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Us Priorities in the Middle East

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Us Priorities in the Middle East US PRIORITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST GENERAL (RET.) JOSEPH VOTEL DECEMBER 2019 POLICY PAPER 2019-23 CONTENTS * SUMMARY III * INTRODUCTION 1 * US INTERESTS 1 * STRATEGIC APPROACH 4 * AFGHANISTAN, SYRIA, IRAQ, LEBANON, 5 THE GULF & IRAN * CONCLUSION 8 SUMMARY Today the Middle East is as complex as it has ever been. All of the underlying issues that have undermined progress remain present: sectarianism, corruption, disenfranchisement, economic disparity, terrorism, and extraordinary human suffering. But these long-standing issues are now being exacerbated by super-modern communication capabilities and a more youthful and anxious population that serve to amplify the challenges of the region. The region is on edge — and it is in fact a tinder box with few clear paths to stability or de-escalation. The best way forward is to relentlessly pursue clarity in our interests and objectives. This is the best thing we can do to de-escalate tensions, pursue our interests in the region, and support our overall global national security strategy. Cover photo: US military vehicles, part of a joint convoy with the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), patrol near the town of Al-Muabbadah in Hasakeh Province in northeastern Syria on the border with Turkey, on Nov. 9, 2019. (Photo by DELIL SOULEIMAN/AFP via Getty Images) Above photo: A US military Chinook helicopter lands on a field outside the governor’s palace during a visit by the commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General Scott Mill- er, and Asadullah Khalid, acting minister of defense of Afghanistan, in Maidan Shar, capital of Wardak Province. (Photo by THOMAS WATKINS/AFP via Getty Images) My main takeaway is that the best path INTRODUCTION to stability is to relentlessly pursue clarity in our interests and objectives. Today the Middle East is as complex as I believe this is the best thing we can it has ever been. All of the underlying do to de-escalate tensions, pursue our issues that have undermined progress interests in the region, and support our remain present: sectarianism, corruption, overall global national security strategy. disenfranchisement, economic disparity, terrorism, and extraordinary human US INTERESTS suffering. But these long-standing issues are now being exacerbated by super- First and foremost, as a priority I think we modern communication capabilities and have to review, renew, and more clearly a more youthful and anxious population articulate our interests and priorities in that serve to amplify the challenges of this region. Only then can we begin to the region. devise an effective regional strategy Add to this new conflict (as we see that can be integrated with our national between Turkey and the Kurds in interests around the globe and can be Syria); increasing instances of civil effectively implemented by those who unrest against corrupt and ineffective do our bidding on a day-to-day basis. governments (as we are seeing in When people ask me why we care Lebanon and Iraq); increasing instances about this area, I usually try to discuss of Iranian-sponsored proxy war across our interests in five ways: the region (as we see in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq); great power competition 1. Ensure countries, areas, and (between China, Russia, and the U.S.); populations in the region can’t be unresolved conflicts in Syria, Yemen, used as platforms for attacks against and Afghanistan; and fatigue on the part our homeland, our citizens, or those of many of the countries (including ours) of our friends and allies. that have been engaged in this region 2. Prevent proliferation of weapons of for a long time. The region is on edge mass destruction. — and it is in fact a tinder box with few clear paths to stability or de-escalation. 3. Deter and contain adversarial influence and activities that further I will start by discussing one big destabilize the region and prevent overarching idea and then get more them from spilling out and affecting specific about several of the ongoing our interests in other regions. operations and events that we are currently observing in this vitally 4. Protect freedom of navigation and important area. flow of commerce through the region. 1 5. Maintain a favorable balance of these interests, and the fifth — proliferation influence that supports our long-term — triggered a significant, lengthy, and national interests. largely unprecedented diplomatic effort. This list of interests in the region has not Interests, and their priority and vitalness, changed significantly for some time, and I ought to be a significant factor in a future do acknowledge that an argument can be strategic vision for this region. For the made about the “vitalness” of each of them. purposes of discussion and argument, I will With the possible exception of proliferation, consider the interests mentioned above I would agree that these interests are not to fall into the category of important but currently “existential” to the survival of the not vital interests, meaning that our very United States, but that does not mean they survival is currently not at risk. aren’t important. Failing to preserve any In the past few decades our strategic one of them would only make things more approach to this region has been defined complicated and complex, and potentially by preserving access to vital resources, put our citizens at greater risk. containing Iraqi aggression, countering That said, we cannot ignore that over the last Iran’s revolutionary approach, or by our several years we have responded militarily concern for terrorism that emanates from and diplomatically in some manner to four of the region and ends up on our doorstep or the doorsteps of our close partners. A partial view of Baghdad is reflected in the visor of a US Army helicopter crew member as he looks out of a Chinook flying to Baghdad International Airport. (Photo by ANDREW CABALLERO-REYNOLDS/AFP via Getty Images) 2 The USS Abraham Lincoln, the HMS Defender, and the USS Farragut transit the Strait of Hormuz on Nov. 19, 2019. (Photo by Zachary Pearson - U.S. Navy via Getty Images) All four of these remain important, but in Many of our relationships and alliances my view none of them should dominate were built around this fact. I think this our overall approach to the region. Our “principle” is still valid today. priority should be focused on preserving This is not new in our approaches to an overall favorable balance of power in the region. I often remind people that the region when compared to other great my first roommate at West Point came power competitors or would-be regional to the Academy from Tehran American hegemons. High School. His father was our defense As the U.S. Special Operations Command attaché. This level of balance on both (SOCOM) and later the U.S. Central sides of the Arabian Gulf helped us — Command (CENTCOM) commander, I was until it didn’t. Up until that time we didn’t supported by a cadre of excellent policy have large deployments of troops in the advisors (POLADs). One of the things they region. We didn’t need them; our balanced often reminded me of was the foreign relationships on each side maintained a policy “principle” (as they referred to it) that relative level of stability that served our allowing any single power to dominate this interests. part of the world would be detrimental to our overall national security objectives. 3 I am also not suggesting that we orchestrate our partners and with our combatant some sort of near-term “kumbaya” moment commands to support theater campaign with the Iranians. I don’t think this is plans. particularly wise or even achievable right • To compliment this, we must make our now. support conditional on commitments to military professionalism and sustained STRATEGIC self-reliance. We should use our APPROACH considerable experience in coalition war-fighting to help our partners in What it does mean is that the United States the region achieve a better level of should pursue an overall strategic approach integration and unity of effort among that makes or keeps us (depending on your themselves. view) the preferred partner in the region: morally, diplomatically, economically, and • We should triple the amount of money militarily. Being the preferred partner will we spend on International Military allow us an opportunity to preserve our Education and Training (IMET). This is The USS Abraham Lincoln, the HMS Defender, and the USS Farragut transit the Strait of Hormuz on Nov. 19, 2019. important interests in this region while at a certain way to create a generation of (Photo by Zachary Pearson - U.S. Navy via Getty Images) the same time shifting the necessary focus regional leaders and their families who to address vital national interests that are have an appreciation for our country. essential to our survival — like maintaining During my last year in CENTCOM, we our competitive edge against China. spent just under $19 million on this program. In the big picture it is not that And it can be done in a sustainable manner. expensive, but what we get from it is Doing this will require that we also pursue invaluable. We get officers that study some very specific actions that help to in our schools and families that live in solidify our influence. These could include our communities. If you don’t think this the following: matters, look at the most supportive and • A re-look at our security cooperation progressive defense chiefs across the arrangements, both in terms of region — overwhelmingly many have organization and in execution of our spent time in our schools. Their families military funding and sales programs. have had the experience of living in Our efforts must be backed up with Leavenworth, Carlisle, Montgomery, an emphasis on responsiveness, Newport, and here in Washington and professionalism, and self-reliance.
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