systems—known as of the Theater Ballistic of Korea have been allied in a security the Cheongung.40 The Cheongung is Missile Defense Enterprise partnership since the 1953 Mutual intended for South Korea’s multi-tiered According to IHS Jane’s, South Korea’s Defense Treaty was signed. Under that and integrated Korean Air and Missile defense industrial base has developed treaty, the United States continues to Defense system.41 and expanded like its commercial deploy 28,500 troops on the Korean South Korea’s balance toward indig- markets.46 It is still dominated by large Peninsula and provides for the col- enous systems is likely due to its sensitive corporations—known as chaebols—that lective defense of the republic.34 The economic relationship with China and its produce in a wide array of market seg- collective defense capabilities that the goal of taking overall defensive command ments. For example, almost all of the United States has deployed in South of the United Nations units still stationed naval construction contracts are handled Korea include ballistic missile defense in the South against North Korean by Hyundai or Daewoo.47 Its indige- assets such as the PAC-3 system and invasion.42 Also, South Korea has been nous capabilities are capable of produc- potentially THAAD in the near future.35 reluctant to cooperate with Japan on ing naval platforms, aircraft, armored And even though South Korea has been ballistic missile defense. Creating its own vehicles, and tanks. South Korea’s chae- active in purchasing point defense capa- indigenous capability gives them the op- bols also have made significant— ₩1.5 bilities, such as the PAC-2 system, and tion to avoid a reliance on Japan. Much trillion—financial investments in air and developing indigenous capabilities to of that reluctance has stemmed from his- missile defense. counter a potential invasion from North torical legacies of the Japanese occupation South Korea’s experience with de- Korean conventional forces, it has of Korea before and during World War veloping domestic high-end electronics depended on its diplomatic solutions in II, as well as the current geopolitical and for the commercial sector has paid the face of the North’s development of economic relationships between China, dividends for its ability to manufacture long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear Japan, and South Korea.43 In November command, control, communications, warheads for those missiles.36 2015, however, all three countries agreed computers, intelligence, surveillance, On January 12, 2016, North Korea to resume regular trilateral meetings on and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and battle conducted a nuclear test.37 On February security and economic issues.44 management capabilities. On its Web 8, 2016, North Korea launched a satellite Therefore, South Korea’s defense site, LIG Nex1—formerly known as with its long-range missile system.38 The industrial base has demonstrated its LG Precision—advertises long-range first event seemingly did not push South ability to work with foreign partners to surveillance radar systems, maritime Korea from its preference for diplomatic develop military capabilities oriented radar systems, and overhead sensors.48 solutions with the North; South Korean toward air and missile defense, has shown Given the maturity of the ballistic mis- officials continued to be noncommittal recent sensitivity to potential threats from sile defense architecture with regard to toward purchasing enhanced ballistic North Korea, and has demonstrated interceptor technology, it makes sense 28 Forum / Expanding Zeus’s Shield JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 to leverage South Korea’s expertise in tecture will have the defensive assets to communications channel. A trilateral se- C4ISR and battle management. South globally deploy an integrated air and curity alliance will consolidate capabilities, Korea, in collaboration with the United missile defense system by 2018. leverage comparative advantages, and States, could make significant contri- In the Asia-Pacific region, two of our create formal channels of communication butions to the integration and foreign closest allies, Japan and South Korea, among all three countries’ diplomatic, interoperability in the C2BMC system. have demonstrated high technologi- political, military, and industrial spheres. According to the director of the Office of cal competency and have a history of Closer communication channels in these Testing and Evaluation, C2BMC Spiral working with the United States in co-de- areas greatly enhance the unity of effort 8.2—scheduled to be deployed in fiscal veloping aerospace and defense systems. and command. When coupled with the years 2017 and 2018—does not have an Also, they have demonstrated a long symbolic impact of a trilateral security alli- engagement management capability.49 history of not working well together.51 ance deploying ballistic missile defenses in Since U.S. systems operate over the Link- A phased approach with significant eco- the area, these communication channels 16 system, the South Koreans could be nomic incentives should be sufficient to could dramatically improve the influence employed to develop a parallel standard attract and retain Japan and South Korea of a theater ballistic missile defense sys- for our foreign partners that seamlessly in such an alliance. If the phased adaptive tem. A unilateral effort by the United fuses their data into the overall C2BMC approach policy is going to be applied States would demonstrate a unity of architecture. to the Asia-Pacific theater in the post- effort and command militarily, but could The added bonus of creating a C4ISR Obama administration, however, the new not have the same impact diplomatically, and battle management development policy iteration should reflect the needs politically, or industrially. niche for South Korea is that it could of the region. An integrated trilateral alli- integrate South Korea more closely in ance structure between the United States, Assessment of New Approach the architecture without immediately Japan, and South Korea would maximize This Asia-Pacific–oriented phased exacerbating its fragile relationships with the BMDS extended deterrence against adaptive approach presents some key Japan. South Korea’s relationship with countries with advanced or advancing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, the Chinese may be fraying as well. South ballistic missile capabilities such as North and threats. The primary strength of Korea’s retort to the Chinese over the Korea and, in a regional context, China. a trilateral security alliance for ballistic THAAD issue in March 2015 could The value of this new approach missile defense between South Korea, be a sign of that tension.50 Given the focuses on enhancing the extended de- Japan, and the United States is the deep events with North Korea in January and terrence provided by a trilateral ballistic working relationship our militaries and February 2016, the impetus to provide a missile defense architecture, while low- defense industrial bases have established more advanced multi-layered capability ering the cost through co-development over the decades. Also, formal channels within its missile defense system may partnerships and burdensharing. While enable tighter integration and interop- incentivize South Korea to develop the per-unit costs of the SM-3 Block IIA erability between all three countries next generation of command and control are higher than those of the Block IB, when conducting tests and joint oper- systems for the BMDS. the added capability of the new system ations in the region. Ultimately, this enhances its marginal value. Also, using creates a more powerful force multiplier A New Approach for one integrated command, control, battle for ballistic missile defense. the Asia-Pacific Phased management, and communication system The weakness of the approach is its Adaptive Approach with multiple radar and electro-optical assumption that South Korea and Japan Ballistic missile defense is about security. tracking systems on land and sea creates a will continue to have the incentive to pro- By employing these defensive capabil- vastly superior capability than if deployed vide key components for major systems in ities, countries intend to reduce their by just the United States. Lastly, the the architecture. The alliance would have risk of being attacked by adversaries symbolic deterrence of a trilateral alliance a certain amount of assumed interdepen- with ballistic missiles. Therefore, it structure for the defensive architecture dency that would be uncomfortable for makes sense to incorporate these allies may be the greatest value proposition for the United States. It seems to make sense into the defensive architecture within this new policy. The inclusion of Japan that the United States would prefer to the realm of their comparative advan- and South Korea in developing and de- maintain an independent ballistic missile tages to share costs and capabilities. If ploying a system sends a clear message to defense capability in the region to hedge the phased adaptive approach, as articu- China regarding the unity of effort and its bets. However, the power of a formal lated in 2009, truly realizes the deploy- command in the region for integrated air trilateral security alliance that relies upon ment of the Aegis Weapons System with and missile defense.52 an interdependency model creates a level SM-3 Block IIA interceptors by 2018, To communicate the superior de- of deterrent credibility for the system complemented by PATRIOT PAC-3, terrent value of this approach, partner that would be absent in an informal con- THAAD, and C2BMC spiral upgrades, countries will need to actively use inte- federation of nations. Also, the level of then the ballistic missile defense archi- grated training and testing as the primary risk introduced with more participating JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Ayers 29 defense architecture. The development of a trilateral security alliance focused around a ballistic missile defense system seems to be the correct answer. The United States must be prepared to deploy appropriate BMDS assets and resources to build this capability. It is likely that the implementation of this new approach could incur high costs and require increased attention and resources to maintain. However, the unknown factor is the amount of willingness within the three countries to make those investments. In recent months, both Japan and South Korea have appeared to be willing to move forward in that direction. However, the outcome of the U.S. election will determine how willing we are to make that kind of investment with our Asia-Pacific partners. What is clear is that the future will be increasingly complex and that the implementation Sea-Based X-Band radar successfully traveled from Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, to waters off Aleutian Island of this new policy recommendation will chain of Alaska, February 2007 (Missile Defense Agency) take time and energy. JFQ countries would increase. The number of interests. With three different countries resources required to maintain the diplo- united in a security alliance to counter matic, political, economic, military, and aggressive behavior by North Korea and Notes informational flows involved in such an China, three different sets of national 1 alliance will be significant. interests will find ways to complement White House, “Fact Sheet: United States Missile Defense Policy: A Phased Adaptive Ap- The new approach creates significant and clash with each other. South Korea’s proach to Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe,” opportunities to test the concepts of a tendency toward economic partnerships September 17, 2009, 1, available at 30 Forum / Expanding Zeus’s Shield JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Effort Increase.” at JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Ayers 31 The NDU Foundation Congratulates the Winners of the 2016 Essay Competitions he NDU Foundation is proud to support the annual Secretary of Defense, Strategic Research Paper Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Joint Force Quarterly essay com- T petitions. NDU Press hosted the final round of judging on May 12–13, First Place 2016, during which 23 faculty judges from 14 participating professional military Lieutenant Colonel David A. Mueller, education institutions selected the best entries in each category. The First Place USMC winners in each of the three categories are published in the following pages. Air War College “Civil Order and Governance as Military Secretary of Defense National Third Place Responsibilities” Security Essay Competition Lieutenant Colonel William H. Mengel, USA Second Place U.S. Naval War College Major Jeff Wong, USMCR “Untangling the Gordian Knot? The Marine Corps Command and Staff College Socio-Cultural Challenge of Syria” “Interwar-Period Gaming Today for Conflicts Tomorrow: Press Start to Play” Chairman of the Joint In 2016, the 10th annual competi- Chiefs of Staff Strategic Third Place tion was intended to stimulate new Essay Competition Lieutenant Colonel Max Pearson, USAF approaches to coordinated civilian and National War College military action from a broad spectrum of “Convenient but Dangerous: civilian and military students. Essays were Understanding China’s Defense” to address U.S. Government structure, policies, capabilities, resources, and/or Strategy Article practices and to provide creative, feasible ideas on how best to orchestrate the This annual competition, in its 35th First Place core competencies of our national secu- year in 2016, challenges students at Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Dean rity institution. The NDU Foundation the Nation’s joint professional military McCoy, USA awarded the first place winner a generous education institutions to write research U.S. Army War College gift certificate from Amazon.com. papers or articles about significant “The Palestinian Authority Security aspects of national security strategy to Force: Future Prospects” First Place stimulate strategic thinking, promote Major Lee M. Turcotte, USAF well-written research, and contribute to Second Place Air Command and Staff College a broader security debate among profes- Lieutenant Colonel Jaren Keith Price, “The Viability of Moral Dissent by sionals. The first place winners in each USA the Military (or, Chapter 6 of the U.S. category received a generous Amazon. U.S. Army War College Truth and Reconciliation Commission: com gift certificate courtesy of the “The Rebirth of Japan’s Amphibious Conclusions Regarding the Second NDU Foundation. Forces: Regional Security Implications” Internment of American Citizens)” Third Place Second Place Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin R. Colonel David Christopher Menser, Jonsson, USAF USA U.S. Army War College U.S. Army War College “Terminating Conflict with the Islamic “Did the United States Lose China State” Again?” 32 Essay Competitions / Introduction JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Joint Force Quarterly Maerz Awards In its inaugural year, the JFQ Maerz Awards, chosen by the staff of NDU Press, recognize the most influential articles from the previous year’s four issues of JFQ. Five outstanding articles were chosen for the Maerz Awards, named in honor of Mr. George C. Maerz, former writer-editor of NDU Press. Best Forum Article Best Features Article NDU Foundation Dorothy E. Denning, “Rethinking the Vincent A. Manzo, “After the First Shots: The NDU Foundation is a nonprofit Cyber Domain and Deterrence,” JFQ 77 Managing Escalation in Northeast Asia,” 501(c)(3) organization established (2nd Quarter 2015) JFQ 77 (2nd Quarter 2015) in 1982 to support and enhance the mission and goals of the National Best JPME Today Article Best Recall Article Defense University, America’s preemi- Burton H. Catledge, “Debunking John Erath, “Union Success in the Civil nent institution for military, civilian, Technical Competency as a Sole Source of War and Lessons for Strategic Leaders,” and diplomatic national security education, research, outreach, and Innovation,” JFQ 76 (1st Quarter 2015) JFQ 77 (2nd Quarter 2015) strategic studies. The Foundation promotes excellence and innovation in Best Commentary Article education by nurturing high standards William M. Marcellino, “Revisioning of scholarship, leadership, and profes- Strategic Communication through sionalism. It brings together dedicated Rhetoric and Discourse Analysis,”JFQ 76 individuals, corporations, organiza- (1st Quarter 2015) tions, and groups that are committed to advancing America’s national secu- Distinguished Judges rity and defense capabilities through Twenty-three senior faculty members from the 14 participating PME institutions the National Defense University. The took time out of their busy schedules to serve as judges. Their personal dedication Foundation provides NDU with pri- and professional excellence ensured a strong and credible competition. vately funded resources for: •• Education, Research, Library, and Teaching Activities •• Academic Chairs, Faculty Fellow- ships, and Student Awards •• Endowments, Honoraria, Semi- nars, and Conferences •• Multicultural, International, and Interagency Programs •• National Security and Homeland Defense Outreach Keep informed about NDU Foundation activities by visiting on- line at: www.nduf.org. Front row, left to right: Dr. Kathryn Fisher, College of International Security Affairs; Ms. Joanna E. Seich, NDU Press; Dr. Richard DiNardo, Marine Corps Staff College; Dr. Benjamin (Frank) Cooling, Eisenhower School; Dr. Linda Di Desidero, Marine Corps University; Dr. Greg McGuire, Joint Forces Staff College. Middle row, left to right: Dr. Geoffrey Gresh, College of International Security Affairs; Dr. Lindsay P. Cohn, Naval War College; Dr. Carl “CJ” Horn, Information Resources Management College; Dr. Charles C. Chadbourn III, Naval War College; Dr. Anand Toprani, Naval War College; Dr. Margaret Sankey, Air War College; Col James Gannon, USMC, Naval War College. Back row, left to right: Dr. Bernard I. Finel, National War College; Dr. William T. Eliason, Editor in Chief, JFQ; Captain Bill Marlowe, USN (Ret.), Joint Forces Staff College; Dr. Ryan Wadle, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Paul J. Springer, Air Command and Staff College. Not shown: Dr. Antulia (Tony) Echevarria, U.S. Army War College; Dr. Richard B. Andres, National War College; Dr. Larry D. Miller, U.S. Army War College; Mr. Larry Garber, Eisenhower School; Dr. James Lacey, Marine Corps War College; Mr. John L. O’Brien, Information Resources Management College; Dr. Harold R. Winton, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Photo by Katie Lewis, NDU JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 2016 Winners 33 Battleship USS Arizona sinking after being hit by Japanese air attack on December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor (U.S. Navy/National Archives and Records Administration) The Viability of Moral Dissent by the Military (or, Chapter 6 of the U.S. Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Conclusions Regarding the Second Internment of American Citizens) By Lee M. Turcotte Stand up amid the general hurricane, thy one tost sapling cannot, Starbuck! And what is it? Reckon it. ’Tis but to help strike a fin; no wondrous feat for Starbuck. What is it more? From this one poor hunt, then, the best lance out of all Nantucket, surely he will not hang back, when every foremast-hand has clutched a whetstone. Ah! Constrainings seize thee; I see! The billow lifts thee! Speak, but speak!—Aye, aye! thy silence, then, that voices thee. —Captain Ahab, Moby-Dick 34 Essay Competitions / The Viability of Moral Dissent by the Military JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 his article is not a partisan state- This article explores whether there is the internment of Muslim citizens and ment, although it unequivocally ever a moral imperative for the military— resident aliens in the United States. The T judges the rising tide of national- primarily senior military leaders—to signing of EO 15022 was not an exact ism, isolationism, xenophobia, and anti- refuse to obey the direction of civilian recapitulation of American history, but Islamic rhetoric occurring throughout leaders. I believe the answer is yes. In any attempt to understand the military’s the West. While anti-Islamic rhetoric practice, though, disobedience on moral involvement and culpability in the do- and actions are integral to the scenario grounds is exceedingly unlikely. The mestic internment of Muslim Americans described herein, the characters are fic- year in the scenario is unstated, but the (the Second Internment) must begin tional and not analogous to any military moral and racial questions of this article with established facts of the internment or political figure currently in a position are urgent. Security environments, threat of Japanese-Americans during World of authority or running for office. The perceptions, and moral thresholds can War II (the First Internment).1 Personal political affiliation of the President in shift more quickly than many people care Justice Denied is the definitive accounting the scenario is deliberately unstated. No to acknowledge. Moral debate is not a of the First Internment. Its clarity, hon- political party has a monopoly on or luxury for other, more secure times. esty, and balance serve as the inspiration immunity from ugly ideas. The scenario’s premise requires ac- for the U.S. Truth and Reconciliation The concept for this article began with ceptance of several assumptions. First, Commission’s mandate to understand what I thought was a wildly unlikely hypo- regardless of the exact details, Islamists and illuminate injustices perpetrated by thetical situation of military involvement conduct a series of domestic attacks the U.S. Government, with a view to- in the internment of American citizens. sufficient to generate widespread and ward reconciliation and the prevention of Nationalistic, xenophobic discourse in enduring fear. The President declares additional injustices in the future. Europe and the United States led me to a state of emergency and directs the Immediately following the Japanese wonder about the moral and constitu- military to intern Muslim citizens domes- attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, tional implications of the military’s refusal tically until loyalties can be determined 1941, the U.S. Army began establishing to follow such guidance from civilian and security reestablished. Congress regional defense commands with geo- authorities, should it be directed. backs the President, but the Supreme graphic responsibility for various portions My knowledge of the internment Court declines to intervene, deferring of the United States. Western Defense of Japanese-Americans during World to the Executive in a time of national Command (WDC) was the first to be es- War II stopped at the fact that there was emergency. While this scenario involves tablished, with Lieutenant General John a Japanese internment; I thought the Muslims, similar situations may arise Dewitt taking command on December military could not have been involved. in regard to any ethnicity, ideology, al- 11, 1941.2 In the 10 weeks after its estab- This ignorance is embarrassing, but it was legiance, or religious affiliation. The lishment, WDC assessed the West Coast shared by all of my colleagues with whom potential scenarios are, unfortunately, security situation and concluded that the I initially discussed this scenario. None limited only by one’s imagination. Japanese population posed a threat to of us had any idea about the U.S. Army’s The following, except for explicit both military and national security. In role in 1942. We assumed it was a domes- historical references and civil-military re- hindsight, WDC’s eventual justification tic operation because of Posse Comitatus lations discussions, is a work of fiction. of “military necessity” to evacuate and and other legal restraints on the use of exclude Japanese-Americans from the Federal troops domestically. Part 1. Historical Context West Coast was wholly unsubstantiated I was horrified by the details of On February 19, 1942, President by any reasonable standard of military Personal Justice Denied, the final report of Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Execu- intelligence. General Dewitt’s final the Commission on Wartime Relocation tive Order (EO) 9066, authorizing justification of military necessity was un- and Internment of Civilians, and particu- the internment of 120,000 Japanese- apologetically racist3 and culminated with larly the description of how abject racism Americans on the West Coast, a plan a staggering assertion worth preserving in yielded “military necessity” as the justi- justified and largely executed by the the public awareness: fication for interning Japanese-American United States Army. For fifty years after citizens. Instead of being a farfetched World War II, scholars, Presidential There are indications that [over 112,000 thought experiment, this article became a administrations, and Congresses con- potential enemies, of Japanese extraction] straightforward question: “Can this hap- demned the Japanese Internment more are organized and ready for concerted ac- pen again?” emphatically and remorsefully than any tion at a favorable opportunity. The very other injustice in American history. fact that no sabotage has taken place to Less than a century later, in compli- date is a disturbing and confirming indi- ance with Executive Order 15022, the cation that such action will be taken.4 Major Lee M. Turcotte, USAF, wrote this essay U.S. military’s U.S. Northern Command while a Student at the Air Command and Staff College. It won the 2016 Secretary of Defense (USNORTHCOM) established Joint The same perverse logic was not National Security Essay Competition. Task Force–Freedom to plan and execute applicable to the origins of the Second JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Turcotte 35 Internment. Lone-wolf attacks from passed the Civil Liberties Act of 1987, Hemisphere against Axis attack during Islamists had occurred, though no avail- which contains near-verbatim excerpts World War II does not question the ap- able evidence suggests a widespread or from Personal Justice Denied, most nota- propriateness of the military’s role in the even nascent conspiracy. However, such bly the recognition of “grave injustice,” First Internment. Guarding the United ironclad logic and fallacious rhetoric echo the acknowledgment that “these actions States and Its Outposts recounts Western across both internments, the memory were without security reasons,” and the Hemisphere defense efforts, with a chap- of which must continue to serve as a re- description of motivations of prejudice, ter devoted to a factual description of the straint on threat inflation and arguments hysteria, and leadership failure.8 Congress First Internment. The narrative focuses of military necessity. also apologized on behalf of the Nation heavily on the decisionmaking process Despite the vitriol of General Dewitt’s and authorized reparations. President of General Dewitt’s staff to justify the justification for excluding the Japanese Ronald Reagan signed the Civil Liberties exclusion of the Japanese on the grounds from the West Coast, the military can Act of 1987 into law on August 10, of military necessity, with emphasis on only share in the blame. Congress and 1988, with public comments on how the external political and public influences the public also pressed for exclusion internment was a “grave wrong” and “a supporting exclusion. The extent of the of Japanese citizens based on fear and mistake . . . based solely on race.”9 scrutiny of the Army’s role, and the clos- racial hostility. Personal Justice Denied After taking office, President George est Guarding the United States and Its summarizes the situation thusly: “The H.W. Bush signed the letters of apology Outposts comes to self-reflection, is to ask, governmental decisions of 1942 were that accompanied reparations to intern- “What were the reasons that impelled the not the work of a few men driven by ees. In 1992, he approved an amendment Army to carry out the mass evacuation?” animus, but decisions supported or ac- to the Civil Liberties Act to address This is settled one sentence later with: cepted by public servants from nearly technical issues with the payment of “The President and Congress had ap- every part of the political spectrum. Nor reparations. In his remarks after signing proved mass evacuation and the Secretary did sustained or vocal opposition come the amendment, he called the internment of War . . . thought it necessary to carry it from the American public.”5 WDC’s “one of the darkest incidents in American out.”12 Thus ends the military’s scrutiny attitude mirrored public sentiment, constitutional history” and reiterated of its involvement in one of the great except that the military also wielded the the need “to do everything possible injustices in American history. rhetorical cudgel of “military necessity.” to ensure that such a grave wrong is After extended debate within WDC and never repeated.”10 Four consecutive Part 2. Resignation between Secretary of War Henry Stimson Presidential administrations condemned of the Chairman and various Federal agencies, President the First Internment and, with the sup- The Second Internment differed Franklin D. Roosevelt signed EO 9066 port of Congress, the U.S. Government substantially from the First in that on February 19, 1942. With additional took the exceedingly rare step of paying its origins were primarily political, as Federal support, WDC orchestrated the reparations. opposed to being fueled by speculative evacuation and exclusion of 120,000 Despite this unambiguous acknowl- military threat assessments. As insider Japanese-Americans from the West Coast. edgment of wrongdoing, the collective attacks escalated, political figures, media Historical judgment of the First statements of the government regarding pundits, and outspoken citizens began Internment is marked by consistent, the First Internment are framed primarily openly questioning whether collective unambiguous condemnation. President in terms of justice, not morality. Personal action against Muslim citizens might be Gerald Ford formally terminated the Justice Denied refers to lapses of consti- militarily necessary. This idea also sur- authority of EO 9066 on February 19, tutional commitment and democratic faced in the military, but not in an orga- 1976, with a statement that the evacua- values. It offers a warning that American nized way, and not because of command tion of Japanese-Americans was a tragedy exceptionalism can lead to complacency influence or the threat assessments of and a national mistake.6 President Jimmy toward “evil-doing” elsewhere and an in- planning staffs. Most Servicemembers Carter recommended establishment of sistence that “it can’t happen here,” even understood the intent if not the legal the Commission on Wartime Relocation though “it did happen here.”11 Crucially, nuances of the Posse Comitatus Act, and Internment of Civilians in 1980. while Personal Justice Denied questions which forbade the Federal military from Congress authorized the commission, the decisionmaking process of the U.S. conducting domestic law enforcement which finalized Personal Justice Denied in Army and WDC leading up to EO 9066, activities. The military did not come 1982. it does not address civil-military relations up with the idea for the Second Intern- Personal Justice Denied opened by or whether the military’s active role in ment, nor did it advocate for an intern- calling the First Internment an “extraor- identifying citizens as threats and then ment as a matter of policy or necessity. dinary and unique” event in American taking action against them was appropri- The most significant difference history and a “grave injustice” shaped by ate for Federal military forces. between the First and Second intern- “race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure Likewise, the U.S. Army’s military ments was the vehement opposition of of political leadership.”7 Congress then history of its defense of the Western the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 36 Essay Competitions / The Viability of Moral Dissent by the Military JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Dressed in uniform marking service in World War I, this veteran enters Santa Anita assembly center for persons of Japanese ancestry evacuated from West Coast, April 5, 1942, Arcadia, California (National Archives and Records Administration/Clem Albers) during discussions with the President The Chairman knew he had no le- and basic human rights, citing the gov- and the President’s senior advisors. The gitimate basis to step down in protest of ernment’s extensive record of apologies Chairman spent weeks arguing against flawed strategy. Internment as a strategy and restitution. The Presidential adminis- internment of Muslims, in discussions was by no means simply a matter of mili- tration insisted it was a matter of supreme that grew heated but remained profes- tary expertise. It was inherently political emergency.13 Amends could be made sional. The Chairman’s first argument and appealed to the widespread public after the fact, if necessary. was that internment of Muslim citizens sentiment that the only way to restore In a private meeting with the was a disastrous strategy from a purely security was to take action against the Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, military perspective, since it would ef- Muslim population, regardless of their and Chairman, the President announced fectively legitimize the propaganda of citizenship. Strategic disagreements the final decision to order the detention violent extremist organizations assert- aside, the Chairman’s most fundamental of Muslims domestically until security ing a war on Muslims by the West. The reservation was the moral bankruptcy could be reestablished. Given the state Chairman also predicted enough active of internment and the damage to of emergency, the Supreme Court would resistance domestically, by both Muslims the military’s standing in society that defer to the Executive in matters of and the general public, to cause incidents would result from its involvement. The national security; congressional support of Federal troops using deadly force Chairman insisted that the basic premise had already been secured. The Chairman against American citizens on more than of a mass internment was antithetical to resigned immediately, calling the decision isolated occasions. American values, constitutional principles, a catastrophic strategy, a loathsome attack JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Turcotte 37 to comprehend the significance of the Chairman’s resignation and the military’s subsequent willingness to proceed with the internment. Samuel Huntington laid the founda- tion for future discourse in American civil-military relations in his 1957 treatise The Soldier and the State. In addition to describing principles of objective and sub- jective civilian control of the military that have defined the civil-military relations field ever since, Huntington considered several forms of military dissent. The first he called operational and doctrinal dissent, which occurs among soldiers within the military chain of command, due primarily to differences in tactical knowledge or differing situational aware- ness between commanders and soldiers in the field.14 As long as the soldier’s jus- tification for dissent supports the higher mission or objective of the organization, Huntington claimed this sort of dissent was justifiable. Huntington’s second form of dis- sent occurs at the level of civil-military interaction. At this level, the authority of the statesmen to decide to go to war is absolute. Jus ad bellum is not for the soldier to decide. “Superior political wisdom,” Huntington claims, “must be accepted as fact,” even in a political envi- ronment such as Nazi Germany.15 Within war, however, when a statesman violates objective control (that is, intrudes into Huntington’s esteemed realm of “au- tonomous military professionalism”) and issues “militarily absurd” orders that fall “strictly within the military realm without any political implications,” disobedience 16 Rose Fukuda and Roy Takeda, Manzanar Relocation Center, 1943 (Library of Congress/Ansel Adams) is justified. This is the point at which the constraints of Huntington’s theoreti- on American values, and an unforgiv- obedience to civilian authority, and cal model become apparent, given how able national disgrace, all the more so whether resignation by generals in protest sharply he delineates between political because similar events had occurred—and could ever be a legitimate means of dis- and military expertise. Even if the military been roundly condemned—within living sent. The only comparable prior rupture agrees widely on apparently clear-cut stra- memory. The President was not entirely in civil-military relations was General tegic concerns, statesmen need only claim shocked by the Chairman’s resignation of the Army Douglas MacArthur’s in- broader political implications, which and already had a successor in mind. The subordination and subsequent firing by cannot then be disputed by the military. Chairman’s successor was quickly con- President Harry Truman. MacArthur’s Huntington’s overly strict definitions firmed; shortly thereafter, the President firing, however, left the civil-military neglect truths about politics and war signed Executive Order 15022. relationship intact and served to rein- recognized by Carl von Clausewitz at the The Chairman’s resignation repre- force the principle of absolute civilian dawn of the Napoleonic era in the early sented the culmination of a multi-decade control of the military. An understanding 1800s. In practice, as Clausewitz and the scholarly debate on the limits of military of the “resignation debate” is essential Chairman both realized, strategy and 38 Essay Competitions / The Viability of Moral Dissent by the Military JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 politics cannot be disentangled. If civilian intervention” in politics. His definition to secure . . . the preference for reason supremacy is to continue to be meaning- of military intervention is informed by over coercion in public policymaking.”26 ful, dissent cannot be justified based on the actions of officers such as Douglas This arrangement did not put the mili- violations of objective control. MacArthur, whom Finer criticizes for “in- tary into a position of blind, thoughtless Huntington’s third scenario for venting their own private notion of the obedience, Burk claimed, as long as the dissent is on the basis of illegal or uncon- national interest” and “drawing a distinc- military introduced its “expert knowledge stitutional orders from civilian authorities. tion between nation and the government into policy deliberations” to help inform Under these circumstances, the military in power.”21 Furthermore, if military political decisionmaking. If this was the must give “considerable presumption intervention takes place, it will likely be case, the military would be acting with of validity to the opinion of the states- motivated by selfish corporate interests “responsible obedience.”27 man.” If the legitimately functioning instead of the idealism of upholding the Though Burk’s definition of re- branches of government, including and military’s self-appointed “sacred trust” of sponsible obedience already seems to especially the judiciary, agree on the legal- supervising the Republic.22 rationalize away moral dissent at the level ity or constitutionality of an order, the Despite Finer’s concerns about undue experienced by the Chairman, he went military must obey.17 This was the case military corporate interests, he claims the on to scrutinize Huntington’s analysis for the Second Internment, a position military is generally reluctant to coerce of moral dissent. He rightly identified the Chairman recognized all too clearly the government’s domestic opponents. Huntington’s failure to provide use- by the end of his final meeting with the “Foreign foes” are the enemy, not fel- ful answers about when moral dissent President. low nationals.23 Finer provides British, might be appropriate, even with regard Morality is Huntington’s final German, and Turkish examples of do- to extremes such as genocide. Burk criti- scenario for dissent. Individuals serv- mestic military intervention, but tellingly, cized Huntington’s use of “crude binary ing in the military do not and cannot he makes no mention of the U.S. Army’s terms” to frame his discussion about “surrender to the civilian [the] right to role in 1942. Since Finer is mostly con- disobedience and dissent, and then spent make ultimate moral judgments.”18 If a cerned with creeping military influence in the remainder of his essay seeking to statesman overrules morality for national politics and not outright overthrow of the define a “protected space” for disobedi- interest, hewing to Michael Walzer’s con- government, his concern apparently does ence. Unfortunately, Burk’s “protected cept of supreme emergency, the soldier not extend to actions where fellow na- spaces” all devolved into examples of should obey except in the most extreme tionals are defined as potential enemies in moral action within a purely military con- circumstances. Huntington offers no a time of war. He also cites an abundance text. These are valuable and legitimate clarity about what these circumstances of military interventions motivated by examples in their own right, but they might be; he acknowledges genocide as “national interest” in South America, but offer nothing to differentiate responsible morally intolerable, but expresses un- he dismisses this as unlikely in countries obedience from moral dissent at the level certainty about whether there could be with free and fair elections.24 Finer does of civil-military interaction.28 Despite a countervailing factors against dissent in not specifically address moral dissent. He tortured argument that clarifies dissent the face of genocidal orders.19 In the end, does, however, add essential context for within the military chain of command but Huntington leaves no meaningful op- understanding the risks of the military’s absolves senior leaders of moral responsi- tions for dissent from political guidance, divergence from society, as corporate bility via “responsible obedience,” Burk and he is especially unwilling to consider self-interest advances a self-proclaimed concludes with an insight that neatly moral dissent in a substantive way. and potentially dangerous conception of summarizes the question of moral dissent Shortly after publication of The national interest and constitutionality. and seems to offer a way forward: “The Soldier and the State, Samuel Finer added Scholars continued to debate the ongoing task is to use reason to choose a to the civil-military canon with a counter- possibility of moral dissent well into course of action that is militarily effective point to Huntington titled The Man on the post-9/11 era, largely within and that is justifiable by the values and Horseback. Finer was concerned primarily Huntington’s original framework of customs held by liberal democratic societ- with the military’s growing influence in disobedience. In 2009, James Burk ies.”29 While it does not offer any tangible politics, specifically in the context of the criticized Huntington for neglecting the courses of action, this at least suggests military’s institutional protectionism and viability and necessity of moral dissent, moral or rational responsibility must still advocacy for its own corporate interests. though he agreed with Huntington’s be somehow involved. Finer criticizes Huntington’s definition premise that the decision to wage war The nadir of the resignation debate of professionalism as excessively strict is always political, leaving the military occurred in 2015, as the featured article and idealized, and while he recognizes no space for dissent in the matter.25 The of a special edition of Strategic Studies civilian supremacy over the military,20 he military’s refusal to obey political direc- Quarterly, an Air Force–sponsored expresses concern about the blurring of tion would “pose a constitutional crisis,” publication on national and interna- lines between political and military in- given that the Constitution “established tional security. The author, a U.S. Army stitutions and the possibility of “military particular institutional arrangements . . . major, fully accepted Burk’s premise of JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Turcotte 39 responsible obedience and went on to is how easily it can be used to absolve Chairman of the Joint Chiefs proceeded assert that military leaders “cannot claim the military of any sort of moral respon- with implementation. any legitimate basis upon which to as- sibility, since the boundary between The moral motivation for the sess the national interest, the public will, military strategy and politics is almost Chairman’s resignation was unique, or the common good.”30 In assessing entirely subjective. No one meaningfully but the insignificance of resignation as other scholarly views on the possibility improved on Huntington’s evasion of a threat to civilian control—at least if of dissent on narrow moral grounds, the the question of moral dissent, until the used in the rarest of circumstances—was author dismissed any protected space Chairman put it to the test. foreshadowed by the early retirement for moral resignation as “vanishingly The Chairman was deeply conflicted of Air Force Chief of Staff General small.”31 He also claimed that even if about resigning. He exited the stage as Ronald Fogleman in 1997. Fogleman’s there was a morally defensible reason for Kohn recommended, quietly and as apo- retirement was the culmination of his resignation, there would be no way to do litically as possible. He never entertained frustration with providing “military ad- it privately or apolitically. Moreover, this the idea of trying to rally support and vice the civilian leadership did not value would be the wrong avenue for resigna- generate more widespread disobedience. for whatever reason.” He also resented tion since “a professional standard upon This was a principled decision; he felt that what he judged to be misguided politi- which to judge the morality of conse- leading a revolt would have been an at- cal decisionmaking by then–Secretary quences . . . would preclude individual tack on the country, and the country was of the Air Force Sheila Widnall and the resignation and instead dictate disobedi- worth preserving, if not his role within Bill Clinton administration, the details ence by the officer corps as a whole.”32 it. It was also a pragmatic decision. The of which, by Fogleman’s accounting, In the end, the author dismissed outright Chairman had no expectation that he compelled him to retire rather than con- any consideration of moral resignation, could unify the military in opposition to tinue to work in an environment where claiming such concerns came at the ex- the internment of Muslims. The military his expertise was “not valued by those in pense of “far more pressing questions.”33 was overwhelmingly Christian and the charge.”36 Fogleman’s retirement, a sort Richard Kohn took a blunt but rather majority of Servicemembers identified of preemptive resignation, generated a more productive stance. While acknowl- as ideologically conservative, character- flurry of debate about the state of civil- edging the fact that resignation directly istics not inherently anti-Muslim but military relations at the time. Fogleman’s assaults civilian authority, Kohn admitted that placed the military in broad align- attitude had hints of MacArthur-esque the possibility of “truly extraordinary or ment with the President’s policies. One condescension toward his supposedly dire circumstances” that might justify other factor concerned the Chairman unprincipled civilian bosses. However, his resignation. Contrary to the call for mu- profoundly. He recognized a widespread description of his role as Air Force Chief tiny or mass disobedience in response to sense of animosity toward Muslims of Staff—“it’s a tour, not a sentence”— immoral guidance, Kohn suggested prin- throughout the Services, largely as a re- rings true in the sense that individuals cipled resignation must be done as quietly sidual effect of decades of stalemated war must retain some personal agency to de- as possible in order to offer at least some in the Middle East and northern Africa. cide whether they can continue to fulfill protection to civilian control of the mili- The singular embodiment of this racism their duties responsibly. Circumstances tary.34 Of course, this provides no clarity was the slur haji, used for local nationals and motivations differed, but in each case about what circumstances might justify and insurgents alike. The Chairman ex- retirement in protest and resignation had such principled resignation, but Kohn at pected this latent racism to be redirected no meaningful effect on either the short- least left open the possibility that such a onto the Muslim population in the course term functioning of the government situation merited consideration and could of the internment, and he was not wrong. or the long-term status of civil-military legitimately occur. The historical novelty and appar- relations. Despite the tensions inherent in While opinions were clearly mixed on ent momentousness of the Chairman’s the American civil-military relationship, the viability of principled resignation, the resignation were matched only by its Huntingtonian professionalism and cen- majority opinion left essentially no space almost immediate irrelevance. In a turies of near-absolute military deference for moral agency among military officers, striking historical similarity to Attorney to civilian control have produced a struc- particularly generals responsible for advis- General Francis Beverley Biddle’s vocal ture resilient enough to absorb shocks ing elected leaders. From a constitutional dissent against the idea of a Japanese and even, on occasion, to accommodate perspective, civilian control of the military internment—Biddle took “coarse and behavior considered either petulant or is indeed absolute. Burk’s concept of threatening abuse for his unwillingness insubordinate. responsible obedience is little more than to join the stampede to mass evacua- a minor qualification to Huntington’s tion”35—the Chairman’s resignation was Part 3. Conclusions original claim that the military never gets treated with utter contempt and vitriol Principled refusal to obey civilian direc- to decide when the country goes to war. by segments of the media. After a hail of tion—outright rebellion or deceptive While proper in constitutional terms, accusations of cowardice and treason, the compliance with no intent to actually the trouble with responsible obedience press moved on, and the newly appointed obey—is insubordination. There is no 40 Essay Competitions / The Viability of Moral Dissent by the Military JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Persons of Japanese ancestry arrive at Santa Anita Assembly center from San Pedro, California, April 5, 1942, Arcadia, California (National Archives and Records Administration/Clem Albers) legal legitimacy to it so long as constitu- the government, are clearly immoral. right. If political representation is the tionality is defined in terms of respect- Genocide is the default example, but highest good, if the liberal democratic ing the orders of elected leaders whose possibilities short of genocide, however principles upon which the Constitution decisions are supported by all branches undefinable in advance, must surely also is based are the most foundational of all of government. There is no Platonic exceed a moral threshold. When these the values the United States represents, ideal of constitutionality, no higher circumstances arise, even though personal then revolt is intolerable for the same knowledge the military can claim. The thresholds will differ, individuals must reason as secession: It is an attack on the military never questioned its role in the retain the freedom to opt out. Those state. Democratic societies are capable First Internment because by definition individuals will face consequences, as of implementing morally abhorrent it did the right thing. the Chairman did in the aftermath of his policies, but taking down the state, and This all seems perfectly logical, resignation. Principled resignation should the representation of the citizenry with except for the existence of Personal be exceedingly rare, but it must have its it, is not a legitimate solution. Perhaps Justice Denied. Moral dissent cannot be place. there is a point at which a society must reconciled with the military’s constitu- Critics might then ask, if principled be destroyed to save it, to resort to the tional obligations, and yet individuals resignation on moral grounds is accept- tragic logic of prior wars. If this is the must retain their autonomy. There are able, why is organized mass disobedience case, then the moral limits of dissent by circumstances that, while constitutional not also defensible in extremis? Revolt is the military must remain bounded by in the sense of being sanctioned by unacceptable for a reason that Burk gets faith, if nothing else, in the potential for JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Turcotte 41 our constitutional system to correct itself, US/index.htm#contents>. Western Defense What Is Wrong,” in American Civil-Military Command’s geographic area of responsibility Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New restore balance, and acknowledge its included Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Era, ed. Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. shortcomings. Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Wash- Snider (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univer- Personal Justice Denied provides the ington. sity Press, 2009), 155. more fundamental, less legalistic reason 3 Among other examples, Dewitt’s final 26 Ibid., 156–157. that the resignation debate failed to recommendation to the Secretary of War on the 27 Ibid., 157–158. “Evacuation of Japanese and Other Subversive 28 Ibid., 162–168. meaningfully consider moral autonomy. Persons from the Pacific Coast” states, “The 29 Ibid., 171. The discussion was predicated on the Japanese race is an enemy race and while many 30 Jim Golby, “Beyond the Resignation self-assurance that “it can’t happen second[-] and third[-]generation Japanese Debate: A New Framework for Civil-Military here.” Despite values of honor, integrity, born on United States soil, possessed of United Dialogue,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 9, no. 3 courage, and service, the military is a States citizenship, have become ‘Americanized,’ (Fall 2015), 18–46. the racial strains are undiluted.” Quoted in 31 Ibid., 21. profoundly amoral institution. If consti- Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commis- 32 Ibid., 23. tutionality consists of enacting the will of sion on Wartime Relocation and Internment 33 Ibid., 25. the people, as manifested by the actions of Civilians (Washington, DC: The Commis- 34 Richard H. Kohn, “Building Trust: of elected leaders, the military will simply sion on Wartime Relocation and Internment Civil-Military Behaviors for Effective National mirror—and sometimes facilitate—the of Civilians, 1983), 82, available at 42 Essay Competitions / The Viability of Moral Dissent by the Military JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Gun truck from 2632nd Air Expeditionary Force Transportation Company, 3rd Platoon, responsible for providing security to military and civilian convoys as they transport supplies to multiple Forward Operating Bases throughout Iraq, leads convoy on Main Supply Route, June 2004 (U.S. Air Force/Scott Reed) Civil Order and Governance as Military Responsibilities By David A. Mueller n April 2003, as U.S. forces closed ning or guidance on how to handle British Army’s Egyptian Expeditionary in on Baghdad, chaos and disorder looting, commanders in Baghdad Force, had dispatched a force, the I began to break out in the city of decided to focus on defeating the last Desert Mounted Corps under Australian more than six million residents. As civil remnants of the Iraqi military and did Lieutenant General Harry Chauvel, to order broke down, the lack of guidance little to maintain order in the capital.1 take the Ottoman city of Damascus. and forethought that U.S. leadership Eighty-five years earlier, another Allenby gave Chauvel specific orders on had put into the responsibility of U.S. Western military force had advanced on a how the city was to be taken and admin- forces for maintaining civil order in key Middle Eastern city and found itself istered in order to strengthen the British their newly conquered territory became faced with a similar situation. General position for the postwar settlement. apparent. Because there was no plan- Edmund Allenby, the commander of the When civil disorder began to break out in Damascus, however, Chauvel prioritized maintaining civil stability above his orders Lieutenant Colonel David A. Mueller, USMC, wrote this essay while attending the Air War College. from Allenby. Although his decision It won the Strategic Research Paper category of the 2016 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff greatly complicated the postwar situation Strategic Essay Competition. JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Mueller 43 and was a clear violation of direct orders, and the U.S. Army’s occupation author- General Franks, however, seemed there is no question that he viewed ity in post–World War II, we see how to have little interest in the Phase IV maintaining civil order as an implied task these longstanding historical facts were plan. As Michael Gordon and Bernard of the utmost military importance, and lost on U.S. forces in 2003. Trainor write, “Franks appointed a tiny Allenby supported his decision.2 cell of planners working on ways to get The vastly different manner in which The 2003 Invasion humanitarian assistance to the Iraqis. But American commanders viewed their The breakdown of order in Iraq imme- he seemed content to leave the lion’s responsibility to maintain civil order in diately after the U.S. military defeated share of the Phase IV planning to others Iraq from their British and Australian Iraqi forces was the result not of a in the government.”10 The one military counterparts in World War I speaks to the single oversight or bad decision, but staff to put any effort into the Phase way each group viewed the roles and re- rather a massive gap in the planning IV plan was Army Lieutenant General sponsibilities of a military force. The U.S. and preparation for the U.S. offensive. David McKiernan’s Combined Forces military’s willingness to cede postwar Stability operations, known as Phase IV Land Component Command (CFLCC). stability operations to civilian authority, in the U.S. Joint Operation Planning McKiernan, who assumed he might have even an authority within the Department Process, represent the transition from to lead the postwar reconstruction, was of Defense (DOD), would have been direct combat against enemy forces to assembling a Phase IV plan. As the plan foreign to Allenby and his lieutenants the maintenance of civil order until matured, however, the lack of U.S. forces in 1918. This truth goes beyond the “legitimate local entities are function- required planners to assume the avail- fact that travel and communication are ing.”6 Phase IV planning is doctrin- ability and effectiveness of Iraqi forces to much easier today, or even the formative ally considered a responsibility of the perform many of the tasks.11 experiences of Allenby and Chauvel (both joint combatant commander during The civil administrator who was to veterans of the Boer War) compared to operational planning. In 2003, this lead the civilian side of Rumsfeld’s two- their American counterparts, and speaks was General Tommy Franks, USA, the pronged approach to the occupation of to an evolution of thinking among commander of U.S. Central Command Iraq was Lieutenant General Jay Garner, American military professionals.3 (USCENTCOM). USA (Ret.). Garner was contacted Operation Iraqi Freedom marked the This was not the first time the on January 9, 2003, and agreed to a first time since World War II that the USCENTCOM staff had considered how 4-month commitment. His position U.S. military conducted offensive opera- to invade Iraq, a nation the United States was ratified on January 20, 2003, with tions without a partner force to handle had previously invaded in 1991 during a Presidential directive.12 The choice of occupation duties. Following the conclu- the first Gulf War and against which it had Garner made sense; he had run relief sion of hostilities in Europe in May and had a policy of regime change since 1998, operations to the Kurds in northern Iraq in Japan in August 1945, the largest when then–USCENTCOM Commander after the 1991 Gulf War,13 so he had stability operation ever conducted by General Anthony Zinni, USMC, devel- experience with humanitarian operations, the United States—and one of the most oped Operations Plan 1003. Designed he was familiar with Iraq, and, as a retired successful in history—was undertaken for the invasion and occupation of Iraq, it general, he would integrate well with his by the U.S. Army. At the peak of its called for 380,000 U.S. troops to stabilize military counterpart. USCENTCOM, authority, the U.S. Army occupied four the nation of 24 million.7 As preparations however, had been planning the inva- nations and had more than 300 million began for the 2003 invasion, Secretary of sion—and mostly ignoring Phase IV people under its jurisdiction.4 The need Defense Donald Rumsfeld rejected the operations—for more than a year. Now, to prepare for military occupation was large troop requirement of the 1003 plan, 2 months before the invasion, Garner recognized by U.S. military leaders and insisting that force levels were too high. was just putting his team together. When government officials as early as 1940.5 The study conducted by the Joint Staff they arrived in Kuwait, the team was The resultant standards that were used to prove the force levels could be lower, told that there was no room to quarter to such enormous effect in Germany, however, failed to take stability operations them on base with the CFLCC staff, so Japan, Korea, and Austria would be lost into consideration.8 As planning contin- they continued their planning from the on U.S. forces more than 50 years later, ued, General Franks told subordinates in isolation of a beachfront hotel, still using however. Thus, despite the fact that the August 2002 that the postwar planning Iraqis, foreign forces not yet committed, uniformed military historically has been effort would be led by the Department and contractors to meet the plan’s force the responsible agency for civil order of State. By mid-October, however, structure requirements.14 and postconflict governance, the lack of Secretary Rumsfeld had secured DOD as A gap is a weakness in a military force. appreciation for this fact by modern U.S. the lead agency. Rumsfeld then decided to Physical gaps are usually found at the commanders contributed to the 2003 divide the responsibilities in postwar Iraq boundaries between adjacent units that security struggles in postwar Iraq. By between a civil administrator and military do not coordinate properly.15 Franks’s comparing the U.S. invasion of Iraq with commander, each of whom would report plan was creating a gap between Phase the British capture of Damascus in 1918 to the USCENTCOM commander.9 III (dominate–break the enemy’s will to 44 Essay Competitions / Civil Order and Governance as Military Responsibilities JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Before making his final departure from Iraq on June 28, 2004, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer shakes hands with U.S. Servicemember while he and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh walk to Baghdad International Airport (U.S. Air Force/D. Myles Cullen) resist) and Phase IV.16 More importantly, Phase IV plan was creating a command what the Nation’s military is for; we’re Franks was the commander who should climate that viewed stability operations as not trained to do this. You need to get have been responsible for both phases someone else’s problem—not a military the people who are supposed to do this and the transition. Instead, however, responsibility. Franks was not alone in to do it.”21 “Franks focused most strongly on [Phase creating this perception, and it was not While he may not have been speak- III],” while Phase IV was little more limited to USCENTCOM. ing for the entire military, Estes was than a “skeleton” until “very late.”17 In Shortly after retiring in late 1998, certainly not alone in these views, and Franks’s own memoir, he recounts tell- General Howell Estes, USAF, gave an the aversion to using U.S. forces for ing the “bureaucracy beneath” Secretary interview to the PBS television program such tasks was routinely emphasized by Rumsfeld, “You pay attention to the day Frontline regarding the military mission Secretary Rumsfeld in the run-up to the after and I’ll pay attention to the day in Bosnia. Referring to the many roles invasion. In a speech on February 14, of.”18 He was essentially taking ownership the military was being asked to perform 2003, Rumsfeld assured listeners that the of what he saw as the military responsi- in order to stabilize Bosnia, Estes stated, United States could conquer and leave bilities (warfighting) while pushing off “There is a civilian component that needs Iraq quickly without lengthy “peacekeep- to the civilians what he perceived as non- to do the nation-building. And what the ing” or “nation-building” operations.22 military tasks (postwar governance). military needs to do is go in and set the The lack of planning and guidance Command climate is defined as “the conditions in which the nation-building regarding civil order came to a head as culture of a unit. It is the way a unit teams can come in and carry out their U.S. troops entered Baghdad and Iraqi ‘conducts business.’ The leader of the operations.”20 Estes did not clarify who civil authorities abandoned their posi- organization is solely responsible for the civilian component was or where it tions. As U.S. Marines toppled the statue the organization’s command climate. would come from, only that it was not of Saddam Hussein in Firdos Square Commanders at all levels establish this the military’s role. He claimed later that on April 9, 2003, looting was already climate by what they say and what they the overall view of the military regarding beginning in the city.23 In the days that do.”19 Franks’s lack of interest in the those additional tasks was that “this is not followed, maintaining civil order was JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Mueller 45 Soldier stands guard duty near burning oil well in Rumaylah Oil Fields in Southern Iraq, April 2003 (U.S. Navy/Arlo K. Abrahamson) dismissed as outside the responsibility needed to be safeguarded for postwar approach the United States took to the of U.S. forces in Iraq. “U.S. forces have stability, placing the national bank and postwar stability, but it was hardly the neither the troops nor the inclination to the Baghdad museum as the highest last. Garner, understaffed and never police neighborhoods or deter looters in priorities, while the oil ministry was the sufficiently part of the planning effort, the next few days, according to [George lowest. In the immediate turmoil after arrived in Baghdad on April 21, 2003.30 W.] Bush administration officials,” the the invasion, the Republican Palace and The following day, Garner was informed Washington Post reported in an April 10, oil ministry were well protected,27 while by Secretary Rumsfeld that he would 2003, article titled “U.S. Military Spurns the looting of the Baghdad museum in be replaced and his entire organization Postwar Police Role.”24 Two days later, view of U.S. forces became the symbol of dissolved in order to make room for the the newspaper updated the status of postwar chaos and U.S. indifference to Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) the direction: “Troops are to intervene civil order.28 The disconnect between the under the leadership of L. Paul Bremer.31 directly only if Iraqis appear to be stealing people responsible for the postwar plan Bremer “possessed full executive, legisla- weapons from any of the many arsenals and the military forces required to imple- tive, and judicial authority” in Iraq, but found throughout the city.”25 While the ment that plan was astounding. While while he reported directly to Secretary Los Angeles Times reported that some U.S. forces did begin dedicated efforts to Rumsfeld, his chain of command as a troops had been given orders to stop the restore civil order, they did not have the Presidential envoy was unclear.32 What looting as early as April 11, it pointed out forces to do the job, and the Iraqis were was clear, however, is that Bremer re- that the U.S. military’s “hands-off policy not organized quickly enough to provide ported to no one in Iraq and no one had encouraged the looters to commit the forces necessary. As late as May 27, wearing a uniform. However, Major more and more thefts.”26 the New York Times was still reporting General Ricardo Sanchez, USA, who From Kuwait, Jay Garner and his the looting that was occurring through- was now the senior military commander team could only watch the looting and out Iraq.29 in Iraq, did not report to Bremer either. wonder what would be left by the time The failure to prioritize civil order in While he had been directed to sup- they arrived in Baghdad. They had pre- the immediate aftermath of the invasion port Bremer and the CPA by Secretary pared a prioritized list of buildings that was one symptom of the dysfunctional Rumsfeld, his chain of command still ran 46 Essay Competitions / Civil Order and Governance as Military Responsibilities JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 through CFLCC and USCENTCOM would demand postwar control of any clear what Chauvel was supposed to do if and then to the Secretary.33 In short, territories Allenby conquered in Syria Feisal insisted on his own Arab govern- there was no single person in Iraq in and had representatives with Allenby’s ment once he took the city, although charge of the entire U.S. effort, much less army to ensure their interests were Allenby instructed Chauvel to “deal with the coalition and Iraqi efforts. safeguarded.36 him through Lawrence” if there was any As if to emphasize how little anyone The British hoped to avoid imple- trouble.41 cared about the postwar effort, the im- mentation of Sykes-Picot in Damascus When Chauvel and the ANZACs mediate aftermath of the invasion was because they preferred to grant its arrived at the outskirts of Damascus on defined by a rush of senior leadership to postwar governance to Prince Feisal, September 29, 1918, Feisal’s Arab army leave theater. By the end of the summer, who, accompanied by the most famous was still at least 3 days away. With orders McKiernan and Franks had left Iraq, liaison officer in history, T.E. Lawrence, to avoid the city, the ANZACs continued Garner was replaced by Bremer, and was leading an Arab army against the to pursue the fleeing Turkish army. The Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, Ottoman Turks in the name of Arab na- Ottoman government within Damascus, USA, had turned V Corps over to newly tionalism. After a volley of telegrams and however, decided on September 30 to promoted Lieutenant General Sanchez.34 face-to-face diplomacy between London, abandon the city and join their retreating This left the newest corps commander in Paris, and the Middle East, Allenby gave army, which caused civil disorder to break the Army and a civilian administrator who his subordinates specific orders regarding out.42 Like his American counterparts in learned he would be going to Iraq only in the movement on Damascus, which was 2003, Chauvel was unable to retain the April to run the occupation, and neither designed to avoid implementation of the civil apparatus he had planned to use to of them was in charge. The lack of clarity, Sykes-Picot agreement. He dispatched maintain order in the city. Furthermore, focus, and a coherent plan for postwar General Harry Chauvel, the leader of in pursuit of the Turks, one of Chauvel’s Iraq, as well as the many failures of the the Australia New Zealand Army Corps units had violated orders and ridden CPA, are well documented by authors (ANZAC) cavalry and a fellow Boer War through Damascus on October 1, where such as Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Michael veteran, to lead the politically fraught local Syrian Arab notables gave them an Gordon, and Bernard Trainor.35 The un- mission on Damascus.37 official welcome. Meanwhile, Chauvel, derlying mistake, however, was a failure Two key provisions in Allenby’s trying to solve his civil governance prob- to recognize the military necessity of civil orders were designed to avoid imple- lem, worked with Lawrence (who had order and postwar governance. The U.S. mentation of the Sykes-Picot agreement. arrived in Damascus ahead of Feisal), and military, which had not been responsible First, Chauvel was to allow Feisal’s Arab appointed a pro-Feisal Arab as the new for an occupation in more than 50 years, army to liberate the city. Allenby’s order, governor.43 missed the fact that both historically are expressing concerns familiar today, On October 2, with Feisal’s forces 1 military tasks. directed that none of Chauvel’s troops day away from Damascus, civil disorder should enter Damascus. According to was still rampant and possibly exacerbated Taking Damascus: The Army of David Fromkin, this was “presumably to by the appointment of the governor. Empire Prioritizes Civil Order forestall resistance by a possibly hostile Chauvel decided to march his entire force In late September 1918, British General Moslem [sic] metropolis to a Christian through Damascus to quell the unrest. Edmund Allenby was preparing to con- occupation.”38 Furthermore, if Feisal’s According to Fromkin, “This was exactly tinue his Middle East offensive against army, and not the British force, were what Allenby and Clayton [the political the Ottoman Turks. Allenby had already to capture Damascus, Feisal might not officer] had hoped to avoid: the popula- conquered Sinai and Jerusalem and was be subject to an agreement to which tion aroused [and] Christian troops advancing in Transjordan, but his next he played no part. In fact, Allenby’s defiling through the streets of a great conquest had the potential to create a chief political officer had already written Moslem [sic] city to restore order.”44 political firestorm. Damascus was the Sykes, stating, “If Feisal makes good in It was also the final action in a series first city in Allenby’s path earmarked to a military sense he may well carry Syria of events that completely undermined fall under French control by the terms with him.” Otherwise, he would have no Allenby’s intent to avoid the implementa- of the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement. A influence.39 tion of Sykes-Picot and the subsequent secret plan through which the British The second key provision in Allenby’s political complications. Most notably, and French committed to a postwar orders was to retain the Ottoman civil however, Allenby, who arrived the same partition of the Middle East between government in Damascus. Chauvel rec- day as Feisal, understood the situation them, Sykes-Picot was to be put into ognized that he did not have the forces Chauvel had been placed in and did not effect in any area conquered by either to place a military governor in charge blame him.45 Ally. Thus far, Allenby and the British of the city of 300,000, and the foreign In comparing Chauvel’s decisions government had total control of the office believed Sykes-Picot would not to those of American commanders in decisions concerning their conquered go into effect until the British exerted 2003, the timeline is telling. Three territories. The French, however, control over the civil authority.40 It is not days is the longest Chauvel would have JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Mueller 47 needed to tolerate civil unrest to comply the report written by Colonel Irvin L. governance task because of how it would with Allenby’s orders, but he deemed Hunt, who “spent the interwar period be perceived. He “worried that presiding the delay unacceptable. In the case of seeking to ensure that the army was pre- over the governance of people through- marching his troops through the town, it pared for its next occupation.”48 Hunt’s out the world could send the wrong would have been a 1-day delay to wait for report identified two major lessons from signal to the American People.”54 Most Feisal’s Arabs to do the same thing. One the Rhineland occupation. First, the of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s day, however, was too long for Chauvel. military civil administrator, who reported Cabinet members had strong reservations By contrast, 3 days into the Baghdad un- directly to the overall theater commander, about granting the Army such a large role rest, American commanders still were not was separate and distinct from the tactical in postwar policy, and even Roosevelt certain that providing civil order was their commander, thus dividing the legislative himself was lukewarm at best regarding responsibility, even if they had the forces and executive authorities between two military governance in Europe.55 In the to do so. Allenby’s support for Chauvel commanders. The report stated that all end, however, no other U.S. Government in the aftermath of Damascus, however, authorities should be consolidated under organization had the resources, required is evidence that the distinguished British one commander. Second, Hunt criticized structure, doctrine, and precedent to general understood that maintaining civil the use of the same military units for accomplish such a monumental task and order was an implied task when he gave tactical and governance duty simultane- to incorporate civilians into the military the order to conquer the city. ously; separate units would have been governments where necessary.56 Military preferable.49 governance was the logical, if imperfect, World War II: The U.S. Army The Rhineland experience and the choice. and Military Government Hunt report inspired both study and The success of the World War II oc- The U.S. Army ran one of the most debate regarding military governance cupations is undeniable and was often successful postwar stabilization efforts throughout the interwar period, and led cited by the Bush administration in 2003, in history following World War II. The to updates to existing U.S. war plans.50 but the model of military government Army established military governments With the outbreak of war in Europe in was always overlooked. Even without in Japan, Korea, Austria, and Germany, 1939, it was only natural for the U.S. military government, if the principles and Army generals were appointed to Army to update its military governance of a unified command and an emphasis command them.46 Command author- doctrine, and FM 27-5 placed all author- on military necessity had been given ity was at the heart of what made the ity with a single unified commander—the prominence, the U.S. occupation of Iraq military governments so effective. Field military governor—and emphasized may have looked more like that of World Manual (FM) 27-5, Military Govern- “military necessity” as the driving prin- War II. In the end, the results of the U.S. ment and Civil Affairs, first published ciple in military governance.51 While the post–World War II occupation in Europe in 1940, established military govern- Army’s embrace of military governance demonstrate that the choice of military ment as a “command responsibility” may appear strange in 2016, the U.S. government in postwar situations may be and gave the commanding general “full Army of 1940 could refer to a long list much like Winston Churchill’s opinion of legislative, executive, and legal author- of precedents in which U.S. occupa- democracy: it is “the worst form of gov- ity” over his assigned territory.47 These tion required military governments: the ernment, except for all the others.”57 are the same authorities given to L. Reconstruction following the end of Paul Bremer in 2003, except that unlike the Civil War in 1865, the Philippines Are We Learning the the military commanders, Bremer had (1898–1946), Cuba (1898–1902), Wrong Lessons? no authority over the forces he relied Puerto Rico (1898), Veracruz, Mexico The lessons drawn from any war are on for his security. While control of (1914), the Rhineland (1918–1923), and always critical to the way future opera- postwar policy was debated throughout numerous Marine Corps interventions tions will be conducted. Lieutenant World War II, the Army was the most in the Caribbean. Together, these oc- General Daniel Bolger, USA (Ret.), prepared agency to institute postwar cupations represent more than 120 years identifies several key lessons from governance and had the doctrine to of consistent, though periodic, need for the failed U.S. occupation of Iraq in support its position. military governments.52 By contrast, the his 2015 book Why We Lost: A Gen- It is important to note that, leading U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 occurred eral’s Inside Account of the Iraq and up to World War II, the U.S. Army’s more than half a century after the military Afghanistan Wars. Bolger argues that most recent occupation experience, government in Japan ended in 1952.53 “short, decisive, conventional conflicts and the one that drove most research The idea of placing conquered and waged for limited ends” emphasize the and strategic thinking at the Army War liberated nations under U.S. Army rule advantages of America’s swift and agile College during the interwar period, was not without opponents in the early military.58 He states that if the U.S. was the Allied occupation of Germany’s 1940s. Army Chief of Staff General effort in Iraq had ended after the initial Rhineland following World War I. The George C. Marshall had misgivings about campaign in 2003, “admiring war col- most influential study of the period was the Service taking on such a monumental leges would have studied the brilliant 48 Essay Competitions / Civil Order and Governance as Military Responsibilities JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 opening rounds as models of lightning Small Wars Manual of 1940, but that reduced capacity with questionable capa- war.”59 Bolger does not speculate on publication has entire chapters on mili- bilities.67 As such, the military remains the what postwar Iraq would have looked tary government and how to conduct only large organization the Nation can like if U.S. forces had departed in May elections—essentially nation-building turn to and state, “You’re leaving next 2003, but he implies that it was neither from the ground up.66 To truly close the week to go halfway around the world for America’s problem nor the U.S. mili- doctrinal loop, either the next update the next year”—and not have half the tary’s responsibility.60 of FM 3-24 should include sections on personnel resign. Bolger criticizes the doctrine con- military government and elections or a We have seen from the above ex- tained in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, as modern version of FM 27-5, Military amples that civil order and governance “the shiny objects of counterinsurgency Government, should be created. historically are the responsibility of theory.”61 He degrades counterinsur- the military that conquers a territory. gency doctrine as a distraction from a Conclusion Nevertheless, today, instead of a Colonel focus on “core strength, rapid, decisive There is a distinct difference between Hunt attempting to prepare the United conventional operations.”62 However, the responsibility to maintain civil States for its next occupation, military Bolger ignores the fact that the insur- order in the transition from combat leaders such as Daniel Bolger advocate gency in Iraq was not an inevitable operations to postwar governance and against future U.S. postwar occupation by-product of the invasion, but rather the running of the occupation govern- and deem preparation for such a likeli- was the result of U.S. mismanagement ment itself. It is logically consistent to hood unnecessary. We do not always of the postwar situation. Specifically, it believe that the military should do all get to choose the war we want to fight, resulted from the failure to treat civil it can to maintain civil order through however; the enemy also gets a vote. order and competent postwar governance combat operations and that the occu- Occupation duties are the inevitable as military responsibilities. FM 3-24 pation government should be run by result of most offensive operations. was a critical milestone in correcting some other entity, whether the State We need to recognize that a military not only doctrine, but also the culture Department or another arm of govern- unprepared for occupation is likewise within the military. Following its publica- ment. What is clear, however, is that unprepared for offensive operations. tion in 2006, the Army revised FM 3-0, maintaining civil order through the The decision to conquer comes with the Operations, with a renewed emphasis transition is critical, and the military responsibility to govern, and it is always on stability operations, civil order, and must be prepared to provide postwar easier to destroy than to create. Even if support to civil government.63 Both doc- security forces. Therefore, if we are to we do not resource units for civil affairs uments reflect the U.S. military’s evolved keep unity of command and view the and occupation duties, we need mature understanding of civil order and good running of an interim stability govern- doctrine and a military culture that re- governance as a distinct military priority ment as a command function, a military fuses to rely on General Estes’s mythical in ways that would have been familiar government under a uniformed com- “civilian component that needs to do the to the U.S. Army of World War II or to mander is the most logical option. If, nation-building” as the foundation for Chauvel’s ANZACs. however, another entity is going to run Phase IV plans.68 The newfound emphasis on civil stabilization operations, the military Finally, a closing point regarding the order and stability operations found in commander should involve that entity adamant public debate about the threat FM 3-24 and FM 3-0 is a strong and in planning for the transition and ensure from the Islamic State of Iraq and the important step toward ensuring that the that the responsibility for civil order, Levant (ISIL) and the increased calls military importance of civil order is not as well as the command relationship, is for its destruction: While the threat is lost on future generations. However, codified in a robust Phase IV plan. undeniable and the calls for ISIL to be while those manuals emphasize support There will always be military profes- annihilated have become increasingly for existing civil governments and the sionals who see their role exclusively compelling, those who advocate that end importance of good governance, only as fighting the enemy, destroying their must also provide the answer to postcon- FM 3-24 makes mention of military gov- equipment, and defeating their armies, flict governance in the areas the group ernment, and then only once.64 Given the believing that all civil order and policing controls. Furthermore, any military climate in which the authors of FM 3-24 duties should be left to someone “trained commander executing a plan aimed at de- were writing, I applaud them for even to do it.” The problem, however, is that stroying ISIL should see the maintenance mentioning military government. Was that group of “trained to do it” individu- of civil order and postconflict governance anyone ready, however, to advocate for it als does not exist in a deployable form as a military responsibility. A mature plan or to implement it? The answer is no. The in the United States and never has. The should be required before what little 2014 version of the document eliminated State Department’s Civilian Response order still exists in the region is destroyed the reference to military government.65 Corps, established in 2004, was to have by U.S. action. JFQ Both versions of FM 3-24 revisit many of been that capability, but it never reached the themes found in the Marine Corps’ its planned size and currently exists in a JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Mueller 49 24 Peter Slevin and Bradley Graham, “U.S. 61 Ibid., 429. Notes Military Spurns Postwar Police Role,” Washing- 62 Ibid., 433. ton Post, April 10, 2003. 63 Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations 1 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Train- 25 William Branigin and Rick Atkinson, (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of or, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion “Anything, and Everything Goes,” Washington the Army, February 2008), available at 50 Essay Competitions / Civil Order and Governance as Military Responsibilities JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Palestinian Authority President Mahmud Abbas greets U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry as he arrives for meeting in Amman, Jordan, June 2013 (State Department) The Palestinian Authority Security Force Future Prospects By Jeffrey Dean McCoy hould the United States con- between the Israelis and the Palestin- course, far more complex. Unknown to tinue to support the Palestinian ians. To the average American, the most is the fact that during the 2014 S Authority Security Force (PASF)? term Palestinian is often synonymous Israel-Gaza conflict, the West Bank was To the Western observer, the current with a masked Arab hurling a rock at quiet and stable. In fact, since 2009 violence in Jerusalem is but another the ubiquitous Israel Defense Forces the PASF has received silent, grudg- iteration of the intractable conflict (IDF). The reality on the ground is, of ing approval of its performance in the West Bank by Western leadership.1 The success of the PASF, like that of many nascent security forces supported by Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Dean McCoy, USA, wrote this article while a student at the U.S. Army War College. It won the Strategy Article category of the 2016 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the United States, can be short-lived, Strategic Essay Competition. especially in light of recent attacks by JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 McCoy 51 both Palestinians and Israelis. However, to Peace to end the Israeli-Palestinian guard force with no arrest authority. It PASF performance has shown that it is conflict.5 The difficulty of implementa- can react quickly to control riots and a capable security force that is worthy tion and complexity of the environment establish checkpoints in support of PCP of Israeli partnership, Palestinian trust, increased after Hamas won the Gaza operations or response to emergen- and further U.S. support. To substanti- Strip election in January 2006, and its cies. The PCP are trained in a Western ate this position, the development of subsequent forceful takeover from the European police style of law enforcement the PASF will be briefly examined Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in 2007. and perform much like an average police and set against its unique organiza- This development would effectively split force. Although they have made strides tion. Both its history and its distinct the Palestinians into the Fatah-ruled in their professionalism and training as of structure allow it to maintain order West Bank and Hamas-led Gaza Strip.6 late, they continue to be woefully under- within the West Bank. The PASF will resourced in radios, vehicles, and other face challenges to further development Organization basic equipment items when compared if any success in a two-state solution is The PASF is organized into four main with their PG and NSF counterparts. As reached, but it remains the best hope services, each with a separate and dis- with many security forces, PASF interop- for legitimate security for the Palestin- tinct mission, with other supporting ele- erability is heavily reliant on the personal ian people. ments of various sizes and capabilities, relationships of the various commanders. including an extensive intelligence appa- Development ratus. Integral to this architecture is the Opportunities and Challenges The growth of the Palestinian Authority founding principle that the PASF was The PASF has attained a level of pro- Security Force is not well understood created with full transparency to Israel fessionalism and ability sufficient to and is often wrapped in misconceptions and coordinated by, with, and through maintain the security environment in about regional actors. Development of the USSC. the West Bank. This statement could the PASF began after the September The four basic services are the be viewed as a mediocre assessment 1993 signing of the Oslo Accords, Presidential Guard (PG), responsible for of its abilities, but it is in fact a huge which followed the end of the First the security of the Palestinian president; accomplishment given the challenging Intifada.2 Substantial donor support National Security Force (NSF), which environment in which it operates. The was used to transform the bodyguards provides area security and support to PASF is placed between an aggres- and security personnel of the Palestine the Palestinian Civil Police; Palestinian sive IDF and a continuously angry Liberation Organization (PLO) and Civil Police (PCP); and Civil Defense Palestinian populace and must make its leader, Yasser Arafat, into an initial (CD) directorate, which provides basic both sides happy. Of all the security security force that swelled under Ara- firefighting and emergency response forces trained by the United States, fat’s leadership.3 His involvement in the throughout the West Bank.7 the PASF is the most cosmopolitan in security force, however, caused Western The PG was the first service to be experience, having been trained in a leaders to question the PLO’s dedica- trained extensively by the USSC and is variety of locales. Its members operate tion to achieving peace with Israel. The seen as the most skilled and most loyal el- with the most to prove. Although basic majority of the PASF was incapacitated ement of the PASF. The PG highlighted coordination takes place with the IDF, following the outbreak of the Second its capabilities during the May 2014 joint patrolling has been discontinued Intifada in 2000, which resulted in visit of Pope Francis to Jerusalem and since the Second Intifada.8 In keeping decreased donor aid and the destruc- Bethlehem, providing close-in, vehicle, the West Bank at a low boil, the PASF tion of much of its infrastructure.4 The and route protection. The NSF is broadly is often vilified by fellow Palestinians death of Arafat in November 2004 and organized into nine numbered special as “Israeli sub-contractors for secu- the ascension of Mahmud Abbas as his battalions that allow for a battalion in rity.”9 In fact, most violence occurs replacement established the conditions each of the West Bank governorates, as at Palestinian and Israeli seam areas for rebuilding a more enduring Palestin- well as a battalion to deploy as neces- such as settlements, where the IDF ian security organization. Supported sary for emergencies or coverage during maintains responsibility. Frustratingly, by the “Quartet” powers (the United training. (Force coverage excludes East these attacks often support the narra- States, European Union [EU], United Jerusalem, with smaller, company-sized tive for unilateral Israeli action in the Nations, and Russia), Secretary of State elements in the less-populated governor- West Bank. Although unsophisticated Condoleezza Rice in 2005 announced ates, such as Tubas in the northern part by modern security or police standards, the creation of the office of the United of the West Bank.) The NSF provides di- the PASF operates in and among the States Security Coordinator (USSC) rect support to its PCP counterparts, who Palestinian people and is a significant for Israel and the Palestinian Authority, are conventionally deployed throughout line of defense against extremism and which would oversee the rebuilding of the West Bank in various police stations terrorist threats to the region. PASF the PASF into a multi-branch security and centers in generally company-size training continues to evolve, with an force as a part of the so-called Roadmap units. The NSF resembles a national assessment that its members are ready 52 Essay Competitions / The Palestinian Security Force JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 to move beyond the basic skills and peace, and the West should continue to training provided in the past to more support the ongoing professionaliza- New from specialized and joint training that allows tion of this key contributor to Arab- for significant skill improvement in Israeli peace. JFQ NDU Press lower level PASF leaders and interser- for the Center for Strategic Research vice cooperation.10 In addition, a robust Strategic Forum 298 training program is gaining traction Notes Cross-Functional Teams in Defense with support from the Italian Carabin- Reform: Help or Hindrance? 1 ieri, which provides the “best fit” for Alaa Tartir, “The Evolution and Reform By Christopher J. Lamb of Palestinian Security Forces 1993–2013,” the gendarmerie police and security Stability: International Journal of Security and There is skills that support the PASF situation Development 4, no. 1 (2015), 1–20. strong bipar- and ability.11 2 Brynjar Lia, Building Arafat’s Police: The tisan support There has been a concerted effort Politics of International Police Assistance in the for Section by the USSC to improve both PASF Palestinian Territories After the Oslo Agree- 941 of the ment (Reading, United Kingdom: Ithaca Press, interservice cooperation and the profes- 2007), 25. Senate’s ver- sionalism of its force, but its leadership 3 Roland Friedrich and Arnold Luethold, sion of the is resistant; they falsely perceive that the eds., Entry-Points to Palestinian Security Sector National degradation in the standing of the indi- Reform (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Demo- Defense cratic Control of Armed Forces, 2007), 20. vidual services would impact the sharing 4 Authorization Act for 2017, which 12 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab- of donor funding. With an extremely Israeli Conflict, 7th ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. requires the Pentagon to use cross- top-heavy rank structure, the PASF must Martin’s, 2010), 492–494. functional teams (CFTs). CFTs are make strides in the institutional train- 5 Jim Zanotti, U.S. Security Assistance to the a popular organizational construct ing of the junior enlisted members and Palestinian Authority, R40664 (Washington, with a reputation for delivering bet- focus on a multi-service officer training DC: Congressional Research Service, January ter and faster solutions for complex 8, 2010), 1. program. This is hard to initiate, as there 6 Smith, 511. and rapidly evolving problems. The currently is no Palestinian minister of 7 Ibid. Department of Defense reaction to security or commander of the PASF. 8 Terry Wolff, “District Coordination Office the bill has been strongly negative. This vacancy gives the PG and NSF and Liaison Workshop,” briefing notes, NATO Senior officials argue that Section commanders nearly unfettered commu- School, November 23, 2014. 941 would “undermine the author- 9 Tartir, 12. nication directly to President Abbas. Few 10 John Kenkel, “USSC Training, Education ity of the Secretary, add bureaucracy, in the PASF leadership, however, would and Leader Development 101 Brief,” USSC and confuse lines of responsibility.” be willing to support the surrender of briefing slides, August 19, 2015. The Senate’s and Pentagon’s dia- access and influence to the Palestinian 11 Ibid. metrically opposed positions on the 12 Authority leadership. Lastly, if a two-state Ibid. value of CFTs can be partially recon- solution is to be achieved, the IDF and ciled with a better understanding of police must openly improve their coop- what CFTs are, how cross-functional eration with their PASF counterparts and groups have performed to date in curb their unilateral activities within the the Pentagon, and their prerequi- West Bank areas. sites for success. This paper argues there is strong evidence that CFTs The PASF deserves a future. It is a could provide impressive benefits if proven and capable security force that the teams were conceived and em- succeeds in spite of its extraordinarily ployed correctly. challenging mission. With improved cooperation with the IDF and contin- ued support from the USSC, as well as training that continues to address leader, joint, and institutional capacity, the PASF will provide the security envi- ronment that is necessary to enable the breathing room for a legitimate peace process in Israel and the West Bank. Given the volatile political and social Visit the NDU Press Web site for environment, Israel should embrace more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu the PASF as a legitimate partner for JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 McCoy 53 National War College (NDU Special Collections) t the end of September 2016, the National Defense Univer- The National sity (NDU) and National War A th College (NWC) celebrated the 40 anniversary of the University and the War College 70th anniversary of the War College by dedicating the West Wing of Roo- sevelt Hall on Fort Lesley J. McNair Celebrating 70 Years of to General Colin Powell, USA (Ret.).1 The epigraph above is inscribed over Developing Strategic the entrance of the Powell Wing and expresses General Powell’s thinking on his War College experience. Perhaps Practitioners unbeknownst to General Powell, his words echo a statement by Lieuten- By Darren Hartford and David A. Tretler ant General Leonard T. Gerow, USA, president of the 1946 board that recommended the formation of the I came here to study war, and while I learned about war, I learned even more about the importance of finding peace. Brigadier General Darren Hartford, USAF, is the 29th Commandant of the National War College at the —General Colin Powell, USA (Ret.) National Defense University. Dr. David A. Tretler is National War College, Class of 1976 Dean of Faculty at the National War College. 54 JPME Today / Seventy Years of Developing Strategic Practitioners JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 National War College: “The College officer corps that is a mosaic of groups of the OPMEP assigns to the college: “to is concerned with grand strategy senior leaders, each of which has special educate future leaders of the Armed and the utilization of the national expertise in a particular dimension of Forces, Department of State, and other resources necessary to implement that strategy—from operational strategies civilian agencies for high-level policy, strategy. . . . Its graduates will exercise and campaign plans to Service strate- command, and staff responsibilities by a great influence on the formulation gies to national military strategies to conducting a senior-level course of study of national and foreign policy in both national security strategies. One can see in national security strategy.”12 General peace and war.”2 The charge implicit the variety of skills that the Joint Chiefs Powell, as CJCS, first assigned this mis- in General Gerow’s conception of the and other government stakeholders sion to the War College in his 1990 college, and in General Powell’s later desire in senior officials in the focus Military Education Policy Document, the experience there, is that despite its areas the OPMEP lays out for the vari- predecessor of the OPMEP.13 Subsequent “War College” moniker, the school’s ous senior-level schools. For example, Chairmen have reaffirmed this mission six course of study is more than just a look the OPMEP stipulates that the focus times. This is the fourth mission statement at war; it encapsulates whole-of-govern- for the Service war colleges is to address the college has had, but all have had the ment solutions to the entire spectrum “theater- and national-level strategies same essential thrust: producing senior of national security issues. That charge and processes. Curricula focus on how military and civilian leaders with special continues to inform both the college’s the combatant commanders, Joint Staff, expertise in national security strategy. sense of itself and the guidance pro- and Department of Defense use the vided to it by the Chairman of the Joint instruments of national power to develop Program Aspects Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). and carry out national military strategy, In shaping the NWC program, the Since 1996, the Chairman has pro- develop joint operational expertise and college leadership has focused on what vided that guidance via CJCS Instruction perspectives, and hone joint leadership it has seen as the four crucial aspects 1800.01, Officer Professional Military and warfighting skills.”7 of the mission statement. First is the Education Policy (OPMEP), the latest For the Joint and Combined charge to conduct a senior-level course edition of which is dated May 29, 2015.3 Warfighting School at the Joint Forces of study in national security strategy. As the name implies, the document’s Staff College (JFSC), its focus is to This is the distinct raison d’être of purpose is to “distribute the policies, “further develop joint attitudes and the college. NWC is singularly—and procedures, objectives and responsibilities perspectives, joint operational expertise, solely—tasked with focusing on national for officer professional military education and hone joint leader potential and security strategy. Other PME schools and joint professional military educa- warfighting skills.”8 The Joint Advanced include national security strategy in tion.”4 While the document stipulates Warfighting School at JFSC focuses on their curricula as part of the foundation several educational standards applicable the military art and science of planning, or context for their own distinct field to all professional military education preparing, and executing campaign plans of study, but no other school spends (PME) schools, it offers a caveat that for joint, interagency, international, and its entire 10-month program focused there will be differences in application multinational participants across the full solely on national security strategy. “since no particular organizational pat- range of military operations. The Dwight NWC understands its purpose to be to tern or application strategy applies in D. Eisenhower School for National create a cadre of officers with special all settings.”5 Likewise, to address the Security and Resource Strategy’s distinct expertise in national security strategy distinct nature of each senior-level col- focus is “on developing the national that, when blended with cadres of lege, the OPMEP dictates that “PME security strategy and in evaluating, officers with special expertise in other institutions will base their curriculums marshalling, and managing resources areas of national security affairs, creates on their parent Service’s needs or, in the in the execution of the strategy,”9 while a synergy far more powerful than could case of the NDU colleges, on their CJCS- the College of International Security be achieved by any uniform, standard- assigned missions.”6 Affairs “provides a senior-level perspec- ized program of education for all offi- Resident senior-level PME only tive on which to base strategic response cers. Every aspect of the NWC program lasts 10 months. Each senior-level PME to terrorism, irregular warfare, and other is shaped by the goal of producing institution has to balance the breadth contemporary security challenges.”10 graduates who, given a particular of education that a senior official needs Within this mosaic of skill sets, the national security challenge, can assess in order to provide effective strategic OPMEP charges the War College to focus that challenge and develop a credible, leadership with the need for depth in es- “on national security strategy—the art comprehensive national security strategy sential areas in order to generate critical and science of developing, applying and to deal with it. expertise. The OPMEP addresses this coordinating the instruments of national Second is the task to educate. The tension by tasking the various senior-level power to achieve objectives contribut- OPMEP defines educate as convey- PME schools with different missions and ing to national security.”11 This focus ing general bodies of knowledge and focus areas. The end result is a senior on national security drives the mission developing habits of mind applicable JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Hartford and Tretler 55 to a broad spectrum of endeavors.14 As •• First, improve the quality of applied context of national security strategy, and the OPMEP directs, NWC aims not strategic thinking of all its graduates, contemporary military capabilities and at enhancing its students’ capacities to shifting their intellectual and profes- doctrine. Students cap their studies with perform specific functions and tasks, but sional perspectives from the tactical a year-long Individual Strategy Research rather at fostering their breadth of view, and operational to the strategic, and Project (ISRP) in which they select a diverse perspectives, critical analysis, developing the analytical ability and contemporary national security challenge, abstract reasoning, comfort with ambi- judgment they will need to function research and analyze it, develop a strategy guity and uncertainty, and innovative in the gray areas that characterize to deal with it, present their strategy in a thinking, particularly concerning complex the complex, civil-military, multina- strategy paper, and then present and de- problems. tional interactions at the national- fend that strategy to a two-person faculty Third is the charge to educate future strategic level. team. In essence, they end the year dem- leaders for high-level policy, command, •• Second, produce within each class a onstrating they can do what the college and staff responsibilities. In designing cadre of highly skilled strategic prac- has set as its purpose: produce graduates and executing its curriculum, NWC looks titioners—bona fide strategists and who, given a national security challenge, beyond its graduates’ follow-on assign- strategic advisors who demonstrate can assess that challenge and develop a ments to the highest, most important the high degree of expertise, concep- strategy to deal with it. strategic responsibilities they will hold tualization, and innovation in national during the remainder of their careers. As security strategy formulation that will Measuring Success the OPMEP stipulates, NWC concen- be needed to lead the Nation’s strate- The National War College has produced trates on developing the habits of mind, gic efforts in the future. approximately 11,300 graduates over conceptual foundations, and critical the past 70 years. As stated previously, Working from its mission and its two faculties graduates will need as strategic its mission is to educate future leaders goals, the college has formulated six core leaders or as key strategic advisors in the for “high-level policy, command, and educational outcomes that define the Department of Defense, Department staff responsibilities,” and if measured essential concepts our graduates must of State, and other U.S. Government by the high-level responsibilities alumni master and that serve to integrate the agencies. have achieved, then the college has entire academic program: Finally, there is the charge to educate achieved this goal. Among its alumni are future leaders of the “Armed Forces, •• apply the logic of strategic and a U.S. Senator, Senator John McCain Department of State and other govern- critical thinking in national security (Class of 1974), and a Secretary of ment agencies,” as well as International matters State, General Colin Powell; 3 National Fellows. All aspects of NWC are thor- •• analyze the practice of strategic lead- Security Advisors, General Powell, Lieu- oughly joint and interagency—its origins, ership in national security tenant General Brent Scowcroft (1968), its programs, its faculty, and its students. •• analyze how domestic, transnational, and General James Jones (1985); at Because a joint and integrated perspective and international factors shape least 2 State Department graduates permeates and informs the entire NWC national security strategy and policy who have achieved the highest Foreign program, the experience forces students •• analyze the nature, character, and Service Officer rank of Career Ambassa- out of their intellectual and cultural conduct of war dor, Ambassador Stapleton Roy (1975) comfort zones. The nature of the NWC •• evaluate the nature, purpose, capa- and Ambassador William Brownfield environment ensures that all graduates bilities, limitations, and principal (1993); and 7 of the 19 Chairmen of are able to transcend their particular concepts for use of the instruments the Joint Chiefs of Staff, starting with Service, operational, or intellectual frame of national power—diplomatic, infor- the 6th, General Earle Wheeler (1950), of reference and can operate from a truly mational, military, and economic and including the 18th, General Martin joint perspective. •• develop national security strategies Dempsey (1996). Since the college’s for situations of peace, crisis, and founding, 29 graduates became a Desired Program Outcomes war. Service chief (out of the 106 who have Given the NWC mission, its aim is to held those positions), and 30 graduates The National War College achieves develop national security strategists who became combatant commanders (out of its learning outcomes via an extensive are expert in the dynamics of force, 97). And as of this writing, 26 percent core curriculum, taught sequentially, that diplomacy, economics, and information, of the Active four-stars and 18 percent constitutes 80 to 85 percent of the overall and the orchestrated employment of of the Active three-stars are graduates. program. That core curriculum examines those instruments in pursuit of national This record of achievement, from a the fundamentals of thinking strategically, interests. Thus the College has set for student body that for the past several the elements and instruments of national itself two goals: years has represented approximately power and influence, the theory and prac- 14 percent of the military officers who tice of war, the domestic and international attend senior-level PME in a given year, 56 JPME Today / Seventy Years of Developing Strategic Practitioners JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 President Obama jokes with Vice President Biden and former Secretary of State Colin Powell following meeting in Oval Office, December 2010 (The White House/Pete Souza) is a testament both to the quality of the (2010), who currently serves as a special Socratic method in small-group seminars college’s incoming students and to the assistant to the President for National (no more than 13 students per seminar) effectiveness of the college’s efforts to Security Affairs. is at the heart of the college’s educational hone those high-quality students’ abili- U.S. students who reach the highest approach, its faculty members are critical ties as strategic practitioners.15 level of government service after gradu- to the college’s success. While all faculty A review of the alumni rolls shows that ation are just one mark of the college’s contribute inside the college, however, of the 8,249 military officers who have success. The college also is a springboard and are recognized experts in their fields, graduated from the college over the past for the careers of its International Fellow some of them contribute well beyond 70 years, 2,167 (26 percent) have made graduates. Since 1990, 541 International the classroom and shape the discussion of general or flag officer rank. A similar per- Fellows have graduated from the institu- strategic issues on the national stage. For centage of Foreign Service Officers (309 tion in support of the Chairman’s vision example, the first deputy commandant of 1,189 State Department graduates) to engage and foster relationships with for international affairs was Ambassador have gone on to become Ambassadors. foreign partners. While most of these George Kennan, who shaped the coun- Not included in these numbers are the graduates have achieved general or flag try’s containment strategy. On the faculty countless civilian agency members who officer rank in their respective countries’ the same year as Ambassador Kennan attended the school as GS-14s and GS- services, many have gone on to become was Dr. Bernard Brodie, who went on to 15s and went on to join either the Senior service chiefs, chiefs of defense, or shape U.S. nuclear strategy. Other lumi- Executive or Senior Intelligence Service ministers of defense. The University’s naries over the years include Colonel John ranks. Nor does it include those military International Student Management Collins, USA (Ret.), Dr. Bard O’Neill, members who may have retired from Office recognizes these officers by Dr. Terry Deibel, Dr. Martin van Creveld, Active service and then chose to continue inducting them into its International and Dr. Bud Cole, to name just a few. to serve the government as civilians. Two Fellows Hall of Fame, and, at last count, such examples are Colonel James Baker, 19 NWC International Fellow alumni Challenges USAF (Ret.) (2006), who currently have received this honor. With the overall drawdown of person- serves as the Director for Net Assessments Faculty performance also factors into nel and budgets over the past few in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the college’s success, both as contributor years, some Services struggle to fill and Colonel Troy Thomas, USAF (Ret.) and product. Given that the use of the their quotas of students and faculty at JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Hartford and Tretler 57 the school. Part of NWC’s success has the effectiveness of its colleges and com- effective whole-of-government solutions depended on the OPMEP’s requirement ponents while maximizing the efficiencies to national security challenges short of that there be equal representation of where possible. NDU is also seeking ways war to ensure and sustain the peace. JFQ officers from all three military depart- to free up funds to invest in academic ments in both the student body and technology for the future to maintain the on the faculty so that no one military quality of the student experience. This is Notes culture shapes the discussions in and out leading to changes in support and staffing 1 of the classroom.16 The inability of one at the component level that NWC needs Portions of this article come from the Na- tional War College (NWC) submission for the or more military departments to fill their to adapt to in order to face fiscal realities Process of Accreditation for Joint Education. quotas upsets the balance among the and to continue successfully fulfilling its 2 Leonard T. Gerow, Report of War Depart- departments, which is a central pillar of mission. ment Military Education Board on Education the distinctive form of joint education System for Officers of the Army (Washington, the college provides. While there are The Way Ahead DC: War Department, May 27, 1946), available at 58 JPME Today / Seventy Years of Developing Strategic Practitioners JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 National War College (Katie Freeman) The National War College Marking 70 Years of Strategic Education By Janet Breslin-Smith eventy years ago, a war-weary Soviet aggression shattered postwar Washington struggled with dreams of peace. With the dawn of S uncertainty and alarm. Exhausted 1946 we entered a new strategic era— after years of global conflict and still the bipolar struggle with the Soviet Dr. Janet Breslin-Smith was Chair of the carrying memories of the Great Depres- Union. Department of National Security Strategy at the National War College (NWC) and taught sion, America yearned for home and The Nation responded. Testifying to at the college from 1992 to 2006. She is prosperity. Yet barely 6 months after the resilience and creative pragmatism of co-author of The National War College: A victory in World War II, Washington American leadership, Washington’s alarm History of Strategic Thinking in Peace and War (NWC Association, 2008). She is President of faced troubling signs of danger ahead. and uncertainty soon were replaced by Crosswinds Strategic Consulting. A past ally was becoming a threat. productivity and accomplishment. Key JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Breslin-Smith 59 that year, these men developed the first “joint” evolution in professional military education—the Army-Navy Staff College, a 12-week program for selected officers for command and staff duty in unified or coordinated com- mands. This idea caught on and by 1944 there was growing support, not only for enhanced joint senior officer education but also for a larger institu- tional reorganization cutting across the Executive Branch. Within months of war’s end, these military leaders, working with officials in the Truman administration and with Congress, began to develop the com- ponent parts of what was to become the National Security Act of 1947. There was an active give and take over suggestions to consolidate the Departments of War and the Navy, to create an independent Air Force, to centralize and improve national intelligence, and to create a co- Senior American commanders in Western Europe, 1945; seated, left to right, William Hood Simpson, ordinating National Security Council for George S. Patton, Carl A. Spaatz, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, Courtney Hodges, Leonard T. the President. Gerow; standing, left to right, Ralph Francis Stearley, Hoyt Vandenberg, Walter Bedell Smith, Otto P. Weyland, and Richard E. Nugent (U.S. Army/National Archives and Records Administration) Underlying these structural changes was a shared vision that the Nation political, military, and diplomatic leaders “Hap” Arnold, the experimental heritage needed a new and broader focus on strat- encouraged and embraced experimenta- of the Franklin D. Roosevelt years, and egy, grand strategy, the “interrelationship tion, and within a year of war’s end, they fresh opportunity presented by the new of military and nonmilitary means in the had created new institutions, formulated Harry Truman administration. There promulgation of national policy,” to meet new strategy, and developed new con- was also a special urgency to these years, the challenge posed by an aggressive gressional support. as dramatic new technologies disrupted Soviet Union and its economic ideology In today’s climate of bureaucratic the tried and true notions of war and of Marxism. This vision found its home as gridlock and institutional rigidity, it is peace. Atomic weapons, missile technol- the foundational concept for the National worth noting that the Nation’s capital ogy, breakthroughs in the speed of flight, War College, which celebrates its 70th an- once welcomed new ideas that challenged and new forms of communication jolted niversary this year. past assumptions, and worked across Washington into action. Today the United States, and indeed party lines with the Executive Branch. Any sense of complacency, “the the world, struggles with a different chal- Washington quickly set aside entrenched stovepipe” constraint in our current ter- lenge. We are confronted with a complex interests and readied itself for what was to minology, was replaced by a shared belief religious, political, and cultural struggle, a be called the Cold War. that this new threat required new national self-conflicted mass movement embracing Creativity did not emerge overnight. security thinking. The military, diplomats, terror tactics and an aggressive religious It was forged from years of executive and scholars had to work together. But ideology. We are not even sure what to and congressional engagement dur- first they had to study together. call it. ing the New Deal era, and benefited Indeed, Washington has been amaz- from national wartime unity and the First Attempts at Joint ingly slow at, if not incapable of, finding specific talents developed during the Professional Military Education new strategy and being open to new war, especially by the Army, for rigorous As early as 1943, in the midst of war, ideas. Given this prolonged failure, it may planning. The war had made Washington Generals Eisenhower, Arnold, and be useful to examine the late 1940s and a marketplace for fresh thinking and Marshall and Admiral Ernest King 1950s, the early years of the War College, institution-building. The history of the were looking ahead to redesign and for lessons that can be applied to today’s postwar period reflects the stature of mili- improve professional military educa- search for a new and more effective strat- tary leaders such as George C. Marshall, tion and, ultimately, create a new egy. It may also remind us of a time past, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Henry H. architecture of national security. In “when government worked.” 60 JPME Today / Marking 70 Years of Strategic Education JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 The Idea for the National “it is the War Department opinion that All of these colleges would be collo- War College eventually graduation from the College cated at the tip of Greenleaf Point, the Old Eisenhower, Marshall, and Arnold’s should as a rule be a prerequisite for selec- Washington Army Arsenal in Southwest vision for the new War College was clear tion for higher commandant and staff Washington, now known as Fort Lesley from the beginning. They wanted to positions.”3 He believed the National J. McNair. However, the early promise of experiment with a 10-month program War College should be a unique joint joint and interagency education was not for military and Foreign Service Officers school for select graduates of the Service- to be. While the Industrial College and at the 20-year mark of their careers. specific colleges.4 He also looked beyond the War College held down two sides of They wanted to break down Service- the military to see the school as offering an imagined academic quadrangle at Fort culture barriers by educating officers professional executive education for the McNair, the other colleges—and thus together and they wanted a student newly imagined larger national security hope for coordinated professional devel- body that included the broader national community. opment—were postponed. security community. Eisenhower, Marshall, Arnold, The original mission statement of the and King had taken the first step for The Role of the State College reflects these early concerns: joint professional military education Department with the formation of the Army-Navy The State Department did not develop 1. to prepare senior military officers, Staff College (ANSCOL) in 1943. its own college, either for lack of funds foreign service officers and other Cementing this idea in a new institution or interest, much to the dismay of national security professionals for required political skill and attentiveness Eisenhower, Marshall, and Arnold. After higher levels of responsibility to Service sensibilities on the part of a year of inconclusive discussion, State 2. to foster greater understanding and General Eisenhower and Admiral Chester decided to simply be included with the cooperation between the services and Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations. The War College. A 1970 letter to National agencies.1 National War College would initially be War College historian James Stansfield But Eisenhower’s vision went beyond commanded by a naval flag officer, Vice recounted State’s quandary: the bureaucratic. He wanted to change Admiral Harry Hill, with deputy com- the way officers thought. Writing in mandants representing the other Services There were continuing efforts in January 1946, he stated his intentions for on rotation. A new Armed Services Staff 1945–1946 to obtain the participation of the school: College, for midlevel officers, would be the Department of State and its Foreign located at the Naval Base in Norfolk, Service Officers in the postwar ANSCOL. Since [the College] is at the top of the mili- Virginia, while the War College would We never could find anyone in State will- tary educational system, one of its primary be on an Army post. And it was not just ing to make a decision on this. Sheldon functions should be to develop doctrine any Army post. As the first annual report Chaplin, then Director of the Foreign rather than to accept and follow prescribed of the War College noted, “In February, Service, supported the idea in principle, doctrine. . . . The War College approach to 1946, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, but could not move his superiors to make any problem should not be bound by any Chief of Staff of the Army, designated the a basic decision. Hence the new National rules or accepted teaching. If this is not done, Army War College, Washington, DC, as War College was organized primarily as a the War College loses one of its most valuable the site of the new college. The necessary military operated school.6 and essential assets. The course should be alterations were made possible through designed to develop officers for high staff and the contribution of $140,000 by the War In January 1946, both the Secretary command positions in both peace and war.2 and Navy Departments.”5 of War and the Secretary of the Navy In that same month, another panel on wrote to Secretary of State James Byrnes, As Eisenhower and Arnold discussed postwar education, chaired by Lieutenant advocating State participation. Byrnes the new school, they urged that the stu- General Leonard Gerow, recommended complained that State was shorthanded at dent body include not only military and a broader vision for professional educa- the Department, but he later concurred Foreign Service Officers, but also “person- tion. The Gerow Board proposed a new with their proposal to include Foreign nel from non-military agencies other than National Security University, including: Service Officers as students and faculty. the State Department.” As he sketched Both Eisenhower and Nimitz were an Administrative College out his ideas, Eisenhower wanted to pave •• delighted. In Eisenhower’s words, the an Intelligence College the way for the new national security orga- •• military needed “a little training in diplo- an Industrial College nization that was being developed in those •• macy.” Indeed, the first commandant, a new joint National War College to transitional months following V-J Day. He •• Vice Admiral Harry Hill, told the stu- replace the Army War College proposed that a new joint and interagency dents in 1946 that “never before had the a State Department College, which college, a National War College, would be •• need for mutual understanding and team- would be the senior school for the culmination of an officer’s professional work between the State Department and Foreign Service Officers. military education. Eisenhower wrote that the Armed Forces been so necessary.” JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Breslin-Smith 61 To mark this understanding, the War which we could take as a point of departure strategic framework for the United States College would have a special deputy for our thinking and teaching. It was but also to the course of study for that commandant for foreign affairs. In an the mark of the weakness of all previous first academic year. In the months preced- inspired choice, George Kennan, a long- American thinking about international ing Kennan’s arrival and the opening of time Soviet expert, most recently Deputy affairs that there was almost nothing in the college, Admiral Hill reached out Chief of Mission in Moscow, was selected American political literature in the past to academic leaders around the country for this position. Actually, his selection one hundred years on the subject of the rela- and regional area specialists. All offered was quite extraordinary, reflecting a rare tionship of war to politics.8 suggestions of the curriculum and teach- Washington insider serendipity. Just ing style. The initial 10-month program months before the War College opened, Kennan treasured his association with was divided into two semesters. The fall Kennan had been tasked, as were other the command leadership of the college as term was focused on U.S. foreign policy, senior diplomats, to analyze Joseph well as the unique student body: “measures short of war,” and was taught Stalin’s new aggressive posture and state- by Kennan and temporary faculty from ments. Kennan’s thorough evaluation Most of the officers from the armed services major universities and research centers: of Soviet culture, history, and Stalin’s were men with recent distinguished war re- Hardy Dillard from the University of worldview caught the attention of then– cords, but they had by no means been chosen Virginia, Walter Wright from Princeton, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, for this alone. Mature, thoughtful, keen, and Bernard Brodie and Sherman Kent, who circulated it among his Pentagon pleased to be there and anxious to make both from Yale. The spring term focused colleagues. In a fortuitous chain of the most of it, they were a joy to teach. One on “military elements of national power events, by late summer in 1946, President learned from them as one taught.9 as a means of attainment of United States Truman and George Marshall had policy objectives” and was taught by reviewed and approved of this analysis. As he looked back at that first aca- the military faculty. Thus, the new War Kennan was called back from Moscow, demic year at the War College, Kennan College curriculum gave equal weight to and as a result of Forrestal’s support, he felt it was “the occasion for a veritable war and measures other than war. was appointed the first Foreign Service outpouring of literary and forensic effort As Kennan again reflected in his Officer to be part of the leadership at a on my part. I look back today with a Memoirs, this course of study itself was military institution. slightly horrified wonder on the energies new: this frenzy reflected.”10 Kennan and the It was certainly a most understandable The War College course, particularly Development of Strategy frenzy, given his observation that many during the autumn term, was focused George Kennan brought to this assign- in Washington were falling into despair on the interrelationship of military and ment great enthusiasm and intellectual over Soviet actions and “jumping to the non-military means in the promulgation production. As he recalls in his Memoirs, panicky conclusion that this spelled the of national policy. It was a course, in short, “The College was intended as the senior inevitability of an eventual war between on strategic-political doctrine. . . . This establishment for in-service training in the Soviet Union and the United States.” was the first time I had personally ever had the problems of national policy, military With the advent of atomic weapons, their occasion to address myself seriously, either and political. This being only the inau- destructive capability being developed by as a student or as a teacher, to this subject. guration of its existence, the program both superpowers, Kennan searched for a It was also the first time the United States for the first year was necessarily experi- strategy, to avoid what would come to be Government had ever prescribed this area mental. We were in a position to try out known as “mutually assured destruction.” of inquiry for study in an official academic new ideas of method and substance in He led in the effort to find “measures institution embracing in its student body teaching and this was in itself exciting.”7 short of war,”11 which would advance na- and teaching staff all three of the armed Kennan underscored the creativity of tional interests. He argued that the United services, as well as the State Department.13 that period in Washington: States should take advantage of “the weaknesses of Soviet power, combined Throughout the year, the class would It was the first time the United States with frustration in the external field, to be confronted with a series of strategic Government had ever prescribed this area moderate Soviet ambitions and behavior.” dilemmas, designed “to increase students’ of inquiry for study at an official academic Kennan wrote that the Soviet leaders capacity to think broadly, conceptually, institution embracing in its student body “were not supermen. Like all rulers . . . analytically, and critically as they involve and teaching staff all three services as well they had their internal contradictions and themselves in grand strategy and the as the State Department. Not only were dilemmas to deal with. Stand up to them, United States national security policy—its we all new to this subject, personally and I urged, manfully but not aggressively, and formulation and implementation.” institutionally, but we had, as we turned give the hand of time a chance to work.”12 to it, virtually nothing in the way of an es- Kennan’s conceptual work at the War tablished or traditional American doctrine College contributed not only to a new 62 JPME Today / Marking 70 Years of Strategic Education JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 The First Academic Years the land. President Truman and Secretary When the War College opened on Forrestal attended lectures in Roosevelt September 3, 1946, everything was in Hall, members of the Cabinet and place for this academic experiment: A senior military leaders spoke in Arnold provocative course of study, a faculty Auditorium, Representatives and Senators and student body of combat veterans, often met with speakers and students. Foreign Service Officers, academic The commandant’s residence became the leaders, and agency professionals at the gathering point for policy luncheons and midpoint of their career. Standing on dinners. It could be said that these con- the stage in what is now Arnold Audito- versations began the firm foundation for rium, Commandant Hill welcomed the new grand strategy. Away from the press, inaugural class. His message captured in the private intimacy of the War College the excitement of this new educational and the refuge of Fort McNair, key politi- experiment. He began, “It is a great cal and military leaders could join with honor and privilege for all of us to be academics to better understand national associated with this new college, par- security challenges and think through ticularly at this stage in world affairs, strategy. As Kennan observed at the time, where every day new problems of “Officers of Cabinet rank, generals, and state are rising, the solution of which Senators sat at our feet as we lectured. is of vital concern to this country and The college came to provide a sort of George F. Kennan, 1947 (Library of Congress/ the world.” Hill urged the students academic seminar for the high echelons Harris & Ewing) to “keep your minds flexible and free of governmental Washington generally.”16 from preconceived ideas,” and prepared Realizing that his own Cabinet and them to think anew: “Wars cannot Rekindling the War the national security community were be considered only in light of their College Contribution to divided on policy, Eisenhower wanted military objectives. World events today Thought and Strategy a thoughtful review of past strategy, as- are highlighting the fact, more clearly Today, Washington once again struggles sumptions, and projections. For security than ever before, that political and eco- with uncertainty and alarm. Almost 40 and logistical reasons Eisenhower called nomic objectives have an equal or even years into a struggle expressed both upon the War College to host this strat- greater import than those of a military within Islam and between Islam and the egy exercise in June 1953, shortly after nature.”14 West, the United States still searches graduation. Named Project Solarium, the Embracing this change in his own for strategy. While the 40-year Cold exercise was an outgrowth of discussions thinking on the subject, Hill shared with War began with strategy, this new era in the third floor White House solarium, the students his own transition from the- seems adrift and reactive. What aspects among Eisenhower, Secretary of State ater commander to commandant: of War College history might provide John Foster Dulles, and George Kennan, guidance? Is there something about the reviewing strategy regarding the Soviet Last year when I received orders to this atmosphere of collegial interaction, the Union. duty, I was in Manila preparing to take encouragement “to ponder,” to look for Eisenhower wanted to hear alterna- the 6th Army into Japan. General [Walter] the “sources of conduct,” to understand tive strategies and consider his options, Krueger was embarked on my flagship, the nature of the conflict, that might so the exercise required separate task and I had many pleasant and instructive inform the incoming administration as forces to develop three approaches to discussions with that outstanding warrior it prepares for responsibility, much as strategy. Each task force included experts, about the problems of military education. the Truman and Eisenhower adminis- working with background documents And I will always remember his basic trations did in the early years of the War on Soviet politics, history, economic admonition: ‘make ’em ponder.’ That College? and military capabilities, Soviet leaders, is exactly what we propose to do here—to It is worth consideration. The and Soviet motivation for action. Team give you practical problems upon which to tranquility of Fort McNair still beckons A was headed by Kennan himself and think—and ponder—and arrive at indi- the weary bureaucrat and politician. considered primarily a political strategy, vidual conclusions you are ready to defend The access to both military and agency alliance structures, following along the against all attacks.15 professionals, as well as academic lead- initial concepts of “containment.” Team ers, is unique in the country. Indeed, B considered an expansion on the “con- As the War College began, that Eisenhower returned to the War College tainment” idea by hardening opposition admonition—to “make ’em ponder”— in 1953, not as a military leader but as a to the Soviet Union, using the prospect established a tradition and atmosphere recently elected President, to make new of war and possible nuclear retaliation. that attracted the highest leadership in use of the institution he had inspired. Team C analyzed and advocated the “roll JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Breslin-Smith 63 back” concept, current at the time, to around the world is unabated. Voters are the exercise into the academic program as counter Soviet expansion and diminish looking for new approaches, new policy. they did over six decades ago. its influence through a variety of military, The incoming President should follow The new administration will struggle political, and economic means. Over that Eisenhower’s example and commission a to find a way to defeat the Islamic State summer, the various task forces had time deeply informed and competitive strate- of Iraq and the Levant. Even 15 years on, for analysis and deliberation away from gic review. strategy can emerge anew. Washington the pressures of daily work and politics. Is it time to inaugurate a new Project can once again welcome new ideas, Kennan and Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Solarium? Given the specific conundrum rethink past assumptions, and work to- Goodpaster were the in-house experts. of an expansionist, violent, religious gether to find long-forgotten peace and Each group submitted its recommenda- ideology, an Arab world beset by crisis, opportunity in the world. JFQ tion to the National Security Council. It is this not even more perplexing than was on the basis of these analyses and rec- Cold War puzzles? A reimagined Project ommendations that Eisenhower decided Solarium would not be a highly classi- Notes to generally follow Kennan’s approach. fied and secret exercise, but rather an 1 The strategy known as “containment” innovative unclassified exercise, bring- The National War College (NWC), Annual Report 1946–47, Special Collections, endured, even with adjustments, ing together new scholarship and new National Defense University Library, Washing- throughout the Cold War. There was no experts on Islam, the Middle East, North ton, DC. direct military attack and no use of nu- Africa, and South Asia. Muslim American 2 “Memorandum for the Commandant, clear weapons between the two national scholars, Middle East studies scholars, Army and Navy Staff College,” January 28, protagonists throughout this period. And business leaders, and diplomats with 1946, signed by Dwight Eisenhower (emphasis in original). Reprinted in Janet Breslin-Smith in 1991, the Soviet Union did indeed long-term experience in the region could and Clifford R. Krieger, The National War succumb to its own “internal contradic- come together once again in the quiet College: A History of Strategic Thinking in Peace tions and dilemmas.” of Roosevelt Hall “to ponder” this new and War (Washington, DC: NWC Association, How might such an exercise be religious movement and the crisis across 2006). 3 recreated today? Although many others the Muslim world. They could recapture “Memorandum for the Commandant, Army and Navy Staff College.” have advocated new Solarium exercises, Kennan’s belief that the War College 4 Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed that all most have focused on the bureaucratic, could be a seminar for the city. existing Service colleges be closed and the new budgetary, and interagency aspects of Following past experience, this joint National War College be the only senior strategy. But there is a case to be made exercise should begin with an intensive professional military education institution. Both to go back to the original genius of the foundational discussion and analysis of the Army and Navy resisted this idea, which eventually died. original Solarium model—a focus on the Islamic and Arab politics, political Islam, 5 National War College, 2. history, culture, motivations, actions, and regional history, culture, and worldview. 6 Robert L. Clifford, “Letter to George J. psychology of the opponent, with area The group could assess the impact of sus- Stansfield, April 29, 1970,” Special Collections, experts informing the debate. tained low oil prices, sustained conflict in National Defense University Library. 7 In 2017 a newly elected administra- the region, and the next generation. The George F. Kennan, Memoirs, Vol. 1, 1925–1950 (New York: Pantheon, 1967), 306. tion faces a challenge much different exercise should include both younger and 8 Ibid., 308. than the Cold War Soviet threat. In the experienced scholars and policy experts, 9 Ibid., 307. midst of modern technology and ever- mirroring the role played by Goodpaster 10 Ibid., 307–309. growing globalization, today’s challenge, and Kennan in the initial exercise. The 11 Hence the title of Kennan’s lectures at ironically, seems somehow ancient and challenge to the group will be, as it was in the War College: Giles D. Harlow and George C. Maerz, eds., Measures Short of War: The uncomfortable. As Secretary of Defense Eisenhower’s era, to consider “measures George F. Kennan Lectures at the National War Robert Gates argued in 2007, our past short of war,” using Kennan’s wording, College, 1946–1947 (Washington, DC: NDU focus during the Cold War an intellectual challenge in contrast to Press, 1991). existing tactical and operational military 12 Ibid., 364. 13 covered over conflicts that had boiled and approaches. Ibid., 308. 14 Harry W. Hill, Convocation Address to seethed and provoked war and instabilities Following this exercise and review, the National War College Class of 1946–47, for centuries. . . . Ethnic strife, religious the President’s new National Security National Defense University Library, Special wars, independence movements. . . . These Council would assess the Project Collections, 1. old hatreds and conflicts were buried alive Solarium foundational assumptions and 15 Ibid., 2. 16 . . . but like monsters in science fiction, they alternatives. As a follow-on to the exer- Kennan, 306. 17 Remarks by Secretary Robert M. Gates, have returned from the grave to threaten cise, the next entering class at the War Landon Lecture, Kansas State University, No- 17 peace and stability around the world. College—military students fresh from de- vember 26, 2007, 2. ployment, Foreign Service Officers, and In the 10 years since Secretary Gates’s agency students experienced in the policy warning, the threat to peace and stability world—would incorporate the findings of 64 JPME Today / Marking 70 Years of Strategic Education JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Marines from Infantry Training Battalion, School of Infantry–East, navigate through obstacle course at Camp Geiger, North Carolina, October 2013 (U.S. Marine Corps/Paul S. Mancuso) Meaningful Metrics for Professional Military Education By Joan Johnson-Freese and Kevin P. Kelley rofessional military education PME (JPME) I (intermediate) and II strength in the JPME programs and areas (PME) is guided by the formal (senior)—the “colleges”—parameters where improvement would serve educa- P requirements put forth by Con- were also expanded toward providing tional purposes. Over the years, JPME gress as part of the Goldwater-Nichols officers the education necessary to colleges have been accredited to award Department of Defense Reorganization understand the context of theater and master’s degrees by the same regional Act of 1986. Initially, the intent largely strategic environments and the critical accreditation bodies that oversee civilian focused on training and educating thinking skills to address increasingly academic institutions. But a dilemma is military officers to operate in a joint complex environments. created within JPME by its dual purposes: environment. At the higher levels, joint Subsequently, studies by private con- graduating officers to meet Goldwater- sultants, the General Accounting Office, Nichols requirements and getting them and Congress itself have been conducted back to their operational billets as quickly toward assessing programs and identify- as possible, and maintaining academic Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese and Dr. Kevin P. Kelley 1 are Professors of National Security Affairs at the ing further issues. Focusing here on the rigor within an accelerated course taught Naval War College. colleges, those studies have found areas of by a largely nontraditional faculty. JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Johnson-Freese and Kelley 65 Colleges (NEASC), as an example of the regional accrediting bodies, clearly states its accreditation parameters as follows: NEASC Accreditation Attests to •• substantial compliance with estab- lished qualitative standards •• integrity in statements to the public describing the institution’s program •• institutional commitment to improvement •• sufficiency of institutional resources. NEASC Accreditation Does Not •• guarantee the experience of individual students •• guarantee the quality of specific programs •• compare or rank institutions.7 So accreditation does not inherently attest to the academic “excellence” and “rigor” often flaunted by PME institu- tions.8 “Excellence” is part of an ordinal Sergeant 1st Class John Wesserling receives congratulatory handshake from Command Sergeant scale including unsatisfactory, satisfac- Major David M. Clark during inaugural Benavidez Leader Development Program graduation ceremony tory, good, excellent, and outstanding. in Thayer Award Room at West Point (U.S. Army/Vito T. Bryant) Academic rigor is also a scale, but simply asserting that “my program is rigor- Over the past several years PME Recently, the Office of the Secretary ous” without a benchmark means little. has both come under fire from critics, of Defense (OSD) has taken a welcome If JPME wants to claim excellence and and touted its own rigor and innova- and active interest in JPME. Through rigor, then, in at least some ways, it must tion. Retired PME professors Dan OSD Policy, an assessment of JPME measure itself against the civilian academic Hughes and Howard Wiarda first openly “Institutional Rigor” was tasked programs at schools it claims as peers, suggested that JPME standards, meth- in the Defense Planning Guidance where counterpart civilian strategists odologies, and objectives tended more (2017–2021).6 Though the results are are educated, such as Harvard’s John F. toward training approaches that the mili- unavailable at the time of this writing, dis- Kennedy School of Government, Tufts tary was more comfortable with—and cussion with officials who have knowledge University’s Fletcher School of Law that led to high graduation rates—than of the study suggests it will focus on re- and Diplomacy, The Johns Hopkins more complex ones.2 Defense pundits solving faculty issues at JPME institutions, University’s Paul H. Nitze School of such as Tom Ricks joined in, bitingly such as administration and career progres- Advanced International Studies, and suggesting in his blog column, “Need sion—all worthwhile topics long overdue Yale’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs.9 budget cuts? We can probably start by for attention. Curiously, however, it Civilian graduate programs are an- closing the Air War College.”3 Other appears the “rigor” focus was dropped, nually ranked by such entities as U.S. PME faculty, current and former, joined apparently because it was quickly decided News and World Report and Forbes. While the discussion,4 as occasionally did PME that PME rigor was “fine.” their specific methodologies vary some- students themselves, largely through As a large bureaucracy, and whereas what according to discipline and other comments at blog sites such as Small bureaucracies largely abhor change, the considerations, a combination of expert Wars Journal, War on the Rocks, and the military is in general not an organiza- opinions, peer assessments, and statistical U.S. Naval Institute blog. Institutional tion known for either acknowledging indicators—qualitative and quantita- champions responded, sometimes in problems or altering comfortable ways of tive—about the students and faculty is print toward engaging in useful dia- operation. Consequently, the “everything generally used.10 If PME institutions logue, sometimes through backchannels, is fine” mentality has been a sort of man- truly aspire to be rigorous, an assessment including suggesting that critics were tra in PME, with institutional programs similar to those used to rank “peer” civil- simply disgruntled employees or the being accredited to award graduate de- ian institutions should be conducted. The most dreaded of individuals in PME in- grees offered as evidence. However, the assessment could and should not only stitutions and not team players.5 New England Association of Schools and 66 JPME Today / Meaningful Metrics for PME JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 be designed to account for PME “differ- other fields; meaningful metrics offer include but are not limited to several areas ences” but also allow for at least minimal institutional credibility and provide value also deemed similarly important in civilian comparisons of best practices common to in identification of areas ripe for improve- academic institutions and measured by civilian and PME institutions. It would ment. No institution should see itself as U.S. News and World Report and Forbes, go beyond the qualitative indicators of no longer needing or potentially benefit- which thus offer useful models. These rigor largely currently relied on in PME, ing from improvement, making data models identify key areas considered as those indicators have been shown to be validity and transparency important. important, such as quality of the faculty, of limited value and even spurious. and weight them in their overall assess- Naval War College Professor Nicholas Establishing Credibility ments. While drawing from those models Murray considered how PME metrics The methodologies used by U.S. to design and weight a similar but appro- could be misused in a 2014 article in News and World Report and Forbes priately tailored assessment tool for PME Joint Force Quarterly, looking at the for their annual college rankings offer institutions is beyond the scope of this Army Command and General Staff insights for measuring academic excel- article and the methodological expertise College: lence, rigor, and perhaps even value. of the authors, the general parameters for U.S. News and World Report rankings such a tool can be outlined, and that is the Command and General Staff Officer provide a largely holistic evaluation our intent. Actual design and selection of Course currently devotes roughly 250 of institutions and accommodate such an assessment tool would likely best school hours of study to mission command, different goals and parameters for be done by assessment professionals under directly or indirectly. This number comes undergraduate, graduate, and profes- the auspices of an independent entity such from a total of about 700 hours of core sional programs. Forbes focuses more as, again, OSD, since it is responsible for and advanced instruction, going by the on “outputs” (professional attainments establishing and overseeing PME policy. 2013–2014 academic year. That looks postgraduation). While PME does Additionally, note is made regarding impressive on paper. However, only around not utilize academic admission stan- means to potentially utilize more stan- 100 of the teaching hours truly involve dards—an issue unto itself—all military dardized metrics or improve processes, critical thinking as it would be understood Services except the Navy compete for which were identified in conjunction with outside of PME.11 positions in PME graduate-level resi- development of these parameters. dent programs, and therefore graduates It is also interesting to compare that should be those in line for professional Metrics That Matter the total number of classroom hours of advancement. As such, overlap between Overall Quality. Peer review is a a 2-year master’s program or master of the two ranking systems points out standard method of “quality” evalua- business administration (MBA) program areas of common academic consider- tion in both academia and the military. is between 350 and 450 annually.12 ation, and unique aspects of the two “Academic peer scores” are also included Murray points out that classroom hours provide areas of consideration poten- as part of calculating U.S. News and are being added to the staff school cur- tially applicable to PME. World Report college rankings, whereby riculum, leaving students increasingly less In terms of overlap, for example, administrators at civilian institutions time to think and study. But reflection on both rankings consider student-to-faculty are surveyed regarding what they think what is being taught is an essential part of ratios and the quality of the teaching of each other. Using that basic model, any quality educational program, though faculty. PME institutions similarly seem for example, PME institutions being too often not the practice in JPME. to recognize these as important metrics assessed would be asked to provide the Such an assessment of rigor ought to as well, as they regularly report these names of a number of other civilian and be welcomed by PME institutions. The ratios and describe their faculties with PME academic institutions, perhaps military thrives on metrics, including at such superlatives as “world class,”14 eight to ten, that it considers its peers— PME institutions. Indeed, the rationale “top quality,”15 “highly qualified,”16 its equals in terms of “rigor.” Naming for hiring an increasing number of re- and “superb.”17 However, the basis for peers is already done in conjunction with tired military officers as administrators using these superlatives, or an external other PME assessments, such as those at PME institutions is often to gather verification, has never been given. In fact, conducted by Service inspector generals. data for internal and external use. An individuals internal and external to PME The inclusion of the views of indi- Army University PowerPoint slide states institutions have raised questions related viduals at “peer” civilian schools would that it “Takes Pride in Achievement of to faculty hiring and qualifications.18 provide an indicator of whether a reci- Measurable Goals.”13 But the transpar- Therefore, it would serve PME institu- procity of views as peers existed, and if ency of the data and its validity for tions well to be able to provide a credible, not, why. Furthermore, it would act as a specific purposes can be tenuous. Though externally verified assessment that backs safeguard to avoid the potential for PME certainly valuable, educational metrics its use of superlatives. institutions to simply affirm the eminence are more difficult to assess than those Ways to evaluate academic quality, in- of each other. The Program for the regularly used in training, business, or stitutional rigor, and curricular relevance Assessment of Joint Education (PAJE), JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Johnson-Freese and Kelley 67 Airman from 18th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron explains his role in aeromedical mission to students attending JPME Okinawa Experience, Kadena Air Base, Japan, September 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Corey M. Pettis) for instance, is loosely the intra-PME percentage of the faculty has terminal relevant (consistently active, versus one equivalent of accreditation. But PAJE degrees? In acknowledgment that some publication every 4 to 5 years). inspection team members are drawn civilian schools are considered more Criteria for evaluating the quality from several PME institutions to inspect rigorous than others, where a faculty of the civilian academic faculty, retired one PME school in particular, at a point degree was earned (top ranked, ranked, military faculty, and Active-duty faculty in time. These team members conduct non-ranked) should be considered. Those members would likely have some overlap; inspections knowing that they will be types of factors deal with credentials however, there would also need to be on the other end of an inspection soon, upon hire. Equally important, however, criteria unique to each group. In terms raising the incentive for favorable findings is professional development after hire of overlap across the faculty, for example, all around. While the results of civilian and over the course of a career. Such fac- all faculty members should teach in accreditation inspections are made public, tors as national appointments (National fields in which they have an appropriate that is not the case for the PAJE, and so Academy of Sciences), service to the background (for example, faculty teach- the pass/fail rates of PAJE inspections are profession, service to the institution and ing international relations should be generally opaque. the Department of Defense, research trained in that field). All faculty members Quality of Faculty. PME faculties and publications (university press books, should also be expected to be excellent are hybrid faculties including academics, books, peer-reviewed articles, publica- teachers. But differences in qualifications security practitioners, Active-duty mili- tions that required external acceptance and, consequently, expectations must be tary, and retired military. They will come versus personal blogs, and conference considered as well. to PME with a variety of backgrounds; papers and invited presentations) should Retired military faculty members therefore, faculty can be assigned numeri- be considered. Moreover, it is important make up a significant portion of college- cal points based on a number of factors, to consider the arc of research of a faculty level JPME faculties, though data on some more applicable to certain types of member to ensure a person is active in percentages are not institutionally identi- faculty than others. For example, what his or her field and also up to date and fied. They immediately become counted 68 JPME Today / Meaningful Metrics for PME JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 as part of the academic faculty and are Active-duty faculty members, additional can recognize quality, rigor, and relevance given a professorial rank, though they qualifications are highly desirable and when presented with it. But what the have little or no enculturation to the should warrant extra credit in terms of as- students want and expect from JPME academic profession. These individuals sessing overall military faculty credentials. programs—in terms of both content and are typically officers who retired at the Command at the commander/lieutenant degree and type of challenge—widely O-5 and O-6 rank. They can be tremen- colonel level is especially valuable for a varies. Student satisfaction is important, dous sources of valuable experiences and faculty member teaching command and and student evaluations provide insight military expertise. They may also have staff–level intermediate courses, as is into satisfaction. The bigger problem is superb teaching skills especially tailored experience as a senior staff officer on a that most PME faculty members work to the PME environment. The challenge major staff, as well as joint duty experi- on renewable 3- or 4-year contracts, with in assessing the value associated with their ence. Command at the captain/colonel student evaluations a big part of that experience is that some of that value is level and/or Pentagon experience should renewal criteria. That inherently makes it perishable as it becomes more removed be especially valued for faculty teaching at difficult for faculty not to feel compelled from today’s environments. senior war colleges. to teach first to “satisfy” the students, As such, metrics to evaluate these Though academic credentials are not rather than to consider educational chal- retired military faculty members should the primary consideration for Active-duty lenge and effectiveness. certainly give credit to those credentials faculty members, such faculty members While all PME institutions have piles valued for Active-duty officers, such as with advanced degrees relevant to the of evaluations that might be offered as command, senior staff experience, and JPME curriculum they will be teaching evidence of faculty quality, rigor, and rel- Pentagon assignments. But as faculty should be recognized and valued in as- evance, their value can be limited. Some members with professorial rank, they also sessing overall faculty quality. Though departments that utilize teaching teams, need to maintain demonstrated currency it is rare, credit should be given to for example, have had students evaluate in these areas rather than just relying on Active-duty faculty members who have the team rather than the individual team expertise and experience that might be graduate-level teaching experience prior members, thereby making it impossible seriously dated. In that regard, evaluation to arriving at their PME institution. to differentiate between the teaching pro- of how effectively these officers maintain Factors such as those described look at ficiency of individuals. In some instances, their expertise and currency by assessing the quality of individual faculty members. data are referenced (even to the faculty) how they are contributing to the con- Additionally, however, the qualities of but not shared by administrators. With tinued development of their profession faculties as a whole are important. scrutiny, however, valid data from the would be useful. Like civilian academics, Because of the unique nature of PME plethora of evaluations conducted would research and publication must be an institutions, diversity across military likely be available. important metric. Different from civil- communities and between warfighter Student survey variations among and ian academics, though, retired military and staff communities is also important. within PME institutions also suggest that faculty might additionally—though not Equally important, diversity of thought a common, professionally developed and totally in lieu of research and publica- and perspective considered critical to validated student assessment protocol tion—demonstrate currency through education often comes through demo- is needed. Such a common assessment continued connectivity with Active-duty graphic diversity, including such factors system and tool would also allow for forces or nonacademic professional as gender and race. Otherwise, there is comparative data across institutions. PME events. a real danger of “like teaching like” in institutions should certainly be allowed For Active-duty faculty members, terms of broader cultural perspective. to include “other” questions specific to several obvious but not always followed Demographic diversity has, however, their own institutions, but not to skip the standards should be considered. It is been largely neglected in PME to date, common questions. generally accepted that officers trying and should be considered.19 Acceptance and Graduation Rates. to teach other officers senior in rank Finally, other institutional factors Acceptance and graduation rates are to them is problematic due to cultural that relate to quality of the faculty—and other metrics strongly considered in issues. As such, all faculty members for standard best practices within civilian ranking civilian schools. If, as standard both intermediate and senior JPME academic institutions—such as support reasoning goes, acceptance standards are institutions should be at the grade of for professional development (time and high, graduation rates should be as well, commander/lieutenant colonel and resources) and faculty involvement in and top schools want successful alumni. above. Military faculty members teaching institutional governance must also be Harvard University has an approximately at either intermediate-level or senior-level considered. 6 percent acceptance rate, the Harvard PME institutions should have completed Student Assessments. Students at Law School is approximately 16 percent, an in-residence program at that level. PME institutions are professionals. Some and the Harvard Business School is Though these standards would seem to at the war college level have held major about 12 percent. Harvard University’s be the minimal necessary standards for command; therefore, it is assumed they graduation rate is approximately 93 JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Johnson-Freese and Kelley 69 percent, and that of Harvard Law is 96 approach to selecting PME students—a rigor, relevance, and perhaps even value percent. Harvard statistics, however, are bidding system, for example. Already are not comprehensive. Our intent not necessarily representative of overall some Servicemembers “bid” for which was only to demonstrate how the same rates: the graduation rates from a science, school they would like to attend, but methodologies used to evaluate a range technology, engineering, or math–related with final selection made within their of civilian academic institutions could graduate degree within 4 years is 66 per- Service based on their records. Under be used as models for PME institutions. cent, and 86 percent for an MBA.20 this suggested new system, students from The key seems to be identifying common While students from all Services ex- any Service could bid to attend any war qualifiers relevant to any academic institu- cept the Navy compete for resident JPME college or staff college at the appropriate tion, and then developing and utilizing billets, that competition is not based stage of their careers—that is, when the common measurements across institu- on academics since Goldwater-Nichols profession sees that they are ready for this tions, while allowing for tailoring and the initially focused JPME requirements next level of education and when their addition of unique measurements where on instilling “jointness.” Whether that assignment officers state that they could required, as is already done for business, rationale still holds, especially at the war be made available for a year of education. law, and graduate schools. college level, seems ripe for reconsidera- They would have to submit an applica- tion. Theoretically, lack of an academic tion similar to what a civilian university Recognize Excellence quality control system should mean a would require. The individual JPME It is time to stop simply professing the higher nongraduation rate in JPME institutions would then screen those ap- “superb” quality of the academic pro- schools than in schools with selective plications like any admissions department grams at our PME institutions and the admission standards, or at least close to at a university would do and send letters “world class” standard of their faculties the overall averages. This seems especially of acceptance. Several JPME institutions and actually determine whether such true given the accelerated (10 months) might accept some individuals, and those accolades are truly deserved. Would the nature of the JPME program and the individuals could then select the one institutions and their faculty be better fact that many of the students enter with they prefer. JPME institutions’ “accep- served with concrete evidence of these academic backgrounds not requiring sig- tance rates” could be compared and the claims rather than mere proclamations? nificant writing skills. percentage of those who actually select Do the students who plan to attend Yet while PME institutions have each college could also be calculated and these institutions and the citizens who declined to release official data, their compared, potentially offering insight pay for their existence deserve more graduation rates, with graduate degrees, over time of the “street credibility” of than simple assurances from the leaders have been “guessed” as nearly 100 per- each JPME school. of these institutions of the value of the cent without contradiction.21 Perhaps the Output Metrics. Finally, just as the education they provide? If the answers pool of military students is better on aver- Forbes rankings focus on “output,” there to these questions are yes, then we need age than the pool of students attending must be an element of that in any JPME to do more to honestly assess the PME civilian state institutions. Perhaps military assessment. One method of measuring programs than is currently done. students are more motivated to work success is to survey both graduates and Undoubtedly, Stanford, Harvard, and hard than their civilian peers. Perhaps the the military “employers” of graduates the Wharton School at the University military students—highly trained in their regarding the “value added” of a graduate of Pennsylvania revel in being named fields, sometimes at a cost to taxpayers education. Some military institutions have the 2016 top graduate business schools of as much as $6 million annually22—are attempted to contact alumni and employ- by U.S. News and World Report, and considered so professionally valuable that ers, perhaps 5 years after graduation, with rightly so.23 Those PME institutions that they are simply “too big to fail.” It is limited success. Here again standardiza- excel—and are indeed peers to the top impossible to tell. But PME graduation tion of both the assessment tool and civilian academic schools or among them- rate data should be considered in any as- the process used to administer that tool selves—should similarly be identified and sessment. Special attention might also be would significantly add to the compara- allowed their due bragging rights. Those paid to the characteristics of individuals tive value of the data. Additionally, for schools identified as needing improve- who do not receive either their JPME those Services where selection for at- ment would be served by an assessment qualification or graduate degree (for tendance to resident JPME programs as well, one that clearly identifies areas re- example, not having English as a first is competitive, it could be assumed that quiring attention. The military has never language or poor writing skills due to in- individuals sent are slated for success. shied away from the use of benchmarks in experience) so that appropriate attention Therefore, promotion rates might also operations; they serve a valuable purpose can be paid at the institutional level to be considered as an “output” measure, as in military operations. Transparent data help future students to succeed. well as other military accolades. and benchmarks could serve a valuable If the best and the brightest are Obviously, these suggestions and purpose in military education as well. JFQ intended to attend resident PME pro- examples for developing meaningful grams, perhaps what is needed is a new metrics regarding academic excellence, 70 JPME Today / Meaningful Metrics for PME JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 “A Comment on ‘Does Keeping PME Relevant at JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Johnson-Freese and Kelley 71 A-10A Thunderbolt II aircraft flies over target area during Operation Desert Storm (U.S. Air Force/Fernando Serna) The Urgent Necessity to Reverse Service AirLand Roles By Price T. Bingham urrent U.S. military joint and occurring over the last two-and-a-half important advantages requires examin- Service doctrine assigns U.S. decades in the Air Force’s surface ing the continuing validity of prevailing C Army forces, supported by U.S. surveillance and precision attack assumptions regarding Service roles in Air Force forces, the role of being capabilities, it is time to reverse these defeating such a threat. This examina- responsible for defeating an opposing roles.1 Role reversal is an urgent neces- tion begins by identifying the rationale mechanized army. But now, thanks sity because it would give the Armed behind today’s Army force structure. to significant advances that have been Forces the ability to defeat an opposing The Army’s current force structure mechanized army faster with far less risk can be traced to the way great captains to U.S. personnel, while significantly and effective armies have learned to reducing the amount of resources use rapid movement to create impor- Lieutenant Colonel Price T. Bingham, USAF the United States needs to devote to tant advantages over their opponents.2 (Ret.), is a former Combat Fighter Pilot, Aviation Expert, and frequent commentator on Air Force countering this threat. Understanding Exploiting the advantages that rapid and joint issues. why reversing roles can provide these movement can create despite advances in 72 Commentary / The Urgent Necessity to Reverse Service AirLand Roles JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 firepower explains why, during the 20th weather.4 It is important to note that the holding the head of a pin at arm’s length century, mechanization transformed the ability of air forces to find and destroy an gives an idea of the difficulty aircrew faced way armies were structured and fought. opponent’s surface naval forces before in visually acquiring a target as small as a This transformation made it necessary they could move into close proximity to tank.6 Adding to this target acquisition for armies to be able to fight and defeat U.S. ships was made easier because of the problem was the near impossibility of an opposing army’s mechanized forces relatively small number of ships in an op- determining visually from a fast-flying in close combat because, despite often posing fleet and the large size of many of aircraft whether a vehicle had already been massive efforts, air forces performing these ships. destroyed or was a decoy. interdiction were unable to prevent pow- Although airpower’s role in defeat- Airspeed and altitude also had an erful opposing forces from coming into ing armies was far more limited in the important impact on limiting the ef- close proximity to army forces, especially past than it was in defeating naval surface fectiveness of an airman’s visual search if that movement took place at night or forces, there are two key similarities that for an army’s vehicles. Although flying at during bad weather. Prevailing in close help explain why there is a need now to slow airspeeds could provide more time combat made it necessary for the U.S. reverse U.S. Air Force and Army roles. to look, it also increased the amount of Army’s armored units to become heavier One similarity is that, like navies with time air defenses had to hit the aircraft and equipped with ever more powerful their dependence on ships, mechanized making the search. Similarly, while fly- weapons, while also requiring that the armies depend on their vehicles for the ing at low altitudes made it easier to see U.S. Air Force devote significant assets to movement that creates the operational- small objects such as vehicles, it greatly the close air support mission. and tactical-level advantages of surprise, increased aircraft exposure to short-range Serious limitations in the ability of mass, and favorable position, which surface-based air defenses.7 The impact airmen to detect, track, and precisely enhance their ability to prevail in close slow airspeeds and low altitude had on target an opposing army’s vehicles ex- combat. Mechanized armies are also increasing an aircraft’s vulnerability to plains why, historically, air forces have similar to navies and their ships in their surface-based air defenses explains why, in been limited to playing an important, but dependence on vehicles for armored the Southeast Asia conflict, fast movers, supporting, role in defeating an opposing protection, heavy firepower, engineering such as the F-100F “Misty” forward air army. These limitations explain why the support, and, most importantly, for sup- controllers (FACs), replaced slower O-1 reversal of roles between air and surface plies, especially fuel. and O-2 FACs in high-threat areas.8 forces occurred first in naval warfare. Yet despite these similarities, there Given a pilot’s limited field of view, it In naval warfare, the relatively smooth were major differences between naval was necessary to fly a great many sorties surface of the sea made it somewhat easy and land warfare that explain why, until to have a reasonable chance of finding for airmen in the 1940s to find an op- recently, a reversal of roles between the an army’s vehicles within a large search ponent’s ships with their unaided vision Air Force and Army was not appropri- area, and this reliance on vision limited well before these ships could move into ate. Compared to the relatively smooth the search to good weather and often only close proximity of U.S. naval surface surface of the sea, the land’s surface is far to daylight hours. Opposing armies were forces. For example, during the Battle more complex because of its roughness quick to recognize that bad weather and of Midway, Lieutenant Commander C. and the presence of vegetation and build- darkness seriously degraded the ability of Wade McClusky, Jr., flying at 20,000 feet ings.5 This complexity prevented airmen airmen to find and attack their vehicles. and approximately 140 miles from his from using radar to find opposing vehicles For example, by limiting their movement own carrier, visually spotted the wakes because radar energy reflected from the to the hours of darkness or to bad weather of the Japanese fleet, which included the land’s surface created so much clutter during Operation Diadem in Italy, the 812-foot-long Kaga aircraft carrier, while that, until recently, it was impossible to Germans were able to shift major units he was still 35 miles away.3 Once they see small objects like vehicles, especially from one sector of the front to another found the Japanese carriers, U.S. naval air when they were moving. despite harassment by a daily average of forces were able to deliver the munitions The complexity of the land’s surface 2,000 Allied sorties.9 needed to complete their destruction. also made it much more difficult for air- Recognition of the difficulties weather Ultimately, the loss of their four carriers men to see an opposing army’s vehicles. and darkness created for a visual search convinced the Japanese naval leaders that The challenges of the visual search for also does much to explain the timing they could no longer risk engaging the opposing army vehicles were addressed of the German offensive known as the U.S. fleet in close combat with their main by Royal Air Force Air Vice Marshal Battle of the Bulge. However, when the force’s battleships. The effectiveness of air John Robert Walker. In addition to the maneuver or threat of such maneuver by forces against naval surface forces during problems posed by terrain roughness, friendly army forces prevented an oppos- World War II was also greatly enhanced vegetation, and buildings, he explained ing army from limiting their movement to by the development of airborne radar, that there just is not much to see with periods of bad weather or darkness, as was which made it possible for airmen to find a target like a 22-foot-long tank even at the case for the German army during the and sink ships even at night and in bad ranges of 3 kilometers. He stated that Allies’ Normandy breakout, it became JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Bingham 73 U.S. Navy F-14A Tomcat, Fighter Squadron 211, Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia Beach, Virginia, in flight over burning Kuwaiti oil wells during Operation Desert Storm (U.S. Air Force) much easier for airmen to find and attack apparent to the opponent, these targets during Desert Storm revealed that surface vehicles as they attempted to move. Still were often well defended, and opposing surveillance technology was now making another challenge that severely limited forces would prepare countermeasures it possible to detect and target vehicular the effectiveness of air interdiction in such as bypasses or mass the resources movement deep in enemy territory, even stopping the movement of an opposing needed to make rapid repairs. All these when this movement was taking place army was the low probability of hitting countermeasures help explain why the during darkness. During a night attack and destroying or seriously damaging United States, despite thousands of on Khafji, Saudi Arabia, by two Iraqi such small targets with cannon fire, dumb sorties, had limited effectiveness in the divisions, JSTARS made it possible for bombs, and unguided rockets, especially interdiction of North Vietnamese forces coalition leaders to see that the develop- if the vehicles were moving.10 moving on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.11 ing attack was not a feint and to target All these considerations help explain But in Operation Desert Storm in powerful air attacks against the Iraqi why airmen performing interdiction 1991, and more recently in Operation divisions well before most of their units would often focus their attacks on fixed Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force began field- could move into close proximity to coali- transportation infrastructure such as ing the capabilities that are needed to tion ground forces. These attacks were bridges and tunnels, the destruction or change the way we defeat an opposing so devastating that an Iraqi veteran of damage of which might stop or at least mechanized army. The deployment of the Iran-Iraq war stated that his brigade delay vehicular movement. But since the two prototype E-8A Joint Surveillance suffered more losses in 15 minutes of importance of such infrastructure was also Target Attack Radar Systems (JSTARS) air attacks north of Khafji than it had 74 Commentary / The Urgent Necessity to Reverse Service AirLand Roles JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 endured in 10 years of the Iran-Iraq unit, the 101st Airborne Division, as well guarantees that these vehicles are oc- war.12 JSTARS targeting was also proving as for supplies. Believing that this storm cupied by an opponent’s soldiers. Killing to be a powerful force multiplier because, provided cover from air attack, the Iraqis or wounding these soldiers makes it pos- as JSTARS commander Colonel George moved their Medina Division south to sible to create such fear in other soldiers K. Muellner put it, “With JSTARS, fight- attack the 3rd Division. But by breaking that they are likely to become unwilling ers went ‘bingo [empty] ammo,’ not cover and moving, the Iraqis made it to risk movement or even occupy their ‘bingo fuel,’” which had not been the case possible for JSTARS to detect the divi- vehicles.20 With careful planning, the when they had to search for their own sion’s vehicles and target them with air prompt execution of attacks against mov- targets.13 attacks, delivering hundreds of precision- ing vehicles is likely to create the degree After their defeat at Khafji, in what guided weapons—predominantly of fear sufficient to cause paralysis while the Iraqis had planned to be the “Mother satellite-guided—as well as “dumb” targeting and destroying a relatively small of All Battles,” the Iraqis put increased bombs, causing the Medina Division’s number of vehicles. This approach is in emphasis on minimizing movement destruction before it could close with contrast to Desert Storm, where the Army and dispersing their forces and digging the 3rd Division. As Air Force Brigadier emphasized the importance of air attacks, in to reduce their vulnerability to air at- General Allen Peck put it, “Ground forces causing physical attrition while grossly tack for the remainder of the war. These forced the enemy’s hand. If they massed, underestimating the importance of the measures prevented training and limited airpower could kill them, if they scat- psychological impact air attacks had on resupply, causing Iraqi soldiers to see tered they would get cut through by the Iraqi soldiers.21 the growing futility of their situation.14 ground forces.”17 Using fear to help create paralysis And when precision air attacks using Yet despite the abundant evidence not only reduces the numbers of op- laser-guided bombs began soon after the from these recent conflicts of our growing posing army personnel killed, but it also battle, the Iraqi soldiers’ sense of futil- capability to reverse the roles of air and allows the desired results to be achieved ity increased as they realized that even land forces when fighting mechanized much faster and with far fewer sorties when their vehicles were dispersed and land forces, Service and joint doctrine and munitions than could be achieved dug in, they were vulnerable to sudden, remains stuck in the past. For example, by relying solely on attrition. Yet another lethal precision attacks. Recognizing joint doctrine’s guidance that air inter- operational advantage provided by radar their increased vulnerability, many Iraqi diction should be employed in support surface surveillance capabilities that can soldiers moved away from their vehicles, of land force maneuver reveals the U.S. detect, track, and target vehicular move- which limited training and maintenance military is failing to make the changes ment is the ability to provide precise, and made their forces extremely vulner- necessary to capitalize fully on our new real-time assessment of the degree to able to defeat when coalition land forces capabilities.18 This failure stands in stark which attacks are achieving the desired began their offensive.15 After the war, contrast to the dramatic changes that the paralysis. And when widespread paralysis Colonel Aleksandr Tsalko, a Soviet army Navy began making before and com- of opposing mechanized forces has been officer who also served as a deputy to the pleted during World War II, reversing achieved, U.S. Army forces will possess Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet the roles of air and surface naval forces in the immense operational advantage of Socialist Republics, recognized the grow- defeating an opposing fleet.19 dominant maneuver that makes it possible ing capability of modern airpower against Reversing roles and making Air Force for them to quickly complete the defeat of ground forces and called the idea of forces our primary means for attacking the opposing forces with far less need for seeking victory in the future through the and defeating an opposing mechanized engaging powerful opposing mechanized contact between large-scale ground forces army would provide the United States units in high-risk close combat.22 as “sheer madness.”16 with a number of extremely important Despite the growing effectiveness Operation Iraqi Freedom provided advantages. These advantages are the of Air Force forces against mechanized further evidence that advances in sur- result of unprecedented advances in forces, Army forces would still be needed veillance and precision air attack were the ability of Air Force surface surveil- to play a valuable supporting role in making land forces far more vulnerable lance systems to detect, track, target, achieving the defeat of an opposing army. to detection and destruction by air at- and destroy an army’s moving vehicles By exploiting the importance movement tacks. In Iraqi Freedom, 9 of the 116th well before they can reach a position in plays in land operations, Army maneuver Air Control Wing’s 15 E-8C JSTARS close proximity to friendly land forces. could make an opposing army’s forces aircraft were available and made a tremen- One important advantage from precisely even more vulnerable to defeat by air dous difference. With the Desert Storm targeting an opponent’s vehicles when attack.23 In their supporting role, U.S. model of protracted bombing before they are moving is that it eliminates the Army forces would use maneuver to put committing land forces to an offensive possibility of wasting precious time and opposing land forces on the horns of a having been rejected, the U.S. Army’s resources attacking previously destroyed dilemma that has no satisfactory answer. 3rd Division had slowed its advance dur- vehicles or decoys. Of even greater The opposing army’s dilemma is this: If it ing a sandstorm to wait for its follow-on importance, targeting moving vehicles attempts to counter the Army’s maneuver JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Bingham 75 by moving, it makes its vehicles far more coverage of all areas where opposing over obstacles such as rivers and moun- vulnerable to detection and destruction forces can move by wide-area, real-time, tains, reducing their need for engineering by air attack, but if it attempts to reduce all- weather GMTI radar systems such as support while making their maneuver its risks from air attack by not moving, it JSTARS is central to reversing roles. As much faster as well as far less predictable. will be unable to effectively counter Army a result, these systems cannot be fielded As with the Air Force forces, Army forces maneuver while providing even more time in the small numbers that currently make will need to be horizontally integrated for its vehicles to be located and destroyed them such a high-demand but low- so their employment complements that by precision air attack. density capability. And recognizing that of the Air Force while reducing the risk Perfecting the ideas outlined here screening can limit what can be seen by of fratricide. To make opposing army for exploiting the advantages made pos- JSTARS, their employment must be com- forces move so they could be more easily sible by reversing the roles of the Air plemented by fielding sufficient numbers detected, targeted, and destroyed by Air Force and Army in the AirLand fight of other GMTI-capable systems such as Force forces while minimizing the risk and turning these ideas into joint and Global Hawk, which can ensure all move- of close combat with intact units, Army Service doctrine will require applying ment screened from JSTARS coverage maneuver would need to be rapid and lessons gained from intensive wargaming will still be detected and tracked. In addi- unpredictable. It is also quite likely that and exercises, just as was the case with tion to significantly increasing its surface during a campaign’s initial stages, this the Navy’s reversal of roles between its surveillance force structure, the Air Force maneuver would be designed to tempt air and surface forces. And, as was the must horizontally integrate its capabilities opposing forces to advance into areas case with the Navy, reversing roles will so that sensors, air and space operations where they could be more easily trapped depend on making major changes in centers, targeting systems, and shooters and destroyed. the force structure of the two Services. can seamlessly communicate with each Despite the tremendous advantages Unfortunately, all the Services have a his- other, eliminating time-consuming, error- possible with a reversal of roles, this tory of their senior leaders resisting major prone manual translations by humans.28 change is very likely to be strongly re- force structure changes brought about Since causing paralysis will require the sisted by the leaders of both the Army by advances in technology, despite these prompt destruction of opposing vehicles and Air Force. The Army’s reluctance is changes providing the promise of making whenever they attempt to move, it will be easier to anticipate because of the great our Armed Forces more effective. This re- necessary to field sufficient numbers of implications for its force structure and, sistance occurred even when the changes shooters equipped with moving target– perhaps most importantly, because of the being made were confined to a single capable munitions in order to saturate dominant role the Army currently plays Service rather than requiring actions by their coverage of a large area. And given in planning and executing AirLand fight. two or more Services.24 For example, the importance of endurance for achiev- Its unwillingness to accept the need for the Navy’s senior leaders’ identification ing the desired degree of shooter–target these changes is likely to be magnified with their battleships made many of them area saturation, it is likely that many of by the failure of many Soldiers to ap- slow to recognize the growing ability of these aircraft should be unmanned aerial preciate fully the growing contribution aircraft carriers to change naval warfare.25 vehicles like the MQ-9 Reaper. But force modern airpower has made to the defeat Similarly, many of the Army’s senior lead- structure alone will not be enough. It is of opposing armies.31 This lack of ap- ers were slow to recognize that advances also vital that the Air Force learn from preciation is evident in the way some in firepower were causing the horse cav- Operation Desert Storm and focus far Soldiers have criticized support provided alry to lose its effectiveness.26 And some more attention on the operational level by Airmen while simultaneously ignoring senior Airmen’s attachment to manned of war and conceptualize how to employ the favorable comments made by oppos- bombers made it difficult for them to rec- airpower in a campaign against ground ing soldiers regarding U.S. airpower’s ognize the growing capabilities of ballistic forces.29 effectiveness.32 Perhaps part of the reason missiles.27 Once the Air Force makes the neces- for the Army’s attitude toward airpower The changes the Air Force must make sary changes in its force structure and can be found in the fact that it has been in order to assume the primary role in doctrine, changes in Army force structure over 70 years since U.S. Soldiers have defeating an opposing mechanized army could be made. In its supporting role, suffered significant losses from air attacks. begin with its surface surveillance force the Army would need fewer and lighter Surprisingly, despite the criticism made structure. Changes in this force structure vehicles. Lighter vehicles would be more by Soldiers, Airmen have been reluctant are necessary because detecting and de- easily transportable by air, to include by to criticize the Army even when the deci- stroying an opposing army’s vehicles well vertical lift.30 Not only would lighter sions made by Soldiers were responsible before they can move into close proxim- vehicles make it possible for Army forces for seriously handicapping the Air Force’s ity to U.S. Army forces depends on the to reach a distant theater quickly, but effectiveness.33 employment of highly capable Ground enabling their vertical lift could also give Compared to the Army, the lack of Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) radar Army forces a major operational and tacti- interest Air Force leaders have exhibited surveillance. Continuous and complete cal advantage by allowing units to leap in reversing roles in the AirLand fight is 76 Commentary / The Urgent Necessity to Reverse Service AirLand Roles JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Marines climb side of berm into attack positions during Operation Desert Storm (U.S. Marines/R.J. Engbrecht) much more puzzling, especially when potential to transform the way the United level of war, where the role of wide-area compared to naval airmen, who actively States conducts the joint AirLand fight. surveillance-targeting air interdiction worked to reverse naval airpower’s sup- The Air Force’s slowness in recognizing would be most evident.37 It may also be porting role to the battleship in the years the unprecedented advantages of the because of an informal agreement among before World War II.34 Perhaps RAND capabilities provided by JSTARS has been the Services to do nothing that would analyst Carl Builder’s assessment of the evident in how often the lessons from one upset their current way of doing business, Air Force was correct. He believed the operation on how to use JSTARS most even at the cost of harming long-term Air Force could be said to worship at effectively had to be relearned during the military effectiveness and efficiency. the altar of technology with pride of as- next operation.36 Again, Builder faults all the Services when sociation with a machine, even before Still another great obstacle to a rever- he notes that “when alternative concepts the institution. He noted an institu- sal of AirLand roles can be found in the of war (or how to fight those wars) begin tional resistance to the introduction of way jointness seems to work in today’s to affect the institution—its organiza- new weapons. Perhaps we see it today U.S. military. Despite the major advances tion and aspirations—then its intellectual with JSTARS. The Air Force’s focus in airpower’s ability to detect and destroy energies quickly become focused upon a on aircraft, especially the aerodynamic an opposing army’s vehicles, which has competition for stature and survival.”38 performance of aircraft, seemed to him been demonstrated in Libya and now If true, it would be a devastating indict- to be its main priority along with its against the Islamic State of Iraq and the ment of our current military leadership, institutional independence.35 If so, this Levant, all the Services have shown a lack making it essential that the Nation’s would explain why the Air Force has paid of interest in exploring an operational civilian leaders intervene, as they did with so little attention to the importance of concept that would require a reversal of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of military theory, which shows why the roles. Part of the problem may be the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, to new capabilities possessed by an “old” tendency, especially in the Army, to focus make the U.S. military much more uni- non–aerodynamically exciting platform on the tactical level of war and the close fied and effective.39 such as E-8C JSTARS provides the fight, rather than on the operational JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Bingham 77 U.S. Air Force RQ-4 Global Hawk aircraft maintenance technicians perform preflight checks prior to mission, November 2010 (U.S. Air Force/Andy M. Kin) Technology, September 15, 2014, 42–46. The The obstacle inter-Service politics to what was stated by key leaders at a 250-pound Small Diameter Bomb successfully poses to changing Service AirLand roles recent airpower symposium hosted by completed tests using its tri-mode seeker that should be apparent to all concerned RAND and the Air Force Association’s proved its ability to achieve direct hits against with national security. According to one Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. both stationary and moving targets through expert, inter-Service politics undermines Lieutenant General Steven Kwast, com- weather or dust. See “SDB II Moves into Low- Rate Initial Production,” Air Force Magazine, the popular theory that jointness has mander of Air University, stated that November 2014, 25. successfully integrated the four Services as the Air Force continues to shrink, 2 The horse, chariot, railroad, and, most re- into an almost unified fighting force. He it was urgent for Airmen to find new cently, the internal combustion engine have all calls for the Services to “more openly ways to solve old problems. As Retired caused revolutionary changes in land warfare by acknowledge their parochial concerns and Lieutenant General David A. Deptula, enhancing the ability of armies to move quickly. See John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New either argue that their parochial perspec- dean of the Mitchell Institute, put it, York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993). Armies were tive better achieves U.S. national security “The concepts of the last century will most effective when their objective in moving objectives than others’ perspectives or simply be eclipsed in the information was the mind and will of their opponents, using abandon them.” The issue is so important age,” and all Airmen must be empowered the speed of their movement to create disorder that he believes “the Secretary of Defense to think critically on how to solve current and paralysis. See Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century War- should consider inter-Service politics the and future challenges.41 JFQ fare (London: Brassey’s Ltd., 1985); and Field primary problem facing U.S. defense and Marshal Lord Carver, The Apostles of Mobility: look to weed out its clouding of policy The Theory and Practice of Armoured Warfare choices. And the President and Congress Notes (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., should consider whether structural reform 1979), 77. Even in Vietnam the mobility and 1 firepower advantages provided by armor were is needed to change the bargaining ad- A top priority for the Air Force is to recapitalize the E-8 JSTARS fleet, which evident in the fact that armor units were among vantages that create today’s inter-Service possesses the ability to track moving targets the last units withdrawn. In December 1971, 40 politics.” through weather over a wide area, and proved 54 percent of the U.S. maneuver battalions still It is important to conclude on a note to be invaluable in Iraq and Afghanistan, with in Vietnam were armored units. See Donn A. of optimism regarding the possibility of a business-jet–size aircraft with equal or even Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam (Wash- ington, DC: Department of the Army, 1978), the Air Force at last advocating the need greater capability than the E-8. See Amy Butler, “More for Less,” Aviation Week & Space 164–165. After World War I, when reforming for a reversal of roles by calling attention 78 Commentary / The Urgent Necessity to Reverse Service AirLand Roles JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 the German army, General Hans von Seeckt’s Persian Gulf (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical because they could not be relied on to hit the great contribution was thinking of a “war of & Aviation Publishing Company of America, target. However, these attacks were effective movement.” See Robert M. Citino, Quest for 1995), 253. because of the disruption and morale effect. Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in 13 Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air According to General Heinrich von Vieting- Europe, 1899–1940 (Lawrence: University Press Power and the Gulf War (Washington, DC: hoff, the presence of Allied fighter-bombers of Kansas, 2002), 195. Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 220, 245. paralyzed all German movement. See Gooder- 3 Jonathan B. Parshall and Anthony P. Tully, 14 For in-depth treatment of this attack son, 212, 321. Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle see Price T. Bingham, The Battle of Al Khafji 21 Perry D. Jamieson, Lucrative Targets: The of Midway (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, and the Future of Surveillance Precision Strike U.S. Air Force in the Kuwaiti Theater of Opera- Inc., 2005), 217. (Arlington, VA: Aerospace Education Founda- tions (Washington, DC: Air Force History and 4 In July 1944, Admiral Towers decided to tion, 1997). Museums Program, 2001), 118, 136. designate the light carrier USS Independence 15 Keaney and Cohen, 18, 132. 22 Field Marshal Erwin Rommel comment- as a night carrier. Soon the Navy was equipped 16 Hallion, 261. ed on the impact Allied airpower had on his with night-capable aircraft such as the TBM 17 William M. Arkin, “Fliers Rose to Occa- operations in Normandy, writing that “during Avenger, whose ASD-1 radar could see a flattop sion—Speed Kills,” Los Angeles Times, June 1, the day, practically our entire traffic—on roads, at 40 miles. See Clark G. Reynolds, The Fast 2003. tracks and open country—is pinned down by Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy (New 18 Joint doctrine never mentions the need powerful fighter-bomber and bomber forma- York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), for or ability to achieve vehicular paralysis. tions with the result that the movement of our 229. While it states that interdiction and maneuver troops on the battlefield is almost completely 5 For an excellent discussion of the com- should normally be integrated to create dilem- paralyzed, while the enemy can maneuver plexity of ground, see Simpkin, 57–77. mas for the enemy and that interdiction attacks freely.” See B.H. Liddell Hart, ed., The Rommel 6 J.R. Walker, Air-to-Ground Operations can produce a psychological impact that could Papers (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Com- (London: Brassey’s Ltd., 1987), 109. significantly reduce enemy capabilities and mo- pany, 1953), 476–477. 7 British Operational Research examin- rale, it does not provide any guidance for how 23 As A-10 pilot First Lieutenant John ing the armed reconnaissance mission, which this psychological impact could be achieved. Marks, who with Captain Eric Salomonson required fighter-bomber pilots to fly low to See Joint Publication 3-03, Joint Interdiction destroyed 23 Iraqi tanks with Maverick missiles, look for German vehicles, found it to be more (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, October 14, explained, regarding Phase IV of the Gulf War, dangerous than close air support. See Ian 2011), vii, xi, I-3, and I-5. “It was exactly what he had hoped, that the Gooderson, Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied 19 While some commanders gave naval Army advance would do exactly what it did, Close Air Support in Europe 1943–45 (London: aviators more latitude in fleet exercises before that is, force the Republican Guard out of their Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 201–209. the war, the battleship remained supreme with prepared positions, out in the open and onto 8 William W. Momyer, Airpower in Three aviation playing a supporting role. In 1940 the the roads.” See Jamieson, 164. Wars (Washington, DC: Department of the Air General Board freed the aircraft carriers from 24 In the past the relationship between Force, 1978), 326. the battleships, although the Battle Force—not doctrine and force structure has caused the Ser- 9 Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction: Air carriers—remained the “core” of the fleet. vices to neglect some important technological Power and the Land Battle in Three American The damage inflicted by the Japanese at Pearl breakthroughs. This is because the formulation Wars (Washington, DC: Center for Air Force Harbor shifted the burden of the Pacific War of doctrine is often used to justify a Service’s History, 1994), 208. to aircraft carriers, and the superiority of the attempt to obtain or maintain exclusive control 10 The average Typhoon pilot in trials, firing aircraft carrier became more clear as the war over certain roles and missions. Since criticism all eight rockets in a salvo against a target the progressed. Even so, as late as 1943, Admiral of doctrine results in undermining the case the size of a tank, had roughly a 4 percent chance Harry Yarnell’s “Report on Aviation” noted Service has made for certain roles and missions, of a hit, and in combat the accuracy was further the anger of aviators over the continued sup- such criticism is discouraged and breakthroughs reduced. Average radial error for bombs was pression of naval aviation by non-aviators. See in technology that might bring established doc- 158 yards. See Gooderson, 76–77. William M. McBride, Technological Change and trine into question are often ignored. See Perry 11 Trucks moving on the roads of Steel the United States Navy, 1865–1945 (Baltimore: M. 19 Smith, “The Role of Doctrine,” Ameri- Tiger in southern Laos were considered the The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), can Defense Policy, vol. 3 (Baltimore: The Johns most lucrative and vulnerable targets because 200–210. Hopkins University Press, 1973), 422–430. the road system was too redundant and easily 20 Examination of conflicts shows that the 25 On the eve of World War II, many naval repaired to be a good target. See Mark, 335. psychological effect of fear caused by air opera- leaders and experts like naval analyst Bernard During Operation Desert Storm the Iraqis dem- tions can be more important that the physical Brodie doubted the ability of the aircraft carrier onstrated similar skill in countering attacks on destruction inflicted. See Stephen T. Hosmer, to replace the battleship and revolutionize naval transportation infrastructure. After the conflict, Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in warfare. See Clark G. Reynolds, The Fast Car- General Chuck Horner cautioned, “Anybody Four Wars 1941–1991: Lessons for U.S. Com- riers: The Forging of an Air Navy (New York: that does a campaign against transportation manders (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996). McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), 20–21. systems [had] better beware! It looks deceiv- During Operation Desert Storm, air interdiction 26 In October 1938, Major General John ingly easy. It is a tough nut to crack. [The succeeded in destroying the confidence of Iraqi K. Herr, chief of the cavalry, stated that “he Iraqis] were very ingenious and industrious in soldiers in their equipment, which they saw was unwilling to give up a single horse or man repairing them and bypassing them. . . . I have as a magnet for air attacks. As a result, much from the horse cavalry in order to organize never seen so many pontoon bridges. [When] of their equipment remaining intact when the any mechanized units.” He asserted that “for the canals near Basra [were bombed], they just ground offensive began was abandoned or at a considerable period of time [mechanization filled them in with dirt and drove across the least unoccupied when reached by advanc- was] . . . bound to play an important but minor dirt.” See Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Co- ing Coalition ground forces. See Keaney and role while the horse cavalry plays the major role hen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Cohen, 103–104. Operational Research ground so far as our country is concerned.” See David Persian Gulf (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute surveys in World War II conducted by the Brit- E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: In- Press, 1995), 82–83. ish found that fighter-bomber attacks against novation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945 (Ithaca, 12 Williamson Murray, Air War in the the German armor did not destroy many tanks NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 136–137. JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Bingham 79 27 Commenting on the Air Force’s negative noting that Allied tactical air forces devoted 36 See Price T. Bingham, “The Joint STARS approach to long-range ballistic missiles in the more of their missions to interdiction. Yet he Challenge,” Joint Force Quarterly 49 (2nd Quar- early 1950s, Trevor Gardner, Secretary of the never notes that this interdiction contributed to ter 2008), 64–65. Air Force Harold Talbott’s special assistant with success because it had (as German command- 37 Discussing an Army corps acting as a responsibility for the Air Force missile program, ers noted) a devastating impact on the German joint task force headquarters, “The first priority thought that “the situation would continue army’s mobility. He does mention that Allied must be to fight the joint fight—that is, to take unless some strong, external influence forced air forces mistakenly attacked friendly ground advantage of the synergy available from syn- a change.” See Edmund Beard, Developing the forces throughout the war, but he does not chronized, coordinated employment capabili- ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics (New comment on whether Army artillery might have ties from all the Services. If they fight the joint York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 154– also made the same mistake. When discussing fight well, they are unlikely to face the ground 155. the war against Iraqi in 1991, he writes that air combat intensity that characterizes WFX [warf- 28 In April 2002, General John P. Jumper planners assigned large numbers of U.S. aircraft ighter exercises]. . . . Joint training exercises made an impassioned plea for this kind of to look for targets of opportunity with the create a Service training dilemma: Good joint integration. He compared what he wanted to purpose of preventing Iraqi movement in day- level training does not necessarily provide a how the Air Force performed air-to-air combat, light because they “apparently preferred such good component training experience.” See saying, “The sum of all wisdom is a cursor over potentially wasteful, independent operations to ThomasE. Ward II, “A JTF Training Dilemma: the target.” See Raymond A. Shulstad, “Cursor providing direct support to the ground forces.” Component Rigor Joint Realism,” Joint Force on Target: Inspiring Innovation to Revolution- 33 Even though it was the failure of the Quarterly 46 (3rd Quarter 2007), 114. ize Air Force Command and Control,” Air and Army to coordinate with the Air Force that 38 Builder, 129, 151. Space Power Journal, Winter 2011, 21. caused severe problems during Operation En- 39 See James R. Locher III, Victory on the 29 During Operation Desert Storm, air plan- during Freedom’s Operation Anaconda, Army Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the ners in the Black Hole focused on a strategic Major General Franklin Hagenbeck publicly Pentagon (College Station: Texas A&M Univer- campaign against the Iraqi heartland, but there criticized the Air Force’s performance, noting sity Press, 2002). is no evidence of “an effort to conceptualize its slow response in the crisis. See Rebecca 40 R. Russell Rumbaugh, “The Best Man an operational-level air campaign against Iraqi Grant, “Stacked Up Over Anaconda,” Air Force for the Job? Combatant Commanders and the ground forces . . . [the planners] responsible for Magazine (March 2012), 58–62. The first year Politics of Jointness,” Joint Force Quarterly 75 the KTO [Kuwait theater of operations] simply of the Korean conflict also provides a number (4th Quarter 2014), 97. threw air power up against an enemy sheltered of examples of decisions by Soldiers that se- 41 Autumn A. Arnett, “Innovating for in well-dug-in positions.” See Murray, 320. verely limited the effectiveness of the Air Force. Airpower,” Air Force Magazine (January 2015), 30 A key performance requirement of the General Douglas MacArthur’s staff, which 18–21. Sikorsky CH-53K heavy-lift helicopter, which consisted almost entirely of Army officers, often was rolled out formally on May 5, 2014, is the made critical decisions without first asking for ability to lift a 27,000-pound external payload Air Force input—for example, on August 13, 110 nautical miles in high/hot conditions 1950, directing that the entire B-29 force be (3,000 feet/91.5°F). See Graham Warwick, diverted from interdiction to carpet bomb a “Heavier Lifter,” Aviation Week & Space Tech- suspected enemy “concentration” when the nology, May 5, 2014, 45. size of the target area was 26 square miles, not 31 The official Army account of the Gulf the 3 square miles the Air Force recommended. War gives the Army the main role in defeating Post-attack reconnaissance revealed no evidence the Iraqi army, stating that “as part of the Co- of enemy activity in the area bombed. See Rob- alition, the American Army decisively defeated ert Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force the fourth largest field army in the world. It in Korea, 1950–1953 (New York: Duell, Sloan, did so at the lowest cost in human life ever re- and Pearce, 1961), 130–131. After Inchon, the corded for a conflict of such magnitude.” While decision made by U.S. Soldiers to dedicate all it recognizes that air forces “so dominated airlift to the supply of advancing United Na- the air that enemy ground units were largely tions (UN) ground forces greatly delayed the prohibited from maneuvering and only dared to deployment of Air Force fighters and Mosquito move at night or in bad weather,” it also found Forward Air Control aircraft to forward bases. airpower lacking. It notes that “despite 41 days When Chinese units ambushed UN forces, the of almost continuous aerial bombardment, the distance between our air bases and the hard- Republican Guard remained a cohesive and pressed Army units seriously handicapped the viable military force able to fight a vicious battle Air Force’s effectiveness because it significantly and survive to stop it from responding to the reduced the number of sorties that could be Great Wheel, or prevent it from retiring some flown, lowered aircraft payloads, and increased of its elements to safety.” See Robert H. Scales, the time it took these aircraft to reach the tar- Jr., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf get. See HQ Fifth Air Force Memo for Record, War (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, Inc., 1994), “Meeting on Airlift to Pyongyang,” HRA File 5, 368. K168.041-1, vol. 6 (part 4), October 22, 1950. 32 See Jonathan M. House, Combined Arms Also see Futrell, 201–203. Warfare in the Twentieth Century (Lawrence: 34 See Clark G. Reynolds, Admiral John H. University Press of Kansas, 2001), 171–172, Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy 271. When discussing Allied AirLand opera- (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991). tions in Europe in 1944, the author complains 35 Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: that General Elwood Quesada emphasized American Military Styles in Strategy and Analy- close air support only when ground command- sis (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University ers were launching a major ground offensive, Press, 1989), 19, 23, 71. 80 Commentary / The Urgent Necessity to Reverse Service AirLand Roles JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Machine gunner with Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, Marine Rotational Force–Darwin prepares to provide security during Exercise Hamel at Cultana Training Area, South Australia, Australia, July 2016 (U.S. Marine Corps/Osvaldo L. Ortega III) Center of Gravity Analysis “Down Under” The Australian Defence Force’s New Approach By Aaron P. Jackson iven Australia’s position as a key The ADF has recently reviewed its U.S. ally and a much smaller mil- equivalent to the U.S. Joint Operation G itary power, as well as the array Planning Process, called the Joint of cultural similarities between the two Military Appreciation Process (JMAP), countries, it should come as no surprise and as a part of this review it has up- that U.S. developments have regularly dated its approach to COG analysis. Dr. Aaron P. Jackson is a Joint Operations Planning Specialist in the Joint and Operations influenced Australian Defence Force Ongoing Australian evaluations of the Analysis Division of Australia’s Defence Science (ADF) thinking about armed conflict.1 previous ADF approach to COG analysis and Technology Group. The views expressed Center of gravity (COG) analysis, a in light of contemporary operational in this article are the author’s own and are not necessarily those of the Australian Department of lynchpin of campaign and operation requirements prompted this update. Defence or any part thereof. planning, is no exception. The publication in the United States of JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Jackson 81 Amphibious assault vehicles carrying Company G, Battalion Landing Team 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, charge onto Freshwater Beach during Exercise Talisman Sabre 2011, Queensland, Australia (U.S. Marines/Garry J. Welch) several new theoretical developments “The key characteristic, capability or within a planning group). Once the COG subsequently constituted a key input locality from which a military force, was identified, doctrine provided better during the development of the updated nation or alliance derives its freedom of guidance for the subsequent develop- approach, although the approach itself action, strength or will to fight at that ment of a “COG analysis matrix” for each has adapted the theory to suit Australia’s level of conflict.”3 Analysis of critical COG, which broke the COG down into national conditions and the ADF’s re- vulnerabilities (CVs) was introduced at CCs, the CCs into CRs, and the CRs into quirements. As a result, the ADF’s new the same time as the term COG. CVs. approach to COG analysis constitutes an By the early 21st century, the ADF Later in the JMAP, courses of action innovation in its own right. This article joint approach to COG analysis had be- were developed by arranging decisive summarizes this new approach to COG come better developed. For example, the points along one or more lines of opera- analysis as well as elaborating its origins ADF’s joint approach to COG analysis tions that collectively led to the defeat of and the influences on its development. expanded in 2002 to include critical ca- the adversary’s COG. Although decisive pabilities (CCs) and critical requirements points could be linked to achieving effects COG Analysis Requirements (CRs).4 Staff would first identify adver- that were broader than defeating the ad- for Today’s ADF Operations sary and friendly COGs based on a broad versary’s COG (or protecting one’s own), The term center of gravity entered analysis of the operational environment. the need to sequence them on a line of Australian Army doctrine in 1992 and Doctrinal guidance about precisely how operations running toward defeat of the ADF joint doctrine in 1998.2 The to do this was minimal, and the process adversary’s COG tended to limit their definition of COG that featured in the of determining COGs had a tendency focus. Furthermore, at no stage in the 1998 interim edition of JMAP doc- to degenerate into a planning group JMAP were planners required to deter- trine remained essentially unchanged “educated guess” (or, in some cases, to mine operational objectives or the desired between then and the recent review: be decided based on force of personality operational endstate. Even though they 82 Commentary / Center of Gravity Analysis “Down Under” JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 were required to determine the joint underlies the practical application of the nately, this theoretical work was also force’s mission, the positioning of defeat concept.” His key concern was that COG available to assist in the development of of the adversary’s COG at the end of all analysis reduces complex systems to a the doctrine, as was comprehensive data lines of operation made this implicitly single point of focus and subsequently about Australia’s recent operations. The synonymous with achieving the desired leaves staff open to a confirmation final decision about how to fit COG operational endstate. This method of bias.6 At the other end of the spectrum, analysis within the JMAP resulted from COG analysis and operational planning Professor Michael Evans of the Australian a thorough evaluation of ADF opera- was theoretically workable and was well Defence College emphasized his view tional requirements and the theoretical suited to conventional warfare scenarios. that COG analysis remains highly rel- literature, supported by extensive con- In practice, however, conventional evant and advocated the introduction of a sultation with key stakeholders.10 warfare is almost the only kind of opera- U.S.-style approach to operational design The result of the review was twofold. tion that the ADF has not conducted into ADF doctrine as a way to modernize First, the role of COG analysis relative so far this century. Since 2001 the ADF the force’s approach to COG analysis.7 to other components of the JMAP was has conducted dozens of operations, Regardless of the variety of these conclu- altered. Second, there was an update including unconventional warfare and sions, the debate itself reinforced the to COG analysis itself, including key stabilization in Afghanistan and Iraq; need for an evolution of the ADF’s doc- definitions and the method used to de- peace enforcement in Timor Leste; peace- trinal approach to COG analysis. termine COG. keeping in the Solomon Islands; truce Regarding the relative position of monitoring in the Sinai and South Sudan; The Existential Question COG analysis to the other components of provision of humanitarian assistance and The recent review of the JMAP com- the JMAP, the COG analysis methodol- disaster relief throughout the Asia-Pacific; menced in accordance with the ADF’s ogy included in the new edition of the and provision of ADF assistance to do- joint doctrine review cycle, which stip- JMAP doctrine states that defeating the mestic authorities during major natural ulates that all publications should be adversary’s COG could be explicitly linked disasters and major sporting events such reviewed every 3 to 5 years.8 The first to either a decisive point, an operational as the 2006 Melbourne Commonwealth question facing the ADF was whether objective or the desired operational end- Games. In total, the ADF has conducted to keep COG analysis in doctrine at state (determining the desired operational at least 48 different operations since all. This question was relatively easy endstate and constituent operational 2001, most of which have been unop- to answer. All of the major stakehold- objectives are now explicit components of posed.5 The nature of these operations ers in the JMAP doctrine publication the JMAP).11 This means that defeating has meant that COG analysis often had to wanted the concept retained (these an adversary’s COG is no longer implicitly be applied more flexibly than the JMAP stakeholders included operational-level linked to achieving the desired operational doctrine seemed to intend (for example, headquarters and professional military endstate—although the option to make by being applied to nonadversarial actors education institutions). Indeed, this this link remains available in the revised within an area of operations). That this aspect of the review showed that cul- methodology, so that there will be no regularly occurred is a testament to the turally, the ADF—the army in particu- problems applying COG analysis to con- initiative of staff officers and planners lar—is wedded to the COG concept to ventional operations or training scenarios across the ADF; however, it was also a the extent that removing it from doc- in the same manner as it was applied in the key indicator that the doctrine was ready trine altogether would have resulted in previous iteration of the JMAP. for an update. insurmountable “sales resistance” to In other types of operations, the flex- Beginning in 2008, a half-dozen eval- the point where the revised iteration ibility of the revised JMAP allows the uations of the ADF’s application of COG of JMAP doctrine likely would not defeat of an adversary’s COG to be linked analysis were published, mostly written have been applied.9 As a result, COG to only one of several operational objec- in response to conceptual developments analysis remains prominent within ADF tives or to one or more decisive points appearing in U.S.-based publications. joint doctrine. along a single line of operations. This has These evaluations offered several recom- resulted in the new edition of the JMAP mendations about how the ADF might The Methodological Question doctrine more closely mirroring recent approach COG analysis in light of these The second issue facing the ADF was practice. Furthermore, the new edition of conceptual developments, although the more difficult: What form should COG the JMAP doctrine also establishes that recommendations themselves varied analysis take, and where should it be in unopposed operations, a COG analysis significantly between publications. At one positioned within the planning process? may be completed for a nonadversarial end of the spectrum, then–Lieutenant When the review of the doctrine com- threat that would prevent mission ac- Colonel Trent Scott asserted that COG menced, recent theoretical development complishment if not adequately addressed. was a “flawed concept,” stating that of COG analysis had already led to Ultimately, in this revised approach it is up “what does invalidate the centre of pedagogical changes at the Australian to the commander to determine how to gravity is the reductive hypothesis that Command and Staff College. Fortu- approach COG analysis for any particular JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Jackson 83 The ADF first incorporated COG Table. New Definitions of Center of Gravity and Related Critical Factors analysis into its joint doctrine in 1998, Term Definition and the concept has been broadly useful The primary entity that possesses the inherent capability to achieve an as a component of ADF joint opera- Center of gravity objective or the desired end state. tions planning. Since 1998, the ADF An action (verb) done by the center of gravity that enables it to achieve an Critical capabilities methodology for conducting COG objective or the desired end state. analysis, as well as its definition of COG A thing (noun), resource, or means that is essential for a critical capability to Critical requirements and related terminology, underwent only enable a center of gravity to function. minor changes until the recent review Those critical requirements, or components thereof, that are inherently of the ADF’s JMAP doctrine. In light of Critical vulnerabilities targetable and vulnerable to neutralization, defeat, or destruction in a way that will contribute to undermining a center of gravity. stakeholder requirements and operational lessons, supported by theoretical develop- Source: Australian Defence Force Publication 5.0.1, Joint Military Appreciation Process, 2nd ed., ment of the concept, it was determined Amendment List 1 (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, February 25, 2016). during this review that the ADF approach to COG analysis required revision, which operation. This approach had previously and CVs. In deriving these definitions, was undertaken accordingly. The result been common in practice, but had not theoretical works published by Dale C. is an updated approach to COG analysis been addressed in previous editions of the Eikmeier, Joseph L. Strange, and Richard that is well suited to contemporary joint JMAP doctrine. The new doctrinal flex- Iron were particularly influential, albeit operations. No operational concept or ibility regarding the relative position of that the approaches to COG analysis ad- idea exists in a vacuum, however, and it is COG analysis within the JMAP therefore vocated by these theorists were modified therefore expected that at an appropriate means that the doctrine is now able to to be simpler and more strongly inter- point in the future, the ADF approach provide guidance for the commander and linked before the final ADF definitions to COG analysis will again be revised in staff regardless of the commander’s cho- were determined.12 Despite their origins response to the conditions of the day. sen operational approach. in theoretical papers, it must be noted Until then, an approach to COG analysis The second result of the doctrine that these definitional changes were only that reflects the most up-to-date thinking review, the update to COG analysis, had implemented as the result of stakeholder available has postured the ADF for con- two aspects. One of these was definitional suggestions about how the doctrine tinued operational success. JFQ and the other structural. A decision to re- could best address their operational and vise the definition of COG was made due instructional needs. to the very broad “catchall” nature of the The structural aspect of the change Notes previous definition, which was sufficiently to COG analysis involved an amendment 1 open as to allow almost anything to be to the way in which the COG and the re- The similar positions and common grouping of the United States and Australia deemed a COG. In addition to wanting lated CCs, CRs, and CVs are determined. on the Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map is a key a narrower definition that could be more Here, Jan L. Rueschhoff and Jonathan indicator of the cultural similarities between easily linked to either an operational ob- P. Dunne’s approach to identifying them. See World Values Survey Database, jective or the desired operational endstate, COG “from the inside out” shaped the “Findings and Insights,” undated (but it was decided to limit the interpretation doctrine’s recommended methodology including data from 2014), available at 84 Commentary / Center of Gravity Analysis “Down Under” JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 U.S. Marines move toward objective during Exercise Hamel at Cultana Training Area, South Australia, Australia, July 2016 (U.S. Marine Corps/Mandaline Hatch) 6 Trent Scott, The Lost Operational Art: Science 1998, ed. Frank G. Hoffman and Gary 11 All references to JMAP doctrine and Invigorating Campaigning into the Australian Horne (Washington, DC: Department of the the ADF’s revised approach to COG analysis Defence Force (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Navy/U.S. Marine Corps, 1998), 11. made in this section of this article are to Centre, February 2011), 41–45. 10 Relevant theoretical works include Dale C. Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 7 Michael Evans, “Centre of Gravity Eikmeier, “Center of Gravity Analysis,” Military 5.0.1, Joint Military Appreciation Process, 2nd Analysis in Joint Military Planning and Design: Review (July/August 2004), 2–5; Celestino ed., Amendment List 1 (Canberra: Defence Implications and Recommendations for the Perez, Jr., ed., Addressing the Fog of COG: Publishing Service, February 25, 2016); for Australian Defence Force,” Security Challenges Perspectives on the Center of Gravity in U.S. COG analysis, see 3.6–3.17. 8, no. 2 (Winter 2012), 81–104. Military Doctrine (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. 12 Dale C. Eikmeier, “Redefining the 8 The previous edition of the JMAP Army Combat Studies Institute Press, 2012); Center of Gravity,” Joint Force Quarterly 59 doctrine was published in 2009. The revised Dale C. Eikmeier, “Give Carl von Clausewitz (4th Quarter 2010), 156–158; Eikmeier, “After (current) edition was developed during 2014 and the Center of Gravity a Divorce,” Small the Divorce: Clausewitz and the Center of and published in February 2015. Following Wars Journal 9, no. 7 (July 2, 2013), available Gravity”; Joseph L. Strange and Richard Iron, assessments of the revised edition undertaken at JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Jackson 85 F/A-18E Super Hornet, attached to Strike Fighter Squadron 31, and F/A-18F Super Hornet, attached to Strike Fighter Squadron 213, prepare to launch from flight deck of USS George H.W. Bush to conduct strike missions against ISIL targets, September 2014 (U.S. Navy/Robert Burck) Hybrid Threat COG Analysis Taking a Fresh Look at ISIL By Michael D. Reilly However absorbed a commander may be in the elaboration of his own thoughts, it is sometimes necessary to take the enemy into account. Winston Churchill ebates continue in the media, Levant (ISIL). Imbedded within these of gravity is the clearest path to defeat military, and foreign policy circles debates are fundamental disagreements against any foe—especially a hybrid one. D about the national strategy to about ISIL’s strategic and operational An assessment of ISIL’s center of gravity defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the centers of gravity. Correctly identifying is critical to developing a suitable opera- the center of gravity (COG) of an adver- tional design aimed at its defeat. The sary is critical to designing an opera- first order of business, however, is to tional approach to defeat him. On the determine if ISIL is a hybrid actor and, Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Reilly, USMC, is an other hand, misidentifying the center if so, how that impacts our analysis. Operational Planner at U.S. Pacific Command. 86 Commentary / Hybrid Threat COG Analysis JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 There is an issue, though. Our collec- activities are closely intertwined in many depth, complexity, and impact of these tive reliance on traditional thinking and of the current gray zone or limited war hazards lies un- or under-recognized until continued use of existing COG doctrine conflicts—as in the case of ISIL.3 He de- attempts to contend with them are well is particularly problematic. However, by fines a hybrid threat as “any adversary that underway.”5 By their very nature, hybrid examining hybrid warfare and expand- simultaneously employs a tailored mix of threats, like ISIL, are highly integrated, ing the definition of the center of gravity conventional weapons, irregular tactics, amorphous, and difficult to analyze. As beyond that of “hub of all power” by the terrorism, and criminal behavior in the such, identifying a single unit, force, per- inclusion of the “modalities of principal same time and battlespace to obtain their son, or ideology as the center of gravity use,” commanders and planners can iden- political objectives.”4 A state or nonstate is potentially dangerous and misleading. tify critical capabilities, requirements, and entity capable of fully integrating these Likewise, identifying a hybrid threat’s most importantly, vulnerabilities more operational-level modalities into a vi- critical vulnerabilities is extremely difficult rapidly and set U.S. operational planning able and unified course of action across as there is no single source of strength on stronger footing. Simply put, a shared the political, military, economic, social, to defeat and no silver bullet powerful understanding of hybrid warfare and information, and infrastructure (PMESII) enough to neutralize the critical capabili- centers of gravity are required for a fresh spectrum has a significant advantage ties inherent within a hybrid adversary. analysis of ISIL. over an adversary still approaching The real danger in applying traditional Complexity, deception, and ambigu- warfare from a traditional, irregular, or COG analysis to hybrid threats is that it ity are characteristics of warfare dating compound perspective. The blending of misleads senior leaders into believing that back to ancient times that are enjoying a multiple, unified, and integrated modali- operations against hybrid adversaries will renaissance due to an emerging method ties, void of traditional military customs be shorter, less costly, and less risky than of conflict described as hybrid warfare. or norms, makes hybrid war distinct from is probably the case. Hybrid warfare falls into an area of con- other types of warfare and makes assess- The COG constructs currently used flict within the gray zone of “competitive ing an adversary’s COG so difficult. in doctrine and practice either fall short of interactions among and with state and The following definition of a hybrid providing a useful method for discerning non-state actors that fall between the threat is proposed to gain shared under- a hybrid threat’s center of gravity or omit traditional war and peace duality.”1 The standing and a framework for analyzing the concept entirely. This increases the emergence of hybrid war, as demon- ISIL: probability of responding too slowly to strated by Hezbollah in 2006, Russia in effectively counter the threat or misiden- 2014, and ISIL’s current activities in Iraq Any adversary that creates a dilemma tifying the center of gravity and taking and Syria, creates a panoply of problems across the PMESII spectrum by simul- inappropriate actions based upon legacy for policymakers, operational planners, taneously employing a tailored mix of definitions intended for a traditional and commanders due to the enigmatic traditional warfare and weapons, irregu- interstate construct that may not apply to nature of the threat. lar warfare, catastrophic terrorist actions, hybrid adversaries. Learning from Operations Desert and disruptive and/or criminal behavior Before proposing a new method of Storm and Iraqi Freedom, challengers to in the same time and battlespace to obtain analysis, debilitating problems in current U.S. power actively avoid actions likely to political objectives within operational or approaches must be understood and result in an overwhelming conventional political limitations. accepted. In this article, current perspec- military response. This creates a global tives on COG analysis are examined context where the United States, as the Freier’s four modalities framework— with an eye toward determining if those de facto guarantor of global stability, with the inclusion of criminality alongside constructs adequately support the analysis faces increasing hybrid conflicts as state the disruptive challenge—is used in this of a hybrid threat adversary. This article and nonstate actors develop asymmetric article as the construct to analyze hybrid then recommends an updated method for ways to challenge American dominance. threats. While every conceivable sce- analysis specific to understanding hybrid Recognizing that hybrid warfare is far nario may not fit comfortably into these threat actors and applies this method to more than a subset of irregular war- modalities, this hybrid threat methodol- ISIL as it is considered an example of a fare, analyst Nathan Freier developed ogy adequately captures the ways and hybrid threat actor with clear effects on a comprehensive description of hybrid means required at the operational level potential future conflicts. Freier calls these warfare and defines it as an adversary’s to accomplish the desired ends for the asymmetrical conflicts the “hybrid norm” integration and use of at least two of the majority of opponents U.S. forces will of the future,6 while Russell Glenn adds following modalities: traditional warfare, confront in the 21st century. it is critical that military professionals not catastrophic terrorism, irregular warfare, Hybrid threats, according to Freier, allow themselves to become myopic in and disruptive use of technology.2 are the Defense Department’s “new their vision of future threats and see each Frank Hoffman builds upon Freier’s ‘wicked problems’ where precise iden- new conflict as the same as the last, since concept and includes “criminality” within tification of what is most harmful or U.S. and coalition forces are more likely the disruptive modality, since criminal important is problematic” and “the true to face hybrid threats in future conflicts.7 JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Reilly 87 COG Discussion the objective.”12 Understanding that an As demonstrated, there is currently no Current translations of Carl von Clause- enemy’s center of gravity may be elusive, adequate model or methodology to de- witz’s On War describe the center Eikemeier built upon Strange’s CG-CC- termine a hybrid threat’s center of gravity. of gravity as the “hub of all power CR-CV model to include an assessment The current definitions and methods fail and movement, on which everything of the threat’s strategic and operational to account for the multimodalities, ambi- depends.”8 Clausewitz approached objectives. This addition assists planners in guity, and political constraints presented warfare from the perspective of nation- understanding the critical capabilities re- by hybrid threats. Joint Publication states using organized violence in a quired to meet those objectives and points 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation battle of wills, where the ultimate more accurately to the center of gravity of the Operating Environment, does not objective was the enemy’s submission (the “doer”) that inherently has those ca- mention hybrid threats or discuss the use through the destruction of its military pabilities to accomplish that objective.13 of multiple modalities.19 In the case of a forces. But do the current interpreta- Professor Vego argued that “the hybrid threat, the center of gravity may tions and applications of Clausewitz’s concept of center of gravity is perhaps the not be the traditional source of greatest concept hold true for hybrid threats most critical element of operational and strength, power, or resistance described that may not seek decisive battle? strategic warfare. No plan for a campaign by the current definitions. In practice, Joint doctrine defines a center of or major operation can be executed a single moral or physical source of gravity as “the source of power that pro- quickly and decisively without identifying strength may not exist due to the blend- vides moral or physical strength, freedom enemy and friendly COGs and properly ing of capabilities and resources required of action, or will to act.”9 The Marine applying combat power to degrade, de- in constructing a hybrid force. This raises Corps further describes an operational- stroy, neutralize or protect them.”14 He an interesting conundrum for planners: level center of gravity as “normally an defines a center of gravity as “that source what if the center of gravity of a hybrid element of the enemy’s armed forces” of leverage or massed strength—physical threat adversary is not his source of great- that is the “most dangerous to us or or moral—whose serious degradation, est strength, power, or resistance? Is the the one that stands between us and the dislocation, neutralization or destruction COG concept still relevant to these types accomplishment of our strategic mis- will have the most decisive impact on the of threats? sion.”10 These definitions provide the enemy’s or one’s own ability to accom- Eikmeier postulates a theory that doctrinal baseline for threat analysis, but plish a given military objective,” and one could radically change how COG analysis may not fully apply to hybrid threats. that can be associated with all three levels is understood and practiced. Eikmeier The four scholars who stand out as the of warfare.15 also argues that Clausewitz’s On War most useful and comprehensive in their Colonel Echevarria identified the cen- was mistranslated by Michael Howard understanding of center-of-gravity analy- ter of gravity as the (centripetal) force, or and Peter Paret, resulting in the cur- sis, and who are briefly discussed here, focal point that holds the various entities rent understanding of Clausewitz’s idea are Joe Strange, Dale Eikmeier, Milan together.16 He argues that the COG con- being slightly, but significantly, wrong. Vego, and Antulio Echevarria. cept was originally aimed at achieving the He assesses that the “hub of all power” Dr. Strange wrote extensively about total collapse of the adversary’s forces and description of the center of gravity is not COG analysis with an eye to assisting is only applicable for absolute (or total) Clausewitzean; rather it is the product of military planners through a logical war where the destruction of the enemy’s Howard and Paret’s translation. Eikmeier construct commonly referred to as force is the primary goal. This distinc- argues that this mistranslation fosters a the “Strange Method.” He defines a tively Clausewitzean point of view holds crucial misunderstanding as Clausewitz center of gravity as the “moral or physi- true to the essence of On War, where never actually uses the term center of cal strength, power, and resistance.” each side seeks an advantage against the gravity in German—gravitationspunkt. Revolutionary at the time, Strange de- other in a decisive battle. Echeverria does Rather, Clausewitz uses the German veloped his now famous CG-CC-CR-CV not advocate the partitioning of centers word schwerpunkt (usually translated construct that forms the basis of joint of gravity at the strategic, operational, as the center of gravity), which literally doctrine, to assist planners in identifying or tactical levels, and argues that these means the weight of focus or point of the center of gravity (CG) along with are modern artificial constructs and not effort. In practice, Clausewitz may have its critical capabilities (CCs), its critical how Clausewitz viewed warfare.17 He been describing what is currently identi- requirements (CRs), and its potential concludes that the COG concept is not fied in doctrine as the “main effort.” critical vulnerabilities (CVs).11 applicable to the array of limited wars This makes sense as Clausewitz was most Colonel Eikmeier argued that the (under which hybrid war usually falls) concerned with the decisive battle and COG concept is useless if it cannot be since the concept of attacking the center defeating the enemy’s main effort was the readily understood and applied in a real- of gravity often comes in conflict with surest way to win the contest of wills. world planning situation. He defined the limited political objectives and rarely Doctrinally, the main effort is estab- center of gravity as “the ‘primary doer’ results in the total collapse of the enemy’s lished to “attain the primary objective of with the capability required to achieve forces through a decisive battle.18 a major operation or campaign.”20 This 88 Commentary / Hybrid Threat COG Analysis JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Soldiers assigned to Charlie Battery, 1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, fire M777 A2 Howitzer in support of Operation Inherent Resolve at Platoon Assembly Area 14, Iraq, November 2016 (U.S. Army/Christopher Brecht) is consistent with this article’s definition objectives, provoke the full applica- designs to quickly and effectively defeat of a center of gravity as the actor’s main tion of U.S. military might, or cause threats, like ISIL, before they escalate to effort to achieve its operational-level unacceptable second- and third-order the point where later adaptation is unac- objectives and is simpler to understand effects—like the loss of international ceptably costly in blood and treasure. and easier to put into practice than the support. Clausewitz’s concept is still ap- The six-step analytical process pro- “hub of all power” metaphor. Following plicable, but the doctrinal definitions and posed below is intended for use against this logic, the real task in COG analysis methods for analysis are less useful for hybrid threats, but can be successfully is identifying the enemy’s operational analyzing a hybrid threat. Rather, faced used as a general theory for threat analy- main effort, not necessarily its greatest with a hybrid threat, planners require an sis. Correctly identifying the center of source of strength.21 This definition updated method. gravity is critical because, as Vego writes, opens the aperture on COG analysis at “operational COGs are linked to both the operational level, is applicable to hy- Applying a New COG strategic and operational objectives; op- brid threat scenarios, and acknowledges Method to ISIL erational goals and COGs establish the that the center of gravity can shift as the An analytical method for hybrid threat foundation for the selection of tactical situation develops, thus forcing periodic COG analysis is proposed here that objectives.”22 Those acquainted with the reassessment and, if necessary, reframing takes into account the amorphous and Strange and Eikmeier method will note of the problem. agile nature of hybrid threat adversaries. many similarities. This is purposeful as In the case of hybrid war, the center In a hybrid war scenario, identifying the the primary goal is to provide operational of gravity may not be the source of great hybrid threat’s operational level center planners with a more intuitive method for power, strength, and resistance, or the of gravity as the “modality of principal COG analysis that they can apply quickly focal point because the use of a particular use” enables planners and commanders and effectively in operational design and force may negate the identified political to develop operational approaches and the joint operation planning process. JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Reilly 89 desired ends, military objectives, and limitations. This assessment must be made in a timely manner to inform deci- sionmakers and it is critical that planners continuously review and revalidate this assessment as it bears great importance for the correct identification of the center of gravity. Planners must determine the political endstate, the military objectives at the operational level of war, and any limitations (military or political) likely imposed on the forces conducting the actions. This assessment is a critical step as the adversary’s desired ends and objec- tives relate directly to the ways and means required to accomplish those objectives. Strategically, ISIL espouses the creation of the historical Islamic caliph- ate. Operationally, ISIL’s objectives are Secretary Kerry closes his speech book after addressing delegates in Human Rights Chamber at to seize the territory required to build United Nations Palais des Nations, following bilateral meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey the caliphate, establish the economic Lavrov, Geneva Switzerland, March 2, 2015 (State Department) infrastructure to fund it, build an army Step 1: Identify Observed Modalities. terrorist operations, killings of Sunni and to expand it, and terrorize all those who The most important step is identifying Shia “apostates,” and Internet-based oppose them. They appear to have no the modalities employed by the adver- recruiting. This modality solidifies its political or operational limitations that sary. During this step, every observed rule in captured areas, frightens potential inhibit their ability to seek their objectives enemy action is categorized into one of adversaries, attracts foreign recruits, and through the use of unrestricted warfare. the four hybrid modalities: traditional, increases its stature on the world stage. Step 3: Identify the Critical catastrophic terrorism, irregular, or dis- Third, ISIL displays the disruptive/crimi- Capabilities—Ways. Planners must ruptive technology/criminal activities. nal modality through its vast network identify the ways or actions required (or Operational planners must pay particular of illicit oil trafficking and sales, illegal critical) in achieving the desired ends. In attention to their commander’s indica- bulk cash transfers through charities and keeping with both Strange and Eikmeier, tions and warnings constructs and individuals, stolen foreign aid, kidnapping a CC is always an action. CCs are usually priority intelligence requirements as they operations, taxes, and illegal checkpoints. noted as an “ability to” perform a certain drive the intelligence collection efforts Fourth, ISIL appears to have acquired activity critical to the success of the op- and greatly influence what enemy action or produced chemical weapons and may eration. If multiple CCs are required to is observed and reported. If information have the intent to use these weapons. If accomplish the desired ends, then these gaps are identified, they must be filled true, this displays a catastrophic terrorism should be prioritized in order of neces- in a timely manner to ensure that threat modality that could be used against vul- sity. If possible, capabilities should be modalities are observed and identified. nerable, high-profile targets. narrowed down to the fewest number of ISIL displays attributes of all four ISIL’s extensive information op- critical capabilities. hybrid modalities. First, ISIL displays the erations (IO) contribute to all four ISIL’s strategic CC is the ability to traditional modality through its fielded modalities in much the same manner that foster international Sunni patronage military and militia forces. These forces IO supports multiple lines of effort in while keeping the United States from execute traditional military operations joint doctrine. Also, there is considerable directly confronting its forces on the with modern weapons systems against overlap between the traditional and irreg- ground in Iraq and Syria. Its ideologi- traditional armies (Iraqi and Syrian armed ular modalities as well as the irregular and cal call for a decisive battle to take place forces) and local militias. ISIL fighters criminal modalities. Most importantly, in western Syria against Western forces typically wear uniforms, deploy in units, ISIL acts very much like a nation-state is one of the methods used to keep the and employ rudimentary combined arms even though it is a nonstate rogue actor. United States at bay. offensive operations. They also defend Step 2: Identify Adversary’s Assessed This apocalyptic vision of a grand the ground they have taken with prepared Objectives and Limitations—Ends. As battle between Islam and the West, defensive positions. Second, ISIL displays the modalities of the threat’s operation coupled with U.S. political limitations, the irregular modality through its use are discovered and identified, an assess- appears to be effective in deterring the of shadow governments, highly visible ment must be made as to the threat’s United States from committing general 90 Commentary / Hybrid Threat COG Analysis JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 purpose forces to this conflict. U.S. po- and is consistent with a Clausewitzean of gravity—the modality of principal litical and strategic guidance places limits view of the center of gravity.26 use—is determined, all of the other on American action and may in effect The highly integrated nature of means and modalities identified are deter the United States from committing hybrid warfare makes the delineation categorized as critical requirements. general purposes forces to this conflict. between the modality of principal use As Strange notes, these are actual Politically, the United States will not di- and the supporting modalities difficult to things—nouns—required for the critical rectly support the Bashar al-Asad regime make. This inherent fusion of modes pro- capabilities to be fully operative. Similar in its fight against ISIL. Strategically, vides the hybrid actor with the capability to current doctrine, this should be a list after the long conflicts in Afghanistan to shift main efforts should the situation of the other noted modalities, resources, and Iraq, the United States seems loath dictate, depending on its own capabili- units, or other means required to execute to engage in any long-term stability ties, the type of adversary, the political the CCs such as trained guerrilla forces or operations.23 ISIL leaders know that the objectives, and self-imposed limitations. a flexible command and control network. current American administration has no Similar to a conventional force shifting The remaining three modalities, appetite for another protracted ground main efforts in response to the conditions along with all the resources and means campaign in the Middle East. on the ground, the hybrid threat could contained in the traditional modality, are Operationally, there are four CCs potentially shift main efforts as part of the identified as CRs. Two CRs that must required to accomplish ISIL’s operational plan or in response to friendly actions. be addressed are ISIL’s senior leadership objectives. First, it requires the ability However, changing the main effort at the and its ideology. Once located, senior to defeat regional challengers and seize operational level is no easy task and may leadership must be killed or captured terrain. Second, it must have the ability provide an opportunity to seize the initia- as they have ordered and carried out to govern the areas seized. Third, it must tive from the hybrid foe. Additionally, barbarous terrorist actions. This is critical have the ability to self-sustain and gener- the political objectives or limitations may to weakening its fielded forces’ loyalty ate income. Fourth, it must have the reduce the flexibility of the hybrid force and ability to coordinate operations, and ability to recruit, train, and employ forces. to shift the main effort and dictate which there is no place for these leaders in the Step 4: Identify the COG—Modality modality must be prioritized to accom- post-ISIL society. Secondly, ISIL’s Salafist of Principal Use. Once the employed plish the objectives. jihadist ideology is not the center of grav- modalities are identified, the adversary’s Determining ISIL’s center of gravity ity; rather, it is a CR necessary for the objectives and limitations assessed, and through the traditional methods is dif- recruiting and sustainment of the group’s the required capabilities to accomplish ficult and potentially irrelevant. Indeed, stated purposes. Efforts are being made these objectives revealed, a determination applying doctrinal COG analysis to ISIL to neutralize the Islamic State’s ideologi- is made as to which modality (irregular, likely results in various “mirages” that cal message with counter-messaging, but traditional, catastrophic, or disruptive/ look “good in theory, but rarely exists in this is proving ineffective. Defeat on criminal) is the enemy’s main effort to the real world in a way useful for military the battlefield is often the best counter- accomplish those objectives. The modal- planners.”27 In reality, ISIL has no single narrative to the jihadist’s message. ity that possesses the required CCs to source of physical or moral power; it is an Step 6: Identify the Critical accomplish the desired objectives within integrated network of networks with no Vulnerabilities. Some of these CRs (or the identified limitations is now identi- single, critical node. It is a truly hybrid subsets of CRs) are vulnerable to attack, fied as the enemy’s center of gravity. It threat. But that does not mean that it is deficient in some way or not strong becomes the principal “doer of the action indestructible or undefeatable. enough to defend themselves, and are that achieves the ends.”24 This is a critical ISIL contains all four modalities identified as critical vulnerabilities (CV). assessment as the subsequent approach within its hybrid nature, but one mo- Because they are critical, any interdic- and follow-on actions should be designed dality stands out as its main effort: the tion, destruction, or neutralization to attack the center of gravity identified as traditional. This modality is ISIL’s center should have a direct or indirect effect on the modality of principal use since this is of gravity to accomplish its operational the ability of the center of gravity (the the enemy’s main effort. objectives and create the caliphate. Its modality of principal use) to accomplish The center of gravity should be the real source of power lies in its state-like the desired ends. Finding a hybrid modality that the adversary employs as the military forces arrayed on the battlefield threat’s CV may be difficult due to its main effort to accomplish the operational engaged in the seizure or defense of ter- ambiguous and enigmatic nature, and objectives within the identified or assessed rain, not in its ideology or other moral there may be few actual CVs. Planners operational limitations.25 For a hybrid factors. This is an important distinction must resist the pressure to manufacture force, the modality of principal use pro- as many identify it as a terrorist organi- CVs, looking for the elusive silver bullet, vides a type of cohesion for the employed zation when it is better described as a as this only oversells the effectiveness of forces to bind. This cohesion of forces, pseudo-state. the operational design. under a principal modality, allows the main Step 5: Identify the Critical ISIL shows few CVs, but assessing effort to deliver the most effective blows Requirements—Means. Once the center the traditional modality as its center of JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Reilly 91 11 gravity allows for an operational approach Commanders must demonstrate Joe Strange, Centers of Gravity and Criti- cal Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewit- designed around defeating that modality the ability to execute a coup d’oeil in zian Foundations So That We Can All Speak the as it will have the greatest impact on the recognizing the hidden truth behind Same Language (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps group’s ability to accomplish its goals. In today’s complex, nonlinear, and opaque University Press, 1996), 43. layman’s terms, ISIL is acting more like a problems that have no simple or eas- 12 Dale C. Eikmeier, “After the Divorce: traditional conventional force and should ily discernible solutions.28 Confronting Clausewitz and the Center of Gravity,” Small Wars Journal, March 6, 2014. be treated as such. Any operational ap- these complex hybrid threats places a 13 Ibid. proach that addresses it as just another “premium on the cognitive skills needed 14 Milan Vego, “Center of Gravity,” Mili- nonstate actor conducting irregular war- to recognize and quickly adapt to the tary Review 80, no. 2 (March 2000), 23. fare or terrorism will fail to defeat ISIL unknown.”29 Rapidly and accurately iden- 15 Ibid., 24. 16 because its very nature is more traditional tifying a hybrid threat’s center of gravity Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Reining in the Center of Gravity Concept,” Air and Space than irregular. Understanding this reality is critical in mitigating or defeating the Journal 17, no. 2 (Summer 2003), 3. provides insight into why current coali- most likely type of adversary, like ISIL, 17 Ibid., 6. Echevarria does note that the tion efforts are failing to defeat it. that U.S. forces will meet on the 21st- current conflict with Islamic terrorism (and al To defeat ISIL, coalition forces must century battlefield. Again, Clausewitz is Qaeda), when viewed as a “war to the death,” engage in a conventional air-land cam- prophetic and timeless in admonishing qualifies as Total War and is the type of conflict that warrants center-of-gravity analysis. paign to destroy its uniformed military the “statesman and commander” to de- 18 Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Clause- and non-uniformed militia forces and termine the “kind of war” waged and not witz’s Center of Gravity: It’s Not What We eliminate its senior leadership. This coali- fall into the trap of entering the desired Thought,” Naval War College Review 56, no. tion should be led and manned by those war and not the real one.30 The method- 1 (2003). 19 with the most to win or lose in the re- ology proposed in this article could help JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (Washington, gion—Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, commanders do just that. JFQ DC: The Joint Staff, June 16, 2009), II-65–II- and Kuwait. Only after ISIL’s traditional 68. forces are systematically destroyed and its 20 JP 5-0, IV-48. leadership erased can the root causes of Notes 21 Dale C Eikmeier, “Give Carl von Clause- Sunni disenfranchisement and abuse by witz and the Center of Gravity a Divorce,” 1 Small Wars Journal, July 2, 2013. the regimes in Iraq and Syria be addressed. Joseph Votel, “The Gray Zone,” White Paper, U.S. Special Operations Command, 22 Vego, 26. September 9, 2015, 1. 23 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Pri- Recommendations 2 Nathan Freier, Strategic Competition and orities for the 21st Century (Washington, DC: The fundamental nature of war remains Resistance in the 21st Century: Irregular, Cata- Department of Defense, January 3, 2012), 6. 24 unchanged; however, the character strophic, Traditional, and Hybrid Challenges in Dale C. Eikmeier, “A Logical Method for Center of Gravity Analysis,” Military Review and conduct of 21st-century warfare Context (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2007), 2, 18–19. 87, no. 5 (September 2007), 62–66. continues to evolve. Compared to the 3 Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid vs. Com- 25 Ibid. Clausewitzean vision of conventional pound War: The Janus Choice,” Armed Forces 26 Clausewitz, 485–486. interstate conflict, modern warfare is Journal, vol. 14 (October 2009). 27 Mark Cancian, “Centers of Gravity Are a increasingly characterized by the erosion 4 Frank G. Hoffman, “On Not-So-New Myth,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124, no. 9 (September 1998), 30. of the state’s sovereignty and monopoly Warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats,” War on the Rocks, July 28, 2014, available at 28 Clausewitz, 102. Clausewitz described of violence coupled with the continuing 92 Commentary / Hybrid Threat COG Analysis JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Marines from Mike Battery, 4th Battalion, 14th Marines, operate 155mm M198 howitzer in support of Operation Phantom Fury, November 2004 (U.S. Marine Corps/Samantha L. Jones) certain trumpet for friends and allies to heed. In our messy democracy, domes- Toward a Future tic politics and bureaucratic politics will often frustrate strategy, but, in the end, national strategy retains its importance. National Strategy For the entire Cold War, we had one overarching national strategy: the containment of our principal enemy, the A Review Essay Soviet Union. Strategic debates on how to contain the Soviet Union were severe By Joseph J. Collins and constant, but the aims and framework of the strategy were widely accepted. Containment activities ranged from hat could be more important national policy, but, in turn, strategy military operations to subtle diplomacy or than a nation’s strategy? A guides subordinate plans and policies. foreign aid to the more than occasional W strategy brings together ends, It provides a framework that can help covert operation. When the Cold War ways, and means. It assesses costs and us comprehend contextual develop- ended, some claimed that history (and risks and establishes priorities. It takes ments, which, in turn, can reshape the strategy!) had ended, but others argued basic guidance and direction from strategy. A consistent strategy is also a that the United States had to exploit its “unipolar moment” or otherwise behave, in Madeleine Albright’s phrase, as the world’s “indispensable nation.” Dr. Joseph J. Collins is the Director of the Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. A retired Army colonel, he was formerly Deputy The predominant national strategy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. that emerged has been called primacy or JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Collins 93 liberal hegemony. During the years of the Trump should choose one of three strate- of overlapping commitments, interests, Bill Clinton administration, this strategy gies: Independent America, Moneyball and rivalries demands the kind of long- featured engagement and enlargement America, or Indispensable America. After term strategic thinking that a Moneyball of the number of democracies, especially quizzing the readers about their views, approach, with its focus on limited in Europe. After failures in Somalia Bremmer artfully takes a chapter to investment in limited goals for near-term and Rwanda, the domestically focused advocate for each of the strategies, later results, can never produce. How many Clinton team fought low-casualty air wars matching the readers’ views to their pref- American (and global) problems are the in Bosnia and Kosovo, followed by peace erences on his quiz. result of short-term thinking” (137)? enforcement operations, which were Independent America, what some Advocates of Indispensable America are followed by what came to be known as would call neo-isolationist America, ar- globally focused, activist, and oriented on nation-building. The George W. Bush gues that America is overextended abroad both standing up to and engaging China administration initially rejected nation- and underfunded at home. In the future, and Russia. American values loom large building and tried to focus on great it should forget about being the leader of in this strategy, and expanding the num- power relations, but fate had another the free world, lead by example at home, ber and vitality of democracies around path in mind. After the 9/11 attacks, be far less active abroad, and concentrate the world is also part of the approach. President Bush conducted a retaliatory on improving its infrastructure and Bremmer’s advocacy for this option war against al Qaeda and the Taliban economy. This strategy option, as written, concludes: government in Afghanistan, and less than even rejects regional and global trading 2 years later, a preventive war against arrangements. For Independent America, Seven U.S. presidents, Democrats and Iraq, presumed to be both a supporter of “national security begins at home,” and Republicans, followed their [Truman international terrorism and the holder of to protect the homeland, we have to and Eisenhower’s] lead. When Soviet weapons of mass destruction stockpiles invest in public infrastructure, border communism finally collapsed, democracy, and research programs. That misestimate protection, and homeland defense. freedom of speech, and free-market capital- led to a still-compounding tragedy in the Moneyball America—despite the ism began the next phase of their global Middle East. catchy title—is actually a strategy guided advance. Imagine the cost to the world if The Barack Obama administration by finite, prudent realism, “a cold- America decides that the job is now fin- made it quite clear that its priorities were blooded, interest-driven approach that ished—that Americans will no longer fight ending the war in Iraq and first surging redefines America’s role in the world in a for these values (158). and then drawing down in Afghanistan. way designed to maximize the return on The new President was all about exit the taxpayer’s investment” (89). Aiming Bremmer, an internationalist, sur- strategies, with the accent mark on exit directly at both security and prosper- prises the reader in his last chapter when and less so on strategy. U.S. strategy en- ity simultaneously, Moneyball America he—almost reluctantly—opts for the neo- countered a host of new problems. Allied demands more prudent intervention- isolationist, Independent America, with dissatisfaction with the Obama adminis- ary choices, a focus on vital interests, the addition of an added plank on more tration appeared to rise as overseas policy prudent negotiations, the use of sanc- international trade. In the conclusion, problems increased and compounded one tions, and, occasionally, leading from however, he puts aside his own prefer- another. Today, the United States finds behind. It takes its direction on using ences and insists that the key thing for the itself war-weary and deficit-ridden, with force from the Colin Powell and Casper Trump administration is to choose a sin- much of the world dissatisfied with our Weinberger doctrines. In Bremmer’s gle strategy and to follow it consistently: leadership. We are at a strategic inflec- formulation, this strategy emphasizes “The worst choice of all is to refuse to tion point. What we have been doing trade, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. choose, because I don’t believe we can no longer works, and the need for a new Overall, Moneyballers argue for humility: continue to improvise our foreign policy. strategic course is overwhelming. “America is not an exceptional nation. We’re confusing our allies, our rivals, and Three books have performed seri- America is the most powerful, but that the American people with an incoherent ous strategic critiques that range from doesn’t mean that it’s always right. We approach to an increasingly dangerous the theoretical to the micro-analytical. are not all-knowing, and the universal world” (191). Together, they have produced a set of benefit is never our concern” (119). Bremmer’s short book is earnest, books that should be read by the incom- Indispensable America, which takes clever, and appeals to a wide audience. ing national security team. its names from Madeleine Albright’s Its laser-like focus on the elements of The first book is Ian Bremmer’s oft-used phrase, is a strategy that is ori- each of the three strategies is terrific, but Superpower: Three Choices for America’s ented on global leadership, engagement, the student of international affairs and Role in the World.1 Bremmer, the founder and, where necessary, intervention. This the policy wonk need more detail to add of the Eurasia Group and a prolific strategy is frequently referred to as liberal meat to the strategic frameworks that he author, argues that we have become in- hegemony or primacy. It is long-term in so artfully builds. creasingly directionless and that Donald its perspective: “Today’s globalized world 94 Commentary / Toward a Future National Strategy JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Barry Posen’s Restraint: A New entail a reduction in “political commit- Posen’s recommendations, however, Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy ments and military deployments” and made sense for his restraint strategy when adds theoretical and practical detail to transitioning many regional burdens to it was written, but may need to be modi- the debate over future strategy.2 It also our allies over a decade. Posen treats fied to take into consideration aggressive goes one step further than Bremmer: every region of the globe in some de- changes in Chinese and Russian behav- Posen includes a military strategy, a force tail, but in all, U.S. allies receive tough iors, as well as operations against ISIL. structure, and a useful risk analysis. Posen love under the strategy of restraint. For Similarly, writing in 2012–2013, Posen is a senior professor at the Massachusetts example, over time, Israel would lose its might want to reconsider his argument Institute of Technology and a prolific multibillion-dollar U.S. defense subsi- that U.S. troops should be withdrawn on academic writer on national security is- dies. Posen also concedes that some of schedule from Afghanistan, “no matter sues. His book, published in 2014, is a our major allies might have to become what develops” (127). Posen is wary of cousin to Bremmer’s Moneyball strategy. nuclear powers in the process of reestab- China, but does not support suggestion Motivated by perceived failures such as lishing regional balances. His proposals by “offensive realists” to contain it or fos- the enlargement of the North Atlantic for fighting violent terrorist movements ter a “preventive cold war” (171). Treaty Organization (NATO), the war are balanced, even if less detailed than his The strategy of restraint is a potential in Kosovo, and the Iraq War, Posen thoughts about major powers. (The ad- alternative to liberal hegemony, selective concludes that “the United States has vent of the Islamic State of Iraq and the engagement, or a “fortress America” ap- grown incapable of moderating its ambi- Levant [ISIL] occurred after this book proach. Posen’s approach is consistent, tions in international politics. Since the was written.) well-reasoned, and comprehensive. He collapse of Soviet power, it has pursued a Posen’s national strategy of restraint also has owned up to the risks inherent in grand strategy that can be called ‘Liberal comes with a military strategy that fo- changing strategies and implicitly encour- Hegemony,’ which is unnecessary, cuses on “command of the commons,” aging nuclear proliferation. It is a book counterproductive, costly, and wasteful” sea, air, and space, an idea that he put for the serious student of global affairs, (xi). Posen’s prescription is a strategy of forward in 2003. (He says little about while Bremmer’s breezier tone is better restraint that is focused on realism, vital cyberspace, although it could easily suited to the general reader. interests, and prudence. be adapted to his strategy.) A focus on In the past few years, President In his tightly reasoned book, Posen control of the commons would reduce Obama captured some of the spirit of is concerned with international relations military personnel strength by 20 the restraint strategy with little of its theory, strategy development, and the percent, and spending from around 4 rigor or consistency. He has drastically record of current efforts to secure our percent of gross domestic product to reduced forces fighting in the Long War national security. He takes the reader about 2.5 percent. He would reduce from a few hundred thousand to less through the ascent of liberal hegemony, all the Services, including the Navy, the than 20,000, total, in Iraq, Syria, and the rise of neoconservativism, and keystone in his maritime strategy. Posen Afghanistan. While the inelegant “lead- changes in the international system, admits that a strategy of restraint might ing from behind” was never officially which he maintains will further frustrate encourage nuclear proliferation. He doctrine, Obama tried to give allies and liberal hegemonists. He finds our large wisely posits at least a decade for transi- partners greater space to exercise initia- Armed Forces and frequent interven- tionary activities. tive. On his watch, however, the security tions overseas to be costly and ill-advised, In my view, Posen’s military strategy situation in Iraq and Afghanistan deterio- especially in the Middle East. In many and force structure are risky. The military rated, the civil war in Syria turned Europe places, U.S. forces, a potential solution, strategy relies on the good offices of allies and the Middle East upside down, can easily become a significant problem.3 whom we no longer would serve with on and ISIL, the successor to al Qaeda in He is also tough on our “cheap riding” the ground. A smaller, mostly mobile off- Iraq, established a proto-caliphate and or “reckless driver” allies (35–44). Posen shore force would be a weaker deterrent extended its tentacles into Asia and concludes that the costs of liberal hege- and a reactive warfighting entity. Such a North Africa. As its battlefield prospects mony have far exceeded its benefits and force would have less slack for multiple have worsened, ISIL has expanded its that the overactive strategy is “unneces- contingencies and carry with it an in- anti-Western terrorist operations with sary given our strong, inherent security creased risk of running out of means even dedicated operatives or otherwise with position” (65). when pursuing limited ends. Accordingly, Internet-inspired actors or small groups. Posen argues that this wasteful, dys- a markedly smaller force also carries a On President Obama’s watch, Libya and functional strategy should be replaced by higher risk of defeat if it arrives too small Yemen also fell into turmoil. The last a strategy of restraint that is focused on or too late to get the job done. Today, book in this trilogy—Robert Kaufman’s the balance of power in Eurasia, manag- markedly building down U.S. forces as Dangerous Doctrine: How Obama’s ing the threat of nuclear weapons, and China and Russia improve theirs may cre- Grand Strategy Weakened America—ad- “suppressing terrorist organizations that ate an impression of weakness. dresses this problem set.4 have global ambitions” (69). This would JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Collins 95 Kaufman argues that Obama flubbed U.S.-Russian relations and handled Putin poorly. He concludes, “President Obama fundamentally misjudged the character of Russia’s increasingly nasty, authoritarian, and assertive regime, the grandiosity of Russia’s swelling ambitions, and the in- ability of democratic Europe to counter them without strong American leadership stressing muscular deterrence rather than conciliatory engagement” (72). Kaufman finds that Obama has failed to lead our European allies or even maintain their trust. (Of late, NATO has begun to beef up its presence in Eastern Europe, but Kaufman would likely see it as too little and awfully late.) In the Middle East and Afghanistan, Kaufman finds Team Obama focused on strategic withdrawal and not war winning. In Libya, President Obama led from behind, and despite the Arab Spring, the President gave a low priority to promoting democracy. Where he did Nuclear weapon test Dakota on Enewetak Atoll, 1956 (National Nuclear Security Administration) support a democratically elected govern- Professor Kaufman is on the faculty •• Use force sparingly, proportionally, ment in Egypt, he was slow to see the of Pepperdine University. His book is a multilaterally, for limited goals, with danger of its Islamist bent. He has cozied scholarly, conservative, and polite but limited means, and only as a last up to Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan in Turkey powerful critique of the Obama grand resort. and ignored his authoritarian tendencies. strategy. He rejects notions that Obama •• Rely more on soft power rather The security situation in Iraq deteriorated is either a pure realist or idealist, and he than on hard power. Focus more rapidly in Iraq during the Obama ad- asserts—like Bremmer in his advocacy on the danger of terrorism, nuclear ministration. In Afghanistan, the security for an Indispensable America—that proliferation generally, humanitarian situation today is even more troubled “President Obama has imprudently aban- concerns, and unconventional threats than when Obama took office. Kaufman doned the venerable tradition of muscular rather than on the imperatives of decries the Iran deal, but some of his internationalism emblematic of Presidents traditional geopolitics. more dire projections have not come to Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Reagan, •• Realize that the emergence of other pass. Finally, Team Obama delivered the and both Bushes” (4). He notes that power centers makes a substantial Libyan people from Muammar Qadhafi’s Obama has turned his back on the U.S. devolution of American responsibili- oppression into chaos. The debacle in role, in Josef Joffe’s term, “as the world’s ties possible. Benghazi was in part the result of a fail- default power” (4). Kaufman writes that •• Build bridges to engage and con- ure to follow up a successful multilateral the “Obama Doctrine” of retrenchment ciliate actual and potential rivals humanitarian intervention with effective has the following tenets: (10–26). assistance to the new government of Libya. Protect the world and the United Kaufman runs this doctrine up •• By the sixth chapter, the reader is States from the arrogance of Ameri- against international relations theories not surprised to read that Kaufman can power too often justified by and concludes that Obama’s “original believes that Obama’s pivot toward Asia extravagant claims of American and largely coherent synthesis draws on has been a bust. He argues, “President exceptionalism. multiple sources and experiences” (60). Obama’s Asia policy has de-emphasized Embrace multilateralism rather than He concludes later that this synthesis •• traditional geopolitical rivalry, elevated unilateralism or narrow coalitions of “appropriates the most problematical climate change as a priority rather than a the willing. features of these paradigms without their peripheral security issue, and emphasized Minimize the salience of regime type countervailing values” (183). •• diplomacy rather than hard power in or ideology. Having addressed theory, Kaufman fashioning an Asian pivot that remains takes the reader around the world. more rhetoric than reality” (145). Like 96 Commentary / Toward a Future National Strategy JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Bremmer and Posen, Kaufman is wary of consistent yet flexible strategy, but if his- •• How can the United States ensure China’s growing power, but he empha- tory is a guide, the President is not likely that its allies do their fair share? sizes that the roots of this problem are to follow a specific international relations •• How should the United States in China’s authoritarian political system. theory. The result may well look like balance its defense priorities among In any case, Kaufman rails against China some sort of combination of the recom- preparing for great power contingen- for behaving aggressively and Obama for mended strategies in these three books cies, continuing to fight terrorists, focusing on spreading optimism and soft and the other sources mentioned, above. and contending with rogue regional power in the region. He cites influential What prudent strategic advice can we powers? sources that assert that the United States leave for President Trump and his na- •• What role should regional and global is losing its military edge in the region. tional security team? First, the next U.S. trading arrangements play in U.S. Kaufman also notes that a “neglect of strategy will not be like the Cold War’s strategy? India ranks high on the list of the Obama containment. It will not have a single, •• What percent of U.S. national administration’s foreign policy mistakes” primary focal point. U.S. domestic needs product can we afford to spend on (178). He concludes that the Asia pivot, will compete with security challenges, national security, and how will we like the Syria red line, was typical of which will emanate from major powers, control entitlement spending and Obama’s “words without meaning . . . like Russia and China; revisionist regional the national debt to allow for a commitments without follow-up, phrases powers, like Iran and North Korea; and robust defense, improvements to our without plans” (184). transnational threats, like international crumbling infrastructure, and other In his conclusion, Kaufman returns to terrorist movements and illicit criminal validated Federal programs? Josef Joffe’s phrase and recommends that networks. The pace of change also seems Third, with an eye to the future, the United States behave as “the world’s to be accelerating. Strategy and the secu- strategists should also mine the past for default power,” strengthen its defenses, rity environment are interactive. Change lessons. In the past year, a team at NDU and conduct its affairs with a keen sense in one will be reflected in the other. worked on the strategic lessons of the of regime types, that is, favoring democ- President Dwight Eisenhower was wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The ef- racies and furthering democratic values. fond of repeating an old Army adage: fort has borne great fruit and deserves He recommends a “grand strategy an- plans are nothing; planning is everything. to be replicated for other cases.8 Henry chored in moral democratic realism” that In that regard, a future strategy will have Kissinger tells us that history teaches by embraces American exceptionalism and to have relatively constant objectives with analogy.9 Strategic wisdom can come only behaves with prudence as its paramount the flexibility to change ways and means. from the knowledge of many cases and value (191–198). Needless to add, Posen Strategists will have to become masters the ability to compare them contextually. and Bremmer would take issue with these of multi-scenario thinking.7 Strategy will International relations theory is a useful conclusions. For Posen, Kaufman’s stra- chart the course, but change will be con- tool, but Goethe tells us in Faust that “all tegic recommendations are the source of stant and often discontinuous. Of course, theory, my friend, is gray, but green is America’s problems abroad. there is a danger here: a strategy that the golden tree of life.” The danger may Merlin the Magician could not square changes rapidly or dysfunctionally can risk arise if cases are made to fit into existing all the contending circles drawn by these appearing feckless or confuse friend and theories rather than being used to refine three authors. While they all recommend foe alike. or modify them. strategic change, they disagree widely on Second, the next strategy should Fourth, strategic analysis teaches the that change, with Bremmer advocating begin with an exhaustive analysis of the importance of assumptions, from the an inward-looking Independent America, security environment, including chal- grand to the petty. Strategic assumptions Posen calling for a realist strategy of lenges and opportunities. Next, it will must be continually tested and strate- restraint, and Kaufman recommend- need to have an elaborate, prioritized set gies adjusted appropriately. Opinions ing a strategy akin to primacy, which he of national security objectives. The hard and assertions can also be problematic. calls moral democratic realism. Other arguments in the next national strategy For example, Posen, in arguing for his scholars have added to the list of possible development are likely to come in de- strategy of restraint, asserts on the first strategies: Brandeis’s Robert Art, writing termining the “hows” of the strategy. page of his book that the United States is in 2003, rigorously evaluated various Bremmer, Posen, and Kaufman’s work “incapable of moderating its ambitions in options and recommended a strategy would suggest that some of the key ques- international politics” (xi), but President of selective engagement, which falls tions include: Obama has made a serious attempt to between restraint and liberal hegemony.5 Does the United States maintain do just that. Some, like Kaufman, might Frank Hoffman of the National Defense •• global engagement and force pres- add that Team Obama has often been University (NDU), a decade after Art, ence, limit its presence to a few key too restrained. Moreover, Bremmer and had his own hybrid strategy, which he regions, or adopt a fully offshore Posen both assert that NATO expansion called forward partnering.6 President posture? has been dysfunctional and is a factor in Trump will and should choose a single JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Collins 97 steps of God sounding through events, then leap up and grasp the hem of His garment.”10 Here is hoping that President Trump is listening and ready to leap. JFQ Notes 1 Ian Bremmer, Superpower: Three Choices for America’s Role in the World (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015). 2 Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foun- dation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014). 3 This theme is nicely developed in David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), xiii–38. 4 Robert Kaufman, Dangerous Doctrine: How Obama’s Grand Strategy Weakened America (Lexington: University Press of Ken- tucky, 2016). 5 See Robert Art, A Grand Strategy for Remains of “Iron Curtain” in Czech Republic, 2014 (Courtesy Marcin Szala) America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). Russia’s increasing aggressiveness. There press is sharply curtailed. The growing 6 Frank Hoffman, “Forward Partnership: A are other possible explanations. Instead, assertiveness of Putin and Xi Jinping add Sustainable American Strategy,” Orbis (Winter 2013), 20–40. For an additional source that Russian policy may be motivated by to this concern. The United States must argues that the United States has much conti- Putin’s misguided machismo, or its his- be wary of such states, even when they nuity in its grand strategy, see R.D. Hooker, Jr., torical habit of attempting to dominate its temporarily act in consonance with our The Grand Strategy of the United States, INSS neighbors, or a desire to control its near interests. At the same time, these three Strategic Monograph (Washington, DC: NDU abroad and restore territory lost at the books have each given testimony to the Press, October 2014). 7 The classical text that employs multiple- dissolution of the Soviet Union. For my difficulties of nation-building or attempt- scenario long-range planning is Peter Swartz, part, I could not imagine the evolution ing to export democracy. The danger Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future of democracies in East Europe without of false democrats, like Egypt’s Muslim in an Uncertain World (New York: Currency NATO expansion and the Partnership Brotherhood ruler Mohamed Morsi and Doubleday, 1996). 8 for Peace, which both have allowed East now Turkey’s Erdo˘gan is yet another Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph J. Collins, eds., Lessons Encountered: Learning European militaries to evolve beyond the complicating problem. from the Long War (Washington, DC: NDU Soviet model. In strategic affairs, facts Finally, even the best of strategies Press, 2015). are often illusive or subject to complex cannot be an infallible guide for a future 9 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: qualifications, far beyond what will fit President to make specific decisions. Simon & Schuster, 1994), 27. 10 on a bumper sticker or a talking point. Often, a reasonable strategic initiative, This quotation can be found at BrainyQuote.com, available at 98 Commentary / Toward a Future National Strategy JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Afloat Forward Staging Base (Interim) USS Ponce conducts operational demonstration of Office of Naval Research–sponsored Laser Weapon System while deployed to Arabian Gulf, November 15, 2014 (U.S. Navy/John F. Williams) Breaking Through with Your Breakthrough How Science-Based Communication Can Accelerate Innovation and Technological Advantage By Dave Nystrom and Joseph Wojtecki, Jr., with Mat Winter Communicating naval science and technology . . . is about our responsibility to convey truth and reality for informed decisionmaking. Lessons learned detailed here are as much about good leadership as they are skills for defense innovators. —Rear Admiral Mat Winter, USN, Chief of Naval Research JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Nystrom and Wojtecki, with Mat Winter 99 aval technology today can trace persevered, retired at the rank of admiral, is September 11, 2001. Enormous un- its origins to Office of Naval and was credited as the “man who taught certainty prevailed as the day unfolded. N Research (ONR)–sponsored us how to shoot.”1 Horrific images are still etched in our research, but in order for break- Some may recognize this case study minds. We were fearful, angry, and throughs to reach the fleet, ONR and be struck by the parallels facing grieving. Shortly after the second World has a responsibility to communicate modern defense innovators. From a com- Trade Center tower fell, New York mayor warfighting value and foster informed munication perspective, Sims assumed Rudy Giuliani held a news conference to support for implementation. This article too much: that facts speak for themselves, speak to the Nation. The first question shares some insights from decades of that he was an effective messenger, and he received was anticipated: “How many innovation and offers seven communi- that data-laden technical reports would are dead?” His response was powerful: cation practices that can help innova- counter intractable perception-based “Ultimately, the number is more than tors and leaders in military science and resistance. Sims underestimated the stress we can bear.” He continued to express technology, not only in the Navy but his innovation placed on the status quo compassion, conviction, and optimism also in the other Services. and how that stress impacted gaining throughout the aftermath. As we scan the defense landscape, we informed support. Giuliani’s effectiveness might have see that threats are proliferating, adversar- Today, we do not lack smart people, been different had he responded only ies are closing the gap, and the pace of talent, or good ideas. The problem with casualty statistics or succumbed to innovation, once set by the Department remains at the point of implementation; the emotion of the moment. But in fact, of Defense (DOD), is exposing the con- this is the point where, after the initial his comments had been developed 5 years sequences of our bureaucracy’s declining exuberance of discovery and early sup- earlier during routine crisis preparedness ability to keep up. While innovation of port, the reality of overcoming resistance planning, following a proven risk com- all types is needed, the kind that enables from “late adopters and laggards,”2 munication model. Giuliani developed us to win wars is technology-based. The combined with scaling the bulkheads of this plan with support from the Center Department of the Navy has a solid bureaucracy, sets in. Science-based com- for Risk Communication, a research or- record of leveraging technology for munication, however, can help defense ganization addressing how people process decisive capability advantage, but often innovators break through with options information differently in high-stress it is a stressful journey, sometimes calling well short of letters to the President. situations. While 9/11 is the extreme, the for extraordinary intervention. We also principles apply equally to everyday work- contend with that most inelastic of naval Stress Impacts Communication and home-life circumstances. In naval cultural traits, tradition, which sometimes Innovation is the adoption of a new innovation, risk communication leads us requires heroic effort and personal sacri- invention, practice, or idea.3 Therefore, to think beyond the factual merits of new fice from innovators to overcome. increasing the success rate requires technologies to consider stakeholders’ Consider the case of Lieutenant deeper understanding of how to gain concerns, needs, and perceptions. William Sims. In 1900, Sims introduced informed support. This seems straight- Naval scientific research is the re- continuous-aim firing for naval guns forward, but the complexities of com- sponsibility of ONR. It is the incubator using gears and telescopic sights to municating innovation, and the changes for Navy technology innovation, and compensate for a ship’s roll, increasing invoked, are often oversimplified. Recall its mission is to ensure technological accuracy by 3,000 percent. Nevertheless, moments when you were involved in a warfighting advantage for the Navy and his reports were systematically ignored crisis, had to deliver bad news, or had Marine Corps. ONR’s job is to discover, or rejected by the Navy’s Bureau of to persuade others on some controver- develop, and deliver decisive capabili- Ordnance—citing the technology as sial point. The message, messenger, and ties—and, when necessary, challenge the “unnecessarily disruptive to the social method all take on crucial significance status quo. This often requires top cover, order of a ship.” Exasperated, Sims in such circumstances. Effective com- as Lieutenant Sims discovered, and is wrote to President Theodore Roosevelt, munication in stressful situations draws why ONR is among the few agencies who in 1902 intervened to circumvent upon an understanding of science-based in the Navy established by Congress.4 Navy bureaucracy and appointed Sims as principles that apply to the diffusion of Investments made decades ago have Inspector of Target Practice, where he innovation. yielded discoveries in material science, commissioned and tested new gunnery One point of reference for high pulse power, and advanced electronics to instill continuous-aim technology. He stress that Americans vividly remember that have led to today’s technologies such as electromagnetic railguns, laser can- nons, and autonomous systems with true swarming capability. Dave Nystrom is the Organizational and Communication Strategy lead in the Office of Naval Research In each of these examples, com- at the U.S. Navy. Joseph Wojtecki, Jr., is the Assistant Director at the Center for Risk Communication. Rear Admiral Mat Winter, USN, was the 25th Chief of Naval Research, and is now the Deputy Director of munication played an important role in the Joint Strike Fighter Program. gaining informed support for advancing 100 Features / Breaking Through with Your Breakthrough JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 these new technologies. We discuss each case to illustrate key communication prin- ciples (which are italicized in the text), six strategic communication factors, and these seven conventional wisdom traps: •• Just get the word out. •• You cannot over-communicate. •• Decide, announce, defend. •• Facts speak for themselves. •• Silence is golden. •• Perception equals reality. •• Experts make the best messengers. For railgun, lasers, and autonomous swarm, the most common conventional wisdom trap avoided was “just get the word out.” How often has a blast email resulted in successful change? Too often, information dissemination is confused with effective communication. After the “word is out,” it is tempting to check off Dylan Ottman, from Office of Naval Research (ONR) Tech Solutions program, explains technology behind Fast-Tint Protective Eyewear during ONR 2012 Science and Technology Partnership communication as completed. In fact, all Conference, Arlington, Virginia (U.S. Navy/John F. Williams) information must pass through complex filters before it registers with meaning for powder to fire hypervelocity projectiles a demonstration was the best course. a receiver. These filters transform (limit at speeds up to Mach 7, at ranges 10 Invited were key decisionmakers, includ- and distort) information, especially under times farther than current naval guns, ing then–Chief of Naval Operations stress, so what the receiver hears may and with greater accuracy. Railgun is (CNO) Admiral Gary Roughead and oth- bear little resemblance to what the sender safer to operate aboard ships and is ers who could speak to the technological intended. These filters include: effective against multiple threats. merits with higher credibility than could Like Lieutenant Sims with contin- ONR alone. Landay and D’Andrea also ability to focus on the information •• uous-aim gun technology, railgun is knew they needed support beyond DON trust and credibility of the source •• disruptive to adversaries and in a different and invited the news media. The event alignment of words with actions. •• way to those internally vested in the status was positioned as a “World Record” dem- The proper metric for communication quo. Dr. Elizabeth D’Andrea, the ONR onstration of a 10-megajoule shot—then is not what we say, but what others hear railgun program officer in 2007, under- the world’s most powerful railgun. and do in response. This underscores the stood the advocacy challenges for railgun, With so much on the line, spokes- dual role of communication in technology and it became apparent that most were persons were prepared to deliver adoption: First, we must have effective based on misperceptions, uninformed comprehensive structured messaging strategies to inform critical decisions. And opinions, or lack of awareness. “Railgun telling the compelling story accurately. At second, we must understand stakehold- was not being taken seriously by naval Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC)– ers’ points of view to anticipate potential leaders,” stated D’Andrea. “The lab team Dahlgren on January 31, 2008, Dr. resistance and advise decisionmakers on was making breakthroughs almost every D’Andrea, her chief engineer Charles options for gaining informed support. day, but they did not know how to trans- Garnett, and Rear Admiral Landay late ‘tech-talk’ into ‘fleet-speak’ that naval achieved success with an event that be- Electromagnetic Railgun: officers understand.” Additionally, some came known as the railgun “shot heard Overcoming Resistance pockets of deeper resistance saw railgun round the world.” “This was a turning Railgun is a revolutionary advancement as a threat to the existing political/social point for railgun. It earned CNO as a in naval gun technology. Developmen- order of naval gun and missile technology. champion who understood its warfighting tal success has enabled rapid progress D’Andrea understood the stress of value. Going forward, communication toward land-based and at-sea demon- time constraints, limited resources, and became a major part of my job as visibility strations. Railguns provide affordable competing priorities on leaders whose increased. We focused on gaining key solutions to costly challenges. What support was critical. With then–Chief stakeholders’ trust and were very honest began as an ONR-funded project is now of Naval Research (CNR) Rear Admiral about our successes, failures, and chal- a technology for America’s future fleet. William Landay, it was determined that lenges. Consistent messaging, backed up Railgun uses electricity instead of gun- direct engagement with stakeholders at by results, was the key,” stated D’Andrea. JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Nystrom and Wojtecki, with Mat Winter 101 National media coverage helped foster is denied, resistance (sometimes outrage) the problem using a combination of interest outside DOD and captured the is predictable. commercial lasers normally used for man- public’s imagination. Clips of railgun tests No matter how compelling a new ufacturing. They modified components earned millions of views on the ONR technology may be, innovators must con- and designed the system to achieve the YouTube channel. Railguns found their sider its potential negative impacts (real necessary performance for a warship. In way into video games, science classes, and and perceived). Good communication 2013, they were ready to test-fire aboard even Hollywood (for example, a Navy strategies account for stakeholders’ needs, the USS Dewey against a drone. Within ship armed with railguns saved the planet expectations, and potential resistance. seconds of firing, the drone burst into in the Transformers sequel). Support con- flame and crashed into the ocean. The tinues, and railgun is on track to become Laser Weapons System: test was successful, but few knew about it. an official program of record. Addressing Barriers What did this mean for the Navy, the pro- The conventional wisdom traps High-energy laser weapons represent gram, and the future of directed energy? avoided in this example were “you can- game-changing technologies. ONR Morrison had historical data from the not over-communicate” and “decide, is a leader in fielding directed-energy project, test results, and high-resolution announce, defend.” Communication op- technology, and laser systems comple- video. Would these facts speak for them- portunities must be established between ment existing naval weapons. Lasers selves? “True innovation should expect parties for innovation diffusion to occur.5 enable the Navy to fight at the speed of skepticism,” stated Morrison, “and skep- The goal for the railgun example was light. In 2014, the first operational laser ticism plays an important role in science, to communicate for effect. Where mass cannon was installed aboard the USS but it means one must communicate awareness is the objective in marketing, Ponce and deployed to the Persian Gulf. meaningful facts to stakeholders. This in this case, building relationships with Testing proved that lasers could work in can turn potential skeptics into educated decisionmakers was key to success. the harsh maritime environment. Pro- advocates.” To leave the narrative in- People are bombarded every day with viding new levels of precision and speed terpretation to those feeling threatened more information than they can process. for naval warfighters, laser weapons also by its success could provoke greater Railgun needed to cut through distrac- increase safety because, like railguns, resistance. Morrison briefed then-CNR tions to become the signal in the noise. they use electricity rather than explosive Rear Admiral Matthew Klunder, who, This meant concise, clear, brief, and accu- propellant or warheads, eliminating understanding the importance, provided rate messaging on an interpersonal level ammunition magazines. A laser weapons support for a communication strategy. for mitigating resistance, fostering trust, system (LaWS) is tunable, giving com- The first step was to assemble pro- and building a support network (old- manders the option to fire a warning gram information into a message map. fashioned, face-to-face conversation). flash before a lethal beam. Current Message-mapping is a process that Innovators must see themselves as power levels are effective against small collects, organizes, and structures data change leaders and understand their boats, planes, and unmanned aerial into key messages, supporting facts, and responsibility for communicating. Dr. vehicles. They also cost less to build, proof points. The next consideration was D’Andrea made the railgun program install, and fire—less than $1 per shot— messenger selection. For different stake- very transparent to Navy leadership. compared to traditional weapons such holders, messenger credibility varies, as Unfortunately, an often-observed pattern as multimillion-dollar missiles. does the effectiveness of various commu- in organizational communication is the So why has it taken so long to get nication methods. Among the technical DAD (decide, announce, defend) model. lasers aboard ships? After all, laser de- community, Morrison and his team Typically, executives huddle behind velopment started in the 1980s under engaged their peers and fellow program closed doors to make an important deci- the Ronald Reagan administration’s officers. They provided classified brief- sion. Especially when the decision has Strategic Defense Initiative, or “Star ings to flag officers and officials, while negative impact on the workforce, as Wars.” The technical hurdles are signifi- Rear Admiral Klunder briefed peers and the decision is announced, leaders find cant. Weapons-strength lasers require top-level decisionmakers. Internal support themselves immediately on the defensive, large amounts of energy, both for the evolved along with alignment of messag- scrambling to explain their decision to beam and for the apparatus itself. Early ing, both critical for addressing public now angry and distrustful personnel. lasers suffered from system weight, low inquiry. And media were already digging. Trust is based in perception and is efficiency, and materials deficiencies. As the USS Dewey returned to San essential for informed support. Valuing Focusing and targeting the beam aboard Diego, a reporter published a photo- people means more than just informing a moving ship in a maritime environment graph showing a large white dome on them; it means involving and engaging are also difficult computing and engineer- its fantail, postulating that it could be them. The credibility lost from DAD is ing challenges. Given these issues, one a laser system. Rather than letting the far less about the decision itself than how can understand the skepticism. rumor mill run amuck, the CNR decided it was reached. People expect a voice in Peter Morrison, ONR program of- to meet with media and get ahead of the decisions that affect them. When that voice ficer for LaWS, and his team approached story. At traditional news conferences, 102 Features / Breaking Through with Your Breakthrough JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Table 1. LaWS Message Map High energy laser weapons represent game- Laser systems complement existing naval The U.S. Navy is a leader in fielding directed- changing technologies weapons suites energy technologies Inherently low 50 cents per shot Effective against a Small boats Rapidly innovate Mature science (well past engagement costs Vs. $1 OOs K per missile range of threats UAVs in response to physics) emergent threats Deep magazine Sub-sonic cruise missiles Have the power Suitable for low-budget Aircraft Successfully tested onboard environment a ship Multi-mission Deter asymmetric threats Deployable on a Shipboard Deliver advanced Ready to put on naval ships capabilities Protect shipping range of platforms Airborne capabilities to Currently in integration forward deployed efforts Terminal defense Ground-based systems forces Transportable Testing continues Speed-of-light Precision Enhances Changes in naval tactics Will continue to Navy platforms engagement Fast engagement time ship combat New ship designs be introduced USMC platforms effectiveness as technology Radically maneuvering Enhance procurement plans matures 2016 test at sea targets for ship-based weapons Limited collateral damage 27-9-3 Statement: “High energy lasers weapons represent game-changing technologies. The U.S. Navy is a leader in fielding directed-energy technologies, and laser systems complement existing naval weapons suites.” the spokesperson stands at a podium. neither is a satisfactory solution, and each fact. This “27-9-3” structure helps However, to put people more at ease, both require future ships to be designed people determine what is important (key ONR’s media relations lead, Peter from the keel up to support electric messages) and whether the information Vietti, developed a conversation-based weapons. This requires the Navy to make is believable (supporting facts and proof roundtable format with Klunder as chief an “all in” wager. Making the shift from points) (see table 1). spokesperson and with Morrison attend- traditional guns and missiles requires There are no information voids; ing to provide details. Reporters were long-term vision, communication sup- something always fills them (usually invited to participate either in person or port, and leadership from both military rumors). There is strong temptation to by phone. The resulting news headlines and elected officials. withhold information until all decisions made the Navy’s laser cannon known The conventional wisdom traps are made and all questions have answers. around the world with remarkable ac- avoided in this example were that “facts The problem with this “silence” is that curacy and consistency of messages. speak for themselves” and that “silence stakeholders’ needs do not remain on Awareness soared, and support followed. is golden.” Relying on facts alone to hold while leadership deliberates. Silence Following the announcement, resolve misperceptions is unrealistic in breeds uncertainty and distrust. Silence then-CNO Admiral Jonathan Greenert high-concern circumstances. Behavior is is antithetical to pre-decisional dialogue ordered the laser “out to the Fleet for predicated on perceptions, and misper- that could satisfy people’s expectation of operational demonstration.” The pro- ceptions often lead to behaviors that seem having a voice (control) in decisions that gram accelerated to install an advanced irrational from the perspective of reality. affect them—a prerequisite for support. prototype aboard the USS Ponce. Testing The innovators’ challenge is that they The alternative is providing interim in the Persian Gulf allowed Sailors to see may be too close to their ideas to see how updates through two-way channels, its value firsthand, gaining their informed others might fail to grasp the importance. clarifying what is known and what is not, support and credible advocacy. Reporting Research shows that stressed people steps taken toward clarification, and when this success also signaled a new age for lose on average 80 percent of their capacity the uncertainty will end. the U.S. Navy to potential adversaries. to process information (hear, understand, Innovators must know that uncer- Today, a new generation of 150-kilo- and remember). To mitigate this loss and tainty is a heavy psychological burden watt lasers is being developed for the optimize the remaining 20 percent of ca- on those whom their innovation might Arleigh Burke–class of destroyers. The pacity, the communicator must pre-process impact. A steady flow of meaningful fiscal year 2016 defense bill “directs the the information to make it more digestible. communication relieving the anxiety of Secretary of the Navy to develop a plan The message map is designed specifically uncertainty enhances trust and acceptance. for fielding electric weapon systems,” to pre-process information. meaning both lasers and railguns. Laser People can process three messages at a Swarmboats: Managing weapons and railgun are paradigm shifts time. Message maps, therefore, arrange Perceptions for the Department of the Navy, chang- data in three levels of three: three key With autonomous swarm, unmanned ing the doctrine of naval warfare. While messages, three supporting facts for each Navy vessels can overwhelm an adver- prototypes have shown great promise, message, and three “proof points” for sary. A first-of-its-kind technology JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Nystrom and Wojtecki, with Mat Winter 103 Dan Wise, from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, prepares to take readings following successful test of Office of Naval Research–funded Electromagnetic Railgun, in Virginia, June 21, 2012 (U.S. Navy/John F. Williams) enables swarming capability, which gives Command and Sensing), derived from of the test. These “real” Sailors oversaw our naval warfighters a decisive edge. the National Aeronautics and Space the swarmboats as supervisors oversee Autonomous vehicles are used widely Administration’s Mars Rover program. subordinates, giving direction and evalu- across the Service on, under, and above Shutting down the James River and ating performance. the ocean. The next logical step is to the airspace above it does not go un- As with railgun and LaWS, the first connect them in new and meaningful noticed. Likewise, boats without people step was to develop a message map with ways. Swarming of autonomous systems aboard maneuvering around the test Dr. Robert Brizzolara, the ONR pro- opens new thinking about autonomy: range raise obvious questions from on- gram officer responsible for autonomous improved ability to operate forward, lookers. And the dominant characteristic swarmboats. Brizzolara and his team fo- protection of high-value assets (for of swarmboats—their ability to act au- cused on what the technology does, how example, the USS Cole), and multiplied tonomously—rekindles dire perceptions it works, and why it is important. The combat power and improved distributed about science-fiction scenarios. demonstration required coordination with lethality at decreased risk. Despite their benefits, autonomous ONR, NECC, Fleet Forces Command, In 2014, ONR demonstrated autono- swarmboats faced significant technical NSWC-Carderock, Fort Eustis, and the mous swarming technology in unmanned and emotional hurdles regarding whether Coast Guard to work just as a real-world surface vehicles (USVs) on the James a robot should ever make a lethal deci- scenario. On a hot August day, after years River in Virginia. The swarmboats simu- sion. From engineers to leadership, the of research, multiple autonomous USVs lated a “high value unit” transit such as answer was a unanimous no. This was successfully demonstrated the new swarm- the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran regularly a priority message. Additionally, before ing capability—both in escorting vessels employs swarm tactics (not autono- Sailors were asked to relinquish control and engaging hostile craft. mous) using small speedboats. Thirteen to autonomous boats, the benefits of Benchmarking the prior success of USVs in the test constantly shared sen- swarm and the trustworthiness of the the LaWS communication strategy, ex- sor data and route information using a technology had to be made clear. Sailors ternal outreach was delayed until internal software/hardware kit called CARACaS from the Naval Expeditionary Combat Navy briefings were accomplished and (Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command (NECC) were an integral part support was gauged. The technology 104 Features / Breaking Through with Your Breakthrough JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 was well received, and Admiral Greenert Table 2. Science-Based Communication Factors put his full support behind announcing 1. Intensity of Resistance: Low, Medium, High the breakthrough. Once more, Rear Railgun (Overcame Resistance) 2. Depth of Resistance: Opinions, Beliefs, Values Admiral Klunder was the spokesperson, lending his credibility to the warfighter 3. Barriers to Informed Support: (Lack of) Awareness, Knowledge, LaWS Understanding benefits and addressing potential negative (Addressed Barriers) 4. Overcoming Barriers: Inform, Involve, Engage perceptions about autonomous systems. 5. Perception Factors: Trust, Benefit, Control Brizzolara focused on the technology, Swarmboats (Managed Perceptions) 6. Interactions Shaping Perception: Dissemination, Interactive, publishing articles about the CARACaS Interpersonal kit in defense journals. National media recognized the Is the source of information trusted? Stressed people attribute 75 percent importance of this breakthrough and ac- •• (appropriate messenger) of message content to nonverbal signals: curately reported the story, positioning What are the benefits to me and attire, posture, grooming, vocal quali- the capability as a new defense against •• others? (safe and cost-effective) ties, and behaviors. Nonverbal signals another USS Cole–like incident and as a How do stakeholders exert control? are processed quickly—usually within 30 counter to Iranian small boat operations •• (Sailors supervise the USVs) seconds for a presenter before an audi- in the Persian Gulf. “The first USV swarm ence. When stressed, the most negative demo was a key milestone in autonomous People judge the messenger before they interpretation of any nonverbal signal control for USVs,” stated Brizzolara. “We listen to the message. Expertise alone does will apply (folded arms, dry mouth, and demonstrated autonomous operation of a not make a trusted messenger. The criti- shifting eyes would signal defensive and team of USVs in a higher-fidelity environ- cal characteristics for effective messengers unapproachable, nervous and lying, and ment than ever before. We are building are trust and credibility. If the judgment dishonest and deceptive). on that success, adding to the capability on messenger trustworthiness is not Trust is hard won and easily lost, and planning more complex demos to favorable, the message is irrelevant. When so selection of credible messengers is further develop the technology.” The people are asked what their criteria are critical. Credibility is relative; it var- swarmboat program conducted additional for trusting someone, responses fall into ies by person, organization, and topic. demonstrations and testing in 2016 and three broad categories: competence and Ranking the voices on a topic provides is on track for operational unmanned expertise, honesty and openness, and car- a “credibility ladder” that is a guide in surface vehicles. ing and empathy. selecting messengers. Since the military This technology is also revolu- In low-stress situations, competence and enjoys high confidence with the public, tionizing unmanned aerial vehicles expertise account for approximately 85 the CNR was a logical choice as spokes- (UAVs)—part of ONR’s Low-Cost percent of trust (whom do I trust to per- person for autonomous swarmboats. The UAV Swarming Technology (LOCUST) form routine maintenance on my car?). In CNR, no matter who occupies the posi- program. LOCUST can launch dozens high-stress situations, 50 percent of trust is tion, has the responsibility to lead ONR’s of swarming UAVs to autonomously based upon caring and empathy (whom do command message. overwhelm an adversary. A ship-based I trust to guide me in a financial or health demonstration of 30 rapidly launched, crisis?). In other words, people do not care Conclusions and Takeaways autonomous, swarming UAVs is planned. what you know until they know that you The ingenuity of the men and women In this third example, the conven- care. With autonomous swarmboats, for serving the Department of Defense is tional wisdom traps avoided were that example, we did not circumvent the issue not in doubt—the challenge for inno- “perception equals reality” and that “ex- of human-in-the-loop control—it was ad- vators is developing informed support perts make the best messengers.” A more dressed head-on, acknowledging concerns for implementation. Science-based accurate statement regarding perception about lethal decisionmaking. communication principles change how and reality is that “What is perceived One of the most powerful signals of we traditionally think about com- as real is real in its consequence.”6 caring and empathy is active listening. munication: from “get the word out” Obviously, gaps occur between reality Innovators should take time to listen to to careful planning for the concerns, and perception. But the significance of stakeholder concerns upfront, ensure needs, and perceptions of stakehold- these gaps might be surprising. Simply understanding, actively address them, ers. Communication informs strategic introducing facts into a debate rooted in and provide periodic updates. Even plans, and planning informs communi- misperception is unlikely to resolve dif- though concerns may be unfounded in cation strategy. ferences. Applying this thinking to the reality, they are real to those holding We define communication as the introduction of new technology, such as them—and therefore legitimate. Words application of messaging, strategy, and autonomous swarmboats, illustrates how or actions minimizing the importance of tactics to achieve an effect. Effectiveness words and actions can promote trust, stakeholder concerns will set back trust depends on how well we resolve the communicate benefit, and share control: significantly. JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Nystrom and Wojtecki, with Mat Winter 105 Figure. Science-Based Communication Model •• Find a Champion: Ally with a senior- *Control level sponsor in a position commen- Active surate with the change associated *Benefit Informed with your innovation. Support Engage •• Know Your Audience: Identify cred- (interpersonal) *Trust ible voices for different stakeholders. Understanding Rank these against the relative cred- ibility of opposing voices. Think “Up and Out”: Commu- Involve •• (interactive) Knowledge nication with media can provide independent validation; this requires strong public affairs support. Interactions Learning Values Awareness Innovators are change leaders, which Inform (dissemination) Beliefs requires much more than a good idea to be successful. Science-based com- Opinions munication helps mitigate stress from innovation-induced change. Expanding communication beyond just “getting the Resistance word out” avoids conventional wisdom traps and focuses on dialogue with stake- Low Med *Perception factors High holders and decisionmakers. Examples Chart 8: Learning is first a function of effective communication. “Active informed support” results of communication at the Office of Naval from assessing depth of resistance (opinions, beliefs, values) against a range of communication Research provide a framework to think methods (inform, involve, engage) to dispel or counter misperceptions. Perception factors are addressed through accurate messages and actions that foster trust, show benefit and share control. strategically: thinking “down and in” pro- This promotes learning by expanding awareness, knowledge and understanding toward the goal of motes internal alignment, and thinking being the “signal in the noise.” “up and out” helps to proactively manage perceptions and expectations. “Breaking through with your breakthrough” is factors that contribute to resistance, Think “Down and In”: Effective •• ultimately a function of your communica- barriers, and misperceptions. Table 2 communication begins internally tion effectiveness to overcome resistance, summarizes the factors discussed in each like the nervous system of an orga- lower barriers, and achieve informed sup- of the technology cases. Combining the nization. Communicate goals to port—an important competency for all “science-based communication factors” align your team, build relationships, leaders. JFQ suggests a model uniquely applicable to and find support in your chain of the diffusion of technology innovation command, then attract thought (see figure). leaders as advocates and early Notes Leaders must set the conditions for adopters. innovation. Does the command climate •• Communicate for Effect: Develop 1 Elting E. Morison, “A Case Study of In- support innovators (trust)? Are they communication strategy upfront by novation,” Enineering and Science Monthly, vol. recognized (benefit)? Are they empow- mapping stakeholder needs, con- 7 (1950), 5–11. 2 ered (control)? Military culture fosters cerns, and perceptions to foresee Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innova- tion, 5th ed. (New York: Free Press, 2003), 221, the mindset that “what interests my resistance and how to gain informed 267. boss fascinates me,” so communicate support. 3 Peter J. Denning and Robert Dunham, that innovation is a priority, and put col- •• Anticipate, Prepare, Practice: Adopt The Innovator’s Way: 8 Essenstial Practices of laborative processes in place to engage high-stress communication prin- Successful Innovation (Cambridge: MIT Press, people on a portfolio of mission-based ciples to avoid conventional wisdom 2010), 5–6. 4 Public Law 588 of 1946, signed by Presi- initiatives. Change policies that inhibit traps—common sources of failure in dent Harry S. Truman. innovation and agility (foster speed and change initiatives. 5 Rogers. decentralized authority). No matter how •• Signal in the Noise: Use 27-9-3 6 Vincent Covello et al., Improving Risk compelling a new idea or technology message maps to drive integrity and Communication (Washington, DC: National may be, a leader must empathetically a consistent voice. Tell a compelling Academies Press, 1989), table 2.1, 35. understand the people it will impact and story with supporting imagery about then act accordingly. what your innovation is, how it Based on lessons learned, we offer the works, and why it is important. following seven communication practices: 106 Features / Breaking Through with Your Breakthrough JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 President Obama talks with Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention regarding recently diagnosed Ebola case in Dallas, Texas, September 30, 2014 (The White House/Pete Souza) The Imperative for a Health Systems Approach to Global Health Engagement By Tracey Koehlmoos, Linda Kimsey, David Bishai, and David Lane he military health system is a than half a billion dollars per year on on service delivery to information- strategic asset. The Department global health engagement (GHE). gathering in order to support commu- T of Defense (DOD) spends more There is a shift from an exclusive focus nity engagement in public health policy development, thus engaging broader elements of the health system. This Dr. Tracey Koehlmoos is a Division Director and Associate Professor in the Health Services transition requires DOD GHE efforts Administration (HSA) at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS). to consider how they can contribute Commander Linda Kimsey, USN, is the Master of Health Administration and Policy Academic Director to stronger health systems and broader and Assistant Professor in the USUHS. Dr. David Bishai is a Professor at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. Rear Admiral David Lane, USN, is Director of the Defense Health Agency’s global health objectives. Military GHE National Capital Region Medical Directorate. is an essential part of a national strat- JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Koehlmoos et al. 107 Figure. The Dynamic founding of the Army, Marine Corps, the primary authority over all of DOD Architecture and and Navy prior to the American Revolu- GHE activities.4 Interconnectedness of Health tion. Global health projects date back In 2011, the Under Secretary of System Building Blocks to the Philippines campaign in the Defense for Policy, who has policy late 19th century, which attempted to but not execution oversight of foreign use the delivery of health services to engagements, established the military Service Medical foster support for U.S. forces. During position of Global Health Engagement Information Delivery Technology the 20th century, the military not only Coordinator within the Stability and proved that mosquitoes were the vector Humanitarian Affairs Office. This office for yellow fever, but also engaged in provides policy oversight and guidance prevention programs for yellow fever for conducting health- and medical- Health Finance Governance Workforce and malaria. The era after World War II related activities with foreign civilian and saw the creation of overseas laboratories military entities. The creation of other in Guam, Egypt, and Thailand and the new offices for coordination includes Source: Don de Savigny and Taghreed Adam, development of the hepatitis-A vaccine. the Global Health Working Group as Systems Thinking for Health Systems Strength- th ening (Geneva: Alliance for Health Policy and Later in the 20 century, in addition well as an International Health Division Systems Research, 2009) to the medical research laboratories, within the Defense Health Agency. To there were efforts to help countries capture effectiveness of interventions, the egy that recognizes the importance contain biological threats and to assist department commissioned the Measure of strong health infrastructure to the with the delivery of health services of Effectiveness for Defense Engagement stability and health of nations.1 In through short-term, episodic medical and Learning program to develop a the context of competing budgetary interventions often referred to generi- method to better evaluate how GHE concerns within DOD, it is even more cally as medical civic action programs helps meet U.S. national security goals essential that GHE not only meets the (MEDCAPs) or medical readiness train- and establishes a tool to assess efficiency needs of partner nations but also pro- ing exercises. Since the United Nations and effectiveness of health engagements. duces maximum benefit to the broader (UN) Security Council’s 2001 declara- policy objectives of the United States. tion that HIV was a national security Understanding the Components Systems engagement is more aligned threat because of the potential destabili- of the Health System with U.S. projection of soft power as zation of societies, DOD has deepened The World Health Organization well as improving civic engagement its engagement in global health through (WHO) defines a health system as “all between American health assets and basic research and development, health organizations, people and actions whose civil society in partner countries. service delivery, and public health proj- primary intent is to promote, restore or ects to support a systems response to maintain health.”5 Traditionally, much Expanding Soft Power ongoing and emerging health threats.3 of DOD health engagement focused In the development and health care Following criticism for disjointed on the delivery of health services by arena, both health and/or general efforts and lack of progress toward military personnel or, more recently, in systems thinking strives to capture how achieving broader engagement objectives, collaboration with host-nation military various elements are connected to each DOD made a series of policy and organi- personnel, as opposed to maximizing other within the whole. In approaching zational changes during the past 5 years the potential to build capacity, promote an issue or an intervention, however to adopt a more balanced approach that stability, and strengthen relations discrete, there is the need to model the supports sustainability and demonstrates through engagement with elements of impact that one change, one input, one the effectiveness of such engagement. the entire health system. A country’s circumstance might have on the broader Perhaps most importantly, the 2010 health system is not the same as a health environment. In this context, it is useful DOD Instruction 6000.16, “Military care system. There is frequently confu- to invoke a model showing how things Health Support for Stability Operations,” sion over the connection of health care relate to one another. By thinking and declared that GHE should be given services with the broader determina- engaging with the health system rather priority comparable to combat opera- tion of population health in the overall than with a single component, the ability tions. DOD is increasingly emphasizing health system. exists to produce a synergy in which the and engaging in GHE activities within The delivery of health services is just outcome of engagement is greater than the areas of responsibility of each of the one of six building blocks of the health the sum of the individual parts.2 combatant commands so that more than system, as originally proposed in the 50 percent of DOD’s humanitarian assis- WHO’s Framework for Action.6 The Evolution of DOD GHE tance projects, throughout all combatant other five building blocks of a health Although DOD was formally estab- commands, are medical or health related. system are the health workforce, health lished in 1949, its roots go back to the However, there is still a lack of clarity in information, medical technology, health 108 Features / The Imperative for a Health Systems Approach JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 financing, and leadership and governance (see figure). The six–building block model proposed in the Framework for Action, like other health systems models, provides a conceptual framework toward understanding the entirety of a health system while also facilitating the effec- tive comparative analysis of different health systems around the world. Each building block will be described in turn, accompanied by current and/or potential mechanisms for military health system engagement. An important systems prin- ciple is that these building blocks have multiple layers of interconnection and the whole is larger than the sum of its parts. A key concern for DOD is ensuring that its engagement effects the intercon- nection to create greater coherence and alignment with the objectives of better Patients wait during Medical Civic Action Program in Lunga Lunga, Kenya, August 23, 2012, as part of population health and projection against Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (U.S. Air Force/Daniel St. Pierre) emerging threats. Service delivery, almost exclusively delivering health services in conjunction training programs of partner-nation mili- direct patient care, has long been a hall- with NGOs in Afghanistan. One lesson tary physicians by visiting U.S. military mark of DOD GHE. Service delivery learned about how best to work with physicians. In a newer expanded para- includes aspects of packages of services nonstate actors and the possible unin- digm of health engagement, corpsmen being offered; delivery models like in tended consequences is to complement might share skills with community health the home, in the community, or in the rather than duplicate the efforts of other workers or via short-term exchange pro- clinic or hospital; health infrastructure agencies including NGOs. Additionally, grams at medical, dental, health service and flow of logistics; management; safety local civilian governments, and the health administration, and nursing schools.10 and quality; and capturing the demand services provided directly to civilians, Of note, however, lessons learned from for care.7 This work was most frequently should emphasize the local standards of Afghanistan have demonstrated that conducted through MEDCAPs and their care so that unsustainable interventions investment in medical and educational dental counterparts or as part of a disaster do not lead to unrealistic expectations or infrastructure without assuring that the response or humanitarian aid situation. the perception of a decline in “positive local health workforce and health sys- While the fallback for consideration perceptions of the U.S. military.”8 tem can sustain new facilities should be in service delivery is the government or The health workforce is the next build- avoided.11 public sector services, in many low- and ing block. It is made up of the people Next, information means that the middle-income countries a substantial within a country whose primary role health system allows the generation and proportion of all health services is actually is to protect and/or improve health strategic use of information, intelligence, sought in the nonstate sector. There is regardless of level of training. There is and research on health. Ideally, three growing acknowledgment that govern- great variation in the type and density of areas should be covered under health ments and donors must look beyond the cadre, especially in developing countries. information, including data and analysis traditional boundaries of public health Viewed as a spectrum, there might be on health determinants, health systems service delivery and engage the nonstate physicians, policymakers, planners, and performance (including outcomes), and sector (that is, private, nongovernmen- managers at one end and skilled birth at- health status of populations. Some well- tal organizations [NGOs], faith-based tendants, community health workers, and developed examples of GHE that support organizations, and so forth)—although even untrained providers and drug sellers this building block include the develop- it is not clear how best to do this—and at the other—spread between the public, ment of disease surveillance systems, interventions to work with the nonstate nonstate, and private sectors. WHO the rollout of standardized and reliable sector may have unintended effects. An has found a strong positive correlation tools and instruments, and the collation example highlighting this change from between health workforce density and and participation in the publication of public to nonstate service engagement service coverage and health outcomes.9 international health statistics. The WHO from the recent conflicts in Iraq and GHE in the health workforce building states that “more than just a national con- Afghanistan includes military personnel block might include augmenting the cern, as part of efforts to create a more JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Koehlmoos et al. 109 secure world, countries need to be on the capacity.13 One recent accomplishment is have unique military-to-military–specific alert and ready to respond collectively to the successful development and testing of HIV/AIDS prevention programs de- the threat of epidemics and other public an HIV vaccine in Thailand. Consistently signed to address risk factors, in addition health emergencies.”12 A functioning low funding for the laboratories has to treatment and care programs for their health information system in a country led to the creation of entrepreneurial personnel. It is worth noting that the enables local and global decisionmak- scientific activities with local and global DOD budget for fiscal year 2011 for ers to prevent or respond to a crisis in a partners such as universities and other PEPFAR was $148.5 million, and most real-time manner. Partner nations can be international agencies, thus strengthen- of these accounts are administered by empowered to collect, analyze, and share ing the brand and, in most cases, the combatant commanders or the Defense their own health information. This type relationship with local governments, so Security Cooperation Agency. The DOD of engagement is longstanding to some the labs should be considered “national HIV/AIDS Prevention Program is a extent through the Centers for Disease assets.”14 However, as exemplified by relatively small portion of PEPFAR fund- Control’s (CDC’s) Global Health Naval Medical Research Unit 2, whose ing and is stovepiped from the broader Security Branch and especially the joint 40-year history in Indonesia ended in health systems finance. While efforts Biological Threat Reduction Program as 2009 during a protracted and aggressive toward health sector reconstruction in well as through the network of military disagreement over viral sample rights to Afghanistan might serve as an example laboratories led by the Armed Forces H5N1 (Avian Influenza), it is essential of health financing, DOD has limited Health and Surveillance Center. Moving for these facilities to protect their work engagement in this arena but can seek to forward, however, efforts should be made and the U.S. Government’s investment improve in future efforts. to build capacity in the host nation and through the development and mainte- Last and perhaps most importantly, empower local institutions strengthening nance of host-nation champions.15 the building block of leadership and the relationship between nations rather The penultimate building block is governance is the most complex. Also than just train local employees to support financing. Health financing mechanisms known as stewardship, this area focuses the U.S. military–led efforts in a nonsus- vary across nations depending on history, on ensuring strategic policy frameworks tainable manner. institutions, and traditions. The goal of and effective oversight of the system; The next building block is medical health financing should be to reduce coalition-building; and accountability, technology. Broad areas within this build- gross inequities in access to necessary regulation, and attention to the overall ing block include medical products, care and avoid catastrophic costs to the design of the health system.16 Again, vaccines, and other technologies with a population, especially the poor. In some there is no single model for stewardship cross-cutting emphasis on quality, safety, developing countries, there are innovative of a health system, although in most and cost-effectiveness of these items. To approaches like micro-insurance, voucher countries the default is to the ministry some extent, DOD could participate schemes, or social franchising in efforts to of health or its equivalent. However, in the technology transfer from high- provide universal coverage. There is no before the military engages in global income countries to developing countries one best or right model, but the military health, consideration should be given with an emphasis on essential medicines health system should be cautious not to to the reality that in some developing for maternal child health and neglected deliver services that diminish confidence countries, there are large-scale NGOs tropical disease. DOD work on vaccines in or otherwise interrupt local programs serving a majority of the population. For is perhaps its most visible contribution and practices. example, in Bangladesh the NGO BRAC to global health, having played a major While the financing of the health (formerly known as the Bangladesh Rural role in developing 25 percent of all li- sector may appear to be the health Advancement Committee) has more than censed vaccines in the United States since systems building block best suited to 64,000 village health workers who touch 1962. More recently, DOD has led the be addressed by other agencies in the the lives of 110 million Bangladeshis and, only late-stage clinical trials for vaccines U.S. Government, DOD contributes as the world’s largest NGO, has more found to be efficacious against malaria to this effort, too. For example, DOD than 120,000 employees working in 14 and HIV. While the Army and Navy’s engagement helps in the fight against countries including Afghanistan, Uganda, overseas medical research laboratories in HIV through implementation of the Pakistan, and Sudan.17 A long-term gap Thailand, Egypt, Peru, Kenya, Germany, President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS in this area was that humanitarian visits and Cambodia conduct medical research Relief (PEPFAR), which in general sup- by U.S. Navy hospital ships often took that ties directly to the protection of ports work in 73 countries. PEPFAR place with little if any interaction with deployed Servicemembers, their work supports HIV/AIDS prevention, treat- local health-related activities undertaken has led to the development of health ment, and care, strategic information, by U.S. civilian agencies and NGOs.18 products including vaccines, drug thera- development of human capacity, and Furthermore, military GHE with host- pies, and medical devices with the ability development of programs and policies nation leadership appears to lack clear to improve health worldwide, as well as in partner militaries and civilian com- guidance as to which agency (U.S. civil- building the local medical and scientific munities. Thirteen PEPFAR countries ian or host nation) should engage local 110 Features / The Imperative for a Health Systems Approach JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 governments, and there appears to be no consistent guidelines on when to depart a humanitarian relief situation. Efforts to develop defense health leaders from foreign nations require research in terms of effectiveness for improving GHE and strengthening health systems. Critical Considerations for Expanding Soft Power Unintended consequences and con- nections typify health systems, and policymakers and strategists must design monitoring systems and stakeholder engagement to remain responsive and proactive. Such holistic thinking and broad objectives could assist with overcoming the pervasive misunder- standings in the approach, culture, and vocabulary that currently hamper the Patient looks through lens to determine eyeglass prescription during 2013 Operation Pacific Angel, DOD ability to work well with other Dong Hoi, Quang Binh Province, Vietnam (U.S. Air Force/Sara Csurilla) agencies and groups in the global health arena.19 Given the prominence of GHE Health Systems and National health-related goals, such as reducing as a key to soft power for the United Objectives for Future GHE infant mortality, improving maternal States, more effort should be given to Future engagement by the military with health, and combating HIV/AIDS, achieving sustainable, well-planned, and international governments and health malaria, and other devastating infectious well-coordinated military-to-military systems might benefit from closely diseases. Future MEDCAPs or training and military-to-civilian activities.20 Fur- aligning with broader national and exercises could work with partner na- thermore, in the current Joint Concept international models. Some examples of tions’ ministries of health or local NGOs of Health Services, although its primary effectively using soft power to improve to understand the country-specific, tar- focus is on the readiness of U.S. medical the health of the poor might include geted approaches required to achieve the forces, GHE is encouraged with an assistance with achieving specific targets goals and to ensure that all health services eye toward assisting partner nations in the Millennium Development Goals assisted with meeting the goals. An exam- to develop and sustain their health and the forthcoming Sustainable ple of this is providing and promoting the service networks to ensure capabilities Development Goals, which will include use of zinc in the treatment of childhood are suitable, accessible, and understood responding to the emerging threat diarrhea in partnership with host-nation when the United States needs them of noncommunicable diseases and efforts to scale up such intervention to to support operations. Better engage- assistance with stemming the scourge reduce child mortality. ment would enable DOD actors to use of motor vehicle crashes. Develop- Another example of potentially existing resources to understand both ing capacity in these areas demands relevant engagement that is of concern the health system of the partner nation engagement across multiple sectors of to both partner nations and DOD is and the evidence base for an appropri- government and civil society. Public traffic-related deaths. It is predicted ate response. These resources exist in health practitioners in partner countries that by 2030, traffic injuries will be the places such as the WHO-sponsored in connection with public health experts fifth leading cause of death. Already ap- Asia Pacific Observatory on Health from DOD could and should convene proximately 1.3 million people die due to System and Policy, which is home to local stakeholders from law enforce- traffic accidents each year, and an addi- Health System in Transition reports ment, commerce, transport, and the tional 20 million to 50 million are injured and the Evidence Aid repository, which private sector to examine epidemiologi- or disabled. Despite being home to fewer is an international initiative to provide cal data on modern threats to health. than 50 percent of the world’s motor ve- information to decisionmakers through First, the majority of low- and middle- hicles, low- and middle-income countries creating access to systematic reviews on income countries have spent the previous have 90 percent of the mortality burden the effects of interventions and actions 15 years engaged in efforts to achieve the for traffic accidents.21 Traffic deaths are of relevance before, during, and after UN Millennium Development Goals. also a risk to U.S. Servicemembers while natural disasters and other humanitarian There are well-evidenced packages of on deployment or otherwise serving emergencies. interventions for achieving most of the abroad. Thus, there is the possibility JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Koehlmoos et al. 111 4 of direct benefit to the United States systems engagement so that it can move Ibid. 5 World Health Organization (WHO), Ev- through engagement that promotes away from the days of poorly designed erybody’s Business: Strengthening Health Systems and implements proven interventions health activities that failed to coordinate to Improve Health Outcomes—WHO’s Frame- such as driver training, traffic calming with local governments and providers work for Action (Geneva: WHO, 2007). mechanisms, and others that could lead and led to little enduring benefit for the 6 Ibid. 7 to a reduction in the amount of traffic host nation or diplomacy.23 The recent Ibid. 8 J. Christopher Daniel, Global Health En- deaths and injuries.22 Such engagement push toward organizational structure gagement: Sharpening a Key Tool for the Depart- might come through exposure and diplo- and programmatic support, as well as the ment of Defense (Washington, DC: Center for matic engagement with high-level policy development of models to capture effec- Strategic and International Studies, 2014). leaders in a cross-sector setting such as tiveness, are steps in the direction toward 9 WHO, Everybody’s Business. transportation and urban planning in maximizing soft power from GHE. 10 Aizen J. Marrogi, J. Fike, and Edwin Bur- kett, “The Role of Graduate Medical Education addition to health, or it might come Recent policy and structure changes in the U.S. Global Health Engagement Effort,” through sharing driver safety programs within DOD lend themselves to taking a poster presented at Association of Military Sur- for cars and/or motorcycles, like those health systems approach and promote an geons of the United States, Washington, DC, used by DOD. Best practice in this area ease of collaboration as highlighted dur- December 2, 2014. looks like a cross-governmental task force ing the response to the Ebola epidemic. 11 Daniel. 12 WHO, Everybody’s Business. with ongoing expertise in surveillance of Such steps are indeed promising, but 13 J. Stephen Morrison et al., The Defense rates of crashes, injuries, deaths, speeding, a health systems approach and systems Department’s Enduring Contributions to Global seatbelt use, helmet use, and drunk driv- thinking that recognize the interaction Health: The Future of the U.S. Army and Navy ing. A good response includes all aspects between building blocks and incorporates Overseas Medical Research Laboratories (Wash- of a health system that is much broader service delivery, the health workforce, ington, DC: Center for Strategic and Interna- tional Studies, 2011). than clinical service delivery. The shift in health information, medical technology, 14 Ibid. global epidemiology has raised issues such health financing, and leadership and 15 Ibid. as road safety and noncommunicable dis- governance should become a hallmark 16 WHO, Everybody’s Business. eases to the forefront, and it is incumbent of all future DOD GHE. If it is true that 17 Tracey Pérez Koehlmoos et al., “Health for DOD policymakers and strategists to for every $1 spent on diplomacy and Transcends Poverty: The Bangladesh Experi- ence,” in “Good Health at Low Cost” 25 Years adapt to this change. development, $5 is saved in defense, then On: What Makes a Successful Health System? ed. there is an even greater imperative to ef- Dina Balabanova, Martin McKee, and Anne Conclusion ficiently and effectively use the military Mills (London: London School of Hygiene and Innovation often occurs during tragedy. for promoting diplomacy. However, Tropical Medicine, 2011). 18 The Ebola epidemic in western Africa DOD GHE should be aligned to poli- J. Stephen Morrison et al., U.S. Navy Humanitarian Assistance in an Era of Austerity in 2014 took steps toward exemplifying cies, priorities, and perspectives among (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and a whole-of-government health systems partner-nation policymakers, strategists, International Studies, 2013). strengthening approach to GHE, and agencies, as well as among interna- 19 Michaud, Moss, and Kates. particularly in Liberia. DOD provided tional agencies to engender collaboration, 20 Marrogi and al-Dulaimi. 21 an investment and committed military cooperation, and stability. JFQ WHO, “Fact File: 10 Facts on Global Road Safety,” available at 112 Features / The Imperative for a Health Systems Approach JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 USS Nimitz conducts Tailored Ship’s Training Availability and Final Evaluation Problem, which evaluates crew on performance during training drills and real-world scenarios, Pacific Ocean, November 2016 (U.S. Navy/Siobhana R. McEwen) The Case for a Joint Evaluation By Wilson T. VornDick ctive and Reserve Servicemem- nel, the U.S. military stands as one of larger Department of Defense (DOD) bers spend in excess of 3 million the largest assessment organizations personnel initiatives, degrade the joint A hours (roughly 342 years) in the world.2 Yet each Service has its force’s ability to achieve national mili- annually preparing, rating, reviewing, own stovepiped assessment system that tary objectives, and inefficiently expend and socializing military professional essentially evaluates the same thing: limited resources. Furthermore, the evaluations up and down the chain of identifying those most qualified for highest military positions remain at the command before submission to their advancement and assignment to posi- joint, interagency, and secretariat levels. respective Services.1 With almost 1.4 tions of increased responsibility. These These critiques occur not only at million Active-duty and 800,000 systems appear to support this goal evaluation time when raters and report- National Guard and Reserve person- within their respective Services well ing seniors scramble to comprehend, enough, despite occasional evaluation fill out, and complete evaluations for overhauls.3 Nevertheless, these dispa- their ratees per their respective Services’ Commander Wilson T. VornDick, USN, serves on rate and divergent evaluation systems requirements and guidelines, but also the Joint Staff J8 (Directorate for Force Structure, burden joint operations, distract from when DOD and the joint force need Resources, and Assessments). JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 VornDick 113 Instructor administers OC spray during OC Spray Performance Evaluation Course, part of Non-Lethal Weapons Instructor Course, on Camp Hansen, Okinawa, Japan, August 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Thor Larson) to identify skilled and competent Incongruent evaluation systems also affairs, electronic warfare, military police, Servicemembers for special programs degrade the ability of the joint force to intelligence, and engineering. and operational assignments, certify joint face stated national military objectives Finally, the comparative time ex- credit and qualifications, or fulfill and more effectively. The Capstone Concept pended by the combatant commanders track DOD-wide personnel initiatives.4 of Joint Operations stresses that “the (CCDRs) on fulfilling four different Recently, DOD has faced scathing criti- strength of any Joint Force has always evaluation systems’ requirements is inher- cism for its inability to hold the Services been the combining of unique Service ently inefficient and amounts to what accountable during the performance capabilities into a coherent operational economists equate to lost productivity. evaluation process or monitor profes- whole.”7 Moreover, the 2015 National Meanwhile, the Services spend millions sionalism issues linked to ethics, gender Military Strategy elaborates that the of dollars annually on the personnel, issues, and command climate.5 For their “Joint Force combines people, processes, facilities, and support systems required part, the Services have employed their and programs to execute globally inte- to administer these systems, even though evaluation systems to monitor some of grated operations,” while “exploring how many of the Services’ core evalua- these issues as well as others that may our [joint] personnel policies . . . must tion functions are shared and overlap. exist within their evaluation processes. evolve to leverage 21st-century skills.”8 Combined, these diminish both short- For instance, the Marine Corps com- There is no reason why an evaluation and long-term efficiencies and resources. missioned multiple studies over the last system should not align with joint force Regrettably, no comprehensive study decade to assess the extent to which leadership and operational doctrine. An has evaluated the U.S. military’s myriad biases exist within officer evaluations integrated personnel evaluation system of personnel evaluation systems as a based on occupation, race, gender, com- would be instrumental in achieving whole, nor has a study assessed the lost missioning source, age at commissioning, the goal for both the global integrated productivity and resources consumed marital status, type of duty (combat vs. operations concept and national military in maintaining these separate regimes. noncombat), and educational achieve- objectives. Besides, enhanced jointness al- DOD would better serve the CCDRs and ment.6 While these individual efforts are ready exists within many military specialty operational commitments by coupling helpful, they could be better coordinated communities that have similar perfor- its human capital with a simple, efficient, among the Services and joint force to mance measures, such as health care standardized, and joint evaluation system: arrest what are essentially shared, cross- and medical services, special operations, the Joint Evaluation System (JVAL). Service personnel challenges. chaplain corps, logistics, cyber, public JVAL offers DOD and the CCDRs a 114 Features / The Case for a Joint Evaluation JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 viable and valuable yardstick to measure a Web-based application and portal.11 applicable to the proposed JVAL con- personnel capabilities and capacities. But Instead, Navy evaluation reviewing of- structs to be described later. before highlighting possible constructs ficials are required to mail their rated Standard Identification. All of the for JVAL or the methods in which it FITREPs to Navy Personnel Command. Services begin their evaluation form could be implemented, a broad look at This can delay the completion of the eval- with the same boilerplate administrative the status quo of the four Service-centric uation process by up to a week or more. section. This section generally includes evaluations is in order. Finally, the intent with which the the ratee’s name, social security number Services view their evaluation systems or DOD identification number, rank, Status Quo of Service is markedly different. The 184-page period of evaluation, title, duty descrip- Evaluations Marines’ Performance Evaluation System tion, occupational designator, and unit Across the Services, officers’ careers manual, the shortest among the Services, assignment. Separately, the rater’s and generally begin with a focus on entry- notes that the PES “provides the primary reviewing officials’ relevant information level technical, managerial, and tactical means for evaluating a Marine’s perfor- is also included in this section.15 The two skills, which steadily evolve into more mance to support the Commandant’s key takeaways from this section are that senior-level supervisory, operational, efforts to select the best qualified per- the ratee is immediately identified by and strategic skills as they progress sonnel for promotion, augmentation, overall functional capability or category in along the career continuum. The intent retention, resident schooling, command, either operations, operations support, or of the various Service-centric evaluation and duty assignments.”12 Meanwhile, sustainment, and the rater and reviewing systems is to capture that progression. the expansive 488-page Army Pamphlet official are identified.16 But the mechanisms used to accomplish 600–3, Commissioned Officer Professional Measurement/Assessment. This is that task could not be more dissimi- Development and Career Management, the second most important of the four lar. Each Service’s evaluation system which incorporates the OES, echoes sections since it rates ratees’ capabilities breaks away from the others in a variety its sister Service’s findings and further against their Service’s performance stan- of ways: the number of evaluations, elaborates that evaluations can assist dards through a variety of metrics. The scope, nomenclature, delivery, intent, with functional description, elimina- Services are split evenly in their approach language, content, format, length, tion, reduction in force, and command to the metrics portion between either a and style, among others. Singling out and project manager designation.13 binary yes or no (for the Army and Air the first five of these (number, scope, Additionally, the Army leverages its Force) or an ascending scale (ranging nomenclature, delivery, and intent) suc- OES to encourage the “professional from 1 to 5 for the Navy and from A to cinctly illustrates this point. development of the officer corps through G for the Marines).17 The two most com- First, three of the Services (the Air structured performance and develop- monly shared traits for assessment among Force, Navy, and Marine Corps) maintain mental assessment and counseling,” as the Services are character and leadership. a single, Service-related evaluation for well as promoting the leadership and However, the actual count of trait-related officers and warrant officers (notwith- mentoring of officers in specific elements performance metrics varies substantially standing the Air Force) up to the O6 of the Army Leadership Doctrine.14 from a high of 14 for the Marines’ PES to level.9 In contrast, the Army uses three After considering just these five differ- a low of 6 for the Air Force’s OPR.18 For different evaluations to track its officer ences, it appears that there is no overlap some Services, the performance metrics career continuum: company grade (O1- or commonality among evaluations. On do not align or are excluded entirely. For O3, WO1-CW2), field grade (O4-O5, the contrary, there is. These differences, example, physical fitness standards are CW3-CW5), and strategic grade (O6).10 along with the others mentioned earlier, not explicitly listed in Air Force or Navy It is worth pointing out that the Marine become less apparent once the overall evaluations. Instead, they are filled in by Corps is the most inclusive of all the format and flow of the evaluation forms the ratee and verified by the rater in other Services in number and scope since the are compared. areas of the evaluation. same Performance Evaluation System Are the Various Service Evaluations The same is true for supporting com- (PES) form encompasses the ranks of One and the Same? Each of the Services’ mentary. For the Marines and Army, each E5 up to O6. Second, the nomenclature evaluations can essentially be broken performance metric is tied to corroborat- assigned by each Service is different: the down into four general sections: a ing commentary. This is not the case for Navy uses the Fitness Report (FITREP), standard identification section, a mea- both the Air Force and Navy, which have Marine Corps the PES, Army the Officer surements and assessment section (with separate areas for commentary that are Evaluation System (OES), and Air or without substantiating comments), detached from their performance metrics Force the Officer Performance Report a section for rating official or review- rankings.19 In either case, the commen- (OPR). With regard to delivery, the Navy ing official commentary and ranking tary allows ratees the opportunity to remains the only Service that does not of the ratee, and, finally, a redress or describe and validate their performance in have the capability for the evaluation adverse remarks section. These sections advantageous or disadvantageous terms form to be delivered in real time through are important because they are directly (subject to any revisions by the raters or JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 VornDick 115 Figure 1. Marine Corps “Christmas Tree” additional documentation is submitted, this is the shortest section for each of the Description Comparative Assessment Services’ evaluations. It is worth not- ing that the Services unanimously point The Eminently Qualified Marine out that the evaluation forms are not to be used as a counseling tool under any One of the Few circumstances. Exceptionally Qualified Marines Evaluations Remain a Pyramidal One of the Many Highly Qualified Scheme. The purpose of highlighting Professionals who form the these four sections is to point out the Majority of this Grade significant commonalities among the Services’ evaluation systems. Evaluations A Qualified Marine remain an understated and underap- preciated, if not uniformly shared, Unsatisfactory responsibility among the Services. Regardless of their differences, these reviewing officials). More importantly, inflation). Indeed, scoring inflation has systems all seek the same goal: to identify this language even can note the ratees’ been a systemic problem across all the those officers most qualified for advance- rankings among a subsection of their Services. The Army has routinely revised ment and assignment to positions of peer group or among the entire peer its evaluations to tamp down on inflation, increased responsibility. Army Pamphlet group (otherwise known as a hard or and the Marines commissioned studies to 600–3, Commissioned Officer Professional soft breakout in the Navy’s FITREP). It assess the extent to which grade inflation Development and Career Management, should be of no surprise that the Services persists in the PES.20 To combat rank- is spot on when it describes the officer have neither performance metrics nor ing inflation, the Services have increased evaluation structure as “pyramidal” with commentary explicitly designated on training for raters and instituted manda- an “apex” that contains “very few senior their evaluations for joint force or tory ceilings and floors for scoring and grades in relation to the wider base.”22 DOD-related initiatives, such as joint rankings. This has resulted in a significant Furthermore, Pamphlet 600–3 notes professional military education and sexual reduction in overall inflation; however, that advancement within this pyramid to assault prevention. the problem still exists and is actively increasingly responsible positions is based Rating Official/Reviewing Official monitored by the Services. on “relative measures of performance Remarks. This is the most important sec- Finally, the Services have competi- and potential” and evaluations are the tion of the evaluation process because it tive promotion groupings under which “mechanisms to judge the value of an in- includes a ranking scheme and competi- the rater classifies the ratee. The Army’s dividual’s performance and potential.”23 tive promotion category for the ratee. previous OER, DA Form 67-9, allowed This is as true for the Army as it is for the For rankings, each Service allows the the senior rater to mark the ratee as Above joint force. As such, all the Service-centric rating official to rank or score the ratee Center of Mass, Center of Mass, Below officer evaluations are prime for rollup against a subsection of the ratee’s peer Center of Mass Retain, and Below Center into JVAL. group or among the entire peer group. of Mass Do Not Retain. In the PES, This is commonly referred to as stratifi- the reviewing official marks the ratee JVAL Constructs cation. The score presented to the ratee for comparative assessment using the Unifying four dissimilar evaluation by the rater usually includes a cardinal Marines’ iconographic “Christmas Tree” systems is no small task. Ostensibly, it is number to denote the quantity of officers with the Eminently Qualified Marine at unlikely that the Services will surrender evaluated by the rater with a correspond- the top of the “tree” to Unsatisfactory their traditional roles and responsibili- ing ordinal number for the ratee’s rank at the bottom (see figure 1). The Navy ties in the personnel domain. However, among his or her peers. The rater’s has five promotion categories rang- JVAL is not mutually exclusive. The ranking profile (essentially the historical ing from Significant Problems to Early beauty of the JVAL construct is that it composite score of the rater’s previous Promote, whereas the Air Force has three: can be incorporated piecemeal or as a rankings) plays an important role later in Definitely Promote, Promote, and Do Not whole by the Services and joint force. establishing and tracking the ratee’s rela- Promote.21 JVAL’s constructs allow the Services to tive score against those of the rater. Redress/Adverse Remarks. The final tier or scale their respective evaluation Rater profiles and scores remain a section is reserved for an acknowledg- systems through three main approaches: contentious issue among the Services ment statement by the rater and provides joint-centric, Service-centric, or hybrid. because some raters’ profiles and scor- the opportunity for the ratee to challenge Joint-Centric. This is the most dy- ings may be immature, skewed, or, in or appeal any portion of the evaluation namic and efficient approach to JVAL, as the worst case, trend upward (known as with supporting documentation. Unless it rolls all the Services’ evaluation systems 116 Features / The Case for a Joint Evaluation JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 into one unified evaluation system. The savings annually, take back lost productiv- Figure 2. Star Pictogram format and template for the joint-centric ity, and increase efficiencies. Right-sizing construct would align with the four de personnel, facilities, and support systems Exceeds Standards facto sections noted earlier: an identifica- is relatively easy to quantify in budget tion section, a performance metric section terms. However, efficiencies are tricky Above Standards matching substantiating commentary, to ascertain since many are intangible or Meets Standards a rater assessment section with ranking have not been properly researched. For and promotion category, and a redress example, under one evaluation system, Progressing or adverse remarks section. Out of these a Servicemember’s separation or retire- Below Standards four sections, selecting the performance ment into a post-military career would metrics from the four current evaluations be less intimidating and more transparent systems likely will present the greatest if a standardized performance measure evaluations by rank so that junior and challenge to finalizing the joint-centric existed for potential employers and the warrant officer evaluations (WOs/O1- template. Likewise, the distinctive Service transitioning veteran to gauge their O4) would fall under the Service-centric formats, styles, and delivery methods will skills.24 Second, inter-Service transfers, approach and senior officer evaluations need to be addressed. However, these augmentation by Reserve and Guard (O5-O6) under the joint-centric one. can be properly vetted during the imple- personnel, and joint task force mobiliza- This combination would sync well with mentation stage to be described later. tions would be more seamless if a shared the existing officer career progression One idea for the comparative assessment evaluation system existed by which to that places senior officers in more joint portion could incorporate a pictogram of measure personnel capabilities. Finally, it roles and responsibilities over time. Thus, a star, similar to the Marines’ “Christmas would alleviate the need, however minor, efficiencies and cost savings could be Tree,” with five competitive categories for Service-specific raters and reviewers divided between the Services, the joint from highest to low: Exceeds Standards, within organizations. force, and DOD. Finally, the hybrid Above Standards, Meets Standards, Service-Centric. Under the Service- construct would be an ideal intermediary Progressing, and Below Standards (see centric construct, the Services would point between both JVAL extremes (joint figure 2). retain full control of their current evalu- and Service) or act as an incremental The two most important features ation systems. However, the Services’ stopping point before fully adopting the that the joint-centric construct offers are evaluation systems and information joint-centric approach. In any event, the method of delivery and the short- would be fed directly into the larger these three proposed JVAL constructs and long-term gains in efficiencies and joint force– and DOD-supported JVAL. will achieve a more holistic and unified resources associated with implementing The main difference would be that there approach to officer evaluations in lieu of one evaluation system. The joint-centric would be two parallel systems working in the status quo. Unfortunately, there is no construct envisions delivery through a tandem: the traditional Service evaluation JVAL-like program under consideration. secure, Web-enabled portal and applica- system and the new JVAL. The critical tion. This capability would not only allow component for this approach would Current Reforms Omit JVAL JVAL to be readily completed, socialized, be that the actual inputs selected for DOD unveiled one of the most signifi- reviewed, and submitted, but also permit inclusion into JVAL from the Services’ cant personnel initiatives in a genera- DOD, the joint force, and the Services to systems would need to be vetted and tion, Force of the Future (FotF), in readily access, search, and analyze their scaled by all parties in order to populate 2015.25 Although FotF unleashed a personnel’s performance and capabili- the agreed-upon JVAL template. In this cascade of Service-related personnel ties. At the same time, DOD would be case, JVAL would resemble the template reforms from retirement to promo- able to directly propagate and measure and delivery envisioned for the joint- tion schedules to diversity alongside a DOD-wide initiatives and policies. JVAL centric construct, but with an additional host of corresponding Service-specific might even be used to create a repository bureaucratic and operational layer at the programs, such as the Department of of profiles to track skill sets, personnel joint force and DOD level to maintain the Navy’s Talent Management, FotF progression, and assignments by the en- the JVAL evaluation process. As a result, omitted evaluation reform.26 This is an tire joint force and Services. JVAL could the Service-centric construct would be unfortunate omission among the myriad become a clearinghouse for personnel the least dynamic and efficient approach of novel proposals encapsulated in FotF evaluations in the same way Defense to JVAL. because its launch provided an oppor- Finance and Accounting Services has with Hybrid. As its name implies, the hy- tune moment to address the disjointed military pay and finances. brid construct merges selected portions and disparate Service-centric evalua- Finally, by combining the four from both the joint- and Service-centric tion systems.27 Besides, DOD began Services’ evaluation-related personnel, models. These portions could be com- phasing in its new civilian employee facilities, and support systems, DOD bined in any number of ways. One performance and appraisal program would realize millions of dollars in costs possible combination might divide around the rollout of FotF. New JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 VornDick 117 of the armed forces.”32 As noted, it is unlikely that the Services will surrender their personnel systems so easily. This is precisely why DOD and the joint force need to incentivize the Services through the efficiencies, cost savings, and overall personnel readiness that JVAL offers. JVAL Implementation. Once ap- proved, the most realistic approach for implementing JVAL would be for DOD to identify the USDP&R with the overall responsibility and assign one of its prin- cipals or deputies to act as the executive agent.33 To carry out that responsibility, the executive agent would then establish three standing groups: the Executive Steering Group, Senior Advisory Group, and Joint Integrated Process Team. Consisting of Senior Executive Service ci- vilians and senior flag officers, each group Pacific Fleet Master Chief inspects chief selectees at group PT session on Naval Air Facility Atsugi, would have its own unique set of tasks Atsugi, Japan, August 2011 (U.S. Navy/Justin Smelley) and responsibilities in order to plan, sup- Beginnings started April 1, 2016. The per the Secretary of Defense, to prescribe port, collaborate, and implement JVAL in first phase incorporated about 15,000 in the “areas of military readiness, total a time-phased approach. An initial pilot employees at a handful of locations, force management, military and civilian program would be recommended, and, if including the National Capital Region, personnel requirements, and National successful, would transition into a rollout with additional phases to integrate Guard and reserve components” with period of 3 to 4 years. This rollout period most of the remaining 750,000 DOD the Assistant Secretary of Defense for would coincide with policy and regula- civilian employees by 2018.28 Taking a Manpower and Reserve Affairs overseeing tion revisions, strategic communications, page from FotF and New Beginnings, supervision of “Total Force manpower, system development, realignment of DOD could pursue a similar top- personnel, and reserve affairs.”31 While infrastructure and facilities, right-sizing down approach to implement JVAL. there appears to be no previous chal- of personnel, transfer of previous evalua- However, this approach would likely lenge to these statutory delineations with tions, and deployment of mobile training require congressional legislative changes regard to evaluation policies, any changes demonstrations and teams. At that time, to Title 10, reinterpretation of exist- would certainly engender pushback from JVAL could be expanded to include gen- ing Title 10 authorities, or Presidential the Services. eral and flag officers as well as the enlisted directives that challenge the Service’s Language could be inserted within ranks. This long and complex method hegemony over personnel evaluations. the congressional National Defense is preferable for DOD because it allows Haven’t the Services Always Rated Authorization Act to include JVAL or to the Services the opportunity to properly Themselves? The military Service secretar- reassign personnel roles and responsibili- uncouple previous personnel-related ies traditionally have been responsible for ties in light of these possible statutory regulations and systems, address griev- “administrating” their Service personnel limitations. In the alternative, there are ances, assuage concerns, build consensus, under Title 10, and, reciprocally, the a variety of internal and external options and evaluate and execute JVAL. Services have codified this within their for DOD to institute JVAL without respective regulations.29 For example, resorting to seismic revisions in extant Redress or Adverse Remarks? the Department of the Navy’s General laws, such as inter-Service memorandums JVAL would be a monumental shift in Regulations state explicitly that the of agreement, Joint Chiefs of Staff in- the way DOD, the Services, and the “Chief of Naval Operations and the structions, and Office of the Secretary of joint force historically have handled per- Commandant of the Marine Corps Defense policy directives to expand FotF. sonnel. While instituting the cross-Ser- shall be responsible for the maintenance Reinterpreting Title 10 authorities could vice JVAL is not without its challenges, and administration of the records and be another option. The Chairman of the it is within the capability and capacity of reports in their respective services.”30 Joint Chiefs of Staff does have broad Title DOD. The incentives to make the shift On the other hand, Title 10 also grants 10 powers that include “formulating to JVAL are real. Secretary of Defense the Under Secretary of Defense for policies for concept development and ex- Ashton Carter recently acknowledged Personnel and Readiness (USDP&R), perimentation for the joint employment at Harvard University that “we have 118 Features / The Case for a Joint Evaluation JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 a personnel management system that eNAVFIT, in a few years. wave-of-force-of-the-future-initiatives>. 12 Department of the Navy Marine Corps 26 Department of the Navy, “Talent Man- isn’t as modern as our forces deserve.”34 Order P1610.7F Ch 2, Performance Evaluation agement,” available at JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 VornDick 119 he U.S. Army’s reputation for effectiveness during World War T II has not fared well over time, particularly regarding the European theater of operations. This is surprising given what the Army accomplished. Just to refresh the reader’s memory, the United States went to war with a small, impoverished Army that conducted maneuvers with wooden weapons and borrowed vehicles in the years leading up to World War II. Yet within 12 months of Germany declaring war on the United States, the Army invaded North Africa and knocked Vichy French forces out of the war. In another 12 months, it knocked Italy out of the war. And 12 months later, the Army was on the border of Germany, having just defeated Adolf Hitler’s last-gasp effort to stop the Allied onslaught. Nevertheless, these achievements seem to have diminished over time. By way of illustration, ask any military of- ficer which of the following factors best explains U.S. victories in the European theater during World War II: •• Army leaders executed an organi- zational miracle in quickly creating Left to right, Henry H. Arnold, Joseph T. competent armies that won a series McNarney, George C. Marshall, Brehon of victories from North Africa to the B. Somervell, and Lesley J. McNair (NDU Special Collections) heart of Germany. •• The Russians did the preponderance of fighting, leaving an exhausted Wehrmacht to be mopped up by the relatively incapable Army. •• The American people tightened their Leadership and collective belt so U.S. and Russian forces together could overwhelm the German military with vastly superior Operational Art in numbers of . . . well, everything! Fifty years ago, most readers would have chosen the first statement; today, World War II few would. This sad fact is one reason all serious students of U.S. military per- formance should read Mark Calhoun’s The Case for General Lesley new biography General Lesley J. McNair: J. McNair Unsung Architect of the U.S. Army. By Christopher J. Lamb Dr. Christopher J. Lamb is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. 120 Recall / The Case for General Lesley J. McNair JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 “Should” is the key word, for as Calhoun I saw the creation of this mighty force—this European generals of the old school could points out, McNair is often overlooked mighty Army, victorious in every theater certainly have executed the invasion with or maligned by historians and even those against the enemy in so short a time and the forces available, but they could never within the Army to which he dedicated from such a very small parent stock. This have prepared it—neither technically, his life. is an achievement which the soldiers of organizationally, nor in the field of train- There are several reasons why McNair every other country will always study with ing. The functioning of the Allied fighting is not much appreciated today. Most im- admiration and with envy. But that is not machine, with all its complexity, surprised mediately, he spent most of his career in the whole story, nor even the greatest part even me, and I already had a fairly high staff assignments rather than command- of the story. To create great Armies is one opinion of their powers. ing forces in the field. For many observers thing; to lead them and to handle them this fact alone disqualifies McNair as a is another. It remains to me a mystery as Calhoun explains how the Army subject worthy of serious study. Even yet unexplained how the very small staffs achieved its successes and why they are Calhoun’s colleagues at the Army’s which the United States kept during the now so roundly dismissed. In answering School of Advanced Military Studies, years of peace were able not only to build up the latter question he rebuts supercilious where he is an associate professor, advised the Armies and Air Force units, but also to British historians and generals who, against his researching McNair. Most mil- find the leaders and vast staffs capable of he believes, have skewed the historical itary historians seem to agree there is little handling enormous masses and of moving record. He cites Gerhard Weinberg’s to learn from McNair since they ignore them faster and farther than masses have observation about British disappointment or disparage McNair without actually ever been moved in war before.1 in American performance at Kasserine: bothering to research his career and deci- “It is difficult to understand,” Weinberg sions. More broadly, Calhoun suspects Churchill attributed the Army’s stated, why the British “found it so hard the lack of interest in McNair’s career triumph of organization and arms to its to comprehend that the Americans’ tak- reflects the currently prevailing view professional officer corps, who were “able ing several months to learn what it had that the U.S. Army performed poorly in to preserve the art not only of creating taken [the British] army and its leaders World War II and that the United States mighty armies almost at the stroke of a three years” to learn “was a good, not a only won the war by sharing astounding wand—but of leading and guiding those bad, sign for the Allied cause.” materiel abundance with its Allies. Some armies upon a scale incomparably greater Calhoun also aligns his work with go even further, and argue the richly sup- than anything that was prepared for or growing scholarship that questions the plied Army was relatively incapable even even dreamed of.” “material preponderance thesis,” arguing compared to a war-weary Wehrmacht America’s enemies were also surprised that the Soldiers who: because it was led by men like McNair by the Army’s achievement. Erwin who got more wrong than they got right Rommel is often cited in this respect. The fought their way across Western Europe when preparing the Army for war. renowned German general acknowledged to defeat Germany did so in the face of Calhoun was undeterred by these the Americans could not be compared disadvantages that make the material narratives and his colleagues’ recom- to his own veteran troops but drew little preponderance argument seem like fan- mendation, and the result is a superb consolation from his early victory over tasy [and did so against] a tenacious . . . biography that contributes to the grow- the Army at Kasserine Pass in North German army that remained a competent ing literature that challenges the reigning Africa. He stated the Americans “made and determined foe, fighting to protect scholarship on Army performance in up for their lack of experience by their far its homeland and benefiting from shorter World War II. It is puzzling that McNair, better and more plentiful equipment and lines of communication and increasingly a man so respected by leaders as diverse their tactically more flexible command,” compact front lines. as Generals John Pershing and George noting that “the tactical conduct of the Marshall, should fall into disrepute. Our enemy’s defense had been first class. They Calhoun reviews the literature on Allies, and even our enemies, had much had recovered very quickly after the first comparative combat effectiveness of better things to say about McNair’s work shock and had soon succeeded in dam- U.S. and German units, citing some than contemporary historians. Keenly ming up our advance.” After D-Day, recent studies arguing the Army bested aware of how isolationist sentiments kept Rommel was even more impressed and, the Wehrmacht when they met on equal the Army prostrate during the interwar like Churchill, attributed the success to terms. He believes men like General years, both friends and foes were shocked stellar leadership: “The leaders of the McNair were largely responsible for the by its sudden emergence as a global force. American economy and the American solid Army performance: Winston Churchill considered the General Staff have achieved miracles,” sudden rise of the U.S. Army “a prodigy and “the organization, training, and The U.S. army could and did stand toe to of organization.” He thought the mass equipment of the U.S. Army all bear wit- toe against the German army and win, production of divisions was an unparal- ness to great imagination and foresight.” in battle after battle and campaign after leled “spectacle”: He claimed: campaign, [which] resulted largely from JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Lamb 121 the army’s logical organization and sound up (as a percentage of GDP) every year Division fought in North Africa in late doctrine, as well as the arduous training of the war.” For this startling tidbit and 1942 with light, under-gunned tanks that helped American citizen-soldiers learn other aspects of the national economic while the British at El Alamein several this doctrine and overcome their lack of mismanagement of the war, Calhoun months earlier had enough new U.S. combat experience. relies on compelling scholarship by Jim M4 Sherman medium tanks to equip Lacey.2 Americans wanted guns and but- an entire armored division.3 Calhoun Calhoun knows he has an uphill ter and they got them, but at some cost argues McNair understood the impact battle in challenging the established view to the Army, which endured personnel of all these key shortages and limitations of Army performance but optimisti- and material shortages that affected Army well before other officers, and necessarily cally asserts that “careful research and force design and mobilization plans. The adjusted force design to emphasize ef- compelling arguments can eventually Army halted most weapons develop- ficiency as well as effectiveness. change even the most well-entrenched ment programs in 1936, and they were The second element in Calhoun’s narratives.” not resumed until 1939 or 1940. When case is how, despite the neglect and To this end, Calhoun makes a com- resources did begin to flow the Army was second-class status, Army leaders such prehensive case for a reappraisal of Army disadvantaged in favor of air and naval as Generals McNair, George S. Patton, performance while charting McNair’s ca- power because U.S. leaders like Roosevelt and Albert C. Wedemeyer studied the reer path in detail. His case does not rest believed World War II would be a “war of German military and built an impres- on the ad hominem argument that biased machines rather than men.” sive force that proved equal to the task British commentators have dominated The Army also suffered acute person- of defeating the Wehrmacht on its own World War II scholarship, or even on the nel shortages. With only 5 percent of turf at the end of extended American awkward and ultimately less-than-relevant volunteers opting to serve in infantry or lines of communication. Army officers comparisons of the relative combat effec- armor, the Army was short 330,000 men learned a great deal from World War I, tiveness of individual U.S. and German by September 1942. Manpower limita- but mostly how unprepared the Nation divisions. Instead, his argument for a tions help explain the lack of a rotation was for modern warfare. They knew that reappraisal of Army World War II per- base for infantry divisions and the prac- if the United States was to avoid the stun- formance has three main elements, all of tice of feeding individual replacements ning losses the American Expeditionary which emphasize operational factors. into frontline units, which produced Forces suffered in the Meuse-Argonne First, he emphasizes just how handi- many quick casualties. Low-quality Offensive (more than 100,000 casualties capped the Army was in terms of human recruits were another limitation McNair in 47 days of fighting), the Army needed and material resources before and during had to deal with. The Army received a a new doctrinal foundation and training the war. Most readers know the Army grossly disproportionate share of the regime. McNair was able to resolve ongo- was small and inadequately equipped lowest quality recruits in terms of size, ing controversy over the design, size, and before the war. They may even know that health, and intelligence. Even more sur- composition of Army divisions when oth- British observers of Army prewar maneu- prising is the extent to which the Army ers could not, earning Marshall’s moniker vers declared it would be outright murder allocated the small percentage of high- as “the brains of the army.” McNair was to send American troops against the quality recruits it did receive to Army able to push out 14 divisions in 1942, Germans. But readers may be surprised Service Forces and Army Air Forces 16 more in 1943, and 48 more in 1944 to discover how much President Franklin (McNair’s competitors for resources) on before hitting the wall with a mere 8 divi- D. Roosevelt deprived the military in the the grounds that operating their equip- sions in 45. Because of McNair, Calhoun years leading up to World War II (for ment demanded better personnel. argues, the Army “deployed to combat example, cutting officer pay by 15 per- These air and support units hogged well-trained, in logically organized units, cent while requiring Army officers to run resources while doing their best to with a mechanized combined arms Civilian Conservation Corps programs remain independent of McNair’s Army doctrine that proved appropriate to the that had to avoid any semblance of mili- Ground Forces, which bore the brunt World War II battlefield.” tary ethos for the participants). General of tough missions and casualties; this An interesting aspect of Calhoun’s Marshall could not get the President was an organizational imbalance that case for superior Army performance to take even a 40-minute drive to Fort Calhoun gently insists must be laid at that distinguishes him from most of the Belvoir to observe Army ground training Marshall’s feet. Shipping was also a other so-called revisionist historians is his before the war. limiting factor for the Army. Marshall emphasis on learning as opposed to adap- Readers also may be surprised to told Roosevelt in January 1943 that the tation. Calhoun notes that, intentionally discover that Americans did not tighten Army could replace personnel more easily or not, many of these historians leave their belts to enable the arsenal of democ- than lost shipping. Even America’s Allies readers with the impression that “the racy to overwhelm the Axis powers with sometimes seemed to take precedence U.S. Army faced a situation for which it American abundance. On the contrary, over McNair’s Army Ground Forces. As lacked the appropriate training, equip- “consumer spending in America went another source relates, the 1st Armored ment, and leadership—yet somehow it 122 Recall / The Case for General Lesley J. McNair JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 possessed a unique ability to find novel and innovative approaches to fight and thereby overcome its many limitations.” In contrast, Calhoun argues the primary way the Army succeeded was by “learning how to fight as it was trained, organized, and equipped” to do so. Certainly this was McNair’s view of what success re- quired. He put little stock in the wartime propaganda that assured the American public that the creative, adaptive spirit of free citizen-soldiers would invariably de- feat the goosestepping automatons of the Third Reich. McNair put his faith in re- alistic training and did his best to provide it, knowing such training could favorably flatten and shorten the learning curve Soldiers would invariably experience in real combat. Calhoun makes a strong case that McNair succeeded and that the Army learned from training and combat how to execute its doctrine to good effect. It did not have to “adapt” its doc- trine on the fly to defeat the Germans. The third part of Calhoun’s case is that Army performance must be judged with operational as well as tactical and strategic criteria. Historians who focus on the strategic level of war are impressed by the casualties the Russians absorbed and inflicted on the Germans, and the role U.S. material support played in Russian success. Calhoun does not think these Upon his arrival in Washington, General Ben Lear (left) greets injured General McNair facts should blind historians to the reality (NDU Special Collections) that Eisenhower’s operational strategy accurately accounted for U.S. strategic adhere to [his broad front strategy] de- As for individual weapon systems, advantages and limitations, which were spite some subordinates’ desire to pursue many historians consider it shocking that reflected in the way the Army was orga- a more aggressive operational approach.” U.S. tanks and antitank weapons were nized, trained, equipped, and employed. It ensured, Calhoun states, “the logistical inferior to the best German models. Albeit widely interpreted now as too sustainability of Allied operations—a skill Given the paucity of funding and lack of timid, Eisenhower’s operational strategy the Wehrmacht never mastered, despite preparedness prior to World War II, it is of maintaining pressure all along the the boldness of its commanders and its surprising that American weapons were Western front and not overextending the impressive tactical prowess.” not outclassed more often. Army leaders line in a salient that would invite German If some commentators focus too understood their subordinates’ frustra- counterattack was successful. Eisenhower much on the strategic setting and ig- tion with their less-capable weapons. understood that fragile coalition unity— nore logistical and other operational Eisenhower early on “ordered Patton to easily ruptured by military reverses—was constraints, others make an even greater conduct demonstrations of the M3 Stuart an imperative. He also understood that mistake by focusing singularly on light tank penetrating the armor of cap- because of limited Army resources, the German tactical excellence, according to tured German Panzer IVs to improve his large numbers of U.S. troops pouring Calhoun. The battle at Kasserine Pass is a troops’ confidence in the 37mm gun.” onto the Western front were increasingly case in point. Calhoun argues that viewed But McNair knew the 37-mm antitank ill-trained and at the end of a fragile supply as a months-long campaign, American weapon was underpowered, and said chain. Calhoun’s response to the armchair forces learned from early tactical reverses, so. As Calhoun notes, McNair did not generals who argue with success is that employed their doctrine and training, and control the Army Ordnance Department Eisenhower was correct to “doggedly emerged victorious. or establish broader resource priorities. JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Lamb 123 to evaluate and better understand the mobile, mechanized warfare that he and other Army generals fully expected would characterize the coming war in Europe. Prejudice against staff assignments and staff-heavy careers notwithstanding, anyone who reads Calhoun’s book will likely conclude McNair was a quintes- sential “soldier’s soldier.” He was taciturn, formal, disciplined, physically fit, energetic, and faithfully implemented de- cisions by his superiors without complaint whether he agreed with them or not. He did not play office politics, build a cult of personality, or seek attention from the press. In fact, he became more reserved and more focused on his work over time, in large part because of his poor hearing, which deteriorated over the course of his career and contributed to social isolation, but which he accepted matter-of-factly. Lesley J. McNair in his office at the Army War College (NDU Special Collections) McNair deplored large staffs. He According to Calhoun, “The limitation equipment that made it superior to the believed they skewed the tooth-to-tail in American production and shipping Wehrmacht in combat effectiveness, ratio and shifted the collective burden capacity that made fielding new weapon despite the threat posed by German to the relative few on the frontlines. systems particularly challenging” was heavy tanks.” He cites Eisenhower in this He made sure General Marshall knew something Army leaders like McNair had regard, who reported that “in pieces of infantry made up 11 percent of Army to live with. New and better tanks and artillery, the enemy has lost eight to our personnel but suffered 60 percent of the tank destroyers were delivered late in the one [and] we have knocked out twice as casualties during the campaign in Italy, war but McNair had to construct a doc- many tanks as we have lost.” and could not make rapid headway be- trine and training regime based on what Calhoun explains how McNair’s en- cause the frontline Soldiers were grossly he had and not what he hoped he might tire career prepared him well for the task outnumbered by their support troops. receive at some point. of fielding and training Army divisions Worldwide, during the first half of 1944, That doctrine emphasized combined in combined arms warfare. He excelled Army Ground Forces took 83 percent of arms and maneuver, which helps explain in diverse assignments but especially the casualties while only constituting 35 the lack of a heavy tank equal to what the took advantage of his educational op- percent of U.S. forces. McNair believed Germans fielded. Calhoun argues that a portunities. While teaching Reserve that “American soldiers were sustaining conscious decision was made to go with Officer Training Corps (ROTC) courses avoidable casualties . . . because their the reliable and fast Sherman as part of a at Purdue University, he published natural leaders (of course, with excep- combined arms package that worked well influential articles on military affairs. tions) sat at desks or tended machines until the later stages of the war when the He also debated Christian pacifists who well behind the lines.” This greatly upset Germans deployed their heaviest tanks. wanted to end ROTC and foreswear McNair, who made a point of keeping Heavy tanks and their onerous support all military preparedness, arguing they his hard-working staff minuscule and all requirements could not be delivered in practiced “treason under the guise of Army Ground Force overhead positions time by Army Ordnance and would have religion.” Later his research at the Army lean compared to the bloated staffs his imposed logistical burdens at the expense War College was considered to be of competitors built up in Army Service of other critical elements of the combined “exceptional merit” and forwarded by Forces and Army Air Forces. By 1945 the arms package, which, taken as a whole, the commandant to the War Department. percentage of McNair’s Army Ground did a good job of destroying German Still later, Marshall handpicked McNair Forces in overhead positions was 4.1 per- tanks of all sizes. Artillery, airpower, to serve as commandant of the Army’s cent compared to 22.9 and 32.2 percent and antitank weapons were intended to Command and Staff College because for Army Service Forces and Army Air be the primary means of killing enemy he wanted its methods and curriculum Forces, respectively. tanks. Thus, according to Calhoun, updated, which McNair did, advancing McNair was a straight talker. Years Army Ground Forces “possessed com- Army doctrine in the process. McNair before Patton made his colorful speeches bined arms doctrine, organizations, and made the most of all these opportunities to the 3rd Army in 1944, McNair gave the 124 Recall / The Case for General Lesley J. McNair JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 entire Army and the Nation a “blood and troops. Contrary to many accounts and Air Forces, something he attributes guts” speech on Armistice Day, December assumptions, he was not partial to his to McNair’s personality and respect 1, 1942. He told his audience, “It is the branch, which was artillery. As General for the chain of command. For ex- avowed purpose of the Army to make kill- Paul F. Gorman remarks in a study of ample, McNair’s Army Ground Forces ers of all of you.” He stated that Soldiers Army training, McNair wanted highly controlled tank training but not tank had to make a “fiendish transformation” realistic training and impartial training production, unlike the Army Air Forces, and “hate more and more,” and that assessments, stating, “The truth is sought, which managed to gain direct control “those of you who do not hate now are regardless of whether it is pleasant or over aircraft procurement. Rather than going to do so later.” He explained that unpleasant, or whether it supports or fight these sorts of bureaucratic battles, although war kills by fire so far as possible, condemns our present organization and McNair seemed to believe integrating “modern war” also required close combat tactics.”5 Among the interesting anecdotes the efforts of functional commands of and even hand-to-hand combat for final Calhoun relates in this regard is McNair’s equal rank was the job of the next higher victory against a determined enemy. He clashes with Billy Mitchell and Hap echelon in the chain of command (that is, did not want any illusions about fighting Arnold as a result of his leading a joint General Marshall). antiseptically with detachment: analytic effort to determine the most ef- Also, while Calhoun is well-ac- fective mix of forces for defending Hawaii. quainted with most sources, as another Our soldiers must have the fighting spirit. Both men were branch “partisans” who reviewer notes, he could have used other If you call that hating our enemies, then were guilty of intentional misrepresenta- Army officer remembrances of McNair we must hate with every fiber of our being. tions, according to Calhoun. In contrast, (including his subordinates) more exten- We must lust for battle; our object in life McNair took a combined arms approach sively to better explain his behaviors and must be to kill; we must scheme and plan to warfighting. Calhoun effectively makes bureaucratic challenges.6 For example, he night and day to kill. . . . Since killing is the case that throughout McNair’s career missed Major J.E. Raymond’s insightful the object of our efforts, the sooner we get in his objective, rigorous analysis of military description of the informal atmosphere in the killing mood, the better and more skill- force development and training issues McNair’s headquarters and of McNair’s ful we shall be when the real test comes. The explains why his superior officers kept indefatigable and parsimonious ap- struggle is for survival—kill or be killed. rewarding him with advancement. proach to his work as documented in Calhoun’s book is excellent but Phyllis J. McClellan’s Silent Sentinel on McNair noted that polling reportedly not without some imperfections. To the Potomac, Fort McNair, 1791–1991. indicated that: paraphrase another reviewer in another He also missed a superb treatment of context, it is so good we cannot help McNair’s development of doctrine and One half of you expect the war to end wishing it were better. As others have training in General Paul F. Gorman’s The within two years. But your reason must tell noted, it would benefit from more data Secret of Future Victories.7 you that it will end only when you finish and charts to help illustrate comparative Calhoun’s account of how General it. If you intend to do the job in two years, funding levels between and within the McNair’s career ended is poignant. He make yourself into fighting devils now, not Services, the extent to which Army lo- notes that McNair seemed downcast— later. . . . You are going to get killing mad gistics were insufferably strained, and the despondent over the War Department’s eventually, why not now while you have differences between types of divisions and bureaucracy, the consistent short-chang- time to learn thoroughly the art of killing. their equipment. Calhoun’s explanation ing of ground forces, and even pessimistic Soldiers learn quickly and well in battle— of Army organizational politics also leaves about the problems confronting the no doubt about that—but the method is something to be desired. Often when he Army and its conduct of the war. As the costly to both you and the Nation.4 asserts McNair did not have the authority Army had to cover increasing combat to resolve an issue, it is hard to understand losses, it began to eat into the training McNair’s objective was to motivate why, and the reader suspects Calhoun may base and disrupt unit integrity, forcing his troops to expect the worst and mini- be giving McNair the benefit of the doubt McNair to issue triage guidance for train- mize it by rigorous training while they too often. Many sources believe McNair ing priorities, safeguarding individual still had the opportunity. His speech could have done better if he had experi- and small-unit training at the expense shocked some Americans, and Calhoun mented with more and better integrated of larger-unit maneuvers.8 It must have only quotes a single paragraph from it, combined arms elements, but Calhoun been excruciating for McNair, who had but it deserves to be read in its entirety typically attributes such shortcomings to done so much with so little, to have to as a model of empirical analysis, transpar- inadequate resources and authority, often increasingly push Soldiers forward to ency, candor, reason, and moving oratory. but not always making a compelling case. battle in patchwork divisions not properly McNair was also “joint” for his time Calhoun does agree, however, that prepared for the test of battle. period. He battled branch parochial- McNair was loath to take bureaucratic Ironically, McNair suffered the quick ism in his attempts to provide effective, politics seriously, unlike his protago- fate he feared for the many green troops combined arms support for frontline nists in Army Service Forces and Army he prepared for war. He was assigned JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Lamb 125 “Does the Army achieve synergy among the staff, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and U.S. Army Forces Command, or do unnecessary friction, redundancy, and bureaucratic infighting remain?”9 Indeed, given the prejudice against staff assignments that Calhoun’s colleagues assume to be the norm today, we have to ask whether mili- tary leaders really appreciate the critical importance of contributions from officers with McNair-like credentials. Put differ- ently, would serving as “the brains of the Army” (or the joint force) any longer be a sure-fire path to promotion, or even considered a compliment? In any case, for this reviewer, who works at General McNair’s namesake installation, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Calhoun’s book is a must-read. It also is a moving reminder that we must come to work every day intent on trying to After arriving in Washington, General and Mrs. McNair were taken to their Army War College quarters (NDU Special Collections) contribute to military performance with the same spirit of objectivity and determi- command of field forces in Europe, where public appreciation. It was, Churchill nation that exemplified General McNair’s he was soon killed on the frontlines. As stated, “a gift made by the Officer Corps long, distinguished, and selfless career. JFQ Calhoun relates, close observation was a of the United States to their nation in time hallmark of McNair’s approach to prob- of trouble,” one that he hoped would not lem-solving over the years. He pioneered be forgotten. Calhoun’s book depicts the Notes observed-fires for artillery, made a habit extent to which the gift has been forgot- 1 of observing training up close, and had ten, particularly the sacrifices made by Winston Churchill, “Address to American and British Service Members, The Pentagon, previously been wounded in North Africa McNair, the unsung architect of the U.S. Washington, DC, March 9, 1946,” in The while observing fighting too closely. Told Army. Fortunately, Calhoun’s book also Sinews of Peace: Post-War Speeches (Boston: his presence boosted troop morale, he re- admirably provides a compelling correc- Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1949). turned to the frontlines a second day in a tion to this egregious oversight. 2 Mark T. Calhoun, General Lesley J. row. He was killed by bombs inaccurately The import of Calhoun’s biography McNair: Unsung Architect of the U.S. Army (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), dropped by the Army Air Forces’ B-24 goes well beyond the contribution it 201. See Jim Lacey, Keep from All Thoughtful long-range strategic bombers, which were makes to World War II historiography Men: How U.S. Economists Won World War II pressed into service for close air support. and the ongoing debate over U.S. Army (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011). Thus, the man whose career is now dis- performance during that period. His 3 Paul F. Gorman, The Secret of Future missed as uninteresting because so much impressive recounting of McNair’s career Victories (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, February 1992), II-1–II-57. of it was spent in staff assignments became is a reminder that effective leadership— 4 The speech can be read in its entirety at the only American lieutenant general ever particularly in the military—can best be 126 Recall / The Case for General Lesley J. McNair JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 First, however, there is a small himself to critics who favor fostering problem of definitions. Zenko uses the a broad culture of critical thinking (or term red-teaming to mean a “structured whatever the term du jour is) over red- process that seeks to better understand team cells. the interests, intentions, and capabilities Zenko extracts general principles of an institution—or a potential competi- that make for successful red teams. First, tor—through simulations, vulnerability “The Boss Must Buy In.” Red teams do probes, and alternative analysis.” This is no good if they are used as cover for a slightly different from the most common decision that has already been made, or if definition, which defines red-teaming as the red team is forced on decisionmakers a subset of alternative analysis that aims who have no intention of listening to the to view “a problem from an adversary or given recommendations. Second, red competitor’s perspective.” People with a teams should be “Outside and Objective, military background remember friendly While Inside and Aware,” which means forces being depicted in blue and the that the team is not poisoned by group enemy in red; hence, “turning the map think, but is sensitive to organizational around” and thinking like the enemy concerns in how it presents its analysis. denote “red-teaming.” It is not a point This ties in to the third principle: that against Zenko, but readers need to keep red-teamers should be “Fearless Skeptics in mind that he uses the term in a more with Finesse.” expansive way than normal. “Have a Big Bag of Tricks,” the Zenko catalogues the use of red- fourth principle, might seem to be most Red Team: How to Succeed teaming in a variety of security contexts, relevant to the cyber security realm, by Thinking Like the Enemy ranging from the Central Intelligence where red-teamers might be imagined to Agency’s analysis of Syria’s Al-Kibar be computer geniuses who need state-of- By Micah Zenko nuclear research site to physical penetra- the-art hacks in order to defeat computer Basic Books, 2015 tion tests of government buildings. The systems. In fact, Zenko emphasizes that 338 pp. $16.00 research is exhaustive, based on over 200 the best red-teamers in cyber security go ISBN: 978-0465048946 interviews with government officials, through great pains to use only simple Reviewed by Matthew Cancian business leaders, and maverick think- techniques that could realistically be ers. The diversity of red teams and the employed by an adversary. This could be analyses of their successes and failures are applied in other contexts more relevant yber warfare, asymmetric threats, enough to make this book a valuable ad- to defense; it was, after all, the simple emerging challenges to conven- dition to any policymaker’s reading list. techniques of communicating by run- C tional hegemony—a myriad of The exact reasons why red-teaming ner and suicide boats that defeated the threats face American policymakers in through a special cell of maverick thinkers “Blue Team” in the infamous Millennium the 21st century. In Red Team: How to is needed, however, are not explicated Challenge 2002 experiment that Zenko Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy, as much as one might wish. Why can uses as one of his teaching points. Micah Zenko, a senior fellow at the an entire organization not be made up In another principle, Zenko coun- Council on Foreign Relations, proposes of critical thinkers? Recent editions of sels that organizational leaders should “red-teaming” as an effective antidote military journals are replete with calls for “Be Willing to Hear Bad News and to the cognitive biases that plague deci- “agile,” “adaptive,” “critical,” or “strate- Act on It,” which was unfortunately sionmakers in any organization. Overall, gic” thinkers (or all four at the same time, not the case when the Federal Aviation Zenko does an excellent job portraying as then–Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Administration red team warned of criti- the value of having a cell of critical, Staff General Martin Dempsey called for cal security shortcomings before 9/11. outside-the-box thinkers to challenge in 2013). Zenko effectively argues that it Finally, Zenko argues that one should orthodoxy in variegated contexts, and is impossible for any large organization to “Red Team Just Enough, But No More.” specifically recommends how to design be staffed entirely by mavericks; the “ex- Red-teaming is not an end unto itself; it red-team engagements to overcome isting guidance, practices, and culture of should serve to enhance decisions. the organizational inertia and blind an institution are essential to its function- By showing the effectiveness of spots that they are meant to combat. ing effectively.” Otherwise, the institution alternative analysis cells in diverse con- The book is a worthy read for national would have to constantly reinvent every texts, Zenko succeeds in convincing security analysts of every stripe who are process. I agree with Zenko on this point, readers of the need for red-teaming in working to keep America safe in the face but by not devoting enough space to the a variety of contexts. One unresolved of the complexities of the 21st century. necessity of alternative analysis, he opens tension throughout the book, however, JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Book Reviews 127 is whether the ability to red-team effec- being denied the same rights at home. tively is an innate quality or whether it is Finally, Hervieux uncovers the forgotten something that can be taught to anyone. story of Waverly Woodson, Jr., a balloon Zenko alternatively lauds the University battalion medic from Philadelphia, whose of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies heroic care for mostly white Soldiers at Fort Leavenworth for teaching critical on D-Day should have earned him the thinking, then describes the red-teamers Medal of Honor, except that in Jim Crow he meets as born mavericks or quotes America, blacks were essentially ineligible them stating that their brand of outside- for such distinctions regardless of their the-box thinking is innate. By the end actions. Fortunately, thanks to Hervieux’s of the book, readers might still remain history, Congress and the U.S. Army are puzzled by this ambiguity. reexamining Woodson’s actions, albeit Overall, Zenko has assembled a over 72 years after the event and 11 years remarkable host of evidence and makes after his death in 2005. a strong case for the utility of alternative Of the over 30 balloon battalions analysis cells, or red teams, in a variety of fielded by the Army, African-Americans national security contexts. Readers of this manned just 4. As Hervieux highlights, journal would do well to read his book these units—the 318th, 319th, 320th, and and think about how the techniques that 321st—were a “source of tremendous Zenko details would benefit their organi- pride for black America” and received fre- zation. JFQ quent coverage in the African-American and white press. But of all of these th Forgotten: The Untold Story units, only one—the 320 —landed in Captain Matthew Cancian, USMC (Ret.), Normandy on D-Day. Before it rede- served from 2009–2013. He is currently a of D-Day’s Black Heroes, Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the at Home and at War ployed to England 140 days later, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 320th destroyed at least one JU-88 and By Linda Hervieux possibly other German aircraft, particu- Harper, 2015 larly in the early days of the invasion, and 353 pp. $27.99 received a commendation from General ISBN: 978-0062313799 Dwight D. Eisenhower for its service Reviewed by Bryon Greenwald at Omaha Beach. Moreover, the 320th captured the attention of servicemembers across Europe and changed some, if not inda Hervieux’s well-written and all, minds about the ability of African- thoroughly researched book, For- American Soldiers. As Bill Richardson, L gotten: The Untold Story of D-Day’s a military correspondent, noted to Black Heroes, at Home and at War, is a Eisenhower’s staff, “It seems the whole micro history that makes three macro front knows the story of the Negro bar- contributions to American military rage balloon battalion outfit which was history. At its core, Forgotten is the one of the first ashore on D-Day. [They] story of the 320th Anti-Aircraft Barrage have gotten the reputation of hard Balloon Battalion, VLA (Very Low workers and good soldiers. Their simple Altitude), the only African-American earnestness and pride . . . is obvious to combat unit to land in France on D-Day, some of the most Jim-Crow–conscious June 6, 1944. As such, it pulls double southerners” (p. 238). duty by highlighting the untold story The Army created barrage balloon of this innovative method of protecting battalions to deploy aerial obstacles Allied ships and troops from air attack as to deter enemy aircraft from strafing well as by emphasizing the role of Afri- and dive-bombing ships and friendly can-Americans in Operation Overlord. locations. A battalion consisted of four Forgotten is also a poignant reminder batteries, each able to fly several “silver that the men of the 320th Battalion were sausages” simultaneously to an altitude part of a force of one million African- of 2,000 feet. Three- or four-man crews American men and women who fought tethered each 35-foot-long balloon to for freedom and democracy abroad while the ground with a long cable that held a 128 Book Reviews JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 small explosive at each end. If not fouled the 29th Infantry Division. As Woodson’s Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s Allied chief of outright by running into the cable, an LCT arrived at Omaha Beach around staff, initially resisted the move, fearing it attacking aircraft activated two quick 9:00 a.m., it struck a mine that disabled broke the Army’s policy on the segrega- releases that freed the cable from both the motor and hit another mine that tore tion of units—a silly rule that ignored the the balloon and the ground. As the cable into the hull. Then an artillery round reality of infantry combat. Many of his separated, it deployed two small but landed in the jeep on deck, killing several contemporaries considered Lee arrogant different-sized drag chutes that pulled men. Woodson suffered shrapnel wounds and self-aggrandizing; some even referred one of the explosive charges toward the to the leg, the first of two wounds, and to him as “Jesus Christ Himself” after his plane, detonating on contact. Ideally, soon found himself struggling to get initials J.C.H. It is conceivable that Lee’s Army antiaircraft artillery machine guns, ashore, out of the frigid water. Once on reputation within the European theater 40-millimeter (mm) Bofors, or 90-mm the fire-swept beach, he quickly set up an of operations (ETO) for racial tolerance guns engaged any enemy aircraft flying aid station and treated 200 wounded and combined with his personal demeanor to above or around these aerial obstacles or dying Soldiers until he collapsed 30 hours have a chilling effect on Woodson’s award drove them even higher, where they fell later from his wounds and sheer exhaus- recommendation. Unfortunately, the prey to Allied defensive fighters prowling tion. As he would tell the story years ETO awards board recommendations are the skies—a truly joint effort. later, when men needed aid, “They didn’t also lost to history. Forgotten makes its second important care what color my skin was.” As the In 1992, the Army ordered an inde- contribution with Hervieux’s recounting black press recounted, his actions merited pendent inquiry to determine why no of segregation in America in the 1930s the Medal of Honor. World War II African-American Soldiers and 1940s. It is the quality of the unit’s But back then, black men did not received the Medal of Honor. The panel service when compared to the inequality receive the Medal of Honor. Of the concluded that the racial climate and of its servitude to a disapproving and dis- 433 Medals of Honor awarded for ac- practice within the World War II Army criminatory nation that makes the history tions during the war, none went to contributed to the failure of African- of the 320th Anti-Aircraft Barrage Balloon African-American Soldiers. Woodson’s American Soldiers to be awarded the Battalion compelling for the reader. commander, a white officer, recom- medal. The panel also found that it could Hervieux vividly recounts the fear black mended him for the Distinguished not determine if Woodson deserved the Northern Servicemembers had when trav- Service Cross, the Nation’s second Medal of Honor because it lacked his eling in curtained railcars to training bases highest award. As Hervieux records, Army file, which had been destroyed in in Tennessee or Georgia and the treatment Lieutenant General John C.H. Lee, the a 1973 fire at the National Personnel they received in some quarters from white Deputy Commander of U.S. Forces in Records Center in St. Louis. Fortunately, officers and others in authority, particularly Europe, believed Woodson deserved the due to Hervieux’s research, Congressman military and civilian police. This behavior Medal of Honor and ordered the recom- Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) asked the stood in stark contrast to how the British mendation changed. Hervieux notes that Army to review Woodson’s actions and and French welcomed them as equals. As mention of the award even reached the recommended he receive the Medal of damning as their treatment before the war, White House, but whether the recom- Honor. While Woodson may get his due it was America’s failure to recognize their mendation reached President Franklin D. eventually, posthumously awarding him wartime service with a measure of equal- Roosevelt, who was not as farsighted re- the Medal of Honor will not repair the ity that spurred many African-American garding race relations as his wife Eleanor, damage done at the individual and collec- Soldiers to join the growing civil rights was lost to history. In the end, Woodson tive level to the fabric of American society movement. As such, Forgotten serves as received the Bronze Star, the Nation’s by what Ta-Nehisi Coates describes in his a window into America’s past and places fourth-highest award for valor. award-winning memoir, Between the World contemporary racial issues into important Why Woodson did not receive the and Me, as essentially decades of overt and historical perspective. Distinguished Service Cross, one can only covert, conscious and unconscious racism As a final contribution to American guess. Perhaps in upgrading the award and discriminatory treatment. military history, Hervieux’s work corrects recommendation, Lieutenant General Forgotten is an excellent book. Linda past oversights and shortcomings. For Lee actually did Woodson an unintended Hervieux deserves great credit for un- Forgotten is built around the individual disservice. Although a strict disciplinar- covering this long-forgotten and unique histories of several members of the ian, Lee was ahead of his time regarding history. Her book not only preserves the 320th Battalion—Wilson Monk, Henry race relations and equality. When a past, but also brings to light legacies that Parham, George Davison, and William shortage of infantrymen threatened to are otherwise grievously forgotten. JFQ Dabney, to name a few. None is more slow American combat operations in famous, but still forgotten to history, Europe, Lee offered black men, serving than Waverly Woodson, Jr., whose skill as as laborers in the U.S. Army Services of Dr. Bryon Greenwald is a retired U.S. Army officer currently serving as a Professor in the Joint a medic found him assigned to an early Supply, the chance to become infantry Advanced Warfighting School in Norfolk, Virginia. arriving landing craft, tank (LCT) with replacements. Major General Walter JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Book Reviews 129 to missile defense that has emerged since revealing how international security is- the presidency of George H.W. Bush.” sues such as missile defense reside within Kelleher and Dombrowski assemble an a specific context in any given country impressive array of international subject or region. In this regard, the treatment matter experts to contribute to the vol- of Israel’s Iron Dome antirocket system ume, organizing their resulting work into is excellent. Ariel Levite and Shlomo 14 chapters. To structure these, they di- Brom’s chapter, “From Dream to Reality: vide the volume into three parts, in turn Israel and Missile Defense,” stands out as examining U.S. policies and programs, the best among many excellent chapters regional dynamics, and critical global for its detailed analysis of the potential analyses. The various contributors employ benefits of missile defense. an extensive array of sources: government The book also explores significant documents, scientific reports, policy pa- joint issues such as the proper roles and pers, and intelligence estimates, as well as missions of the various U.S. military relevant interviews, speeches, addresses, Services, including the Navy’s ballistic and statements by key policymakers. missile defense–capable Aegis ships armed The first five chapters examine mis- with SM-2 and SM-3 interceptors, and sile threats to the United States, the the Army’s Patriot PAC-2 and PAC-3 dichotomy between national and theater batteries and Terminal High-Altitude missile defense, technology, and the Area Defense system. role of Congress. But the bulk of the Overall, Regional Missile Defense is a work resides in the second part, which valuable contribution to understanding Regional Missile Defense gives extensive coverage to the ques- the vital and sometimes contentious de- from a Global Perspective tions, prospects, and consequences of bates on this mission area, which will grow missile defense in such specific regions in importance in the future. The book is Edited by Catherine McArdle Kelleher and countries as Europe, Russia, Israel, the first volume in some time to analyze and Peter Dombrowski the Arabian Gulf nations, South Asia, missile defense in a serious and compre- Stanford University Press, 2015 China, and Japan. The last two chapters hensive way and is a welcome addition to 328 pp. $29.95 consider the positives and negatives of the existing literature, much of it overly ISBN: 978-0804796354 missile defense in terms of grand strategy broad. In their conclusion, Kelleher and Reviewed by William A. Taylor and costs. Throughout the work, the Dombrowski point out that “officials and contributors pay particular attention to elites are again struggling over topics such President Barack Obama’s European as offense-defense tradeoffs, the adequacy n Regional Missile Defense from a Phased Adaptive Approach. of missile defense technology advances, Global Perspective, Catherine M. While focused on missile defense, the projected deployment schedules, funding I Kelleher and Peter Dombrowski book also offers cogent considerations priorities, and the new participation of analyze the history of missile defense, of far-reaching concepts, including an allies and friends in key burden sharing.” U.S. policy debates, the resulting evenhanded evaluation of the trials and Such a situation magnifies the importance acquisition programs, and challenges benefits of collective defense and the role of informed debate on these critical issues. and opportunities of the past, present, of technology as an enabler and limiter In the end, Regional Missile Defense pres- and future. The genesis of the volume of grand strategy. The work also dem- ents a balanced assessment that is likely to was two workshops on the topic held onstrates the importance of resources to become the standard work on the topic at the Naval War College during 2011 national and international security, both for quite some time. JFQ and 2012. While seemingly dated, the in real terms and as a result of tradeoffs work remains timely given the eleva- and opportunity costs. Finally, the vol- tion of regional missile defense in the ume explores the political and symbolic Dr. William A. Taylor is an Assistant Professor of Security Studies at Angelo State University and U.S. National Security Strategy and nature of missile defense and offers author of Military Service and American Democracy Russia’s provocations in the Baltics and valuable reflections on the essence of the (University Press of Kansas, 2016). Ukraine. The anthology should prove security dilemma. Of particular relevance useful to policymakers, scholars, and in this regard is the appropriate balance students interested in the complexities between offensive and defensive capabili- of missile defense around the globe. ties, both in one’s own arsenal and in the The editors’ objective is simple: “to perceptions of allies and adversaries. explain the origins, the evolution, and One of the particular strengths of the implications of the regional approach this anthology is its regional approach, 130 Book Reviews JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 One of 12 Outstanding Airmen of 2015, Sharry Barnshaw, 436th Communications Squadron client systems section chief, focuses on personal improvement to become a better leader, supervisor, mentor, peer, and follower, ultimately shaping herself into a better person (U.S. Air Force) his year, in support of the Secretary of Defense’s prior- Mentoring T ity to “build a department and joint force of the future by embracing Civilian Contributions change,” General Dunford laid out his approach for the future joint force. His three key joint force focus areas include to the Joint Force the requirement to develop leaders for Joint Forces Next. By Kevin D. Scott To achieve the Chairman’s goals, the Joint Staff developed three core functions to focus staff efforts on the unique capabilities they bring to support The future operating environment will place new demands on the Chairman, Secretary of Defense, leaders at all levels. To best prepare our future leaders for success we and President of the United States. Committed leadership is the driving force must continuously assess and refine our leader development. behind all current and future efforts. —General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. Vice Admiral Kevin D. Scott, USN, is the Director for Joint Force Development (J7). JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Scott 131 J7 Role in Integrating contributes to the organization’s overall preferences after they have assessed Tomorrow’s Joint Force mission in support of the warfighter. several potential candidates. As director for Joint Force Develop- Civilian leaders need to understand the The next step is for both mentor and ment and the Chairman’s lead for importance of work/life balance as an mentee candidates to complete a person- the third core function, “Integrating essential skill for success. We must con- ality profile tool for helping predict how Tomorrow’s Joint Force,” I am com- tinually review our professional goals as people will relate to one another. The mitted to the Chairman’s vision of “a we expand our experience and education. profile tool evaluates compatibility rather joint force composed of agile and adap- A mentoring program is grounded in than skills or knowledge. After reviewing tive leaders and organizations who can quality mentors. Mentors listen to their the profile results and mentees’ prefer- critically think and innovate through mentees’ ambitions and concerns and ences, the program coordinator (a senior dynamic problems in an increas- share their own professional experiences. civilian collateral duty) matches mentors ingly transregional, multidomain, Mentors build the confidence of their with mentees. This matching is critical; multifunctional threat environment.” mentees, so they can further enhance the the mentee needs a mentor who is a Success requires that we pay attention knowledge and skills needed to succeed teacher, sponsor, counselor, and advo- to current and future joint leaders— in positions of increased responsibility. cate. We then conduct a formal meeting, military, officer and enlisted, as well as While developing the Joint Force presenting each mentor with his/her new civilian. Civilian professional develop- Development Civilian Mentorship mentee, after which the paired mentor/ ment and growth need a deliberate Program, our research team identified mentee meet to complete a mentoring approach. Our ability to meet future several themes from successful Federal agreement. This agreement defines how challenges will depend in large part and formal and informal corporate and when they meet with each other as on the quality and effectiveness of our mentorship programs. In line with those well as relationship expectations. Within own civilian leaders. successful themes, the J7 team outlined the first month, the team develops a for- Today, our civilians lead organiza- the following program objectives: mal mentoring action plan that identifies tions at every echelon. They drive the mentee’s goals and what is required Commitment: requires and ensures a doctrinal and functional changes and •• or recommended to reach those goals. pledge from mentors, mentees, and work side by side with senior leaders, Formal mentorship and monthly the directorate’s senior leaders and deployed military units, and all levels of group training sessions occur throughout personnel supervisors. staff. They understand the operational the year. Mentors and mentees attend Effective pairing: matches mentors picture as well as the risks, constraints, •• presentations that provide an expanded and mentees based on specific intentions, and political nuances of the view of Joint Force Development mis- criteria so that the individuals will current operating environment. Our sions as well as Joint Staff, combatant have different, but complementary, civilians provide critical continuity, command, Service, and Department of characteristics. expertise, and stability. A deliberate ap- Defense–wide systems and processes. Diversity: avoids pairing mentees proach to grow and retain quality civilian •• Mentees are exposed to senior leaders with mentors from the same division leadership is a critical component of joint who help them understand the “big or branch. force development. picture” and improve their confidence Partnership: creates a superior- Creating a mentorship program is •• and situational awareness. The most subordinate relationship between the one of the primary ways we can develop important part of the relationship is the mentor and mentee, which is why and retain our civilian leaders. The mentor’s ability to listen rather than the word mentee is used and protégé Joint Staff J7 established a formal Joint dictate, encourage rather than discour- is not. Force Development Civilian Mentorship age, and provide guidance so the mentee Honesty: makes clear that while the Program in 2014. The deliberate integra- •• can make informed decisions. After the mentoring process helps the mentee tion of a mentorship component within year is over, we hold a formal closing to gain new skills, there are no prom- our leader development program pro- ceremony. Mentees receive a certificate of ises associated with the program. vides the Joint Staff with an even more completion, and all participants receive a capable and competent cadre of civilian Joint Staff Mentorship Program lapel pin. leaders with in-depth joint force develop- How the Program Works But that is not where the program ends. ment expertise. First and foremost, this program is vol- Many of the mentors/mentees that were Mentoring, unlike training, is in- untary for both mentors and mentees. paired still meet today. tended not only to impart skills, but also Supervisors can recommend someone to encourage a change in individuals’ for the program, but that individual Benefits perspectives on their organization, their must agree to participate. Once mentors Results from a J7 survey completed by goals, and their own personal develop- and mentees are identified, they mentors and mentees who have partici- ment. Our leaders need to understand conduct initial in-person “meet and pated over the past 2 years identified how their particular work or skill set greets.” Mentees submit their mentor 132 Joint Doctrine / Mentoring: Civilian Contributions to the Joint Force JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 multiple benefits from establishing and Benefits to the Department of Defense retain our future civilian leaders. executing a mentorship program. •• Improved unity of effort: Mentees Mentoring promotes the ability of every gain broader knowledge and under- member of the Joint Staff to contribute Benefits to Mentees standing of the mission and vision meaningfully to Joint Forces Next. I •• Organizational understanding: of their organization, as well as the see this as a powerful tool to improve Mentees have the ability to exhibit Chairman and Secretary of Defense. the entire Defense Department civilian a better understanding of roles and They become personally invested in workforce—personally, professionally, and responsibilities throughout the orga- organizational success. organizationally. This codified initiative, nizations, their contributions to mis- •• Greater productivity: Productivity along with other civilian professional de- sions, and how all roles fit together improves as a result of an enhanced velopment programs, will further support to support the warfighter. skill set and a better understanding the quest to achieve a Total Joint Force •• Career orientation: They look at of the organization’s goals. that will face any transregional, multido- their careers as a long-term opportu- •• Orderly transition: Joint Forces Next main, multifunctional challenge in the nity rather than a short-term job. is the most important beneficiary future. JFQ •• Focus: They have a clearer vision of of the mentoring program. Today’s their own personal goals and how to mentees will become tomorrow’s achieve them, including various on- government civilian leaders. Should you have any questions about this program, please contact Ms. Stephanie Roper- the-job experiences or formal degree The current and projected security Burton of the J7 Military Secretariat, manager programs. of the Joint Force Development Mentorship environment our nation faces is charac- •• Professional networking: They are Program, or Ms. Beth Lape, program director terized by complexity, uncertainty, and of the Joint Force Development Professional more exposed to others from dif- rapid change—far faster than we have Certification Program. ferent organizations in a team-like ever known. We face strategic challenges environment, as well as helping to and crises simultaneously and across the develop and expand their network of full spectrum of our current capabilities. people. Technology gives adversaries low-cost ca- pabilities that can offset some of our most Benefits to Mentors expensive acquisition programs. Adding •• Giving back to the organization: to this dilemma are significantly diminish- Some people seek a career in public ing manpower and funding levels. The service to do just that—serve. One burden of success is now placed squarely reason so many veterans and military on our most valuable resource, people, retirees go on to become civilian and with the challenges we face, people government workers is to continue are the true game changers. Therefore, it serving. Mentoring provides a mean- is essential that we commit to providing ingful opportunity to do so. pathways for professional and personal •• Improved listening skills: Unlike growth to meet current and future a supervisor, coach, or trainer, the demands. mentor’s primary tool is to listen— Creating tomorrow’s joint force truly listen—to what the mentee leaders requires the creative selection, is communicating. What mentees development, and management of our are not saying is as important as talent. The primary task for developing a what they actually verbalize. This well-balanced and integrated future joint enhanced listening capability is force is to develop military and civilian applicable to everyday use at work, at leaders who can think critically, solve home, or in the community. problems, and collaborate. To ensure •• Personal satisfaction: Mentors enjoy success we must infuse both military and the pleasure of helping a colleague civilian leaders at all echelons in the joint to grow professionally and gain the force with adaptive behavior, creativity, organizational equivalent of “street innovation, and critical thinking skills. smarts.” Mentors take pride in When successful, we will have attained knowing that their efforts have made the vision laid out by the Chairman to their organization just a little better. develop leaders for Joint Forces Next. Mentoring is one of the primary means by which we can develop and JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Scott 133 Soldiers conduct static line airdrop during Joint Operational Access Exercise 13-02, at Sicily drop zone, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to train with paratroopers from U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division on projecting combat power in denied environments (DOD/Jason Robertson) Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons A New Joint Operational Concept By Michael E. Hutchens, William D. Dries, Jason C. Perdew, Vincent D. Bryant, and Kerry E. Moores n two separate keynote addresses at the annual conventions of the profes- sional associations of the Army and Captain Michael E. Hutchens, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Staff, N503 Concepts and I Implementation, is the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons Office Lead. Air Force, General Joseph Dunford, Jr., Colonel William D. Dries, USAFR, is Associate Division Chief, Concepts Division, Deputy Chief of Staff, described how he and the other Service Strategic Plans and Requirements, Headquarters Department of the Air Force. Lieutenant Colonel Jason C. Perdew, USMC, is a Joint Concepts Analyst for the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory/Futures chiefs went through a “process of dis- Directorate. Colonel Vincent D. Bryant, USAR, is a Senior Analyst for Army Space Strategy and Policy, covery” to develop the new National Headquarters Department of the Army G3/5/7. Colonel Kerry E. Moores, USA, is Branch Chief for Future Military Strategy.1 He further explained Joint Force Development and Concept Implementation, Joint Staff J7. 134 Joint Doctrine / Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 that part of that process included their action in the global commons in an era constitute an unprecedented array of an- collective thinking on our national of increasingly sophisticated and rapidly tiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities centers of gravity. proliferating military threats.2 The con- that threaten the U.S. and allied model In particular, General Dunford cept’s operational-level thought will also of power projection and maneuver. These conveyed that at the operational level, it inform capability and force development challenges seem even more daunting is our ability to globally project power activities to aid in the shaping of the joint given recent fiscal constraints that have that is a key military center of gravity. force necessary to address those military significantly impacted both force struc- On that point, he went on to state, “In threats. ture and military readiness. my judgment, [potential competitors’] The United States will continue to Unless countered, these challenges operational patterns, their capability develop and enhance its regional and will reduce the credibility of U.S. secu- development, and their behavior are de- global power projection capabilities in rity guarantees and the confidence of signed to undermine the United States, order to provide a full range of options to legitimate users that they will continue to our ability to project power, and the cred- succeed in defense of our global interests enjoy unconstrained access to the global ibility of our alliances.” He continued, and those shared by our allies and part- commons. These formidable capabilities “We’ve also seen them modernizing their ners. Actions taken in concert with the can also cause U.S. and allied forces to existing systems and also some capabili- transition and application of this concept operate with higher levels of risk and at ties that are particularly concerning to will inform and refine those capability greater distances from areas of interest. the United States . . . their long-range development efforts. conventional strike, modernized nuclear Initial Response: Air-Sea Battle capabilities, and their focus on developing Rise of Antiaccess/ Given these operational realities, the a wide range of robust cyber, space, elec- Area-Denial Threats Department of Defense recognized tronic warfare, and undersea capabilities.” The United States is a global power the need to explore and develop ideas For a nation that should think and with global interests. This foundational and capabilities to enhance U.S. power act globally, the United States must be principle continues to place demands projection capabilities and strategies, as capable and ready to address emerging on the military’s ability to project and well as to ensure freedom of action. In challenges in a way that has been an sustain power globally. Since the end of July 2009, then–Secretary of Defense advantage for American and allied forces World War II, U.S. forces have generally Robert Gates directed the Services to for decades: the ability to project military enjoyed unrestricted and unchallenged address this military problem set, and a force into an operational area with suf- access to the global commons, which in new operational concept called Air-Sea ficient freedom of action to accomplish a turn has facilitated the ability to project Battle (ASB) was created. designated mission. power. This unfettered access also A multi-Service office was established contributed to a shift in priorities away to not only write the new concept, but Signed and Approved from thinking, planning, and operations also construct, administer, and oversee On October 19, 2016, Vice Chairman to ensure continued operational access. viable transition and application actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Paul Additionally, the Nation’s focus on two throughout the military Services. ASB Selva, USAF, signed the Joint Concept wars over the past two decades that would be incorporated into more than for Access and Maneuver in the Global required a different kind of warfighting two dozen wargames, experiments, Commons (JAM-GC), officially signal- and different capabilities and capacities studies, and exercises at the Service, ing its approval as a joint operational than those required to counter a near- combatant command, joint, and allied concept to support the Capstone peer competitor further drew collective levels. ASB tenets were codified in three Concept for Joint Operations 2030. attention away from the issues of con- implementation plans that produced Most importantly, JAM-GC will inform tinued operational access. force-development recommendations joint force operations so that the United Today, efforts by determined across key warfare areas to be tested, States can maintain access to and potential adversaries to obtain, field, proved, and finally adopted by the “fleets maneuver through the global commons, and proliferate formidable advanced and forces.” All these exploratory activi- project power, and defeat an adversary technologies and military capabilities to ties revealed important insights. Many of attempting to deny freedom of action to counter U.S. and allied power projection the findings from these activities validated U.S. and allied forces. are undermining these traditional U.S. ASB’s original central idea of the need for JAM-GC is the evolved replacement military advantages.3 These capabilities a more fully networked and integrated of its predecessor, the much-analyzed not only include traditional weapons cross-domain force. Air-Sea Battle concept, and continues the such as aircraft, submarines, mines, and natural and deliberate evolution of core missiles, but also encompass emerging ca- Developing a Whole U.S. abilities to project power. The con- pabilities in all domains, including space New Concept cept focuses on gaining and maintaining and cyberspace.4 The range, lethality, and In fall 2014, the Service chiefs met and operational access to preserve freedom of sophistication of these new capabilities agreed that ASB should be revised into JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Hutchens et al. 135 an authoritative joint concept in support maturation, transition, and application •• provide the necessary force develop- of, and subordinate to, the Joint Opera- remains with the Services, yet with the ment activities, particularly education tional Access Concept (JOAC). Their enhanced clout of formal Joint Staff J7 and integrated training, needed conclusion was that evolving ASB from oversight. to succeed in future contested its original multi-Service arrangement Based on several years of comprehen- environments into a fully integrated joint concept, sive wargaming and experimentation, •• recognize, understand, and advocate under oversight by the Joint Force JAM-GC refines and adjusts ASB’s for new capabilities and approaches Development Process, would be the ideas, intending to address the contested required to defeat evolving threats. logical continuation and progressive environment at acceptable levels of risk. Addressing the possibility of having to enhancement of these organized efforts Whereas the ASB concept was designed confront a near-peer, modern competi- to address the current and future con- to counter emerging A2/AD challenges tor, JAM-GC posits operations against tested environments. and hinged on a “disrupt, destroy, de- determined, capable, and elusive oppo- With improved understanding of feat” approach to specific adversary A2/ nents who avoid U.S. strengths, emulate operational requirements to address A2/ AD capabilities, JAM-GC is focused on U.S. capabilities, attack vulnerabilities, AD challenges in the global commons, defeating an adversary’s plan and intent, and expand operations beyond physical the Services and Joint Staff achieved rather than just concentrating on disman- battlegrounds. consensus and agreed on the name Joint tling adversary A2/AD capabilities. The new name also reflects several Concept for Access and Maneuver in the JAM-GC concentrates on the important ideas for joint force success in Global Commons. operational level of war. It is not itself contested environments. The most obvi- In early 2015, in response to the a strategy; rather, it is an operational ous change reflects that operating in the Service chiefs’ decision, the Air-Sea Battle approach to enable strategy. Likewise, ef- face of comprehensive A2/AD threats re- Office began work to evolve Air-Sea fective tactics are necessary, but JAM-GC quires the integration of capabilities from Battle into JAM-GC. To further under- is not meant to provide tactical solutions. all five warfighting domains (land, sea, write the new initiative, the Director of Similarly, the concept does not advocate air, space, and cyberspace), not just from the Joint Staff issued a memorandum for specific emerging capabilities. If such the air and sea domains of its correspond- in January 2015 officially directing the capabilities develop and are fielded, they ingly titled predecessor. name change, and he placed concept de- will make JAM-GC’s approach more The concept also includes the ca- velopment efforts under monitoring from effective. pabilities—and capacities—of allies and the Joint Staff J7 Directorate for Joint There is recognition of the im- partners when and where appropriate, Force Development. portance of technology to overcome as access to the global commons is a Development and writing of the new adversary capabilities as well as defend collective interest of the international concept was done under the auspices friendly vulnerabilities, but the concept community. JAM-GC will continue to of the existing formal joint concept de- also recognizes the limits of technology build on the U.S. commitment to our velopment process.5 Adherence to this and the need to integrate low-tech op- allies and partners around the world who systematic process ensured JAM-GC tions where and when appropriate for the are essential to successfully overcoming received the necessary Joint Staff integra- joint force. Importantly, JAM-GC lays threats to access in the global commons. tion and oversight afforded other joint out an approach for operations in con- Improved interoperability with allies and concepts. tested environments that does not rely partners is a fundamental tenet of the on overcoming a potential adversary’s new concept. Building on the ASB Foundation A2/AD military capabilities, whereas Just as with the original Air-Sea Battle Development of JAM-GC is about ASB’s approach focused on changing the concept, JAM-GC is not predicated improving joint warfighting effective- environment by systematically defeating on any one potential adversary, theater ness in a contested environment while A2/AD, so the joint force could operate of operations, or geopolitical scenario. employing the valuable research and as it preferred. This subtle but important Rather, the concept is driven by the lessons learned from implementing change represents an acknowledgment global proliferation and increasing sophis- the Air-Sea Battle concept. JAM-GC that A2/AD capabilities evolved more tication of A2/AD threat capabilities with keeps and enhances ASB’s proven best quickly than anticipated and could only global applicability. Its focus is on the ideas, with its lessons identified and be dismantled at high levels of risk. challenge of contested access and maneu- incorporated to result in a joint concept JAM-GC is intended to aid com- ver in the global commons from 2016 to that is more applicable and adaptive to manders, planners, and capability 2025 and beyond. the quickly changing and increasingly developers to: Furthermore, “access and maneu- difficult operational environment. It is employ existing joint force capa- ver” reflect the overall importance of now a joint concept built on the ASB •• bilities in innovative ways to ensure operational access and freedom of action, “chassis.” While JAM-GC now exists access and freedom of maneuver while “global commons” delineates those as a joint concept, responsibility for its 136 Joint Doctrine / Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 areas of sea, air, space, and cyberspace that belong to no one state. JAM-GC acknowledges that “access” to the global commons is vital to U.S. national in- terests, both as an end in itself and as a means to projecting military force into hostile territory. Solution to an Operational Problem JAM-GC puts forth an evolutionary approach to joint force operations that centers on enhanced all-domain integra- tion across Service and component lines in order to develop a force that can continue to ensure freedom of action in the global commons despite increasingly sophisticated A2/AD threats. The con- cept’s operational problem statement is summarized thus: The joint force must be able to maintain access to and maneuver through portions of the global commons, project power, and defeat an adversary attempting to deny freedom of action via the employment of A2/AD capabilities. The tactics and military strategies employed in the global commons must adapt to keep pace with potential adver- saries’ technological advances, including improvements in positioning and timing, guidance, propulsion, computing power, sensing, accuracy, and signature. In an era of a “leaner” force structure and increased proliferation of advanced threat United Launch Alliance Delta IV-Heavy rocket carrying National Reconnaissance Office payload and weapons technologies, countering an launches from Space Launch Complex-6, August 28, 2013, at Vandenberg Air Force Base (U.S. Air adversary with the potential for numeri- Force/Yvonne Morales) cal superiority and near technical parity is at the heart of JAM-GC’s operational •• Distributable: “the ability to dis- •• Sufficient scale: Examples of increas- problem. perse, reposition, and use a variety of ing capacity include increasing range, bases and operating locations, while carriage, and loiter times of existing Building Blocks retaining the ability to maneuver and platforms; expanding the number To meet the challenges of the opera- concentrate combat power” of partners conducting operations tional problem, the future joint force •• Resilient: “the ability to recover together; and increased use and inte- must be distributable, resilient, and rapidly from adversity and setbacks, gration of commercial systems. tailorable, as well as employed in suf- which usually come in the form of •• Ample duration: U.S. and allied ficient scale and for ample duration. The combat losses” forces must have necessary “staying concept further defines and explains this •• Tailorable: Forces available to the power.” A key feature must be a particular set of required characteristics joint force commander that “can be logistics system that provides redun- for the joint force and why they are key readily commanded, controlled, and dancy and timely access to resources to the success of joint operations in a employed in any necessary temporary to withstand interruption, corrup- future contested environment: or permanent structure to accom- tion, and attrition. plish assigned missions” JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Hutchens et al. 137 E/A-18 Growler assigned to “Gauntlets” of Electronic Attack Squadron 136 lands as USS Ronald Reagan and USS Independence conduct maneuvers during Rim of the Pacific 2014 (U.S. Navy/Conor Minto) While JAM-GC emphasizes these Challenges.” Several joint operational outlined in the Joint Concept for Rapid key elements of joint force integration, concepts align under this strategic guid- Aggregation and thus complements and other elements of national power—that ance to address the access challenge of seeks to set conditions for the operational is, a whole-of-government and coalition projecting U.S. military power from the ideas of follow-on operations in the Joint approach—including diplomatic, infor- homeland into contested-entry opera- Concept for Entry Operations. Finally, mation, military, economic, financial, tions at overseas locations in all five realizing the value and necessity of being intelligence, and law enforcement should warfighting domains. able to sustain operations, JAM-GC also be well integrated with joint force The Capstone Concept for Joint complements and relies on the “globally operations. Operations sets the tone and the stage integrated logistics” envisioned in the for the family of joint operational con- Joint Concept for Logistics. Relationship to Other Concepts cepts. This concept describes potential The January 2012 Defense Strategic operational concepts through which Commitment to Implement Guidance states, “The United States the joint force of 2030 will defend the Substantial work to develop methods will continue to lead global efforts Nation against a wide range of secu- and capabilities to address the A2/ with capable allies and partners to rity challenges. JAM-GC builds on AD military problem set continues. assure access to and use of the global the established central JOAC idea of Through the further development commons . . . by maintaining relevant cross-domain synergy. But JAM-GC and transition and application of the and interoperable military capabilities.” operationally advances JOAC’s ideas with JAM-GC concept, the Services— One of 10 primary missions it identi- a more specific and detailed conceptual working with allies and partners— fies for U.S. forces is to “Project Power design. JAM-GC further builds on force remain committed to forging a closer Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial development and management activities and more resilient, networked, and 138 Joint Doctrine / Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 integrated force capable of establish- any of the ideas, initiatives, and efforts ing and maintaining freedom of action undertaken under JAM-GC will require New from and operational access whenever and realistic testing, evaluation, and validation wherever it is needed. These areas will before transition and application in the NDU Press require increased attention and focus for field. It will require unprecedented joint for the Center for the Study of operating and prevailing in the emerg- cooperation and learning. Chinese Military Affairs ing sophisticated, challenging—and Early returns on JAM-GC are promis- Strategic Forum 297 lethal—contested environments. ing. Actions taken in concert with the Will Technological Convergence JAM-GC will address a full spectrum transition and application of this concept Reverse Globalization? of integrated capabilities for A2/AD are already informing and guiding related By T.X. Hammes threats to include both nonmatériel nascent capability and force development Numerous and matériel solutions. JAM-GC seeks efforts by the Services. The concept trends are to identify capability gaps, provide in- supplies a unifying framework for col- slowing, and tegrated joint capabilities, and develop laboration among military departments may even be doctrine, organization, training, matériel, and Services to address the increasingly reversing, leadership and education, personnel, and sophisticated threats. Sustained and inte- globaliza- facilities solutions (with an emphasis on grated efforts by the Services to develop tion over the jointness.) The concept will not replace the capabilities envisioned with this con- next decade the Services’ unique programming, cept’s ideas can impose costs on potential or two. requirements, and acquisition processes, competitors, deter conflict, and enable Manufacturing and services are nor will it direct any specific funding continued U.S. and allied access to and trending toward local production. actions. It will be available to inform maneuver in the global commons while Technological and social develop- the Services’ budgeting processes and ensuring operational freedom of action. ments will accelerate these trends. provide a medium through which all The ability of the joint force to globally Voters in the United States and four Services can ideally collaborate to project U.S. military power in support Europe are increasingly angry over improve budgeting efficiencies. of national objectives will remain—as international trade. Authoritarian While JAM-GC addresses current and General Dunford affirmed—a “source of states, particularly China and anticipated A2/AD threats for the next strength.” JFQ Russia, are balkanizing the Internet decade and beyond, it does not specifi- to restrict access to information. cally endorse promising yet undeveloped Technological advances are raising future capabilities. Reliance on existing Notes the cost of overseas intervention systems and capabilities is paramount, but while deglobalization is reducing 1 if such advanced capabilities emerge and General Joseph Dunford, Jr., USMC, its incentives. This paper argues addresses at the annual Air Force Association can be fielded, they will make JAM-GC’s convention on September 21, 2016, and the that deglobalization would have approach more effective. Association of the United States Army on momentous security implications. October 5, 2016. Accordingly, deglobalization must Will JAM-GC Be Realized? 2 The Joint Operational Access Concept be monitored closely and if the The desired realization of the JAM-GC (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, trend continues, U.S. leaders will January 17, 2012), 1, defines theglobal com- concept will be a joint force—ready and mons as “areas of air, sea, space, and cyberspace need to consider restructuring or- trained—with interoperable land, naval, that belong to no one state.” The land domain ganizations, alliances, and national air, space, and cyber forces having the is not part of the global commons, since all security strategy. necessary capabilities to overcome and inhabitable land is possessed by some nation or defeat the increasingly sophisticated entity. 3 Weapons and methods used to counter threats that potential competitors are U.S. power projection, as well as challenge now fielding. Such a realization will access and maneuver, are collectively referred to in turn sustain the ability of the joint as antiaccess/area-denial capabilities. force to project military power wherever 4 The military warfighting domains are now and whenever needed to help counter generally considered to be land, air, maritime (to include subsurface), space, and cyberspace. aggression or hostile actions in the 5 The formal process used for the develop- global commons against U.S. and allied ment of all joint concepts is found in the Chair- interests. man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction The challenges are real; intensifying 3010.02E, Chairman’s Guidance for Develop- and proliferating A2/AD threats will re- ment and Implementation of Joint Concepts Visit the NDU Press Web site for (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 17, quire sustained and focused institutional more information on publications 2016). at ndupress.ndu.edu examination and attention. 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The Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University was tasked to answer these questions. The editors composed a volume that assesses the war and analyzes the costs, using the Institute’s considerable in-house talent and the dedication of the NDU Press team. The audience for this volume is senior officers, their staffs, and the students in joint professional military education courses—the future leaders of the Armed Forces. Other national security professionals should find it of great value as well. The volume begins with an introduction that addresses the difficulty of learning strategic lessons and a preview of the major lessons identified in the study. It then moves on to an analysis of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq from their initiation to the onset of the U.S. Surges. The study then turns to the Surges themselves as tests of assessment and adaptation. The next part focuses on decision- making, implementation, and unity of effort. The volume then turns to the all-important issue of raising and mentoring indigenous security forces, the basis for the U.S. exit strategy in both campaigns. Capping the study is a chapter on legal issues that range from detention to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. The final chapter analyzes costs and benefits, dissects decisionmaking in both campaigns, and summarizes the lessons encountered. Supporting the volume are three annexes: one on the human and financial costs of the Long War and two detailed timelines for histories of Afghanistan and Iraq and the U.S. campaigns in those countries. The lessons encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq at the strategic level inform our understanding of national security decisionmaking, intelligence, the character of contemporary conflict, and unity of effort and command. They stand alongside the lessons of other wars and remind future senior offi- cers that those who fail to learn from past mistakes are bound to repeat them. Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Books/LessonsEncountered.aspx JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE EIGHTY-FOUR, 1ST QUARTER 2017 Flickr Pinterest Facebook Twitter www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm You can also find us on: can also find You Visit us online at: http://ndupress.ndu.edu Visit JFQ is available online at the Joint Electronic Library: articles, occasional papers, books, and other publications. site is a great place to find information on new and upcomingsite is a great place to find information With 20,000 unique visitors each month, the NDU Press WebWith 20,000 unique visitors each month, JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Our understanding of the importance and keeping peace is of women in building Around and activists are the globe, policymakers empower women as working to National Defense University, Washington, DC National Defense University, Washington, informed by a wide range of experts, from diplomats to military officials and from human rights activists to development professionals.together The goal of this book is to bring these diverse voices. As leaders in every region of the world recognize, no country can reach its full potential without the participation of all its citizens. This book seeks to add to the chorus of voices working to ensure that women and girls take their rightful place in more prosperous world. safer, building a stronger, Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Books/WomenontheFrontlinesofPeaceandSecurity.aspx agents of peace and to help addressagents of peace and as survivors the challenges they face of conflict. When women are important in peace negotiations, they raise involved issues that might be otherwise When women are overlooked. educated and enabled to participate in every societies—from aspect of their growing the economy to strengthening the security sector—communities are more stable and less prone to conflict. Women on the Frontlines of Peace and Security of Peace on the Frontlines Women Foreword by Hillary Rodham Clinton and Leon Panetta NDU Press, 2015 • 218 pp. This book reflects President women’s Obama’s commitment to advancing Barack participation in preventing conflict and keeping peace. It is inspired by the countless the frontlineswomen and girls on a difference who make every day in their communities and societies by creating opportunities and building peace. Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff University Press by National Defense Have you checked out NDU Press online lately? Have you checked