Campaigning The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College
Featured Essays
Globally Integrated Countering Threat Operations: Transforming Networks: A Standard Lines the JTF Core of Effort Model
U.S. Needs to “Get Smart” Transregional Capstone vs Russia Exercise Trains for Tomorrow’s Fight
“That All May Labor As One”
Fall 2017 Campaigning
Fall 2017
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=69 http://jfsc.ndu.edu/
Commandant RDML Jeffrey Ruth, USN
Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs Dr. Amie Lonas
Director, Joint Advanced Director, Joint and Combined Warfighting School Warfighting School CAPT Miguel Peko, USN CAPT Paul Crump, USN
Director, Joint Command, Director, Joint Continuing Control and Information and Distance Education Operations School School COL Rolf Watts, USA COL Ernest Parker, USA
Editor
Dr. Daniel H. McCauley
Editorial Board: Assistant Professor William S. Marlowe Dr. Kenneth P. Pisel Dr. Frederick R. Kienle
Cover image: JCWS Seminar 14 Students 17-04, 2017. Photo by Daniel McCauley.
Campaigning Fall 2017 i In this issue of Campaigning:
Editor’s Corner…………………………………………………………………………….iii Dr. Daniel H. McCauley
Features
Globally Integrated Operations: Transforming the JTF Core…………...………………1 Col Camille Nichols, COL Robert Paddock, LTC (P) Jasper Jeffers, and Lt Col Sean Monteiro
Countering Threat Networks: A Standard Lines of Effort Model……………………...13 Col Chris Goodyear, COL Brian Greata, LTC Timothy Payment, and Col Martin Wetterauer
U.S. Needs to “Get Smart” vs Russia.……………………………….……………………27 CDR David P. Wolynski, LTC John R. Cuva, Maj Ryan A. Reynolds, and MAJ Anthony P. Newman
Transregional Capstone Exercise Trains for Tomorrow’s Fight…….…………………37 LCDR William Buell, Maj Erin Dorrance, and MAJ Bob West
Commentary
Developing an Operational Approach for the Transition from War to Peace through Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Development: Understanding Critical Aspects of the Environment…………………………..……….46 Associate Professor Tom Snukis
Polarity Management in International Relations….……………………………………50 Dr. Daniel H. McCauley and Dr. Sadi Sadiyev
The Foresight Factor
Strategic Foresight Tools and the Russia National Security Strategy: US Policy Implications………………………………………………………………...……………..57 MAJ Kent E. Justice
Author Submission Guidelines…………………….………………………………….…73
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense.
Campaigning Fall 2017 ii Editor’s Corner
Welcome to the Fall 2017 edition of CDR David Wolynski, LTC John Cuva, Maj Campaigning. One of the desired outcomes Ryan Reynolds, and MAJ Anthony of the Joint Professional Military Education Newman provide our third featured essay, system is to develop Joint officers who can the “U.S. needs to ‘Get Smart’ vs Russia.” think creatively and adapt to change. This In this essay, the authors argue that Russia is edition of Campaigning presents seven re-emerging as a global actor and that their essays from students and faculty who think use of ‘smart power’ differs from the critically and strategically while applying traditional approach used by the U.S. and its joint warfighting principles at all levels of Western partners. The authors suggest that war. an adaptable and responsive integration of all of the U.S. instruments of national power The Features section begins with an essay is needed to successfully counter Russia’s by Col Camille Nichols, COL Robert strategic progress. Paddock, LTC (P) Jasper Jeffers, and Lt Col Sean Monteiro. Their essay, “Globally Our final featured essay is “Transregional Integrated Operations: Transforming the JTF Capstone Exercise Trains for Tomorrow’s Core,” posits that a globally integrated Joint Fight,” by LCDR William Buell, Maj Erin force is necessary to meet today’s global Dorrance, and MAJ Bob West. Building security challenges, but the DoD enterprise upon General Joseph Dunford’s priority of is not operationally optimized to do so. The improving the Joint force’s ability to authors suggest changes to doctrine, integrate joint capabilities in a transregional, organization, training and leadership to multidomain, and multifunctional fight, the create greater synergy for future globally authors propose institutionalizing a integrated operations. Transregional Capstone Exercise Program to do so. The authors support this thesis by The second featured essay, “Countering identifying basic exercise requirements, Threat Networks: A Standard Lines of Effort propose training objectives, and address Model,” by Col Chris Goodyear, COL Brian three potential challenges to exercise Greata, LTC Timothy Payment, and Col implementation. Martin Wetterauer proposes that understanding networked adversaries and This edition’s Commentary section presents countering threat networks is becoming an two essays for your consideration. The first increasingly challenging problem for Joint essay, “Developing an Operational force commanders. The authors identify Approach for the Transition from War to generally accepted means to understand Peace through Stabilization, Reconstruction, these threats along with the lines of effort and Development: Understanding Critical necessary to combat these challenges Aspects of the Environment,” by Tom successfully. Snukis, is the third in a series of four essays. This essay focuses on the challenges of
Campaigning Fall 2017 iii failed and failing states and the affect they Finally, in this edition’s Foresight Factor have on the U.S.’s ability to provide essay, MAJ Kent Justice applies foresight stabilization and reconstruction after armed tools in an assessment of Russia’s National intervention. Professor Snukis provides the Security Strategy. In this essay, “Strategic reader with a keen understanding of the Foresight Tools and the Russia National problem of failed and failing states and an Security Strategy: U.S. Policy Implication,” understanding of the forces within the he argues that using foresight tools can environment that must be understood and provide policy makers with a different managed. perspective with which to develop a national policy to counter Russian security interests Our final Commentary essay is by Dr. that run contrary to U.S. interests. After a Daniel H. McCauley and Dr. Sadi Sadyev detailed analysis, MAJ Kent provides the who apply the concept of polarity reader with a policy recommendation. management to the current international relations environment. Using historical and We hope you enjoy this edition of current examples of natural counter-poles, Campaigning. You can let me know what the authors identify the inherent dangers in a you think by emailing me at uni-polar environment. Given the lack of a [email protected]. natural counter-pole to the U.S. in the current strategic environment, the authors Daniel H. McCauley argue that the U.S. must act as if there is a Editor counter-pole to minimize the natural oppositional reaction to an unopposed hegemon.
Campaigning Fall 2017 iv Globally Integrated Operations: regional commands, operate as asymmetrical Transforming the JTF Core actors, and compete in multiple domains threatening to overwhelm US military war by fighting plans and resourcing. Chairman Col Camille Nichols, COL Robert Paddock, LTC (P) Dunford’s approach to managing such cross- Jasper Jeffers, and Lt Col Sean Monteiro cutting threats better “is improving the ability of the Defense Secretary to work with the wide swath of functional and regional “I personally don’t believe the current commanders, from Strategic and Cyber planning and organizational construct or Commands to Central and Northern and command and control are optimized for the Pacific Commands.”2 current fight,…What really is required is Chairman Dunford has identified global integration.” Gen Joseph Dunford, planning, organizational construct, and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 command and control as three areas in which the Joint Force is currently not optimized to 3 As Chairman Dunford asserts, the perform GIO. While application of GIO is a United States needs a Joint Force organized, Department of Defense undertaking that trained, equipped, and ready to execute affects departments, services, and combatant globally integrated operations (GIO) to meet commands, the scope of the discussion will the complex challenges of today and the focus on the joint task force (JTF). Focusing future. The ability of the globally postured on the JTF is key because this is the Joint Force to purposefully combine quickly organizational structure upon which the Joint with mission partners to integrate capabilities Force will aggregate to employ the range of fluidly across domains, echelons, geographic military operations across and within boundaries, and organizational affiliations geographic combatant commands (GCCs). currently is not operationally optimized. Dr. Daniel McCauley has pointed out Rapidly emerging, destabilizing phenomena that the current organizational structures of such as the effective rise of transregional the Joint Force are basically anachronisms of 4 violent extremists (for example, the Islamic the Cold War. The Joint Force is built to State in the Levant (ISIL)), regional deliberately mass forces and effects in order pandemics, and aggression by near peer to dominate the enemy. This construct carries actors are the “new normal.” Events like service expertise and inclinations. While the these will require the Joint Force to expertise strengthens the joint approach, effectively aggregate swiftly, reconfigure inclinations can provide detriments to fully amid operations, and disaggregate ready to realizing GIO. In order to optimize, Joint execute again. The world that the nation will Force providers and organizational face is fraught with transregional, multi- constructs require joint enhancements to dimensional, multi-domain threats. These equip the JTF with the resources and threats will increasingly cut across the
Campaigning Fall 2017 1 capabilities to operationalize GIO to meet the Baghdad. USCENTCOM designated United complex problems of an uncertain world. States Army Central Command (ARCENT) This essay provides a brief case study as a joint force land component command of the challenges in organizational formation (JFLCC) to engage in operations. As the of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) operations proved to require a more thorough JTF highlighting areas where the Joint Force joint approach, USCENTCOM chose can focus GIO optimization efforts. From ARCENT to form the core of a combined there, a framework is presented that consists joint task force (CJTF), designated as CJTF- of critical components that future GIO OIR.5 The threat of destabilization posed by optimized JTFs can adopt. Next, the requisite ISIL provides a pertinent and contemporary training and organization is examined to example of a situation requiring GIO. OIR, integrate and synchronize the GIO optimized and the challenges experienced in standing Joint Force with other national instruments of up a CJTF in this dynamic and evolving power required to enhance unity of effort. operational environment, provide valuable Finally, insight is provided into preparing and insight into where to focus efforts to optimize sustaining a GIO optimized Joint Force. JTF’s for GIO. These revelations will provide an initial Prior to the rotation of the initial pathway for the Joint Force to enhance the CJTF-OIR command structure, the Center for GIO concept to present the national Army Lessons Learned (CALL) conducted command authority an optimized military as an initial impressions report. The hard an instrument of national power to engage the lessons observed during the creation of transregional, multi-dimensional, multi- CJTF-OIR serve as considerations for domain challenges of the 21st century. creating JTF cores that can effectively aggregate and execute GIO from the outset. JTF Considerations: OIR Challenges Chief among the lessons from CALL are JTF manning, interagency interoperability, and In June 2014, emboldened by multinational partnership considerations. growing sectarian discord, ISIL emerged Manning presented a clear challenge from the eastern deserts of Syria and began to CJTF-OIR as it attempted to stand-up amid an expansion into Iraq. ISIL swiftly and the roiling crisis. CALL noted that it was effectively captured Mosul, pressing three months after CJTF-OIR’s October 2014 southward virtually unimpeded into the establishment before it received intelligence, remaining Sunni territories coming within a targeting, fires, information operations, civil stone’s throw of Baghdad. In order to prevent affairs planning, and cyber operations subject the fall of the Iraqi capital, the national matter experts.6 This occurred because command authority (NCA) authorized ARCENT did not understand the training United States Central Command support and qualifications required to take on (USCENTCOM) to deploy an assessment the full authorities and responsibilities of a team, and to conduct air strikes, to defend CJTF. Manning analysis is a seemingly
Campaigning Fall 2017 2 simple undertaking in benign conditions, but optimized for GIO will need to account for a daunting undertaking when conducting institutional and information enterprise operations while under force management interoperability requirements. level constraints. CALL also observed that These examples are a few lessons that ARCENT allowed Service habits to influence future JTFs can consider in optimizing for CJTF manning.7 Taking an approach GIO. The Joint Force and future JTF informed by only one way of doing business commanders are wise to prepare for friction further exacerbated the delay in CJTF-OIR points. As the DoD continues to evolve the obtaining the personnel necessary to Joint Force to better build JTF cores, it must maximize its mission. Dynamic situations also develop an approach to meet the requiring GIO are not going to allow for pre- challenges upon which GIO is designed. ordained JTF manning packages nor will the There is a current functioning example of an resource constrained environment allow for interagency and coalition integrated JTF with standing JTFs. Service headquarters elements global operational responsibilities that can that provide the core of a JTF must begin the offer a potential roadmap: the United States manning capability analysis well prior to Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). receipt of mission. It is important to place emphasis on capabilities required and the Benchmarking for GIO Success approach to using them. At the outset of operations, CJTF- USSOCOM, through its theater OIR did not adequately address interagency special operations commands, provides a and multi-national interoperability. The model for the implementation of GIO conditions that allowed for the rise of ISIL optimized to engage the transregional, multi- primarily point to areas of governance as dimensional, multi-domain threats. The shortfalls. A fact proven by the nine lines of previous USSOCOM commander, General effort (LOE), seven of which fall under the Joseph Votel, highlighted the ongoing global capabilities resident in the Department of responsibilities of USSOCOM in his posture State.8 CALL discerned that CJTF-OIR statement to Congress in March 2016. “Our command structure lacked unity of effort.9 actions in support of the GCCs include such This resulted in duplication and friction mission sets as: enhancing partner amongst the various organizations tasked capabilities, coordinating counter-terrorism with conducting missions under OIR (CT) planning and operations, supporting the auspices. Another hindrance on unity of capabilities of our interagency partners, and effort was the ability to share information developing critical relationships with key within CJTF-OIR and across its partners. influencers”11 CALL observed that OIR participants had The description of USSOCOM’s trouble sharing information due to differing global responsibilities is remarkably similar Service information enterprises and multi- to the vision of GIO as described by national partner classification levels.10 JTFs Chairman Dunford, “We need to make sure
Campaigning Fall 2017 3 in the context of transregional, multi-domain, GEN Votel, “Our mission, as I pointed out multifunctional conflicts that we have the last year, is to synchronize the planning of right command-and-control construct in special operations and provide SOF to place to integrate joint capabilities and support persistent, networked, and support rapid decision-making by national distributed Geographic Combatant command authorities.”12 USSOCOM Command (GCC) operations to protect and maintains persistent capabilities and advance our nation’s interests.”13 personnel in more than 80 countries. These The ‘relationship network’ is not a capabilities remain in the environment on a specific USSOCOM description, but refers to constant basis to generate understanding, the effort and focus on nurturing and faster relationships, and reduce reaction time. investing in key allied and partner nation These elements support the regional or individuals and institutions. USSOCOM has geographic combatant commander, but are consistently increased the number of foreign simultaneously integrated into USSOCOM’s liaisons to its headquarters facility in Tampa, global network of US and International increasing the total number of contributing Special Operations Forces (SOF). This partner nations to 17 over the last two years. connection permits collaboration across Each USSOCOM element in the more than geographic, functional, and bureaucratic 80 countries where SOF deploys is in part a boundaries that do not routinely occur in the liaison node and views the maintenance and regionally focused combatant commands. investment in host nation partners essential. There are a number of unique aspects GEN Votel describes this during his posture of SOF that cannot be replicated in the statement, “…we are continuing to build general purpose force – in fact, two of the relationships with international and domestic ‘SOF Truths’ are that “SOF cannot be mass partners through sustained security produced” and that “Quality is more cooperation, expanded communication important than Quantity.” The quantity and architectures, and liaison activities.”14 types of capabilities required to address the USSOCOM has strengthened the transregional threats exceed both the mass relationships and connections that provide production and quality maxims of SOF. the foundation for this network to enable However, there are key fundamentals in more regular communication and USSOCOM’s global approach that do collaboration. The number of participating transcend the SOF core mission sets and are nations is just a measure of performance. The scalable to all Joint Forces. proven ability during many crisis operations USSOCOM uses three critical for SOF elements to lead general purpose components to execute GIO: the relationship force elements into unfamiliar environments network, the information technology leveraging their relationships and networks, network, and persistent forward presence. as in Mali in 2013 and returning to Iraq in These underlying principles are prominent in 2014, is the key measure of effectiveness. the USSOCOM mission, and reinforced by Despite the importance of the relationships,
Campaigning Fall 2017 4 the ability to effectively communicate USSOCOM maintains a competitive information to the right decision maker is advantage. “Another critical effort is our SOF even more important, especially if that Information Environment, which supports decision maker is on the other side of the our need for better situational awareness, globe. collaboration, decision-making, and The information technology (IT) synchronization under complex conditions. network is perhaps the most underestimated While these technologies are important, we and overlooked element leading to the believe humans are more important than successful integration of global operations. hardware.”16 The right relationships and the SOF operates and manages its own IT right communication tools are enabled by the networks. This permits a level of access, final focus. In order to truly understand the control, and ability to adapt that does not environment, you must be in the exist on larger DoD systems. The most environment. critical difference in the way SOF approaches GEN Votel comments, “In all of these the IT network is that they do not differentiate examples, which cover just a segment of our between the tactical and strategic networks. activities, SOF plays a key role by working In SOF, there is one network that is used by with a range of partners on complex and both elements in CONUS performing demanding problem sets. Even in those garrison and training functions, and elements situations where SOF are in the lead for in forward persistent presence locations. small-footprint, high-risk missions, we are Deploying conventional forces bring their fully integrated with, and fully dependent own tactical network that is unique to that upon, our conventional force.”17 USSOCOM unit, and it does not integrate well with the executes this using a mix of rotational forces global strategic network. Merely shifting the and permanent assignments, and is principle approach of the Joint Force to a comfortable operating with very small single, interoperable network, would pay footprints in remote locations. This concept tremendous dividends to effecting GIO. GEN of employment allows for greatly increased Votel describes the importance of the understanding of the environment and for principle of side-by-side systems in his increased ability for indications and warning, posture statement, “Our facility provides our which reduces risk to time and distance international partners access to their own considerations when key military advice or national classified communication systems capabilities are required. while placing them in a single collaborative Securing additional basing space, side-by-side with their US agreements could be exceptionally difficult, counterparts.”15 While the principle of side- but there may be an opportunity to look at by-side systems seems intuitive, it is not the expanding the use of commercial Afloat norm. The rapid movement of information Forward Staging Base (AFSB) platforms and transregionally is so important that GEN increasing, within the Army specifically, a Votel invested resources to ensure that set of forward rotational exercises and
Campaigning Fall 2017 5 deployments to give the Joint Force a more forward presence (Figure 1). The commercial One of the critical shortfalls in the company Maersk has already looked at the current organization of the JTF for executing concept of converting a commercial ship to GIO is the lack of an element dedicated to an AFSB, with projected costs of 60-75% maximizing the synergy with the other three less than newly built ships and Navy components of the Joint, Interagency, platforms.18 Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment. While current doctrine governing JTF operations highlights the necessity of coordinating in the JIIM environment in order to facilitate unity of effort, achieve common objectives, and provide common understanding, organizationally, JTFs only account for the Joint, leaving the Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational elements to be worked out later.20 Without these elements present, a JTF commander will be hindered in meeting the requirement identified by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, that forces be globally postured and able to Figure 1. Rendering of converted commercial move quickly across traditional boundaries.21 19 vessel AFSB As Dr. Dan McCauley correctly points out, GIO requires leaders who are experts in These three key focus areas: operating in the JIIM environment.22 persistent presence, the relationship network However, these leaders cannot be created and the information technology network, are overnight, nor can they create effective JIIM key scalable elements that are proven in the teams without preparation and training. This USSOCOM model for GIO. However, while integration of JIIM efforts into the JTF must USSOCOM provides the Department of begin even before planning for the JTF Defense an example of a functional commences in order to ensure trust and command with global operational effectiveness within the JIIM team. responsibilities, other agencies and However, current doctrine falls woefully departments must be integrated with the joint short in proposing how to do this. force to truly achieve globally integrated While virtually every element of GIO operations. would benefit from the inclusion of JIIM experts into the JTF construct, there are three Realizing Effective GIO Partnerships GIO elements in which such inclusion is
Campaigning Fall 2017 6 absolutely essential – global agility, In comparison, JIIM coordination partnering, and being increasingly was handled better outside of Iraq. The discriminate to minimize unintended CENTCOM leadership, utilizing the consequences. To obtain Global Agility, the expertise of its foreign area officers (FAOs) U.S. must be able to posture when and where in the J5 and in the Embassies throughout the in the world it needs to. Getting the AOR, developed a relatively effective key permissions for access, basing, and overflight leader engagement strategy with the regional (ABO) requires experts who have developed partners and the interagency in Washington, relationships with the State Department and which facilitated the rapid building of the the host nation. Another element of GIO, anti-ISIL coalition and permissions for ABO Partnering, clearly depends on having a JTF in the AOR.26 with experts who know how to build these partnerships. Having personnel on the JTF Recommendations staff with extensive knowledge of JIIM partners will also help the commander better Current Doctrine, Organization, understand both the friendly and operational Training and Leadership (the DOTL of environments and avoid making missteps DOTMLPF) do not adequately address the which have unintended consequences. need to include JIIM when considering and Synchronizing the military element of power creating a JTF to execute GIO. Changes in with the other aspects of national power – this area could ensure much greater synergy diplomacy, economics, and information is an between DoD and its JIIM partners in future implied element of GIO and in this regard, GIO. The doctrine for JIIM coordination having a built-in JIIM expert is critical. found in Joint Publication 3-08, Perhaps because the military was Interorganizational Cooperation, states that a such a dominant player during the nearly nine whole of government approach is required to years of Operation Iraqi Freedom, military achieve unity of effort in any joint leaders were slow to develop a structure in operation.27 While the doctrine ties Iraq in 2014 to optimize integration with the operational success to the integration and other elements of national power, resulting in harmonization of military and civilian a lack of understanding of the environment efforts, it is more suggestive than directive. and a lack of unity of effort, according to As currently written, it is likely to lead to ad CALL.23 This was most visible in the hoc organizations in which no relations or unsynchronized efforts to build the capacity trust have developed prior to the crisis. To of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) after they mitigate this, doctrine should be changed to had been routed in Anbar and Nineveh require DoD to reach out to interagency Provinces.24 The CALL report went so far as partners and try to create JIIM teams focused to call the State Department – DoD on a particular issue (such as Iraq, Korea, relationship “divisive.”25 pandemics, WMD proliferation, etc.) who correspond regularly and meet periodically
Campaigning Fall 2017 7 so that relations and trust are already in place environment, and can work with the host if a crisis develops. However, without nation to maximize the effectiveness of JIIM direction from the NSC, or Congress efforts and the coordination of the national rewriting laws, these organizations will instruments of power. Because JIIM continue to be ad hoc. For there to be a lasting coordination is such a critical part of the JTF solution, Congress would have to direct a effort in GIO, this JIACG leader must be part Goldwater-Nichols-like law that forced of the Commander’s primary staff with members of the interagency, whose leaders regular and direct access to the commander to were members of the NSC, to send be both an advisor and a “translator” between representatives from their respective the different cultures that exist within the agencies to the JTF and reward them JIIM team. appropriately for taking these assignments. The JTF’s JIIM team will be much Creating JIIM organizations would more effective if they train together before require buy-in from the National Security there is a crisis. Planning and war gaming Council and the other JIIM members. While possible scenarios for their region or issue of DoD cannot force these partners to agree to interest would help to build mutual create these contingency JIIM organizations, understanding and trust. These efforts should it can take steps to address the shortfall in its culminate with annual exercises. The State own doctrine regarding JTF organizations. Department’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI) Currently, Geographic Combatant regularly runs crisis management exercises Commands (GCC) have Joint Interagency for Embassies. For GIO to be effective, the Coordination Groups (JIACG) that facilitate GCC J7 and FSI should develop exercises to interagency coordination at the GCC level, build JIIM synchronization. but there is no such requirement at the JTF Maximizing the effectiveness of JIIM level. Doctrine should require DoD to reach in GIO will also require a greater investment out to its interagency partners and try to in the assessment and training of FAOs. create a JIACG as soon as there is an Because most FAOs do not reach full indication that a JTF will be stood up. While effectiveness until they have multiple JIIM more difficult, the GCC Commander should tours under their belt, this cannot be done also help the JTF commander get quickly or cheaply. However, the relative representation from key multinational cost of training a single FAO who can then partners to join the JTF. The GCC should maximize the effective synergy of the designate a senior FAO to lead the JTF’s interagency, intergovernmental and JIACG, who can facilitate organizing and multinational partners in comparison to the ensure the effectiveness of JIIM activities. cost of large scale military formations, which Through multiple tours, a senior FAO has the could make situations worse, is bearable. experience working with JIIM partners, Currently, the services pay lip service to the knows how a country team works, can help need for JIIM expertise, but they do not the Commander better understand the
Campaigning Fall 2017 8 assess or promote an adequate number of extremely demanding logistically. As FAOs to fill the growing demand. warfighters change how they fight, logistics Without identifying FAOs organizations also need to be transformed. specifically, the traits McCauley discusses as GIO is unattainable without a strong logistics required for Joint Force Leaders in GIO system. GIO calls for joint forces to be spread already exist in the FAO community and, widely across the world, often in relatively often, the Special Forces community. small units conducting a wide assortment of McCauley highlights the need not just to missions with different support requirements, understand the culture of the other JIIM ranging from humanitarian members, but also one’s own culture in order assistance/disaster relief missions to major to fully comprehend the different context combat operations. For example, one military each partner has when viewing a situation.28 command could have five units operating in The environment these leaders must operate five different areas utilizing five different in will often be complex, ill-defined and lines of communications. Logistic multi-cultural, requiring a leader who is organizations must provide an enduring adaptive and innovative.29 To deal with these organizational structure built on situations, McCauley proposes three responsiveness and flexibility to support competencies for leaders of GIO. First, they GIO. must understand current and future The Joint Logistics Enterprise conditions that make strategic sense. Second, recommends the concept of globally they must understand global trends and integrated logistics (GIL) as an answer to implications to the U.S. and other global and support GIO in this environment of local actors. Third, they must strive to see demanding requirements with severe fiscal information that is contrary to the strategy or constraints. The Joint Concept for Logistics trends.30 To be able to do this, the JTF leader defines GIL as “the capability to allocate and must have advisors in the staff who adjudicate logistics support on a global scale understand the JIIM environment. to optimize effectiveness and responsiveness, and to reconcile competing demands for Sustaining GIO limited logistics resources based on strategic priorities.” 31 If implemented, GIL could As the Department of Defense improve the ability of the joint force to executes GIO, the Department must also rapidly aggregate, reconfigure, and determine how the implementation of this disaggregate anywhere in the world; enhance concept will be sustained. The ability of the the ability to accurately collect and analyze joint force elements to purposefully combine logistic information; improve the ability to quickly with each other and their mission rapidly move forces, supplies, and partners in order to integrate capabilities equipment; and leverage operational contract fluidly across domains, echelons, geographic support. These few enhancements of the boundaries, and organizational affiliations is
Campaigning Fall 2017 9 logistics force should provide GIO future should be utilized to train leaders to adapt to success. a diverse set of circumstances and become Not only does GIO need to be experts in a range of different mission (i.e., sustained by restructuring the joint logistics combat, humanitarian assistance and disaster force, the Department of Defense must also relief) types. In addition, this education and look at sustaining GIO through changes in training must include other government and joint leadership, education and training. non-government organizations. “Joint Force global leaders must be adaptive, innovative, and critical thinkers capable of Conclusion operating in complex, ill-defined, and multicultural environments as demanded by The Joint Force faces a world of the globally integrated operations concept.”32 continuing challenges and these challenges In order to sustain GIO critical leadership present themselves in real-time with global competencies, the GIO concept must be connections. The Joint Force must evolve, institutionalized into Service and Joint retaining the fundamental principles of joint education and training programs. operations, while shedding the bureaucratic The Department of Defense must vestiges of a bygone era that prevent rapid grow leaders that are adaptive, innovative, global connection, coordination, and and critical thinkers. Therefore, military employment. The core of this new approach education must incorporate the GIO concept will be the JTF. JTFs are the key to at the lowest (i.e., military academies, employing the Joint Force in GIO against Reserve Officer Training Corps) to the transregional, multi-dimensional, multi- highest (i.e., PINNACLE, CAPSTONE, domain threats. How we organize, build, and KEYSTONE) levels of military schools. sustain these JTFs will determine their Leader education must also include advanced ultimate success. studies at civilian colleges and universities. USSOCOM provides a successful This education must provide a baseline model for the evolution of the Joint Force for understanding of the GIO enterprise that GIO, and also illuminates focus areas that can leaders can leverage in tactical, operational, lead to true effectiveness for JTFs: persistent and strategic assignments. When training forward presence, the relationship network, leaders for the future it is imperative that the and the information technology network. As training replicates the future globally we build JTFs, to optimize the chances for integrated operations environment as fully as success in GIO, the JTF must be able to possible. It is imperative that the training is coordinate with JIIM partners and leverage realistic, challenging leaders’ knowledge, their strengths. This requires that JIIM skills, and critical thinking in situations as expertise be built into the JTF structure and close as possible to the conditions of future training from the beginning. Finally, not only operations. Combatant Command exercises, does a change need to occur in the operational functional training and combat training construct to support GIO, the Joint Force
Campaigning Fall 2017 10 needs to consider making significant changes Accounting from North Carolina A & T State University in 1993 and an MS in Business in the logistics, education, and training Administration (Leadership) from Central Michigan environment in order to sustain the GIO University in 2008. Prior to her current assignment, concept. The logistics community has Col Nichols served as Commander, Defense Contract Management Agency Korea, Daegu, South Korea. developed the GIL concept to complement GIO. In addition, our education and training Colonel Robert Paddock, USA, is currently serving must restructure to grow the adaptive, as the Chief of the Security Cooperation Division in the J5 of U.S. Central Command. He was innovative, and critical thinking leaders commissioned through the United States Army required for the future. Reserve Officer Training program in 1989. COL Paddock earned a BA in History from the College of There are no simple solutions for the the Holy Cross in 1989, a MA in Arab Studies from transregional, multi-dimensional, multi- Georgetown University in 2002, and a MA in domain threats, but there are simple choices Administration and Strategic Studies from Muta’a University in Jordan in 2013. Prior to his current we can control as we organize to address assignment, COL Paddock served as the Senior these threats. Defense Official / Defense Attaché in Jordan.
Lieutenant Colonel Jasper Jeffers, USA, is currently serving as a staff officer at the Joint Special Operations Author Biographies: Command at Fort Bragg, NC. He was commissioned through ROTC at Virginia Tech in 1996, earning a BS Colonel Camille Nichols, USAF, is currently serving in Political Science. Prior to his current assignment, as Director, Program Integration, Joint Contingency LTC Jeffers served in various command and staff Acquisitions Support Office, Defense Logistics positions within the special operations community. Agency, in Fort Belvoir, VA. She was commissioned through North Carolina A & T State University Detachment 605 in 1993. Col Nichols earned a BS in
1 Colin Clark, “CJCS Dunford Calls For Strategic 9 Ibid. 14. Shifts;’ At Peace Or At War Is Insufficient’”, 10 Ibid. 12, 21. Breaking Defense, September 21, 2016, accessed 11 US Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, October 15, 2016, Statement of General Joseph L. Votel, U.S. Army, http://breakingdefense.com/2016/09/cjcs-dunford- Commander, United States Special Operations calls-for-strategic-shifts-at-peace-or-at-war-is- Command, 114th Cong., 1st. Sess., March 8, 2016. insufficient/. 12 Jim Garamone, “Dunford: Command, Control 2 Ibid. 3 Must 'Keep Pace' in 21st Century,” Defense Media Ibid. Activity, January 4, 2016, accessed October 28, 2016, 4 Dan McCauley. “Globally Integrated Operations: A http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/639844 Reflection of Environmental Complexity”, Joint /dunford-command-control-must-keep-pace-in-21st- Force Quarterly 71 (2013): 64, accessed November 7, century 2016, http://dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-71.pdf. 13 US Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, 5 ARCENT Transition to Combined Joint Task Force Statement of General Joseph L. Votel, U.S. Army, – Operation Inherent Resolve: Lessons and Best Commander, United States Special Operations Practices, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Command, 114th Cong., 1st. Sess., March 8, 2016. Lessons Learned (CALL), March 2016), 1, 14 Ibid. http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/ 15 Ibid. 16-10.pdf. 16 6 Ibid. Ibid. 7, 8. 17 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8. 18“Maersk Line Limited, Success Stories, Working 8 ARCENT, 11. with US Military”, modified 2016,
Campaigning Fall 2017 11 28 Dan McCauley. “Developing Joint Force Leaders http://www.maersklinelimited.com/working-with- for Globally Integrated Operations,” Small Wars mll/success-stories/ Journal, January 29, 2013, 3-4. 19 Kyle Mizokami, “A Quick and Cheap Power 29 Ibid. 3. Projection Alternative for Japan,” Japan Security 30 Ibid. 5. Watch: New Pacific Institute, January 26, 2012, 31Joint Concept for Logistics. September 25, 2015. accessed October 25, 2016. 32 Dan McCauley. "Developing Joint Force Leaders http://jsw.newpacificinstitute.org/?p=9830 for Globally Integrated Operations." Small Wars 20 Joint Publication 3-08: Interorganizational Journal, January 29, 2013. Coordination during Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 June 2011), ix. 21 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 September 2012), iii. 22 Dan McCauley. “Developing Joint Force Leaders for Globally Integrated Operations,” Small Wars Journal, (January 29, 2013), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/developing-joint- force-leaders-for-globally-integrated-operations, 1. 23 ARCENT, 14, 32. 24 Ibid. 17. 25 Ibid. 11. 26 The Army, Marine Corps, and Navy refer to their regional/interagency specialists as FAOs. The Air Force calls its specialists Regional Affairs Specialists (RAS). For this essay, FAO refers to this specialty in all services. 27 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interorganizational Cooperation. Joint Publication 3-08. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 12, 2016, xiii.
Campaigning Fall 2017 12 Countering Threat Networks: A official doctrine to guide joint force Standard Lines of Effort Model commanders and their staffs as they formulate plans to oppose these most by challenging problems. JP 3-25 provides a number of operational level considerations, Col Chris Goodyear, COL Brian Greata, including the importance of interagency LTC Timothy Payment, and Col Martin Wetterauer integration, planning to counter threat networks, and assessing progress towards Understanding networked adversaries victory against threat networks. It also covers and countering threat networks (CTN) is an the finer details of CTN activities, such as increasingly common challenge for joint fundamentals and best practices for analyzing force commanders. This challenge is likely network structure, counter threat finance, to grow as asymmetric approaches and CTN in a maritime domain, identity hybrid warfare become standard for those intelligence activities, and exploitation to adversaries who are weaker and search for support CTN. However, doctrine provides legitimacy in achieving their objectives. The very few specifics for a commander or staff implications for commanders is that they considering how to develop an operational must be armed with a generally accepted approach, and specifically what lines of effort means to understand these threats and (LOEs) best achieve operational and strategic prepare plans to thwart them. end states against threat networks. Finally, This network phenomenon is not JP 3-25 only briefly considers CTN outside entirely new to U.S. and allied military of conflict zones, where the full range of forces, as joint force commanders have friendly military actions will usually be confronted terrorist networks in Afghanistan, severely restricted. Iraq, and around the world before and since JP 3-25 is deliberately broad, and, in 9/11. U.S. Southern Command has been fact, is a very good document for exposing fighting criminal threat networks for over 20 personnel to concepts and orienting thought years through Joint Interagency Task Force- against these complex threats. This essay South (JIATF-S). Insurgent threat networks attempts to refine the guidance found in JP 3- are an even older phenomenon—as old as 25 by proposing a methodology to employ JP nation-states and those who have sought to 3-25 doctrine through recommended lines of overthrow them. These are all valid examples effort to counter threat networks. of threat networks; however, a critical, Specifically, we intend to prove the following relatively recent development is the thesis: In an Outside Declared Theater of convergence of criminal, insurgent, and/or Active Armed Conflict (ODTAAC) 2 terrorist capabilities into hybrid networks that environment, a whole of government solution leverage their respective strengths to create a leading to a judicial (i.e., rule of law) end synergistic threat effect.1 state is best achieved through lines of effort With the release of Joint Publication aligned with threat network functions. In (JP) 3-25, Countering Threat Networks, on examining this thesis, we will attempt to 21 December 2016, the joint force now has
Campaigning Fall 2017 13 define an optimal end state and supporting narcotics trafficking, this became a raison operational conditions, and consider potential d’etre. 8 Likewise, the ability of criminal lines of effort that align along the PMESII networks to utilize established trafficking (Political, Military, Economic, Social, routes to wittingly or unwittingly move Information , and Infrastructure Systems) 3, terrorists and/or weapons of mass destruction DIMEFIL (Diplomatic, Information, constitutes a serious threat. Finally, Military, Economic, Finance, Intelligence, Hezbollah uses the drug trade and other illicit and Law Enforcement)4, and Threat Network activities around the world to fund terrorist Function models.5 Ultimately, we attempt to activities in the Levant.9 identify a template with the optimal lines of These kinds of threats, and the effort along which to carry out military environments in which they operate, operations, actions, and activities that naturally drive friendly networks towards contribute directly to, or support, whole-of-government solutions due to the achievement of objectives to counter threat complexity of the problem and the networks. requirement for a comprehensive approach.10 To combat threats such as these, the U.S. Background Government has undergone a significant increase in interagency cooperation since Threat networks are not new. They 9/11. 11 The use of Title 10 forces under a have always existed in various forms, Title 50 lead and authority is one area in activities, and degrees of power. They are, particular that has been utilized to leverage per JP 3-25, those networks whose size, the strengths of participating agencies to a scope, or capabilities threaten US interests.6 greater overall effect. 12 Likewise, detailing Common types of threat networks are Title 10 personnel to other Federal agencies terrorist, criminal, and insurgent networks.7 for a specific mission or purpose is another Criminal networks can include narcotics, way DoD can contribute to an other-than- human trafficking and human smuggling (to military effect. include the movement of special interest These efforts are commendable, but aliens), and weapons smuggling (potentially they are niche efforts, usually isolated in including weapons of mass destruction, nature, and limited in achieving the overall WMD) amongst other illicit activities. The end state. They don’t constitute a relatively recent convergence of these kinds comprehensive approach, or provide a “best of threat networks is what poses an practice” for lines of effort that a joint force increasingly significant threat to U.S. commander could use to organize operations interests. We have already seen the merging to counter threat networks. of all three in the Fuerzas Armadas This is particularly true when Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in considering the differences between a Colombia. What began as an insurgent conflict zone and an ODTAAC environment. movement gradually adopted terrorist tactics, Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF- and then after funding themselves through S), which conducts detection and monitoring
Campaigning Fall 2017 14 missions to combat illicit trafficking and is Security Investigations (HSI) agent is not an widely considered an example of successful instrument of diplomatic, military, economic, interagency action, is still largely focused on or informational power but the authorities one kind of commodity (narcotics) of one and potential effect that HSI can bring to bear type of threat network (criminal) and does not against transregional actors is significant. function cross-domain (it is almost entirely Likewise, the financial effects that the U.S. limited to the Air and Maritime domains).13 Department of the Treasury can apply to While its function concentrates on network threat network finances presents a disruption through evidentiary seizures and considerable threat to a network’s resources. criminal prosecution, it is limited by charter The DIMEFIL construct better captures the from leveraging all elements of national full range of instruments of national power. power to achieve a comprehensive approach This construct first appeared in the National and strategy. However, one thing is clear Military Strategic Plan for the War on from the JIATF-S example, and that is the Terrorism in 2006 and, although not official fact that a judicial end state is the de facto doctrine, does serve to address an expanded “approved solution” for the Western view of applicable national capabilities.15 Hemisphere (WHEM) when combatting This concurrent de-emphasis of threat networks. military power and expanded consideration The WHEM is not alone in this of other instruments of national power has respect, and serves as a good example of an resulted in a preference within ODTAAC ODTAAC environment. In this environment, environments for what is commonly referred the Military element of national power is de- to as a “judicial end state” for threat emphasized, creating greater reliance on the networks. But why should a judicial end state remaining diplomatic, economic, and be desirable over any other? Is this just a information instruments. This is political ploy, an effort to make US activities representative of any ODTAAC area, more palatable? While there is value in considered diplomatic or “Title 22” reinforcing the rule of law during CTN environments. Although the military is used activities, there are also some good reasons to great effect in these theaters, it is usually why a judicial end state is desirable outside through soft power and influence, and not of a conflict zone. kinetic strikes as used in theaters of conflict. First, there is the question of jus ad The DIME construct, however, bellum, or the theory of just war. If a non- ignores some very powerful instruments of state actor happens to reside within a national power that are utilized not only in the particular state that is friendly to the U.S., U.S. Southern Command AOR, but around what exactly is the right of the U.S. to the world. These include law enforcement, conduct military operations against that intelligence, and financial entities that can adversary? If we conduct clandestine warfare achieve effects against threat networks and across regional and country boundaries, our which don’t easily fall into one of the actions no longer fit the status quo of justified “DIME” bins. 14 For example, a Homeland use of force based on the law of armed
Campaigning Fall 2017 15 conflict and theaters of armed conflict. 16 network, and thereafter achieve complete Second, there is ambiguity regarding what dismantlement. On the other hand, other law level of violence rises above criminality to enforcement entities are tasked with that of armed conflict. Without clear disruption of criminal activities and are quick definitions of what constitutes a significant to move against threat network activities in enough threat to warrant military action, a order to disrupt imminent threats. Therefore, law enforcement solution is preferred. 17 “judicial end state” implies a wide range of Third, we should consider the impacts to law enforcement and judicial/prosecutorial accepted norms of proportionality in an activities that achieve the desired end state ODTAAC environment. Current rules and reinforce the rule of law within regarding proportionality arose from ODTAAC environments. conflicts in which civilians were deemed a If we accept that the judicial end state part of the enemy, and could share in the is preferred in an ODTAAC environment, hardships of war. 18 In an environment in then we must be concerned about how to which the threat network hides amongst design an operation to achieve it. civilians who may have no allegiance or even Operational design is “the conception and awareness of the threat network, a construction of the framework that underpins reassessment of the legal framework a campaign or major operation plan and its governing hostilities may be in order. 19 subsequent execution.” 21 It results in the Ignoring this consideration, and the potential operational approach, “which broadly for collateral damage, risks alienating the describes the actions the joint force needs to indigenous population and US legitimacy. take to reach the desired state.”22 Some of For these reasons and others, there is a the components of an operational approach current of thought that emphasizes limiting or (particularly specific contributing factors or abandoning the use of military detention, intermediate military objectives) cannot, and limiting the use of lethal force, and a should not, be determined until faced with an preference for criminal prosecution over actual problem and development of a proper military detention. 20 This effectively understanding of the environment, the constitutes the judicial end state. precise threat networks and their capabilities, This, like any policy or generally and friendly network. accepted norm, is bound to run into Notwithstanding this, the lines of occasional conflicts. For example, within law effort for CTN within an ODTAAC enforcement, one such source of tension is environment should be relatively stable and between disruption and dismantlement. applicable regardless of the specific Investigative entities are tasked, and are environment or threat network. naturally inclined due to the nature of their Threat networks are formed at the work, to lean towards caution when confluence of a catalyst, a receptive considering disruption activities. They audience, and an accommodating generally prefer to delay disruption in order environment. The removal of any or all of to gain greater knowledge of an entire these is necessary to eliminate the threat that
Campaigning Fall 2017 16 any network poses, and to achieve an End state #3 – Unaccommodating acceptable end state. Therefore any Environment. The environment is articulation of an end state should at a inhospitable to the organization and activities minimum reflect a satisfactory achievement of the threat network. (In an ODTAAC of effects against these three conditions (See environment, law enforcement activities are Figure 1):23 critical to achieve this.) The accomplishment of these three
end states constitutes success vis-à-vis End state #1 – No Catalyst. The catalyst for establishment of the threat countering a threat network. A joint force network is eliminated or sufficiently commander may add to these to meet a addressed to reduce the perceived need to peculiar additional environmental condition assemble or take action. that they have been tasked to resolve, but End state #2 – No Receptive cannot take away if they want to address the Audience. Potential threat network audiences threat network completely. have more to gain by not participating, are In order to reach the end state, certain not motivated to participate, or do not have operational conditions must be achieved. In the means to conduct actions that address the the case of countering threat networks, it is catalyst. possible to backwards plan conditions that support the end states listed previously, and
Campaigning Fall 2017 17 that are applicable to any kind of threat factors (potentially along with network. The following conditions must be others) that fall along lines of met; each is listed with the end state(s) that it effort to achieve this will support (see Figure 2). condition. - Friendly network narrative or option - Effective governance presents a safer seen as more legitimate and less risky environment and greater economic than threat network practices or opportunities than a threat network. ideologies (End states 1, 2, 3). (2, 3) o In order to achieve this condition, the risks associated To achieve this condition, a with the threat network comprehensive approach will assist host outweigh the benefit or profit; nation development of available economic threat ideologies are seen as opportunities; promote effective and bankrupt; a narrative alternate equitable governance including the rule of to the threat network is law; and establish a safe and secure developed and accepted; and environment through successful detention the threat network, its and prosecution of threat network members. objectives, and its actions are seen as illegitimate. These may constitute intermediate
Campaigning Fall 2017 18 - Threat network operations, threat networks. The following description of intelligence, and sustainment models and analysis intend to provide a broad degraded. (3) answer for future application. o To achieve this condition, Description joint forces should consider degradation of threat network This paper considers three potential freedom of movement; LOE models –the DIMEFIL, PMESII, and disruption of their ability to Threat Network Function models. Before gather intelligence or examining these models there are a few notes resources; and disruption of on considerations that should be common to threat network operations, any LOE model adopted by the joint force actions, and activities commander. Any solution will have to take (OAAs). into consideration conflicting priorities and determine a method for resolving such The emphasis on the rule of law, the conflicts. The Unity of Effort Framework establishment of a safe and secure Solution Guide provides a useful tool to environment, successful prosecution, and guide operational-level planning and disruption of threat activities all are areas development of conflict resolution where law enforcement and judicial procedures between departments/agencies.24 processes will contribute heavily. The likely One area in particular that will have “judicial end state” desired given current to be taken into account during planning is policy and common practice, as well as the tension and balance required between the compelling reasons given an ODTAAC desire (and sometimes requirement) to environment, is reflected in a number of these disrupt imminent threats versus the desire, conditions. particularly among investigative and The precise actions that will fall along intelligence entities, to leave certain threats in these lines of effort are too specific to be place in order to facilitate a longer-term considered in this paper, and instead must be dismantlement of a network. Clear triggers developed and refined once confronted by a and acceptable levels of risk must be specific threat network scenario. These can identified to guide this decision making. 25 subsequently be tailored and scaled based on All three pillars of “network engagement” analysis of the peculiarities of the specific must be considered when developing specific environment and threat network. actions along whatever LOE construct is The key question that remains is how adopted. That is, while countering the threat a joint force commander should select lines network, the whole-of-government must also of effort that will support achievement of a partner with the friendly network and engage judicial end state, articulate an appropriate with the neutral network. 26 Finally, a DOD role in a whole-of-government comprehensive approach should always be solution, and provide an ideal application of pursued and incorporated. Other military instruments of national power to counter partners, the Interagency, partner nations,
Campaigning Fall 2017 19 intergovernmental and nongovernmental environment considered, and the desire for a partners, and the capabilities they all bring to law enforcement oriented approach. In this bear should be incorporated when and where model, lines of effort are aligned directly
they are willing and able in order to achieve with (and are named for) each of the seven a comprehensive approach. DIMEFIL instruments of power. DOD has its The first Line of Effort model own Military LOE, and can support each of considered is Friendly Network oriented; the the other LOEs to varying degrees. DIMEFIL construct (see Figure 3). The second LOE model considered, a DIMEFIL consists of Diplomatic, Threat Network oriented model, was PMESII Information, Military, Economic, Financial, (political, military, economic, social, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement information, and infrastructure). This is a instruments of friendly national power. systems-based model intended to define the DIME is well established, but as discussed structures of an adversary through previously in the Background, the additional examination of the PMESII characteristics of FIL instruments are appropriate given the the state. 27 This can be applied towards nature of the threat, the ODTAAC threat networks that exhibit these
Campaigning Fall 2017 20 characteristics, and instruments of friendly against threat intelligence, propaganda, and power can be applied against each of the strategic communications (either to build threat PMESII systems. As with the their legitimacy or tear down that of the friendly network).
DIMEFIL example, lines of effort are aligned The Operations LOE includes actions with and named for each of the six systems. against training, drug manufacturing, (See Figure 4.) operational elements, weapons The final LOE model has a mixed manufacturing, C2/leadership, and Threat Network and Friendly Network clandestine network components. The orientation. In this model, three Threat Sustainment/Logistics LOE includes Network Functions (Information, potential actions against threat finance; Operations, and Sustainment / Logistics) are recruiting; transport of drugs, weapons, supplemented with the addition of a Host people, etc.; and other logistical capabilities. Nation (HN) Development LOE. The Threat The addition of the Host Nation Network Functions are derived from various Development LOE provides sufficient functions identified in JP 3-25, and attention on the Friendly Network for a generalized to fit any type of threat network. comprehensive approach toward The Information LOE can include actions development tasks which support conditions
Campaigning Fall 2017 21 that can meet the desired end states. (See state”, and 3) Alignment with end state Figure 5.) conditions.
Analysis and Discussion First Criterion. Our previous In developing criteria to evaluate the discussion of threat networks showed that proposed LOE models, we considered first CTN naturally requires a whole-of- the thesis and what criteria would lead us to government solution due to the complexities an optimal model for CTN in an ODTAAC and multifaceted underlying problems that environment. Based on this analysis, we give rise to threat networks. Therefore, the selected the following criteria: 1) The first criterion is: Maximization of whole-of- maximization of whole-of-government government coordination (all instruments of coordination and a comprehensive approach, national power) and a comprehensive 2) Applicability to the ODTAAC approach. At first glance it would appear the environment and a desired “judicial end DIMEFIL model is preferred because it captures in dedicated lines of effort a broad
Campaigning Fall 2017 22 range of instruments of national power. In successful prosecution and other law reality, this is counterproductive because in enforcement activities. Therefore, our next building lines of effort along narrow roles, criterion is: Applicability to the ODTAAC agencies may become myopic in focusing environment and a desired “judicial end only upon “their” line of effort, and tend to state.” PMESII provided no apparent ignore how they might contribute to the other advantage in the ODTAAC / judicial end lines of effort. This can lead to stove-piping state environment. DIMEFIL dedicates an of thought and action, and the comprehensive entire LOE to law enforcement activities, approach will suffer as a result. 28 This is which have a clear tie to the judicial end state. considered in Joint Publication 5-0, which The Financial LOE in DIMEFIL includes even goes so far as to recommend against this Counter Threat Finance activities, which approach.29 would also support law enforcement and PMESII is threat- and result-oriented, prosecution. Threat Network Functions which should drive greater collaboration avoids a specific LOE for law enforcement, amongst instruments of power to arrive at instead intending that each instrument should better coordinated activities along the LOEs. integrate activities within each LOE. This is However, it doesn’t completely eliminate the slightly more difficult in that it requires a potential organizational “lane” problem, in concerted effort to coordinate, much as with that the Military LOE remains and may drive the first criterion. military contributions unnecessarily along a Third Criterion. Any line of effort sole line of effort. The Threat Network model should naturally align with end state Function model doesn’t establish these conditions, not crosscut across most or all of organizational lanes, and instead encourages them. In this way, there should be an cross-cutting application of the instruments alignment between cause and effect. of national power across all the lines of effort Therefore the final criterion is: Alignment (See Figure 5). A potential disadvantage of with end state conditions. DIMEFIL fares the this model is that this requires a significant worst against this criterion, precisely because effort to coordinate in order to integrate, de- DIMEFIL are the “means” for carrying out conflict, and synchronize interagency lines of effort, and LOEs are the “ways”. As contributions. But on balance, this process such, the DIMEFIL instruments should be will result in more deeply analyzed and applied across all lines of effort. As a result, coordinated results. For this reason, the DIMEFIL is not a good model for Threat Network Functions model is demonstrating a flow from lines of effort, to preferable under this criterion. conditions, to end state. While the DIMEFIL Second Criterion. Considering the elements will certainly support achievement ODTAAC environment and the desire to of conditions and end states, they do not align reinforce the rule of law, we determined that or “flow” towards the end states. This an operational approach and associated lines became painfully obvious when creating a of effort should lead a joint force commander diagram of operational approaches, creating toward a framework which supports a spider web of contributions from every
Campaigning Fall 2017 23 LOE to each operational condition (see condition; the Information LOE aligns with Figure 3). the Legitimacy and Threat
PMESII aligns somewhat better with Ops/Intel/Sustainment conditions, and the the conditions in that there’s an exact Host Nation Development and Information alignment between the Social LOE and the LOEs align with the Good governance / Legitimacy condition, and the Infrastructure economic opportunities condition. This is LOE and the Good governance/economic overall a much cleaner, straightforward opportunities condition. (See Figure 4.) Two alignment than the other two LOE models LOEs (Political and Economic) support two offer. conditions. Only two LOEs contribute to all After considering these criteria, the three conditions – the Military and Threat Network Functions model is the best Information LOEs. (There is some overlap in model identified for lines of effort that lead these two LOEs, as potential military to end state achievement. The other two information support operations exhibit models simply had deeper flaws when characteristics of both). The Threat Network compared against the evaluation criteria. The Functions model also aligns with the problem with the PMESII model is that it’s identified conditions and end states. The based on a tool designed to analyze an Operations and Sustainment/Logistics LOEs adversary and its “system of systems” in align well with the Threat Network order to identify critical capabilities,
Campaigning Fall 2017 24 requirements, and vulnerabilities for center what conditions constitute acceptable end of gravity analysis – not to themselves state(s), and how to achieve them. Likewise, become lines of effort. DIMEFIL is usually a joint force commander may face a scenario considered the “means” of achieving in which countering a threat network is not operational and strategic objectives, and the only challenge. This is very likely in the making them lines of effort (i.e., the “ways”) real world. Besides the threat network, there is potentially problematic and should be probably will be other environmental carefully considered during planning. conditions that force a hybrid approach to DIMEFIL should cut across all LOEs, not developing end states, conditions, and lines define LOEs. Its potential for stove-piping of effort. In that case, the recommendation along organizational/authority lines makes we make in this paper will serve as a base this model less than ideal. While DIMEFIL from which to develop a more complex, arguably dedicates an entire LOE to a core tailored operational approach to address other interest – that of the primacy of law challenges within the OE. enforcement and rule of law – the Threat Based on current policy and practice, Network Functions model better aligns with as well as conformance with the various conditions and end states, and if properly criteria identified in this document, implemented will foster better whole-of- organizing elements of national power along government solutions including support to the Threat Network Function lines of effort achieving a judicial end state. will best serve a joint force commander searching for an effective approach to Conclusion counter threat networks.
In an ODTAAC environment, a Authors Biographies
whole of government solution leading to a Colonel Christopher Goodyear, USAF. Col judicial end state is best achieved through Goodyear is currently serving as a United States adopting lines of effort aligned with Threat Special Operations Command liaison officer to the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Special Network Functions of Intelligence, Operations Division. He was commissioned through Operations, and Sustainment/Logistics, ROTC at The Citadel in 1995. Col Goodyear earned together with Host Nation Development. a BA in English Literature from The Citadel in 1995 and an MA in Education from Touro University in Our analysis shows that when 2007. Prior to his current assignment, Col Goodyear confronted by a threat network, adopting served as the commander of the 58th Operations Support Squadron, Kirtland AFB, NM. lines of effort that conform with Threat Network Functions is advantageous as a Colonel Brian Greata, USA. COL Greata is currently standardized template for developing serving as an operations officer in Special Operations Command South. He was commissioned through the operational design. (See Figure 6.) United States Military Academy (USMA) in 1994. There will always be local conditions COL Greata earned a Bachelor of Science in Regional and factors that cause planners to reevaluate Geography from USMA in 1994 and a MBA with a concentration in International Business from the their understanding of the environment, University of Colorado, Colorado Springs in 2012. assessment and definition of the problem, Prior to his current assignment, COL Greata served as
Campaigning Fall 2017 25 the Garrison Commander of U.S. Army Garrison Natick. Col Martin Wetterauer III, USMC. Col Wetterauer was commissioned in 1992 after graduating from Lieutenant Colonel Tim Payment, USA. LTC Louisiana State University. Col Wetterauer just Payment is currently serving as the Secretary of the recently gave up Command of 8th Marine Regiment, General Staff in United States Army Europe. He 2d MARDIV. That tour included a deployment as the earned his undergraduate degree from Kentucky Commander of the SPMAGTF-CR-AF. Col Wesleyan College in 1997 and Masters from Webster Wetterauer is headed to Bahrain to serve as the Deputy in 2008. Prior to his current assignment, LTC Commander of 5th MEB. Payment commanded an Infantry Squadron in 2D Cavalry Regiment in Europe.
1. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 16. Robert M. Chesney, “Beyond the Publication 3-25, Countering Threat Networks Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism,” Michigan 2016), B1. Law Review 112, no. 163 (2013): 205-211. 2 ODTAAC does not appear in any official 17. Jennifer C. Daskal, “The Geography of establishing doctrine or policy documents. However, the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and it is in wide use as a term of art to refer to any region Targeting Outside the ‘Hot’ Conflict Zone,” or area outside of “hot” conflict zones. These regions University of Pennsylvania Law Review 151, no. 5 generally are marked by the predominance of the (2013): 1166. Department of State, little kinetic activity, and 18. Charles P. Trumbull IV, “Re-Thinking the cooperation with sovereign partners. Principle of Proportionality Outside of Hot 3. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Battlefields,” Virginia Journal of International Law Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington DC: 55, no. 3 (2015): 525. Government Printing Office, 2017), IV3. 19. Ibid, 526. 4. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20. Robert M. Chesney, “Beyond the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Terrorism (Washington DC: Government Printing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism,” Michigan Office, 2006), 6. Law Review 112, no. 163 (2013): 213-219. 5. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 21. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 3-25, IV3. Publication 5-0, Joint Operational Planning 6. Ibid, I1. (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 7. Ibid, III8. 2011), GL13 8. Ibid, B3-B6. 22. Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Forces 9. Ibid, B6. Staff College, Student Text 1, 6th Edition, The Joint 10. Ibid, I3. Staff Officer’s Guide (Norfolk: NDU Press, 2017): 3- 11. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 33. Publication 3-05, Special Operations (Washington 23. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), III-22-III- Publication 3-25, II2. 23. USSOCOM’s Interagency Partnership Program 24. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-7 Future Joint and Special Operations Support Teams are specific Force Development, Unity of Effort Framework examples of increased cooperation between DoD and Solution Guide [Washington DC: Government interagency partners since 9/11. Printing Office, 2013], 6. 12. Anthony J. Fontanella, “Bringing Out the 25. Ibid, 11. Small Guns: Title 50 Covert Operations As A 26. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Response to Unconventional Threats in the Modern Publication 3-25, I2. Era,” Connecticut Journal of International Law 31, 27. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint no. 115 (2015): 115. Publication 3-0, IV3. 13. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 28. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-25, V19 Publication 5-0, III28. 14. Ibid, I5. 29. Ibid. 15. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, 6.
Campaigning Fall 2017 26 U.S. needs to “Get Smart” vs between two types of power. Soft power Russia refers to those instruments of national power that entice or attract other countries to your by own country’s point of view or objectives.3 CDR David P. Wolynski, LTC John R. Cuva, There is no forcing mechanism with the use Maj Ryan A. Reynolds, and MAJ Anthony P. of soft power. Soft power can, however, be a Newman powerful instrument to promote national interests if it is skillfully used and focused As technology advancements have appropriately. Hard power, on the other hand, made the world appear smaller, the effects, or is the application of those instruments of ripples, of national and international actions national power that employ forcing have changed the global environment in mechanisms. Typically military or which we live and operate. These changes, economic4, these instruments compel or often rapid and sudden, are not always coerce other actors. apparent until assessed in combination with Nye further refined and introduced other, sometimes climactic, events. The the balance of soft and hard power as “smart actions of the Russian Federation power”.5 While most national actors use a specifically, considered by some to have been semblance of smart power, the Russian dormant for a time, are having a profound application manifests as somewhat unique. effect on the geopolitical landscape in ways Whether described as smart power or hybrid that challenge U.S. and Western partner warfare, several authors have attempted to interests. define or characterize Russian applications of Politically downplayed by both the national power. Royal Air Force Officer, U.S. and Germany, Russian actions have Andrew Chisholm, argues that Russia’s use been written off as regionally aligned and of smart power goes through several distinct comparatively childish.1 Whether these phases. These phases, once identified, can messages were true statements or verbal provide insight on Russian intentions and political fisticuffs, ignoring the indications objectives, especially during a crisis.6 that Russia as a re-emerging international Russia’s unique smart power strategy, actor is foolish. Russia is and has been using previously undefined and unacknowledged, its own brand of smart power differently from has resulted in a shift of regional and those of traditional Western powers and thus international power. has led some nations to assume the country’s Russia has a recent history of its own leadership is incapable of exercising such a brand of smart power focused on deception. strategy.2 Understanding how Russia uses This deception has caused Western powers to this strategy is critical and requires a whole miss opportunities to react. Referring to of government(s) approach that overcomes Russia, Chisholm states “A critical and existing barriers and obstacles and that is essential element of this smart power adaptive to meet future challenges. approach is the use of a deception strategy to Political scientist and the pioneer of minimize the Western reaction and create soft power theory, Joseph Nye, differentiates
Campaigning Fall 2017 27 time and space, albeit limited, to allow narrative of Ukraine being threatened by neo- coercive hard power to work.”7 Russia’s Nazis who seek to establish a fascist, anti- combined use of soft and hard power, Russian regime in Ukraine.11 This narrative intertwined with deception is apparent in plays deep into the Russian historical mindset recent history. since the greatest threat faced by Russia in In its conflict with Georgia in 2008, modern times was Hitler’s invasion of the Russia used a distinct smart power strategy. Soviet Union in World War II. Painting This military struggle began after a long Ukrainian forces as a straw man neo-Nazi period of tensions between the two countries threat enticed the Russian public to support over the sovereignty of several pro-Russian the military efforts both in Crimea and regions in Georgia. On the soft power side, eastern Ukraine. The straw man neo-Nazi Russian propaganda painted Georgian threat also played well with the ethnic President Mikheil Saakashvili as dangerously Russian population of Ukraine who generally unstable and, if successful in his ambitions, a mistrusted the Western regions, especially threat to the entire Caucasus region.8 Russia after the Orange Revolution in late 2004 also painted Saakashvili as a brutal dictator caused the fall of the pro-Russian who had taken draconian actions against the government in Kiev.12 indigenous Russian population in the pro- Russia also successfully used hard Russian regions in Georgia. Thus, Russian power tactics in Crimea in 2014 with the citizens were led to believe that military successful deployment of Russian military action against Saakashvili was morally forces to key bases across Crimea, creating a justified and necessary. Russia has also used fait accompli for either Ukrainian or possible the increasingly conservative and nationalist Western intervention.13 Ukraine would risk a Russian Orthodox Church as an instrument of broader war against Russia if it decided to soft power, both in Georgia and in the forcibly re-claim the Crimean bases and key broader region.9 The Russian government lines of communication that were quickly uses the Russian Orthodox Church’s seized by the Russian military. Additionally, religious rhetoric and authority to push back in the Donbas region, Russian military forces against Western ideas and governments. On provided direct support to Ukrainian rebel the hard power side, Russian military forces forces, allowing the rebels to seize key terrain invaded Georgia during the 2008 crisis and and defend against lopsided Ukrainian physically secured the breakaway regions of counter-offensives.14 Similar to Crimea and Abkhazia and South Ossetia.10 The Georgian Georgia, the Ukrainian government was government has had to accept the de-facto forced to accept the Donbas rebel gains loss of these areas to Russian control. otherwise it would risk a broader war with Another prominent example of Russia. Russia has also used other hard Russian smart power is Russia’s seizure of power instruments, such as cutting off natural Crimea and the eastern Donbas region of gas and raising tariffs of Ukrainian-produced Ukraine in 2014. On the soft power side, the goods to apply pressure on the Ukrainian Russian government promotes the false government.15
Campaigning Fall 2017 28 In Syria, Russia has used smart power condemned Assad’s use of chemical weapons to justify its military intervention and protect against civilians. Russia lost significant its Middle East interests. Russian soft power credibility when it claimed that Assad’s tactics tried to promote a narrative of the regime didn’t have chemical weapons and Syrian fight as a fight solely between the that the April 2017 attack was a result of legitimate government of Assad and Syrian rebel actions.18 “terrorists”.16 According to Russian and Despite these soft power setbacks, Syrian regime press releases, everyone that there are several reasons why Russia will was fighting the Assad regime were continue to use a smart power strategy in the classified as “terrorists”, and thus justified future. First, using smart power allows the use of Russian military retaliation. The Russia to effectively leverage its existing Russian government needed to sell the capabilities and expertise while minimizing narrative that the Syrian intervention was the risk and possible escalation that could justified, especially as the government faced come from using hard power exclusively. As an economic downturn and the prospect of recently assessed by the U.S. Intelligence Russian military casualties. On the hard Community, Russia has a strong soft power power aspect, the Russians successfully used capacity in many television, media, social their military to prevent Assad’s collapse and media, and cyber venues.19 In particular, reverse Syrian rebel gains. Additionally, Russia knows how to tailor its social media through military action, Russia has ensured a and cyber capabilities to exploit the inherent lead role in resolving the Syrian Crisis. This open information societies of the West. This will allow Russia to protect its interests in is a critical advantage, as Western Syria that primarily revolve around its warm democracies pride themselves on the free water naval base at Tartus. flow of information and capital that Russia Unfortunately for Russia, their soft cleverly exploits. In combination with this power efforts in Ukraine, Georgia, and most soft power approach, Russia will continue to recently Syria, have had little effect in the use its hard power capabilities in the future. broader international community. Russia has While it does not have a strong economic not expanded its list of friendly countries or instrument of power, it does have some populations beyond those who have levers, such as natural gas, which Western traditionally supported Russian or Soviet Europe relies on. Additionally, Russia actions. The one exception has been Russian continues to modernize its military despite its cultivation of hard-right, populist, social economic challenges. For nearly all the conservatives in several Western countries countries bordering on Russia, this military such as France and the U.S.17 These new capability represents a destabilizing and relationships, however, have yet to translate sometimes existential threat. into any pro-Russian policies in Western Another reason why Russia will countries. Additionally, Russian soft power continue to use a smart power strategy in the efforts in Syria suffered a serious blow when future is that this strategy has been effective worldwide audiences recognized and in achieving short-term Russian strategic
Campaigning Fall 2017 29 objectives.20 Russia has ensured the de-facto from the Center for European Policy sovereignty of Russian enclaves in Georgia, Analysis (CEPA) stated that, “In the United eastern Ukraine, and Syria all while States, some are calling for the reconstruction preventing a Western military response. of the US Information Agency, an institution While Russian actions have triggered abandoned after the end of the Cold War. economic sanctions by the West, they have Such a center could analyze Russian yet to reverse any of Russia’s territorial information warfare efforts; establish a gains. Given Putin’s objective of restoring framework for the integration of critical data Russia’s influence to the days of the Soviet into national strategy; develop, plan and Union,21 it is a reasonable prospect that synchronize a response across different Russia will not willingly give up any of these government bodies that would expose foreign acquisitions. information operations, and pro-actively Countering Russian use of smart advance fact-based narratives.”23 In addition, power requires a whole of government legislation with regards to the “Countering approach that overcomes existing barriers Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation and obstacles and that is adaptive to meet Act”, was introduced in the United States future challenges. It is important to Congress in the Spring of 2016 (initially recognize the existence of bureaucratic and entitled “Countering Information Warfare institutional barriers, along with cultural Act”), approved by the House of barriers, within the U.S. interagency in order Representatives and Senate in early to help us comprehend where the whole of December 2016, and signed into law by government approach is lacking in its President Obama on 23 December 2017; capacity to be both adaptive and agile in the thereby declaring the establishment of a pursuit of effectively countering the “Center for Information Analysis and conspicuous threat of Russia’s calculated and Response” in the near future. The intent of successful use of smart power. this center is to analyze and collect data on Barriers or obstacles create the efforts of foreign (Russian) government significant friction in contesting Russia’s information warfare and to expose and smart power. While serving as a professor at counter such (Russian) foreign information Harvard, social and political scientist Karl operations.24 The question is, when this Deutsch defined power both as “the ability to center is fully established, will this center prevail in conflict and to overcome encompass all of the necessary interagency obstacles” and as a “symbol of the ability to entities required for the performance of its change the distribution of results, and charter and will this center effectively particularly the results of people’s address Russia’s continuous propaganda behavior”.22 One barrier or obstacle when efforts? dealing with Russia has to do with the lack of Cultural barriers can certainly impede a centralized entity that analyzes information progressive efforts towards seeking peace and collectively works towards identifying a and stability between two opposing nations calculated response. An August 2016 report such as the U.S. and Russia. Svetlana Ter-
Campaigning Fall 2017 30 Minasova, a leading foreign language involve the explanation of decisions along specialist and teacher, said, “The better, with dealing with crisis, and if an event quicker and easier international occurs, and there is a lack of initial communication is becoming technically, the information provided, others will jump in to more irritating are the obstacles, namely, provide their own spin of the story; (2) linguistic and cultural barriers, undermining Strategic Communication, which focuses on the possibilities of communication among the development of simple themes; and (3) nations.”25 Although the U.S. and Russia do Development of lasting relationships with indeed have cultural and linguistic barriers key individuals over a long period of time that help undermine clear and effective which fosters credibility, especially during communication it is also important to note face-to-face engagements. Regardless of the that one side (Russia) is certainly benefiting institutional framework, cultivating the from reflexive control. Specializing in efficacy of U.S. government public contemporary Russian and Ukrainian history, diplomacy efforts in the field requires an political scientist Andreas Umland advanced degree of cultural understanding eloquently talks about the fact that the and awareness by American diplomatic political and military leaders of the West are officials.27 addressing short-lived threats whereby The whole of government approach Brussels and Washington are inadequately lacks in its capacity to be both adaptive and cautious and responding incompetently to agile in its pursuit of effectively countering prevailing new challenges in Eastern Europe. the conspicuous threat of Russia’s calculated This bears a causal relationship with regards and successful use of smart power. Retired to Russia’s aggressive posture towards the Senior Foreign Service Officer with the U.S. West. He goes on to say that the concrete Agency for International Development nature, risks, and final resolution of Russia’s (USAID), Dr. James Stephenson, emotionally antagonistic posture toward experienced firsthand the difficulties of NATO continues a Cold War stance. In lieu whole of government as the Mission Director of assessing Russia’s challenges and in Iraq. In his chapter entitled, “Whole of entertaining new options to respond, this is Government in Diplomacy and Development: serving (vice containing) Russia and Whole or Hole?, he touches on this important increases insecurity throughout Eastern aspect and hi perspective is worthy of Europe.26 consideration. He emphasizes the point that Some barriers to building cultural ambassadors are basically Chief Executive relationships could be a lack of daily Officers (CEOs) of multifaceted interagency communication, a lack of clear strategic missions, and that the military is ever more communication, and a lack of any engaged in stability operations that have development with regards to long lasting become mostly indistinguishable from relationships. This coincides with Joseph civilian reconstruction and stabilization Nyes’ three dimensions (or stages) of public efforts. A successful whole of government diplomacy: (1) Daily communications approach, should set out to streamline efforts
Campaigning Fall 2017 31 whereby agency representatives initially diplomatic, informational, military, and team up to serve the overall mission economic (DIME) “smart” power, originates objectives prior to deliberating on any as policy from the President in consultation individual agency interests. Stephenson goes with the National Security Council (NSC), is on to state that expanding civilian capacity detailed by the various executive and taking on a more broadening set of departments, and implemented by U.S. responsibilities for development, diplomacy ambassadors and executive department and most importantly, smart power representatives abroad. While the NSC and projection can in turn, provide collective the associated National Security Staff are a offsets regarding the continual strain on codified means of promoting U.S. military resources.28 Another point regarding government unity of effort for the application the need to counter Russia’s use of smart of national “smart” power in pursuit of power via a whole of government approach national interests, there are very few comes via the Christian Science Monitor's legislatively established mechanisms below Washington Editor, Peter Grier. He states this strategic-level organization that provide that both U.S. lawmakers and officials alike continued support through execution. The claim that countering Russia’s attacks will inevitable outcome is that, despite the require a comprehensive use of all levels of numerous formal and informal coordination national power whereby Cyber Defense and synchronization mechanisms that have makes up part of the calculation. Grier’s been implemented over the years, the various article emphasizes that the U.S. suffers from departments of the executive branch are shortfalls in the areas of defense, detection largely left to their own devices in and deterrence. The U.S. is deficient in using determining how they will align themselves two-factor authentication for computer in achieving national strategic goals. access, security within aging legacy systems, An exception to this assessment is and good network visibility to spot exemplified by the country team construct intrusions.29 employed at U.S. embassies and diplomatic Understanding that the U.S. faces missions around the world. These teams some fairly entrenched, systemic obstacles in represent, in effect, a microcosm of the efficiently and effectively bringing all executive branch. The ambassador, as the elements of its national smart power to bear President’s personal representative to the in preempting or countering Russian host nation, is the lead executive that competition, it would be beneficial to explore manages all the elements of national “smart” an approach that might be taken in power being applied in the host nation by overcoming some of those obstacles. One leveraging the support, expertise, and legal option, that will no doubt stimulate much rich authorities provided by the individual debate, is a national level realignment of the executive departments based on the national executive agencies that wield this power. interests associated with that country, and to Conceding that it may be an overly simplistic a certain extent, the geographic region to conceptualization, the application of U.S. which it belongs. The ambassador, though
Campaigning Fall 2017 32 always subject to Presidential direct always challenge the responsiveness and intervention, is vested with the executive adaptability of the NSC. Conversely, the authority to coordinate, synchronize, and country team can be responsive and adaptive align the whole-of-government application of in its application of power because, even U.S. “smart” power within the host nation. though its actions are aligned with global In the NSC and embassy country strategic end states, its focus is necessarily teams, the U.S. has well-established means narrow, constrained primarily to the host for the coordinated application of national nation with subordinate emphasis placed on “smart” power. The NSC provides this at the regional imperatives that lie outside its global/strategic level, while the ambassador authority. and country team do the same at the local, A proposed way ahead is the host nation level. In the former, the obstacles implementation of a regionally aligned of executive branch institutional and cultural organization that can approach the biases, along with bureaucratic friction, can responsiveness and adaptability of the be overcome, or at least mitigated by direct country team model but whose focus is on interaction between leadership at the highest coordinating and aligning the application of levels of government. In the latter, individual regional “smart” power in the pursuit of department and agency influence are global strategic goals. The executive subordinated to the ambassador’s singular departments have various regional structures Presidentially appointed authority, driving that seek to meet this objective to one degree unified direction and effort in the application or another. The most prominent examples of “smart” power. If the coordination of “smart” power application is occurring at the global and country levels, the question then becomes: what, if anything, is being done at the regional level? Its inherent and necessarily broad perspective will
Campaigning Fall 2017 33 being the Department of Defense (DOD) intermediate position between individual geographic combatant commands that are country ambassadors and the President, both stipulated in the Unified Command Plan, the ambassadors and the DIME Managers and the Department of State (DOS) derive their authority from the same source. geographic bureaus. However, the regional That being the case, it is imperative that both alignments captured in these two models do work closely with one another to ensure that not match and there is no formal mechanism regional and global strategic goals are not to drive unity of effort between them below jeopardized by too narrow a focus on host the level of their respective secretaries. The nation requirements, nor that individual associated resources of these existing country team efforts are derailed by regional organizations should be reorganized into a demands. new construct that merges departmental This proposal is not meant to be authorities and capabilities to achieve more definitive but rather a prompt for further effective and efficient DIME “smart” power discussion. One concern with the model is management. For simplicity, this new model that it continues a trend of “smart” power can be labeled as the “DIME Manager” application on a national rather than concept (see figure above). Similar to a multinational basis. It is certain that partner country ambassador, the DIME Manager is a nations, no matter how friendly, will rarely civilian Presidential appointee vetted and have national interests that are in exact approved by Congress that assumes alignment but the future points to an authority over the application of U.S. environment where “smart” power must be inclusive of partnership rather than exclusive “smart” power on a regional basis. The as unilateral action may dilute or even negate DIME Manager is supported by a staff of its potency. The DIME Manager model is senior executive department representatives supportive of this in that a single regional that provide the means, in terms of expertise, authority invites coordination for collective capabilities, and capacity that are necessary advantage. Second, while this proposal may to achieve the national security goals directed be a step in the right direction for improving by the President and the NSC. The specific the U.S. “smart” power game against Russia authorities that reside within the individual and other competitors, it does not directly departments are subordinated to the address the global challenges of executive authority of the DIME Manager; responsiveness as it focuses on improving this unity of authority allows for greater regional performance. The requirements for responsiveness and adaptability at the interregional coordination, though perhaps regional level. The regional DIME Managers somewhat streamlined, still remain leaving will work collaboratively with the NSC to action and reaction at the global level inform the development of national security somewhat wanting. One further weakness of strategy and policy end states and the DIME the DIME Manager proposal is the extent of Manager staffs will coordinate with the NSS the reorganizational efforts that will have to and executive departments on the ways in occur in the face of the aforementioned which those end states will be realized. While the DIME Managers cannot assume an
Campaigning Fall 2017 34 institutional and departmental cultural overseas tours with coalition partners. Notably, barriers as well as the historical inertia of the Commander Wolynski served with the United States Special Operations Command, Central and United current bureaucratic system. Nevertheless, States Naval Forces, Central supporting coalition the need for change to a more responsive and efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Commander adaptive approach seems apparent. Wolynski also recently served as the Defense It is safe to assume that cultural Intelligence Department Chair for the United States barriers are difficult to change, and some National Intelligence University in Washington D.C. Lieutenant Colonel John R. Cuva, United States would argue they are necessary to our current Army, is currently serving as the Director of Western values. Using this assumption, Personnel, Administration, and Support for the United institutional adaptation is necessary if the States Military Delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty international community is to understand the Organization (NATO). Lieutenant Colonel Cuva’s changing environment we live in. Russia is experience with coalition and joint partners includes assignments as the J1’s lead strategic planner for evolving and demonstrating an astute and United States European Command, multiple tours to effective model for the application of Iraq supporting United States Forces Iraq, and six national smart power. Her end states and months supporting Operation Joint Guardian in timeline for achievement are unclear as are Kosovo. the international community’s willingness Major Ryan A. Reynolds, United States Marine Corps, is currently serving as a Special Operations J5 and ability to challenge these methods and Planner for United States Special Operations objectives. Understanding the indicators and Command, Pacific in Honolulu, Hawaii. Major use of Russian smart power is critical and Reynolds’ experience includes multiple years serving requires institutional change at the regional with the Republic of Korea as a J5 Planner for Special and international level. An adaptable and Operations Command, Korea and deployed tours throughout the Pacific. Major Reynolds also has responsive integration and synchronization multiple tours deployed to Iraq supporting United of all aspects of national power is required if States Forces, Iraq. the U.S. and its partners are to successfully Major Anthony P. Newman, United States Army, is counter Russia’s strategic progress. currently serving as the J4, Director of Logistics, for the White House Communications Agency in Washington D.C. Major Newman’s experience Authors Biographies includes multiple tours to Afghanistan serving with International Security Assistance Force in Regional Commander David P. Wolynski, United States Commands, East and North. Major Newman also has Navy, is currently serving with the Nimitz Operational experience in the Pacific serving with coalition efforts Intelligence Center, in Washington D.C. Commander in the Republic of Korea, the Kingdom of Thailand, Wolynski’s experience includes multiple joint and and the Philippines.
1 Jonathan Adelman, "The Surprising Resurgence of 3 Joseph Nye, “Soft Power and Conflict Management Russia as a Great Power," The Huffington Post, in the Information Age,” in Turbulent Peace: The September 08, 2015, 1, accessed May 17, 2017, Challenges of Managing International Conflict, ed. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan- Chester A. Croker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela adelman/the-surprising-resurgence_b_8104486.html. Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 2 Andrew Chisolm, “Disrupt, Coerce, Legitimize, Peace Press 2006), 354. Attract: The Four Dimensions of Russian Smart 4 Ibid, 354. Power” (master’s thesis, National Defense 5 Joseph Nye, “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft University, 2017), 2. Power,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 88 No. 4 (July/August 2009): 160-163.
Campaigning Fall 2017 35 Techniques: A Report by CEPA’s Information 6 Chisholm, 39. Warfare Project in Partnership with the Legatum 7 Ibid, 23. Institute https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2690 8 No Author, “A Scripted War,” The Economist, August 2016 August 14, 2008, accessed May 15, 2017, 24 Fitsanakis, Joseph, US government to set up ‘anti- http://www.economist.com/node/11920992. propaganda center’ after Obama signs new law. 9 No Author, “Portrait of a Country,” The Economist, https://intelnews.org/tag/us-center-for-information- February 14, 2015, 73. analysis-and-response/ Intel News, 28 December 10 No Author, “A Scripted War,” The Economist, 2016 August 14, 2008, accessed May 15, 2017, 25 Svetlana Ter-Minasova, War and Peace of http://www.economist.com/node/11920992. Languages and Cultures?, 11 No Author, “Great Patriotic War, Again,” The http://web.uri.edu/iaics/files/04-Svetlana- Economist, May 2, 2015, 43. TerMinasova.pdf, (Moscow State University, 12 Ibid, 44. Intercultural Communication Studies XVII: February, 13 No Author, “What Russia Wants: From Cold War 2008), Ibid 52 to Hot War,” The Economist, February 14, 2015, 20. 26 Umland, Andreas, Why the West Misunderstands 14 Ibid, 21. Russia’s Challenge: Looking past the bluster and 15 Ibid, 19. hyperbole of Russia’s political leaders and business 16 Simon Sebag Montefiore, “Putin’s Imperial elites. https://www.theglobalist.com/west- Adventure in Syria,” The New York Times, October 9, misunderstands-the-russian-challenge/ The Globalist, 2015, A31. June 8, 2016. 17 No Author, “Russia’s Active Measures: The 27 Nye, Joseph S., Smart Power Needs Smart Public Motherland Calls,” The Economist, December 10, Diplomacy. 2016, 52. http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/smart- 18 Martin Chulov and Kareem Shaheen, “Syria power-needs-smart-public-diplomacy Harvard Chemical Weapons Attack Toll Rises to 70 as Kennedy School Analysis and Opinions - Daily Star, Russian Narrative is Dismissed,” The Guardian, February 15, 2010 April 5, 2017, accessed May 16, 2007, 28 Stephenson, James., Conflict Management and https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/04/syri “Whole of Government”: Useful tools for U.S. a-chemical-attack-idlib-province National Security Strategy?, 19 No Author, “What Russia Wants: From Cold War http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1102.pdf to Hot War,” The Economist, February 14, 2015, 22. Strategic Studies Institute Book, CH. 9, April 2012. 20 Ibid, 21. 29 Grier, Peter., Election meddling: When Russia 21 No Author, “Great Patriotic War, Again,” The returns, will the US be ready? Economist, May 2, 2015, 43-44. http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2017/0331/ 22 Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, The Analysis of Election-meddling-When-Russia-returns-will-the- International Relations, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: US-be-ready The Christian Science Monitor, March Prentice-Hall, 1978), Ibid, 23. 31, 2017. 23 Lucas, Edward and Pomeranzev, Peter, Defending and Ultimately Defeating Russia’s Disinformation
Campaigning Fall 2017 36 Transregional Capstone Exercise objectives, and address three potential Trains for Tomorrow’s Fight challenges to implementation.
by Transregional Threats and Response
LCDR William Buell, Maj Erin Dorrance, and MAJ Bob West Militaries must now operate in a complex and extraordinarily dynamic world Train the way you fight because you will where several multifaceted real-world threats fight the way you train. Just about every U.S. may exert a cumulative effect on the ever- military commander will tell you that they growing battlefield. Not only do state actors embrace this time-honored military mantra. such as Russia, China, and Iran have the In his first “From the Chairman” column for capability to conduct transregional JFQ, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff operations, but a variety of non-state actors (CJCS) Joseph Dunford described how he such as the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS), Al sees the current and future fight. Noting the Qaeda, and a multitude of transnational significant implications for how the Joint criminal organizations (TCOs) also threaten Force will fight he writes, “…it [is] probable to disrupt the international order across that future conflicts will most often be traditional combatant command boundaries. transregional and fought across multiple While globalization trends have connected domains and functions. Driven by this countries around the world, they have also assumption, one of my highest warfighting enabled threat networks and violent extremist priorities is to improve our ability to integrate organizations (VEOs) to operate on the joint capabilities in a transregional, global stage. In Admiral Kurt Tidd’s 2017 multidomain, and multifunctional fight.”1 posture statement for U.S. Southern To realize one of the Chairman’s Command, he states that some criminal highest warfighting priorities, the joint force networks in his area of responsibility (AOR) must institutionalize a Transregional are globally-integrated enterprises with profit Capstone Exercise Program (TCEP) margins that rival Fortune 500 companies. incorporating all geographic combatant These networks smuggle precursor chemicals commands (GCCs) and functional combatant and fentanyl from China into Central commands (FCCs). While the joint force has America and Mexico in order to make shown steady progress toward exercising in extremely potent heroin that causes overdose multiple domains and across multiple epidemics in the U.S. There are networks that functions within regional theaters, transport large cocaine shipments to the U.S., transregional exercising is virtually West Africa, Europe, and Australia, while nonexistent. This article will highlight the others make tremendous profits by illegally transregional threat that the exercise should mining gold in Guyana, Peru, and Colombia. address, delineate some basic exercise Other networks kidnap, money launder, and requirements, propose four training extort—all while moving illicit goods across the globe.2
Campaigning Fall 2017 37 The majority of combatant against the five key challenges. One commanders recently testified before transregional capstone exercise (TCE) per congress that they face some subset of five challenge: TCE-RUS, TCE-PRC, TCE-IRN, key challenges (Russia, China, Iran, North TCE-NK, and TCE-VEO, would allow Korea, and VEOs), commonly referred to as focused training and sufficient time for the “4+1”, in their geographic region or planning. Currently there are a handful of functional area.3 Speaking at the annual Air exercises that do, in fact, attempt to exercise Force Association conference in 2016, transregionally with more than one CCMD. Chairman Dunford observed that such threats In February of 2017, the three-week Austere increasingly operate across the regional Challenge exercise included four combatant combatant command structure.4 For commands: U.S. European Command, U.S. managing these threats he recommended Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, improving the ability of the Secretary of and U.S. Strategic Command.8 U.S. Defense to work across both geographic and European Command Commander, Gen. functional combatant commanders and Curtis M. Scaparrotti, described the exercise strengthening of the Joint Staff (JS).5 as a complete success stating that the exercise According to the JS J7, leadership validated these CCMDs’ ability to rapidly often discusses the benefits of cross- respond together with decisive and Combatant Command (CCMD) activities; overwhelming success in Europe and to however, the U.S. military has not fully enable other CCMDs.9 Austere Challenge is understood or addressed challenges in cross- a good initial step to transregional exercising; CCMD coordination. Specifically, how the however, there has never been a U.S. military Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) exercise that encompassed all GCCs and will establish authorities, responsibilities, FCCs working collaboratively against a truly and processes with required JS support global challenge. required for globally-integrated operations outlined in the Capstone Concept for Joint Exercise Program Requirements Operations (CCJO) has yet to be tested.6 The J7 clearly views reallocation processes for As part of the Joint Training Policy, critical resources such as munitions, the Chairman’s Exercise Program (CEP) is intelligence, support, strategic lift, and cyber designed to improve capability and the assets as limiting to mission success in a readiness of U.S. military forces to conduct global fight.7 No doubt there are many other joint operations through the conduct of challenges DoD has not considered that a regularly-scheduled strategic, national-level transregional global exercise could reveal. exercises that look at plans, policies, and The TCEP involving all GCCs and procedures under different simulated crisis FCCs would give Secretary of Defense situations.10 The CEP further stipulates that (SECDEF) James Mattis and Chairman Department of Defense (DoD) entities Dunford a realistic, in-time transregional conduct exercises for a multitude of purposes training platform to prepare for conflict to include joint training, theater-engagement
Campaigning Fall 2017 38 activities, mission and plan rehearsal, address the current environment and essential concept analysis, lessons learned evaluation, characteristics. One of these elements is doctrine validation, and interagency Transregional Joint Training. The guidance integration.11 The TCEP would fall under and states, “Every priority strategic challenge is embrace all facets of the CEP with special transregional in nature, as potential emphasis on joint training, concept analysis, adversaries’ interests, influence, capabilities, and doctrine evaluation. and reach extend beyond single geographic Implementing the Joint Training regions. Joint training must specifically Policy, the annual Chairman’s Training address the higher-level collaboration of the Guidance, released in January of 2017, is a Joint Staff with OSD, as well as horizontal clear call for leadership to shift their way of coordination among CCMDs, to achieve thinking about training and exercising. It desired effects.”14 The TCEP epitomizes the directs the joint force to conduct “exercises transregional joint training element and, if involving multiple CCMDs, the Joint Staff, designed properly with concrete objectives, and appropriate CSAs [Combat Support can strengthen the “connective tissue” Agencies] oriented on the priority strategic between key leaders that will be needed in challenges [4+1] and homeland defense.” It crisis. also notes that these exercises will “strengthen the ‘connective tissue’ between TCE Objectives leaders and organizations, validate assumptions, examine globally integrated To realize the Chairman’s operations and other mature concepts, test transregional training guidance, a TCE key ideas, and confirm the joint force can should accomplish four specific training execute assigned missions.”12 objectives directed toward supporting one of The 2017 Chairman’s Training the five key challenges to give GCCs and Guidance lists four essential characteristics FCCs realistic training against a benchmark that joint training should incorporate. First, competitor. These objectives include: 1) the training must reflect the strategic exercising command and control constructs, environment and its respective challenges. 2) improving situational awareness on Second, training must emphasize global transregional problems across GCC integration across the five key challenges. boundaries, 3) improving cross-CCMD Third, training must span the range of coordination, and 4) stress testing military operations. The fourth and final communications systems. essential characteristic is that training must enable innovation.13 The TCEP should Global Command and Control include all of the Chairman’s four essential characteristics of joint training for maximum Exercising command and control as a benefit. training objective in a global scenario is The same guidance also describes needed to address shortfalls in DoD’s ability eight required joint training elements to to integrate operations under the current
Campaigning Fall 2017 39 regional command construct. Chairman where typically a role player is appointed to Dunford does not believe the current play the SECDEF and Chairman and updates organizational and command and control occur at regular intervals, an unlikely constructs are ready for the current or future scenario during a major crisis. fight.15 He says what is truly required is global integration.”16 In attempting to Common Situational Awareness address mission command and synergy challenges, the JS J7 recommended Global participation would test not incorporating the Office of the Secretary of only command and control, but also Defense (OSD) into exercises as a best coordination between nine unified combatant practice. He writes, “Where applicable, commands as the joint force strives to meet exercise the agility of OSD as the the second objective of improving situational establishing authority together with the JS awareness on transregional problems across under crisis conditions to plan and direct GCC boundaries. This second objective responsive and synchronized cross- would be useful to determine how the joint Combatant Command Operations.”17 force will collectively contribute to shared To best train for this objective, a TCE’s awareness amidst a multitude of defense and primary training audience should be at the commercial options for building a common Tier One level and include the SECDEF, operating picture (COP) or common CJCS, JS, and all CCMDs. The Tier One intelligence picture (CIP). While Global level of training is designed to prepare Command and Control System-Joint (GCCS- national-level organizations and CCDRs and J) is the program of record intended to their staffs at the strategic and operational provide a one stop shop for joint planners to levels of war to integrate interagency, non- build awareness, most CCMDs gravitate governmental, and multinational partners in toward some sort of tailored system for their highly-complex environments. The Joint region for a variety of reasons. Google Earth, Training Policy advocates integrating a All Partners Access Network (APAN), diverse audience into exercises in order to CENTRIXS, and BICES are all examples of identify “core competencies, procedural systems currently in use to build a COP or disconnects, and common ground to achieve CIP. Classification, bandwidth, manpower U.S. unity of effort.”18 management requirements, and compatibility Understanding that the SECDEF and considerations can be evaluated in an CJCS will likely be unable to clear their exercise environment and lessons learned schedules for the entire exercise duration, a applied to doctrine development or global command and control objective will acquisition programs. also test the ability of these leaders, as well as combatant commanders, to synchronize and Cross Combatant Command Coordination coordinate information while traveling or attending to real-world schedules. This Once common awareness is would differ sharply from current exercises established, the joint force should be stressed
Campaigning Fall 2017 40 to use that information in a coordinated inject, though fraught with challenges, fashion against the adversary. Hence, a third provided great realistic training and lessons training objective to improve cross- learned to the CCMD. combatant command coordination is needed A proposed TCE can satisfy the four to bridge the gap from information to action. proposed training objectives only with full In the joint concept on rapid aggregation, the participation from the primary training JS J7 recommends that CCMDs become audience. Full participation is needed to test increasingly collaborative and a variety of dilemmas that leaders may face interdependent in both planning and such as how the CJCS and SECDEF will execution. “They must expand virtual and prioritize assets to CCMDs when every physical collaboration among commands to CCMD would be making requests at the same allow for shared situational understanding time for the same challenge or threat. and for the collective capacity of multiple Conducting this exercise once every two commands to quickly combine and solve years would efficiently train key leaders and problems.”19 their staffs during their command tenures and provide valuable lessons learned to improve Communications Systems Stress the ability to fight transregionally.
Finally, a TCE should stress Challenges communication systems as a fourth training objective. An exercise could then validate Too Hard to Integrate With Existing communications systems architecture, Exercises including satellites, information servers, multinational collaboration networks, and Some may say a biennial exercise email services, when all CCMDs are which includes all GCCs and FCCs is straining communications infrastructure unrealistic given the often times frantic simultaneously. U.S. Southern Command operations tempo and fiscal constraints that Commander, Adm. Kurt Tidd, capitalized on burden the DoD. At present, this is true. a unique opportunity to stress test However, reevaluating existing exercises and communications when he found himself either cancelling or integrating them into the required to travel for other obligations during capstone exercise could alleviate much of the PANAMAX 2016, an exercise that brings additional burden of a new mandatory together sea, air, and land forces in a joint and requirement for the JS and CCMDs. combined operation focused on defending the Development of a TCE should follow the Panama Canal. The staff coordinated lessons learned from NATO. In the wake of multiple video teleconference calls that the Crimea crisis, NATO quickly went from patched into HQ, Joint Training Center about 100 exercises to 300 exercises per year Norfolk, and CENTRIXS systems from a and reached the capacity of allies to support. variety of locations, including one Instead of adding additional exercises, occurrence while airborne. This unintended NATO is now focused on increasing their
Campaigning Fall 2017 41 realism, flexibility, and robustness. This scenarios can further validate the legitimacy change in thinking has allowed for NATO to of the exercise as it would allow CCMDs plan and execute faster.20 Likewise, a TCE assigned synchronizing responsibilities to provides an opportunity for CCDRs to set exercise against a variety of benchmark aside redundant training exercises while threats. Despite the resource challenges, keeping the intent of higher guidance ensuring the SECDEF, JS and all GCCs and providing a “less- is-more” training option FCCs participate in the exercise is central to for the CCMD. achieving proposed training objectives, The first full biennial capstone especially command and control and exercise should not be executed until 2020 to communications stress testing. Each GCC provide planners adequate lead time to plan and FCC’s unique capabilities and and schedule the exercise across the DoD. geographic expertise should be represented in Further, a TCE would have to be assigned the exercise and this will indeed pose the priority event status to ensure prioritization greatest challenge to scheduling and throughout the DoD. Once scheduled far in execution. advance, planners should be able to schedule To address the resourcing issue, it other events around an established battle will be important to put a mark on the rhythm that runs a TCE every other year, on calendar as soon as possible to enable Global even years, starting in 2020. Force Management processes time to allocate any shift in resources. JS and CCMDs will Scheduling and Resources also need to quickly determine required staff to serve as role players and determine how Others might argue that a TCE is just best to meet this need. Options for building another exercise requirement that takes away the necessary training elements could include time they could spend on real-world issues assigning select staff TDY, employing and that there is not enough time and modular training teams, hiring short-term resources to do both. The DoD and other contractors, or creating computer system agencies are indeed faced with fiscal simulations. For an exercise of this scale, new challenges that have resulted in the U.S. collaboration mechanisms between training having the smallest Army and Navy since elements may be required as physical space World War II.21 At the same time, with the to house a training element of this magnitude plethora of exercises already being executed, will likely not permit complete co-location. finding a time window that would work Sufficient time for planning will be the key to across the joint force would be difficult. To addressing all of these challenges. address this concern, the JS and CCMDs should first establish a culture that recognizes Not Enough Doctrine to Exercise the value of a TCE, and set it as a top training priority in order to solidify support for Another argument against aggressive exercise participation. Rotating incorporating a TCE into all GCCs and FCCs through the five key challenges in a variety of training schedules is the lack of transregional
Campaigning Fall 2017 42 joint doctrine. The Joint Training Policy for force operating across multiple non- the armed forces of the U.S. states that contiguous geographic areas to accomplish training must be based on approved joint its mission against a single threat.”24 doctrine unless the training is being used primarily for concept development.22 Conclusion Currently, there is not a sufficient amount of cross-CCMD doctrine. When combined with The CJCS has stated that his the need to determine resourcing described warfighting priority is to improve the above, this will indeed be a formidable military’s ability to integrate joint challenge for joint force planners. It is capabilities in a transregional, multidomain, important to note, however, that this exercise and multifunctional fight. While the joint could be a firestarter to generate and/or force has shown steady progress toward validate joint doctrine in development. exercising in multiple domains and across Each successive TCE could aid multiple functions within regional theaters, doctrine development by feeding a cycle of transregional exercising is virtually assessment. As a starting point for nonexistent. The joint force needs to development, exercise planners could aim to institutionalize the TCEP incorporating all test some of the ideas put forward in the GCCs and FCCs as a key element to realizing Globally Integrated Operations CCJO. This the Chairman’s highest warfighting priority. concept advocates eight key elements among A TCE should test command and control which mission command, global agility, and constructs, improve situational awareness on flexibility in establishing joint forces could transregional problems across GCC be tested in a TCE.23 boundaries, enhance cross-CCMD While mission command may be preferable coordination, and stress test communication in most situations, complex conflicts with systems as primary training objectives. These near-peer adversaries may require integrating objectives reflect current shortfalls and are mission command with centralized control needed to prepare the joint force to face any mechanisms required for employment of of the “4+1” challenges. nuclear weapons or other national Though implementation of a TCE will be met capabilities. Training objectives on global with challenges from competing priorities, agility could test the joint force’s ability to scheduling, resourcing, and nascent shift resources between CCMDs as strategic transregional doctrine, overcoming these dilemmas emerge and help validate existing challenges will set the joint force on a posture. Lastly, the CCJO insight on trajectory to defend the U.S. against the flexibility in establishing Joint Forces should transregional threats of tomorrow. Without be tested. It notes that while current joint this exercise or another like it, critical forces are typically organized around shortfalls in joint force capability to address geographic or functional considerations, the these threats will persist. Adopting the TCEP future force may have to consider that “this will help realize the Chairman’s vision for the might be done globally” or as a “joint task future joint force and help him fulfill his
Campaigning Fall 2017 43 statutory responsibilities to advise, direct, Authors Biographies assess, and execute joint operations against LCDR William “Flanders” Buell, USN, is currently the most challenging transregional threats. assigned to U.S. Southern Command as a Theater Using a TCE, we can train the way we fight Campaign Planner in the J5 Directorate. so we will fight the way we train. Maj Erin Dorrance, USAF, is assigned to SOUTHCOM as the deputy to the Office of Congressional Affairs which is located in Miami, FL.
MAJ Bob West, USA, is assigned to SOUTHCOM as the Supply and Services Branch Chief in the J4 Directorate.
1 DUNFORD, JOSEPH F. "From the Chairman." 8 Vandiver, John. Stars and Stripes. “From ‘Sleepy JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly no. 80 (2016 1st Quarter Hollow’ to war-fighting footing, EUCOM muscles 2016): 2-3. Military & Government Collection, up. Oct. 13, 2016. https://www.stripes.com/from- EBSCOhost (accessed April 11, 2017), 1. sleepy-hollow-to-war-fighting-footing-eucom- 2 Admiral Kurt Tidd, “U.S. Southern Command muscles-up-1.433867#.WP4xtIWcHVg Posture Statement for the Senate Armed Services 9 EUCOM Participates in Global Command, Control Committee Hearing,” April 6, 2017, 6. Exercise. DOD. 3 Admiral Harry Harris, “U.S. Pacific Command https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/10876 Posture Statement for the Senate Armed Services 01/eucom-participates-in-global-command-control- Committee Hearing,” Feb. 23, 2016. exercise/. General John Hyten, “U.S. Strategic Command 10 “CJCSI 3500.01H (Joint Training Policy for the Posture Statement for the Senate Armed Services Armed Forces of the United States),” April 25, 2014. Committee Hearing,” April, 4, 2017. http://www.jcs.mil/Library/CJCS-Instructions/, B-5. General Lori Robinson, “U.S. Northern Command 11 Ibid. Posture Statement for the Senate Armed Services 12 Ibid, 5. Committee Hearing,” April 6, 2017. 13 “CJCSN 3500.01 (2017-2020 Chairman’s Training General Curtis Scaparrotti, “European Command Guidance),” January 12, 2017. Posture Statement for the Senate Armed Services http://www.jcs.mil/Library/CJCS-Instructions/, 2. Committee Hearing,” March 23, 2017. 14 Ibid, 3. Admiral Kurt Tidd, “U.S. Southern Command 15 DUNFORD, JOSEPH F. "From the Chairman." Posture Statement for the Senate Armed Services JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly no. 80 (2016 1st Quarter Committee Hearing,” April 6, 2017. 2016): 2-3. Military & Government Collection, General Joseph Votel, “Special Operations Command EBSCOhost (accessed April 11, 2017), 1. Posture Statement for the Senate Armed Services 16 Clark, Colin. “CJCS Dunford Calls For Strategic Committee Hearing,” March 18, 2017. Shifts; ‘At Peace Or At War Is Insufficient’” General Thomas Waldhauser, “African Command September 21, 2016. Posture Statement for the Senate Armed Services http://breakingdefense.com/2016/09/cjcs-dunford- Committee,” March 23, 2017. calls-for-strategic-shifts-at-peace-or-at-war-is- 4 Clark, Colin. “CJCS Dunford Calls For Strategic insufficient/, 2. Shifts; ‘At Peace Or At War Is Insufficient’” 17 “Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Mission September 21, 2016. Command and Joint Force Synergy,” March 2013. http://breakingdefense.com/2016/09/cjcs-dunford- http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/fp/mission_command_f calls-for-strategic-shifts-at-peace-or-at-war-is- p.pdf, 8. insufficient/ 18 “CJCSI 3500.01H (Joint Training Policy for the 5 Ibid Armed Forces of the United States),” April 25, 2014. 6 “Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Mission http://www.jcs.mil/Library/CJCS-Instructions/, B-6. Command and Joint Force Synergy,” March 2013. 19 “Joint Concept: Rapid Aggregation,” May 22, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/fp/mission_command_f 2015. p.pdf, 12. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts 7 Ibid / joint_concept_rapid_aggregation.pdf, 8.
Campaigning Fall 2017 44 20 Tadjdeh, Yasmin. 2017. "NATO Increasing Training to Counter Resurgent Russia." National Defense C1, no. 758: 20-21. Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed April 20, 2017), 1. 21 Ullman, Harlan. Defense News. “Smallest Army and Navy Since Before WWII: So What?” Aug. 10, 2015. http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/comment ary/2015/08/10/smallest-army-and-navy-since- before-ww-ii-so-what/31428429/ 22 “CJCSI 3500.01H (Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States),” April 25, 2014. http://www.jcs.mil/Library/CJCS-Instructions/, C-1. 23 “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020.” September 10, 2012. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/concepts.htm, 4 24 Ibid, 4-6
Campaigning Fall 2017 45 Developing an Operational community has a mutual challenge. “Forty to Approach for the Transition from sixty states, home to nearly two billion War to Peace through Stabilization, people, are either sliding backward and Reconstruction, and Development: teetering on the brink of implosion or have Understanding Critical Aspects of already collapsed.”1 They concisely capture the Environment an ongoing and ever expanding global issue, “in a period of unprecedented wealth and by invention, people throughout Africa, Central Thomas J. Snukis Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East are locked into lives of misery [and] politicians, This essay is the third in a series of generals and business leaders are beginning essays that focus on the transition from war to realize that we must arrest and reverse state to peace through stabilization, failure… in order to overcome the effects of reconstruction, and development. The first these weak, failing, and failed states.”2 As essay identified and summarized the essential the United States has been recently involved US governmental strategic guidance, in two state-building efforts following concepts, and doctrine surrounding combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq stabilization, reconstruction, and and anticipates potential involvement in development. The second essay examined similar situations, it is imperative to other relevant literature on the subject and understand the intricacies and nuances of highlighted several areas that the US national these environments and handle them with security policymaker, diplomat, joint more sophistication and skill then we have in warfighter and other governmental agencies the recent past. To do this we must gain a must account for as they seek to understand better understanding of the environment and an emerging post-intervention environment. possible approaches to the problem. This essay focuses on a critical challenge resident in the international environment that Understanding the Environment impacts the US ability to stabilize, reconstruct, and develop nations before, Francis Fukuyama captures the during, and/or after armed intervention. That essential nature of state-building and the challenge is the ever increasing number of international dilemma when he emphasizes, fragile, failing, failed, and collapsed states “state-building is one of the most important and the state-building requirement within issues for the world community because these nations. weak or failed states are the source of many of the world’s most serious problems, from The Problem poverty to AIDS to drugs to terrorism…while we know a lot about state-building, there is a Ashraf Ghani, the current president of great deal we don’t know…We need…more Afghanistan, and Clare Lockhardt, co- thought, attention, and research on this founder and director of the Institute for State area.”3 Robert Rotberg echoes Fukuyama’s Effectiveness, counsel that the international
Campaigning Fall 2017 46 counsel, “In a time of terror awareness, the existence of this particular state…; the moreover, appreciating and responding to the state must have a raison d’etre – reason for dynamics of nation-state failure motivate existing.”7 Understanding the centrifugal and critical policy debates. How best to centripetal forces resident within a country understand the nature of weak states, to becomes an essential prerequisite to generate strengthen those poised on the abyss of a positive outcome. Without this failure, and to restore the functionality of understanding we will fail every time as failed states, are among the urgent policy Richard Helms, CIA director during the questions of the twenty-first century.”4 Vietnam era, noted regarding US While we will not explore this topic in great involvement in Vietnam, “ At the root of this depth, we present and emphasize several failure of intelligence was “our national crucial points for practitioners as they deal ignorance of Vietnamese history, society, and with this challenge, especially following language.”8 some sort of armed intervention. Volumes of literature evaluate the In 1950 Richard Hartshorne basic US state-building approach in both published his The Functional Approach in Afghanistan and Iraq as ineffective and Political Geography where he added to the extremely costly. Addressing the extreme understanding of weak states with his cost and effort required by outside entities in concepts in the context of state effectiveness. state-building, especially that following an He proposed the following, “The fact that a armed intervention, several scholars and country has a name and a government, that an practitioners offer alternative approaches for international treaty recognizes its existence those weak and failing states that struggle to as a state and defines its territorial limits-all become contributing members of the that does not produce a state.”5 Hartshorne international community. Ghani and recognized two forces within a nation that Lockhardt propose a strategic framework that contribute to or detract from state “argues for a citizen-based approach to state effectiveness. “We have been considering a building: a new legal compact between variety of centrifugal factors in the regional citizen, state and the market, not a top-down geography in a state-area which make it imposition of the state.”9 This approach has difficult to bind those regions together in an promise in some areas but what happens effective unit…[to produce a state] it is when the basic centripetal force described by necessary to establish centripetal forces that Hartshorne a “raison d’etre” is absent or so will bind together the regions of that state, in inextricably blurred by competing views or spite of the centrifugal forces that are always imposed fracturing that progress is next to present.”6 A deep understanding of these impossible? forces becomes essential in developing a Jeffery Herbst also offers an approach coherent approach to catalyze state-building that addresses this issue, “let states fail: allow under any circumstances. Hartshorne’s new forms and centers of political authority research emphasized, “The basic centripetal to emerge through conflict and cooperation force must be some concept or idea justifying without outside direction or
Campaigning Fall 2017 47 intrusion…redraw national boundaries to countries it is even harder, “the effort needed reflect these new arrangements, rather than to stabilize Bosnia and Kosovo has proved seeking to perpetuate the untenable fictions difficult to replicate in Afghanistan or Iraq, of many existing states.”10 This approach nations that are eight to 12 times more may have utility but in the process of failing populous.”13 Moreover, “the more sweeping many of these states become safe havens for a mission’s objectives, the more resistance it terror groups or perpetrate great crimes is likely to inspire. Resistance can be against their population which cannot be overcome, but only through a well- ignored by the international community considered application of personnel and under the UN responsibility to protect (R2P) money over extended periods of time.”14 mandate. Jeremy Weinstein offers a strategy We also recognize that our of “autonomous recovery” as an alternative, understanding of state-building remains whereby states reach “a lasting peace, a incomplete and potentially flawed. “The systematic reduction in violence, and postwar deeper problem is insufficient understanding political and economic development in the of state-building’s complexities – in absence of international intervention.”11 particular, its intrinsic tensions and Under better scrutiny and deeper analysis, the contradictions.”15 Fukuyama cautions that pros and cons of each will emerge. there are “grave limitations to the ability of Regardless if one or the other or a hybrid external powers to create demand for would work in a given circumstance, they institutions…” necessary to generate must, at a minimum, be considered with other effective state-building.16 He argues that the available alternatives in a discourse international community, or whatever entity contemplating the use of force or other has intervened with the intent of building a extreme measures. Although the Marshall state, is “not simply limited in the amount of Plan receives high praise from most for jump- capacity it can build” but even more starting European Recovery, there are several worrisome, Fukuyama argues, “It is actually scholars who question whether it was complicit in the destruction of institutional economically necessary. “The historical capacity in many developing countries.”17 guild sitting in judgement [almost seventy Ultimately depending on how the U.S. and years later] has yet to render its final the international community approach state- verdict.”12 building whether before, during, or after an Considering the above we clearly armed intervention, it is highly possible that recognize that state-building is not only a with the best of intentions and despite an critical issue globally but is also an acute exceedingly large investment the effort may issue in the Middle East. Difficult, costly, make the situation worse as we experienced manpower intensive, and time-consuming in Iraq and Afghanistan. under the best of circumstances, in areas that As joint operational commander’s require forceful intervention to enact change, and staffs think through these issues and force alone may not be sufficient to build prepare plans and orders for similar what we want. Additionally, in populous environments in the future they must fully
Campaigning Fall 2017 48 account for the nuances and intricacies of Author Biography these complex issues resident in many Thomas J. Snukis is a retired U.S. Army infantry struggling nations throughout the officer and is an associate professor at the Joint Forces international community! They cannot Staff College. overlook the requirements and tensions inherent in these fragile, failing, failed, and collapsed states.
1 Ghani, Ashraf, and Clare Lockhart. 2008. Fixing 9 Ghani and Lockhart. Fixing failed states: a failed states: a framework for rebuilding a fractured framework for rebuilding a fractured world. 7. world. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 10 Paris, Roland, and Timothy D. Sisk. 2009. The 1. dilemmas of statebuilding: confronting the 2 Ibid. 4. contradictions of postwar peace operations, security 3 Fukuyama, Francis. 2004. State-building: and governance series. London; New York: governance and world order in the 21st century. Routledge. 12. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. ix. 11 Ibid. 4 Rotberg, Robert I. 2004. When states fail: causes 12 Machado, Barry 2007. In search of a usable past: and consequences. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton the Marshall Plan and postwar reconstruction today. University Press. 1. Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Foundation. 15. 5 Hartshorne, Richard. 1950. The functional approach 13 Rand xxxvii in political geography. Annals of the Association of 14 Ibid. xx-xxi American Geographers, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Jun., 1950), 15 Paris and Sisk, The dilemmas of statebuilding: pp 95-130. 110. confronting the contradictions of postwar peace 6 Ibid. 109-110. operations, security and governance series. 13. 7 Ibid. 110. 16 Fukuyama, State-building: governance and world 8 Weiner, Tim. 2011. Legacy of ashes: the history of order in the 21st century. 39. the CIA. London: Penguin. 244. 17 Ibid.
Campaigning Fall 2017 49 Polarity Management in Within the international system, International Relations polarization can be described as a process in which several groups or nations merge by into one larger unit under an agreed upon coordinated direction for an economic, Dr. Daniel H. McCauley and social, or political purpose. In international Dr. Sadi S. Sadiyev relations, a nation or group of nations, are always trying to maximize the international A nation’s grand strategy is a product system in a manner that best serves its 1 of the state, its society, and political values. citizens, which, in one school of thought, It is essentially “the use of power to secure comes at the expense of other nations or 2 the state.” In general, when discussing groups of nations. Russian expansion grand strategy, scholars argue that three efforts in Georgia and Ukraine are recent conditions must be taken into account: the examples, and Armenia’s expansion and nation’s interests, priorities, and the occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh 3 instruments of power. A national interest is region in Azerbaijan, originating in the defined as, “…a public good of concern to early Twentieth Century, is a historical 4 all or most [citizens]….” Priorities allow example. In each example, one nation or decision-makers to “rack and stack” group thinks one way and another nation or competing objectives based upon the group thinks the opposite. situational factors. The instruments of power Nations are societies that are a are those resources that nation states use to moving complex of overlapping and nested promote their interests, such as diplomatic, structures and situations of conflict, power information, military, and economic (DIME) balancing, balances of powers, and means. structures of expectations.6 What emerges In a great deal of literature from this dynamic is a type of polarization describing the current international system, between the two nations or groups of the benefits of a uni-, bi-, or multipolar nations in which neither group is willing to world permeate national security subvert (compromise) its own interests to discussions. The concept of polarity another. The ongoing conflict within Iraq management, however, and the dynamic and Syria is an example. With neither interplay of the poles is rarely discussed and group willing to change, the dynamic understood. Therefore, a discussion of becomes intractable. International relations polarity management is undertaken from problems, just like many social problems, which key “takeaways” are identified. therefore, become polarities to manage, not According to the definition in the paragraph problems to solve. above, three major characteristics of a grand After World War II, European strategy emerge: economic, political, and countries and America founded NATO to socio-cultural. Although these are identified merge and unite their political, as individual characteristics, the three are economic, and military force against the intrinsically related. For the purposes of this Soviet system. Just as communism and argument, international relations problems capitalism needed each other to show the 5 are viewed as social problems , which merits of their respective ideologies during encompass the political and economic the Cold War, polarities are sets of characteristics or variables. opposites that cannot function well
Campaigning Fall 2017 50 independently. As the two sides of any As international relations are tied to a polarity are interdependent, a solution for nation’s grand strategy with the intention of one side cannot be made without shaping the global environment for the considering the other side.7 The benefit of its own citizens, a polarity experiences of these organizations reveal dynamic is automatically put into place that basic factors that, with varying force, affect consists of an “us versus them” mentality. religious, ethnic, cultural, and social Immediately following the 9/11 attacks in polarization. the U.S. in 2001, President George W. Polarities in international relations Bush stated that, “You’re either with us or are chronic, ongoing, unavoidable issues against us in the fight against terror.”10 The that are also unsolvable. The need to manage idea was that there were only two sides to these types of polarities increases or the conflict and each side was the extreme decreases as the system or relationship opposite of the other. More recently, U.S. changes in complexity, diversity, speed of President Donald Trump declared the change, and resistance to change. In most concept of ‘America First’ loud and clear academic problems, the definition of solving throughout his campaign and his a problem posits that there is only one right inauguration speech setting the stage for a answer or two or more right answers that are polarity dynamic between America and the independent. In reality, virtually almost all rest of the world.11 academic problems are problems with one The key to understanding and right answer. In problems with polarities, as managing international relations polarity in most social problems, by definition, issues is to get past the idea that “I’m right polarities have 2 or more right answers that and my opposition is wrong.” If either pole are interdependent. were allowed to “win out,” the downside of Managing polarities in international either extreme would eventually undermine relations requires analysts who understand the positive aspects resulting in a problem that these types of problems have 2 or more worse than the original one. Just as both right answers that are interdependent. poles have positive aspects, they also have Managing polarities in international negative components that would manifest relations is essential for one generation to themselves if given the time and lack of pass key elements of its culture on to the opposing constraints. Rather, the necessary next generation. When typical problem approach is to understand that both solving skills are used to address polarity opposing parties are not only right, but that issues, there is a high likelihood that the they are dependent upon each other’s truth problem will be made worse.8 over time. The two opposite poles serve as Polarity is managed well when you a counterbalance to the other, while not capitalize on the inherent tensions between allowing the most positive aspects of either the two poles. You get the benefits of both pole to come to fruition, the most negative upsides and the synergies between them. aspects are mitigated as well. Polarity is managed poorly when one pole is focused on to the neglect of the other. This is likely to occur when the issue is seen as an either/or problem.9
Campaigning Fall 2017 51 Figure 1. Figure 3.
Figure 2. Figure 4.
An example of polarity management Pole 1 does not simply allow Pole 2 is show in Figures 1 through 4. In Figure 1, to create a new equilibrium at its expense. the two poles are identified which sit at the As a natural result of Pole 2’s action, Pole 1 extreme opposite of each other. In Figure 2, develops a counter-tension or energy that the relationship between the two poles is acts in an opposite direction as Pole 2’s as represented by the oval tying the two poles shown in Figure 4. In most cases, the together. counter-tension required to move the In Figure 3, there is an inherent equilibrium back to its original position tension between the two poles in the system requires even more energy, which results in that results in some sort of equilibrium an overshoot or even more extreme positon between the poles. In Figure 4, that than the original state. Over time, these equilibrium is changed when Pole 2 tries to tensions and counter-tensions either go back increase its influence over the status quo. to the original status quo or a new Pulling the equilibrium nearer to Pole 2 equilibrium is reached. requires energy and creates a tension Managing polarity is more required to keep the new equilibrium in complicated than simply managing tensions. place. In the context of international relations, each
Campaigning Fall 2017 52 pole represents a school of thought or positive aspects of capitalism would start to ideological framework that best supports be realized Figure 6. that nation’s interests. In theory, two nations could have ideological frameworks that are polar opposites. A historical real-world example would be the ideological battle between communism and capitalism during the Cold War. Each side believed they were right and the other side wrong. As a result, each tried to force the other side to capitulate through various means in which the great powers of the contemporary system have been joined by a few regional groupings-Europe, NATO, Warsaw Pact, Figure 6. European Trade Union, etc. There were, and are, however, plusses and minuses to Over time, however, without a each ideological pole. For the Cold War counterbalance, the natural tendency would period, some of the positive aspects of the be for the negative aspects of capitalism to communist ideology are identified in the begin to come into play (Figure 7.) As a upper left-hand quadrant of the diagram result, the equilibrium would start to shift to (Figure 5). The negative aspects of the lower right-hand quadrant. communist ideology is located in the lower left-hand quadrant. Likewise, the positive and negative aspects of capitalism are listed in the upper and lower right-hand quadrant respectively. All things being equal, the tension between the two poles is equidistant to both.
Figure 7.
Once the negative aspects of capitalism came to the fore, the natural positive aspects of communism would become more appealing. The equilibrium would start to shift into the upper left-hand Figure 5. quadrant (Figure 8). Once the equilibrium established In theory, if in the natural course of itself on the left-hand side of the quadrant, environmental interactions the positive over time, the negative aspects of the aspects of capitalism started to pull the ideology would come into play, creating the equilibrium to the upper right, many of the dynamics for an equilibrium swing in the opposite direction (Figure 9).
Campaigning Fall 2017 53 reinforced over time (Figure 11). The United States and its concept of capitalism has experienced a similar phenomenon since the demise of the Soviet Union and the natural counter-tension of communism. Over time, the negative aspects of capitalism come to the fore and the other actors and stakeholders in the environment then equate those negative qualities to the Americans themselves, undermining both the ideology and the legitimacy of the United States. Figure 8.
Figure 10.
Figure 9. In any unipolar environment, the
specific characteristics of any unipolar The positive aspects of capitalism system depends on the behavior of the would come back into play and the unipolar state. Global incentives, equilibrium would start to shift back to the constraints, and restraints associated with right (Figure 10). Over time, the system’s the unipole’s position within the equilibrium would develop a continuous international structure can affect behavior. figure eight pattern reaching a balance that In addition, the unipole’s domestic might not eliminate the negative aspects, but institutions and processes, intrinsically does provide for a constant “refresh” by not linked to the international system, might staying in any one quadrant for very long. In undergo significant change based upon the addition, within a bipolar system, a result of immediate effects of its behavior within the the natural dynamic systemic balancing, international system.13 secondary states were able to play one In the case of the two decades superpower off against the other providing immediately following the Cold War, the opportunities that would not normally be U.S. used its economic and military available.12 resources to dominate the international Normally, one would think that environment. This domination, however, removing a polar counter-balance would be came at a price as the U.S. bore the good. Unfortunately, without the counter- preponderance of costs while first tension, the system usually stays in one quadrant with the negative aspects becoming
Campaigning Fall 2017 54 In international relations, polarity management posits that the poles are necessary to act as natural counter-balances to the development of extreme ideology or extreme effects from taking place. The tension between opposite ideologies, however, can be lessened through an understanding that both poles represent truth and that neither is wrong. To lessen the tension, and eliminate the more detrimental
Figure 11. overshoot response, some middle ground, or for some that very unsatisfying word attempting to shape the world in its image, ‘compromise,’ must be reached. and then underwriting global security. Of course, tension is increased even Initially, the U.S. had an interest in bearing as the middle ground is sought; however, these costs as it directly benefitted from each polar system is likely to manage the promoting its values and interests within the smaller amounts of tension required over international system.14 Just as the theory time as opposed to a huge one-time assumes, however, given that the U.S. was requirement. unchallenged by any peer competitors Whereas national interests are in a during that time period, U.S. interests sense unipolar, the manner in which these became more parochial at the expense of interests are ultimately pursued in the international order and state and non-state international system would benefit greatly actors. from a bi- or multipolar approach. In the Over time, the cost of bearing the case of the U.S., an economic or military disproportionate expense naturally inclines counterbalance would naturally lessen the the unipole, in this case, the U.S., to seek the negative aspects that would develop over economic and security assistance from time from a purely American approach. A others within the global environment who purely unipolar approach creates a sense of have benefitted to varying degrees from the “us versus them,” which tends to create a promotion of its national interests. As such, system marked by antagonism. A unipolar the unipole leverages its position of system also tends to make the unipole the privilege to force these adjustment burdens adversary of all other system actors leading on other states. These other states naturally them to focus almost entirely on the develop a sense of resentment of the forced unipole—to counter, contain, or exploit it— coercion, especially in light of the unipole’s at the expense of other threats that may be efforts to maintain its position at the expense more severe. A bi- or multi-polar of others within the international system.15 international environment would provide In addition, the now visible manifestations other international actors a sense of choice of the negative outcomes inherent within or opportunity while providing a sense of any unipolar system, serve as an opportunity system balance. for other international actors to attribute all In the current international of the negative conditions on the unipole environment in which the U.S. is still the whether it has anything to do with them or dominant military and economic power, not. U.S. national interests must be pursued in a
Campaigning Fall 2017 55 manner that supposes there are counter- poles even when there are not. To do International Studies Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Denemark, Vol. X, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, otherwise will undermine all of the good 2010, 6375 – 6387. that the U.S. brings to the world. 6 Rummel, R.J. Understanding Conflict and War, Vol. 4: War, Power, and Peace, “Chapter 2, International Relations,” Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE
Publications, 1979. Authors Biographies 7 Johnson, Barry. Polarity Management. Identifying and Managing Unsolvable Daniel H. McCauley is currently serving as a faculty Problems. HRD Press, Inc.: Amherst, MA, member with National Defense University’s Joint 1996. 8 and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) in Johnson, Barry. Polarity Management. A Norfolk, Virginia. In addition to teaching in the Summary Introduction. Polarity Management Associates, June 1998. classroom, he has served in several course director 9 Johnson, Barry. Polarity Management. A and curriculum development capacities. Dr. Summary Introduction. Polarity McCauley has served on the military faculty at the Management Associates, June 1998. Canadian Forces College in Toronto, Ontario, 10 “You are either with us or against us,” Canada, and as adjunct faculty for the U.S. Marine CNN.COM, November 6, 2001, Corps Command and Staff College and the U.S. Air Washington, DC. Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.at Force Command and Staff College. tack.on.terror/ 11 Graham, David, A. “America First': Sadi S. Sadyev is currently serving in the military Donald Trump's Populist Inaugural education and sciences environment in Baku, Address,” The Atlantic, January 20, 2017. Azerbaijan. Dr. Sadyev was admitted to the State Available at: University of Languages in 1996 and earned his https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive Bachelor’s degree of Faculty of Translation (English /2017/01/trump-inaugural-speech- analysis/513956/. and German) in 2000. In 2002, he earned a Master’s 12 Ikenberry, G. John, Mastanduno, and degree in the same field of study. In 2002, Dr. WholforthWilliam C. “Introduction: Unipolarity, Sadyev was accepted to into the PhD program at the State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” in Institute of Literature of the National Academy of International Relations Theory and the Consequences Sciences of the Republic of Azerbaijan, earning his of Unipolarity, Cambridge University Press: PhD in 2006. In 2014, he was awarded the rank of Cambridge, UK, 2011, p. 11. 13 associate professor and in 2015 was promoted to Ikenberry, G. John, Mastanduno, and WholforthWilliam C. “Introduction: Unipolarity, professor at Azerbaijan Republic War College of the State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” in Armed Forces. Dr. Sadyev has published a book, International Relations Theory and the Consequences "Literature of Balkan Turks," and has more than 50 of Unipolarity, Cambridge University Press: scientific articles on literature and strategic issues. Cambridge, UK, 2011, p. 11. Dr. Sadyev’s email is: [email protected]. 14 Ikenberry, G. John, Mastanduno, and WholforthWilliam C. “Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” in International Relations Theory and the Consequences 1 Sargeaunt, H.A., and West, Geoffrey. of Unipolarity, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2011, p. 11. Grand Strategy, University of Michigan, 15 Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1941. Ikenberry, G. John, Mastanduno, and 2 Hooker, Richard, D. Jr., The Grand Strategy of the WholforthWilliam C. “Introduction: Unipolarity, United States, National Defense University Press, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” in Washington D.C., October 2014. International Relations Theory and the Consequences 3 Drew, Dennis and Snow, Donald. “Grand of Unipolarity, Cambridge University Press: Strategy,” in Making Strategy: An Cambridge, UK, 2011, p. 11. Introduction to the National Security Process and Problems, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1988. 4 Huntington, Samuel. “The Erosion or American National Interests,” Foreign Affairs, 76, No. 5, Sep-Oct, 1997, 36. 5 Tsygankov, Andrei, P. and Tsygankov, Pavel, A. “Russian Theory of International Relations,” in
Campaigning Fall 2017 56 Strategic Foresight Tools and the to dissect the 2015 Russian NSS, and Russia National Security Strategy: concludes with a recommended way ahead for U.S. policy. US Policy Implications Elements and Relationships within the by NSS MAJ Kent E. Justice The first tool utilized in examining the Russian NSS is a causal loop diagram Despite the dissolution of the Union (CLD). The CLD presents the elements of the of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991, the NSS and the relationships between them. It follow-on manifestation of Russia, the allows for a clear reflection of what Russia Russian Federation, remains a powerful and considers to have bearing on its national influential actor in the international arena. It security, and presents what Russia maintains a seat on the United Nations (UN) understands it needs to do in order to improve Security Council with requisite veto power, or maintain certain areas. and is a leading nuclear capable nation. With Figure 1 is a summarized CLD for the such stature, it remains paramount for the NSS as a whole. The summarized CLD United States (U.S.) to thoroughly shows the core relationship of the NSS, understand the security strategy and national which is the central association of national interests of Russia in order to devise an security and socioeconomic development. As appropriate policy approach for furthering provided in the NSS, each has a positive U.S. interests. The government of Russia effect on the other. As national security published an updated National Security improves, or is guaranteed, the 1 Strategy (NSS) in December of 2015. It socioeconomic development of Russia allows for insights into how Russia sees the improves. As the socioeconomic world, its place in it, and sources of concern / development of Russia improves, so perceived threats. Russia published this improves the national security. document in the midst of having a litany of With the balance between national national level concerns such as a stagnating security and socioeconomic development economy, declining birthrate, weak residing at the center of the CLD, the graphic institutions, and weakening social cohesion. reflects various elements present in Russia Analysis of this document can provide that have bearing on either national security perspective to U.S. policy makers in how to or socioeconomic development. The major approach Russia, and how to achieve desired elements reflected in this summarized effects. Understanding how Russia perceives diagram are: causes and effects in a variety of areas such as the economy and national defense can • strong state and public security; provide U.S. officials an awareness of • improvement of the quality of life of potential policy levers. This work utilizes a Russian citizens; variety of analytical strategic foresight tools
Campaigning Fall 2017 57 Figure 1.
Campaigning Fall 2017 58 • economic growth; Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (among • improving science, technology, and others). education; • development of the population’s Relative Strength of NSS Elements health / development of health care; • culture; Not all elements reflected in the CLD • preservation of environmental bear equally on Russian national security and security and rational environmental socioeconomic development. To gain an management; appreciation of which factors may bear more • strong national defense; weight than others, the Force Field Diagram • strategic stability. (FFD) in Figure 2 contains the elements from the CLD that had a positive effect on national Key elements, along with some security and socioeconomic development, as influencing elements, are grouped by color well as some primary factors that work for clarity. Additionally, some key negative against those positive effects. The numbers influencers are reflected in red font. As this is reflect relative strength, demonstrating the a summary graphic, there are other negative overall relative importance of each element influences which can be seen in detailed in achieving national security and CLDs for each major element (not included socioeconomic development. Assigned in this publication). Some negative elements values are subjective, based on perceived and reflected in Figure 1 are: understood influence. • Corruption; National defense remains a primary • Imposition of restrictive economic concern for Russia. It is arguably the measures against Russia; strongest factor towards protecting national • Decline in the quality of education; security. Besides encapsulating the Russian military organization itself, it also represents • Low standard of qualification for Russia’s strategic deterrence capability medical personnel; manifest in its nuclear readiness. One • North Atlantic Treaty Organization primary factor working against the national (NATO) military activity near defense of Russia is the military activity of Russian borders. NATO. Russia remains critical of NATO Anytime Russia identifies a negative activities in Eastern Europe, and views them element in the NSS, it provides a listing of as a direct threat against the Russian countermeasures. The conclusion of the Federation. document provides a listing of indicators that Russia views as valid evaluation criteria for its NSS. Presumably, Russia intends to monitor such figures as citizen satisfaction, proportion of modern arms used in the military, life expectancy, and per capita
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Figure 2. Force Field Diagram for Safeguarding the Russian Federation’s National Security and Socioeconomic Development.
The second strongest factor in improving Improving citizen quality of life is the third national security is state and public security. strongest factor listed on the FFD. Russia Strong border protection and effective law believes that developing the potential of its enforcement remain important in ensuring population, providing for needs, and the security of the nation. Working counter to increasing income will have a positive impact internal security are the activities of terrorist on socioeconomic development. Economic or radical groups. Russia keenly monitors the sanctions, however, continue to have a activities of extremist groups around the negative impact on quality of life. These world, particularly in its region, and is forced measures negatively impact the availability to maintain vigilance against any potential of goods and capital, which can have activities within Russia. The April 2017 secondary and tertiary effects on other areas, metro blast in St. Petersburg provides a such as science and technology development. recent example of the internal security The quality of life of the Russian people 2 concerns of Russia. continues to slip in the face of slow economic growth.
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Figure 3. Russia’s GDP at Purchasing Power Parity chart. This graphic reflects the negative effect of sanctions in 2014, and negligible growth forecast into the future.3
Economic growth remains a priority for the concern about an erosion of traditional Russia, and Russia believes this factor has a morals. The government is taking a keen positive impact on socioeconomic interest in maintaining a sense of Russian development. However, in recent years, identity. A fracturing of what it means to be Russia’s economy has stagnated, and the a Russian could inhibit the government’s positive impact of economic growth on ability to muster the population’s support national security is diminished (Figure 3). 3 around policy approaches to resolving Significantly impacting this, along with other Russia’s problems moving forward. areas, is corruption. Cited in numerous areas Furthermore, the government is battling to in the NSS, corruption appears to permeate reduce the ‘brain drain’ of professionals, as throughout society to the point where it is trust in public officials, systems, and 4 perhaps a part of the culture. This has institutions is wavering (Figure 4). significant impacts given the precarious position in which it places government Implications for the Future budgets, along with the negative effect it can The use of a Futures Wheel (FW) have on state security. (Figure 5) allows for structured The remaining elements listed, both brainstorming in order to gain an positive and negative, in the FFD do not appreciation of potential first and second appear to weigh significantly on Russian order effects about trends for Russia. Given national security or socioeconomic the results of the analysis from the CLD and development relative to the other factors. Of note is the mention of culture in the NSS, and
Campaigning Fall 2017 61 Figure 4. Worldwide Government Corruption Perception Index graphic. Russia’s rating of 2.39 places it on par with or below some African nations, making it one of the most perceived corrupt nations in the world.
FFD, a FW that examines increasing NATO as outmatched and unable to catch up in the buildup and continuing economic sanctions near term. provides insights into potential impacts of Second order effects of a NATO these policy decisions. buildup could see a negative effect on Increasing NATO military buildup in diplomatic relations with NATO member NATO’s ‘Eastern Flank’ is a stressor to states and Russia, a reciprocal military Russia’s national defense and overall buildup by Russia, and a domestic Russian strategic stability. Increasing buildup could population that feels increasingly unsafe. reflect any enhanced military activity from Any negative effect on diplomatic relations increasing troop numbers in the vicinity of could see short to long term diminishing Russia’s borders, to the deployment of relationships between Russia and NATO improved equipment that provides an members, a loss in reciprocal tourism (as advantage over Russian equipment, such as Russia may ban travel to certain countries, enhanced radar. This is of particular concern or hike visa fees), and a reduction in trade. to Russia, as its domestic technology For Russia’s military buildup in response, industries that support military systems this will drive a demand for an increased development will be taxed to retool and security and defense budget, require develop in the face of challenges from the innovation to counter any new NATO international arena.5 Given this concern, the system capabilities, and require a continued deployment of new capabilities would cause heightened level of military readiness. alarm, as Russia would perceive itself Lastly, if the population begins to feel unsafe, this could result in a
Campaigning Fall 2017 62 Figure 5. Futures Wheel for Increasing NATO Military Buildup. loss of national pride for the Russian people, total banning of food imports from select a general questioning of the competence of nations and the European Union (EU). the Russian government, and a demand by This aided in precipitating the the people for a government response. collapse of the Russian ruble, and plunged The continuation of economic Russia into a financial crisis. An Austrian sanctions on Russia has direct effects on the study indicated that the sanctions could cost economy and other aspects of its national the EU over 100 billion euros in lost trade, as security. Following Russia’s annexation of well as potentially putting approximately two Crimea in 2014, a slew of nations imposed million jobs at risk. The U.S. further punitive sanctions with a focus on energy sanctioned Russia in 2016 over allegations of related trade on Russia. Russia responded by Russian involvement with election related applying responsive sanctions, including the hacking. These sanctions have had a tangible effect on the Russian economy, as
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Figure 6. Futures Wheel for Continuing Economic
they partially contributed to a contraction of imported. For Russia’s international prestige, the GDP of around four percent in 2015, and this will result in a loss of international status will have reciprocal stressful effects on EU and influence, a loss of public confidence in and other nations’ economies as well. 6 the government, and a possible decline in Second order effects of the sanctions are the foreign investment. If the intent of the inability for Russia to import or export sanctions is achieved and future Russian certain goods, damage to Russian prestige, invasions are deterred, then Western powers and future Russian invasion plans being successfully demonstrate their resolve, deterred. The inability to import and export Russia is forced to respect Western influence, certain goods will result in a decline in tax and stability is increased in Eastern Europe. revenue, reduced demand for production, an increasing backlog of goods across the board, Policy Implications a lack of essential goods in critical industries, and a negative impact on Russian quality of While the intent of the sanctions is to life. However, this can also serve as a alter current and future behavior, what are the stimulus for Russia’s domestic industry, as it seeks to fill gaps where goods are not being
Campaigning Fall 2017 64 Figure 7. Implications Tree for the Impacts of the US Maintaining
enhances that it will actually do so? The use Russia may be able to compensate by
of an Implications Tree (Figure 7) allows for drawing on domestic sources, such as energy an examination of potential policy resources, and relying on friendly foreign implications for maintaining sanctions on partners for lines of credit. Depending on the Russia. Russia remains a proud nation, severity of the sanctions, and how they may drawing on its historical influence as the be adjusted in the future, it is possible to have USSR and its current regional influence. a continued negative impact that may be While Western perspectives may lessened as Russia’s domestic industry rationalize that by punishing behaviors it will adjusts. In the short to near term, with reduce the likelihood that they will be economic decline comes certain negative repeated, it remains to be seen how far effects on domestic employment and quality Russian resolve and determination will aid in of life. overriding negative impacts of the economic There remains a high probability that sanctions. Russia will see its international prestige In terms of economic decline, there negatively affected. In many ways, this is remains a high probability that this will occur already the case. Continued application of due to the sanctions. The immediate effects sanctions demonstrates that Western were rather significant. However, over time, countries continue to judge Russia’s behavior
Campaigning Fall 2017 65 as unacceptable, which could have continued methods that do not utilize direct military impacts on how the world views Russian invasion, coercion, or other activities that activities. As a result of this, it remains likely may fall below the threshold of international that Russia will see a decline in its status and interest would likely be seen by Russia as the a loss of public confidence. While foreign effective way ahead for continuing activities investments will likely drop from those seen as provocations by the West. countries that apply the sanctions, Russia could petition to non-sanction applying allies Potential Future Developments for support. The crux of the sanctions’ intent is to The execution of policy can yield change behavior. This is unlikely to occur. expected and unexpected results. While not The severity of the sanctions is not on a level all results can be foreseen, anticipation to create any crisis situations within Russia. allows for policy makers to remain cognizant Rather, they are on a level to force Russia to of the possibilities, and take steps to mitigate more seriously consider the implications of any potential negative consequences. The its actions. Once Russia completes its survey Cross-Impact Matrix (Figure 8) compares the of the fallout from its activities, and potential effects between trends. This determines methods for recovery (for approach yields insights into anticipated and example, by adjusting domestic industries to potentially unanticipated results. This Cross- compensate or firming relationships with Impact Matrix analyzes potential cross non-sanctioning allies), it probably will effects between declining economic growth; determine that the risk is worth the reward. declining quality of life; declining science, However, on the low probably that Russia technology, and education; NATO buildup; decides to change its behavior in the future, and continuing sanctions. this would directly result in a diminished Declining economic growth, level of Russia intelligence collection declining quality of life, and declining activities and hacking offenses (i.e. actions science, technology, and education are likely viewed as provocative). to have negative influences upon each other. The more likely scenario is that The areas of interest are in the interplay Russia does not change its behavior and between the NATO build up and economic continues its escalation of provocations. sanctions, and the above stated elements. As There is a moderate chance that they could may be expected, NATO buildup and increase in frequency, as Russia aims to sanctions will have an overall negative effect continue its advance on whatever strategy it on elements of Russia’s national security. Of may have for regaining territories that it sees interest is that if sanctions are successful and as having a rightful claim over. Should positively influence Russian behavior, it Russia continue on this path, it is almost could undercut the justification for a NATO certain that it will seek to refine its techniques buildup. Without continuing Russian in order to avoid detection or direct criticism. provocations, NATO members may seek to The use of proxy organizations, alternate
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Figure 8. Cross Impact Matrix of Various Trends and Policies towards Russia.
withdraw forces and capabilities. If this is a Recommended Policy Approach moment that Russia is anticipating, then it would create a security vacuum in the exact Analysis of the Russian NSS reveals region that Russia would desire decreased how Russia views its national security and security. Similarly, if the NATO buildup is socioeconomic development. While successful in deterring Russian actions, then understanding that Russia values these two it removes the rational for continuing key components, and views them as essential economic sanctions. Given the fallout towards furthering its NSS, it remains enduring on the EU from the sanctions, a important to understand what is driving their unified voice may quickly rise calling for an betterment. end to the economic measures against Russia. Overall, national defense, state and Sanction applying nations must also remain public security, and improving the quality of cognizant of the internal effects the sanctions life are the strongest elements currently are having in Russia, as they could positively impacting Russia. However, there unwittingly create unintended crisis are significant variables acting against these conditions. elements, as NATO military buildup, economic sanctions, and corruption erode national security.
Campaigning Fall 2017 67 The latest U.S. National Security disasters mitigates long term negative effects Strategy is from 2015. While this is from the of these occurrences. Russia is struggling to prior presidential administration, it identifies fight corruption in its ranks, as this has an the four main areas of concern for U.S. overall negative effect on the capability of national security as security, prosperity, law enforcement and internal security. In values, and international order.7 In order to terms of maintaining security and further progress towards these elements, the international order, it is in the interest of the U.S. can shape policy towards each of U.S. to cooperate with Russia in the fight Russia’s contributing elements of its NSS. against global Islamic extremist Russia’s national defense organizations. Any successes inside Russia mechanisms present a clear threat towards by groups of interest would be detrimental to the stability of Eastern Europe and NATO overall U.S. efforts to reduce the global allies of the U.S. Recent actions explicitly influence of these groups. Intelligence reflect this, and are in conflict with the sharing and security capacity building in this security aspects of the U.S. NSS. The U.S., regard could be a point of cooperation, along with other NATO partners, has should Russia be willing to entertain such responded by pursuing a buildup of military efforts. Cooperation in the area of response forces and capability in the ‘Eastern Flank’ of and management of natural disasters is also a NATO. Given the relative weakening of potential area for the U.S. to pursue, as this Russia’s economy, lack of ability to quickly can positively reinforce international order, innovate on newer capabilities, and demand effectively mitigating second and third order for a military response in kind, this activity effects. One caveat to any cooperative policy presents a significant stressor to the Russian recommendation is that until the current state. Additionally, the action itself can act as stalemate regarding sanctions and Russia’s a deterrent to future military provocations provocative actions is resolved, it may from Russia, causing it to give pause to its remain politically untenable for U.S. policy actions so as not to exacerbate the situation to makers to pursue overt cooperation with a level beyond its capacity to effectively Russia, even in areas where it is in the mutual respond. To counter Russia’s national interest of both nations. defense element, the U.S. should continue to In regards to the improvement of the pursue engaging the NATO capacity to quality of life of Russian citizens, many of maintain military capabilities forward the elements supporting this rely on domestic deployed in areas in the vicinity of locations policy for the Russian Federation and are assessed to be of future interest to Russia. outside of the concern of the U.S. in terms of Russia’s capability to maintain state U.S. national security. However, content and security remains essential for it to combat satisfied populations of nations across the foreign state intelligence activities, extremist globe can positively support international activity, radical nationalist groups, and order. Additionally, the promulgation of U.S. criminal organizations. Additionally, the values remains important to ensure that ability to respond effectively to natural democracies across the world are preserved,
Campaigning Fall 2017 68 rights for minority groups are maintained, development to help counter NATO and mass atrocities are prevented. In this light, capabilities is a plus. The U.S. can also the U.S. can continue strategic messaging persist in attracting professional talent from when engaging with Russia to encourage Russia, effectively denying them home protection for ar-risk population groups; grown experts that could have contributed in displaced persons; and migrant workers. Russia. Maintaining robust employment Additionally, the U.S. can continue to opportunities in the U.S., while maintaining a advocate to Russia in terms of its support for lenient visa program in this regard, can also civil society and freedom of expression. serve to keep Russia in check in this area. Russian economic growth has Russia’s focus on its health related suffered under the recent adoption of interests include a desire to increase economic sanctions. While this was the intent longevity, lower mortality rates, and increase of the sanctions, the U.S. should remain the size of its population. Doing so would vigilant of the exact effects they are causing increase an available labor population, while in Russia. The intent is to punish Russia for not placing an undue drain on resources for its territorial incursions, not to destabilize the medical care. Of interest in this sector to the government or Russian society. The U.S. U.S. is the ability of Russia to contain should remain cognizant of the magnitude of epidemics, the spread of disease, and the the sanctions, and ensure that they do not spread of illicit drug use. The U.S. can pursue broaden to a level that would cause undue cooperative programs with Russia’s medical suffering to sectors of the Russian economy sector to ensure best practices are employed or population. It is a delicate balance to towards the rapid identification of diseases, achieve the desired effects of the sanctions, and containment when pandemics are and U.S. policy makers must remain vigilant identified. There is also a common interest in on metrics associated with the sanctions’ stifling drug trafficking and use. The sharing effects so as to avoid sparking any internal of information related to the identification of crises in Russia. international drug trafficking methods and For Russia’s advancements in science resources for the treatment of drug addiction and technology, and its level of education, are potential policy considerations for the progress has been slowed in recent years. The U.S. to pursue. recent sanctions have denied goods and Culture and the Russian identity are technologies that would aid in development increasingly becoming an area of concern for and innovation. While this denies the Russian government. Professionals are advancements in technologies that can abandoning service in Russia in pursuit of support infrastructure and consumer goods, it freedoms and income afforded in Western also slows progress in military capability countries. It is a critical point in time for advancements. Given Russia’s provocative Russia, as it appears to be on the losing side actions, this promotes U.S. security interests. of the narrative of what it means to be a Maintaining sanctions in areas that would Russian. Drawing top talent from Russia positively contribute to military capability hampers Russia’s economy and strengthens
Campaigning Fall 2017 69 U.S. prosperity. The U.S. can continue to its national security. The U.S. should serve as a model for advancing equality at advocate to NATO to continue messaging the home and promoting equal opportunity. The troop deployments as a direct action taken in projection to the world of having an response to Russian provocations, and empowered civil society that promotes on highlight the non-aggressive nature against merit with little corruption is of tremendous Russia in the troop deployments. Russia’s appeal. However, a fractured Russia works NSS proposes pursuing stability of against the interest of maintaining an international law, honoring arms reduction international order. U.S. messaging should agreements, participating in nuclear arms avoid inciting any conflicts amongst related discussions, and supporting disgruntled groups in Russia, and should peacekeeping missions. The U.S. advocates continue to maintain messaging related to the for responsible participation in maintaining appeal of the values of the U.S. peace and order in the international arena, Russia’s environmental security and and it is in the U.S. interest to advocate the use of natural resources serve as a platform same from Russia. Each of these areas for shoring up economic security. The provide potential areas for cooperation availability of raw materials is essential, as it between the U.S. and Russia. Should will allow them to proceed without having to relations come to an impasse, U.S. policy rely on imports. Should Russia find itself makers can turn to these measures for points with a dwindling supply of essential of engagement with Russia where trust and materials, the U.S. can utilize this as a lever cooperation can be restored before venturing in trade relations. In terms of pollution and into more contentious issues (i.e. trust waste treatment, these are issues that the U.S. building). can cooperate on with Russia. As seen with China, pollution can present a great number Conclusion of negative externalities to the region. The U.S. can continue to promote responsible use Once the prime adversary of the U.S. and management of resources and waste in the Cold War, Russia has slipped from its management. Effective sharing of role as leading world power to that of a technologies and best practices related to declining regional hegemon. Nonetheless, environmental management are in the interest the nation continues to carry great influence, of the U.S. and should be pursued when and the U.S. must continue to seriously possible with Russia. regard the actions and activities of the The last element to address is Russian government. The NSS provides strategic stability. The deployment and insights into the mechanisms driving maintenance of troop levels in the ‘Eastern Russia’s strategy. Analysis of these elements Front’ of NATO provides stability and gives indications to U.S. policy makers of reassurance to NATO allies. However, this potential policy levers to utilize when measure can also act to destabilize, as Russia seeking to influence Russian behavior. may consider necessary reactions to ensure
Campaigning Fall 2017 70 Economic sanctions have made a conflict in others. Ultimately, the U.S. should significant impact on the Russian economy continue on a policy path of encouraging and the quality of life of its citizens. However, responsible behavior by nations in the the extent to which they will impact Russian international arena while not destabilizing behavior is yet to be seen. As domestic regions. Influencing measures should be industry in Russia responds, and Russian tailored and carefully considered in allies provide aid to Russia, the U.S. and its coordination with allies. This ‘whole of allies may find themselves at a decision point nations’ can send a consistent and unified of how to proceed forward. Shaping message. Continual adjustment of measures sanctions smartly to a level that can influence as needed will ultimately provide government behavior while not overtly conditioning feedback to Russia while crippling the economy or the population will guiding it to its place as a responsible require continued monitoring and member in both its region and the world. consideration by policy makers. Additionally, the buildup of NATO troops in Eastern About the Author Europe has sent a clear message to Russia that its actions will not go unnoticed. The MAJ Kent Justice, U.S. Army, wrote this article for stressors placed upon Russia by this action the Strategic Foresight elective at the Joint Forces Staff College’s Joint and Combined Warfighting require attention and consideration from School, Class 17-1. He currently lives in Seoul, South Russian policy makers. As with the economic Korea where he works as a Policy Officer in the J-5, sanctions, it remains to be seen if Russian U.S. Forces Korea. MAJ Justice graduated from the behavior will be influenced long-term by the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Command and troop presence. Policy makers should General Staff Course Class #60 in July 2015. MAJ Justice was commissioned from the U.S. Military continue to be mindful of potential Russian Academy in 2002, and received an M.A. in Political reactions, and appropriately shape policy Science as an East-West Center Fellow at the decisions going forward. University of Hawaii. Additionally, he is a linguist in Despite recent points of conflict, the Korean and Japanese languages. He previously there remain areas where Russia and the U.S. served in intelligence assignments in Korea and with the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Joint Base can cooperate. Doing so would further U.S. Lewis-McCord, where he deployed twice to the national interests, but could be politically Philippines in support of Joint Special Operations unpalatable to decision makers in the U.S. Task Force – Philippines. MAJ Justice’s next This could send contradictory messaging, assignment will bring him to Tokyo, Japan as the and cause confusion on how the U.S. could Training and Doctrine Command’s Liaison Officer to the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. cooperate in some areas, while coming in
1 Russian President, 2015, Russian National Security 3 The Moscow Times. “Experts Predict ‘Lost Decade’ Strategy (December 31). for Russia’s Stagnating Economy”. Last modified 2 CNN. “St. Petersburg Metro Explosion: At Least 11 August 19, 2016. Accessed June 9, 2017. Dead in Russia Blast” Last modified April 4, 2017. https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/experts- Accessed June 9, 2017. proclaim-lost-decade-for-russias-stagnating- http://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/03/europe/st- economy-55039. petersburg-russia-explosion/index.html. 4 The Moscow Times. “Russia’s Brain Drain Worse Than Previously Believed – Report”. Last modified
Campaigning Fall 2017 71 6 Reuters. “Update 1 – Russian Economy Contracts October 6, 2016. Accessed June 9, 2017. 3.7 Percent in 2015, Slump Set to Continue”. Last https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russias-brain- modified January 25, 2016. Accessed June 9, 2017. drain-worse-than-previously-believed-report-55635. http://www.reuters.com/article/russia-economy- 5 The National Interest. “Russia’s Massive Military idUSL8N15917O. Modernization Might Be in Big Trouble”. Last 7 US President, 2015, US National Security Strategy, modified December 2, 2014. Accessed June 18, 2017. (February 2015). http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-massive- military-modernization-might-be-big-trouble-11768.
Campaigning Fall 2017 72 Campaigning is a Joint Forces Staff College journal designed as a forum for students, faculty, and senior fellows to provide the broader joint professional military education community insights into the application of joint warfighting principles through critical analysis and strategic thinking on current and future operations at the operational level of war.
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Campaigning Fall 2017 73 JFSC Vision
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