MH17 - Potential Suspects and Witnesses from the 53Rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

MH17 - Potential Suspects and Witnesses from the 53Rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade MH17 - Potential Suspects and Witnesses from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade A bell¿ngcat Investigation Table of Contents Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Section One: The 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade ...................................................................................3 Section Two: Mobilization of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade ................................................... 9 The 23-25 June 2014 Buk Convoy Vehicles ............................................................................................. 10 The 19-21 July 2014 Buk Convoy Vehicles .................................................................................................. 15 The 16 August 2014 Missile Transport ........................................................................................................ 17 Deployment of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in the Summer of 2014 ....................... 20 Section Three: Soldiers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade ...................................................... 23 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................. 23 2nd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade in 2013 .................................................................................................... 26 3rd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade in 2014 ....................................................................................................30 Recommissioning of the 3rd Battalion ..................................................................................................... 33 2nd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade in 2014 .................................................................................................... 36 1st Battalion of the 53rd Brigade in 2014 .................................................................................................... 52 Section Four: Cadets at the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade ........................................................... 56 MATI Cadets ........................................................................................................................................................... 56 MIET Cadets............................................................................................................................................................60 Section Five: Commanders of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade .............................................. 63 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................. 63 Buk Unit Commanders of the 2nd Battalion in 2014 ............................................................................. 66 Commanders of the 1st and 3rd Battalions in 2014 ................................................................................ 82 Battery Commanders of the 2nd Battalion in 2014 ................................................................................ 83 Other Commanders in the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in 2014 ........................................ 90 Commander of the 2nd Battalion in 2014 ................................................................................................... 93 Commander of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in 2014 ........................................................ 96 Air Defense and Supreme Commanders in 2014 ................................................................................ 102 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................................................111 Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................................................... 113 bell¿ngcat Introduction In a previous report, Origin of the Separatists’ Buk,1 the Bellingcat investigation team described the movements of a Buk-M1 missile launcher in Ukraine, which was filmed and photographed in Donetsk, Zuhres, Torez, Snizhne, and Luhansk on 17 July 2014, the day Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) was downed. That report provided evidence supporting the hypothesis that this particular Buk-M1 was likely responsible for downing MH17 for two primary reasons: first, it was in range of MH17 shortly before it was downed; second, a missile was missing from the Buk the morning following the downing. Origin of the Separatists’ Buk also described two separate military convoys filmed and photographed in Russia from 23 to 25 June and from 19 to 21 July 2014. These convoys transported Buk-M1 missile launchers along with numerous other types of military vehicles from an area near Kursk to an area near the Russia-Ukraine border in the Rostov Oblast2. One Buk-M1 missile launcher in the 23-25 June 2014 convoy is particularly noteworthy, because it shares many common features with the Buk- M1 that was located within firing range of MH17 and was filmed on 17 July 2014 driving toward the center of an area that was assessed by the Dutch Safety Board to be the launch area of the Buk missile that downed MH17 in Ukraine.3 An examination of the vehicles and license plates of the military convoys in the summer of 2014 reveals that these convoys originated at a military base near Kursk, just west of the village Marshala Zhukova, where the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (military Unit 32406) is based. Soldiers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade posted images of vehicles seen in the June and July 2014 convoys, as well as photographs of the June 2014 convoy itself, on social media sites such as VKontakte4 (or VK, a popular Russian social network akin to Facebook), Odnoklassniki5 (or OK, a Russian social media site more popular with older generations), and Instagram. In addition to pictures of vehicles, some soldiers posted images of military certificates showing the completion of what can be presumed to be a military exercise that took place between 22 June 2014 and 25 July 2014. The present report conducts a deeper investigation into the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, its organizational structure and placement in the Russian army, and the military vehicles involved in the June and July 2014 Buk convoys. This report also describes the results of a thorough investigation of soldiers and officers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade related to the convoys and/or other military operations in the summer of 2014. If the Buk crew consisted of Russian soldiers and officers, it is likely that some number of these soldiers and officers knew the crew members of the Buk missile launcher involved in the MH17 tragedy, or were possibly crew members themselves. Additionally, this report confirms that the certificates mentioned above belong to students of a technical university who completed a training course at the base of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade near Kursk. Some officers can be exculpated from involvement in any of the Buk convoys because cadets from two universities posted pictures of these officers in their photo albums at the base of the 53rd Anti- Aircraft Missile Brigade in the summer of 2014. 1 http://www.bellingcat com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/11/08/origin-of-the-separatists-buk-a-bellingcat-investigation 2 An ‘oblast’ is a Russian administrative division similar to a ‘region’ or ‘province’ 3 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34511973 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11928778/MH17-hit-by-Buk-missile-Ukraine-plane- crash-Russia-live.html http://www.bellingcat com/news/uk-and-europe/2015/10/17/dsb-launch-site 4 http://www.vk com 5 http://www.ok.ru 1 bell¿ngcat An uncensored and more extensive version of this report was sent to the Joint Investigation Team in December 2015. The real names and identities of all soldiers and officers have been shared with the JIT in the uncensored version of this report. Most of the individuals in this report have been censored, to varying degrees. Bellingcat has assigned three tiers of censorship to Russian soldiers and officers: . No censorship: prominent, public commanders in the Russian military. These individuals, from the commander of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade up to the Russian President, have previously appeared in Russian media and in official documents. Their full names and uncensored photographs appear in this report. Partial censorship: officers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade are presented with partial censorship, including their first name and the first letter of their surnames. The faces of these officers are blurred. Full censorship: soldiers (contract soldiers, conscripts, and cadets) are fully censored in this report. Bellingcat has assigned each soldier a first-name pseudonym and blurred their faces. 2 bell¿ngcat Section One: The 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade Videos and photographs of the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy reveal its approximate route from Kursk to Millerovo. One video in particular shows the first location that the convoy was spotted6 near Dolgoye, to the east of Kursk. The convoy likely originated from a military base near Kursk, given the presence of military installations there. The part of road A144 (E38) between Podlesnyy and Dolgoye, where the
Recommended publications
  • Russian Analytical Digest No 173: Russia and Regime Security
    No. 173 12 October 2015 russian analytical digest www.css.ethz.ch/rad www.laender-analysen.de RUSSIA AND REGIME SECURITY ■■ANALYSIS From Crisis to Crisis: Russia’s Security Policy Under Putin 2 Aglaya Snetkov, Zurich ■■ANALYSIS Russia and the West: The Longer View 5 Keir Giles, London ■■ANALYSIS Putin’s Spies and Security Men: His Strongest Allies, His Greatest Weakness 8 Mark Galeotti, New York ■■ANALYSIS Analysis of the Signals and Assumptions Embedded in Russia’s Adjusted Security Doctrines 11 Katri Pynnöniemi, Helsinki ■■OPINION POLL Russian Attitudes on Russia’s Intervention in Syria 13 Institute for European, Research Centre Center for German Association for Russian, and Eurasian Studies Institute of History for East European Studies Security Studies East European Studies The George Washington University of Zurich University University of Bremen ETH Zurich RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 173, 12 October 2015 2 ANALYSIS From Crisis to Crisis: Russia’s Security Policy Under Putin Aglaya Snetkov, Zurich Abstract This article considers Russia’s more assertive foreign policy stance during the Ukraine crisis and now in terms of conducting airstrikes in Syria in support of the Assad regime. It suggests that these foreign policy-choices should be interpreted in light of questions of domestic security and how these foreign actions relate to the Putin regime’s wider political project for Russia. In this way, the regime’s previous concern about the taboo on the use of force abroad has gradually been eroded in conjunction with its shift to articulating a more patriotic and anti-Western political project following the popular protests against the regime in 2011/12.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Article (PDF)
    Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research, volume 181 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference Spatial Development of Territories (SDT 2020) The Role of Citi-forming Industrial Enterprises in the Development of Innovative and Investment Attractiveness of Russian Regions (on the Example of Stary Oskol, Belgorod Region and the «OEMKINVEST ltd») Elena Chizhova Irina Rozdolskaya Department of the Theory and Science Methodology, Economics Department of Marketing and Management and Management Institute Belgorod University of Cooperation, Belgorod State Technological University Economics & Law named after V.G. Shukhov Belgorod, Russia Belgorod, Russia [email protected] [email protected] Sergey Chizhov VeraTuaeva Department of Economics and Production Organization, Department of Construction Management and Real Estate, Economics and Management Institute Belgorod State Construction Engineering Institute Technological University Belgorod State Technological University named after V.G. Shukhov named after V.G. Shukhov Belgorod, Russia Belgorod, Russia [email protected] [email protected] Abstract—The article considers the role of single-industry towns and city-forming enterprises in the formation of the I. INTRODUCTION investment attractiveness of the region. It is shown that from an In Russia, as in other countries of the world, there is a epoch of industrialisation we’ve got a problem of settlements of problem of single-industry town (monotown). Single- the various size having monoindustrial structure. But monocities of the Belgorod region which basic manufacture is industry town is characterized by the systemic unity of its the extraction of iron ore, have kept the specialisation and socio-economic organization and the functioning of the city- investment appeal. The city of Stary Oskol having single- forming enterprise [1].
    [Show full text]
  • Rebooting U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq
    Rebooting U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq MICHAEL KNIGHTS POLICY FOCUS 137 Rebooting U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq MICHAEL KNIGHTS THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY www.washingtoninstitute.org The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publica- tion may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2015 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 Design: 1000colors Photo: A Kurdish fighter keeps guard while overlooking positions of Islamic State mili- tants near Mosul, northern Iraq, August 2014. (REUTERS/Youssef Boudlal) CONTENTS Acknowledgments | v Acronyms | vi Executive Summary | viii 1 Introduction | 1 2 Federal Government Security Forces in Iraq | 6 3 Security Forces in Iraqi Kurdistan | 26 4 Optimizing U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq | 39 5 Issues and Options for U.S. Policymakers | 48 About the Author | 74 TABLES 1 Effective Combat Manpower of Iraq Security Forces | 8 2 Assessment of ISF and Kurdish Forces as Security Cooperation Partners | 43 FIGURES 1 ISF Brigade Order of Battle, January 2015 | 10 2 Kurdish Brigade Order of Battle, January 2015 | 28 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My thanks to a range of colleagues for their encouragement and assistance in the writing of this study.
    [Show full text]
  • Air Defence in Northern Europe
    FINNISH DEFENCE STUDIES AIR DEFENCE IN NORTHERN EUROPE Heikki Nikunen National Defence College Helsinki 1997 Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the National Defence College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the National Defence College. Editor: Kalevi Ruhala Editorial Assistant: Matti Hongisto Editorial Board: Chairman Prof. Pekka Sivonen, National Defence College Dr. Pauli Järvenpää, Ministry of Defence Col. Erkki Nordberg, Defence Staff Dr., Lt.Col. (ret.) Pekka Visuri, Finnish Institute of International Affairs Dr. Matti Vuorio, Scientific Committee for National Defence Published by NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE P.O. Box 266 FIN - 00171 Helsinki FINLAND FINNISH DEFENCE STUDIES 10 AIR DEFENCE IN NORTHERN EUROPE Heikki Nikunen National Defence College Helsinki 1997 ISBN 951-25-0873-7 ISSN 0788-5571 © Copyright 1997: National Defence College All rights reserved Oy Edita Ab Pasilan pikapaino Helsinki 1997 INTRODUCTION The historical progress of air power has shown a continuous rising trend. Military applications emerged fairly early in the infancy of aviation, in the form of first trials to establish the superiority of the third dimension over the battlefield. Well- known examples include the balloon reconnaissance efforts made in France even before the birth of the aircraft, and it was not long before the first generation of flimsy, underpowered aircraft were being tested in a military environment. The Italians used aircraft for reconnaissance missions at Tripoli in 1910-1912, and the Americans made their first attempts at taking air power to sea as early as 1910-1911.
    [Show full text]
  • Inside Russia's Intelligence Agencies
    EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN BRIEF POLICY RELATIONS ecfr.eu PUTIN’S HYDRA: INSIDE RUSSIA’S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES Mark Galeotti For his birthday in 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin was treated to an exhibition of faux Greek friezes showing SUMMARY him in the guise of Hercules. In one, he was slaying the • Russia’s intelligence agencies are engaged in an “hydra of sanctions”.1 active and aggressive campaign in support of the Kremlin’s wider geopolitical agenda. The image of the hydra – a voracious and vicious multi- headed beast, guided by a single mind, and which grows • As well as espionage, Moscow’s “special services” new heads as soon as one is lopped off – crops up frequently conduct active measures aimed at subverting in discussions of Russia’s intelligence and security services. and destabilising European governments, Murdered dissident Alexander Litvinenko and his co-author operations in support of Russian economic Yuri Felshtinsky wrote of the way “the old KGB, like some interests, and attacks on political enemies. multi-headed hydra, split into four new structures” after 1991.2 More recently, a British counterintelligence officer • Moscow has developed an array of overlapping described Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) as and competitive security and spy services. The a hydra because of the way that, for every plot foiled or aim is to encourage risk-taking and multiple operative expelled, more quickly appear. sources, but it also leads to turf wars and a tendency to play to Kremlin prejudices. The West finds itself in a new “hot peace” in which many consider Russia not just as an irritant or challenge, but • While much useful intelligence is collected, as an outright threat.
    [Show full text]
  • The Atlantic Council and Bellingcat Are Guilty of War Propaganda. As
    An essential dimension of humanitarian work is human rights investigations to identify violations and crimes. Human rights investigation organizations, in the digital age, are taking advantage of the growing prevalence of online citizen evidence and extractable data from what they often refer to as ‘open sources’ and social media TheThe AtlanticAtlantic CouncilCouncil andand BellingcatBellingcat areare guiltyguilty ofof warwar propaganda.propaganda. AsAs @ian56789@ian56789 wrotewrote toto mee in in a amessage: message: “The“The membersmembers ofof thethe AtlanticAtlantic CouncilCouncil andand DFRLabDFRLab shouldshould bebe indictedindicted asas accomplicesaccomplices toto WarWar Crimes,Crimes, forfor providingproviding actualactual materialmaterial supportsupport toto alal--QaedaQaeda terrorists,terrorists, andand forfor TreasonTreason (actively(actively supportingsupporting officialofficial enemiesenemies ofof thethe USUS && UK).UK). TheyThey shouldshould bebe spendingspending thethe restrest ofof theirtheir liveslives inin jailjail andand finedfined everyevery pennypenny they'vethey've got.”got.” AndAnd thosethose abusingabusing andand exploitingexploiting BanaBana alal--AbedAbed inin theirtheir ongoingongoing warwar propagandapropaganda shouldshould joinjoin themthem.. FromFrom https://www.rt.com/ophttps://www.rt.com/op--ed/431128ed/431128--banabana--alabedalabed--bellingcatbellingcat--atlanticatlantic--councilcouncil EvaEva Bartlett,Bartlett, JuneJune 29,29, 2018.2018. platforms. For the purpose of this discussion, we make use of the term ‘open source’ as it is specifically used by the organizations discussed here – we acknowledge that ‘open source’ as a term is often used in problematic ways in place of what is simply extractable, publicly available data – the term open source refers to accessible and editable software source code and in this paper’s context the term often misleadingly refers to datasets that have come at a high cost to the organization that procured them.
    [Show full text]
  • Soviet Naval Force Control and the Red Naval C System: What the Blue Commander Needs to Know
    Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1989 Soviet Naval Force Control and the Red naval C system: what the Blue commander needs to know Tondu, Jennifer L. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/26259 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California 7 3-^35 SOVIET NAVAL FORCE CONTROL AND THE RED NAVAL C^ SYSTEM: WHAT THE BLUE COMMANDER NEEDS TO KNOW by Jennifer L. Tondu March 1988 Thesis Advisor: James G. Taylor Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. T24239 classified irity classification of this page REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Restrict ive Report Security Classification Lnclassified lb Markings Security Classification Authority 3 Distribution Availability of Report Declassification Downgrading Schedule Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Performing Organization Report Number(s) 5 Monitoring Organization Report Number(s) Name of Performing Organization 6b Office Symbol 7a Name of Monitoring Organization aval Postgraduate School (if applicable) 39 Naval Postgraduate School Address (city, state, and ZIP code) 7b Address (city, state, and ZIP code) onterev, CA 93943-5000 Monterey, CA 93943-5000 Name of Funding Sponsoring Organization 8b Office Symbol 9 Procurement Instrument Identification Number (if applicable) Address (dry, state, and ZIP code) 10 Source of Funding Numbers Program Element No Project No Task No Work Unit Accession N Title (include security classification) SOVIET NAVAL FORCE CONTROL AND THE RED NAVAL C3 SYSTEM: WHAT IE BLUE COMMANDER NEEDS TO KNOW Personal Author(s) Jennifer L. Tondu a Type of Report 13b Time Coyered 14 Date of Report (vear. month, day) Page Count aster's Thesis From To March 1988 90 Supplementary Notation The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or po- ion of the Department of Defense or the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Research Journal of Pharmaceutical, Biological and Chemical Sciences
    ISSN: 0975-8585 Research Journal of Pharmaceutical, Biological and Chemical Sciences Agroecological And Economic Substantiation Of Agriculture Biologization Elements. Alersandr V Turianskii, Andreii F Dorofeev, Aleksandr V Akinchin*, Sergeii A Linkov, and Aleksey G Stupakov. V.Ia. Gorin Belgorod State Agrarian University, 308503 Belgorod Region, Belgorodsky District, Maisky Village, Vavilova str. 1. ABSTRACT An intensive farming triggers mineralization of humus, which leads to a deterioration in the agrochemical, physicochemical, biological, and other properties of the soil. In this regard, the means for the biologization of agriculture should be given much more attention as a powerful means of increasing the fertility of the soil and the economic efficiency of agricultural production. The presented data testify to the positive influence of green manure crops as an element of biologization on the productivity of agricultural crops and the indices of soil fertility. In general, the most economically feasible for the crops studied is the variant of mustard embedding with the Sun Flower unit, which profitability level averaged 77.5%. While the least cost-effective was the option with the use of unembedded buckwheat - only 39.5%. Keywords: biologization of agriculture, green manure crop, soil cultivation, economic efficiency. *Corresponding author September–October 2018 RJPBCS 9(5) Page No. 1370 ISSN: 0975-8585 INTRODUCTION Solving the tasks of ecological safety of modern farming systems and increasing their economic efficiency should be connected with the biology of agriculture and energy conservation, one of the main principles of which is the preservation and improvement of soil fertility through the use of organic fertilizers [4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23], while the need for rational nature management is strengthened by the transition to sustainable development of rural areas and the "green" economy, the development of the concept of land use ecologization (3, 6.7.10).
    [Show full text]
  • The Annual Report of the Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2019
    The Annual Report of the Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2019 A Destroyed State and Displaced People Thursday, January 23, 2020 1 snhr [email protected] www.sn4hr.org R200104 The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), founded in June 2011, is a non-governmental, independent group that is considered a primary source for the OHCHR on all death toll-related analyses in Syria. Contents I. Introduction II. Executive Summary III. Comparison between the Most Notable Patterns of Human Rights Violations in 2018 and 2019 IV. Major Events in 2019 V. Most Prominent Political and Military Events in 2019 VI. Road to Accountability; Failure to Hold the Syrian Regime Accountable Encouraged Countries in the World to Normalize Relationship with It VII. Shifts in Areas of Control in 2019 VIII. Report Details IX. Recommendations X. References I. Introduction The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), founded in June 2011, is a non-govern- mental, non-profit independent organization that primarily aims to document all violations in Syria, and periodically issues studies, research documents, and reports to expose the perpetrators of these violations as a first step to holding them accountable and protecting the rights of the victims. It should be noted that Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has relied, in all of its statistics, on the analysis of victims of the conflict in Syria, on the Syrian Network for Human Rights as a primary source, SNHR also collaborate with the Independent Inter- national Commission of Inquiry and have signed an agreement for sharing data with the Independent International and Impartial Mechanism, UNICEF, and other UN bodies, as well as international organizations such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
    [Show full text]
  • Security Council Distr.: General 27 January 2020
    United Nations S/2020/70 Security Council Distr.: General 27 January 2020 Original: English Letter dated 27 January 2020 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council The members of the Panel of Experts on Yemen have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel, prepared in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 2456 (2019). The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) on 27 December 2019 and was considered by the Committee on 10 January 2020. We would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council. (Signed) Dakshinie Ruwanthika Gunaratne Coordinator Panel of Experts on Yemen (Signed) Ahmed Himmiche Expert (Signed) Henry Thompson Expert (Signed) Marie-Louise Tougas Expert (Signed) Wolf-Christian Paes Expert 19-22391 (E) 070220 *1922391* S/2020/70 Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen Summary After more than five years of conflict, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen continues. The country’s many conflicts are interconnected and can no longer be separated by clear divisions between external and internal actors and events. Throughout 2019, the Houthis and the Government of Yemen made little headway towards either a political settlement or a conclusive military victory. In a continuation from 2018, the belligerents continued to practice economic warfare: using economic obstruction and financial tools as weapons to starve opponents of funds or materials. Profiteering from the conflict is endemic.
    [Show full text]
  • Industrial Framework of Russia. the 250 Largest Industrial Centers Of
    INDUSTRIAL FRAMEWORK OF RUSSIA 250 LARGEST INDUSTRIAL CENTERS OF RUSSIA Metodology of the Ranking. Data collection INDUSTRIAL FRAMEWORK OF RUSSIA The ranking is based on the municipal statistics published by the Federal State Statistics Service on the official website1. Basic indicator is Shipment of The 250 Largest Industrial Centers of own production goods, works performed and services rendered related to mining and manufacturing in 2010. The revenue in electricity, gas and water Russia production and supply was taken into account only regarding major power plants which belong to major generation companies of the wholesale electricity market. Therefore, the financial results of urban utilities and other About the Ranking public services are not taken into account in the industrial ranking. The aim of the ranking is to observe the most significant industrial centers in Spatial analysis regarding the allocation of business (productive) assets of the Russia which play the major role in the national economy and create the leading Russian and multinational companies2 was performed. Integrated basis for national welfare. Spatial allocation, sectorial and corporate rankings and company reports was analyzed. That is why with the help of the structure of the 250 Largest Industrial Centers determine “growing points” ranking one could follow relationship between welfare of a city and activities and “depression areas” on the map of Russia. The ranking allows evaluation of large enterprises. Regarding financial results of basic enterprises some of the role of primary production sector at the local level, comparison of the statistical data was adjusted, for example in case an enterprise is related to a importance of large enterprises and medium business in the structure of city but it is located outside of the city border.
    [Show full text]
  • The Development of the Urban Settlement System in Belgorod Oblast N
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by DSpace at Belgorod State University ISSN 1875-3728, Geography and Natural Resources, 2013, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 55-60. © Pleiades Publishing, Ltd., 2013. Original Russian Text © N.V. Chugunova, T.A. Polyakova, N.V. Likhnevskaya, 2013, published in Geography and Natural Resources, 2013, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 112-118. SOCIO-ECONOMIC QUESTIONS OF GEOGRAPHY The Development of the Urban Settlement System in Belgorod Oblast N. V. Chugunova, T. A. Polyakova and N. V. Likhnevskaya Belgorod State University, Belgorod, Russia e-mail: С[email protected] e-mail: [email protected] e-mail: [email protected] Received December 1, 2011 Abstract—We have investigated the urbanization processes in the region. The study revealed the characteristics of evolution of urban systems and of the urbanization development stages as well as ascertaining the current formation tendencies for large cities and their suburban zones. DOI: 10.1134/S1875372813010083 Keywords: urbanization stages, suburbanization, development of large cities and agglomerations, suburban zones. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM and for identification of advantages and problems of Urbanization reflects a set of complex processes urban growth in the interests of rational organization related to growth, formation and development of cities and sustainable development of urbanized territories. and their systems. Urbanization is a spatial process which is clearly pronounced when mapped onto the territory. SPATIAL
    [Show full text]