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STRUCTURE of a STATE CAPTURED DOCUMENTS and the ISLAMIC STATE’S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE Daniel Milton | June 2021

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STRUCTURE OF A STATE CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND THE ISLAMIC STATE’S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE Daniel Milton | June 2021 Structure of a State: Captured Documents and the Islamic State’s Organizational Structure Daniel Milton Combating Terrorism Center at West Point United States Military Academy www.ctc.usma.edu The views expressed in this report are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, Department of Defense, or U.S. Government. June 2021 Cover Photo: This image comes from a picture report released by the Islamic State’s Al-Raqqah province in January 2016. COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER acknowledgments Director Although I certainly hope that this entire report is illuminating, it is this section, the acknowledgments, that is simultaneously the most humbling and inspiring LTC Sean Morrow to me. It is a reminder of the tremendous support I have received from others Executive Director in trying to bring this product to light. As in many projects, Muhammad al- `Ubaydi played an important role in helping me understand this material from Brian Dodwell the beginning of the project, but also through his critical feedback on later drafts Research Director of the report. Brian Dodwell and Don Rassler provided encouragement, support, and insight that allowed this report to become better than it would have been Dr. Daniel Milton without their efforts. A special thanks to Audrey Alexander for always being Distinguished Chair willing to be a sounding board on ideas and presentation. I also feel incredibly fortunate to have had the benefit of two talented experts who served as external LTG(R) Dell Dailey reviewers: Aymenn Al-Tamimi and Michael Knights. Their comments helped George H. GIlmore Senior Fellow me refine my thinking in some areas and pushed me to do more in others to uncover additional takeaways. Kristina Hummel did (as usual) a fantastic job Prof. Bruce Hoffman in copyediting the report, making it much clearer than it would have otherwise Senior Fellow been. Many thanks are owed to Andrew Letzkus and Rich Munson for help with the graphics included in the report. I also want to tip my cap to the leadership Michael Morell team at the Combating Terrorism Center and Department of Social Sciences Senior Fellow that has always supported my work: Suzanne Nielsen, Sean Morrow, and Heidi Demarest. Finally, as is the case with a CTC product that uses material captured Chief Joseph Pfeifer, FDNY (retired) from terrorist organizations, the largest demonstration of gratitude goes to the Class of 1971 Senior Fellow men and women who, despite not being able to have their names printed, are the most critical component of the entire process. The Honorable Juan Zarate Class of 1987 Senior Fellow GEN(R) Joseph Votel CONTACT Combating Terrorism Center U.S. Military Academy 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall West Point, NY 10996 Phone: (845) 938-8495 Web: www.ctc.usma.edu The views expressed in this report are those of the author’s and not of the United About the Author States Military Academy, the Department Daniel Milton, Ph.D., is Director of Research at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. His research focuses on the Islamic State, propaganda, of the Army, or any other agency of the foreign fighters, security policy, and primary source data produced by terrorist U.S. Government. organizations. I TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... IV Introduction... ................................................................................................................................1 Description of the Spreadsheet and Data Structuring Efforts ........................... 2 A Note about the Authenticity of the Documents Used in This Report ............. 3 The Islamic State - By the Numbers .........................................................................................5 By the Numbers: Basic Demographics ............................................................................. 6 By the Numbers: The Ministry-Level Breakdown ......................................................16 Examining the Size of Each Ministry ...................................................................................18 A Look Inside the Ministry of Soldiery ....................................................................... 24 A Look Inside the Ministry of Spoils and Plunder ................................................... 26 Mapping the Islamic State’s Military Organization ...................................................... 27 Examining Division-Level Military Units ................................................................... 29 Examining Lower-Level Military Units Within the Divisions ............................ 34 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 38 Appendix of Primary Source Document References ........................................................41 Appendix of Notes, Documentation, and Additional Discussion of Units Listed in Figure 3........................................................................................................................49 II LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Unique Identification Numbers in Two Islamic State Spreadsheets, Late 2016 ..................................... 6 Table 2: Geographic Grouping for ID Numbers..................................................................................................................7 Table 3: Number of Islamic State Personnel, by Registration Province ................................................................ 10 Table 4: Listed Status of Individuals ...................................................................................................................................12 Table 5: Size of Dependent Population in Two Islamic State Spreadsheets ............................................................13 Table 6: Rate of Increase at Different Age Levels for Minor Payees ......................................................................15 Table 7: Number of Wives by Payee ........................................................................................................................................16 Table 8: Number of Individuals Assigned to Islamic State Ministries, Late 2016 ................................................19 Table 9: Role Descriptions of Individuals Coded as Belonging to the Ministry of Soldiery, but Not Assigned to a Specific Military Unit .................................................................................................................................. 25 Table 10: Role Descriptions of Individuals Coded as Belonging to the Ministry of Spoils and Plunder .. 26 Table 11: Division Names in Main and Payment Spreadsheets ..................................................................................... 29 Table 12: Islamic State Military Units, Broken Down by Top Three Provinces Contributing Personnel ....31 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Age Distribution of Payees in Two Islamic State Spreadsheets ...............................................................14 Figure 2: Number of Records by Islamic State Military Division, February 2016-May 2017 ............................ 33 Figure 3: A Selection of Islamic State Military Units, Late 2016 ............................................................................. 36 III MILTON STRUCTURE OF A STATE JUNE 2021 Executive Summary At the high-water mark of the Islamic State’s self-declared caliphate in 2015-2016, the organization controlled a geographic area equivalent in size to the United Kingdom. During this period of time, it attempted to establish governance in those areas while simultaneously carrying out a military campaign against a wide array of adversaries, including non-state, state, and international actors. A significant body of useful literature about the group’s efforts to fight and govern has been written by journalists, scholars, and practitioners, based on sources ranging from interviews with defected fighters and terrified citizens, to analysis of propaganda and leaked documents. In the midst of all that is known about the Islamic State’s efforts to fight and govern, still relatively little is known about the organizational structure the group created to achieve these purposes. This report contributes to our understanding of this important subject by relying on a number of previously unused primary source documents, including two very large personnel rosters, to provide a unique look at the scope and size of the Islamic State’s governance and military enterprise. Some of the key findings of this report include: The Islamic State had tens of thousands of males on its payroll in Iraq. Between the two main personnel spreadsheets, the analysis identified over 60,000 unique identification numbers for “employed” males. Together with an internal memorandum explaining the process for issuing identification numbers, this suggests the group’s overall membership was much larger than previous data has shown. It is important to note that some evidence within these spreadsheets suggests that this number applied almost exclusively to Iraq, suggesting the total size of the organization in Iraq and Syria was much larger. The Islamic State’s total active strength suffered greatly from casualties inflicted by its adversaries. Analysis of the spreadsheet revealed
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