Quarter 2018 rd
Issue 90, 3 90, Issue
and the Consensus Delusion Demosthenes, Churchill, Demosthenes, Churchill,
Innovation onInnovation a Budget Strategic Shaping Strategic
JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE NINETY, 3RD QUARTER 2018 Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 http://ndupress.ndu.edu
Gen Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Publisher VADM Frederick J. Roegge, USN, President, NDU
Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Production Editor John J. Church, D.M.A.
Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich
Copyeditor Andrea L. Connell
Book Review Editor Frank G. Hoffman, Ph.D.
Associate Editors Patricia Strait, Ph.D., and Jack Godwin, Ph.D.
Art Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Publishing Office
Advisory Committee COL Michael S. Bell, USA (Ret.), Ph.D./College of International Security Affairs; Col James D. Dryjanski, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; Col David J. Eskelund, USMC/Marine Corps War College; RADM Janice M. Hamby, USN (Ret.)/College of Information and Cyberspace; RADM Jeffrey A. Harley, USN/U.S. Naval War College; MajGen John M. Jansen, USMC/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; MG John S. Kem, USA/U.S. Army War College; LTG Michael D. Lundy, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Brig Gen Chad T. Manske, USAF/National War College; Col William McCollough, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; LtGen Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., USMC/The Joint Staff; RDML Jeffrey Ruth, USN/Joint Forces Staff College; VADM Kevin D. Scott, USN/The Joint Staff; Brig Gen Jeremy T. Sloane, USAF/Air War College
Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Stephen D. Chiabotti/School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/National War College; Richard L. DiNardo/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Bryon Greenwald/ Joint Forces Staff College; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney- Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Thomas L. McNaugher/ Georgetown University; Bert B. Tussing/U.S. Army War College
Cover 2 images (top to bottom): Sailor from Navy Wounded Warrior–Safe Harbor waits for signal to begin 100-meter cycling event at 2018 Department of Defense Warrior Games at U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, June 2, 2018 (U.S. Navy/ Morgan K. Nall); Senior Airman Heather Carter throws shot put during track and field competition at 5th Annual Air Force Wounded Warrior Trials on Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, February 27, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/James R. Crow); Marine with 1st Marine Division boxing team faces opponent, British Royal Marine, at Commando Training Centre Royal Marines, Lympstone, England, May 3, 2018 (U.S. Marine Corps/Megan E. Brown) About the Cover In This Issue U.S. Army Soldier Second Lieutenant Shelby Blad makes fire in Northern Territory, Australia, Forum August 30, 2016, as part of survival 2 Executive Summary training during Exercise Kowari in Indo-Asia-Pacific region (U.S. 4 Intelligence in a Data-Driven Age Marine Corps/Osvaldo L. Ortega III) By Cortney Weinbaum and John N.T. Shanahan 10 Strategic Shaping: Expanding the Competitive Space By Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, Matthew D. Strohmeyer, and Christopher D. Forrest
16 The Future of the Aircraft Carrier Features Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the and the Carrier Air Wing 60 Bombs, Not Broadcasts: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship By Michael E. O’Hanlon Preference for Kinetic Strategy joint military and security studies journal designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and in Asymmetric Conflict other partners on joint and integrated operations; By Cole Livieratos national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat JPME Today terrorism; homeland security; and developments in 24 568 Balls in the Air: Planning for training and joint professional military education to 68 Reverse Engineering transform America’s military and security apparatus the Loss of Space Capabilities Goldwater-Nichols: China’s to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting By Chadwick D. Igl, Candy S. Joint Force Reforms freedom today. All published articles have been vetted through a peer-review process and cleared by the Smith, Daniel R. Fowler, and By Shane A. Smith, Thomas William L. Angermann Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review. Henderschedt, and Timothy NDU Press is the National Defense University’s D. Luedecking cross-component, professional military and academic 30 Transregional Capstone Exercise: publishing house. Training for Tomorrow’s Fight 78 Don’t Shoot the Messenger: The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations By William A. Buell, Erin Demosthenes, Churchill, and expressed or implied within are those of the Dorrance, and Robert West contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views the Consensus Delusion of the Department of Defense or any other agency of By Michael P. Ferguson the Federal Government. 36 The Case for Joint Force Copyright Notice Acquisition Reform This is the official U.S. Department of Defense edition By Michael E. McInerney, of Joint Force Quarterly. Any copyrighted portions Recall of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Conway Lin, Brandon D. Smith, 86 Defending the AEF: Combat without permission of the copyright proprietors. JFQ and Joseph S. Lupa should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted Adaptation and Jointness from or based on its content. in the Skies over France Submissions and Communications Commentary By Bryon Greenwald JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from members of the Armed Forces, 42 U.S. Special Operations security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, Command’s Future, by Design Book Reviews academic specialists, and civilians from the United By Charles N. Black, Richard States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration 97 The Forgotten Front to ScholarOne, available at https://mc04. D. Newton, Mary Ann Nobles, manuscriptcentral.com/ndupress, or write to: Reviewed by Andrew Byers and David Charles Ellis Editor, Joint Force Quarterly NDU Press 50 Enhancing Global 98 The Logic of American 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 2504) Nuclear Strategy Fort Lesley J. McNair Security Through Security Washington, DC 20319 Reviewed by Michael Fitzsimmons Force Assistance Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 By Keith D. Smith Email: [email protected] 100 Defense of the West JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu/jfq Reviewed by Sten Rynning 53 Cooking Shows, Corollas, and 3rd Quarter, July 2018 Innovation on a Budget ISSN 1070-0692 By Mike Jernigan and Jason Cooper Joint Doctrine 102 The U.S. Government’s Approach to Economic Security: Focus on Campaign Activities By George E. Katsos 108 Joint Doctrine Update Senior Airman checks inside of C-17 Globemaster III before beginning preflight inspection March 27, 2013, at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio (U.S. Air Force/Mikhail Berlin)
Executive Summary
ow well does the U.S. mili- writing, the Budgetary Control Act one of its combat wings, eliminating an tary transform? When are the (or so-called sequestration) is still in entire leadership layer, the group, by plac- H best time and circumstances force, but the Department of Defense ing squadron commanders directly under to change how the joint force does budgetary outlook is fairly bright. So, the wing commander. No billets were business? In search of some answers, if we needed to do some thinking when lost, but the chain of command became I came across a short but powerful money was tight, should these sugges- short, with the idea of empowering those article written a few years ago by two tions not be applied as the situation line commanders to run their squadrons consultants to the United Kingdom improves? Let’s take a minute to see if with only one boss directly above them at Ministry of Defence, David Chinn and this is the case. the tactical level. A big change to be sure. John Dowdy. They conducted a survey Chinn and Dowdy suggest that real Somewhat conversely, Chinn and in December 2014 of “almost 1,000 transformation can best be applied at Dowdy next suggest militaries should not leaders and senior employees in more the “sharp end,” or, as we know it, the reorganize but look for quick wins that than 30 U.S. Government agencies and tactical unit. As an example, “just in can build a momentum for change. They found that only 40 percent believed time” logistics has already been applied also recognize the biggest problem with that their transformation programs suc- widely, and 3D printing may even further change in militaries—resistance to move ceeded.” Even though these results do reduce the demands on the supply chain away from the status quo. To achieve a not seem heartening to those “change that feeds warfighting units. The authors successful transformation, leaders have to agents” among us, their research sug- suggest that “leading through the line,” set a clear idea for change and reinforce gests how to change one’s military even instead of top-down direction, places line how that move is tied to the mission. in a period of budgetary pressure, as commanders with expanded authorities Next, leadership has to show personal was recently experienced in Europe and but holds them accountable. Recently, and lasting commitment to the change. the United States. In fact, as of this the Air Force initiated an experiment in The authors’ last suggestion may be the
2 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 one needed most for success: invest in every level is the readiness of their units, One of the great advantages of my building the right capabilities. Some 75 and exercises have been an effective way position in the joint professional military percent of U.S. Government leaders to prepare for their missions, with joint education world is knowing some ex- surveyed who achieved limited success in exercises being the most prized of expe- ceptional scholars who also happen to be their change efforts blamed not having riences. William Buell, Erin Dorrance, great teachers. Our Recall article is writ- the right capabilities to make transforma- and Robert West suggest that even with ten by JFQ alumnus Bryon Greenwald, tion happen. Maybe as new capabilities the continuing demands of combat one of my teaching battle buddies at are introduced into the joint force, operations across the world, having a the Joint Forces Staff College. His ar- these capabilities will induce a round of transregional capstone exercise is nec- ticle is an excellent look at World War I game-changing experiences. If they do, I essary to be prepared for future crises. through the lens of two of today’s most hope you will write to us and explain your With programs that were meant to solve important concepts: combat adaptation experience. Until then, we have some problems faced by the joint force often and jointness. In Joint Doctrine, along useful ideas to get you started thinking becoming headlines in the news for with our joint doctrine update, George about changes that might be needed. their cost overruns, Michael McInerney, Katsos discusses economic security and This issue’s Forum brings three Conway Lin, Brandon Smith, and its relationship to campaign planning and diverse but important articles that offer Joseph Lupa offer some useful sugges- activities. We also include three engaging some new ideas about today’s increas- tions for joint acquisition reform. book reviews for your consideration. ingly complex and competitive security In Commentary, we offer three arti- With this issue your JFQ team com- environment. With a seemingly constant cles that should get you thinking about pletes our 90th edition and prepares to barrage of concerns about data breaches changes and how they might be brought celebrate the journal’s 25th anniversary and the use of big data to potentially about in the joint force. Joint Special this fall, all thanks to our readers, authors, solve complicated problems, Cortney Operations University’s Charles Black, and the veterans of NDU Press, who Weinbaum and Jack Shanahan offer some Richard Newton, Mary Ann Nobles, have kept this great idea of General Colin interesting insights into the impact of and David Ellis discuss how U.S. Special Powell moving forward in support of the data in the evolving world of intelligence. Operations Command is using a design joint force. Join us in supporting what the Former Headquarters Pacific Air Forces approach to bring back creativity and general called “the cool yet lively interplay commander Terry O’Shaughnessy (now innovation. Following our discussion of among some of the finest minds commit- commander of U.S. Northern Command “by, with, and through” from JFQ 89, ted to the profession of arms.” JFQ and the North American Air Defense Keith Smith believes one of the best ways Command) and his teammates Matthew to succeed in conflict is through security William T. Eliason Strohmeyer and Christopher Forrest force assistance. Taking a page from tele- Editor in Chief have done some excellent thinking vision reality shows involving cooking, about shaping strategy and its potential Mike Jernigan and Jason Cooper believe to expand our deterrence options in we can innovate through a more compet- great power conflicts. Honored to have itive approach. one of the leading defense scholars in The Features section provides some Errata A JFQ 89 caption misstated the date General the pages of JFQ, we welcome back interesting explanations to some nagging Colin Powell met with NDU Press staff. The Michael O’Hanlon from the Brookings questions in the defense and security en- meeting occurred in January 2018. Also, author Institution as he considers the environ- vironment. Cole Livieratos has researched David P. Polatty’s name was misspelled in the same issue. NDU Press regrets the errors. ment that planners are likely to face when U.S. involvement in asymmetric conflicts looking at future combat employment of and explains why the United States pre- Navy carriers. fers kinetic solutions to other options, JPME Today returns in this issue which he believes might yield less costly with three interesting articles on topics results. As we have read in previous including space, joint exercises, and issues, China is reforming its military acquisition reform. The great Canadian at an unprecedented scale and rate. “strategist” Joni Mitchell once sang Shane Smith, Thomas Henderschedt, “you don’t know what you’ve got ’til it’s and Timothy Luedecking help explain gone.” Our space capabilities certainly how the Chinese are using a version of fall into that category, so Chadwick Goldwater-Nichols as a guide to create Igl, Candy Smith, Daniel Fowler, and a joint force. Lastly, Michael Ferguson’s William Angermann suggest the best case study comparison of Demosthenes way to deal with any losses that we might and Winston Churchill is not only en- take in that arena is to seriously plan. A tertaining but also impressive, given the constant concern for commanders at youthfulness of the author.
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Eliason 3 Sailor aboard guided-missile destroyer USS Michael Murphy takes part in Office of Naval Research demonstration of new and improved training combining software and gaming technology to help naval forces develop strategies for diverse missions and operations, Pearl Harbor, March 24, 2016 (U.S. Navy/John F. Williams)
Intelligence in a Data-Driven Age
By Cortney Weinbaum and John N.T. Shanahan
n a foreseeable future, battles may detects a “launch,” a weapons package the adage that “information is power,” unfold using weapons and tactics may have already reached its target society has created technologies capable I that the United States is ill-pre- and achieved its desired effect. Attacks of creating volumes of structured and pared to detect or counter. Today’s against satellites, economic attacks, unstructured data so large as to over- ballistic missiles take tens of minutes and covert influence campaigns can all whelm all previous forms of analytic to cross an ocean, but tomorrow’s occur undetectable to the human senses tradecraft and pattern recognition. As hypersonic weapons may take merely until too late. part of their recommendations from the minutes. Urban warfare could occur in The vector, volume, velocity, variety, January 2017 public meeting, the U.S. hyper-connected cities where overhead and ubiquity of data are disrupting tra- Defense Innovation Board asserted that sensors provide limited value, while ditional tools and methods of national whoever amasses and organizes the most ubiquitous ground sensors provide too security policy, operations, and intel- data—about ourselves as well as our much data for analysts to mine. In the ligence. The scope of such disruption adversaries—will sustain technological cyber domain, by the time an operator will only grow and accelerate. Under superiority.1 Failure to treat data as a strategic asset will cede precious time and space to competitors or adversaries. The U.S. Intelligence Community Cortney Weinbaum is a Management Scientist at the RAND Corporation. Lieutenant General John N.T. “Jack” Shanahan, USAF, is Director for Defense Intelligence (Warfighter Support) in the Office of the (IC), to include the Defense Intelligence Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Enterprise, faces daunting challenges
4 Forum / Intelligence in a Data-Driven Age JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 of pure scale—volume and velocity—as operators. Artificial intelligence (AI) training exercises “to gain operational well as an ever-increasing complexity systems have created their own languages information, gauge troop strength, and of data—variety and veracity. The IC is that human programmers could not read2 intimidate soldiers,” according to Alliance challenged to acquire, manage, correlate, and have taught themselves to play games officials.5 fuse, and analyze ever-increasing amounts using tactics that humans did not teach The ability to fuse enormous amounts of data across agencies and with allies and cannot comprehend.3 The repercus- of data from across disparate data sets and and partners. In our experiences, data in sions of these effects in national security provide meaningful answers are exactly the IC are generated in too many diverse systems are unknown, untested, and what artificial intelligence and machine formats, in too many disconnected or remain largely unexplored. learning were designed to do. As long as inaccessible systems, without standard- the commercial sector can find a way to ized structures and without overarching The Future Battlespace use data to anticipate the brand of car or agreed-upon ontology. This situation The future battlespace is constructed toothbrush that a consumer is likely to risks wasted collections, lack of timeliness, of not only ships, tanks, missiles, and purchase, vendors will sell capabilities to missed indications and warnings, and satellites, but also algorithms, networks, identify user preferences and weaknesses lack of relevance for decisionmaking. The and sensor grids. Like no other time with a specificity that intelligence officers result is an inability to fuse data to create in history, future wars will be fought might expect to find in psychological multi-sourced intelligence as early in on civilian and military infrastructures profiles. the intelligence cycle and as close to the of satellite systems, electric power The United States is at risk of allow- point of collection as possible. Analysts grids, communications networks, and ing adversaries to accelerate and steal are given a task too difficult, too cumber- transportation systems, and within the competitive advantage. China has a some, and with too many hurdles to clear human networks. Both of these battle- national strategy for AI with commensu- to provide timely and relevant analytic fields—electronic and human—are sus- rate pledges to invest billions of dollars judgments or actionable intelligence to ceptible to manipulation by adversary in AI technologies over the next 5 years.6 policymakers and warfighters. algorithms. Chinese researchers publish more journal These challenges should be addressed In electronic environments, algo- articles on AI than their U.S. counter- by: rithms are already used to monitor and parts,7 and People’s Liberation Army maintain control over most areas of crit- strategists are preparing for a world where embracing machine-learning algo- •• ical infrastructure (electric, water, food, humans cannot keep pace with battlefield rithms that can parse data, learn from financial, communications, and so forth). decisionmaking.8 the data, and then respond Russia and China have demonstrated In the United States, the recently encouraging creativity and deep •• their interest in testing the capabilities published National Security Strategy and thinking by intelligence professionals and weaknesses of these systems in the National Defense Strategy both address designing the policy, information •• United States, and intelligence agencies the importance of AI and autonomy technology (IT), agile acquisition, need the ability to fuse data across mul- to national security and warfighting.9 and security environment that tiple sources to understand adversary Beyond the 2016 National Artificial allows human-machine tradecraft to activities and intended outcomes. Intelligence Research and Development flourish. To disrupt human networks, the theft Strategic Plan, however—which is largely These problems cannot be solved of personal data on cleared government focused on research and development— within any one agency, program, or workers in the Office of Personnel the United States does not yet have a intelligence discipline. We see a compel- Management breach provides a rich data sweeping national strategy for AI. ling need for creative ways to adapt to set for an adversary to tailor a covert in- Eric Schmidt, executive chairman of this new environment that must include fluence campaign against each individual Alphabet (parent company of Google) improving the technological and opera- military leader or policymaker.4 If this and chair of the Defense Innovation tional advantages of the IC with systems data were to be combined with financial Advisory Board, described China’s and machines capable of manipulating records stolen from Equifax, email re- advances in AI compared to the United and understanding big data, as well as cords from Yahoo!, medical information States: “By 2020, they will have caught advancing human-machine and ma- from Anthem health insurance, and up. By 2025, they will be better than chine-machine collaboration, so analysts data from additional sources, algorithms us. By 2030, they will dominate the can make the best use of their time work- could create highly sophisticated and industries.”10 ing on the hardest problems. individualized covert influence cam- Meanwhile, serious questions linger paigns against the United States. In a less A Looming Intelligence Failure about the unforeseen repercussions of a sophisticated campaign, North Atlantic Future intelligence tradecraft will machine-learning “black box” that can Treaty Organization military forces depend on accessing data, molding the generate solutions in ways that might recently reported that soldiers’ phones right enterprise architecture around not be readily explainable to its human were hacked by Russia during military data, developing AI-based capabilities
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Weinbaum and Shanahan 5 to dramatically accelerate contex- data-oriented era, it is increasingly pos- indications and warnings before human tual understanding of data through sible to draw intelligence of value from operators have time to read an alert or ini- human-machine and machine-machine the data in aggregate (temporal and geo- tiating a response within a predetermined teaming, and growing analytic expertise spatial behavior patterns, for example). set of approved parameters. Machine capable of swimming and navigating in This can result in an ironic dilemma in learning offers new opportunities to enormous data lakes. The IC needs to which there is too much data for humans shrink the first two phases of the OODA develop tradecraft and methodologies to search effectively for needles, yet not loop, greatly increasing the potential for for accessing, arranging, and analyzing enough accessible data from which to humans to accelerate decisionmaking and data, including structured analytic tech- draw and validate useful intelligence. taking action. niques and analytic tradecraft standards Next is the question of what to do We may well be facing a future for machine intelligence. New technol- with intelligence once it is attained. The involving algorithm-versus-algorithm ogy is evolving faster than the ability of military Services are developing and warfare, leading us to question whether the Department of Defense (DOD) and acquiring combat systems with a greater 21st-century warfighters might look at IC to implement it, train on it, and use hunger for data and intelligence than in minutes of decision time as luxurious it effectively. the past, and intelligence mission data relics of the past. Within the Defense Intelligence must be transferred to these systems as Enterprise, investments in collectors and early as possible in the acquisition cycle Solutions Exist Within Reach sensors are generating an ability to collect and then updated frequently and fast Intelligence agencies can and should more data from more sensor types than enough for use in combat, in ingestible invest in cross-domain, cross-program, at any time before. The DOD roadmap data structures, and at classification and cross-discipline machine-learning for unmanned systems describes a plan levels the combat systems can handle.13 capabilities and require intelligence for thousands of unmanned air, sea, and Meanwhile, within the policy community, officers to use these capabilities to ground systems, without a clear path for policymakers are increasingly relying on their fullest potential. Any data that how all the data from those systems will unclassified publicly available information remain stovepiped in compartments, be analyzed to create value.11 This is in when classified intelligence is too slow to proprietary databases, and on classified addition to space systems and publicly arrive or too highly classified to be useful.14 domains that algorithms cannot reach available unclassified systems. An increase In his groundbreaking work on the will require manual integration by intel- in collection, to include from the most observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) ligence officers, delay intelligence assess- highly classified exquisite sensors, does loop, Colonel John Boyd, USAF (Ret.), ments, and create protected bubbles not necessarily equate to more or better emphasized the importance of operating of data where officers may not be able intelligence or orientation, especially at a tempo or rhythm that an adversary to see inside to bring all sources to when facing near-peer competitors who cannot comprehend or match. Operating bear on analytic problems. This vision may prove equally adroit at adapting to inside an adversary’s OODA loop helps threatens concepts of “need to know” the information environment. accomplish those objectives by disori- and would force the collection and DOD Project Maven, led by enting or warping an opponent’s mental analytic communities—with their breth- Lieutenant General Shanahan, has a images so that he can neither appreci- ren in counterintelligence and security goal of overcoming human intelligence ate nor cope with what is happening offices—to reconcile threats from analysts’ inabilities to deal effectively around him. In today’s fast-paced and outside with threats from within. Data with the massive amounts and types of ever-changing data-driven age, the terms protection policies may give algorithms collection across every domain, a quan- information dominance or informa- access to data fields that human analysts dary called “success catastrophes.”12 As tion superiority are chimerical; instead, are not cleared to see, possibly requiring a starting point and pathfinder project, temporal advantage might be the best decisions about how much trust can be former Deputy Secretary of Defense possible outcome. Yet even that could be placed in machines and how their work Robert Work tasked the Maven team to sufficient to gain the upper hand, if U.S. can be audited for vulnerabilities that find AI and computer vision solutions warfighters can stay inside the adversary’s are both naturally occurring and adver- to augment, amplify, and automate OODA loop while simultaneously using sary generated. exploitation of unmanned aerial system data in imaginative ways to distort the To create this endstate, several activ- full-motion video. adversary’s own orientation. ities should be considered. First, finding Current intelligence practices involve Artificial intelligence and machine the answer to any intelligence question extracting information of value from large learning provide opportunities to acceler- should start with the proposition that datasets of cross discipline (cross-intel- ate through every step of the OODA loop every analyst needs all potentially rele- ligence) information—the needle in the by making sense of data in real time as the vant data, from every possible source.15 haystack—leading to the bulk collection data arrive, evaluating options and initiat- This suggests striking a different balance and storage of hay in hopes that eventu- ing an action in milliseconds, and acting. between the classic deductive (searching ally all needles will exist inside. In a more Such decisions may include responding to for the known unknowns) and inductive
6 Forum / Intelligence in a Data-Driven Age JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Soldier with 3rd Battalion, 6th Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (LI), navigates new Precision Fires-Dismounted system, which includes viewing live-streaming full-motion video from unmanned aerial vehicles on smartphone, 3D digital maps, and ability to send precision target coordinates, at Mission Training Center, Fort Drum, April 5, 2018 (U.S. Army/James Avery)
(synthesizing to discover the unknown or manipulated data, including under- to provide the fuel for machine learning unknowns) analytic approaches. It also standing how to use AI to maximum and human-machine teaming. In turn, requires a different approach to collection advantage to prevent even the more rapid data access requires effective data because all data may be relevant long sophisticated influence operations from management, which calls for new skill after collection and should be accessible affecting desired operational outcomes. sets and expertise—such as data architects in discoverable archives; the processes for Second, data would not be treated as and data scientists. Network access across doing this will depend heavily on whether an IT problem; instead, IT systems should all security domains, access to all relevant datasets include information on U.S. per- be framed by the operational problems data types, and agile integration of disrup- sons and other protected entities, while they solve. This requires moving from tive technologies are key to achieving and data controls and data quality assurance closed, proprietary architectures and sustaining decision advantage. become essential functions. untenable lack of data standards to open Third, publicly available information Widespread integration of machine architecture and Agile Methodology— and open source information will provide learning and AI will present new oppor- open architectures and fast transient the first layer of the foundation of our tunities for deception resulting from data adoption of new technologies and appli- intelligence knowledge. This requires a that have been altered or manipulated. cations—where any data from any source major shift from assuming that the highest Counter-AI will become prevalent while can be found and ingested by any analyst classified intelligence is the most infallible influence operations will take on new at any time. More often, algorithms to embracing and integrating nontradi- dimensions that have yet to be fathomed, will be moved to the data, rather than tional and unclassified sources. Exquisite requiring a renewed emphasis on both trying to move data to the algorithms. collection from all other intelligence offensive and defensive cognitive-centric Global cloud solutions are essential to disciplines will enhance foundational intel- operations. Intelligence analysts need integration, optimized for all aspects of ligence and fill in existing knowledge gaps. to be trained on how to recognize AI rather than only for data storage or This flips a 60-year paradigm and chal- attempts by an adversary to use altered search. Data access must be mastered lenges the very concept of “intelligence”
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Weinbaum and Shanahan 7 Airman with 379th Operations Support Squadron performs maintenance on satellite dish at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, March 30, 2018, as part of Operation Silent Sentry, protecting critical satellite communication links (U.S. Air National Guard/Phil Speck) when classification is not a requirement for that last 2 years or more result in agencies the training and resources to manage information to be of intelligence value.16 on-boarding employees who were at the an overhaul of contracting processes Fourth, shift the joint and combined top of their game 2 years ago (an eon in that puts focus back on quality, results, analytic workforce from industrial-age a data-driven world), and, for mid-ca- and the speed of relevancy rather than production line processing and exploit- reer hires, position requirements value defaulting to lowest price technically ing single collection streams of data to experience in government over science, acceptable contracts.18 Adapting Agile an information-age enterprise model technology, and analytic experience in the Methodologies would facilitate faster where some analysts conduct multi- and commercial and academic sectors.17 In paces of technology development, imple- all-source correlation and fusion, fully the best of circumstances DOD and the mentation, and refinement. Finally, each integrated with joint, national, and IC have been challenged to create multi- of these reforms would create an environ- international partners. While layering year budget strategies within the 4-year ment where research and development intelligence data is a decent start, it is Planning, Programming, Budgeting, (R&D) offices—in IC agencies and insufficient. Both human and AI system and Execution process, while in today’s military Services—can thrive. R&D orga- sense-making are needed to deliver time climate of chronic continuing resolutions, nizations need the brightest technologists and space for decisionmaking. This prin- creating a budget strategy is a hope rather to build partnerships among collectors, ciple also introduces broader questions than a regular occurrence. Intelligence analysts, and industry vendors, and they about the future balance of breadth and agencies have tried again and again to need the support of proactive contracting depth across the analytic workforce. create innovative acquisition reforms officers and an effective budget environ- Training would require more emphasis using small subsets of their budgets and ment to succeed—ultimately leading to on synthesis and creativity in analysis. “innovation offices,” but these solutions an AI-ready, prototype warfare culture. Finally, the solutions described above stall when scaled across national or mili- would require a revolution in IC life tary intelligence programs. Concluding Thoughts cycles for human capital, budgeting, ac- Changes to the IC’s traditional Our proposal has at least one Achilles’ quisition, and research and development. acquisition processes will require a gen- heel that the United States should plan Hiring and security clearance processes eration of contracting officers who have for and mitigate: an over-reliance on
8 Forum / Intelligence in a Data-Driven Age JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 9 technology. Even in the age of autono- ability to make sense of data quickly and National Security Strategy of the Unit- ed States of America (Washington, DC: The mous systems, war will remain a human remaining inside the adversary’s OODA White House, December 2017), available endeavor. If the Nation were to fight a loop. Will the United States and its at
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Weinbaum and Shanahan 9 Seaman handles mooring line on fantail of aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt during regularly scheduled port visit to Singapore, April 2, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Michael Colemanberry)
Strategic Shaping Expanding the Competitive Space
By Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, Matthew D. Strohmeyer, and Christopher D. Forrest
To prevail, we must integrate all elements of America’s national power—political, economic, and military. . . . The United States must develop new concepts and capabilities to protect our homeland, advance our prosperity, and preserve peace.
—2017 National Security Strategy
Deterring or defeating long-term strategic competitors is a fundamentally different challenge. . . . [O]perations must introduce unpredictability to adversary decisionmakers. . . . [W]e will challenge competitors by maneuvering them into unfavorable positions, frustrating their efforts, precluding their options while expanding our own, and forcing them to confront conflict under adverse conditions.
—2018 National Defense Strategy
10 Forum / Strategic Shaping JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 he strategic imperative to succeed military planning and strategy still re- decisionmakers” and “challenge com- in great power competition flect previous ideas of deterrence and petitors by maneuvering them into T demands a new approach to strat- coercion. Current paradigms rely on the unfavorable positions, frustrating their egy to deter, compete, and win against direct threat or application of military efforts, precluding their options while rising and resurgent powers.1 Compet- force—posturing force against force in expanding our own, and forcing them itors are exploiting gaps between the the field to compel an opponent to back to confront conflict under adverse traditional understanding of “peace” down.8 In a similar way, these paradigms conditions.”11 and “war” to aggressively advance their often view shaping operations prior to This article argues that to counter interests below the threshold of armed conflict as a means to set the battlespace these actions and maintain an enduring conflict—often in ways that undermine for tactical and operational success in mil- military and national competitive advan- the U.S.-led international order. Russia itary conflict. The result of this strategy tage, the U.S. defense establishment must encroaches on the sovereignty of its is often a military campaign that lacks develop new strategies and operational neighbors, such as the Ukraine, while strategic vision beyond the tactical fight concepts that expand the competitive the international community struggles and an operational battle of attrition space to deter great powers from escalat- to respond in ways that will deter this where the larger or better equipped force ing prior to or during crisis and ensure behavior in the future.2 China flouts prevails. This approach served the United that we maintain military advantage at international law, claiming new terri- States well over the past century while it an acceptable cost in conflict. To this tory and others’ intellectual property as enjoyed a dominant global military ad- end, this article presents a new approach their own, while eroding U.S. influence vantage. In the decades since Operation termed Strategic Shaping. Strategic in the Indo-Pacific.3 Desert Storm, however, the Nation has Shaping is a coercive strategy employing Both the 2017 National Security increasingly relied on technological an integrated whole-of-government Strategy and 2018 National Defense dominance, ceding quantitative military approach that aims to complicate an ad- Strategy recognized this paradigm shift superiority to these competitors. This versary’s calculus and target his strategic in warfare and now identify China and strategy has proved effective against intentions, not just his forces. The objec- Russia as strategic competitors who countries and nonstate actors over which tive is to create a sharp deterrent effect by exploit advantages below the threshold the United States still retains an asym- removing the adversary leadership’s sense of armed conflict to reach their strategic metric military advantage. of control of the crisis or conflict. There objectives.4 General Joseph Dunford However, such a strategic approach are three pathways through which the recently referred to these actions, broadly may be ineffective in the face of the rapid United States can strive to impact strate- termed hybrid warfare, as “adversarial military advancements of China and gic perceptions: competition with a military dimension Russia, particularly within their imme- by rapidly presenting the adversary short of armed conflict.”5 The National diate regions.9 The eroding American •• with multiple dilemmas, degrad- Defense Strategy puts an even finer point advantage demands that the joint force ing adversary leadership’s sense of on the challenges that China and Russia consider additional concepts that move control pose, stating “they have increased efforts beyond regional attrition-based warfare by enhancing the complexity of the short of armed conflict by expanding co- to exploit competitor weaknesses and •• situation, instilling doubt in the ercion to new fronts, violating principles apply U.S. global advantages. Moreover, adversary leadership’s mind of their of sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and the National Security Strategy specif- own capabilities deliberately blurring lines between civil ically calls for new concepts enabling by posturing to react globally instead and military goals.”6 These actors make the United States to “deter potential •• of locally, leveraging U.S. strengths operational gains with means that fall enemies by denial, convincing them against adversary weakness. short of the Western definition of war— that they cannot accomplish objectives and the West fails to provide options through the use of force or other forms Strategic Shaping contributes to the to deter or counter these competitors’ of aggression.”10 Furthermore, the current debates on how to manage in further gains.7 National Defense Strategy compels the great power competition by providing a While U.S. strategic guidance calls joint force to consider approaches that new approach for countering countries’ for a new approach to these challenges, “introduce unpredictability to adversary attempts to make operational gains on the margins of “peace.” It is also more than horizontal escalation; it is a paradigm shift from a force-on-force General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, USAF, is Commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command. Lieutenant Colonel Matthew D. Strohmeyer, USAF, is approach to one that first seeks to create Commander of the 560th Flying Training Squadron at Joint Base San Antonio–Randolph, Texas. deviations in an adversary’s expectations. Lieutenant Colonel Christopher D. Forrest, USAF, is an Airpower Strategist and Chief of Indo-Pacific Lastly, the concept of Strategic Shaping Division Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Operations, Checkmate Division, in Washington, DC. The authors would like to thank Dr. Oriana S. Mastro and Dr. Forrest E. Morgan for their contributions to builds on classic research in the areas of early drafts of this work. coercion and deterrence that highlight
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 O’Shaughnessy, Strohmeyer, and Forrest 11 the untapped asymmetric advantages that the defense establishment has relied Conventions. But China and Russia exist in first exploiting adversary percep- heavily on material capabilities, use, and often take actions designed to undermine tions and desired strategic outcomes.12 demonstrations of military superiority the United States and its allies without Rather than advocate for a new theory to meet these three standards in crisis escalating to the threshold of armed of deterrence or warfighting, this article and the ability to attrite fielded forces in conflict. Any nation shackled to a binary offers a tangible way to put the advice conflict. But direct application of force on understanding of wartime and peacetime of these thinkers into practice to address force may be insufficient to successfully is necessarily vulnerable to adversary today’s great-power challenges. In the coerce more advanced countries such as exploitation and unnecessarily cedes valu- words of Air Force Chief of Staff David Russia or China. Instead, we argue that able competitive space. Understanding Goldfein, the joint force, as part of a strategy must focus on using military an adversary’s intentions and war par- whole-of-government approach, must forces in such a way that impacts a po- adigm allows for the development of a transition from “wars of attrition to wars tential adversary’s beliefs about the costs, counter strategy, one that often must of cognition.”13 To achieve this approach, benefits, and likely outcomes of different include competition below the threshold military strategists must rethink how courses of action.15 In other words, of conflict. This is the void into which military force is employed in crisis and instead of threatening or attempting Strategic Shaping takes the first of many conflict, while recognizing the de facto to destroy an adversary’s fielded forces steps to come. blurring of those lines by our strategic as much as possible, Strategic Shaping competitors. directly targets adversary incentive struc- A Complementary Approach While the theory behind Strategic tures and decisionmaking. Only through Strategic Shaping is a coercive strategy Shaping certainly applies to steady-state affecting cognitive change can U.S. that applies rapid, whole-of-government strategy for great-power competition, attempts at deterrence and compellence strategic actions to present multiple, the scope of this work is primarily within short of war against a near-peer com- complex dilemmas to an adversary’s the crisis and conflict space. This article petitor be successful. Additionally, like leadership and thereby removes their first examines leading coercive theories, any coercive strategy, Strategic Shaping sense of control, deterring them from highlighting their applicability to dealing is fundamentally a political-diplomatic military conflict. Where pure cost impo- with rising power challenges in the Gray strategy that is most effective in produc- sition and denial strategies attempt to Zone between peacetime and wartime. ing a deterrent effect on the adversary influence adversary operational capabil- We then posit the need to evolve from a in crisis or early conflict when integrated ities by destroying or dislocating fielded focus on attrition and material factors to and synchronized across the whole of forces, Strategic Shaping directly targets one of perception and cognitive factors. government.16 an adversary’s strategy to rapidly con- Finally, we outline the how and what of The raison d’être of the military is found his ability to control the bound- Strategic Shaping as it might be applied to apply force against an opposing mil- aries of a crisis and instill doubt in the in a whole-of-government approach itary to produce a desired military and efficacy of continued military action. against a strategic competitor. political endstate, but if coercion is fun- The intent is to reduce the adversary’s damentally psychological in nature and confidence in his strategy, to create the Moving from Attrition is most effective when integrated across sense that he has overreached, and to to Cognition the diplomatic, informational, military, turn his focus to political objectives Coercion is the threat of damage in and economic elements, how does the that now appear to be at risk. By exac- order to convince a state to yield or military best present forces to achieve erbating uncertainty, Strategic Shaping comply with one’s demands or desires. coercive effects when it is not at war? strives to deter the use of force in crisis Both deterrence and compellence are Such a planning shift may require the and compel an off-ramp in conflict. But forms of coercion; deterrence is the U.S. defense establishment to adjust its if forced to fight, Strategic Shaping also deployment of military power so as to paradigms on the effective use of military postures forces globally to fight from a be able to prevent an adversary from force. Traditionally, Western powers held position of advantage. Strategic Shaping doing something that one does not to the Clausewitzian model that war is targets adversary strategic intentions, want him to do, while compellence is violence and without violent actions, a applying U.S. strengths to confound the deployment of military power so as nation is not really at war. This simple those intentions for a deterrent effect. to be able either to stop an adversary paradigm shackles the military to a my- There are three central elements of a from doing something that he has opic search for the war it wants to fight Strategic Shaping approach. First, there already undertaken or to get him to do rather than the one its competitors might is the creation of rapid, simultaneous something that he has not yet begun.14 present. Moreover, in this paradigm, dilemmas that applies during the crisis The success of either form of coercion there are mutually agreed-upon rules for space before an adversary selects a mili- relies on the capability to inflict unaccept- both peacetime, such as the rules, norms, tary course of action to achieve his aims. able costs, communication of the threat, and principles of the international order, Specifically, the United States needs to and the credibility of the threat. To date, and those in wartime, such as the Geneva consider how its adversary expects the
12 Forum / Strategic Shaping JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 SA-330J Puma helicopter drops supplies on flight deck of USS Truxtun during vertical replenishment with Military Sealift Command dry cargo and ammunition ship USNS Richard E. Byrd, Red Sea, April 12, 2014 (U.S. Navy/Scott Barnes) crisis to unfold, and in particular how the The second element of Strategic with multidomain military force from a Nation will respond, and then take actions Shaping encompasses the movement position of advantage against adversary that confound these expectations. For and posturing of forces to positions that weaknesses. example, in evaluating a military option, can hold at risk adversary weaknesses The third element of Strategic adversary political leadership often seeks with the U.S. strength of global power Shaping is the display of asymmetric assurances from the military that lower projection. The movement of these military capability to instill doubt in the level provocations will not result in a crisis forces, while effectively setting the theater success of the use of force in the minds or conflict that may put other strategic with required posture, also multiplies of adversary political leadership and political goals at risk. If, during a growing the first element’s effects of multiple applies in late crisis and into conflict. crisis, the United States executes concise dilemmas. As the Departments of State Rather than reducing the adversary whole-of-government actions targeted and Commerce take coordinated actions leadership’s sense of control of the situ- against varied vulnerabilities beyond the with the adversary’s bordering nations, ation, this element seeks to erode their immediate issue—to include geopolitical the movement of naval and air forces to assumptions of military capability and weaknesses, internal political rivalries, posture against adversary weaknesses cre- the effectiveness of their forces against national infrastructure challenges, eco- ates additive dilemmas. These challenges the United States. In combination with nomic dependencies, and geographic increase if American forces can stage in the previous elements, the Nation would limitations—this may cause the adversary third-party nations, elevating the political rapidly demonstrate previously undis- to reassess the risks of its approach. Faced cost of in-conflict targeting decisions and closed asymmetric military capabilities. with a significant deviation between thereby their go-to-war calculus. These While this comes at a long-term tactical expectations and reality, doubt and risk actions exacerbate the cognitive sense of cost of allowing the adversary to develop aversion increase, sense of control and loss of control and confounded expecta- a response, the short-term political confidence decreases—all delaying or even tions. Most importantly, if the adversary benefit of instilling military doubt and preventing the adversary from continuing chooses conflict, these globally postured compelling an off-ramp may outweigh along his planned course. forces allow the United States to respond the cost. The more that demonstrations
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 O’Shaughnessy, Strohmeyer, and Forrest 13 Conclusion and Implications One of the enduring challenges of any strategist or military planner is to understand and correctly assess the operational and strategic environments. A military planner must also understand the characteristics and centers of gravity of the adversary and select the appro- priate strategy to meet desired friendly force strategic endstates. There are times, as history has shown, where strict cost imposition and attrition-based strategies are appropriate. This article does not discount their usefulness. Instead, we argue for shifting our coercive strategy paradigms from attri- tion toward cognition—starting with adversary beliefs and perceptions and then considering operational capabil- ities. From the perspective of today’s antiaccess/area-denial operational envi- ronment and great-power use of Gray Zone warfare, competitive overmatch must start from an asymmetric perspec- tive, applying strengths to weaknesses. The wars of tomorrow need to operate within the cognitive domain and with the kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities that can be brought to bear to directly F/A-18F Super Hornet, assigned to Fighting Redcocks of Strike Fighter Attack Squadron (VFA) 22, influence adversary choice selection. breaks sound barrier over aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt during airpower demonstration, Pacific Ocean, May 3, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Spencer Roberts) Strategic Shaping and the concepts discussed herein have the ability to of capability mask the actual technol- include a variety of nonkinetic diplomatic, produce the complex dilemmas for an ogy or platform, the greater the doubt informational, military, and economic adversary to create significant effect on created in the minds of the political lead- pressure across varied geographic loca- its sense of control and therefore its ership. As the interwar strategist J.M. tions. Because speed and synchronization decision to use force. Strategic Shaping, Speight stated of cognitive effects of new are vital to create the cognitive effect of at its core, seeks to achieve Sun Tzu’s technology, “the mystery of airpower is these actions, a Strategic Shaping ap- elusive maxim to subdue one’s enemy half its power.”17 proach must be thoroughly planned and without fighting, and it postures the The linchpin of these three elements precoordinated at the highest levels of joint force from a position of strength if are speed and synchronization.18 Taken government. it comes to conflict. alone, the movement of military forces Central to this coordinated response We must now evolve our strategy during a crisis to an unexpected or is the need for implied reassurance to to attend first to adversary intentions threatening location may not create a the adversary that if he ceases the coer- and ability to make coherent decisions significant deterrent effect. In fact, such cive military action, the United States through an asymmetric approach that an isolated action may have the opposite will remove all corresponding pressure. pits U.S. strategic strengths against result by signaling a lack of real U.S. This reassurance may come as direct adversary weaknesses. Strategic Shaping resolve, appear as an unsupportable messaging to the adversary leadership directly answers the call from the overextension, or be used by an adversary or through the careful choice of actions National Defense Strategy that demands as a pretext for war. However, the same that can be quickly reversed and that can we “develop new operational concepts movement of forces, if combined with minimize lasting political impact, pro- to sharpen our competitive advantages” a host of whole-of-government actions viding the adversary with off-ramps that and “expand the competitive space, and synchronized with U.S. resolve, may minimize international and domestic seizing the initiative to challenge our compel adversary leadership to select a fallout. In this way, the coercive effect is competitors where we possess advan- nonmilitary approach. Such actions may achieved. tages and they lack strength.”19
14 Forum / Strategic Shaping JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 10 The requirements to consider a in the Ukraine and China’s assertive behavior in National Security Strategy of the United the South and East China Seas.” Furthermore, States of America, 26–29. Strategic Shaping approach holds sev- Russia’s objective in the Ukraine is not to “win 11 Summary of the 2018 National Defense eral implications for the joint force. a war” but to bring it further into its orbit Strategy, 5. Operational planning and strategy must and to discourage other countries from doing 12 While we did not include an extensive lit- move beyond current paradigms and in- the same. Finally, a RAND 2015 study points erature review in the article, the primary works stitutional processes to maintain relevance to the very real challenge posed by a Russian of Thomas C. Schelling, Lawrence Freedman, attack against the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- and Alexander George were referenced heavily. in a time of great-power competition. nization in which the Alliance would be unable 13 Megan Friedl, “Goldfein Delivers Such efforts must consider first the cog- to successfully defend its most vulnerable Air Force Update,” AF.mil, September 19, nitive domain of warfare and integrate members. 2017, available at
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 O’Shaughnessy, Strohmeyer, and Forrest 15 F/A-18E Super Hornet from Tophatters of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 14 participates in airpower demonstration over aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis, Pacific Ocean, April 24, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Ignacio D. Perez)
The Future of the Aircraft Carrier and the Carrier Air Wing
By Michael E. O’Hanlon
hat is the future of the aircraft cyber systems that not only make its envisioned 355-ship fleet of the future. carrier for the U.S. Navy? modern ships more efficient but also It would appear to envision a similar role W Some would argue that the leave them vulnerable to hacking, this for the carrier in any future wars to what carrier is obsolete. Faced with threats school of thought has predicted that transpired, say, in Operation Desert Storm ranging from China’s DF-21 and the carrier will soon go the way of the in 1991 and in any future high-end crisis DF-26 ballistic missiles with homing battleship. diplomacy such as the Taiwan Strait Crisis warheads, to the proliferation of quiet Others, including most of the existing of 1995 and 1996. attack submarines, to the spread of Navy establishment, appear to hope that In my view, both these views are nuclear weapons, as well as the very the carrier of tomorrow can continue flawed. The Navy would do better to virtually the same missions as carriers plan for fleets of 10 flat-deck aircraft of the past. Indeed, the Navy still sizes carriers (and another 10 large-deck the carrier fleet using similar criteria to amphibious ships—its “small carriers”) Michael E. O’Hanlon is a Senior Fellow and the Director of Research in the Foreign Policy Program what it employed in those earlier peri- rather than to aim for larger numbers. at the Brookings Institution. ods—and plans to keep doing so under But it should more clearly prioritize, and
16 Forum / The Future of the Aircraft Carrier and the Carrier Air Wing JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 accelerate, development of long-range can include helicopters, Harrier jets, propose the following more detailed stealthy airpower, most likely in the form Ospreys, and, in the future, F-35B taxonomy of potential missions for the of unmanned aircraft, to operate off these Lightning II jets. future U.S. aircraft carrier fleet: carriers. The amphibious ships typically weigh peacetime and crisis presence in key The article begins with a brief sum- 40,000 tons with length of 850 feet or •• regions (largely for deterrence and mary of today’s aircraft carrier fleets and so. By contrast, the flat-deck carriers reassurance) air wings, and then works through the with 75 aircraft to a wing weigh about establishment of maritime air taxonomy of missions for those U.S. mili- 100,000 tons, with a length of roughly •• supremacy, plus littoral sea control, tary assets—today and tomorrow. 1,100 feet.5 in key regions against less powerful Which type of system is better—the foes (the Persian Gulf region) Modern American Aircraft large-deck carrier with three times the establishment of maritime air supe- Carriers and Air Wings number of aircraft, or the smaller carrier •• riority, plus littoral sea control, if The United States has two aircraft with a couple dozen? It all depends possible, against near peers (South carrier fleets today. The first is the one on the mission. Amphibious ships, per China Sea, Baltic Sea) most think about when they hear the aircraft deployed, are somewhat less power projection ashore against less term—the large flat-deck carriers, of expensive over a life cycle than flat-deck •• powerful foes (Iran, North Korea) which the Navy now has 11. Each is aircraft carriers.6 They are also, however, power projection ashore against near capable of holding up to about 75 less capable, plane for plane, so they •• peers (Russia, China) planes, together known as a carrier air would not constitute a less expensive or blue-water sea control (against a peer wing, with capacity for catapult-assisted more effective way to deploy airpower for •• or near-peer rival). takeoff and tailhook-assisted landing.1 high-end combat. Considerations includ- There are nine carrier air wings in the ing survivability, fuel and ammunition Thinking through the capabilities force today—fewer than the number of storage, and maintenance capacity would of the carrier fleet against each of these carriers themselves, since aircraft need favor the larger ships. The flat-deck possible missions helps clarify what kinds, not have quite the same lengthy mainte- carrier is also more effective at sustain- and numbers, of carriers and air wings nance and training cycles as ships.2 These ing operations in bad sea conditions.7 the United States should pursue in the aircraft typically include 44 F/A-18 Affordability issues can favor one type of future. I group the above six missions Hornet or Super Hornet combat air- carrier for some conditions and another into four categories in the following craft, 5 electronic warfare planes, 4 for different conditions or missions. discussion. airborne control planes, 8 antisubmarine Each of the Navy’s aircraft carrier Peacetime Presence and Crisis warfare aircraft, 2 transport aircraft, fleets—the flat-deck fleet and large-deck Response. Historically, when conducting and 8 to 11 helicopters for purposes amphibious ships—would increase force sizing, the Navy has often empha- ranging from antisubmarine warfare to under the Service’s 2016 proposal, now sized the importance of the peacetime search and rescue. (Put differently, there endorsed by the Trump administration, presence mission more than combat re- are typically four squadrons of F/A-18 to grow the fleet to 355 ships in coming quirements. The goal of such operations, combat jets. There is typically also one years. It is an ambitious plan since the of course, has been to reassure allies squadron of helicopters, one of elec- current fleet numbers less than 300 ships, and deter potential adversaries in those tronic warfare aircraft, one of airborne and the previous plan aimed for 308. regions of greatest strategic concern to command and control planes, and one Some, however, would say it is not so the United States, while providing at least of antisubmarine warfare aircraft.3) Over ambitious since it would only return the some initial response capability should a time, the carrier fleet will include the fleet to a size characteristic of the Clinton crisis quickly escalate to open hostilities. F-35C, Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, and years—but today’s vessels, and the aircraft The key regions during the Cold War eventually perhaps a future derivation on them, have never been so capable and included the Western Pacific, the broader of an Unmanned Carrier Launched Air- in general have also never been so large. Persian Gulf area, and the Mediterranean borne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) Under this new plan, the current figures Sea, though that last area has been deem- aircraft. They will replace some of the of 11 flat-deck carriers and 11 amphibi- phasized during most of the post–Cold older Hornets, C-2 aircraft, and perhaps ous large-deck vessels would grow to 12 War era. other systems as well.4 and 13 vessels, respectively.8 Today’s aircraft carriers based in the The Navy also has another 11 ships, United States—all of them except the each with about one-third the carrying Purposes of Aircraft Carriers one that is homeported in Japan and con- capacity for planes as the flat-deck ships. in the 21st Century sidered constantly on station—average The aircraft on these large-deck amphib- Aircraft carriers are often described as just over 25 percent time on deployment. ious ships, designed primarily to move ships designed to help control the sea Thus, they typically average perhaps 20 Marines around the world and provide lanes or to project power. Those con- to 22 percent of their time on station in platforms for some of their operations, cepts are valid, but a bit vague. I would forward waters because they have lengthy
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 O’Hanlon 17 periods of maintenance, preparation, and signal where their important interests lie My own view is that the opportu- then sustainment (that is, being on call and when they demonstrate the kinds nity to base more land-based tactical for rapid response) that consume most of of capabilities that can credibly provide fighter aircraft in Gulf Cooperation their time and because the Navy rightly combat superiority in a conflict. Carriers Council countries—say, one to two prefers to limit the duration of any given have helped enormously in these tasks. squadrons each in Kuwait, the United Sailor’s deployment to 6 or 7 months They have not prevented all wars, of Arab Emirates, and/or Oman—should when possible.9 Additionally, there are course—for example, when Washington be explored as a way to allow occasional long maintenance periods a carrier gen- was not clear about its interests (in the gapping of carrier coverage in the broader erally goes through in its lifetime, with prelude to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in Persian Gulf region. In addition, the one planned lengthy mid-life overhaul 1990, for instance) or when its offshore types of presence missions conducted in and often a couple more unanticipated (if carrier presence was not particularly rele- the South China Sea do not generally shorter) ones. This reduces the effective vant to the type of conflict being waged involve any heightened risk of imminent fleet available at any given moment to on land (many of the Middle East’s civil conflict and thus can be carried out by perhaps nine on average. Thus, a fleet of wars and insurgencies, or those in the even smaller vessels than large-deck 11 carriers, with 1 homeported in Japan Balkans). But they have helped convey amphibious ships. (Indeed, Coast Guard and 2 probably offline at any moment, America’s interest in the security of vessels might suffice, and send a useful can effectively sustain somewhat fewer Taiwan, the waters of the Persian Gulf, message of firm but quiet resolve to than 3 on forward station. They would and Northeast Asia, among other places. Beijing.) Surging carriers infrequently include one or more in East Asia, one or Again, it is difficult to disentangle the near North Korea may be more useful more in the Persian Gulf, and occasion- various contributors to successful deter- than frequently having just one carrier ally one in the broader Mediterranean rence. It is, however, impressive that in there.13 The list goes on. For the presence region or the Indian Ocean (these latter most cases where the United States has mission, there is just as strong a case to deployments often occurring when ships established strong alliances and demon- reduce each of the carrier fleets by one or are in transit).10 strated commitment to them through two ships as to grow them, in fact.14 There is considerable logic to the forward military deployments war has Power Projection Against a Lesser, basic idea of peacetime presence. It shows been avoided. Regional Foe. Consider two of my cate- clear American commitment and steady This quick review of the role of air- gories that focus on regional operations attention to a given region. It is less sig- craft carriers in American national security against lesser (but still dangerous) foes. nificant as a way of maintaining decisive policy underscores the importance of This set of challenges relates most of combat power in a key area, since one perception, more than of demonstrated all to the Persian Gulf region and the carrier—whatever its many strengths— combat capability or war-winning waters of Northeast Asia near the Korean constitutes only a limited capacity. That overmatch, in how the fleet is routinely Peninsula. is true not only for the obvious situation operated. If that is the case, we should si- Carriers could be needed to help in which the United States might seek to multaneously conclude two things. First, establish air superiority in coastal regions. deter a large power, but also even in cases carriers have likely been quite helpful for They could also be needed to contribute involving smaller powers. For example, deterrence and reassurance. But second, to ground-attack operations. the one aircraft carrier stationed in the just when and where and how often they For air superiority against a regional Mediterranean just before the outbreak must deploy to achieve a given effect is foe typically possessing 300 to 600 of the Kosovo war in 1999 was far from less clear. aircraft, many of them likely obsolete enough to deter, or defeat, Serbian Does aircraft carrier presence really or unserviceable, 4 to 6 U.S. carriers strongman Slobodan Milosevic.11 But an need to be continuous in places where would likely suffice. That would provide aircraft carrier battle group still represents the United States also has an established something approaching quantitative and conveys American resolve, with the land presence? Are there cases where parity with enemy forces, combined with implied promise of likely reinforcements land-based airpower or other assets huge qualitative superiority, and a certain should hostilities break out. In other could relieve strain on the carrier force? hedge against attrition. words, its benefits are largely psychologi- Are there locations where the lesser For ground-attack, Operation Desert cal, but nonetheless important. but still impressive combat capabilities Storm provides a useful frame of refer- America’s command of the commons represented by a flat-deck amphibious ence. In that war, there were some 700 has been rather robust and contributed ship would be adequate, and a large-deck key Iraqi strategic targets, presenting to one of the most conflict-free periods carrier could visit only occasionally, if a total of about 3,000 aimpoints, that in major-power relations in recorded at all? To be sure, amphibious ships are were attacked. These included command history. To be sure, nuclear deterrence themselves already typically quite busy as and control locations, radar sites, and and other factors have contributed to key parts of Marine Expeditionary Units the like.15 There might be twice as many the general absence of war as well. But (MEUs), but normal MEU deployments aimpoints against Iran or North Korea.16 deterrence only works when states clearly can be rethought in some cases, too.12 (These figures stand in contrast to the
18 Forum / The Future of the Aircraft Carrier and the Carrier Air Wing JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Aviation Ordnanceman works with shipmates to upload ordnance to F/A-18 Super Hornet on flight deck aboard USS Harry S. Truman, Mediterranean Sea, May 3, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Thomas Gooley) total of 40,000 strikes against ground armada of four to six flat-deck ships could against an Iraq-like foe in the absence targets during the entirety of the war— probably achieve whatever ground-attack of reliable bases on land—at least for a which included almost 25,000 against role the regional combatant commander spell.19 (Studies have also found that, Iraqi ground forces and multiple strikes required of it. in many Cold War periods, the United against many fixed aimpoints.17) Perhaps In major recent wars, which have States did not really have anything close 20 to 50 percent of these target sets been fought largely in the broader to a half-dozen carriers available for a would be within the potential reach of Persian Gulf region, the Navy has typi- regional contingency—or a “1/2 war,” the carrier fleet, which could attack many cally wound up deploying five to seven as conflicts against smaller foes were often of them within a few weeks. But the car- aircraft carriers at peak strength.18 Not called back in that era.20) rier fleet would likely have help. Indeed, coincidentally, major post–Cold War Averaged across scenarios, a carrier for providing strike capabilities against defense planning documents starting with fleet of 10 flat-deck ships (and another ground and coastal targets, it could have the Base Force and the 1993 Bottom-Up 10 smaller carriers, the amphibious large- lots of help—even more than with the Review commonly assumed that five to decks) would seem adequate to the task littoral air superiority mission. Not only six carriers would be needed in any future of dealing with regional foes like Iran and nearby land-based fighter aircraft but conflicts of similar character. Whether North Korea. Such a Navy could even also long-range bomber capabilities (and five to seven carriers were always truly likely support up to two regional conflicts cruise missiles on other ships and subma- needed for conflicts in which the United at once, as U.S. war plans and broader rines) could contribute. Thus, even in a States generally also had access to land defense policy still require. If necessary, scenario in which land bases in the region bases is debatable. Whether more than one operation could probably be handled had been overrun or otherwise rendered five to seven might be needed in a region with three to four aircraft carriers, since unavailable due to an initial enemy attack, lacking land bases is another important ample land bases for tactical airpower or in which regional political problems question. Indeed, over the years, some would likely be available. (In a worst case, precluded access to other countries’ studies have found that up to nine aircraft virtually all of the available fleet might bases for combat operations, a carrier carrier battle groups might be needed
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 O’Hanlon 19 Sailors and Marines participate in flight deck washdown aboard USS Iwo Jima, May 7, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Dominick A. Cremeans) need to be surged to one place until bases is considerably less likely than against the foe, or ships operating near their coasts, on land could be reestablished.) likes of North Korea or Iran, and as such would shift the calculus substantially. For Some ongoing improvements to it is not necessary to think in terms of those missions, longer range aircraft are the carrier air wing could be useful for two simultaneous operations. But robust much better. They allow the carriers to regional conflicts, too, including the deterrence does require war-winning remain at greater distance, enhancing F-35C stealthy aircraft and longer range combat capability against one at a time, their survivability and that of their sur- ground-attack variants of a UCLASS. today and into the indefinite future. face-combatant escorts. Such capabilities However, the case for a different mix of For scenarios involving either of could be hugely helpful even if military aircraft in the carrier wing is most vivid those countries, there are more profound balances had evolved to the point where when considering possible conflict against distinctions between the air superiority the close-in air superiority mission were a near-peer rival. mission and ground-attack mission. no longer as feasible as it had once been. Scenarios and Missions Against Establishing air superiority, if even feasi- Consider one specific example: an op- a Near-Peer Foe. Against a country ble, is most achievable if the carriers are eration involving elements of a Chinese like Russia or China, the challenges of relatively close to the airspace they are naval blockade against Taiwan, perhaps projecting naval power are, naturally, far defending. Otherwise, huge amounts of after Beijing determined that Taipei had greater. Those countries have advanced time would be lost in transit, and rapid taken some steps leaning too far in the di- submarine forces, resilient reconnais- reaction against any kind of enemy surge rection of declaring independence. China sance-strike complexes that are difficult to attack might not occur in sufficiently might conclude that a naval blockade bring down, and potent antiship missiles prompt fashion. could be “leaky” but still be quite potent. of various types. Of course, they also have On the other hand, attacking targets It would not need to stop all ship voyages nuclear weapons. Conflict against either on the territories of either potential into and out of Taiwan; it would simply
20 Forum / The Future of the Aircraft Carrier and the Carrier Air Wing JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 need to deter enough ships from risking Both sides would of course be sorely American space-based reconnaissance and the journey that Taiwan’s economy tempted to attack the adversary’s run- communications systems could survive in would suffer badly. The goal would likely ways, as well as refueling and rearming the face of antisatellite and cyber attacks. be to squeeze the island economically to supplies for the aircraft.25 Chinese capa- If the United States, in conjunction with a point of capitulation.21 bilities in these areas are now such that Taiwan and perhaps Japan, concluded The centerpiece of the approach any Chinese attack against military facil- that conventional operations were not would probably have China’s submarine ities in a place like Okinawa would likely going their way, they might elect to fleet introduce a significant risk factor shut down runways for at least some undertake a systematic campaign of into all maritime voyages into and out stretch of time, and destroy aircraft, bombing targets in southeast China of Taiwan—occasionally sinking a cargo ordnance, and fuel stocks that had not contributing to the military campaign, ship with submarines or with mines it been properly secured in underground such as missile-launching bases, radar and laid in Taiwan’s harbors.22 Over the last areas and/or hardened shelters.26 China surface-to-air missile sites, and submarine 20 years, China’s fleet of modern attack might very well be able to threaten ports (whether or not China had already submarines has grown from roughly 2 U.S. aircraft carriers, too. The closer attacked bases in Okinawa directly). Then to 40.23 China’s precision-strike capabil- they were to Chinese shores, the higher there is the risk of nuclear escalation, ities have improved to the point where the likelihood that sensor-shooter links whether inadvertent or intentional.29 it could conceivably use a preemptive could be maintained long enough to Even though U.S. nuclear forces far missile and air attack against Taiwanese guide a cruise or ballistic missile to exceed those of the People’s Liberation airfields and ports and associated infra- target. Chinese submarines could tar- Army, China might conclude that its structure to hobble Taiwan’s ability to get not only cargo ships but also Navy disproportionate interests in the Taiwan strike back.24 vessels, including carriers. The United issue in particular would warrant nuclear To break the blockade, under current States and any allies would use their own brinkmanship. thinking, the basic concept of operations antisubmarine warfare assets operating Where does this leave things? I for the United States and Taiwan would off land bases and carriers to hunt down believe the United States does need to probably be to deploy enough forces to Chinese submarines. prepare for the direct defense of assets the Western Pacific to set up a protected The typical Chinese attack submarine of threatened friends and allies (such shipping lane east of Taiwan. To carry out might succeed in getting off several as Taiwan, or Japan’s Senkaku Islands, that mission, the United States, together shots against valuable, and vulnerable, or eastern farming towns in Latvia or with Taiwan, would need to establish air surface ships before meeting its own Estonia). However, in the actual event of superiority throughout a large part of the demise.27 A recent major RAND study hostilities, the United States would also region. The United States and Taiwan, on the U.S.-China military balance con- want other options—asymmetric ones, and perhaps Japan and other allies as well, curred with this broad result, especially what B.H. Liddell Hart might call an would also need to protect ships against in cases where Chinese submarines could indirect approach, that played to its own Chinese submarine attack and cope with be cued by sensors to a general area strengths. Rather than forcibly reopen sea the threat of mines near Taiwan’s ports. where a target like a U.S. aircraft carrier and air lanes into Taiwan, or promptly The air superiority mission has might operate.28 China might hope that taking back that notional Baltic farming become much harder given Chinese mod- a quick strike that sank a major U.S. village, the United States and allies might ernization, combined with the realities ship and killed hundreds of Americans wish to apply military power at times of geography and the limited options (or even thousands, in the event of a and places of their own choosing, where for basing U.S. aircraft in the region. carrier sinking) would cause Washington the correlation of forces and geography Fortunately, modern U.S. stealthy or to waver in its future commitment to were more favorable. There would be fifth-generation aircraft are still far supe- the defense of Taiwan. Thus, the carrier downsides to such an approach; the rior to Chinese planes. Unfortunately, fleet in particular would be important threatened ally might not be immediately China now has close to 1,000 fourth-gen- to protect, more so than other military protected. But deterrence—the real goal eration fighters of rough comparability to or commercial assets. Yet if the United here—would likely be reinforced because U.S. aircraft such as the F-15 and F-16. A States made protection of the carrier its indirect defense may be a more credible, RAND simulation estimates that it might preeminent concern, those carriers could and believable, response than direct de- take 6 or 7 U.S. fighter wings (each with be pushed so far out to sea as to be fense in some cases. some 72 planes)—based on Okinawa, in much less useful as platforms launching Thinking in these terms leads nat- other parts of Japan, on Guam, and on aircraft for air superiority or antisubma- urally to my final mission area for the carriers, and supported by aerial refueling rine warfare operations. future carrier fleet—sea control. I think tankers—to do the job. The United States Of course, there would be huge of it as not only a defensive mission to could lose a number of aircraft in this pro- additional uncertainties in this kind protect western shipping but also an cess, perhaps even dozens; China could of scenario, starting with fundamen- offensive opportunity against the assets of lose dozens, or even hundreds. tal doubt as to whether Chinese and possible adversaries.
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 O’Hanlon 21 Sea Control and the Indirect Even if China increasingly succeeds have intelligence-driven strikes against Approach. Being a maritime nation with with time in making its own littoral a relatively modest number of the right allies all around the world, the United regions, including the South China Sea, kinds of larger assets, most of all ships. States has a special interest in securing more difficult and potentially dangerous Numbers matter, but capabilities matter blue-water sea lanes as well as the airspace for American ships, the Indian Ocean even more in such situations. In some above the oceans. This is particularly basin is a different matter. Ambushes near such situations, long-range bombers may true in a globalized world.30 Fortunately, the Straits of Malacca, or alternatively be the preferred tool. In others, however, this is a task the United States remains the Strait of Hormuz at the other end of carriers may be useful. They can also be very good at—and far ahead of China or a notional journey by an oil tanker from helpful in protecting sea lanes to Europe, Russia, even if those two powers could the Persian Gulf to China, could constrict Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the pose limited risks to blue waters with China’s access to oil. Attacks might also Middle East in the event of hostilities their respective submarine forces. take place in the southern South China against another great power. The sea control mission goes well Sea, far from Chinese bases. These could beyond the simple idea of sustaining free involve a combination of bomber, sub- Conclusion access for all to the global commons in marine, and carrier-based aircraft, even In this article, I outlined a nuanced case peacetime. There are wartime scenarios if no regional states like Singapore or for the future aircraft carrier force and where it could also be of great impor- Thailand or the Philippines ultimately its associated air wings. The carrier is tance, as well. wanted to offer America access to bases not becoming obsolete, but its optimal If Xi Jinping commands an attack on their territories. Russian trade could usages in peacetime and especially in on Taiwan, why not take away his de- be challenged in ocean waters near the war against near-peer competitors are pendable sources of oil and his ability to Baltic and Mediterranean seas, as well as changing. trade by sea with foreign partners, rather the Sea of Okhotsk. In neither case would To be sure, some traditional carrier than put tens of thousands of Americans a blockade, coupled with strong and priorities would remain relevant even in close proximity to the Chinese coast sweeping sanctions, have to be airtight to with such a revised strategic concept for with a direct defense operation? If be strategically effective over time. the United States, which would still want Vladimir Putin fabricates a pretext to Indeed, such blockades as well as enough carriers for peacetime presence “protect” native Russian speakers in a associated sanctions would hurt the West. and crisis response, as well as various Baltic state with little green men, do we But such pain is preferable to huge and types of kinetic operations against re- really need to launch Operation Desert enormously costly military operations gional adversaries. Storm on steroids in response? Why that carry considerable uncertainty about Some of the means and methods by not take measures that would strangle their likely outcomes—not to mention a which these operations were conducted Russia’s economy, especially now that real risk of nuclear escalation. Moreover, could change. Large-deck amphibious Western European countries have built the West needs to bear in mind its inher- ships could substitute more often for up enough alternative sources of energy ent advantages. North Atlantic Treaty flat-deck carriers in some presence oper- (through integrated natural gas pipelines Organization nations plus Japan, South ations. More Air Force airpower could and the like) that they could survive any Korea, and Australia together represent be stationed in the Persian Gulf region, resulting Russian cutoff in their hydro- more than half of the world’s gross alleviating the pressure for the carrier carbon supplies? domestic product and by far the world’s force always to maintain coverage there. By combining sanctions with the largest markets. Factories in China and Greater use of unpredictable presence op- selective application of long-range strike oil and gas producers in Russia need us erations could sometimes be favored over power in parts of the global commons, more than we need them, especially given continuous time on station. the United States and its allies can make the world’s new sources of energy and Most of all, the United States needs it entirely unrewarding for Russia or the multiple manufacturing centers that to rethink how it might fight a near-peer China to carry out aggression against ex- could, if need be, replace much of what rival so as to enhance deterrence—and posed U.S. allies. Provided that we have China and Russia now do for the world figure out what that means for the carrier escalation dominance in such domains, economy. fleet and carrier wing. No allies should as I believe we do (though more could For these kinds of operations, long- be abandoned in this process, and no be done to ensure that, especially in range strike capability is highly desirable. strategy of offshore balancing should be economic realms), this kind of approach The purpose of carriers, and assets like adopted. American military assets should could play to Western strengths while bombers, in these sorts of missions, also largely remain forward deployed for also limiting the risks of escalation, since is less to establish air superiority than purposes of deterrence, assurance, and the kinds of military actions I propose to project strike power. Moreover, a warfighting capability, too. But direct and would involve relatively few casualties thorough bombing campaign against prompt defense of all allied territory may and take place at some distance from thousands or tens of thousands of land not be the best, and should not be the adversaries’ territories. targets is less relevant than an ability to only, option for future combat scenarios
22 Forum / The Future of the Aircraft Carrier and the Carrier Air Wing JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 against Russia or China. More indirect, 2015), 86–87, available at
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 O’Hanlon 23 View from aft flight deck window of DOD picosatellite known as Atmospheric Neutral Density Experiment, after release from shuttle payload bay by STS-116 crewmembers, December 2006 (NASA)
568 Balls in the Air Planning for the Loss of Space Capabilities
By Chadwick D. Igl, Candy S. Smith, Daniel R. Fowler, and William L. Angermann
An event of considerable technical and scientific importance . . . [its] importance should not be exaggerated . . . the value of the satellite to mankind will for a long time be highly problematical.
—Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 1957
n October 4, 1957, while the was simply “one small ball in the air,” The Space Race encompassed United States focused on domes- ushered in the Space Era and—follow- the National Aeronautics and Space O tic issues, the Soviet Union ing President John F. Kennedy’s chal- Administration’s (NASA’s) Manned Space successfully launched the world’s first lenge to land an American on the moon Lunar program, which drove America satellite, Sputnik. This event, which by the end of the 1960s—ignited the to the moon and inspired groundbreak- President Dwight Eisenhower quipped Space Race.1 ing American satellite programs. From 1958 to 1960, U.S. space firsts included Corona, the first reconnaissance satellite; Colonel Chadwick D. Igl, USAF, is Senior Military Advisor for the White House Office of National Drug Vanguard II, the first weather satellite and Control Policy in the Executive Office of the President. Lieutenant Colonel Candy S. Smith, USA (Ret.), the first to take a photo from space; and is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty and Staff Development Division at the Army University. TRANSIT IB, the first navigation satellite th Colonel Daniel R. Fowler, USAF, is Commander of the 137 Special Operations Group, Oklahoma Air 2 National Guard. Captain William L. Angermann, USN, is the Reserve Chief Staff Officer at U.S. Fleet program. These programs laid the frame- Forces Command. work for the U.S. military’s dependence
24 JPME Today / Planning for the Loss of Space Capabilities JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 on the National Reconnaissance Office’s The Importance of Space warfighters the opportunity to execute imagery and signals intelligence capa- to the U.S. Military wartime operational plans, competing bilities, real-time weather capabilities The uniqueness of the space domain objectives result in an unwillingness to provided by the Defense Meteorological requires combatant commands to play out the scenarios in a denied or Support Program, and the ubiquitous acknowledge and protect this COG degraded environment that warfighters Positioning, Navigation, and Timing through the operational art of plan- can expect to experience during actual (PNT) system, which provides, at no ning and mitigating risk. The failure to conflict. This is a clear indicator of the charge to over 2 billion people, access understand and plan for the probability critical dependence U.S. forces have on to the Global Positioning System (GPS) and severity of loss may well lead to space. Yet the U.S. military operates constellation. Today, nearly 60 years the culmination of the United States daily with the expectation that it will after Sputnik, the space capabilities and during war. Unfortunately, many U.S. not experience long-term denial of space effects provided by 568 U.S. satellites adversaries already understand the effects. As with the rest of the exercise are deeply integrated into all aspects of American reliance on space as a COG training objectives, U.S. military com- society, especially the U.S. military, and and an operational military paradigm. manders and staffs must assess, plan, that dependence upon them is simultane- Chinese military officers, strategists, and routinely train for the risk of oper- ously unrecognized and irreplaceable.3 and academics demonstrate a clear-eyed ating without integrated space effects Specifically, the U.S. military is heavily view of the space role by pointing out at every level of war. This conflict of dependent on space capabilities to provide that the opening action of any future interest does not allow the warfighter to navigation accuracy for weapons employ- war will likely take place in space, due understand the true impact of near-peer ment, bandwidth for telecommunications, to its nature as a COG.5 Russia, notable adversaries’ abilities to counter U.S. signals and imagery for indications and and singular among U.S. near-peers, capabilities on the battlefield. warning, and missile warning for theater recently combined its air and space Identifying risk at the strategic level operations and nuclear strategic attack. capabilities under one command, not should begin by addressing the military These dependencies create unquantified only to ensure a prompt response to assumption that long-term GPS denial is risk to the United States, and an adversary an attack on its capabilities but also unlikely to occur. The common misper- attack could compromise the effects pro- to ensure it engages adversaries in the ception by military commanders in the vided by U.S space systems. first stage of any conflict.6 Combatant field is that GPS denial would be local- Essentially, space capabilities became command staffs must plan to mitigate ized, temporary, and compensated by a center of gravity (COG) for the United the potential loss of space capabilities alternate options. In October 2008, Dr. States because the U.S. military depends if the United States is to counter near- Peter Hays, a senior space policy analyst on these capabilities and effects across all peer adversaries’ understanding of space with Falcon Research, stated, aspects of military operations.4 Space ef- and their attempts to leverage space as a fects influence planning and execution at COG during or prior to conflict. One of the greatest distinctions today is that strategic, operational, and tactical levels of most commanders in the field don’t put a war. At the strategic level, space capabilities Assessing the Absence lot of time and energy into thinking about influence national economic and defense of Space Capabilities how to get the effect they are calling for. policy including investment banking Because the Services fully integrate space They simply call for an effect and they have and combatant command theater strate- capabilities into warfighting systems, great confidence that it will be delivered gies. Campaigns and major operations the space capabilities themselves have from a wide variety of long-range precision depend on space assets at the operational become integral to mission execution strike capabilities and platforms.8 level. Tactically, battles and engagements and, ultimately, mission success. To utilize space assets to gain and maintain assume that space capabilities, including Highly reliable satellites and their cor- advantage over the enemy. In fact, the ground systems, will be available and responding space effects contribute to Department of Defense (DOD) integrates dependable in a conflict is inherently this misperception. However, more and embeds these capabilities so deeply dangerous and could lead to U.S. mili- important, the commander’s confidence that warfighters rely heavily on the benefits tary failure. Given how the U.S. military in space effects results in a lack of plans of space assets without a corresponding conducts its simulations of denied or for operating in a protracted, contested understanding of how much the U.S. mili- degraded space capabilities in exercises, space environment and an implied tary depends on them. By examining the such failure is possible. In recent exer- assumed risk rather than an explicit assumed and unique risk of space assets, cises, white cell teams quickly restored assumption of risk. we posit that systemic integration requires denied space services and capabilities to A lack of detailed, articulate plans at commanders and planning staffs to reduce allow progress in order to meet train- the strategic level leads to unacknowl- this liability by coherently identifying, ing objectives.7 While the purpose of edged and unquantified risks at the comprehending, planning, and mitigating a joint military exercise is to create an operational level. A primary consequence the potential loss of capabilities. artificial environment that provides of overconfidence in the provision of
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Igl et al. 25 AN/FPS-108 Cobra Dane radar, located at Eareckson Air Station, on Shemya, Aleutian Islands, Alaska, collects radar metric and signature data on foreign ballistic missile events and space surveillance data on new foreign launches and satellites in low-Earth orbit (U.S. Air Force/Brandon Rail) space effects is the risk of having inef- At the operational level, a long-term need to be exercised extensively in antici- fective mitigation and restoration plans. GPS or satellite communications denial pated real-world conditions to retrograde Warfighters must understand what the would cripple all joint functions and to alternative means or equipment. consequences of a loss of space effects result in incalculable risk. Operational The tactical level would also suffer se- would be, and they should be able to commanders’ complete isolation from the vere limitations for providing an accurate quickly make informed decisions on direct battlefield would detrimentally affect dis- application of lethal force and effective action to restore a capability or operate tributed command and control of forces self-defense resulting in the unnecessary without it. At U.S. Strategic Command until mitigation actions resolve the out- risk of collateral damage to people and (USSTRATCOM), warfighters who age. A common operating picture could equipment. Many sensors, munitions, directly control space assets and have miti- be unreliable for situational awareness guidance, navigation, and weapons gation plans to address losses or gaps do because chat and voice communications systems have a critical dependence on not actively utilize the space capabilities dependent on GPS timing signals would GPS or other space effects. For example, allocated in their area of responsibility. In be unavailable. The ability to give and an unmanned aircraft tasked to conduct most situations, a warfighter downrange receive orders would be restricted to a mission in a degraded environment must inform the functional combatant hardline telephones; these could be easily would struggle to proceed to the target command warfighters who control space compromised and the adversary could and be unable to reliably deliver ordnance assets that a denial or degradation exists. deny line-of-sight radio transmissions. or find the way back for a safe recovery. Often, warfighters downrange perceive a While intelligence, surveillance, and re- The United States predicates many of denial as fleeting and likely to be resolved connaissance capabilities may be available its systems designed for the purpose of without taking action. This usually de- through classified systems, war-planning indication and warning on the availability lays switching to a contingency plan—if rooms dependent on satellite communi- of space-provided connectivity. Peter W. one exists. A comprehensive plan must cations would have blank displays instead Singer, a 21st-century warfare expert from promptly direct operators to identify lost of routine news feeds. Additional data the New America Foundation, summa- and degraded space effects, quickly notify sources might display a “404–Page Not rized the military consequences of losing all users of the outage situation, inform Found!” error, signaling a failed Internet satellites: the correct agencies and units that can connection. Accordingly, operational restore services, and transparently imple- plans need to be in place to ensure mis- As one U.S. military officer put it, [it ment immediate mitigation actions. sion accomplishment, and those plans would] take us back to the “pre-digital
26 JPME Today / Planning for the Loss of Space Capabilities JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 age.” Our drones, our missiles, even our dramatic increases in the ability of ad- Figure. Ris Management Process ground units wouldn’t be able to operate versaries to disrupt, degrade, or destroy
the way we plan. It would force a rewrite cyberspace and space systems, it is essential 1. Identification of all our assumptions of 21st-century high- that Joint Forces be able to operate effec- tech war. We might have a new generation tively despite degradation to those systems. t n 2 of stealthy battleships . . . but the loss of space Greater resilience must be built into e . I m m e g p would mean naval battles would in many technical architectures, and the force must a a n c t a
A M ways be like the game of Battleship, where regularly train to operate in worst case s .
s 5 Ris e
12 s
the two sides would struggle to even find degraded environments. s
Management m
9 e
Process n each other. t While the CCJO states mission com-
4 Near-peer adversaries publicly admitted mand must be integral to training at the . Im p t le n to challenging continued U.S. reliance tactical level, the concepts of shared un- m e en pm t lo on strategic advantages in space, thereby derstanding and executing commander’s at ve ion De ion making the expectation of complete intent will only be amplified and severely 3. Mitigat control over the U.S. operating envi- affected if the tactical warfighters become ronment a risk-laden assumption.10 cut off from operational commanders due While many of the systems the U.S. to the unplanned and unmitigated loss military utilizes today can operate in of space capabilities. This is more than a tive termed “Assured PNT (APNT)” degraded conditions, warfighters lack technical limitation. Education, planning, advocates for an open architecture that sufficient proficiency due to limited and training for the loss of space capa- has the ability to incorporate multiple experience operating the systems in bilities must be reinforced with routine PNT-like sensors that improve resil- that fashion. The reliability and seam- exercises to firmly incorporate a decision- ience.14 Dee Ann Divis, a contributing less integration of satellites and their making paradigm where deployed forces editor to Inside GNSS, highlights how corresponding space effects in military are empowered to make all necessary APNT systems under development, operations cause most warfighters to take decisions affecting their force deployment including pseudolites and chip-scale space capabilities and effects for granted, and engagement. atomic clocks,15 present viable alterna- which instills a false sense of confidence tives that provide resiliency and immedi- that will be shattered and paralyzing if Ensuring Access to Capabilities ate backup capability to on-orbit GPS or when that capability is unavailable. A common risk management process, satellites.16 Operationally, combatant Confidence in a capability that may not as illustrated in the figure, represents a command staffs must enforce denial or exist—but upon which the warfighter is simplified, structured approach for com- degradation reporting. Prompt report- also completely dependent—quickly be- manders and combatant command staffs ing enables warfighters to implement comes a major liability. As Michael Peck, to plan for the loss of space capabili- mitigation plans and restore capabilities a contributing writer for the National ties at all three levels of war. Through as quickly as possible. These compre- Interest, noted, “No doubt the Pentagon a process of continual assessment, hensive plans must also focus on how to will find alternative technologies, per- U.S. forces must identify problems, maintain command and control through haps something that will replace GPS. assess impacts, develop and implement backup and legacy systems as well as But the larger question is technological mitigation plans, and train to manage direct tactical forces to work indepen- dependence. If the [U.S. military] is that risk to and dependence on exploit- dently utilizing tactics and procedures helpless when GPS is down, then perhaps able space systems in a conflict.13 Any that do not rely on space. the problem is with the user as well as the technological advantage U.S. forces Currently, planning fails to account technology.”11 For this simple reason, the have over an adversary could be severely for the sustained loss of space effects. U.S. military must place greater emphasis and devastatingly reduced and result Commanders rely on staff planners to on education, training, and planning, to in the culmination of the U.S. military engage this problem, which they are ac- include the identification or development through mission failure or unacceptably customed to, but space capabilities and of alternate technology to address appro- high attrition. This risk could manifest effects are not an asset that geographic priately operating without space-related itself in lost aircraft, ships, Soldiers, and combatant commands directly control. capabilities. Marines at levels not experienced since Due to the global nature of the space The 2012 Capstone Concept for the Vietnam War. Under the Trump domain, space effects extend across all Joint Operations (CCJO) recognizes administration, DOD must include theaters. As specified in the Unified the shortfall in education, planning, requirements in U.S. grand strategy Command Plan, USSTRATCOM is and training. Specifically, it addresses and national policy to pursue alternative responsible for delivering the requested operating in a degraded environment by technologies that reduce this exploit- space effects to meet combatant com- underscoring the able dependency. For GPS, an initia- mand requirements. Joint Functional
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Igl et al. 27 the effects into corresponding plans. Within USSTRATCOM, a small number of space SMEs are assigned to the head- quarters staff, while a larger number of SMEs are assigned to JFCC SPACE. At the geographic combatant commands, just a few billets are allocated to space SMEs with a predominant number of those billets allocated to the Air Force. The Services must fill these billets with competent, knowledgeable space person- nel capable of complete integration into any type of planning process, whether deliberate or crisis action. At the combat- ant commands, the J3 and J5 staffs must prioritize their space SME billets through the assignment process to ensure a gap in personnel does not result in a loss of military capability because a space SME was not positioned to articulate the im- portance of space capabilities to routine military operations. Building a robust space SME core is thus a joint effort where both the Services and combatant commands must work together to fill these critical space SME billets.
Operating Without Space With the onset of combat operations in 2003, DOD focused on reacting to the changing nature of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, contributing to a decreased emphasis on maintaining the U.S. technological supremacy over near- Armillary Sphere, adopted symbol of Space and Missile Systems Center at Los Angeles Air Force Base, peer adversaries. This change in focus points to partial solar eclipse at approximately 61 percent obscuration of sun at 10:20 a.m. local time, allowed adversaries to close the technol- El Segundo, California, August 21, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Sarah Corrice) ogy gap significantly. The Chinese launch Component Command for Space (JFCC space are assumed asymmetric advantages. in 2007 of a direct ascent antisatellite SPACE) accomplishes this through Joint However, assumed technological advan- weapon to destroy an old satellite in low- Space Tasking Orders, focusing on effects, tages are decreasing rapidly. Earth orbit caused concern.19 However, not tangible asset allocation.17 Geographic The April 2012 Chairman of the Joint it was the 2013 revelation that China combatant commanders are not allocated Chiefs of Staff White Paper discussing had the capability to launch a direct space assets. USSTRATCOM provides mission command emphasizes the need ascent antisatellite weapon to destroy a other space capabilities, such as satellite to empower field commanders to make satellite in a 22,000-mile geosynchro- communications, as an effect rather than decisions in the field.18 This mentality nous orbit that proved China had closed an asset, through a priority-based architec- permeates geographic combatant com- the technology gap.20 The discovery ture. In most cases, combatant command mand staffs and joint force headquarters that China could attack U.S. systems in staffs do not explicitly plan for space effects where the joint force commanders (JFCs) space quickly sparked the realization that because USSTRATCOM provides space rely on SMEs to use their knowledge the U.S. military’s dependence on space capabilities. The personnel responsible for pertaining to highly complex systems to technology may also be its greatest risk. maintaining the technological advantage at influence decisionmaking. This idea has yet to fully sink in. More the combatant commands are space opera- From a mission command per- concerning to experts is that both China tions subject matter experts (SMEs). The spective, the SMEs have the unique and Russia are developing weapons that “U.S. Strategic Command effects” and the responsibility requiring them to consider threaten U.S. space capabilities on the corresponding U.S. military advantage in all possible scenarios and then incorporate ground as well as in space.
28 JPME Today / Planning for the Loss of Space Capabilities JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 7 The discussion of the importance of mitigation and plans geographic combat- Chadwick D. Igl has witnessed this during multiple Tier 1 exercises since 2011. space capabilities and effects highlights ant commands should pursue. It is to 8 Ed Morris et al., “A Day Without Space: the crucial need to understand space as a stress the importance that combatant Economic and National Security Ramifications,” center of gravity. The impact of a loss of commands must first acknowledge space Washington Roundtable on Science and Public space effects is clear, especially as near-peer as a center of gravity and, as such, ac- Policy, Washington, DC, October 16, 2008. 9 adversaries actively develop capabilities to cept that protecting the domain and its Peter W. Singer, cited by George Dvor- sky, “What Would Happen If All Our Satellites deny, degrade, and disrupt U.S. access. capabilities requires planning and risk Were Suddenly Destroyed?” Io9, June 4, 2015, As the functional combatant command mitigation. The combatant commands available at
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Igl et al. 29 U.S. Marines with Force Reconnaissance Company, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, III Marine Expeditionary Force; British Royal Marines with J Company, 42 Commando; and U.S. Sailors with Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit 5, attempt to breach door during raids training in Guam, March 20, 2018 (U.S. Marine Corps/Carl King)
Transregional Capstone Exercise Training for Tomorrow’s Fight
By William A. Buell, Erin Dorrance, and Robert West
rain the way you fight because F. Dunford, Jr., describes how he sees framework that promises to enhance you will fight the way you train.” the current and future fight. Noting training against the most challenging T Just about every U.S. military the significant implications for how threats. To fully realize the CJCS vision commander embraces this time- the joint force will fight, he writes, “it for fully integrated transregional, multi- honored military mantra. In his column [is] probable that future conflicts will domain, and multifunctional capabilities for Joint Force Quarterly, Chairman of most often be transregional and fought across the joint force, however, the the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Joseph across multiple domains and functions. GIE framework should include a new Driven by this assumption, one of my Transregional Capstone Exercise (TCE) highest warfighting priorities is to incorporating all geographic combatant improve our ability to integrate joint commands (GCCMDs) and functional Commander William A. Buell, USN, is Branch Chief for Campaign Planning at Headquarters, capabilities in a transregional, multido- combatant commands (FCCMDs). While U.S. Southern Command J5. Major Erin Dorrance, main, and multifunctional fight.”1 the joint force has shown steady progress USAF, is the Military Deputy Chief in the Office of In response to the Chairman’s guid- toward exercising in multiple domains Congressional Affairs at U.S. Southern Command. Robert West is the Supply and Services Branch ance, the Joint Staff quickly implemented and across multiple functions within Chief at U.S. Southern Command J4. a Globally Integrated Exercise (GIE) regional theaters, large-scale transregional
30 JPME Today / Transregional Capstone Exercise JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 exercising remains in its infancy. This arti- in 2016, General Dunford observed M. Scaparrotti described the exercise as a cle highlights the transregional threat that that such threats increasingly operate complete success, stating that the exercise the exercise should address, delineates across the regional combatant command validated the ability to rapidly respond some basic requirements, proposes four structure.4 For managing these threats, together with decisive and overwhelming training objectives, and addresses three he recommended improving the ability of success in Europe and to enable other potential challenges to implementation. the Secretary of Defense to work across CCMDs.9 Austere Challenge is a good both geographic and functional combat- initial step toward transregional exercis- Transregional Threats ant commanders and strengthening the ing; however, it is time to build on that and Response Joint Staff.5 success by moving toward a new exercise Militaries must now operate in a As early as 2013, a Joint Staff J7 built on the premise that conflict with the complex and dynamic world where Deployable Training Division paper on 2+3 will affect the entire force to some several multifaceted real-world threats mission command and cross-domain degree. may affect an ever-growing battlefield. synergy noted that, while leadership often Not only do state actors such as Russia, discusses the benefits of cross-CCMD Exercise Program Requirements China, and Iran have the capability to activities, the U.S. military has not fully As part of the Joint Training Policy, the conduct transregional operations, but understood or addressed challenges in Chairman’s Exercise Program (CEP) a variety of nonstate actors, such as the cross-CCMD coordination. Moreover, is designed to improve capability and so-called Islamic State, al Qaeda, and how the Office of the Secretary of readiness of U.S. military forces to a multitude of transnational criminal Defense (OSD) would establish authori- conduct joint operations through regu- organizations (TCOs), also threaten to ties, responsibilities, and processes with larly scheduled strategic, national-level disrupt the international order across necessary Joint Staff support required exercises that look at plans, policies, and traditional combatant command bound- for globally integrated operations out- procedures under different simulated aries. While globalization trends have lined in the Capstone Concept for Joint crisis situations.10 The CEP further connected countries around the world, Operations (CCJO) had not yet been stipulates that DOD entities conduct they have also enabled threat networks tested.6 The J7 paper poignantly imag- exercises for a multitude of purposes and violent extremist organizations ined reallocation processes for critical to include joint training, theater- (VEOs) to operate on the global stage. resources such as munitions, intelligence, engagement activities, mission and In Admiral Kurt Tidd’s 2017 posture support, strategic lift, and cyber assets plan rehearsal, concept analysis, lessons statement for U.S. Southern Command, as limiting to mission success in a global learned evaluation, doctrine validation, he states that some criminal networks fight.7 While some initial progress in this and interagency integration.11 A TCE, in his area of responsibility are glob- area has been made, there are, no doubt, as part of the GIE framework, would ally integrated enterprises with profit many other challenges the Department of fall under and embrace all facets of the margins that rival Fortune 500 compa- Defense (DOD) has not considered that CEP with special emphasis on joint nies. These networks smuggle precursor a global TCE could reveal. training, concept analysis, and doctrine chemicals and fentanyl from China A TCE involving all GCCMDs evaluation. into Central America and Mexico in and FCCMDs would give Secretary Implementing the Joint Training order to make extremely potent heroin James Mattis and General Dunford a Policy, the annual Chairman’s Training that causes overdose epidemics in the realistic, in-time transregional training Guidance is a clear call for leadership to United States. There are networks that platform to prepare for conflict against shift their way of thinking about training transport large cocaine shipments to the the five key challenges. A total of five and exercising. It directs the joint force United States, West Africa, Europe, and TCEs spread over time as part of the to conduct “exercises involving multiple Australia, while others make tremen- GIE framework would focus on each CCMDs, the Joint Staff, and appropri- dous profits by illegally mining gold in challenge—Russia, China, Iran, North ate CSAs (Combat Support Agencies) Guyana, Peru, and Colombia. Other Korea, and VEOs on a global scale—to oriented on the priority strategic chal- networks kidnap, money launder, and focus training and allow sufficient time lenges [2+3] and homeland defense.” extort—all moving illicit goods across for planning. Currently, there are a hand- These exercises should “strengthen the the globe.2 ful of exercises that do, in fact, attempt ‘connective tissue’ between leaders and Combatant commanders face some to exercise transregionally with more organizations, validate assumptions, subset of five key challenges (compet- than one CCMD. In February of 2017, examine globally integrated operations ing long-term with China and Russia, the 3-week Austere Challenge exercise and other mature concepts, test key ideas, while deterring and countering North included four CCMDs: U.S. European and confirm the joint force can execute Korea, Iran, and VEOs), referred to as Command, U.S. Northern Command, assigned missions.”12 the “2+3” in their geographic region U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Each TCE would incorporate all or functional area.3 Speaking at the an- Strategic Command.8 U.S. European essential characteristics outlined in the nual Air Force Association conference Command Commander General Curtis Chairman’s Training Guidance. Mainly,
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Buell, Dorrance, and West 31 the TCE would reflect the strategic en- commanders and their staffs at the considerations can be evaluated in an vironment, emphasize global integration strategic and operational levels of war to exercise environment and lessons learned across the five key challenges, span the integrate interagency, nongovernmental, applied to doctrine development or ac- range of military operations, and enable and multinational partners in highly com- quisition programs. innovation.13 If designed properly with plex environments. The Joint Training Cross-CCMD Coordination. Once concrete objectives, the TCE would Policy advocates integrating a diverse au- common awareness is established, the strengthen the connective tissue between dience into exercises in order to identify joint force should be stressed to use that key leaders by addressing both higher “core competencies, procedural discon- information in a coordinated fashion level collaboration of the Joint Staff with nects, and common ground to achieve against the adversary. Hence, a third OSD and horizontal coordination among U.S. unity of effort.”17 training objective to improve cross- CCMDs that will be needed in crisis. Understanding that the Secretary and CCMD coordination is needed to bridge CJCS will likely be unable to clear their the gap from information to action. TCE Objectives schedules for the entire duration of the In the joint concept on rapid aggrega- To realize the Chairman’s transregional exercise, a global command and control tion, the J7 recommends that CCMDs training guidance, a TCE should objective would also test the ability of become increasingly collaborative and accomplish four specific training objec- these leaders, as well as combatant com- interdependent in both planning and ex- tives directed toward supporting one manders, to synchronize and coordinate ecution: “They must expand virtual and of the five key challenges scenario to information while traveling or attending physical collaboration among commands give GCCMDs and FCCMDs realistic to real-world schedules. This would differ to allow for shared situational under- training against a benchmark competi- sharply from current exercises where typi- standing and for the collective capacity of tor. These objectives include exercis- cally a role player is appointed to play the multiple commands to quickly combine ing command and control constructs, Secretary and CJCS and updates occur at and solve problems.”18 improving situational awareness on regular intervals, an unlikely scenario dur- Communications Systems Stress. transregional problems across GCCMD ing a major crisis. Finally, each TCE should stress com- boundaries, improving cross-CCMD Common Situational Awareness. munication systems. An exercise could coordination, and stress-testing com- Global participation would test not only then validate communications systems munications systems. command and control, but also coor- architecture, including satellites, informa- Global Command and Control. dination among nine unified CCMDs tion servers, multinational collaboration Exercising command and control as a as the joint force strives to meet the networks, and email services, when all training objective in a global scenario is second objective of improving situational CCMDs are straining communications needed to address shortfalls in DOD’s awareness on transregional problems infrastructure simultaneously. Admiral ability to integrate operations under the across GCCMD boundaries. This second Tidd capitalized on a unique opportunity current regional command construct. objective would be useful to determine to stress-test communications when he General Dunford does not believe that how the joint force would collectively found himself required to travel for other the current organizational and command contribute to shared awareness amid a obligations during PANAMAX 2016, an and control constructs are ready for the multitude of defense and commercial exercise that brings together land, sea, current or future fight.14 He states what options for building a common operating and air forces in a joint and combined op- is truly required is “global integration.”15 picture or common intelligence picture. eration focused on defending the Panama In attempting to address mission com- While Global Command and Control Canal. The staff coordinated multiple mand and synergy challenges, the J7 System–Joint is the program of record video teleconferences that patched into recommended incorporating OSD into intended to provide a one-stop shop for Joint Training Center Norfolk headquar- exercises as a best practice: “Where ap- joint planners to build awareness, most ters and CENTRIXS from a variety of plicable, exercise the agility of OSD as combatant commanders gravitate toward locations, including one occurrence while the establishing authority together with some sort of tailored system for their airborne. This unintended inject, though the [Joint Staff] under crisis conditions region for a variety of reasons. Google fraught with challenges, provided great to plan and direct responsive and syn- Earth, All Partners Access Network, realistic training and lessons learned to chronized cross–combatant command CENTRIXS (Combined Enterprise the CCMD. operations.”16 Regional Information Exchange System), A proposed TCE could only satisfy To best train for this objective, a and BICES (Battlefield Information the four proposed training objectives with TCE’s primary training audience should Collection and Exploitation Systems) are full participation from the primary train- be at the Tier One level and include the all examples of systems currently in use ing audience. Full participation is needed Secretary of Defense, CJCS, Joint Staff, to build a common operating or com- to test a variety of dilemmas that leaders and all CCMDs. The Tier One level of mon intelligence picture. Classification, may face, such as how the CJCS and training is designed to prepare national- bandwidth, manpower management Secretary will prioritize assets to CCMDs level organizations and combatant requirements, and compatibility when every CCMD would be making
32 JPME Today / Transregional Capstone Exercise JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 requests at the same time for the same challenge or threat. Conducting this ex- ercise once every 2 years would efficiently train key leaders and their staffs during their command tenures and provide valu- able lessons learned to improve the ability to fight transregionally.
Challenges Too Hard to Integrate with Existing Exercises. Some may say a biennial exercise that includes all GCCMDs and FCCMDs is unrealistic given the often frantic operations tempo and fiscal constraints that burden DOD. At pres- ent, this is true. However, reevaluating existing exercises and either canceling or integrating them into the capstone exer- cise could alleviate much of the additional burden of a new mandatory require- ment for the Joint Staff and CCMDs. Development of a TCE should follow the lessons learned from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the wake of the Crimea crisis, NATO quickly went from about 100 to 300 exercises per year and reached the limit of the Allies’ ability to support them. Instead of adding additional exercises, NATO is now focused on increasing their realism, flexibility, and robustness. This change in thinking has allowed for NATO to plan and execute faster.19 Likewise, a TCE provides an opportunity for combatant commanders to set aside redundant train- ing exercises while keeping the intent of higher guidance providing a “less-is- more” training option for the CCMD. The first full biennial capstone exer- cise should not be executed until 2020 to provide planners adequate lead time to plan and schedule the exercise across DOD. Furthermore, a TCE would have U.S. Army Special Forces reconnaissance team with U.S. Special Operations Command South to be assigned priority event status to prepares for patrol during Joint Combined Exchange Training culmination exercise with Panamanian ensure prioritization throughout DOD. security forces in Colon, Panama, February 1, 2018 (U.S. Army/Osvaldo Equite) Once scheduled far in advance, planners should be able to schedule other events and resources to do both. DOD and address this concern, the Joint Staff and around an established battle rhythm that other agencies are indeed faced with fis- CCMDs should first establish a culture runs a TCE every other year, on even cal challenges that have resulted in the that recognizes the value of a TCE and years, starting in 2020. United States having the smallest Army, set it as a top training priority in order to Scheduling and Resources. Others Navy, and Air Force since World War solidify support for aggressive exercise might argue that a TCE is just another II.20 At the same time, with the plethora participation. Rotating through the five exercise requirement that takes away of exercises already being executed, key challenges in a variety of scenarios time they could spend on real-world is- finding a time that would work across could further validate the legitimacy of sues and that there is not enough time the joint force would be difficult. To the exercise, as it would allow assigned
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Buell, Dorrance, and West 33 Ships and aircraft representing 19 nations participating in multinational exercise Unitas 2017 conduct joint amphibious landing demonstration, Salinas, Peru, July 22, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Bill Dodge)
CCMDs synchronizing responsibilities need. Options for building the necessary training is being used primarily for con- to exercise against a variety of benchmark training elements could include assigning cept development.21 Currently, there is threats. Despite the resource challenges, select staff a temporary duty assignment, not a sufficient amount of cross-CCMD ensuring the Secretary, Joint Staff, and employing modular training teams, hir- doctrine. When combined with the need all GCCMDs and FCCMDs participate ing short-term contractors, or creating to determine the resourcing described in the exercise is central to achieving computer system simulations. For an above, this would indeed be a formidable proposed training objectives, especially exercise of this scale, new collaboration challenge for joint force planners. It is command and control and communica- mechanisms among training elements important to note, however, that this tions stress-testing. Each GCCMD and might be required, as physical space to exercise could be a fire starter to gener- FCCMD’s unique capabilities and geo- house a training element of this magni- ate and/or validate joint doctrine in graphic expertise should be represented tude would likely not permit complete development. in the exercise, and this would indeed collocation. The key to addressing all of Each successive TCE would aid pose the greatest challenge to scheduling these challenges would be sufficient time doctrine development by feeding a cycle and execution. for planning. of assessment. As a starting point for To address the resourcing issue, it is Not Enough Doctrine to Exercise. development, exercise planners could important to put a mark on the calendar Another argument against incorporat- aim to test some of the ideas put forward as soon as possible to enable Global Force ing a TCE into the training schedules of in the Globally Integrated Operations Management processes time to allocate GCCMDs and FCCMDs is the lack of CCJO. This concept advocates eight key any shift in resources. The Joint Staff and transregional joint doctrine. The Joint elements among which mission com- CCMDs will also need to quickly deter- Training Policy for the U.S. Armed mand, global agility, and flexibility in mine required staff to serve as role players Forces states that training must be based establishing joint forces could be tested in and determine how best to meet this on approved joint doctrine unless the a TCE.22
34 JPME Today / Transregional Capstone Exercise JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 While mission command may be force capability to address these threats Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/fp/mission_ comm_fp.pdf?ver=2018-03-29-142405-290>. preferable in most situations, complex will persist. Smartly adding TCEs within 7 Ibid. conflicts with near-peer adversaries may the GIE framework will help realize the 8 John Vandiver, “From ‘Sleepy Hollow’ to require integrating mission command Chairman’s vision for the future joint War-Fighting Footing, EUCOM Muscles Up,” with centralized control mechanisms force and help him fulfill his statutory re- Stars and Stripes, October 13, 2016, available at required for employment of nuclear sponsibilities to advise, direct, assess, and JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Buell, Dorrance, and West 35 Scheduled to completely replace CH-53E Super Stallion by 2030, CH-53K King Stallion lands after test flight in West Palm Beach, Florida, March 22, 2017 (U.S. Marine Corps/ Molly Hampton) The Case for Joint Force Acquisition Reform By Michael E. McInerney, Conway Lin, Brandon D. Smith, and Joseph S. Lupa n the past 2 years, Congress has While efficiency is a worthy goal, the war by imposing jointness on the com- enacted new reforms to enable rapid bedrock value of acquisitions must be mand structure of the U.S. military. I acquisition of technologies for mili- to deliver a joint force with the capabil- Goldwater-Nichols turned the military tary use. If successful, these reforms ity and capacity to effectively meet the Services into force providers responsible may end up delivering warfighting demands of combatant commanders. for organizing, manning, training, and capability more quickly and cheaply, The Goldwater-Nichols Department equipping units that are then employed but they will not solve the funda- of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 by warfighting combatant commanders mental flaw in defense acquisitions. revolutionized how America goes to as a joint force. This dynamic leaves the Services fundamentally in control of the ac- Lieutenant Colonel Michael E. McInerney, USA, is a Joint Capabilities Analyst at Headquarters, quisition process, creating a classic U.S. Africa Command. Lieutenant Colonel Conway Lin, USA, is Deputy Chief of Space and Weapons “principal-agent” problem characterized Cybersecurity at the National Security Agency. Lieutenant Commander Brandon D. Smith, USN, is an Operations Officer in the National Military Command Center, Joint Staff J3. Major Joseph S. Lupa, by misaligned incentives. As agents, the USAF, is a Force Analyst at the Joint Staff J35 South in Norfolk, VA. Services should act on behalf of their 36 JPME Today / The Case for Joint Force Acquisition Reform JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 principals, developing forces tailored to of acquisitions are obviously important Figure. The Acquisition System the needs of the combatant commanders. concerns, the myopic focus on these two History has demonstrated repeatedly, goals obscures the fact that the biggest Big A Defense however, that the Services are too often defense acquisition problems often have Acquisition System motivated by parochial incentives, which nothing to do with how cost-effectively do not always align with those of the materiel is purchased. PPBES combatant commanders. The result Stories of money wasted during has been the consistent development development of ambitious acquisition of materiel solutions that are not opti- programs like the F-35 fighter or the JCIDS Acquisition mized for joint warfighting. To improve Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Process joint interoperability and warfighting Vehicle excite the media and may infuri- capability, Congress should reform the ate taxpayers. What the warfighter finds Defense Acquisition System (DAS) to more troubling, however, is when the Small A Defense empower combatant commanders and Services continue to champion fruitless Acquisition Process the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acquisition programs like the Army’s with early, direct, and proactive influence Future Combat System (FCS) for years ource Ronald T. Kadish et al., e en e c ui ition er or ance e ent e ort over materiel systems development. while underinvesting in capabilities de- (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Secretary manded by combatant commanders to of Defense, January 2006), 17. Acquisition System vs. support ongoing operations around the Acquisition Process globe. Without fixing that issue, efforts For decades, critiques of the DAS have to improve the acquisition process may the right time. If decisions regarding plowed the same infertile ground. inject some efficiency into the system but what, when, and how much are wrong, Dozens of failed efforts to reform the will not lead to a more integrated and it does not matter how efficiently money system have diagnosed the inefficiency capable joint force. is spent—the wrong equipment is pro- of the acquisition process and then sug- To understand this point, it is im- cured.4 For that reason, and because the gested additional regulations, authori- portant to first sketch out the bigger Acquisition Process has been studied ties, and oversight as the cure. For picture of how materiel development and exhaustively, this article proposes modest example, in his March 1973 statement acquisition works. The DAS—colloquially reforms to JCIDS and PPBE in order to before the U.S. House Committee on known as “Big A” acquisitions—is actu- make the DAS more accommodating of Armed Services, Comptroller General ally three interconnected subprocesses combatant commander needs. of the United States Elmer B. Staats within DOD. First, the Joint Capabilities identified that “overly ambitious perfor- Integration and Development System Misalignment of Incentives mance requirements combined with low (JCIDS) is the subprocess that identifies The 2006 Defense Acquisition Per- initial cost predictions [and] optimistic capability gaps and generates require- formance Assessment Report, led by risk estimates . . . lead almost inevitably ments. Think of JCIDS as the way that Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, to engineering changes, schedule slip- DOD decides what to buy. Second, the found that “combatant commanders pages, and cost increases.”1 Yet 43 years Planning, Programming, Budgeting, participate but do not play a leading later, in the 2016 National Defense and Execution (PPBE) system is the sub- role in defining capability shortfalls.”5 Authorization Act, Congress articulated process that matches available resources Often, this leads to the Services gener- the need for a new round of acquisition against these requirements to produce a ating and validating requirements that reforms in parallel language, noting spending plan and a budget. The PPBE are not linked to what combatant com- that “both the Department of Defense is the way that DOD decides how much manders really need.6 Despite almost [DOD] and Congress are complicit it can afford to buy and when. Finally, 17 years of war in Iraq and Afghani- in pursuing acquisition strategies that the Acquisition Process—called “Small stan, criticisms persist that the Services downplay technical risk and underesti- A” acquisitions—guides how those place too much focus on winning mate cost . . . resulting in an acquisition budgeted resources are spent to develop conventional wars, leaving combatant process that is not agile enough, too risk and procure materiel capabilities. The commanders perpetually short of the averse, and takes too long to deliver.”2 main concerns in this process are cost systems needed to conduct intelligence, Why do problems with the DAS per- and schedule—in other words, how to surveillance, and reconnaissance; sist despite decades of attempted reforms? efficiently buy the equipment. This article deploy joint capabilities globally into One reason these reform efforts fall short purposely does not focus on the Small contested environments; conduct sus- is that their respective analyses tend to A subprocess, as it is downstream of the tainment; command and control widely concentrate on ways for DOD to more root problem in the Big A system (figure). dispersed joint forces; and fight the quickly and cheaply purchase equip- To be successful, the DAS must buy asymmetric wars we currently confront ment.3 While efficiency and timeliness the right amount of the right things at and that we predict for the future.7 JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 McInerney et al. 37 Ramp crew specialists from 386th Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron secure MRAP onto C-17, December 28, 2017, before its transportation downrange at undisclosed location in Southwest Asia (U.S. Air Force/Louis Vega, Jr.) Former Secretary of Defense Robert globe. It therefore follows that combat- time-based incentives for the principal Gates called this “next-war-itis”—the ten- ant commanders have an incentive to and agent. The combatant command dency of the Services to overly focus on pursue materiel solutions that increase focus is on the near-term problems of creating exquisite and expensive systems joint capability and prioritize characteris- crisis response, current operations, and to dominate possible future battlefields tics such as interoperability, deployability, showing progress along lines of effort rather than on providing combatant com- sharing of advanced technologies, mini- in the 5-year Theater Campaign Plan. manders with good enough interoperable mal duplication of programs with similar The Services are fundamentally focused capabilities that they need right now.8 capabilities across Services, joint logistical on long-term problems like preserving Every program emanating from a “Center and maintenance support, and compat- budget share over time and managing of Excellence,” which focuses on closing ible software. Meanwhile, although the the life cycle of programs in the Future a Service-peculiar capability gap without Services are charged with training and Years Defense Program and beyond. due regard for what value the capability equipping the joint force on behalf of the Therefore, the principal prioritizes short- provides the joint force warfighter, high- combatant commander, in practice the term thinking, while the agent has a lights the danger of misaligned incentives Services are actually heavily incentivized strong disincentive to resource near-term in the DAS. When producers deliver a and motivated by budget pressures to demands at the expense of long-term product that their customer does not act in their own respective best interests: requirements. want or need, it really is not relevant how dominance of warfighting capabilities To align efforts, the Services must efficiently that product is produced. within their domains of land, sea, air, have more incentive to see the problem Goldwater-Nichols charged com- space, and cyberspace.9 from the perspective of the combatant batant commanders with employment Additionally, even if the Services commanders. In the social sciences and of joint warfighting forces around the pursue a joint vision, there are conflicting in economics, this tension between the 38 JPME Today / The Case for Joint Force Acquisition Reform JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 incentives of combatant commanders and transformation,” Service shares of the Simply put, a combatant commander the Services is classically defined, as noted defense budget have remained steady. In desperately needed a capability to fight earlier, as the principal-agent problem. the end, “if major external factors can- an ongoing war, yet the Service strongly In this construct, combatant command- not change Service shares, there must be resisted due to the long-term monetary ers are collectively the principal due to powerful internal forces at work.”11 In impact on other acquisition programs their responsibilities to employ forces in other words, no one outside the Services that it rated as a higher priority. While it joint operations, while the Services are has any significant impact on Service is difficult to go into much detail here on the agents that generate these forces. budgets. current capability gaps, a conversation Normally, an effective principal-agent Examples of how the misalignment of with requirements managers at any com- relationship requires that the agent priorities affect materiel development are batant command will reveal that these is compelled to act on behalf of the numerous. Greg Milner’s book Pinpoint problems persist. principal. However, in defense materiel highlights an episode from the 1970s in acquisition, a principal-agent problem which Air Force leadership underfunded, Achieving Joint-Focused arises due to a misalignment of the incen- neglected, and eventually tried to kill the Defense Acquisitions tives between combatant commanders Global Positioning System, known at Alignment of combatant command- and the Services. the time as the 621B Program. Milner ers’ desire for joint capability with the The result of incentive misalign- notes that “the Air Force gets to build for acquisition actions of the Services can ment is that programmed funding only space, but the Marine Corps, Army, and be achieved by addressing how require- haphazardly follows joint priorities. The Navy are much more reliant on actual ments and funding are handled in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff space services [for navigation] than the DOD. Some might argue that combat- issues the National Military Strategy, Air Force itself is. The budget for space ant commanders already have sufficient which lists his strategic priorities, and the is in the Air Force, but in terms of the input in these processes. For example, Secretary of Defense issues the Defense number of customers and users, they’re they submit an integrated priority list Planning Guidance to influence the all in the other Services.”12 This telling (IPL) consisting of their highest prior- Services’ Program Objective Memoranda. historical example demonstrates how a ity joint warfighting capability gaps Once the memoranda are complete, the critical joint warfighting capability was to the Joint Staff annually. The Joint Secretary proposes changes through neglected because the Service with the Staff analyzes these gaps and recom- Resource Management Decisions. least need for the capability happened to mends solutions to the Joint Require- However, this process on average results control the budget. ments Oversight Council (JROC), a in a change of less than 2 percent in the A more recent example is the board consisting of the Service chiefs Service budgets from year to year.10 In reluctance of the Army to procure and chaired by the Vice Chairman of other words, this review ends up being the mine-resistant ambush protected the Joint Chiefs. In previous years, largely a rubber stamp of the Service (MRAP) vehicle. To reduce casualties the combatant commanders were also budgets. Since each Service essentially from improvised explosive devices in Iraq members of this council; however, the controls its own budget, it remains and Afghanistan, U.S. Central Command 2017 National Defense Authoriza- stovepiped, focusing on Service require- was demanding a blast-resistant vehicle tion Act reduced their role from full ments ahead of the needs of combatant to replace the overburdened and under- members “when matters related to the commanders. armored high-mobility multipurpose area of responsibility or functions of The Chairman’s Program Assessment wheeled vehicle. At the time, the Army that command are under consideration” and the Chairman’s Program Review had spent the previous decade champi- to advisors whose input the “council theoretically offer additional points for oning its $160 billion FCS program, a shall seek and consider.”15 joint input, but evidence over many years family of high-tech systems envisioned Despite the joint purview and pow- and several Chairmen confirms that these to fight a near-peer competitor in major erful membership of the JROC, the tools have little measurable impact on ground combat. Rather than divert impact of the IPL on Service budgets is budgets. In fact, “each Service’s share of money away from FCS to pay for the negligible. Of over 250 issues submitted the defense budget . . . with a standard MRAP, Army leadership insisted that “ev- by combatant commands in a recent year, deviation of less than 1.8 percent over a erything we’re doing in Future Combat the council only recommended for the 40-year period” has remained consistent. System has a direct relationship to what Services to “invest additional resources” Despite “massive strategic or techno- Soldiers in combat need today.”13 Despite for four issues. Even then, the Services logical changes over four decades” and these assurances, the first vehicles were are not bound to implement these rec- the transition from “Cold War to peace not scheduled to be fielded for another ommendations, and the Chairman of the dividend to sustained irregular warfare 10 years.14 Months later, Secretary of Joint Chiefs of Staff lacks the authority during the war on terror” or even “dur- Defense Robert Gates personally killed to direct procurement of any materiel ing the so-called revolution in military off the FCS and diverted the money to capabilities.16 Additionally, although the affairs and Donald Rumsfeld’s efforts at meet U.S. Central Command’s need. Chairman does publish the Chairman’s JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 McInerney et al. 39 3 Program Recommendation each year, budget flexibility, the Secretary would Ronald T. Kadish et al., Defense Acquisi- tion Performance Assessment Report (Washing- this input is not directive and only affects direct corresponding base procurement ton, DC: Office of the Deputy Secretary of 17 Service budgets on the margins. budget share to the winning bidder’s base Defense, January 2006), 17, available at 40 JPME Today / The Case for Joint Force Acquisition Reform JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 call for entries for the 2019 Secretary of Defense and 2019 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions Are you a professional military education (PME) student? Imagine your winning essay published in a future issue of Joint Force Quarterly, catching the eye of the Secretary and Chairman as well as contributing to the debate on an important national security issue. These rewards, along with a monetary prize, await the winners. Who’s Eligible? Students, including international students, at U.S. PME colleges, schools, and other programs, and Service research fellows. What’s Required? Research and write an original, unclassified essay on some aspect of U.S. national, defense, or military strategy. The essay may be written in conjunction with a course writing requirement. Important: Please note that entries must be selected by and submitted through your college. When? Anytime during the 2018–2019 academic year. Students are encouraged to begin early and avoid the spring rush. Final judging and selection of winners take place May 2019, at NDU Press, Fort McNair, Washington, DC. For further information, see your college’s essay coordinator or go to: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/About/Essay-Competitions/ U.S. Army 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Soldier checks map of training area during long- range snowmobile movement drill for Northern Griffin 2018 in Rovaniemi, Finland, March 12, 2018 (U.S. Army/Kent Redmond) U.S. Special Operations Command’s Future, by Design By Charles N. Black, Richard D. Newton, Mary Ann Nobles, and David Charles Ellis s U.S. Special Operations USSOCOM has rapidly evolved into a that encourages creativity, critical Command (USSOCOM) cel- global enterprise with broad joint warf- thinking, and innovation. ebrates its 30th anniversary, it ighting, interagency, and international As the command has matured, A 1 faces a future characterized by increas- partnering responsibilities. To better a number of contradictions have ingly complex, dynamic, and ill-defined address the highly complex challenges emerged. First, although USSOCOM security challenges. And since the ter- of modern conflicts, USSOCOM has Service-like responsibilities, with rorist attacks of September 11, 2001, developed the USSOCOM Design Way a mandate to man, train, and equip USSOCOM has been at war for half (SDW), an approach to problem-solving the Nation’s special operations forces of its existence. During this period, (SOF), it “owns” no forces. Because SOF are under combatant command of USSOCOM, with operational control exercised through the USSOCOM Charles N. Black is a Managing Partner at Xundis Global and Adjunct Professor at Joint Special Operations University (JSOU). Richard D. Newton, Ph.D., is a Course Director at JSOU. Mary Ann Nobles Service component commands, the is a Sociocultural Analyst at Ellis Analytics, Inc. David Charles Ellis is a Resident Senior Fellow at JSOU. headquarters sets policies and standards 42 Commentary / U.S. Special Operations Command’s Future, by Design JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 for its Service components to achieve, Based on USSOCOM’s experience, What the USSOCOM design-thinking yet these components are still subordi- this article suggests that SDW offers an team discovered was the confusion in- nate to their parent Services. Second, approach beneficial to other joint, inter- herent in joint doctrine; first directing a when USSOCOM was given authorities agency, or multinational organizations for comprehensive and inclusive approach to assume warfighting responsibilities in confronting and addressing a wide range to operational design, but then focusing 2005, it was limited to “synchronizing” of complex challenges. SDW goes be- squarely on a military endstate. In another activities with the geographic combat- yond operations planning and has proved place, joint doctrine highlights the essen- ant commands (GCC) charged with useful in confronting the complexities of tial nature of gaining an understanding of integrating SOF into the joint activities resourcing, strategy, policy and acquisi- the environment and defining the prob- ongoing or planned within their areas tions, as well as informing, and leading, lem before planning, but at the same time of responsibility.2 Third, many of the joint planning and programming. This dives right into determining centers of missions assigned to USSOCOM were article first explains why USSOCOM gravity, critical factors, termination criteria, of a combined, joint, and interagency required a design-thinking solution. It and so forth, that are the essential out- nature, with authorities and permissions next describes SDW while distinguishing comes of mission analysis. The formulaic distributed across multiple commands it from operational design as described structure of JP 5-0 unnecessarily crushes and agencies. Against this backdrop, in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning. the creativity and innovation that opera- USSOCOM and SOF relied on joint The article then offers practical examples tional design was intended to restore. and Service planning methods such of how SDW has been applied to current Between 2001 and 2015, as the Joint Planning Process (JPP) challenges at USSOCOM. It concludes USSOCOM was cushioned by an ex- and Military Decision Making Process with a prediction of how the SDW might traordinary infusion of resources at the (MDMP) to plan its assigned operations evolve to potentially benefit the broader headquarters and across the enterprise.7 and missions. joint force and interagency community in Incongruities or gaps in processes were While JPP and MDMP are excel- deriving truly comprehensive approaches compensated for by extra people and ad lent processes for what are primarily to the challenges that bedevil the Nation. hoc solutions. Authors of the USSCOM warfighting functions, their limitations as white paper noted, “In many cases, planning tools for comprehensive opera- A Unique Command in conventional planning, programming, tions were exposed during more than a a Structured World budgeting, and procurement processes decade of complex operations requiring For operationally oriented activities, [were] outpaced by special operators whole-of-government approaches. By joint and Service planning processes adapting and improvising to address the 2015, then-USSOCOM Commander provide structured, repeatable, under- dynamic and complex situations they General Joseph Votel recognized the standable, and scalable methodologies [were] facing.”8 The focus across the SOF need for a problem-solving process that for accomplishing complicated tasks. enterprise was on maintaining high levels better addressed persistent, seemingly in- It is important to note that while of direct action proficiency, what some tractable problems. Thus, he inaugurated doctrinal planning processes recog- have called “hyper-conventionality,” and the USSOCOM Design Way.3 nize the need for a comprehensive ensuring the force was adequately trained To restore SOF’s tradition of uncon- approach in order to fully understand and equipped for this narrowly focused ventionality, General Votel judged that the complexity of modern warfare, in mission. The observation was that SOF overcoming complex problems required practice most planners ignore doctri- and USSOCOM had lost the spirit of reinvigorating the creativity and innova- nal recommendations to spend time creativity and innovation that had made tion that had gone dormant across the gaining a deep understanding of the them “special” in the past.9 SDW offered SOF enterprise.4 Eighteen months after nature of the question they are being an approach that encouraged creativity, the command launched the SDW project, asked to answer. They usually jump critical reflection, and innovation beyond the USSOCOM Chief of Staff, Major right into determining how to achieve operational planning in order to address General J. Marcus Hicks, noted that the proffered endstate. While doctrinal the huge array of complex challenges planning processes recommend that facing a globally oriented combatant USSOCOM has embraced design-thinking commanders develop a comprehensive command in the unique position of also and it has improved the way we deal with understanding of the environment fulfilling many of the responsibilities tradi- complex and ill-defined challenges. The before planners begin framing the tionally reserved for the Services. more we learn to use design-thinking and problem, practice has repeatedly defied In the process of determining an become comfortable with its collaborative doctrine. Reality has shown that mili- approach that would restore creativity approach, the more it will improve our crit- tary planners typically, and intention- and critical thinking to USSOCOM’s ical thinking, creativity, and innovation, ally, forgo the inclusion of interagency planning and resourcing challenges, the thereby helping the command overcome and multinational partners and are SDW designers rediscovered the inherent many of the bureaucratic obstacles that often frustrated when a consensus- challenges facing USSOCOM as a func- every large organization faces.5 based campaign plan is required.6 tional combatant command with global JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Black et al. 43 Figure 1. USSOCO s Challenges of perspectives across U.S. joint and interagency capabilities.10 At its core, Service Functions CC D Functions the SDW focuses participants’ efforts Strategy Focus on military endstates on broadening their perspectives and Doctrine Regional orientation engaging in deliberate research and Force Development Limited cross-AOR authority reflection. Consequently, subtle but Resourcing Negligible interagency contributions critical differences exist between more Logistics Conventional ethos doctrinal design processes promul- Acquisition Protective of legacy missions and prerogatives gated by the Joint Staff and Services. Doctrine-based planning begins with the commander issuing an operational Inherent Tensions Inherent Tensions approach in the form of initial planning Services manage personnel Extensive interagency focus guidance—the starting point for achiev- policies and assignments Operations and activities cross 11 Services fund training boundaries and authorities ing an endstate. Doctrinal processes Services procure and provide Authorities optimi ed for permit creativity and innovation in Service-common equipment building partner capacity terms of how the variety of actors con- Interagency Community Services not required to Maturity of force allows verge to achieve the designated military accept SOF doctrine Culture of negotiation higher levels of risk endstate. However, it is the command- MFP-11 limited Domestic and developmental priorities Constrained budgets/limited authorities er’s understanding of the environment that guides staff convergence.12 The Inherent Tensions SOF culture has become objective-oriented potential for conceptual group-think Hyper-conventionality contrary to interagency ethos relative to complex problems elevates under these circumstances since leaders typically have little to no time to devote responsibilities, but one that remains a efforts. As a member of the interagency to deliberate thinking in the modern hybrid creation exercising some of the re- community, USSOCOM often serves military context.13 sponsibilities and authorities of a Service as an integrating element with national In contrast, the SDW recognizes and operating in an environment where agencies, sometimes in the lead, but most that complex problems require a learn- negotiation and diplomacy are usually often in support. Differences among in- ing process through which commanders more important than warfighting skills. teragency member resourcing, missions, are educated along with their staffs by Because of this unique predicament, and priorities contribute to extraordinary way of an iterative process of discovery. USSOCOM wrestled with complex social complexity in achieving unity of effort Design-thinking in this way forms a problems for which JPP and MDMP since all participants essentially volunteer complementary bond with traditional were inappropriate tools. to work together. planning methods by first informing Figure 1 details the unique tensions From the organizational culture commander’s guidance.14 Obviously, time USSOCOM faces given its hybrid nature. perspective, the SDW team realized that available for learning plays a crucial role As a Service-like entity, it sets the require- over the course of almost 15 years of con- in the degree of appreciation staffs may ments for SOF but relies on its Service stant conflict, the command’s focus was accomplish, but even limited design ef- components for personnel, common leaning heavily toward the tactical realm. forts can appreciably improve approaches equipment, and the majority of train- More importantly, though, the staff of- to complex problems. ing. Each Service sets its own internal ficers and middle management at the The USSOCOM Design Way is career paths for its personnel, which headquarters, components, and TSOCs, comprised of three elements: Appreciate often supersede SOF-specific personnel only a few of whom come from the core the Context, Define the Problem, and requirements. As a combatant command, SOF military occupational skill sets, Develop an Approach (see figure 2). USSOCOM can only synchronize its seemed to become mired in a bureau- Moreover, SDW intentionally adopts a forces’ activities. The global combatant cracy of support that morphed into an systemic—different from a systematic— commands actually control the commit- end unto itself. The SDW team offered view of complex problems. In so doing, ment of SOF through their regionally the USSOCOM Design Way to help the SDW recognizes that bureaucratic, aligned theater special operations com- SOF enterprise regain the ethos that had organizational, and population-centric mands (TSOC). Transregional issues, for made it so successful during the first half activities operate in a world of open which USSOCOM is ideally suited due of the command’s existence. systems, not closed ones.15 This is a cru- to its global mission, inevitably become cial distinction because current military regional problems because the GCCs SDW Characteristics planning constructs are based on the retain operational control of forces, The USSOCOM Design Way is a prac- theory that military endstates may be which requires exhaustive coordination tical solution for synthesizing a variety achieved through rigorous application of 44 Commentary / U.S. Special Operations Command’s Future, by Design JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 engineering principles, identifying all rel- acceptable, durable political arrange- Figure 2. lements of USSOCO evant variables, controlling the variables ment with his students at Georgetown Design Thinking through proven practices and limiting University when discussing the frustrating uncontrollable variables, and then repeat- (at least for military planners) incon- ing those practices through doctrinally clusive nature of public diplomacy—an approved processes, like JPP and MDMP. overwhelmingly sociological, and thus While such practice is certainly possible complex context. for complicated problems, when factoring With an open systems perspective, in the human elements that characterize then, the focus of critical observation Define the Develop an modern military operations, doctrinal and reflection should be on why trends Problem Approach planning processes tend to break down, are moving in a particular direction and often with dire consequences.16 how actions might be adjusted in order Appreciate the Context is, therefore, to change the trending direction of the Appreciate the Context the most important part of SDW, as it system or achieve different potential empowers commanders and staffs to outcomes. The Appreciate the Context explore complex problems from a mul- phase explores the mental models driv- titude of perspectives, both internal and, ing human systems and investigates critically, external to the organization. how changes in structures might affect SDW specifically seeks out divergent the patterns and trends that define the perspectives to better anticipate how character of organizations, societies, and organizational, social, cultural, and politi- cultural groupings.20 cal interests might respond to the range The early explorers’ search for the Figure 3. Range of of potential actions being contemplated. Northwest Passage might be used as a Acceptable Futures Design-thinking acknowledges the dif- metaphor to explain design-thinking. ficulty of overcoming organizational Their desired future was a shorter, faster Tolerable and personal cognitive blinders without sea route around North America. The Unacceptable OptionsPossibility meaningful deliberation among advo- problem was that no human knew where Acceptable cates of differing perspectives.17 As a or if such a passage existed. So as early Possibility conceptual process, SDW encourages a as 1497, the approach was for explorers Complex Desired Challenge Being Possibility culture of innovation by “exploring all to sail west from Europe to probe and Addressed facets of a situation in order to discover research different paths. Each expedi- Acceptable What might these be hidden potentialities and overlooked tion (inquiry) was influenced by known Possibility opportunities.”18 and unknown factors, few of which were Unacceptable OptionsTolerable Using an open systems approach, controllable, yet these factors shaped the Possibility the SDW rejects the notion of endstates next iteration of the approach (iterations because when dealing with complex of research, discovery, and reflection). It situations, there is no end to human has only been since 2009 that we now interaction. At best, there will be a enjoy a true Northwest Passage—but it range of future beginnings, which at- has taken climatic changes in the region, titudinally indicates a need for constant something certainly not foreseen 600 partners, access, placement, and/or engagement, reflection, and updated years ago, to enable the emergence of an knowledge that might prevent changes in appreciations of how a system continues ice-free Northwest Passage connecting negative trends or imperil positive ones.21 to evolve in response to the actions being the Atlantic and Pacific oceans across the Once the desired future is determined taken (figure 3). Social interactions are top of North America, at least for a few and the obstacles and opportunities iden- not linear and rarely quantifiable in an en- weeks each year (figure 4). tified, a commander and staff are then gineering sense. Planning processes that Determining the range of desired fu- able to Define the Problem. This state- presume the mathematical repeatability tures, that is, recognizing that the future ment captures the commander’s revised, of social systems are subject to significant is an aspiration and a direction rather comprehensive understanding of the risk.19 The task from a design-thinking than a military endstate in the doctrinal complex problem the staff is being asked perspective is for the commander and sense, enables the commander and staff to address. The result is a significantly staff to determine a range of acceptable to discover obstacles and opportunities in higher likelihood of the staff solving the futures and navigate the evolving and the trends, structures, and mental mod- “correct” problem. emerging conditions as best as pos- els that define the environment. These With an initial appreciation of the sible. Interestingly, Lieutenant General obstacles and opportunities translate into context in hand and the problem ap- James Dubik, USA (Ret.), uses the term the gaps in policy, capabilities, resources, propriately identified, the commander JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Black et al. 45 Figure 4. Iceberg odel executive-level stakeholders from partici- discreet teams building partner capacities pating in the process and providing their with minimal U.S. support to a global interpretations of higher headquarters’ network of geographically dispersed requirements, and the political and stra- forces engaged in long-duration op- vents Evidence, symptoms tegic situation tempered by the benefits erations. From the earliest days of the of the commander’s experience and command, SOF logistics capabilities were education. built to sustain episodic small-scale and Patterns/Trends Rules, doctrine, TTPs low “footprint” operations, actions, and SDW in Action activities. For larger operations, SOF has The impact of SDW is not theoreti- relied heavily on the Services to provide Structure Organi ations, laws, authority, relationships cal. It has been applied at USSOCOM most logistics and base operating sup- headquarters with excellent effect. In port, especially after the opening days of the past year, design facilitators from an operation. This construct worked well ental odels the Joint Special Operations University prior to the terrorist attacks of 2001 be- Beliefs, traditions, assumptions, values (JSOU) have facilitated design inquiries cause SOF were able to leverage mature with the USSOCOM J4, J5, and J6, and theaters and operate alongside robust supported North Atlantic Treaty Orga- conventional forces and capable strategic and staff are now able to Develop nization (NATO) Allies as well. Demand partners in what was a relatively resource an Approach that will become the for SDW courses provided by JSOU has rich and often low threat environment. commander’s guidance to the staff. doubled based on staff-level interest, This reality has now changed with reduc- Depending on the situation, the ap- interest from the Services, the TSOCs, tions in conventional force structure proach may take the format of doctrinal other combatant commands, and other and the requirement for SOF to support commander’s planning guidance (pur- governmental agencies. Perhaps more themselves globally in what are usually pose, endstate, operational risk, etc.), an telling, though, is the growth in demand immature theaters—little to no U.S. abridged commander’s estimate, com- being placed on JSOU to facilitate presence, infrastructure, or support, for mander’s vision, commander’s intent, additional design inquiries as these example, Africa, Southeast Asia, Central or a simple narrative. The key element is practical applications of SDW demon- and South America.26 All of these factors that the document, in whatever form it strate tangible success. Some examples compounded the J4’s challenges to effec- takes, is the commander’s articulation of of the impact SDW has had on current tive sustainment and logistics support to the approach the staff should take.22 For complex problems follow. special operations. complex challenges, it is nearly always Colonel Steve Allen, USSOCOM To further complicate the problem, helpful to include both a visualization Director of Logistics, concluded, the USSOCOM logistics enterprise is and a narrative statement to explain how comprised of the four Service compo- to move the system from the current state Design-thinking allowed the SOCOM J4 a nents and the TSOCs and is tied into toward the range of acceptable futures. holistic perspective on how our logistics en- each of the GCCs and their respective Applying the USSOCOM Design terprise supports the SOCOM commander’s executive agents—for example, the Way to joint and interagency problem priorities. The opportunity to bring together Navy is the executive agent for U.S. sets seems a natural evolution. Since a diverse group of logisticians from across Pacific Command, the Army for U.S. the SDW emphasizes appreciation as the global logistics enterprise enabled European Command, and the Air the most important step, participants divergent thinking, which ultimately has Force for U.S. Northern Command in a design inquiry are afforded ample informed new ideas on global sustainment (USNORTHCOM). time to contribute their personal and and logistics in support of future SOF This global enterprise represents organizational appreciations of the operations.25 more a confederation of separate com- topic at hand.23 It is essential to note mands with different missions, unique that design-thinking does not distribute In December 2015, the J4 was con- challenges, and dependent requirements research roles according to directorate fronted with preparing for the annual than an integrated logistics chain. Many or organizational competency, such as enterprise-wide logistics conference members also share challenges centered the J2 owning intelligence research and that usually concluded with executive on supporting a large global SOF foot- only the J4 researching logistics concerns. sessions and decisions to address major print across geographic boundaries. As Instead, SDW advocates for team-based problems. The first challenge was how the focal point for SOF logistics and research and learning, thereby overcom- to appreciate the multitude of problems sustainment, the J4 directorate has ing the issue of functional stovepipes.24 the directorate faced. wide-ranging responsibilities associated Through collaboration, the probability From 2001–2014, SOF transformed with USSOCOM’s train, organize, and for developing a common perspec- from a force designed for short dura- equip mission as well as the exercise of tive improves, but this does not relieve tion, surgical strike missions, and small, combatant command over TSOCs. As 46 Commentary / U.S. Special Operations Command’s Future, by Design JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Estonian and U.S. special operations forces consolidate after fast rope training from U.S. Air Force CV-22 Osprey, assigned to 352nd Special Operations Wing, near Amari, Estonia, December 12, 2017 (U.S. Army/Matt Britton) such, the J4 must successfully navigate a at the “speed of operations,” which ulti- voicing a strong desire to jump straight web of policy, organizational command mately increases operational risk to SOF. into problem solutions using the same and control, and fiscal and legal re- Given the realities of the current sys- well-meaning, but often unsuccessful, straints and constraints to meet its many tem, there was general consensus in 2015 methods of the past. The nearly 100 responsibilities. among senior staff and key representa- participants were divided into several The realities of the strategic environ- tives from the SOF logistics enterprise diverse teams representing the SOF ment demanded that SOF logisticians that there was a range of perennial and logistics enterprise. The goal was to refine, terminate, or transform how they emergent issues that directly affected the overcome any potential for institutional thought about challenges and how the deployed force and needed attention. loyalty or group-think and work toward joint global logistics enterprise applied It was concluded that standard think- a common perspective. The facilita- the principles of logistics in support of ing and approaches to these challenges tors led the groups using a range of military strategy. Even in historically ma- would likely produce yet another series divergent thinking methods to develop ture theaters like U.S. Central Command, of temporary fixes and perpetuate cur- a shared “Appreciate the Context” force management level constraints result rent negative trends. To that end, the J4 (current system). This endeavor evoked in fewer logisticians deployed in support requested a design inquiry with the goal emotion, highlighted organizational of operations. Moreover, the joint, inter- of achieving an innovative approach to its and personal blinders, and sometimes agency, intergovernmental, multinational, perennial problems. illuminated dogmatic thought. In the and commercial community operates in a The USSOCOM Design Way was end the groups evolved, self-organized, global environment where access, basing, introduced to the participants at the and, with consistent coaching, began to and overflight authorities have signifi- J4’s 2016 annual conference, highlight- see things anew. The range of desired cantly reduced logistics lines of support. ing the core difference from traditional futures developed by the groups were Finally, there are instances when authori- planning. Initially, there was much skep- characterized by recognition that the ties, processes, and systems cannot move ticism among the attendees, with many future of SOF required a robust global JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Black et al. 47 not appropriately organized, manned, Much like USSOCOM, SOCNORTH Complicated vs. Complex or arrayed for critical integration during recognized its unique position among planning and operations at the strate- TSOCs in that the authorities and The character of conflict has evolved, gic, operational, or tactical levels. The permissions to act rest primarily with at least since the end of the Cold War, from complicated to complex. This shift logistics infrastructure and processes its interagency partners. SOCNORTH has presented challenges to leaders and had not kept pace with the expansion changed its perspective and came to planners steeped in traditional, apolitical, of SOF after 2001. Furthermore, the view its value in terms of becoming a and military-centric problem-solving. ability to influence military and civilian key supporting player instead of the star Complicated challenges are predictable talent management was constrained by quarterback on the USNORTHCOM and repeatable; thus, planning and inflexible manpower systems managed by team. This transformed mindset guided desired endstates are often based on the Services, which did not value logisti- and informed the command’s planning repeating previous successes. Checklists, battle books, and standard operating cians’ service with SOF. The result was efforts and set the initial framework for procedures ensure successful processes a constant pool of new Service logisti- SOCNORTH’s “cooperative action” are recorded and repeated. cians having to learn the skills needed among interagency and partner nations.28 Complex problems, however, are defined to support a command that was neither A third example demonstrating the by human interactions, relationships, a Service nor tied to any one theater- practical success of SDW is a design emotions, and dynamic connections. They level executive agent. The outcome of inquiry for the Romanian chief of the cannot be solved through quantitative or J4’s design inquiry led to changes in general staff (CGS) to consider the predictive processes. Traditional problem- organizational perceptions and priorities transformation of Romanian SOF. From solving techniques come wanting when dealing with problems in the inherently and provided the foundation for trans- August 2016 to May 2017, USSOCOM complex human domain. formation to align resources to support design-thinking facilitators helped Complex human-centric systems change emergent and future SOF operations in Romania develop a solution to transform based on influencing actions. They learn new and innovative ways. their national SOF and create a joint and adapt where complicated systems do There are numerous classified ex- command to lead and manage Romanian not, making it nearly impossible to apply amples of SDW in action during the past SOF from its different services. This the objective or quantitative solutions 18 months, although a second unclassi- distinction is important because of found in structured processes. fied example relates to Special Operations previous missteps in other nations that Design-thinking offers a way to overcome Command–Northern Command blindly mirrored the U.S. special opera- traditional problem-solving and deal with (SOCNORTH). SOCNORTH is unique tions structure without fully considering the challenges of modern conflict in the human domain. in that its mission is heavily oriented to differences in missions, regional versus the interagency arena because its area of global responsibilities, resourcing, au- responsibility is the U.S. homeland. The thorities, and national characters. The command was at its 3-year milestone in challenge was complex, characterized by logistics system, fully integrated with its growth and development from a direc- longstanding organizational and cultural joint, interagency, international, and torate within the USNORTHCOM J3 to traditions; the anxiety of likely personnel, commercial logistics networks. a distinct special operations component training, and resourcing turbulence; and A second iteration of the J4 design and subunified command.27 conflicting polycentric security priori- inquiry focused on refining the previous In the closing weeks of September ties (national, bilateral, NATO, and the “Appreciate the Context,” exploring the 2016, a team of senior planners, with European Union). range of desired futures, and identifying support from JSOU design-thinking Over 9 months, the Romanians used problems that prevented transformation. facilitators, embarked on a reflective the SDW to conduct seven 1- to 2-week After a week of rigorous collaboration reframing of SOCNORTH’s existing iterations of reflection, research, and and divergent thinking, the talented campaign support plan to the combat- critique. In between each group session group of experienced logisticians reached ant command’s theater campaign plan. team members had specific exploration the preliminary desired future and prob- The goal was to evaluate and question assignments that were then shared when lem statement. These logisticians’ desired how the command saw itself, its role, the group got back together. Among future was one where USSOCOM pos- and its mission, as well as questioning the unexpected discoveries during ap- sessed the authorities, permissions, and how SOCNORTH should organize preciation was the team identifying the funding to fully leverage the global logis- itself to provide the most value to key stakeholders in the Romanian security tics network in support of SOF. USNORTHCOM. After much debate, structure. This led the team to intention- The group spent considerable time discussion, and learning a new desired ally engage these individuals, thus averting assessing the underlying obstacles and future and approach emerged. any potential institutional, and perhaps realized that the preliminary problem was SOCNORTH’s design inquiry re- personal, apprehensions. The participants’ broad, with both internal and external sulted in a fundamentally new perspective iterative research contributions helped variables. Accordingly, SOF logistics were that reoriented the commander’s vision. broaden and deepen the design-thinking 48 Commentary / U.S. Special Operations Command’s Future, by Design JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 team’s knowledge and appreciation of positive results across the SOF enterprise the contributions of outsiders until after the plan is complete. Romania’s political, geographic, organiza- and offers a simple and low-cost solution 13 Ibid., III-4. tional, and security context—very much a for overcoming seemingly intractable 14 Black et al., 4. comprehensive approach. organizational complexity. By investing 15 In social sciences, open systems allow During each iteration of the design in common appreciations with joint, in- interactions between the internal functions of inquiry, as the participants sought un- ternational, and interagency partners, the a system and the external environment. This enables a system to learn, adapt, and address derstanding, they created new questions, SOF enterprise can significantly amplify its opportunities and obstacles it may encounter. as research often does, that when also impact against what promises to be a truly Closed systems, such as how military planners researched ended up leading to a deeper complex set of uncertain and ill-defined plan, on the other hand, are isolated from their appreciation of Romania’s aspirations challenges in the coming decades. JFQ environment and thus are unable (or unwilling) and challenges. At the CGS’s insistence, to learn and adapt when faced with operational, organizational, or cognitive challenges. the design-thinking team broke out of 16 Horst Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, its comfort zone to develop a joint and Notes “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” a Romanian appreciation. The fruit of Policy Sciences 4 (1973), 155–169. 1 their efforts led to an approach that will U.S. Government Accountability Office 17 The concept of “Four Ways of Seeing” (GAO), Special Operations Forces: Opportuni- not only transform Romanian SOF into has been used to aid designers and planners to ties Exist to Improve Transparency of Funding recognize their own biases. The shortcoming, a fully joint and strategic-level command and Assess Potential to Lessen Some Deployments, though, is that unless others are involved in the prepared to deal with emerging hybrid GAO-15-571 (Washington, DC: GAO, July analysis, the effort becomes an exercise of see- threats, but also provide the headquarters 16, 2015), 8–9, 11–12, available at JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Black et al. 49 U.S. Marine Corps sniper with Task Force Southwest sights in with rifle combat optic on M4 carbine during security post for advising mission with 1st Brigade, Afghan National Army 215th Corps, as they conduct Operation Maiwand 12 at Camp Shorserack, Afghanistan, March 13, 2018 (U.S. Marine Corps/Conner Robbins) Enhancing Global Security Through Security Force Assistance By Keith D. Smith e have consistently heard that impossible to defend against, present dous strides in developing its capabil- the future joint force has to new challenges. Additionally, the ever- ity to train, equip, and advise foreign W be postured to deal with an looming threats from near-peer state security forces and build institutional increasingly complex security environ- actors require our time, attention, and capacity to sustain those efforts, there is ment. Today’s adversaries continue to resources. In the midst of these chal- still more work to be done. threaten our peace with rudimentary lenges, our nation’s security institu- SFA creates a framework for improved weapons that indiscriminately take tions are facing the reality that there partnerships and stronger alliances, and civilian lives. They also attack our com- is no panacea, no secret weapon, no our national security guidance is clear puter networks in ways that, while not magic wand to wave that would make about its importance. Our nation’s all of our security challenges go away. leaders have consistently echoed these However, Security Force Assistance sentiments in press conferences, speeches, (SFA) can help address these challenges and policy documents. While campaign- Keith D. Smith is an Attorney and Military Analyst by enabling U.S. partners and allies ing—and even since he has been in in the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance at the Joint Staff J7, Force to carry larger portions of the burden. office—President Donald Trump has Development. While the joint force has made tremen- openly discussed his desire for our global 50 Commentary / Enhancing Global Security JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 partners to carry a greater share of the for economic development and less current efforts lie, enduring capability security burden. Additionally, due to the receptive to violent extremist ideologies. and capacity require an executive function changes in the global security environ- However, with smaller defense budgets to provide policy guidance and funding as ment, both the Secretary of Defense and and fewer defense experts available to well as a generating function that recruits, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff solve these problems, some of our aspir- organizes, and trains newly assessed have had to place a higher priority on ing security partners stand in need of personnel to a universal standard that can partner and ally contributions than their our help. SFA offers the United States be depended on to produce an enduring most recent predecessors. the opportunity to export peace and military capability. As recently as October 5, 2017, security to such countries. For example, These updates to doctrine are im- Secretary James Mattis published a memo- U.S. aid to Colombia during their fight portant. They begin to create a path to randum to all Department of Defense against the Revolutionary Armed Forces building more enduring capacity and personnel focusing them on his top three of Colombia, National Liberation Army, capability in our global security partners priorities for the upcoming fiscal year. and United Self-Defense Forces of that is consistent with the previously Among those, he highlights the impor- Colombia helped reduce the harmful mentioned national security guidance. tance of partners and allies by directing effects of their transnational drug and Additionally, if the EGO construct is fol- the following: “strengthen Alliances and human-trafficking problems. As their lowed, it helps satisfy the 2017 National attract new partners . . . [in order] to rein- security woes lessened, their economic Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) force the safety and security that underpins prosperity grew. Today, while Colombia’s requirement for “institutional capacity- the peace and economic prosperity for internal security problems are far from building” in train and equip missions. all nations.” With these words, Secretary over, they now have the expertise to make According to the 2017 NDAA, the pur- Mattis makes clear that partner nations’ greater contributions to regional and pose of institutional capacity-building is ability to contribute to global security is global security. Lessons from Colombia “to enhance the capacity of such foreign among his most urgent concerns. and other places are being incorporated country to organize, administer, employ, Furthermore, since assuming his into doctrine to improve the joint force’s manage, maintain, sustain, or oversee the position as Chairman, General Joseph ability to conduct these types of missions. national security forces of such foreign Dunford has repeatedly reminded the More specifically, joint doctrine country.” Institutional capacity-building joint force of the importance of partners was advanced in May 2017 when Joint can also be likened to defense institution- and allies to the future of continued Publication 3-20, Security Cooperation, building, which is the doctrinal term used peace and prosperity around the world. was published. It contained a robust in JP 3-20 to describe SFA at the execu- Recently, he conveyed this notion in a appendix on SFA. SFA is defined in JP tive and generating functions of a foreign Joint Force Quarterly article titled “Allies 3-20 and the Department of Defense security force. and Partners Are Our Strategic Center of Dictionary as “activities that support the In addition to these doctrinal up- Gravity.” In this article, General Dunford development of the capacity and capabil- dates, the Army and Marine Corps are discussed the strategic legitimacy and ity of foreign security forces and their making their own investments to the operational access gained by our global supporting institutions.” A fair criticism joint solution. In the fall of 2011, the partnerships since World War II. More levied by many over the past few years is Marine Corps merged two separate importantly, he described the network that train and equip missions fall short commands to create the Marine Corps of U.S. alliances and partnerships as the of building any meaningful capability Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG). strategic source of power for the joint or capacity because the receiving nation Headquartered in Fort Story, Virginia, force to successfully execute the National rarely has the desire or know-how to MCSCG has the mission of “execut- Military Strategy. Finally, he ended his maintain it. Our current doctrine in JP ing and enabling Security Cooperation article by stating, “Given the nature of the 3-20 addresses this problem with the programs, training, planning, and activi- threats we face today and the challenges executive, generating, and operating ties in order to ensure unity of effort in we are likely to face in the future, I cannot (EGO) construct as a way for planning support of USMC and Regional Marine imagine a scenario in which the United and executing SFA missions to promote Component Command objectives and in States would not be standing alongside sustainability. Specifically, EGO highlights coordination with the operating forces allies and partners across the globe.” the essentialness of each function of a and Marine Air-Ground Task Force(s).” Like the United States, our partners, foreign security force: the executive func- Furthermore, MCSCG offers numerous allies, and aspiring partners benefit from tion, generating function, and operating courses that help prepare Servicemembers these relationships, too. More capable function are roughly analogous (in their who will be working in training, advis- security forces enable national govern- U.S. equivalents) to the Office of the ing, and assisting missions. Examples ments to repel attacks from outside their Secretary of Defense, military Services, of MCSCG’s offerings are the Marine borders and quell insurgencies that might and operating/tactical forces. While the Advisor Course, Security Cooperation rise up from within. In many cases, the operating function (training tactical- Trainer’s Course, and Basic Engagement result would be a nation more fertile level forces) is where much of U.S. SFA Skills Course. JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Smith 51 Soldiers assigned to 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division Security Forces Assistance Brigade, pull security duty during patrol in Bermal district of Paktika Province, Afghanistan, April 27, 2013 (U.S. Army/Mark A. Moore II) Similarly, the Army has made recent told defense reporters at the Association curriculum that would prepare ministe- changes that will contribute to the joint of the United States Army’s 2017 annual rial advisors or require such advisors to force’s ability to build capability and meeting that “It is my assessment, and attend classes at Bydgoszcz. The United capacity in foreign security partners. the assessment of the Secretary and the States should not expect the highest Security Force Assistance Brigades assessment of the Army staff, that we are return from its advisor investment until (SFABs) are the Army’s way of using likely to be involved in train, advise, and institutional processes for fielding and existing force structure in a more effec- assist operations for many years to come.” training personnel assigned to these mis- tive and efficient way to contribute. The While these Army and Marine Corps sions are improved. benefit to the Army and the joint force contributions are important, there is still is twofold. First, SFABs relieve Brigade work left for the joint force. Namely, we The United States must continue to Combat Teams (BCTs) from SFA op- need better training for our senior-level find ways to enhance its SFA capabili- erations, increasing BCT readiness for advisors. In response to the need for ties so that we are postured to build our more conventional missions. Second, ministerial-level advisor training, the partners and allies well into the future. SFABs will develop greater proficiency to Joint Center for International Security The joint force has made recent im- conduct training, advising, and assistance Force Assistance called together promi- provements in this area with the Army’s missions in a small cadre of professionals nent members from the communities SFAB, Marine Corps’ MCSCG, and who can focus exclusively on that mis- of interest to examine the problem improvements to joint doctrine, but sion. In an Army article from May 2017, of training for ministerial-level advi- there is still more that needs to be done. C. Todd Lopez states that the “SFAB is sors. General John W. Nicholson, Jr., Improvements to interoperability be- designed to rapidly deploy into a theater is concerned that most U.S. advisors tween current and future coalition forces of operations in support of a combatant deploying into Afghanistan in support of is a must. Also, the need for training of commander . . . [and] begin to work the North Atlantic Treaty Organization senior-level ministerial advisors has to be with, train, advise, and assist those part- (NATO) Resolute Support mission are addressed. ner nation security forces on anything not properly trained to advise—the very The security challenges that we face they need help with, be it logistics, be job that they have been assigned to do. in the future will only threaten our peace it communications, be it maneuver. For example, many advisors coming and prosperity if we allow it. With contin- Anything they need help with to improve from other contributing nations at- ued focus and determination, the United their capacity and capability, that’s what tend classes at the NATO Joint Forces States can help build more capable global the SFAB is designed to do.” In a sub- Training Centre in Bydgoszcz, Poland. security partners through SFA, thereby sequent article from December 2017, However, the United States has yet to facilitating more enduring peace, security, General Mark Milley, Army Chief of Staff, develop a formal senior advisor training and stability throughout the world. JFQ 52 Commentary / Enhancing Global Security JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Multimission, supersonic bomber B-1B Lancer parked on flightline at Royal Air Force Fairford, United Kingdom, June 9, 2017, supports exercises Baltops 17 and Saber Strike 17 (U.S. Air Force/Curt Beach) Cooking Shows, Corollas, and Innovation on a Budget By Mike Jernigan and Jason Cooper If we do not free ourselves from the ever-expanding, ever-tightening coils of bureaucracy, if we do not set the pace on adopting change, if we continue to think and do in the same ways we have for so long, then our days as the world’s preeminent maritime force are sure numbered—and that number is small and shrinking. —Former Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, April 15, 2015 n the television show Cutthroat can buy advantages for themselves or tage in a time of rapid technological Kitchen, chefs compete against one disadvantages for their adversary. In the advancement and decreasing budgets. I another on a fixed budget where they end, the winning chef shows more cre- The reality is that rapid advance- ativity and innovation in developing a ments in military technology and the recipe while under challenges and bud- introduction of hybrid threat capabilities getary constraints. The Department of obscure the traditional categories of Mike Jernigan is the Director of Logistics and Defense (DOD) finds itself in a similar warfare and increase the difficulty of Installations at United States Forces Japan. Lieutenant Colonel Jason Cooper, USAF (Ret.), is a predicament—developing a recipe that matching capabilities to meet complex Pilot for Southwest Airlines. ensures strategic and operational advan- 21st-century challenges. Scholars argue JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Jernigan and Cooper 53 the long record of U.S. military success and imprudent view of innovation is “learning machines, human-machine “masks major geopolitical and techno- that it presumes a distinct separation collaboration, assisted human opera- logical trends that are rapidly eroding between the future and current plans tions, human-machine combat teaming, the advantages the U.S. military has long “as if we could somehow separate the and autonomous weapons.”7 Creating enjoyed.”1 The geopolitical factors of future from our current agendas” and the ability and capacity to achieve this globalization, a weakened U.S. economy, only have a single future for which to strategy requires multiple resources and $19 trillion of national debt lead prepare.3 The reality is that the U.S. from various technology and science many to question how the United States military will not maintain strategic fields in order to provide the superior will maintain military superiority while advantage by focusing on a single tech- technology offset needed to maintain balancing the promise of new technolo- nology, weapon, platform, or doctrine, strategic dominance in the future. Thus, gies under current budget constraints. as solitary ingredients do not complete the first ingredient required to achieve Relatively inexpensive intangibles the recipe for advantageous transforma- 21st-century transformation is science and related to innovation exist and are tion. Just as a cake is not made solely technology investment across the whole critically important to resolving this from flour, no matter how fancy the of the scientific and military enterprise.8 dilemma. DOD can maintain strategic flour is, “technology-driven RMAs are Silver bullet technologies such as nan- and operational advantages through in- usually brought about by combinations otechnology, neurotechnology, robotics, novation in the future but must avoid of technologies,” not a lone source or or hypervelocity weapons predict a mili- the misperception that success will come concept.4 For example, Blitzkrieg was tary advantage in the future because they from a single game-changing technology. a product of innovation in three tech- have the potential to deliver game-chang- Rather, success in the future will come nologies: the tank, the two-way tactical ing results. This is true to the extent that from following an innovative recipe that radio, and the dive bomber, while the a country can maintain a comparative includes four critical ingredients: research creation of intercontinental ballistic mis- advantage until a counter-technology and development across the science siles was enabled by long-range ballistic or defense is created to mitigate it. and technology spectrum, the military missiles, lightweight fusion warheads, Technology is expanding rapidly and can divorcing itself from a fixation on owning and highly accurate inertial guidance.5 quickly become obsolete or countered. technology and hardware versus leasing Stealth and precision munitions provide For example, rapid advancements have it, key organizational changes, and creat- other examples derived from investment allowed countries like China to develop ing adaptive leaders who can react to the across a wide spectrum of technologies high-end asymmetric capabilities in order pace of 21st-century change. fused with adaptive operational doctrine to employ area-denial tactics and restrict and concepts. U.S. power projection and freedom of Investment in Science In December 2015, then– movement within the global commons.9 and Technology Undersecretary of Defense Robert The U.S. Air Force further demon- It is appealing to believe superior tech- Work described the effects of precision- strated the need for investment across the nology wins wars and difficult to argue guided munitions as the Second Offset entire science and technology spectrum against the notion of game-changing Strategy. Speaking at the Center for New when it completed a 3-year study in technologies, such as the atomic American Security, Mr. Work explained 2010. In Blue Horizons II, researchers weapon. However, an overreliance that the United States has a history of were “tasked to evaluate the effective- on technology is dangerous for two strengthening “conventional deterrence ness of 58 future weapons systems in reasons. First, U.S. military excellence by offsetting or pursuing a combination 2030 and to examine the underlying is not guaranteed as a birthright and the of superior technological capabilities 172 technologies necessary to bring “sizeable margin of conventional tech- and innovative operational and orga- those systems to fruition.”10 Over the nology superiority the United States nizational constructs that offset the course of their research, these scientists has enjoyed for the last 25 years has strengths of our potential adversaries.”6 discovered it was impossible to prioritize eroded.”2 Second, it encourages tunnel He described the First Offset Strategy as one technology over the next because of vision and an ignorance of the value of the development of tactical nuclear ca- the synergistic and congruous effect one smaller, incremental innovation. Too pabilities and the Second Offset Strategy had on the development and maturation frequently, U.S. military innovation as the development and advancement of of another. They learned “the effect of tends to focus on the “next big thing.” precision-targeting capabilities. He goes nanotechnology, computational power, Transformation and innovation are on to argue that the rapid advancements biotechnology, chemistry, and physics buzzwords frequently used in policy in antiaccess/area-denial tactics create the were so interwoven that a lack of research circles pointing to a specific technology need for a Third Offset Strategy, which in any one area would disable the field- or doctrinal change as the next revolu- is required in order for the United States ing of a large number of future systems tion in military affairs (RMA) that will to maintain a strategic advantage in the or concepts.”11 In other words, Blue ensure future U.S. superiority. The future. Furthermore, this strategy is actu- Horizons II provided evidence that fu- problem with this silver bullet approach ally a combination of five components: ture investment cannot be focused on any 54 Commentary / Cooking Shows, Corollas, and Innovation on a Budget JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 singular technology but must be invested than an owner. By doing so, DOD will as its advanced jet trainer since the early “across the whole of the science and increase its relative flexibility to react 1960s and continues to use an aging technology enterprise” if DOD wants to significant changes as rapid advance- commercial fleet for distinguished visitor innovative and transformative concepts in ments occur. Contracts must be struc- transportation, while the F-35 and Long the future.12 tured for the short term and leasing Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) programs If the first ingredient of the recipe may provide a way for the Defense are in response to the aged platforms in of transformative innovation is invest- Department to ensure it is adaptable for the fighter and bomber communities. ment across the whole of the science future changes. Large and complex acquisition items, and technology spectrum, it would be The lessee-versus-owner mentality like the F-35 and LRS-B, which have remiss not to address how DOD can ac- can be applied across multiple aspects of secretive technologies with limited trans- complish this effort within the context DOD. One simple way that could create ferability to the civilian sector, most likely of a budget-constrained environment. cost savings across all the Services would are not good fits for the lessee category Innovative technology investment can be be leasing instead of buying baseline due to the extreme technical specializa- accomplished in several ways. A recent technical equipment, network platforms, tion and little commercial application for example comes from former Secretary of desktop computers, and other “low advanced weapon systems. Defense Ashton Carter, who directed the level” technology types. There are several In the training and commercial Pentagon to “team with Apple, Boeing, benefits to leasing low-tech equipment realms, however, leasing could be a vi- Harvard, and others to develop high-tech in the 21st century, where the computer able possibility. Much like the Air Force, sensory gear.”13 The goal of this program purchased today can be outpaced by “airlines lack cash to finance their big is to “use high-end printing technolo- processing and software development in plans for fleet renewal, and they cannot gies to create stretchable electronics that a matter of months. Leasing can keep the borrow cheaply” to make the recapitaliza- could be embedded with sensors and user’s equipment up to date, and, in the tion of their fleet cost-effective.19 Thus, worn by soldiers . . . and ultimately be long run, the financial burden of obsoles- the airline industry is increasingly turning used on ships or warplanes for real-time cence is passed to the equipment leasing toward “operating leases, in which they monitoring of their structural integrity.”14 company.17 In most situations with really are renting the planes for a few While focused on expanding multiple leasing equipment, the user pays little years at a time with a leasing company emergent technologies, the brilliance of to nothing upfront and has an ability to bearing the risk of any slump in their sec- this program is found in the funding. The maintain predictability in monthly costs.18 ondhand values.”20 In order for leasing to U.S. Government is contributing $75 Leasing provides stability that could be cost-effective for the leasing company, million while “companies, managed by prove valuable in the age of sequestration. the secondary market for used aircraft the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory, Depending on how the lease is struc- must be viable enough to ensure a legiti- will add $90 million with local govern- tured, downsides include losing flexibility mate profit margin over time. Research ments chipping in more to take the total regarding maintenance of a given system, suggests this is the case because “since to $171 million.”15 The reality is that the and, in some cases, leasing can cost more the mid-1980s, trades in the secondary government “is now a relatively small in the long run. That said, the Defense market for aircraft have grown steadily, player in the science and technology Department could work with Congress and the number of transactions on used world . . . [with] over 70 percent of U.S. to pass legislation to provide tax incen- markets today is about three times the investment in basic research . . . now in tives to companies that work with DOD number of purchases of new aircraft.”21 the hands of industry and academia.”16 on programs to provide low-tech leased Coupled with the fact that “over a third equipment, making it more palatable for of the world’s airline fleet is now rented Leasing vs. Owning companies to accept the short-term risk and the proportion is likely to keep grow- This fact reveals the second ingredient with the benefit that the leasing company ing,” leasing in the realm of training and of the innovation recipe: DOD must can return fairly new equipment back to a commercial platforms across the military divorce itself from the notion that it large consumer market at a reduced price Services could be a way to negate large must own and control enterprises, to recapture their profit dividend when purchase costs up front, reduce opera- such as technology, which appear to be the lease is up. tional and maintenance costs over time game-changing today but can become Another area worth evaluating the by operating relatively new aircraft, and antiquated tomorrow. For example, a long-term cost benefit analysis of leasing rapidly recapitalize large portions of an driver who leases a Lexus can get a new, versus owning is with aircraft. One of increasingly aging fleet.22 improved car every few years, while the largest issues facing the Air Force is That said, this shift in mentality and the one driving a 1987 Corolla pays to recapitalization of a significantly aging eventual execution is not without chal- keep it running with a limited ability to aircraft fleet. This issue ranges from find- lenges, and the structuring of leasing improve its function. Similarly, DOD ing replacements for training aircraft to contracts and nuances between operating must explore the idea of becoming developing a new long-range bomber. and capital leases are beyond the scope of more of a lessee of technology rather The Air Force has been flying the T-38 this discussion. However, with the rate at JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Jernigan and Cooper 55 Marine with 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, Kilo Company, uses weapon that has capabilities to shoot down drones with net during Urban Advanced Naval Technology Exercise 2018, Camp Pendleton, California, March 20, 2018 (U.S. Marine Corps/Laiqa Hitt) which technology is advancing, examin- organizations and leaders to be able architecture of a large organization in ing areas where leasing versus owning to react to change. There exists today the 1950s, like General Motors, rather is a realistic possibility will become a “more change to contend with than than the Microsoft, Amazon, or Star- necessary ingredient for innovation and ever before” and its volume, momen- bucks of today.25 transformation if the United States wants tum, and complexity are accelerating One way to structure an effective to stay ahead of its potential adversaries. at increasing rates.23 Organizations organization can be found in the Third At a minimum, the leasing-versus-owning must adapt to this environment. Essen- Offset Strategy discussion from Robert mentality for certain aspects of the tially, “organizations, like individuals, Work. Two of the five components re- military inventory warrants further evalu- have a speed of change at which they quired to achieve the strategy relate to ations and may provide greater flexibility operate best. This speed reflects the shrinking the decisionmaking timeline and options for DOD in the future. degree to which the organization can and, in some cases, developing systems absorb major change while minimizing capable of quickly making decisions for Creating Flexible and dysfunctional behavior.”24 While the senior leaders. Before discussing these Adaptive Organizations U.S. military has proved its ability to components, it is important to note that The third ingredient necessary to remain tactically flexible, DOD is still development of these core capabilities will achieve innovative transformation and organizationally challenged. The reality not be possible without the application of maintain U.S. strategic and military is the current institutional structure the first ingredient of transformation: re- advantage requires creating flexible and of the Services is archaic and will have search and development across the whole adaptive organizations. The effects of difficulty facilitating the type of rapid of the science and technology spectrum. globalization and rapid advancements flexibility and decisionmaking required The first component is the creation of in technology, coupled with the speed to be effective. An examination of any autonomous deep learning systems. In at which information can travel around military Service organizational diagram essence, these systems can rapidly analyze the globe, create new stressors and reveals a cumbersome institutional multiple data inputs, learning through an requirements for resiliency in order for framework more closely resembling the iterative process in order to enhance their 56 Commentary / Cooking Shows, Corollas, and Innovation on a Budget JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 predictive capability and shorten the early a reality, and developing an organiza- individuals present, finding short-term warning indications for senior leaders. tion that facilitates this technology into fixes but often no long-term solutions. These deep learning systems are also ap- the decisionmaking cycle is a step in the In fact, “many organizations rely on a plicable to the realm of cyber and missile right direction. Furthermore, wargam- planned change, classical approach to defense where systems can be developed ing needs to become a collaborative organizations change” implemented to react automatically in order to protect effort where results are reported both through a linear methodology.33 critical infrastructure—both cyber and vertically and horizontally in order to Unfortunately, these linear methods often real, as well as civilian populations—in the prevent the institutionalization of faddish leave the misperception that a single solu- event of a massive attack that would over- assumptions and to better inform senior tion can be found that will permanently whelm the human decisionmaking cycle.26 decisionmakers. solve a given issue. The focus must be The second component is what While it is impossible to guess what on continuous process improvement Secretary Work describes as human- the future holds, it is safe to say rapid ad- programs that are iterative and evolution- machine collaboration. As he states, vancements in technology will change the ary, like the Define, Measure, Analyze, “human-machine collaboration is using character and nature of war. In the future, Improve, and Control (DMAIC) process. machines to help decisionmakers make military expertise may reside in individu- DMAIC is data-driven and requires or- better decisions.”27 One could argue that als who can manage multiple hypersonic ganizations to define key value measures through the use of wargaming exercises, reentry vehicles from a computer console and key performance indicators that DOD has been executing human- as they strike an array of enemy targets. validate and verify the effectiveness of machine collaboration for some time. Furthermore, “new technologies will meeting organizational objectives and The advantage of wargaming exercises is increasingly bring to the fore the expert priorities. In turn, this allows organiza- that they can be used to “explore a range in missile operations, the space general, tions to identify and create processes that of possible warfighting futures; generate and the electronic warfare wizard—none synchronize unity of effort and increase innovative ideas; and consider how to of them a combat specialist in the old efficiency in achieving the strategic objec- integrate new technologies into doc- sense.”31 The question then becomes: in tives of the organization. Methods, such trine, operations, and force structure,” the future will distinct branches of the as DMAIC, will be necessary in order as well as test senior leader decisions military, which often force thinking into to create efficiencies and the requisite in certain scenarios and their possible the pigeonholes of Soldiers, Marines, organizational flexibility to adapt to the outcomes.28 In the past, “wargames were Sailors, and Airmen, be needed? Should current pace of change. an inexpensive tool during a period of the evolution of joint warfighting be At the macro level, the question suppressed defense spending to help taken to the next level, a true joint force becomes do U.S. military organizations planners cope with the high degree of of American warfighters? In a broader provide latitude for risk-taking and, as contemporary technological and opera- qualitative context, DOD must address a by-product of innovation, to flour- tional uncertainty.”29 This is the scenario the question as to whether the current ish. While courage on the battlefield is and challenge DOD currently finds organizational structure of the military rewarded, courage to take risk at the itself facing. In their plan to revitalize Services provides incentives for sustaining operational and strategic levels organi- wargaming for DOD, Secretary Work organizational change. For this discus- zationally is widely unacceptable: “A and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of sion, sustaining organizational change is large body of scholarship within strategic Staff General Paul Selva recommended defined as “the continuous, anticipative, studies attributes innovation failure to the another organizational change necessary and adaptive movement (thinking and hierarchical, inflexible, and rigid nature for success in the future. In their research, actions) taken by organizational members of military organizations.”34 The military they discovered to achieve a desired future.”32 creates a linear environment with rules The first requirement to achieve the and structures that promote black-and- a lack of coordination within the wargam- level of congruence and unity required white thinking. Unfortunately, “people ing community and the absence of any by military members to achieve a desired who adapt more slowly than the pace of direct link between the insights gained endstate begins with senior leader mes- the changes occurring around them do so from wargaming and the department’s saging. Too often different Services stress partly because they have a low tolerance programmatic action. Wargame results are competing messages because each branch for ambiguity and therefore they gener- neither shared laterally across the defense is in competition with the others for valu- ally perceive life in binary terms—yes enterprise nor up the chain to influence able and limited resources. The second or no, black or white.”35 It is time for senior-level decisionmaking.30 requirement is to develop continuous the Services to take a hard look at orga- improvement processes Service-wide, nizational structure and determine if it Thus, applying the first ingredient which allow all to evolve and synchronize provides the level of resiliency and flex- of wide technical research will allow the efforts with the senior leader messaging ibility that will be required for success in development of future systems to make over time. Organizations often overcome the future. Today’s modern corporations the possibility of a Third Offset Strategy obstacles purely based on the talent of the have removed multiple layers of middle JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Jernigan and Cooper 57 management, promoted risk-taking and empowers action, encourages risk and— can be managed in a variety of ways. innovative thinking, and have “even as a byproduct—innovative thinking and One example is enabling leaders to make eliminated many of the functional and that maintains the requisite flexibility smaller, more frequent decisions rather social distinctions between management to maneuver with the speed of a rapidly than letting things build up to the point and labor that dominated industrial changing environment.41 where single decisions have enormous organizations.”36 consequences.46 This technique makes Secretary Carter took steps in the Overcoming Complacency risk more tolerable since only a little is right direction to address this issue. He and Fear of Risk risked with each decision. examined private industry and academia The final ingredient for effective inno- DOD needs risk-tolerant leaders who for ways to increase efficiencies as a mili- vation is people. Leaders at all levels are comfortable in chaos, are effective tary. Furthermore, he “[built] bridges need to be trained to support innova- decisionmakers, have freedom to act with every sector in America from corpo- tion and overcome its two nemeses: and create, and, more importantly, allow ration to academia” in order to facilitate complacency and risk. Complacency is their subordinates room to do the same. new thinking and innovative ways to the antithesis of innovation: things are These facets of professional maturation solve institutional problems.37 Secretary good now, why change? Agility is the can be inserted into curriculums at formal Carter doubled the Secretary of Defense antidote to complacency and must be schools, enhanced by operational and Corporate Fellowship program and applied to innovation to be effective. joint experiences and modeled by leaders. opened the program up to the noncom- Unfortunately, the U.S. military oper- missioned officer ranks.38 This program ates “at a level of agility better suited for The recipe to ensure innovation and, allows military members to work in a less-demanding era.”42 To encourage as a byproduct, preserve strategic and private industry for a year at organiza- innovation, DOD needs “agile leaders operational advantages in the future does tions such as Google, Intel, Amazon, and a leadership culture [to] model and exist. Innovation can be created incre- and others.39 Programs like this afford support agility across the enterprise.”43 mentally and relatively inexpensively by U.S. military members an exceptional Scientists have determined that several adhering to the following ingredients: a opportunity to learn best practices from types of agility exist. One required for general investment over a wide field of industry and an ability to view problems innovation is creative agility, which technology and science by relinquishing through varying lenses, especially from an outdated requirement to own the a change management perspective. transform[s] complex, novel problems technology or hardware, a reformation Opening this program up to noncom- and opportunities into desired results. As of organizational limitations, and a liberal missioned officer ranks is definitely a leaders increase their agility, they become salting of leaders prepared to innovate step in the right direction, as innovative more comfortable with novelty and uncer- and accept new ideas. A winning recipe thinking and newly learned processes can tainty. Because they clearly understand the for innovation is not to take two cups of be applied across multiple echelons of the limitations of any single perspective, they stealth, throw in a handful of nanobots, Services. As Secretary Carter deftly put it, encourage the expression of multiple view- and mix with a giant robot dog. Ralph “throughout this process, we’ve always points and the questioning of underlying Peters warns against an over-fascination been mindful that the military is a profes- assumptions.44 with technologic solutions at the risk of sion of arms . . . it’s not a business. The not investing in other aspects of innova- key to doing this successfully is to lever- This statement is exactly counter to the tion. He reminds strategists that potential age both tradition and change.”40 silver bullet technology approach that enemies are innovating, while the United Traditions are important but so is floods innovative thinking. States “tends to fall in love with the creating an organizational structure and In addition to operating with greater means . . . and be seduced by what we climate that facilitate resiliency and flex- agility, leaders who desire to encourage do; our enemies focus on what they must ibility. Change is essential for strategic innovation must learn to be comfort- do.”47 The effects of globalization and and operational advantage in the future, able with risk. Innovation requires both rapid advancements in technology have and these programs are a step in the right a willingness to act and to create a safe begun a shift in the geopolitical power direction. Otherwise, the U.S. military environment that allows it to flourish. balance. Maintaining U.S. preeminence in may find itself in a situation where the But to create this innovation safe space, innovation will require changing percep- enemy is able to react to the pace of risk must be overcome. People have three tions, organizations, and leadership styles change faster than U.S. forces, thereby fears regarding risk: fear of failure, fear of to a “magnitude that military people still putting enemy actions inside the strate- success, and fear of what others think.45 do not completely grasp and political gic- and operational-level decisionmaking Since risk is foundational to doing new leaders do not fully imagine.”48 However, cycle. “[S]hifting our perceptions toward things or doing things in new ways, lead- the recipe for innovation argued herein is change and how it is managed” requires ers need to understand which of these definitely a step in the right direction and a new vision for the organizational frame- fears they are most vulnerable to and need not come with the drama of a celeb- work of the military Services, one that work to mitigate them. Risk tolerance rity cooking show. JFQ 58 Commentary / Cooking Shows, Corollas, and Innovation on a Budget JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 22 “Aircraft Leasing: Buy or Rent?” Notes 23 Geoffrey Bellman, The Beauty of the Beast: Breathing New Life into Organizations (San New from 1 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “The Penta- Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, gon’s Wasting Assets,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 2000), 38. NDU Press 4 (July/August 2009), 20. 24 Darryl Conner, Managing at the Speed of for the Center for the Study of 2 Jim Garamone, “Carter Details Force of Change: How Resilient Managers Succeed and Chinese Military Affairs the Future Initiatives,” DOD News, Novem- Prosper Where Others Fail (New York: Random ber 18, 2015, available at JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Jernigan and Cooper 59 Airman prepares inert weapon for loading during annual weapons load competition in Hangar One at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, January 20, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Preston Cherry) Bombs, Not Broadcasts U.S. Preference for Kinetic Strategy in Asymmetric Conflict By Cole Livieratos n 2016, the United States dropped for nonplanned targets in support of civilian casualties, the approval author- 24,287 bombs in Iraq and Syria American or allied forces). If the U.S. ity to release ordnance has not changed. I targeting so-called Islamic State (IS) military wishes to conduct an infor- In fact, President Donald Trump has fighters as part of Operation Inherent mation operation, such as dropping signaled that he will delegate even Resolve (OIR). The authority to release leaflets or beginning a new series of greater authority for kinetic operations ordnance for a preplanned target in radio broadcasts, the approval author- to military leaders, while the approval OIR has been delegated to brigadier ity is higher—a major general. Any process for information operations generals and below (it is even lower information operation conducted via remains the same. the Internet or social media as part of The disparity in approval authorities OIR requires Pentagon-level approval. between dropping bombs and dropping Captain Cole Livieratos, USA, is a Ph.D. candidate Despite mounting criticism of the use leaflets is puzzling for those who study at Georgetown University. of American ordnance because of recent foreign policy. Why is there less scrutiny 60 Features / Bombs, Not Broadcasts JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 over kinetic operations that have the the Internet, but in this article, the term Individual agencies of the U.S. potential to kill innocent civilians than is separate from cyber operations. Government may self-select into the issue over information operations that cannot The military’s use of information as a public coalition depending on the nature physically harm anyone? This phenom- tool is fundamentally different than the of a specific conflict or proposed military enon is not unique to OIR in Iraq and use of any military hardware because the information operation. At times, the pub- Syria. The United States has regularly military has a monopoly over hardware lic affairs and public diplomacy sections prioritized kinetic operations above like tanks and bomber aircraft, but no in the State Department, members of the information operations when fighting such monopoly exists over information. Intelligence Community (IC), and even asymmetric conflicts. The hostilities in The military competes in the information the military’s own public affairs branch Vietnam, the second war in Iraq, and marketplace, or the marketplace of ideas, will join the issue public coalition seeking the operations in Afghanistan and Libya with others who trade in information as a to limit the military’s use of information have all demonstrated heavy American profession. Journalists, academics, public operations. Other government agencies reliance on kinetic operations (especially relations professionals, and certain policy- that selectively join the issue public coali- airpower) and a reluctance to focus on makers are in the business of generating tion may do so because of concerns about information operations at the strategic or sharing information. Thomas Risse- the military’s use of information under- level. This article answers the question Kappen separates the public into three mining their credibility or infringing on of why the United States consistently disparate groups: the “mass public,” their own operations. Though these turf prefers kinetic strategies instead of infor- “attentive public” (which has a general battles may sometimes be made public, mation-centric strategies in asymmetric interest in politics), and “issue public” at- they often play out privately among orga- conflicts. Qualitative research, including tuned to specific policy issues.1 nizations. The relationship between the examination of primary source materi- Members of the issue public from Department of Defense (DOD) and IC als, demonstrates that an “issue public the marketplace of ideas represent a de fits this pattern. Tactical and operational coalition” highly scrutinizes military in- facto coalition against the development coordination on information operations formation operations, thereby raising the and conduct of information operations has traditionally been successful, but the potential cost for military commanders by the military. This “issue public coali- IC is more likely to scrutinize strategic- to choose information-centric strategies. tion” is not concerned with having to level informational efforts by DOD. The An existing military preference for kinetic compete with the military over informa- nature of this scrutiny is different than operations—compared with a high level tion, but it is concerned that military public criticism from the media, but it of scrutiny of information operations— “weaponization” of information could pressures military commanders and raises makes it unlikely that military leaders will undermine American credibility and the costs of conducting information op- choose an information-centric strategy in negatively impact their professions.2 Even erations nonetheless. asymmetric conflicts. though the mass public readily accepts While the issue public coalition highly information as an influence technique in scrutinizes information operations, the Issue Public Coalition, Military terms of consumer marketing or politi- military already has an organizational Culture, and Strategic Choice cal campaigns, the issue public coalition culture with a preference for kinetic oper- An information-centric strategy can be argues that inform and influence activities ations. Commanders are not opposed to conceived of as a military strategy that conducted by the executive branch are conducting information operations, but prioritizes informational tools, such as more problematic, even when directed at most commanders do not understand the psychological operations, as a major foreign audiences. The coalition frames process or understand the utility. If com- component of the strategic approach. military information operations in a manders do decide to use informational Strategies that are not information- manner that puts these activities at odds tools, they rarely integrate them through- centric rely on kinetic operations with American political culture, paint- out the entire operational planning (including air strikes as well as raids and ing military information operations as process. As former Chairman of the Joint targeted strikes) and/or train and equip undemocratic or contrary to the freedom Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen wrote missions; these are referred to here as of speech rights guaranteed in the First in an article for Joint Force Quarterly kinetic strategies. The term information Amendment. The issue public coalition in 2009, “We’ve come to believe that operations refers to inform and influence therefore acts in accordance with what messages are something we can launch activities and strategic communications Elizabeth Kier describes when she argues downrange like a rocket, something more broadly. It is distinct from the that civilian groups constrain military we can fire for effect.”4 The military’s military functional area of information doctrinal development because of con- cultural preference for kinetic operations operations (which includes psychological cerns about the military’s power within transcends its failure to comprehend operations in addition to other compo- the state.3 As a result, the level of scrutiny information operations; its organizational nents like electronic warfare, operations placed on military information operations structure, promotion system, professional security, and military deception). Infor- is high—disproportionately greater than military education, budget alloca- mation operations can be conducted via other types of military operations. tion, authorities, and even uniforms all JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Livieratos 61 reinforce this underlying preference for posed toward kinetic action. The first roughly $525 million.7 This amounted kinetic action. Combatant commanders of these counterarguments is that an to only 0.07 percent of the total Defense in asymmetric conflicts are almost always information-centric strategy is a weapon Department budget of $708.2 billion selected from the infantry or a combat of the weak and actors only choose that year.8 If success of information oper- arms branch. Even within special opera- this strategy to compensate for military ations were a priority, this budget would tions units, theater special operations strength. It is true that disparities in be much larger. Furthermore, previous commanders, special operations task force military capacity do result in bellig- studies on asymmetric conflict suggests commanders, and country-level special erents selecting different strategies to that stronger actors should match weaker operations team leaders are almost all maximize their strengths and attack actors’ strategies to prevail.9 American from the Army’s Special Forces or Navy their opponents’ weaknesses. However, professional military educators regularly SEALs, both of which prioritize kinetic several strong actors like Russia and warn against ceding battleground to the activities, especially since 9/11. Few Israel employ information as a major enemy. In asymmetric conflicts, the deci- mechanisms prioritize or reward nonki- component of their strategy in asym- sive battleground is often not geographic netic operations, even when those means metric conflict, while several weak actors space but the information environment appear to be better suited to achieve the like Iraq (in 2003), Libya, and Ukraine and public perception. From a strategic conflict’s political goals. do not prominently feature information perspective, it therefore is not logical for Asymmetric conflicts should neces- operations. Additionally, well-executed a stronger actor to cede the information sitate high involvement from all parts of information operations consume a large domain to a weaker one. the U.S. Government, but the reliance on amount of resources. Actors like Russia A final potential counterargument is the military to plan and execute asymmet- and the IS decide to invest heavily in normative, positing that the U.S. military ric warfare since 9/11 has substantially those capabilities, while many actors already is too involved in information increased. When policymakers commit with similar capacity do not invest in operations and should not be conduct- the United States to an asymmetric con- technologies like media production and ing such activities to begin with. This flict, such as Libya in 2011 or fighting social media. While relative capacity argument is consistent with the issue the IS in Iraq and Syria starting in 2014, may partially explain whether an actor public coalition’s criticism of military the military is primarily responsible for uses an information-centric strategy, this information operations. As previously planning and executing strategy. With alone does not appear to be a sufficient noted by budgetary figures, the U.S. an organizational culture predisposed explanation. military is not too involved in information toward conventional kinetic methods A second potential counterargu- operations already. The argument that and an elevated level of scrutiny from ment to explain why we do not use the military should not conduct informa- the issue public coalition on information information-centric strategies in asym- tion operations usually takes two forms: operations, the risks and potential costs metric conflict is that the United States first, this activity should belong to other for military leaders to adopt an infor- is simply bad at conducting information departments like the State Department or mation-centric strategy are far too high. operations. There is some evidence to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Military leaders default to something support the notion that U.S. military second, it is against democratic principles more familiar and less risky: a kinetic information operations have been inef- for the executive branch (and especially strategy. Through this lens, even civilian fective.5 However, the evidence pointing the military) to conduct information casualties from an air strike will be seem- to not prioritizing military information operations. In response to the first point, ingly less costly to a military commander operations is insufficient for two reasons. DOD is explicitly charged with con- than an errant tweet. Though civilian First, even though the results of military ducting these operations in support of casualties are likely to receive attention information operations have been mixed, military objectives worldwide.10 Properly in the media, the issue public coalition is it has produced major successes along conducted, information operations re- unlikely to frame the tragedy as a threat with its failures.6 In recent asymmetric quire close coordination between several to American democratic values. conflicts, the results of more kinetic ap- agencies, but especially DOD, State, proaches have resulted in failure rather and the CIA. Each of these agencies Potential Counterarguments than success. It is difficult to argue that should have a distinct role in information Existing theories on asymmetric the United States should maintain its operations (or “public diplomacy” or warfare, information operations, and unsuccessful strategy. Second, military “strategic communications” depend- state-society relations may offer coun- capabilities reflect the prioritization and ing on the agency, target, and methods terarguments to the idea that decisions resources invested in those capabilities. involved), but they should all mutually against information-centric strategies When the budget for military informa- support one another. Second, the United in asymmetric war result from an tion operations was near its peak in fiscal States has a long history of the executive issue public coalition that scrutinizes year 2011, the total budget for strategic branch and the military conducting in- military information operations and a communications, information opera- formation operations, dating back to the military organizational culture predis- tions, and psychological operations was Revolutionary War. The notion that this 62 Features / Bombs, Not Broadcasts JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 USS Harry S. Truman’s support of Operation Inherent Resolve demonstrates capability and flexibility of Navy and its resolve to eliminate so-called Islamic State, Mediterranean Sea, May 21, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Thomas Gooley) method of targeting foreign audiences Corps, and the National Endowment the importance of developing the capa- is contrary to democratic principles or for Democracy were all established bility for information operations within freedom of speech is mainly the result of during this period. Psychological the CIA and DOD. In 1953, President framing from the issue public coalition. warfare units, which are still employed Dwight D. Eisenhower commissioned The remainder of this article uses today, were originally established the Committee on International qualitative evidence since World War II to during World War II. President Harry Information Activities (also known as the demonstrate how this framing progressed S. Truman officially founded the Army Jackson Committee) stating, “It has long and became a regular fixture in foreign Special Forces (an outgrowth of the been my conviction that a unified and policy discourse. Army’s psychological warfare branch) dynamic effort in this field [information in 1952. operations] is essential to the security of Post–World War II Because of concerns over the use of the United States and of the peoples in and the Cold War information operations domestically, the community of free nations.”12 The World War II and the early years of Congress passed the U.S. Information committee concluded that psychologi- the Cold War reinforced the belief in and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, cal warfare was inseparable from other information operations and the power also known as the Smith-Mundt Act. This aspects of foreign policy and that such of propaganda. To combat Soviet act specifically charges the Department activities needed to be better coordinated propaganda abroad, the United States of State (executed through USIA) with and centralized. The military would con- created several agencies, institutions, the conduct of information operations tinue developing these functions, but the and organizations in the early Cold War abroad and strictly prohibits targeting do- committee recommended they privatize years. The United States Information mestic audiences with public diplomacy/ most their operations. Agency (USIA), the U.S. Agency for information operations. 11 Even though From the beginning of the Cold International Development, the political Smith-Mundt placed public diplomacy War until the early 1960s, the conduct action component of the CIA, Radio within the purview of State, Presidents of information operations and public Free Europe, Radio Liberty, the Peace Truman through Ronald Reagan knew diplomacy abroad was a major priority of JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Livieratos 63 the U.S. Government. The proliferation Reagan knew the important and unique dinating and executing military infor- of agencies and organizations to conduct influence of information activities. He mation operations.21 Indications from such activities, including growth of these passed three separate National Security the head of OSI, Douglas Feith; general organizations within the military, was Decision Directives (NSDD)—in 1982, officers; and Secretary of Defense understood and authorized by Congress 1983, and 1984—to reorganize elements Donald Rumsfeld were that OSI would to combat the Soviet threat. of the executive branch responsible for mainly be used to plan and coordinate Elite views and public discourse information operations, including the information operations by drawing concerning information operations National Security Council, USIA, and the on existing units and capabilities, like and the organizations that conducted Department of State’s Office of Public psychological operations and informa- these activities began to shift in the early Diplomacy.19 By giving these agencies ad- tion operations units. Nonetheless, the 1960s. Many people in Congress and ditional authorities and resources, as well New York Times published a story on the media started to publicly object to as increasing funding for the military’s February 19, 2002, indicating that OSI military information programs around psychological operations branch, Reagan planned to conduct “black” (that is, this time, but the formation of the issue placed public diplomacy and information covert) programs that would intention- public coalition can largely be attributed operations at the center of his foreign ally release disinformation to foreign to Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR). policy agenda. Even though most schol- media outlets.22 A media firestorm From 1960 through the end of his term ars acknowledge the direct contribution ensued with daily stories about OSI’s as a Senator, Fulbright was the most vocal of these efforts in bringing about the col- apparent intent to disinform foreign critic of Pentagon efforts to shape public lapse of the Soviet Union, criticism from media appearing in all the major Ameri- opinion. He “investigated, exposed, and academics and the media over the actual can media outlets such as the Wash- denounced as undemocratic many of the or perceived covert nature of some infor- ington Post, Fox News, and National tactics and techniques that the Pentagon mational programs (especially focused on Public Radio. After a week of sustained still uses today.”13 Fulbright believed that Latin America) forced President Reagan media coverage, Secretary Rumsfeld any attempt by the executive branch to to dismantle the NSDD-77 structure in announced the decision to close OSI on “manufacture opinion” domestically or 1987.20 Throughout the end of the Cold February 26, 2002. to foreign audiences was undemocratic, War, the influence of the issue public The case of OSI provides a clear akin to “brainwashing.”14 Fulbright’s coalition opposing executive use of in- example of how the issue public coali- personal feud with the military can be formation operations continued to grow. tion engaged in what Gil Merom calls traced to 1959, his first year as Chair of After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a “process of societal ‘coercion.’”23 As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. the issue public coalition worked with it turned out, the leak to the New York He believed that the military interfered conservative lawmakers seeking to save Times about potential black programs with Senate investigations into U.S. money and limit the size of the Federal came from DOD’s own Bureau of Public military participation in the black market Government to dismantle the USIA. As Affairs. Such a leak is consistent with the in Turkey and that they subsequently Gil Merom and Elizabeth Kier argue, characterization of leaks in bureaucratic censored news about the scandal in Stars a small sector of civil society influenced politics being used to undermine a rival and Stripes.15 Fulbright made it his per- government structure and policy by clos- group. Despite repeated assurances sonal mission to investigate and expose ing down an agency that they believed no from Feith, military commanders, and DOD information operations, which he longer had a foreign policy purpose. Secretary Rumsfeld that OSI would not increasingly thought were “trampling conduct any disinformation campaigns on democratic traditions and practices” The Saga of the Office of and would never disinform any audience, by using “deceptive and coercive propa- Strategic Influence foreign or domestic, media coverage ganda.”16 This battle culminated in his The growing influence of the issue continued to allege that OSI would 1970 book The Pentagon Propaganda public coalition over foreign policy intentionally submit false information Machine.17 Fulbright’s immediate efforts became evident only a few short to foreign and domestic audiences.24 to end all military information operations months after the 9/11 attacks. Quick Even after OSI was shut down, academic were unsuccessful, but his efforts spurred to recognize that the coming conflict articles, media reports, and even congres- the rise in scholarly and media criticism with global Islamic terrorism would sional testimony continued to charge of the government’s participation in the largely be ideological in nature, Presi- that OSI was an “attack on truth”25 and marketplace of ideas.18 dent George W. Bush’s administration a “profoundly undemocratic program Toward the end of the Cold War, created the Office of Strategic Influence devoted to spreading disinformation.”26 President Reagan reemphasized the (OSI) within DOD in October 2001. The irony is that the original leak use of information as a tool of foreign The official charter and responsibilities from DOD Public Affairs began a process policy to defeat Soviet propaganda and for OSI had not been fully developed of misinformation itself, as there was no ideology across the globe. Largely due when the office was created, but it substantiating evidence that OSI planned to his background in film and radio, would primarily be responsible for coor- on conducting disinformation. Public 64 Features / Bombs, Not Broadcasts JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Pilots with 96th Expeditionary Bomber Squadron fly B-52 Stratofortress to execute air operations in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, February 13, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Jordan Castelan) statements from the highest levels of lead- market of ideas. In 2006, Secretary mine-resistant ambush protected ership as well as the training and approval Rumsfeld stated, “If I were grading, I (MRAP) vehicles to police forces in the process (which strictly forbid using false would say we probably deserve a D or United States, contributing to what has information) within military informa- D plus as a country as to how well we’re been called the “militarization” of the tion operations suggest that the military doing in the battle of ideas . . . we have police. Many interest groups (including would not be conducting disinformation not found the formula as a country.”28 not only issue publics but also much of operations. The issue public coalition His successor, Robert Gates, admitted the mass public as well) began protest- of public affairs professionals, the press, that it was a mistake to close USIA at ing this practice, asking that police scholars, and certain policymakers capi- the end of the Cold War. Gates stated, forces no longer be equipped with talized on a single report (later shown to “We are miserable at communicating these military vehicles. In this case, the be false) to force a policy change. There to the rest of the world what we are as public drew the line at the domestic use is no indication that the broader, mass a society and a culture, about freedom of a military capability; they did not public took issue with OSI; the only and democracy, about our policies and protest the development of MRAPs criticism on record came from members our goals.”29 Without the proper tools and their use in other countries. of the issue public coalition. Put another and resources, the U.S. Government When it comes to military information way, the case of OSI showed how “soci- will not be able to improve this defi- operations, however, the issue public etal preferences undercut and defeat state ciency. Remarkably, scrutiny from the coalition resists the existence or devel- preferences, not ameliorate them” . . . issue public coalition has prevented the opment of this very capability, even if and that “a minority among the public military from developing or employ- it will exclusively be used on foreign can defeat state policy.”27 ing these capabilities. Such a pattern is audiences. The cost for military com- unique to military information opera- manders, who already prefer kinetic The Situation Today tions and does not work in the same operations, is too high to change this Since the end of the Cold War, high- way for other military capabilities. situation, resulting in kinetic strategies ranking officials in successive admin- For example, when the United States in asymmetric conflict. istrations have lamented American began to diminish its presence in Iraq In a December 2016 DOD report to inability to compete in the international and Afghanistan, it gave or sold several Congress on the progress of Operation JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Livieratos 65 Soldiers with 399th Tactical Psychological Operations Company ask permission of local school headmaster to post information outside school in Cristo Rey, Belize, April 24, 2017 (U.S. Army/Joshua E. Powell) Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Syria, there use information operations more its 2013 reforms to the Smith-Mundt is no mention of “information opera- effectively without eroding credibility Act to allow greater latitude for agen- tions” or “psychological operations” in or threatening American democratic cies (especially the military) to conduct any of the 138 pages.30 The report values. The government needs to information operations online. acknowledges the “psychological effects establish an independent organization Separate from an interagency or- of ISIL’s propaganda on Iraqi and Syrian to coordinate, monitor, and improve ganization to coordinate information populations,” but proposes no American information operations across the gov- operations across the government, DOD efforts to counter these or conduct our ernment. The organization does not should enact an Information Operations own information operations. Instead, the need to be an independent department Task Force to focus strictly on informa- report examines the coalition’s air cam- or agency, but it would need some tion operations and counterpropaganda paign against the so-called Islamic State; autonomy and authority to coordinate rather than the advise and assist or man, humanitarian assistance; governance; and information operations among DOD, train, and equip missions that information coalition efforts to train, advise, assist, State, and the CIA and oversee their operations and psychological operations and equip partners in Iraq and Syria. execution. Personnel working in infor- units are often tasked with. Such a task There is little indication that the United mation operations in all three agencies force would be one of the most direct States will change its strategy in Iraq and should have cross-training with the ways to get more trained personnel work- Syria or prepare for future asymmetric other agencies to maintain awareness of ing on information operations even when conflicts by featuring information opera- their procedures and practices. These they are not deployed, thereby opera- tions more prominently. suggestions would require an increase tionalizing a greater number of qualified in budget and resources dedicated to Servicemembers. Forward deployed Policy Recommendations information operations (to include teams would continue their current There are tangible steps the U.S. public diplomacy) at the national level. inform and influence missions, but they Government and DOD can take to Finally, Congress needs to continue would have more support and resources 66 Features / Bombs, Not Broadcasts JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 for the operational portion of the mission U.S. International Information Policy, March Notes 6, 1984, available at JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Livieratos 67 PHL-03 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems attached to army brigade with People’s Liberation Army Eastern Theater Command fire salvo of 300mm surface-to-surface rockets at simulated ground targets during live-fire training exercise in Gobi Desert of Northwest China, August 8, 2017 (Courtesy China Military Online/Jiang Xiaoliang) 1986 are as important. In late 2015, the Reverse Engineering PLA instituted wide-ranging reforms, arguably the most far-reaching in its modern history. This agenda carried an ambitious completion date of 2020. Goldwater-Nichols Even though scholars have examined the reorganization, some even referring China’s Joint Force Reforms to it as “China’s Goldwater-Nichols,” none have yet examined the modifica- tions as indicators of China’s analysis of By Shane A. Smith, Thomas Henderschedt, and Timothy D. Luedecking 30 years of U.S. joint force reform.1 Using the objectives of Goldwater- Nichols as a lens, this article examines the t is no secret to observers of China’s blunt or defeat American efforts in the progress of PLA developments toward a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that western Pacific, the PLA’s incorpora- more modern, joint military capable of I it closely observes the Department tion of organizational changes likely significant operations within the People’s of Defense (DOD). While many focus influenced by studies of U.S. efforts Republic of China (PRC), as well as more on the PLA’s incorporation of U.S.-like under the Goldwater-Nichols Depart- in the direction of an expeditionary force. tactics, techniques, and procedures to ment of Defense Reorganization Act of It demonstrates, too, that the PRC has already taken significant steps, particularly in the creation of new joint warfight- ing commands, reorganization of its Colonel Shane A. Smith, USAF, is Director of Operations and Intelligence, Twenty-Fifth Air Force. Captain Thomas Henderschedt, USN, is the Naval Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. Colonel Timothy D. department system, and creation of new Luedecking, USA, is Director of Logistics (G4) for III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas. military services. It also reveals, however, 68 Features / Reverse Engineering Goldwater-Nichols JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 limitations such as a continued internal command, placing that authority in the behaviors became dominant in order focus, entrenched bureaucratic interests, hands of combatant commanders. The to protect each Service’s interests, and and the necessity for President Xi Jinping Services were to focus on organize, train, innovation suffered as a result. Budget to use his positional power to enforce and equip functions. The Secretary re- plans were uncoupled from joint capabil- top-down reform without the benefit of ceived greater administrative control over ity warfighting needs and the realistic lessons learned in combat operations or a DOD, while the Joint Chiefs were desig- level of pairing to resources available. senior military champion. Understanding nated as that position’s military staff. The Huntington observed that campaign this PLA effort is crucial for U.S. mili- staff of the Joint Chiefs was also enlarged, planning efforts often appeared like the tary and civilian leaders going forward and the Chairman could now formally Services were preparing to fight differ- both to provide a fresh look at our own vote on matters.6 ent conflicts. Overall readiness suffered. joint developments and to see how they Even President Eisenhower later Furthermore, the system undermined alter the threat picture for our planning recognized that the 1958 act was only the combatant commanders’ ability to development. an interim step. Members of Congress lead with Service component command- had fought him vigorously over his at- ers maintaining an inordinate amount Goldwater-Nichols tempt to unify the appropriations process. of control through their Service chiefs, In 1984, Samuel Huntington called Additionally, Service interests continued who maneuvered to ensure a “piece of “Servicism,” or Service parochialism, to dominate joint considerations, which the pie” for their organization. All in “the central malady of the American saw minimal real change.7 As James all, Service interests trumped strategic military establishment.”2 To combat Locher highlighted, the provisions of the considerations.11 As General Jones put it this, Goldwater-Nichols was born. Far 1958 legislation “were not effectively in a 1982 article, “We need more time on from the first attempt at reform, the implemented. The military departments our warfighting capabilities and less on an act sought to update a system with retained a de facto role in the operational intramural scramble for resources.”12 its origins in the makeshift actions of chain of command and never complied Commencing in 1982 and 1985, re- World War II.3 The National Security with the provision strengthening the uni- spectively, the House and Senate Armed Act of 1947 intended to repair many fied commanders.”8 This set the stage for Services Committees advocated a pro-re- of the pre–World War II defects and future reform efforts. form stance. After extensive resistance by incorporate lessons learned during that General David Jones, USAF, was the Services and Reagan administration, conflict but left most Service-centered the first seated Chairman to speak out legislation named after its champions, inefficiencies in place.4 Not unlike the for reform. Testifying before the House Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) and situation during the war, the new order Armed Services Committee on February Representative William Nichols (D-AL), functioned as a system where the Joint 3, 1982, he stated, “The system is bro- passed into law on October 1, 1986.13 Chiefs of Staff were essentially a com- ken. I have tried to reform it from inside, Public Law 99-433 explicitly identified mittee of equals with the Chairman cast but I cannot. Congress is going to have eight objectives for building the joint in the role of a consensus seeker. Una- to mandate necessary reforms.”9 Almost force: nimity was the watchword, not decisive 5 years of debate followed. Many issues decisionmaking focused on enhancing led to this point in time. Subpar military In enacting this Act, it is the intent of joint mission execution. Thus, Service advice, an inability to effectively operate Congress, consistent with the congressional interests dominated, resulting in diluted together, and chain of command issues declaration of policy in section 2 of the planning and advice to the National were cited as the core issues for negative National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Command Authorities.5 events as far-reaching as the outcome of 401)— Building on his experiences in World the Vietnam War, the Beirut barracks (1) to reorganize the Department of War II and seeking to overcome the bombing, Operation Eagle Claw in Iran, Defense and strengthen civilian authority compromises contained in the 1947 problems during the invasion of Grenada, in the Department; law, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the seizures of two U.S. ships by secured passage of the Department of North Korea and Cambodia in 1968 and (2) to improve the military advice provided Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. 1975, respectively.10 to the President, the National Security His stated goals to Congress included Officers viewed a joint assignment as Council, and the Secretary of Defense; a desire to unify strategic and tactical career threatening. Service leaders tended (3) to place clear responsibility on the planning, create an efficient weapons to retain those viewed as their top talent commanders of the unified and specified acquisition process under the oversight for Service staffs. Promotion rates of combatant commands for the accom- of the Secretary of Defense, and organize Joint Staff officers trailed their counter- plishment of missions assigned to those forces into unified commands that fought parts on the Service side. Commentators commands; as one unit, irrespective of Service. In also observed that the Joint Chiefs this vein, the act removed the military simply proved inadequate in the realm of (4) to ensure that the authority of the Services from the operational chain of strategic planning. Status quo–seeking commanders of the unified and specified JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Smith, Henderschedt, and Luedecking 69 combatant commands is fully com- upon which DOD was to build its future. and Germany. The PLA analyzes its mensurate with the responsibility of those The PRC was watching and would even- own history and filters its examinations commanders for the accomplishment of tually follow suit. of others through this lens; however, missions assigned to their commands; Through revisiting categories pre- since the PRC has not fought an actual scribed in Goldwater-Nichols legislation, war since the Sino-Vietnamese conflict (5) to increase attention to the formulation we can evaluate China’s progress. We first of 1979, it must look outside its own of strategy and to contingency planning; examine the PRC’s approach to strength- experience for how warfare in the infor- (6) to provide for more efficient use of de- ening civilian authority. Second, we look mation age has evolved. fense resources; at the organizational changes being im- Many of the ills previously described plemented to enhance the military advice in the pre–Goldwater-Nichols system are (7) to improve joint officer management provided to senior party decisionmakers. applicable to the PLA. As such, China’s policies; and Third, we scrutinize how the authority joint reforms “hope both to tighten cen- (8) otherwise to enhance the effectiveness and responsibility of joint commanders tral political control over a force that was of military operations and improve the to accomplish their tasked missions is seen as increasingly corrupt and to build management and administration of the being reinforced, with a particular focus the PLA into a credible joint warfight- Department of Defense.14 on the new theater command structure. ing entity.”17 Almost three decades after Fourth, we describe further organiza- Goldwater-Nichols passage, the PLA’s or- Importantly, Goldwater-Nichols tional changes intended to improve the ganizational reforms commenced in late strengthened both the Secretary and formulation of strategy and contingency 2015 and early 2016. Perhaps heeding Chairman. No actor in DOD possessed planning. Fifth, new personnel manage- an observation by General Jones, “after authority outside the control of the ment policies, seeking a more efficient nearly 2 years of studies, committee re- Secretary. The act further recognized the use of defense resources and improve- ports, and presidential interventions, the Chairman as the senior military officer ments in joint officer management, are National Security Act of 1947 emerged and military advisor to the President, explored. Sixth, a description of the as a compromise between those who Secretary of Defense, and National PRC’s steps toward enhancing the ef- favored full Service integration and those Security Council. Consensus with other fectiveness of PLA military operations is who feared centralization of military au- Joint Chiefs was no longer a necessity. reviewed. Finally, as we survey how the thority.”18 It remains to be seen, however, Goldwater-Nichols subordinated the PRC is approaching its joint force future, if the PLA reform process proves to be an Joint Staff to only the Chairman. The this article investigates China’s creation of aggressive Goldwater-Nichols legislation authorities of the combatant commanders new military services and its collaboration effort, or a weakened compromise like over forces assigned them was empha- with industry. the National Security Act of 1947. sized, and the direct chain of command While much of the reform has been relationship between these commanders PRC Reforms public, the PLA’s opaqueness makes and the Secretary and President was We do not argue that the PLA is just in-depth analysis somewhat challenging. codified, excluding Service chiefs from learning lessons in jointness and military However, enough is already understood operational roles. Perceived deficiencies operations from the United States. to facilitate some assessment. Either inde- in planning were addressed. The act re- Nonetheless, we do maintain that U.S. pendently or at President Xi’s direction, quired the President to submit a National joint force reforms and experiences in it appears that the PLA arrived at many of Security Strategy upon which DOD its conflicts were both a catalyst and a the same conclusions as the Goldwater- would base budgeting decisions and cam- focus for the PLA. As multiple authors Nichols framers. Although similar, each paign plan preparations. The Chairman highlight, the Gulf War in 1991 was an has characteristics specifically applicable was made the independent voice on the eye-opening episode for Chinese civil- to the PRC political system, current stra- budget previously missing from military ian and military leaders. Additionally, tegic context, and complicated cultural counsel. Finally, officer management was Russian experiences in both of the post- military history. The article now turns greatly altered with a new joint officer Soviet Chechen wars, as well as reforms to the previously identified objectives management system—a very controver- after the Russia-Georgia conflict, of Goldwater-Nichols to evaluate their sial part of the legislation.15 provided insights for PLA efforts. The actions. In relation to this issue, Huntington PLA studied the Falklands War between Strengthen Civilian Authority. cogently observed that “capable people Argentina and the United Kingdom, As Wuthnow and Saunders state, “The are important, but it is also a mistake to given the situation’s similarity to the main political driver of the reform was downgrade the significance of formal Taiwan issue. Joel Wuthnow and Phillip the desire to tighten political control organizational structure. Organizational Saunders highlight that besides the and supervision of the PLA.”19 While structure both reflects and shapes an United States, United Kingdom, and Goldwater-Nichols attempted to entity’s priorities.”16 Goldwater-Nichols Russia, the PLA focused on reform strengthen civilian authority in DOD, provided that organizational structure experiences in Japan, India, France, recent PLA reforms appear to strengthen 70 Features / Reverse Engineering Goldwater-Nichols JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Soldiers from People’s Liberation Army listen to briefing in preparation for search and extraction exchange during 13th annual U.S.-China Disaster Management Exchange at Camp Rilea Armed Forces Training Center, Warrenton, Oregon, November 16, 2017 (U.S. Army/April Davis) President Xi’s authority over the PLA. In take place in parallel to Xi’s overall anti- lack of a real interagency perspective, this vein and unlike the U.S. desire for corruption campaign, a tool he has used while potentially providing more latitude an unpolitical military, the goal is a PLA to consolidate power over and within the for military leaders to formulate plans that is a direct defender of the Chinese PLA, relieving two CMC vice chairmen outside civilian interference. In effect, an Communist Party that embodies endur- and over 200 other officers.20 organizational personnel mix that previ- ing “revolutionary ideals.” As head of One alarm bell Richard Weitz ously enabled periodic unresponsiveness the party, state, and Central Military sounded regarding enhanced civilian to civilian direction was left in place. Commission (CMC), Xi’s civilian control control in the Chinese system is that few This leads some to conclude that achiev- of the PLA and its reforms is further senior civilian leaders have served in the ing the goal of strengthening civilian solidified. Organizational changes like military and that there is a dearth of op- authority and political control over the transforming the previous General Staff portunities to develop civilian strategic PLA will depend on Xi’s personally as- Department (GSD) into 15 offices work- thinkers either inside or outside the sertive leadership style and his continued ing directly for the CMC, in addition to government. The reforms likewise do not ability to dedicate significant time to implementing Xi’s “chairman responsi- alter the civilian-military balance in the military issues, along with the appoint- bility system”—which raises day-to-day PLA; it remains a military-led organiza- ment of trusted officers to implement his national defense decisionmaking to his tion without the types of civilian political initiatives.21 level—help ensure that all major military- appointees or senior civil servants who Improve Military Advice. The related decisions rest in his hands, and are seen across DOD. All CMC members expansion of organizations directly he possesses a number of levers to ensure except Xi are military officers. This is a subordinate to the CMC deepens the compliance. For instance, PLA reforms weakness, as it highlights the continued pool of advisors who can directly provide JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Smith, Henderschedt, and Luedecking 71 PLA soldier participates in attack exercise observed by General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., and General Song Puxuan, commander, Northern Theater Command, at base in Shenyang, China, August 16, 2017 (DOD/Dominique A. Pineiro) counsel to party decisionmakers.22 For and services to develop joint training Staff Department. In addition to focusing example, interactions with foreign mili- standards and to monitor the implemen- on joint training, operational planning, taries, even during tensions such as the tation of those standards via its inspection capability assessments, 24/7 situational 2009 Impeccable incident, were managed function, measuring the effectiveness of awareness, and overall force readiness, its by the Ministry of National Defense’s exercises and training programs at the portfolio includes acting as a conduit be- Foreign Affairs Office (MND-FAO).23 theater, service, and unit levels. The de- tween the CMC and theater commands. Reform efforts removed MND-FAO partment also inherited a number of PLA Moreover, the Joint Staff Department from the Ministry of National Defense, academies previously supervised by GSD serves as the planning arm and command an organization largely devoid of real organizations, as well as oversight of the and control hub for global actions out- purpose, and moved it into the CMC professional military education system, side the established theaters, which will as the Office of International Military with a charge to improve joint education be described later. This organization and Cooperation (OIMC). Even though and to begin it earlier in careers. This the 14 others formed were designed to OIMC still performs the same duties as move gives CMC leaders better visibility improve training, political indoctrination, MND-FAO, as a body directly subordi- on the progress of joint training across weapons system acquisition, mobiliza- nate to the CMC, it can provide advice the PLA and more opportunities to di- tion of forces, and strategic planning. more directly. rectly influence what is happening in the The staffs are to be manned in a joint In another move, a GSD sub- training realm. fashion and are designed to provide joint department for training was elevated Additionally, the Joint Staff military counsel to senior CMC leaders to a separate entity, the Training and Department, akin to a hybridization of considered missing by many under the Administration Department, directly U.S. J3 (Operations) and J5 (Strategic old system.24 reporting to the CMC. Its portfolio Plans and Policy) staff functions, was cre- Clarify Combatant Command includes working with theater commands ated on the basis of the former General Responsibilities. In a nod to U.S. unified 72 Features / Reverse Engineering Goldwater-Nichols JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 combatant command structure, the PLA with the Strategic Planning Office reform, acquisition methods are under departed from its previous seven military retaining the responsibility to conduct review to weed out the high degree of region construct (Beijing, Shenyang, long-range strategic analysis. This analysis waste and to ensure that the PLA’s rapid Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu, is particularly focused on developing increase in systems translates to a true and Lanzhou) to a five-theater command approaches to multidomain, information- increase in overall joint combat capability. structure (Eastern, Southern, Western, dominant warfare, integrating China’s A further step toward efficiency, as well as Northern, and Central). Under this ground, sea, air, space, and cyber forces to deal with corruption issues, includes a new paradigm, theater commanders are in a truly joint fashion to address threats push to standardize what the U.S. system now joint force commanders. Breaking seen on the horizon. The combination of refers to as regulations and operating down a situation similar to that which the Joint Staff Department, the theater- instructions.29 existed previously in U.S. history where specific contingency planning conducted Improve Joint Officer Management. the Services maintained an operational by the theater commands, and the A significant impact in the joint officer role, these commands are now the main Strategic Planning Office demonstrates management arena was the previously warfighting arm of the PRC. The theater a focus on current and future strategy mentioned assignment of former North commander will operationally control the formulation and operational planning in Sea Fleet commander, Vice Admiral Yuan forces of services assigned to his region. keeping with Goldwater-Nichols.27 Yubai, as the commander of the Southern This directly stems from China’s interpre- Use Defense Resources More theater command, a first for the PLA. tation of its threat environment and the Efficiently. The PRC started the process While a data point of one, this was previ- nature of modern war. They diligently of reform at a low-efficiency baseline with ously considered unthinkable and points observed U.S. joint warfighting and a number of opportunities to address. in an overall positive direction for the cre- the evolution of information-dominant, The most obvious was in manpower; ation of truly joint staffs at the CMC and precision-oriented combat since the Gulf much of the PLA structure has served theater command levels. As senior leaders War. The former system was peacetime as a “jobs program” historically. While like Yuan rise, they can be expected to oriented and put the PRC at a distinct previous downsizing simply trimmed bring co-service representatives with disadvantage in case of unforeseen or overall numbers, this effort concentrates them.30 Another indicator of joint inten- rapidly developing events. The new on a more efficient and effective use of tions for the officer corps is the creation structure seeks to remedy that shortfall resources. Against this backdrop, the of “a new ‘operational command track’ in by making the transition from peace to PLA announced a reduction of 300,000 PLA National Defense University courses conflict faster and smoother. A cadre of personnel. Most observers predict cuts that train PLA officers for promotion joint officers will staff each theater head- will focus mainly on noncombat and low- to senior positions. Attendance in com- quarters. The individual services now skilled positions in the army, as well as mand track courses will likely become a carry out the man, train, and equip func- those working with out-of-date weapon requirement for future joint command tions, providing the forces and systems systems overall. Potentially demonstrat- assignments.”31 One measure of progress the theater commanders will fight with. A ing the rebalancing effect of these cuts, will be how many attendees originate major challenge in this area is the historic officially unverified reporting in March from non-army services. Others include dominance of army interests in the PLA. 2017 indicated that the PLA Navy may examining if joint courses become avail- All initial theater commanders were from increase the force structure of the PLAN able for lower ranking officers, as well as that branch. However, the assignment Marine Corps to support likely expedi- how joint the staffs actually become and of PLA Navy Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai tionary deployments abroad, along with how assignments to the staffs translate as the Southern theater commander an increase in navy technical personnel. into promotion opportunities. Challenges and PLA Air Force Lieutenant General Additional winners in the move include to this effort are not insignificant. Part of Yi Xiaoguang as the Central theater rocket force, air force, cyber, and intel- the need for reform is to curb rampant commander may indicate a new joint ap- ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance corruption in the ranks. As Saunders and proach to theater command leadership.25 (ISR) mission sets. Military accessions at Wuthnow point out, this even extends to Increase Attention to Strategy and PRC academies demonstrate this with the promotion system itself.32 Contingency Planning. A newly created a one-quarter cut in ground-focused Enhance Effectiveness of Military office, the Strategic Planning Office, students and commensurate increases in Operations. China’s former military is directly subordinate to the CMC. It those other prioritized areas.28 region structure did not effectively merge was formerly a component within the Moreover, an examination of the service forces into geographic or regional GSD known as the Strategic Planning multiple academies per service, duplica- commands, with many operational con- Department, which had responsibilities tive bureaucracies constructed for the trols maintained at service headquarters. for “long-term strategic analysis, resource previous military region construct, re- Additionally, a regional commander allocation analysis, and organizational re- serve force structure, and overall militia would not have automatically served as form analysis.”26 A portion of these roles numbers will be reviewed for cuts or re- the operational commander if conflict was spun off into other organizations, organization. As part of overall budgetary erupted. That was determined as the JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Smith, Henderschedt, and Luedecking 73 USS Bunker Hill participates in maneuvering exercise with People’s Liberation Army Navy frigates Daqing (FFG 576) and Yancheng (FFG 546) off coast of Southern California following routine port visit to San Diego, December 9, 2016 (U.S. Navy/Craig Z. Rodarte) situation developed, causing a time lag in training, and career field composition, quickly.”35 Dempsey argues that these response. The previously described move will be formed at the CMC level in technologies, particularly cyber capabili- to a theater command structure was an order to match requirements with actual ties, are expanding at a rapid rate, with intended remedy for this and many oper- budgetary decisions. Likewise, the PLA a commensurate impact on the joint ational concerns, streamlining command will need to move away from its single- warfare environment. He further argues and control arrangements by cutting the service-oriented exercise regime to one that the future U.S. joint force must services out and preordaining that the that builds joint interoperability. Even be- operate across geographical boundar- theater commander is the operational yond all these, the PLA simply does not ies, Service affiliations, and all domains. commander for whatever situation arises have a historic joint operational culture to Dempsey calls for globally integrated in the zone.33 build on. This will have to be inculcated if operations that “assemble quickly and As with joint officer management, reform is to lead to operational success.34 apply decisive force anywhere in the challenges remain to effective implemen- world with a wide array of partners.”36 tation. While the United States promotes The Joint Force Future The PLA appears to possess similar initiative by commanders, the PRC Following 30 years of Goldwater-Nich- views and is taking steps accordingly. system continues to heavily centralize ols, the U.S. military continues to work decisions, restricting freedom of action. at refining joint force capabilities and Creating New Services In the vein of Vice Admiral Yuan’s and processes. Similarly, the PLA will con- As part of the reform agenda, three Lieutenant General Yi’s assignments, tinue to examine areas to improve due major new military organizations were commanders will need to be selected to institutional maturation, the chang- created. For the first time, a separate from the service most appropriate for ing threat environment, and develop- PLA Army ground service was stood up the mission to be executed in that the- ments to the methods of warfare. As in January 2016. This break with the ater, lessening army dominance. It also General Martin Dempsey points out, past serves to lessen army dominance remains to be seen how the connection “the diffusion of power in an era of of the entire PLA, while also provid- between theaters and services, as relating hyper-connectivity is allowing destruc- ing a platform to more effectively to weapons system acquisition, personnel tive technologies to proliferate more concentrate on ground warfighting 74 Features / Reverse Engineering Goldwater-Nichols JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 tactics and service needs. Rather than likely conflicts between the United States has significant challenges, the Chinese function through the old GSD, the and China, the capabilities contained defense industry appears to have a army now sits on par (at least in the within the Rocket Force and SSF em- faster acquisition cycle in recognizing organizational chart) with other service phasize the systems designed to defeat requirements, acquiring information, headquarters. Additionally, a separate the American concept of operations. Put and integrating technologies than does PLA Rocket Force was constructed, in perspective, over 5,100 miles sepa- DOD. Even if one can readily argue replacing the Second Artillery Corps. rate Honolulu, Hawaii, from Taiwan, that a significant advantage within the Some, like Richard Weitz and Song while the Taiwan Strait is only 110 authoritarian Chinese system is the Zhongping, conjecture that its ulti- miles wide. In addition to the Taiwan incorporation of cyber espionage and mate portfolio will include not only scenario, as a RAND report highlights, cyber theft—efforts likely to get even conventional and nuclear missiles but the United States has three treaty allies stronger under the PLA reform initia- also strategic People’s Liberation Army (the Philippines, Japan, and the Republic tive—DOD must discover a method to Navy submarines and strategic People’s of Korea) with territorial or maritime replicate the results needed within its Liberation Army Air Force bombers, claims in conflict with the PRC. From legal framework. should reports of the development of that standpoint, the PRC can prepare for a new nuclear-capable platform bear a fight in its “own backyard” with short Conclusion fruit. No evidence currently exists that logistics and supply chains. Its reorgani- Nearly 30 years after the landmark this will occur. Others, such as David zation efforts play to PRC strengths in Goldwater-Nichols legislation, the PRC Logan, maintain a more likely option the antiaccess/area-denial realm. Its nu- has ushered in reforms pursuing a more is that a hybrid command and control merous, and increasingly more accurate, efficient, capable joint force. Although structure will emerge reminiscent of ballistic and cruise missile systems, along a point of potential debate, it appears U.S. Strategic Command with the other with counterspace, electronic warfare, in- that Chinese decisionmakers learned services maintaining tactical control of formation operations, and cyber warfare some of the U.S. joint lessons without a the platforms and the Rocket Force pos- capabilities, already appear to put U.S. similar level of trauma, cost, and frustra- sessing operational control, furthering bases in the Republic of Korea, Japan, tion, which initially drove Goldwater- the PLA’s stated objective of more joint and Guam at risk and will present chal- Nichols. These significant changes have approaches. Finally, while the elevation lenges to effective entry into the region in been affected within a system that has of U.S. Cyber Command to a separate the event of a conflict.39 a luxury of largely working toward a unified command was finally announced single benchmark, the United States. in August 2017, the Chinese elevated Improving Collaboration The ultimate measure of PLA cyber, electronic warfare, ISR, and space with Industry success in joint force reform will be elements into the Strategic Support An important development in build- its performance in combat. While Force (SSF), which is directly subordi- ing industry collaboration in the PRC Goldwater-Nichols was congressionally nate to the CMC and provides forces was the establishment of the Central driven, previous operations and senior to the theater commands, in late 2015. Commission for Integrated Military leader observations lent credibility and It is a sign of the committee’s concerns and Civilian Development. This orga- emphasized the need to reform. Even over information dominance in multi- nization is charged with civil-military in the face of Service opposition, there domain warfighting.37 The SSF design integration in the technology spec- existed pockets of “believers” and lead- concept trum. Its goal is to bring the military ers who recognized civilian leadership in and industry together to collaboratively the American system and who enabled is the idea of “integrated reconnaissance, pursue the integration of dual-use Goldwater-Nichols–based reforms. attack, and defense,” which requires that technologies, while cutting costs and Unlike the United States in the 1980s, the intelligence, offensive, and defensive promoting the strength of China’s however, the PLA lacks combat experi- elements are integrated together to enable defense industrial base.40 Defense col- ence on which to base its actions. It full-spectrum warfighting in a particular laboration with industry like this is key also lacks an obvious senior leader like domain. This new organizational con- going forward given the rapid advance General David Jones to champion it. struct is also intended to enable previously of technology and its corresponding Joint reforms in China appear to be top- impossible levels of unified planning, force effects on the battlefield. While former down driven by President Xi without construction, and operations.38 U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s that military advocacy. In essence, the and House Armed Services Committee PLA is not learning its own lessons and It appears the PRC is now potentially Chairman Mac Thornberry’s similar modifying accordingly; rather, it is learn- ahead in operationalizing command and efforts at industry collaboration and ing those of DOD. The one simplifying control in the information domain. acquisition reform represent moves in factor in their situation, nonetheless, is When analyzed in conjunction with the right direction, the United States an authoritarian political system that can the geographic proximity of the most lags the PRC in this area. Although it enforce change.41 JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Smith, Henderschedt, and Luedecking 75 Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness,” Political Science Quarterly 113, no. 1 (Spring 1998), 93. 5 Roman and Tarr, 92; Locher, 97–98. 6 Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-599, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., August 6, 1958; Jones, 140; Hunting- ton, 21–23; Locher, 99; Jason Zaborski et al., Evolution of Department of Defense Directive 5100.01: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2014), 14–15; Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Special Mes- sage to the Congress on Reorganization of the Defense Establishment,” speech, April 3, 1958, available at 76 Features / Reverse Engineering Goldwater-Nichols JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Pejsova, “A New PLA for a New Era,” Issue Northern: Korean Peninsula; Western: Central bomber-boost-plaaf-strategic-role-create-cred- Alert 13 (April 1, 2016), 1, available at JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Smith, Henderschedt, and Luedecking 77 President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill in garden of presidential villa during Casablanca Conference, French Morocco, January 1943 (U.S. Navy, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration) Don’t Shoot the Messenger Demosthenes, Churchill, and the Consensus Delusion By Michael P. Ferguson Every war is ironic because every war is worse than expected. —Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory n 1937, as Adolf Hitler’s infantry “heavily armed” to have an effective divisions skyrocketed in violation world system.1 His colleagues echoed of the Versailles Treaty, a member the notion, insisting “Hitler’s dictator- I 2 First Lieutenant Michael P. Ferguson, USA, is Aide of the House of Commons defended ship is gradually breaking down.” de Camp to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Intelligence, Allied Joint Force Command– England’s ongoing disarmament policy, Such comments were not the result Brunssum, Netherlands. claiming one does not need to be of ignorance, but rather a consensual 78 Features / Demosthenes, Churchill, and the Consensus Delusion JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 blindness. They were emblematic of spared no pejorative as they struggled in Greece, but Demosthenes’ gripe years of political rhetoric that dismissed for more than a decade to rouse their was not with standards of living; it was as warmongering the premonitions of lethargic nations to arms, with none with Athenian strategy and government Winston S. Churchill, despite over- other than Aristotle branding Dem- finances.10 whelming evidence to the contrary.3 In osthenes a “mischievous demagogue” Churchill’s doubts regarding Hitler’s the face of such resistance, Churchill at for the suspicious eye with which he peaceful intentions were equally well one time compared himself to Demos- viewed Philip II.6 Churchill received founded. By 1938, only 5 years after thenes of Athens (fourth-century BCE similar treatment when, as early as Hitler assumed the chancellorship, orator and statesman, 384–322 BCE) 1924, he expressed concern over the the German army had swollen from 7 and Hitler to his Macedonian antago- political winds in postwar Germany.7 infantry divisions to a staggering 46, in nist, King Philip II (382–336 BCE).4 While this article deals with these two contrast to England’s 6.11 Moreover, An overview of these two figures figures specifically for their remarkable British and American agents in Germany reveals how Demosthenes struggled similarities and millennia of separation, had reported the widespread killing of with remarkably similar challenges that, they are not historical outliers. In fact, Jews, communists, and social democrats, much like Churchill, pushed him to the the practice of deriding those with as well as the creation of concentra- fringe of his nation’s political paradigm. farsightedness in defense matters is well tion camps capable of housing up to Sadly, the stories of Demosthenes and established in the Western world, and 5,000 prisoners each.12 Despite these Churchill (D&C) are the bookends to a can be observed, for instance, in the reports, and Germany’s flagrant viola- long and ignoble history of marginalizing Seven Years’ War, the American Revolu- tions of the Versailles Treaty, members the bearer of bad news, or shooting the tion, throughout the Cold War, and of Parliament followed Prime Minister messenger, that endures into the 21st even into the war on terror.8 Neville Chamberlain’s lead by ignoring century. John Lewis Gaddis touched on These “blind spots” usually appear Churchill’s admonitions, doubling down this phenomenon regarding the history in the wake of protracted or debilitat- on disarmament, and capitulating to of surprise attacks on the United States in ing wars, or during periods of economic Hitler’s demands.13 his 2003 Harvard Press piece, Surprise, instability when offensive military ac- An examination of the speeches and Security, and the American Experience. tion—or the maintenance of a robust writings of D&C reveals a consistency In it, Gaddis offers a noteworthy maxim: defense—are less palatable to populations in messaging that generally highlights “The means of confronting danger do beleaguered by war and economic de- three flaws: a systemic neglect of military not disqualify themselves from consider- pression. Athens and Great Britain met readiness, a government consumed by ation solely on the basis of the uneasiness these conditions. What was it, though, domestic issues and hollow rhetoric, and they produce.”5 Indeed, the clairvoyant that alarmed D&C to such an extent distrust between allies resulting from a fail- yet disturbing insights of D&C under- that their peers branded them warmon- ure to meet mutual obligations. The crux standably made many of their colleagues gers? The accusation appears farcical of D&C’s crusade was to develop lines uneasy, and the expressions of this uneasi- considering the circumstances but was of effort that addressed these three flaws ness were costly. nevertheless a facet of conventional wis- that, in their eyes, would be catastrophic As the joint force continues to hone dom in both cases. to national defense if not rectified. its strategies in an increasingly complex In the age of Demosthenes, Philip II global security environment, contextual- developed a reputation for entering cities An Archaic State of Disrepair izing the legacies of D&C might assist as a liberator, only to consume the gov- D&C understood well the horrors decisionmakers in their effort to envision ernment from the inside and eventually of war and the necessity of a strong and offset threats evolving beyond the ho- enslave its people.9 For much of the mid- defense. Both of them wore the rizon of conventional wisdom. In pursuit fourth century BCE, Philip conquered uniform—Demosthenes as a young navy of that end, it is necessary to first explore various city-states surrounding Athens, all captain and Churchill as a cavalry officer the oft misused term warmonger before the while assuring the Athenian popular who saw combat in the Boer Wars. But delving into the common grievances of assembly, or ecclesia, that his imperi- their experience was no match for a these two historic figures, and extracting alistic designs excluded Athens itself. disarmament consensus. Neville Cham- lessons germane to more recent chal- Demosthenes remained understandably berlain’s pre–World War II gutting lenges, such as the threat posed by Iran. skeptical, but his fellow statesmen in- of England’s military capabilities is vested heavily in Philip’s empty promises. renowned. Having denied the air force Warmongers and In the meantime, members of the ecclesia requested aircraft and the navy much Mischievous Demagogues defunded the Athenian navy, employed needed ships, he also left the army in History has been kind to its prescient unreliable mercenaries in ground wars, an “archaic state” of disrepair.14 Even thinkers in defense. Their contempo- and disengaged from foreign investments after Hitler declared himself supreme raries, on the other hand, were not to avoid military entanglements. Athens ruler and cannibalized all German press often so accommodating. D&C were was a shining beacon of social progress agencies in 1935, England continued JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Ferguson 79 its disarmament the following month, Platitudes and Unrealities turn allowed Philip to accrue power.29 In recommending an additional £340,000 Despite the charges leveled against them his Third Philippic speech in 341 BCE, reduction in air assets after the by their political opponents, D&C were Demosthenes described what is now £700,000 reduction the previous year.15 advocates of de-escalation who sup- recognized as the Gray Zone, which While Chamberlain’s misadventures in ported diplomatic engagements when- created the apparition of peace between government remain legendary, lesser ever possible, so they could hardly be Macedonia and Athens: “This is what known are the policies of his Athenian considered warmongers in the classical Philip has bought with all his lavish expen- doppelganger, Eubulus, who gutted sense.23 They simply pressed for a resur- diture: that he is at war with you, but you Athens’ stratiotic (military) fund and gence in military readiness and a reas- are not at war with him!”30 Demosthenes endorsed isolationist policies at a time surance of support for their allies, but understood that as Philip uttered words when Philip was expanding his influence even these measured proposals were too of peace between 344 and 342, he was in rapidly in neighboring states.16 hawkish in the eyes of their colleagues. fact setting the conditions for war.31 Both In the History of the Peloponnesian Churchill often vented his frustrations D&C came to the conclusion that only a War, Thucydides describes how fifth- and with this stubbornness, at one time grand alliance could rescue their nations fourth-century BCE Athens had come proclaiming, “There is such a horror of from their current stupor. to place more emphasis on grand archi- war . . . that any declaration or public tecture and metropolitan development speech against armaments, although it Left to Face Their Fate Alone than military might.17 He also notes that consisted only of platitudes and unreali- Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, the leading Athenians were the first of the Greek ties, has always been applauded.”24 Greek states at the time, were weakened states to “lay down their arms and switch One might excuse Churchill’s abrasive by years of infighting and fragile alli- to a more relaxed and gracious way of character upon assuming the monumental ances that forced Athenian generals to life.”18 As a result, Athens grew over- task of righting these wrongs when, for plunder allied territory to field their confident in its naval prowess and reliant more than a decade, his colleagues chided armies.32 When barbarians attacked on mercenaries to achieve its military him as a madman for simply making Athens and Sparta in the fifth century, objectives. This illusion of security led to perceptive observations. For instance, Athenians abandoned their alliance with an obsession with domestic comforts and Anthony Eden, Secretary of State at Sparta and fled to their ships, leaving the willful neglect of military readiness. the Foreign Office, remained adamant Sparta to clean up the mess.33 This Athens thus directed its annual that France’s disarmament was essential pattern continued, as Demosthenes surpluses into the theoric fund created to the security of Europe, and labeled made clear during his First Philippic by Eubulus, which subsidized theater Churchill’s fears a “fantastic absurdity.”25 in 351 BCE: “[Athens’] great festi- performances and religious services for Comments like this were slung frivolously vals were always on time, but military the underprivileged.19 The religious because Chamberlain and his ilk remained support to besieged allies was always and therefore sacred nature of this fund largely beholden to social obligations such too little too late!”34 He concluded by made it politically untouchable. Those as unemployment, exports, and recover- underlining the mutual distrust between who dared recommend moving surplus ing from the 1931 economic collapse.26 Greek states: “we all delay, and are theoric funds into the stratiotic fund were Athens dealt with similar problems weak, and cast suspicious glances at prosecuted and found guilty of an illegal in the fourth century as it emerged our neighbors, distrusting each other proposal.20 Demosthenes often called at- from multiple wars (the Social War, rather than the man who is wronging us tention to the inadequacies of Athenian 357–355 BCE, and the Third Sacred all [Philip].”35 Ironically, Athens had a defense and put forward reforms to War, 356–346 BCE) and was no lon- history of sending ambassadors to criti- correct these deficiencies, but they went ger insulated fiscally by loans from cize Sparta and its warlike culture.36 unheeded.21 As the combat effective- the Persian Empire.27 Both Philip and While Churchill was willing to align ness of Athens’ military atrophied from Hitler were notorious for capitalizing with the “insufferable” Bolsheviks if it stagnation, Philip waged constant battles, on these weaknesses by targeting states meant defeating Hitler,37 it was charac- molding his tactical capabilities around when they lacked the will to fight and teristic of Eubulus to cut ties with foreign his strategic vision. were least likely to be ready militarily. As commitments and reinforce entrench- In Churchill’s England, the concept of Demosthenes put it, “[Philip] attacks ment policies, particularly after the 355 disarmament eventually became so fash- those who are sick from internal dissen- war between allies.38 When the city of ionable that Chamberlain would not even sion, and no one is willing to go out to Phocis surrendered to Philip in 346, read disarmament proposals before ve- defend their territory on account of their Athens was unwilling to honor the oath hemently supporting them.22 While both mutual distrust.”28 of allegiance between the two states.39 Athens and England suffered from a sys- Recognizing this trend, Demosthenes This abandonment came on the heels temic fantasy of security, it was domestic believed Athens had engorged itself on of Philip’s capture and enslavement of concerns and the accompanying political privilege, well-wishes, and social programs Chalcidice in 349 and Olynthus in mid- rhetoric that kept this fantasy alive. that sedated the Athenian masses and in 348 BCE, which became a turning point 80 Features / Demosthenes, Churchill, and the Consensus Delusion JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 in Philip’s war on Athens.40 Demosthenes even sought but failed to achieve an alli- ance with Persia against Philip.41 Similar to the oath of allegiance between Athens and Phocis, Churchill supported a diplomatic guarantee be- tween England and Poland stipulating that, if attacked, England would sup- port the Polish resistance. But when Hitler invaded Poland, Chamberlain was hesitant to honor the guarantee and sought conference with the German chancellor instead.42 In a 1938 appeal to build a European alliance against Hitler, Churchill became less sanguine about the potential for peace: If it were done in the year 1938—and be- lieve me it may be the last chance there will be for doing it—then I say that you might even now arrest this approaching war. . . . Let those who wish to reject it ponder well and earnestly upon what will happen to us, if when all else has been thrown to the wolves, we are left to face our fate alone.43 The Outcome D&C both made final pleas to their people: the Athenian in the form of his Third Philippic speech, and the Englishman with his 1939 publication of Step by Step, 1936–1939, a collection of articles and papers demonstrating the evolution of the Nazi menace. Like England’s surging support for Churchill after Hitler invaded Austria in 1938, Athenian support for Demos- thenes increased when Philip attacked Byzantium in 340, leading to a hasty alliance of Greek states.44 Though promising, this measure proved insuf- ficient to counter Philip’s advances.45 Athens lost its independence in 338 Marble portrait of Demosthenes, after Polyeuktos, Greek, active 280 BCE (Courtesy Yale University when Philip defeated a large force that Art Gallery) included Athenians at the Battle of Chaeronea in Boeotia, and a warrant [Churchill] many apologies.”48 Fortune 351, but most agree Hitler came danger- was issued for Demosthenes’ arrest.46 smiled upon Churchill for numerous rea- ously close to realizing his vision.49 Even The sage of Athens fled, choosing to sons, and although his tenacity was not Joseph Kennedy, then U.S. Ambassador poison himself in isolation rather than enough to avoid war, it did save England to London, believed as late as 1939 that face humiliation and death at the hands from potential annexation. Historians England would come to the negotiating of a Macedonian council.47 still debate Hitler’s ability to conquer all table if Hitler offered terms of surren- In 1939 London, leading thinkers of Europe, much as they question the der.50 Others begged to differ, including began to arise from their intellectual capacity for Athens to resist Philip even if one confidant who observed of Churchill slumber and agree that “England owes it had adopted Demosthenes’ policies in in 1940: “His spirit is indomitable and JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Ferguson 81 Front row, left to right, British Prime Minister (PM) Neville Chamberlain, French PM Édouard Daladier, German Chancellor Adolf Hitler, Italian PM Benito Mussolini, and Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano as they prepare to sign Munich Agreement, September 29, 1938 (Courtesy German Federal Archive) even if France and England should be There is also the issue of foresight further with its bellicosity than informa- lost, I feel he would carry on the crusade in defense. Demosthenes directed his tion operations and incendiary rhetoric. himself with a band of privateers.”51 Due grievances toward what he believed was In addition to repeated public state- in part to Churchill’s unwavering resolve, an institutionally reactionary government ments advocating the destruction of the skill at forming alliances, and unfiltered that only responded to Philip’s moves United States, Iran played an objectively rhetoric, England succeeded where without forecasting them, thereby plac- subversive role in arming insurgencies Athens failed. ing Athens “at his command.”53 The during Operation Iraqi Freedom, while Western world still struggles with the also employing proxies against coalition What Now? same challenges of military readiness, forces in Iraq and elsewhere.56 Iran also In an increasingly multinational operat- the gap between rhetoric and reality, and has its fingerprints on one of the deadli- ing environment, it is important to the maintenance of alliances, such as the est weapons deployed against coalition highlight that in the years leading up to North Atlantic Treaty Organization.54 forces in the last 17 years, the explosively World War II, the League of Nations Applying these observations in more formed projectile, which is respon- encouraged the disarmament of Europe recent context reveals several areas of sible for the deaths of nearly 200 U.S. vociferously, thereby convincing France interest. Servicemembers in Iraq.57 to succumb to Hitler’s demands. Shortly Iran’s consistent record of undermin- Despite such developments, many after this appeasement, Hitler presented ing Western coalitions, coupled with the continue to downplay the significance of France with its terms of surrender.52 simultaneous de-prioritization of military the threat posed by Iran, insisting that More than ever, it is crucial to remem- supremacy among major Western powers it can be pacified through the forging of ber that international consensus is not during the early 21st century, is of par- amicable diplomatic treaties.58 While the always in the best interest of individual ticular concern.55 Across the breadth of same optimistic notions drove reactions states, and at times these two interests nations deemed adversarial to the United of senior officials to initial threat assess- may be in conflict with one another. States, Iran is unique in that it has gone ments of the so-called Islamic State,59 82 Features / Demosthenes, Churchill, and the Consensus Delusion JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 the potentialities of a nuclear Iran, the Considering Russia’s foreign policy benefits not afforded Demosthenes, as number of fighters it may bring to bear interests and its means of pursuing them did advances in communication technol- in future conflicts, and the ideology by did not change (Russia has been violating ogy that enabled Churchill to reach a which its clerical gentry are motivated borders and waging information warfare larger audience more rapidly than was make Iran a more existential threat to for decades), this is another glaring exam- possible in Athens. But the reluctance to global security.60 In his most recent work, ple of an either passive or active inability acknowledge the threat posed by Nazi Eliot Cohen suggests the now defunct to recognize threats in a political climate Germany and Macedonia was much more 2015 nuclear deal struck between the shackled by war fatigue and economic of a cultural problem than a technological United States and the Islamic Republic recovery efforts.67 or political one. Despite the overwhelm- does little to prevent Iran from acquiring Having observed the misery of war ing evidence at hand, the public and an arsenal that would eventually trigger a firsthand, neither Demosthenes nor their representatives did not want King nuclear arms race in the Middle East.61 Churchill had a thirst for conflict. Rather, Philip II or the Nazis to be threats. In Like the United States and Iran, the they sought to deter war by fashioning turn, these very real threats were deemed dynamics of the Athenian-Macedonian alliances and military capabilities that nonthreatening by simply labeling as war- relationship were complex, and for many would make it imprudent for an adver- mongers those stating otherwise. years they engaged in a precarious game sarial state to consider war a viable option The legacies of Demosthenes and of impotent peace deals and political in the pursuit of its political objectives. Churchill reflect the primitive and endur- chess that ultimately empowered Philip Judicious assessments of security threats ing nature of armed conflict. Although and charmed much of the Athenian backed by military might as a deterrent the tools used to wage war will change, citizenry into apathy. The dangers of an to conflict—not a precursor to it—are at times even drastically, the operators increasingly influential Iran are ampli- the most reliable methods of identifying, of those tools will remain subject to the fied by recent developments concerning preparing for, and preventing legitimate same flawed judgment that plagued the the authorization of Iranian militias challenges to national security. Athenian assembly 2,300 years ago. operating in Iraq, and the potential for Instead of reflexively shooting messengers Iranian naval bases to appear in Yemen Conclusion on account of the uneasiness their words and Syria.62 According to Iranian major History’s great social and political produce, perhaps unconventional strate- general Mohammad Bagheri, such bases upheavals are often precipitated by a gic assessments deserve a wider audience. are far more valuable than even nuclear collective ambivalence to existential If only on occasion, what looks like war- technology.63 threats. Alistair Horne referred to this mongering might in fact be the ideas that Western military and intelligence lead- obliviousness as a form of strategic save a continent. JFQ ers have echoed concerns associated with hubris that often follows victory, but a budding Iranian regional power, but it may be even more pervasive than such caveats have gone largely unheeded that.68 Both D&C described a persistent Notes and failed to trigger any tangible strategic illusion of security that incubated their 1 adjustments.64 Even after Iran seized U.S. nations into indifference. This illusion John Keegan, Winston Churchill (New York: Penguin Group, 2002), 118. Navy boats and used the crewmembers remains a constant in the human con- 2 Ibid. to create propaganda videos, the United dition, not bound by time or societal 3 Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: The States pursued amicable relations with progress, and particularly dominant in Prophet of Truth, 1922–1939, vol. 5 (Boston: Iran, much as Athens did with Philip after leading postwar states or those experi- Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976), 445, 494. 4 he captured Olynthus in 348 and used encing downward trends in economic Ian Worthington, Demosthenes of Athens 65 and the Fall of Classical Greece (New York: Athenian prisoners as bargaining chips. prosperity. Oxford University Press, 2013), 343–344. This relationship between Iran and the The fall of Athens despite 5 John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and West, and its analogues to the situations Demosthenes’ exemplary case for its the American Experience (Cambridge: Harvard of Demosthenes and Churchill, is ripe defense was primarily the result of a false University Press, 2003), 33. 6 for additional study focused on the tradi- sense of security that led to poor priori- Charles Darwin Adams, Demosthenes and His Influence: Our Debt to Greece and Rome tion of pragmatic defense in complex tization of government resources, the (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., environments. erosion of alliances, and a distracted pop- 1963), 98. Aristotle was friend to King Philip II These problems are not limited, how- ulace that awoke too late to unite Greece and advisor to his successor and son, Alexander. ever, to the potential of an Iranian-led and repel Philip’s armies. Churchill’s For Demosthenes referred to as a warmonger, power bloc in the Middle East. In the success is largely credited to the superior see Jeremy Trevett, ed., The Oratory of Classical Greece: Demosthenes, Speeches 1–17 (Austin: span of 3 years, the thought of Russia as momentum of his narrative achieved University of Texas Press, 2011), 53–55. a major geopolitical threat went from a through unwavering resolve, strategic 7 John Lukacs, Churchill: Visionary, States- laughing matter in 2012 to the gravest timing, and a pragmatic approach to man, Historian (New Haven: Yale University existential threat to the United States building alliances. The position of power Press, 2002), 5. Churchill also explained how since the height of the Cold War.66 held by Churchill offered additional any speech that “set forth blunt truths” was JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Ferguson 83 the Macedonian Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 58. 17 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, ed. Walter Blanco and Jennifer Tolbert Roberts and trans. Walter Blanco (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1998), 7. 18 Ibid., 5. 19 Trevett, 9; Worthington, Demosthenes of Athens and the Fall of Classical Greece, 89–90. 20 Appollodorus of Acharnae received such a conviction in 348 BCE. See Worthington, Demosthenes, 56. 21 Worthington, Demosthenes of Athens and the Fall of Classical Greece, 87; Worthington, Demosthenes, 47. 22 Gilbert, 463. 23 Demosthenes supported all peace deals with Philip II. See Worthington, Demosthenes, 58–71. Churchill similarly sought counsel with Hitler until 1939, even meeting with him numerous times. See Keegan, 124. 24 Gilbert, 445. 25 Ibid., 461. 26 Keegan, 113. 27 John Buckler and Hans Beck, Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Century BC (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 222–223; Trevett, 9; Adams, 8. 28 Trevett, 170. 29 Buckler and Beck, 220. 30 Trevett, 158. This is from the Third Philippic presented to the eclessia. 31 For example, Philip sent ambassadors to Athens to discuss a peace treaty in 346 BCE while he headed to Thrace to wage war. See Worthington, By the Spear, 63; Worthington, Demosthenes, 75. 32 Trevett, 8–9. 33 Thucydides, 10–11. It is worth noting that, in fleeing Athens, the Athenian navy was able to win the sea battle of Salamis (480 BCE) and the land battle at Marathon (490 BCE), which proved critical to Greek victory in the Persian Wars. Ibid., 29. 34 Worthington, Demosthenes, 51. 35 Trevett, 166–167. 36 Thucydides, 29–30. 37 Monument of Philip II of Macedon in Thessaloniki, Greece (Courtesy Tilemahos Efthimiadis) Keegan, 96. 38 Worthington, Demosthenes, 47. met with the accusation of “warmongering.” 9 Ian Worthington, Demosthenes: States- 39 Ibid., 58. See Gilbert, 445. man and Orator (London: Routledge, 2000), 40 Ibid., 53–55. 8 For instance, critics of Napoleon 75–76; Worthington, Demosthenes of Athens 41 Worthington, By the Spear, 77. Bonaparte were often branded “alarmists” and the Fall of Classical Greece, 113–114. 42 Keegan, 116. in the period following 18th-century British 10 Trevett, 8. 43 Ibid., 123. “adventurism” in the North American colonies. 11 Keegan, 116–117. 44 Worthington, Demosthenes, 82. See Roger Knight, Britain Against Napoleon: 12 Gilbert, 446–447, 485. 45 The infighting and intra-Greek issues that The Organization of Victory, 1793–1815 (New 13 For Versailles Treaty violations, such as distracted Demosthenes and all of Athens for York: Penguin Press, 2013), 70. More recently, building aircraft, see ibid., 488. England also al- decades leading up to its demise may have been Federal Bureau of Investigation agent John lowed Germany to amend the Versailles Treaty the true death knell of Athenian independence. O’Neill was dismissed as an alarmist for his to build submarines and conscript forces. See See Worthington, Demosthenes of Athens and the focus on al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden long Keegan, 116. Fall of Classical Greece, 97. before the 2001 attacks. See Lawrence Wright, 14 Ibid., 115. 46 Trevett, 13. The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road 15 Gilbert, 457. 47 Worthington, Demosthenes of Athens to 9/11 (New York: Random House, 2006), 16 Ian Worthington, By the Spear: Philip II, and the Fall of Classical Greece, 335–337. 296–297, 350. Alexander the Great, and the Rise and Fall of Demosthenes died in 322 BCE. By this time, 84 Features / Demosthenes, Churchill, and the Consensus Delusion JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Philip had been assassinated and his successor, 59 Peter Baker and Eric Schmitt, “Many Alexander, had died only the year prior. Ibid., Missteps in Assessment of ISIS Threat,” New 261–271, 328. York Times, September 29, 2014, available at New from 48 This comment came from Lord Wolmer JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Ferguson 85 “The Ships,” American Expeditionary Forces, Second Air Instructional Center, Tours Aerodrome, France, late 1918 (Lester F. Kirchner Collection, U.S. Army Air Service) Defending the AEF Combat Adaptation and Jointness in the Skies over France By Bryon Greenwald s Americans commemorate the ties offered by airpower. The warring by early trial and error. Still, by the centennial of World War I, we powers, however, found it even harder Armistice on November 11, 1918, the A should note that one of the most to devise schemes to defend against air AEF Antiaircraft Service had acquitted unusual battles of the war occurred attack, particularly later in the war as itself in this new dimension of combat. in the skies over Western Europe. airplanes became more technologically It had learned quickly from its British Not surprisingly, given the newness viable and numerous. By 1917, 3 years and French counterparts, demonstrated of the airplane, every combatant had into the war, the French, British, and a significant amount of combat adapta- difficulty exploiting the opportuni- Germans had begun to figure it out. tion, shot down 58 German aircraft Unfortunately, in 1917 the American in a short time at the front, and began Expeditionary Forces (AEF) was a a century’s worth of joint integration brand new organization, and, like every between air and antiair forces that con- Dr. Bryon Greenwald is an Associate Professor other aspect of its transition to large- tinues today. of History and Theory in the Joint Advanced Warfighting School at the National Defense scale warfare on a foreign shore, it faced This article details how an untrained University. a steep learning curve uninformed cadre of men modified existing French 86 Recall / Defending the AEF JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 equipment and doctrine to build a small of the U.S. Army Signal Corps owned and powered dirigibles. In early 1917, but effective antiaircraft force and initiate six airplanes,4 532 3-inch field artillery a board of officers, led by artilleryman joint air-antiair integration 100 years ago. guns, and absolutely no antiaircraft weap- Colonel Charles Treat, convened to It also highlights how the U.S. military onry.5 By April 6, 1917, when America study the problem and, on April 2, 1917, responded to a threat that did not exist entered World War I, not much had the same day that President Woodrow a mere decade earlier, one that it failed changed. Brigadier General Benjamin Wilson asked Congress for a declaration to anticipate despite obvious indicators. Foulois, Chief of the AEF Air Service of war, recommended creating 168 total In many respects, this type of chal- (1917–1918), pointedly complained that antiaircraft batteries, enough to protect lenge is timeless. It is certainly familiar only 6 of the 65 officers and none of the 15 infantry corps, 4 cavalry divisions, to contemporary observers who have 1,100 enlisted men assigned to him had and rear area supply depots.9 This study, watched the American military and oth- any experience in the organization of however, was highly conceptual. It did ers struggle with counterinsurgency over large numbers of men and materiel or the not write doctrine, provide equipment, or the last 15 years and points to a number tactical use of aircraft.6 train gunners. Those tasks required time, of larger, more important questions. If the U.S. Army had no doctrine, a coherent production capacity, and tacti- How does a military organization learn trained manpower, or equipment with cal know-how, none of which the Army and modify its practices in the face of a which to build an Air Service, it certainly had in abundance. new challenge, particularly one it should had not considered how to defend have recognized earlier? What changes ground troops from air attack. While The Army Looks for Solutions in organization, doctrine, training, or individual officers published articles Shortly after the United States declared equipment are necessary to address the that highlighted the airplane’s military war on Germany, the Allies initiated a challenge? Where does change emerge— potential and suggested ways to shoot series of liaison missions designed to is it top-down leadership, bottom-up it down, the institutional force was slow exchange information and speed the reform, or middle-out problem-solving, to react. In 1909, when Major General Nation’s mobilization and active partici- or a combination of all three?1 These William P. Duvall, Commander of the pation in the fighting. Unfortunately, are a few of the larger questions con- Philippines Division, perhaps influenced information provided by the French sidered in this brief discussion of the by one of these articles, wrote to the and British missions contradicted each origin, structure, and achievements of War Department with concerns of an other and succeeded in confusing an the American Antiaircraft Service during airship attack on Manila, the Chief of already disorganized mobilization World War I. Ordnance responded that he saw no effort. Indeed, the animus between the future in “balloon artillery” and sug- two missions was such that on more Failure to Anticipate gested that 500 shotguns would relieve than one occasion the Chief of Staff’s the Problem Duvall’s worries.7 By 1913, the idea of office would telephone the War College Of all the advances in modern warfare antiaircraft artillery advanced slightly faculty located at present day Fort present at the turn of the 19th century, when Congressman James Hay (D-VA) Lesley J. McNair, where the preponder- nothing awed the public more than the of the House Committee on Military ance of war planning occurred, and airplane. Described both as a “mechani- Affairs raised it during a discussion of the urge them to hasten the departure of cal messiah whose coming would Panama Canal defenses. The Army’s wit- one mission as members of the other transform life and society” and as a ness, Brigadier General George Scriven, mission were on their way over to “bird of hell” whose fiery power would Chief of the Signal Corps, dismissed discuss the war.10 turn New York City into “a furnace the need for a gun to shoot at airplanes, To obtain a clear view of conditions, of crimson flames,” the technological preferring instead to champion the use Secretary of War Newton Baker, in an potential of the airplane seemed bound- of airplanes, for which he was responsible example of top-down problem-solving, less and ominous.2 Although the air- at the time, to defeat any attack. When dispatched groups of officers to Europe plane was invented in the United States Hay asked about a gun capable of shoot- to observe operations for themselves. in 1903, a country protected by vast ing at airplanes, Scriven responded that One group, led by the recently com- oceans and aloof to Europe’s turmoil, the “Ordnance Department had been missioned corporate lawyer and civil the Nation spent only $430,000 on experimenting, but I do not know that aeronautics expert Major Raynal Bolling, its air force between 1908 and 1914. they have yet devised a gun.”8 Indeed, reported that “fighting airplanes and During that same period, both France both the Ordnance Department, which bombers” held significant military and Germany spent close to $22 would build the guns, and the Coast potential but that great numbers of million each, Russia about $12 million, Artillery Corps (CAC), which would man antiaircraft artillery could reduce the and tiny Belgium almost $2 million on them, were unimpressed with the airplane effectiveness of bombing operations.11 military aviation.3 as a weapon of war and focused their Another group, led by Quartermaster When war broke out in Europe on efforts instead on shooting down much Colonel Chauncey Baker, concluded that July 28, 1914, the Aeronautical Division slower and less maneuverable balloons airpower played an important role on the JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Greenwald 87 battlefield and, in response to the threat to antiaircraft artillery as opposed to the arrive in December 1917. He had no the airplane posed to ground forces, point-and-shoot style of some Allies. men or equipment, and only 25 officers recommended that the Army establish When the Army decided in spring trained—a generous classification—in antiaircraft schools and training facilities 1917 to assign the antiaircraft mission the antiaircraft theory and technique. in the United States and France.12 to the CAC, Shipton, Humbert, and To organize the command, Shipton, Anderson, as well as a number of unde- Humbert, and Anderson drafted plans Starting from Scratch rutilized seacoast artillerymen, became for an Antiaircraft Service consisting Acting on the Baker Board’s recom- available to man Pershing’s fledgling of seven sections, three of which—the mendation, General John J. Pershing Antiaircraft Service. With the British Artillery, Machine Gun, and Searchlight directed his staff to incorporate antiair- naval blockade confining the German and Balloon sections—formed the craft defense into the AEF’s organiza- High Seas Fleet to European waters, the nucleus of the Antiaircraft School and tional scheme. Drafted by Major Hugh CAC released men from its traditional mirrored the composite nature of the Drum of the Operations Section, the seacoast and harbor defense mission and Antiaircraft Service. plan assigned one antiaircraft gun bat- trained them in railway and tractor artil- Shipton’s initial desire was that all talion with four batteries of three 3-inch lery and trench mortars and the emerging training would occur at the Antiaircraft guns each as well as one machine gun task of antiaircraft defense. Further School, but equipment shortage and battalion of 48 guns to each corps, the reinforcing the Army’s decision to assign limits on training areas forced him to sep- equivalent of one 3-gun battery and the antiaircraft mission to the CAC was arate the artillery and machine gunnery 12 antiaircraft machine guns to each the acknowledged ability of seacoast artil- courses, in particular, sending some units combat division.13 This parsimonious lerymen to fire at ships moving in two back to Arnouville and the Paris defenses distribution of forces reflected both the dimensions. By logical extension, this to share French artillery pieces. Colonel density of combat formations and the ability made them the most appropriate Jay P. Hopkins, who replaced Shipton appreciation that the AEF was building candidates to attempt to fire at airplanes as Chief of the Antiaircraft Service in this portion of its force from scratch. By moving in three dimensions.15 October 1918, noted that this move gave comparison, during World War II each While en route to Pershing’s the American antiaircraft artillery gunners division had at least one antiaircraft headquarters, Shipton, Anderson, and training at the school the opportunity battalion to defend it from air attack. Humbert stopped in England to in- to practice with actual guns instead of To protect installations in the rear area, vestigate British antiaircraft methods, relying on purely theoretical instruction. Drum added an additional 20 antiair- visited the French Antiaircraft School at Moreover, it provided the French, who craft gun platoons. The total force of Arnouville-lès-Gonesse, north of Paris, experienced constant manpower short- 100 guns was much smaller and, as it and went to the frontlines to observe ages, with personnel to man the guns would turn out, more realistic than the French methods. With the American and defending their capital. As more trained 336 recommended by the Treat Board. French forces occupying adjacent combat units became available, Shipton and But as the Army would soon find out, zones, Shipton decided to leverage the Hopkins continued the policy and sent it was still far beyond the Ordnance opportunity to train his men in French more units into the frontlines to augment Department’s capacity to deliver.14 antiaircraft techniques and accepted the critically short French units. Hopkins later To implement these plans for an anti- offer of a château at Arnouville as the wrote that the men “invariably displayed aircraft service, Pershing summoned three location for the AEF antiaircraft school. such aptitude that they were given equal Coast Artillery Corps officers—Brigadier On September 26, 1917, two semi- opportunity with the French for firing.” General James A. Shipton, Captain Glenn English-speaking French officers began He also noted that sometimes French P. Anderson, and Captain George F. an awkward effort to teach antiaircraft units were so shorthanded that they sur- Humbert—to Europe in late July 1917. theory to a platoon of American officers. rendered total control to the Americans.17 The assignment of Shipton, Anderson, Shortly thereafter, on October 10, 1917, and Humbert is an example of the the AEF General Headquarters estab- Antiaircraft Gunnery Army’s effort to apply the most appropri- lished the Antiaircraft and Trench Mortar Shipton’s secondary motive for collocat- ate expertise and experience to create an Schools at Langres, France, and placed ing with the French was that American antiaircraft artillery organization where Shipton in charge of both. On November officers could keep abreast of the latest none had existed previously. Shipton was 1, the Antiaircraft Headquarters and developments in antiaircraft techniques a seasoned artilleryman and combat com- School moved from Arnouville to and therefore be better qualified to mander in the Philippines with a decade Langres. These actions laid the founda- instruct their men. His attitude toward of experience in the CAC. Anderson and tion for the future development of the “technical shooting” further reinforced Humbert were experts in artillery gun- AEF antiaircraft artillery organization.16 this preference, as he believed that the nery and the mathematics underpinning Shipton quickly realized he had to French had taken the lead in antiair- that discipline. Their background predis- establish an antiaircraft school and train- craft gunnery, while the British seemed posed them to a more scientific approach ing center for the troops scheduled to content to rely on the unscientific and 88 Recall / Defending the AEF JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 inconsistent technique of visually adjust- ing the round on target.18 This reliance on French “technical shooting” demanded a high degree of scientific skill and mathematical abil- ity. First, it required an accurate, rapid measurement of the airplane’s speed, altitude, and course in order to calculate the lateral and vertical deflection to the target. When computed correctly, this information yielded a predicted target flight path. Second, crews had to factor in the known trajectory and velocity of the artillery round as well as the fuse setting. If everything worked properly the round exploded near the target. Typically, the round crossed behind the aircraft because crews could not make the proper adjust- ments fast enough to lead the target. The greatest flaw in the French process, however, was the assumption that the pilot would maintain a steady course in order to preserve his altitude as a means of escape in the event of malfunction or attack. In reality, when under fire most pilots adopted what the British called the “wobble her about a bit” method, making dramatic changes in altitude and direction or “zig-zagging.”19 Before an American antiaircraft crew could fire a shell from the 75mm gun,20 they had to prepare the gun-pit and ready the gun—a process that could take all day. Laboring more like gravediggers than antiaircraft men, they slung picks and shovels for hours to excavate a hole that measured 12 feet across and 3 feet deep, with a 7-foot conical depression sunk in the center to a depth of 4 feet, all while avoiding observation by the Germans a few miles away. Next, they placed the foundation for the semi-fixed U.S. Army Air Service Second Lieutenant Erwin R. Bleckley, 50th Aero Squadron, in observer’s seat of French 75mm by laying a circular run- DH-4, circa 1918 (U.S. Air Force) ning board around the outer rim of the inner conical depression and leveling boxes. While not a fast process, it mir- process took about 2 seconds, meaning it. Then they dropped a “receiving rored the way the French fought the war, that a well-trained crew could fire the gun standard” in the bottom of the cone with spades and artillery in a slow and up to 30 times a minute. Despite these and bolted the slanting struts from the methodical fashion.21 advances, it still took about 25 men—ver- running board to the receiving standard. What made the French 75mm such tical and lateral spotters, telemetry men, With the assistance of ropes and pulleys, an excellent weapon was its hydropneu- fuse setters, telephone operators, loaders, the crew wheeled the gun in front of the matic recoil mechanism, a first of its kind, and gun crew—moving in orchestrated hole, lowered its rear into the receiving which returned the gun to its original chaos to operate the gun and its associ- standard, and bolted it down. They then position after firing. In this way, the ated equipment. rearranged the camouflage and excavated crew could fire the gun rapidly without Occasionally, training and luck com- spots for cases of ammunition and tool re-aiming it after each shot. The recoil bined to catch a German pilot unaware. JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Greenwald 89 U.S. Marines attaching bomb to DH-4 (de Havilland) “Liberty Plane,” circa 1918 (Zimmer/Naval History and Heritage Command) In one instance in late September 1918, Marine Major Andrew Drum, an inno- at all angles of elevation. As a result, the the crewmen in Battery B, 2nd Battalion vative officer who founded the Marine section adopted the Hotchkiss machine Antiaircraft Artillery, spotted a flight of Corps’ first Armored Car Squadron in gun. It also experimented with various six Fokkers flying along the front at “an 1916. Drum, a cousin of Major Hugh antiaircraft machine gun sights and found altitude of 2,000 meters, some 7,400 Drum, previously commanded an infan- a French sight known appropriately as the meters away.” The two-gun battery per- try company with the 5th Marine Regi- “Infantry Corrector,” which offset the formed well enough to fire 10 rounds in ment. From May to November, Drum normal ground sight and provided for quick succession into the formation. As achieved great success in training over super-elevation, the most effective.24 crewman Ernest Stone of Los Angeles, 4,500 personnel, partly because, unlike Concerned about the quality of the California, noted, the airplane “dived the antiaircraft artillery gun course, the troop training, Drum moved his School northwards then after an abnormal curve, units attending machine gun instruction Detachment about 8 kilometers away fell.” It was one of two German aircraft had plenty of machine guns and did from Langres to take advantage of an area downed by his battery; its sister unit, not have to collocate with another unit known as the Courcelles-en-Montagne Battery A, accounted for another three.22 in order to train. Equally important, Antiaircraft Firing Ground. Through however, was Drum’s innovative ability ingenuity and zeal, Drum turned the Machine Gunnery to create a realistic training environment 25-square-mile ravine into an excellent The second course taught by the Anti- for his Soldiers.23 range. He conducted ground firing aircraft School was machine gunnery. One of the first tasks thrust upon against the ravine walls. To simulate fast, In a process similar to what occurred Drum and the staff of the Machine realistic aerial targets, Drum ordered a with the artillery course, the school Gun Section was to select a machine motorcycle driver to tow an airplane- chose an officer familiar with the equip- gun. While an adequate number of the shaped target along the ridge above the ment to lead the instruction, in this French-made Hotchkiss M1914 and ravine. With the driver protected by a case, Major William Simpson of the St. Etienne M1907 machine guns ex- stone wall, the Soldiers below saw only Infantry. Unfortunately, Simpson died isted, the section discovered that the St. the target and could practice live-fire from appendicitis in January 1918. His Etienne was more delicate, would foul traverse and elevation without endanger- replacement was another Infantryman, in muddy conditions, and could not fire ing the rider. This type of middle-out 90 Recall / Defending the AEF JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 adaptive training paid large dividends more accurately than the French, who altitude to Air Service group operations once units reached the frontlines as the literally fired blind. More importantly, offices. This arrangement was critical to two Antiaircraft Artillery Machine Gun searchlights had “a great moral effect on airdrome defense as these sites routinely Battalions fielded during the war downed the enemy aviator.”27 Blinded by the light had no other defense except some ma- a total of 41 German planes. Equally and waiting an upcoming barrage, most chine guns operated by mechanics. An important, they drove away hundreds pilots lost either their resolve or their way example of this rapid alert occurred on more, including 117 during the Battle of to the target. April 14, 1918, when an antiaircraft bat- Saint-Mihiel.25 Interestingly, although the French, tery reported sighting two single-seater British, Germans, and Italians used German aircraft headed south in the Toul Searchlights and protective or barrage balloons, the Sector (in the vicinity of Saint-Mihiel). Barrage Balloons Antiaircraft Service did not. The bal- In less than 4 minutes, two pilots from The final element in the Antiaircraft loons, tethered to the ground by long the 94th Aero Squadron, on its first day Service triad of weapons was the search- wires and often lashed together with of operations in France, took off and light. Early on, the Army discovered horizontal connectors dangling more intercepted the Germans 4 minutes that the strength of the beam did not wires, were ideal for blocking specific later.30 Interestingly, this well-developed outrange enemy artillery but possessed aerial approaches. Fearful of crashing into liaison function seemed confined to the enough candlepower to illuminate a wire, pilots spotting the balloons would American forces as some observers noted incoming aircraft. As a result, the Anti- fly around them only to find themselves that the French batteries did not keep up aircraft Service incorporated searchlight illuminated by searchlights and targeted with Allied attacks and British antiaircraft training into its curriculum in June by antiaircraft fire. Shipton wanted to use batteries did not cooperate with the 1918. As it had with the other two legs them, but a shortage of both manpower Royal Air Force.31 of the triad, the Antiaircraft School and balloons as well as bureaucratic Another example of joint action asked the Army organization respon- infighting with the Air Service killed between the Air and Antiaircraft Services sible for searchlights—the 56th Engineer the idea. Initially, the Air Service, which occurred in defense of Air Service bal- Regiment (Searchlights)—to teach the used balloons to observe artillery fire loonists. Air Service pilots aloft in either course. Not only did it make sense for and enemy movements, wanted them French or American balloons made experts to teach the course, but it also to protect airfields until it learned that tempting targets for German aircraft, made for good combat coordination as Air Service personnel would handle the which attacked them 89 times and the 56th Regiment supported the other balloons, but antiaircraft officers would burned 35 balloons out of the sky.32 One elements of the Antiaircraft Service once command them. With this revelation, reason these attacks were relatively un- they reached the field.26 the threat to airfields declined and the successful was that American antiaircraft The use of searchlights remained the Air Service ended its request for barrage gunners worked closely with balloonists one area uninfluenced by the French, balloons. Of the four proposed barrage to defeat the German air threat. For who did not use searchlights at night, balloon battalions, none was created.28 example, after German fighters had shot but instead relied on sound detectors to In fairness, the Air Service experienced a down 19 observation balloons in 1 day find aircraft and provide gunners with marked shortage of observation balloons during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, a firing azimuth. Unimpressed with the and could not spare any for antiaircraft the First U.S. Army Corps Commander, French method, the Americans followed barrage balloon protection, even of its Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett, the British example and employed both own airfields. The issue of barrage bal- ordered that it was “absolutely essential sound locators and searchlights to find loons lay fallow until the early 1920s that antiaircraft artillery protection be the target. A precursor to the highly when both the Army Air Service and furnished at once.”33 Responding to effective radar of World War II, sound CAC fought for bureaucratic control over this directive, Battery A, 2nd Antiaircraft locators were a large and complex col- air defense assets.29 Battalion, using two borrowed French lection of megaphone-shaped tubes This issue aside, the Air and 75mm autocannons, deployed around that—like an enlarged gramophone Antiaircraft Services worked well together two balloons about 1.5 kilometers behind operating in reverse—picked up and in combat. The Air Service Assistant the front. The battery stayed there for amplified aircraft noise so that an opera- Chief of Staff, Colonel Edgar Gorrell, 13 days withstanding gas and artillery at- tor could determine its general direction commended the Antiaircraft Service for tacks before firing on a flight of German and provide the searchlights with a rough its units’ excellent liaison with Air Service Fokkers, downing 2 in 10 minutes and initial azimuth. Once the searchlights elements, commenting that the batteries another later that day.34 illuminated the target, the gunners set “acted as sentinels for pursuit aviation.” their aiming mechanisms and fired. Given To do so, antiaircraft units maintained Fratricide the difficulty of supply over muddy roads, direct telephone contact with air control Close coordination with the Air Service this procedure saved ammunition by en- centers and flashed the type and number notwithstanding, antiaircraft person- abling the gunners to calculate trajectory of German aircraft, their heading, and nel and other Soldiers across the AEF JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Greenwald 91 “Personnel,” American Expeditionary Forces, Second Air Instructional Center, Tours Aerodrome, France, December 24, 1918 (Lester F. Kirchner Collection, U.S. Army Air Service) Curtiss JN-4H, nicknamed “Jenny,” at U.S. Marine Flying Field, Miami, Florida, circa 1918 (Naval History and Heritage Command) occasionally shot at friendly aircraft. The Often blamed for these “blue-on- by claiming that no one could prove the Antiaircraft School trained all officers to blue” engagements, antiaircraft units aircraft were friendly.38 After this incident, identify friendly and enemy aircraft and investigated them both to correct mis- the sector commander suggested the published aircraft recognition charts, takes and to protect their reputation. In creation of a restricted zone over the but the training of the enlisted men one instance, a sergeant sent to inform a area that friendly planes would not enter may have been lacking. That said, the nearby artillery battery that it had fired at night and fly no higher than 2,000 two antiaircraft machine gun battalions on several friendly planes was told that meters during the day. Despite the value sent to the front controlled just 96 of the commander had ordered the unit to of the idea, the Air Service was extremely the 1,500 antiaircraft machine guns shoot at all planes in its vicinity.36 Another critical of the suggestion, perhaps con- available throughout the American time, an American pilot completed cerned over the ability of its pilots to Expeditionary Forces, suggesting that his flight without spotting a German navigate precisely at night, and the AEF while not blameless, the problem did plane but found a bullet hole near his G3 (Operations) eventually disapproved not come primarily from antiaircraft seat. Investigation revealed that the 21st the idea.39 Sadly, the problem of fratricide units. Indeed, the rest of the force often Machine Gun Battalion, not one of the would continue for the rest of the war operated on the belief that there was no two antiaircraft machine gun battalions, and reemerge in World War II. In that such thing as a “friendly” aircraft and had shot at the plane at long distance war, the U.S. Army would eventually practiced poor fire discipline. Fearful of without identifying it. The problem be- create restricted zones and, by mid-1944, strafing by German aircraft, other units came severe enough that the First Army mark friendly aircraft with invasion (for example, infantry, artillery, and Chief of Artillery ordered all men trained stripes—five alternating black and white air) not only manned their antiaircraft in aircraft recognition.37 bands—to aid recognition. machine guns continuously, but they Antiaircraft units, however, were not also often mounted whatever machine blameless. After the war, one antiaircraft Conclusion guns they could find on sunken poles battery commander admitted that his Despite the early problems of organi- or upended wagon or vehicle axles in men fired at planes flying over his posi- zation and training and the nagging a bottom-up adaptive effort to fire tion even if they could not positively worries over supply, the leaders of at attacking aircraft.35 Greater liaison identify them as German. Another the Antiaircraft Service adjusted to between antiaircraft batteries and other haughtily dismissed criticism that his unit newfound conditions and performed units might have reduced these inci- fired on friendly aircraft over Is-sur-Tille, admirably. In less than 3 months at dents of mistaken identity. home to a huge American supply base, the front, both the machine gun units 94 Recall / Defending the AEF JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 and the amalgamated artillery forces support. Heeding the lessons of history of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, proved the value of solid technical and borrowing successful ideas from but is ever present in the Pentagon, training and good organization. The others, as commanders did from mili- where jointness is often the last item antiaircraft gunners using French 75mm tary theorists T.E. Lawrence and David added to a Service program when money guns shot down 17 aircraft with just Galula, are dramatically helpful. Perhaps exists and the first item cut when budgets 10,275 rounds of ammunition, an appreciating that value and insight are tight. This ebb and flow of institu- average of 605 rounds per airplane. By can come from every direction is most tional and programmatic support for joint comparison, British antiaircraft gunners important. Top-down change brought systems, particularly command, control, expended 10,000 rounds, improving counterinsurgency doctrine and Mine- communication, computers, intelligence, to 4,000 per aircraft in 1918, and the Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles to surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, French used 4,500 rounds for every Iraq and Afghanistan, but middle-out creates gaps in the Nation’s ability to airplane they downed. The machine recognition of the emerging situation and fight as effectively as possible. Thankfully, gunners achieved even more impres- bottom-up execution created the Sunni when bullets are flying, Soldiers, Marines, sive results. With just 225,115 rounds, Awakening. Similarly, bottom-up blogs Sailors, and Airmen focus on the task at the two battalions downed 41 German like “Company Commander” and others hand and, as demonstrated a century ago aircraft, about 5,500 rounds per helped take the “single-loop” learning in World War I and every conflict hence, plane. While the stated mission of the that occurred by trial and error in iso- cooperate and adapt at the operational Antiaircraft Service involved prevent- lated units and spread it across the force, and tactical levels, fighting jointly, side by ing enemy aircraft from obtaining air some of which found its way into the side, as brothers in arms. JFQ superiority and endangering friendly Army–Marine Corps counterinsurgency ground troops, “comparative results doctrine, a sign of “double-loop,” or in actual planes brought down give a institutionalized learning. Better digital Notes very fair measure of the accuracy of the and onsite coordination between rotating 1 shooting.”40 units also helped ensure that not all prog- There is a rich literature on military in- novation and adaptation. For a quick overview, Regarding combat adaptation, the ress was lost when units transferred into read the excellent literature review by Adam AEF antiaircraft experience offers a few theater and replaced one another. Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation general conclusions. First, innovation As for jointness, the Interwar Period Studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. and adaptation succeed more often when (1919–1941) saw increased fighting 5 (October 2006), 905–934. Although there there is an urgent need to solve a specific at the bureaucratic level between the are many new additions, Barry R. Posen’s The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, problem—how to shoot down air- Army, Coast Artillery, Air Service (after and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, planes—that focuses effort and removes 1926, the Air Corps), and antiaircraft NY: Cornell University Press, 1984) best most intra-Service parochialism and artillery, especially as the economy sank represents the top-down school of military in- confusion about the objective. Second, into the Great Depression. Some of this novation, otherwise known as the civil-military the willingness to learn from others and internecine bickering about the value of model. This model posits that top-down inno- vation occurs when civilian leaders partner with adopt the best approaches avoids the airpower and how best to defend against mavericks from within a Service to gain insight “not invented here” syndrome, saves it continued into the early stages of World on necessary changes. The inter-Service model time, and increases eventual effective- War II, but quickly faded as the Nation suggests that innovation occurs as the Services ness. Third, despite inevitable shortages, rapidly expanded the military to fight a compete against each other for more budget the creative use of available resources global conflict. To a certain degree, as authority. The intra-Service model holds that the Services are not monolithic and that com- improves the odds of success. Finally, as money flowed to the bureaucracies and petition among branches (for example, infantry, the story of the World War I Antiaircraft men died in tactical battles, arguments armor) spurs innovation. An early pacesetter Service demonstrates, adaptation and stopped and cooperation started. By the in this school was Stephen Peter Rosen’s Win- learning occur at many levels—top-down, end of that war, airmen and antiaircraft ning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern middle-out, and bottom-up—often artillerymen combined to shoot down Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). Rosen is partially responsible for the simultaneously. Accordingly, leaders over 21,000 Axis aircraft, clearing the “middle-out” school of innovation, as senior should avoid emphasizing single sources skies and pointing the way for a joint and leaders provide political and professional security of change, particularly top-down driven combined victory.41 for mid-grade reformers to change their institu- change, and encourage innovation and Perhaps expectedly, this trend of tion from the inside. Paul Kennedy, Engineers of adaptation at all levels. peacetime inter-Service carping and Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War (New York: Random These conclusions about the causes wartime cooperation reemerged at the House, 2013), is a superb example of middle- of adaptation and change are just as political and institutional levels after the out adaptation during wartime. The bottom- applicable today. Understanding the Korean War and generally correlates with up school is less well defined in the existing specific problem at hand is key, be it the level of interwar fiscal support avail- literature, but no less apparent when one takes regime change, killing insurgents, or able to the Services. It improved slightly a wide view of military history. Still, it seems that bottom-up adaptation cannot succeed creating stable governance and popular after the Goldwater-Nichols Department JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Greenwald 95 without some combination of top-down and/ industry for wartime production. See DeWeerd, 21 Ernest Stone, Battery B: Thru the Fires or middle-out support. Moreover, organiza- 40–42; Ordnance Department, Army Ordnance of France (Los Angeles: Wayside Press, 1919), tional learning is necessary to help those across 1917–1919, Estimates and Requirements Divi- 152. an organization realize that problems exist as sion, pamphlet no. 85 (Washington, DC: Gov- 22 “Technical Report on an Aeroplane do potential solutions to those problems. For a ernment Printing Office [GPO], 1919), 38. Brought Down, HQ, 2nd Army Antiaircraft Ar- good start at understanding bottom-up innova- 10 Frederick Palmer, Newton D. Baker: tillery Service, September 1918, AAS Records, tion and organizational learning, see Francis G. America at War (New York: Dodd, Mead & Reel 8,” cited in Kirkpatrick, 84; Stone, 152. Hoffman, Mars Adapting: Learning During Company, 1931), 168. 23 The 5th Marine Regiment operated under Wartime (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute 11 “Letter, Major R.C. Bolling to Chief the Army’s 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions. Press, forthcoming). For a more historical Signal Officer of the Army, 15 August 1917,” Information about Andrew B. Drum is from look at innovation, see Williamson Murray and series A, volume 1, 46 and 52, in Gorrell, His- New York Times, January 24, 1955, obituaries, Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in tory. 23. For number of men trained, see Hopkins, the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge 12 “Letter, Colonel Chauncey B. Baker, “Final Report,” 211–212. University Press, 1998), which analyzes the ‘Report of the Baker Board,’ 26 July 1917,” 24 Super-elevation is the creation of ad- seven major innovations between World War I Historical Division, Headquarters Department ditional elevation of the barrel of the weapon and World War II. of the Army, in United States Army in the World so as to offset the effects of gravity on the 2 All characterizations taken from Michael War, 1917–1919, 17 vols. (Washington, DC: trajectory or flight of the round. The faster the Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The GPO, 1948) (hereafter, USA/WW), vol. 1, muzzle velocity of the round, the flatter the tra- Creation of Armageddon (New Haven: Yale 55–89. jectory. Weapons with faster muzzle velocities University Press, 1987), 4–9. 13 At this point, each Army corps contained required less super-elevation. 3 Edgar S. Gorrell, The Measure of America’s four combat and two replacement divisions. 25 Hopkins, “Final Report,” 212; Kirkpat- World War Aeronautical Effort (Norwich, VT: 14 “Major H.A. Drum, Headquarters AEF, rick, 27 and 112. Norwich University, 1940), 3. Office of the Chief of Staff, Operations Section, 26 Hopkins, “Final Report,” 213–214; 4 Juliette A. Hennessy, The United States ‘Report on Organization,’ 10 July 1917,” Kirkpatrick, 28–30. Army Air Arm: April 1861 to April 1917 USA/WW, vol. 1, 93–101. The 75mm artillery 27 Hopkins, “Final Report,” 214; Hopkins, (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, piece used by U.S. antiaircraft batteries was “Lecture,” 4–8. 1985), 120. made by the French. Poor industrial manage- 28 Kirkpatrick, 74. 5 Airplane statistics from the U.S. Air ment decisions led the AEF to rely on the 29 U.S. Army Air Forces, Barrage Balloon Force Museum and Joe Baugher, “1908–1921 British and French for almost all equipment. Development in the United States Army Air USASC-USAAS Serial Numbers,” June 24, This management fiasco, on the heels of the Corps, 1923–1942 (Washington, DC: Assistant 2017, available at 96 Recall / Defending the AEF JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 simply do not coincide with those of to shape a client’s behavior by making the United States, and that can lead to assistance contingent on prior compliance tremendous difficulty in convincing with the desired policy). One of Ladwig’s them to adopt U.S.-backed reforms. key findings—a point that should shape Indeed, Ladwig’s central argument future U.S. policy choices—is that cli- is that the “forgotten front” in these ent governments almost universally conflicts—the relationship between the complied with U.S. desires for policy United States and local government it is change when it attached conditions on trying to aid—is just as important. its aid, but never when it simply provided The Forgotten Front is structured inducements. Open-ended inducements, with three theoretical chapters and Ladwig found, simply do not work. three case studies—the Philippines dur- Ladwig argues that significant credit ing the Hukbalahap (Huk) Rebellion, for the successful counterinsurgency in 1946–1954; South Vietnam under Ngo the Philippines must go to the United Dinh Diem, 1955–1963; and El Salvador States because of its sustained, active during its civil war, 1979–1991. Ladwig intervention that relied heavily on the concludes with a final chapter with policy use of conditional aid. This pushed the prescriptions and implications. The three Filipino government to adopt the neces- case studies vary widely in outcome: sary military, political, and economic the Philippines is considered a success; reforms to implement and execute a Vietnam, a clear failure; and El Salvador’s successful counterinsurgency campaign. results are much more mixed. So what The U.S. dominant influence approach The Forgotten Front: explains the differing results? was one of conditional aid and constant Patron-Client Relationships According to Ladwig’s analysis, out- pressure, always tying aid to reform, and in Counterinsurgency comes were primarily determined by the it worked. amount of influence the United States In the case of Diem’s South Vietnam, By Walter C. Ladwig III was able to exert over its ally to reform the United States primarily employed in- Cambridge University Press, 2017 itself and adopt desired U.S. policies. In ducements, with little success; significant $34.99 360 pp. the Philippines, where the United States pressure was seldom brought to bear to ISBN: 978-1316621804 was able to exert the most influence, force Diem to adopt the reforms that Reviewed by Andrew Byers a successful outcome was achieved. In would have led to long-term stability of South Vietnam, where the United States his government, and he was never held was never able to induce internal reform, accountable for his failures. The United his is an important book for failure resulted. In El Salvador, where the States only tried conditioned aid twice theorists and practitioners of United States was able to exert a moder- during this period and appeared to gain T counterinsurgency alike. Ladwig, ate and fluctuating amount of influence, a greater influence as a result, but these who teaches at King’s College London, much more mixed outcome resulted. efforts were not sustained. Inducements begins by pointing out that most U.S. In each case study, Ladwig examines without conditioned aid failed dramati- counterinsurgency thinking errs in discrete “influence events” in which cally in the early years of the Vietnam assuming that the United States will the host nation began by opposing War. share common goals, interests, and pri- U.S. calls for reform or policy change In El Salvador, U.S. influence varied orities with the local government that and the United States then attempted over time and from issue to issue. The it is supporting. As recent experiences to exert influence over its recalcitrant United States alternated use of induce- in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan client. Influence is, of course, difficult ments and conditionality across three indicate, that assumption should not be to measure, but Ladwig uses agency different administrations, but important taken for granted. In fact, many U.S. theory—concerned with how one party reforms and policy changes only occurred elements of strategy applied in coun- attempts to motivate another to act on when strict conditions were attached to terinsurgency—ending political and its behalf—to assess the patron-client aid. military corruption, bolstering political dynamics in each case study. The United There are, of course, obvious policy legitimacy by addressing the public’s States had two chief strategies for influ- implications and lessons learned here concerns, engaging in economic encing its clients: inducement (a client for the United States well beyond these reform—may appear just as threatening will comply with the patron’s preferred three historical case studies. For example, to the local government’s interests as policies if aid is unilaterally provided and as the United States revisits its relation- the insurgency itself. Some local gov- strong statements of support are made) ship with Pakistan and considers how ernments’ political and other interests and conditionality (polices that attempt it might best support its goals in places JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Book Reviews 97 like Afghanistan and Iraq, it should think answer was—more or less—that policy- hard before offering unrestricted aid, makers do not understand what they are which has an exceedingly poor track re- doing. Kroenig’s book serves, in part, as a cord in forcing clients to make the kinds rebuttal to Jervis’s argument. of internal changes needed to compete Of course, the issues here are far from successfully against an insurgency. More just a rehash of Cold War debates. To explication and analysis on why govern- the contrary, nuclear strategy is back at ments often choose inducements over the forefront of national security policy conditionality is needed, since open- thanks to nuclear modernization efforts ended inducements with no specific by Russia, China, and North Korea. actions required in exchange for the aid These developments have been duly are so common. Deeper analysis is also noted in the Defense Department’s new needed of the complexities and difficul- National Defense Strategy and Nuclear ties of adopting a policy conditionality. Posture Review, which have effectively Because of its central theme and put efforts toward long-term nuclear dis- extensive supporting evidence, The armament initiated by President Barack Forgotten Front is one of the most signifi- Obama (with the support of such stal- cant recent books on counterinsurgency, wart Cold Warriors as Henry Kissinger, with major policy implications for the George Shultz, Sam Nunn, and Bill United States and its allies. JFQ Perry) on the back shelf. So Kroenig’s book arrives at an auspi- cious time for new analysis on nuclear Andrew Byers is a former Visiting Assistant strategy. The centerpiece of his argument Professor of History at Duke University and is Co- The Logic of American Nuclear Founder of the Counter Extremism Network. Strategy: Why Strategic is the “superiority-brinksmanship synthe- Superiority Matters sis theory”: that nuclear superiority—a larger or otherwise more capable nuclear By Matthew Kroenig posture than a rival—increases a state’s Oxford University Press, 2018 power in crisis bargaining by means of $29.95 280 pp. increasing its resolve. This builds di- ISBN: 978-0190849184 rectly on the premise first established by Reviewed by Michael Fitzsimmons Thomas Schelling that nuclear crises are “competitions in risk taking,” where the party most willing to run risks (that is, amously, Henry Kissinger once engage in brinksmanship) will prevail. wondered out loud, “What in the To make his case, Kroenig organizes F name of God is strategic superi- the book in two parts, subtly tilting the ority? . . . What do you do with it?” analytic playing field in his direction with Over 40 years later, the questions still the subtitles “The advantages of nuclear resonate, and Georgetown University advantages” and “The disadvantages of professor Matthew Kroenig aims to nuclear advantages?” He identifies four tackle Kissinger’s quandary. The Logic interrelated advantages: reducing the cost of American Nuclear Strategy begins of nuclear war, increasing resolve in crisis, with a puzzle: if the basic premise of providing coercive bargaining leverage, U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy is sup- and enhancing deterrence. He then cri- posed to be that the United States can tiques arguments about four ostensible survive a massive nuclear attack and disadvantages of U.S. nuclear superiority: retaliate with great force (so-called increasing the likelihood of nuclear war, assured destruction), why have suc- sparking arms races, exacerbating prolif- cessive Presidents maintained nuclear eration, and costing too much. capabilities that go well beyond what is The book is the first in Oxford required for this goal? University Press’s “Bridging the Gap” Robert Jervis asked this same ques- series, aimed at improving the worthy but tion back in 1984 in a book titled The perennially difficult goal of better linking Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy academic and policy experts in areas of (Cornell University Press, 1984). His international relations. In this context, 98 Book Reviews JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 the book is exemplary in several respects. One of the pillars of the analysis is the out is actually relevant to decisionmaking First, it tackles a complex policy problem notion that nuclear superiority lowers a in nuclear states. involving several related but competing state’s expected costs in a catastrophic The book presents several statistical objectives (such as deterrence, assurance, nuclear war. Key to this is Kroenig’s analyses on the value of nuclear weapons military effectiveness, stability, nonpro- assessment that U.S. policymakers in a for coercion. These questions are espe- liferation) without limiting its analysis crisis would see a meaningful difference cially important to policy debates, since to only one relevant policy variable. between war outcomes of, say, 50 million the locus of current concern over nuclear Second, it employs a variety of methods and 70 million American dead. While no war risks is in regional conflicts between to interrogate its subjects, including one would argue that the 20 million dif- nuclear powers or their proxies in places statistical analysis, case studies, simula- ference is irrelevant, there are three major like Korea, Taiwan, and Eastern Europe. tion, deductive reasoning, and reviews problems with this argument. In such scenarios, revisionist powers may of the rich existing literature on nuclear First, the nuclear war scenarios hope that their nuclear weapons could strategy. Third, Kroenig gives substantial he simulates are only all-out, arsenal- serve as a shield for limited conventional space and analytic attention to alterna- emptying exchanges on the combatants’ aggression. So the book’s statistical analy- tive theories that compete with his own. homelands. Most would agree that sis on coercion is welcome and valuable. Fourth, as noted, he does not limit his these are the least likely of nuclear war However, Kroenig claims more power case to explaining the benefits of nuclear scenarios today, and even during much for it than is warranted. He translates superiority but devotes the second half of of the Cold War. Instead, scenarios that 20 “nuclear crises” where “victories” the book to rebutting arguments about have preoccupied strategists recently are were evenly split between states with the disadvantages of nuclear superiority. limited regional conflicts and inadvertent and without nuclear superiority into Together, these features make for a thor- escalation in contexts of U.S. extended 52 observations for regression analysis. ough, clear, and transparent analysis. deterrence, perhaps even without any That analysis shows nuclear superiority At the same time, Kroenig’s framing targeting of the combatants’ homelands. as the most important determinant of of his argument sets up what many policy Kroenig acknowledges this point in the crisis victory. Kroenig clearly explains the analysts may view as a strawman. The no- final pages of the book but essentially methodology that enables such a coun- tion that assured destruction should be argues that his logic extends to limited terintuitive result, but his interpretation the essence of U.S. nuclear strategy may nuclear war since the risk of wider escala- of the results as a “powerful relationship” be “a widespread and long-standing aca- tion is always present. between superiority and crisis outcomes demic conventional wisdom,” as Kroenig Second, the most relevant question and as “strong empirical support” for his argues. However, as he points out with respect to how leaders would think arguments is a stretch. Readers interested himself, this has seldom—if ever—been about costs and benefits of nuclear war in this should review the rival arguments the sole rationale given among policy- is not whether they are indifferent to of scholars Todd Sechser and Matthew makers, who have touted substantial between 50 and 70 million casualties. Fuhrmann, who come to different con- consideration for decades to counter- Leaving aside the fact that such estimates clusions in their book Nuclear Weapons force strategies, damage limitation, and are wildly uncertain in any case, the key and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge options for limited nuclear operations question is whether leaders might see University Press, 2017). that diverge from an assured destruc- the stakes in a plausible political conflict Importantly, Kroenig rejects tradi- tion strategy. Kroenig’s description of with another nuclear rival as being worth tional arguments that strategic superiority the conventional wisdom is a bit of a enduring 50 million casualties, but not can be destabilizing by generating incen- caricature: “Scholars argue that nuclear 70 million. It is this logic that would link tives for preemptive first strikes. This capabilities above and beyond a second- strategic superiority to greater risk pro- ultimately leads him to conclude that an strike capability do not matter.” Some pensity in a crisis, but this logic is harder “ideal nuclear posture” is one that would do, but many others cited in Kroenig’s to believe. render the United States “as invulnerable bibliography (such as Richard Betts, Paul Of course, whether leaders think this as possible to nuclear attack from its three Bracken, Frank Gavin, Brendan Green, way is an empirical question. Kroenig’s nuclear-armed rivals . . . while simultane- Keir Leiber, Austin Long, Daryl Press, case would have been bolstered by even a ously maximizing adversary vulnerability and Philip Zelikow) do not. single example of a U.S. leader articulating to nuclear war.” He leaves unsaid But what about the overall case for this kind of logic, but none is presented. that such a policy applied to current pursuing strategic superiority? Kroenig In his case studies of nuclear crises (chap- U.S.-Russia relations would be a major builds a formidable argument that should ter 3), he does offer useful examples of departure not only from the arguments capture the attention of both academic leaders identifying nuclear superiority as of the academics he criticizes, but also and policy specialists in the field. But a consideration in their behavior during from decades of U.S. strategy whose logic caution is warranted, as the evidence pre- crises. But this falls well short of demon- he purports to explain (not to mention sented is rather more ambiguous than his strating that the cost-benefit logic he lays from U.S. obligations under current arms confident claims suggest. control regimes). JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Book Reviews 99 Perhaps the most significant issue initially hostile toward the Alliance, label- with deriving policy implications from ing it “obsolete,” then declaring that it the analysis is Kroenig’s definition of no longer was. He disappointed Allies at superiority itself. In the book’s founda- his visit to NATO headquarters on May tional quantitative analysis, superiority is 25, 2017, when he refused to explicitly defined by the difference between two back the Article 5 clause. Trump’s speech nuclear states’ numbers of warheads. reflected the inward looking and dark Kroenig acknowledges that this is an “American carnage” view of his inaugural imperfect measure but downplays the speech, which is at odds with the reassur- limitation’s importance. A true account- ances of traditional U.S. policy and the ing of superiority would address not only speeches of Secretary of Defense James warhead counts but also a wide variety of Mattis. capabilities such as command and con- Sloan is to the point when he writes trol, delivery vehicles, readiness posture, that if the Allies want NATO, they can defenses, and the like. In a nuclear peer have it but they should consider putting relationship, as between the United States some actions behind their words. Put and Russia, policymakers will never really differently, they can wreck the Alliance think about superiority in the way that by not investing in it. There is probably Kroenig measures it. And in other key sufficient commonality of values and relationships, like between the United interests to justify and prolong NATO States and China, capability disparities are as it currently exists, but new nationalist so large that superiority as a policy choice values are entering the arena, and the is remote from the most important driv- Defense of the West: NATO, political leaders promoting these new ers of nuclear strategy. the European Union and values have no real appreciation for the By the same token, the rationales the Transatlantic Bargain Alliance, past or future. This goes not underpinning the expansion or modern- only for President Trump, but also the By Stanley R. Sloan ization priorities of today’s major nuclear Brexit movement, which pretends to be Manchester University Press, 2016 powers are not tied to the aggregate nu- pro-NATO but is openly disdainful of its $34.95 400 pp. clear balance among countries. Instead, European Allies. ISBN: 978-1526105752 they are efforts to enhance deterrence The book offers a framework for ap- and resilience under specific, stressful Reviewed by Sten Rynning preciating this challenging situation. Like scenarios where nuclear attack could con- this reviewer and other observers, Sloan ceivably be contemplated. did not foresee that the disruptive power In this sense, the book’s title works n this timely book, one of the most of nationalism would come from the better as a riposte to Jervis than as a pol- seasoned observers of Atlantic secu- United States and instead zooms in on icy guide. The “logic of American nuclear I rity affairs, Stanley Sloan, offers European developments. Naturally, we strategy,” after all, has been shaped by insights about the future of the North should not discard the possibility that by many considerations, with “superiority” Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). holding back on his NATO commitment, being just one among them. And readers These insights are linked to a detailed President Trump was simply seeking should be particularly hesitant to accept examination of the Alliance’s origins better burdensharing. There is wide- Kroenig’s implication that a U.S. arsenal and development. Sloan pinpoints three spread agreement, also in Europe, that far larger than Russia’s would be an key alliance drivers—national interests, European defense budgets must increase unambiguous and unvarnished benefit common values, and political leader- to correct the trans-Atlantic bargain. to U.S. national security. Nevertheless, ship—and offers a carefully circum- However, by reducing NATO to a trans- Kroenig certainly succeeds in showing scribed optimistic conclusion: common actional money exchange—a type of U.S. how and why strategic superiority can national interests and values are strong, welfare project for European Allies—and matter, and his analysis will undoubtedly but political leadership is volatile and by being silent on collective geopolitical earn a prominent place in both academic in need of constructive and effective interests, President Trump is effectively and policy debates in the years ahead. JFQ management. jeopardizing the political foundation Sloan’s circumscribed optimism turns of the Alliance. Sloan’s book is an ideal out to be quite justified. Shortly after the gateway to appreciate this challenge and Michael Fitzsimmons is a Visiting Research publication of the book, Great Britain its serious implications. Professor in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. decided to exit from the European Union The buildup to the book’s concluding and Donald Trump was elected President section on NATO’s potential for change of the United States. Trump had been is built on a thorough historical review. 100 Book Reviews JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 The initial section explores Cold War Atlantic community. Today, the bargain NATO, and a second section investigates remains, while the community is a vision New from post–Cold War NATO adaptation. It is struggling against nationalist values. manifestly clear in this investigation that Defense of the West reads exception- NDU Press NATO walks on two legs: one military ally well. More importantly, its clear for the Center for Complex and one political. Both are needed to argument that NATO has endured on ac- Operations keep NATO standing. The most explicit count of interests, values, and leadership Like, Comment, Retweet: The State of statement to this effect was the so- make it ideal for personal reflection or the Military’s Nonpartisan Ethic in the World of Social Media called Harmel Doctrine. This doctrine, classroom education. Anyone who takes by Heidi A. Urben formulated by then–Belgian Minister an interest in the future of the Alliance, Past research of Foreign Affairs Pierre Harmel, was Europe, and global security will find this contends adopted by the Alliance in December book simultaneously thought-provoking that with the 1967. The doctrine advocated a strong and indispensable. JFQ exception defense combined with good diplomatic of voting in relations with the Warsaw Pact states. It Presidential reverberated through the making of all Sten Rynning is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science elections, European consultation and disarmament at the University of Southern Denmark, where military offi- mechanisms (the Conference on Security he also heads the Center for War Studies. Dr. cers’ politi- and Cooperation in Europe) and the Rynning was a Visiting Professor at American University when he wrote this review. cal participation is fairly muted. post–Cold War era where NATO became Through a survey of more than the prime motor of continental order. 500 military elites attending the The Alliance’s extension eastward thus United States Military Academy followed. The U.S. congressional deci- and National Defense University, sion to back NATO enlargement defines this case study seeks to establish one of the most illuminating sections and the nature and extent of politi- most personal moments for the author. cal expression throughout social As the book makes amply clear, conti- media and whether such expression nental order in Europe is based on a mix is in keeping with the norm of of allied military strength and political nonpartisanship. commitment to principle. Defense of the Findings suggest that while most West effectively communicates that if military elites continue to identify as Allies allow collective principles to erode, conservative and Republican, fewer they are tempting adverse political change appear to do so today than at any of continental consequences. The same other time over the past 30 years. can be said for the global order, which Military elites who identify as liber- is American-inspired and American-led. als and Democrats are more likely to The book mentions, but does not delve have more politically diverse military into, this global dimension, which is friends on social media, but are also evident in NATO’s global network of more likely to report feeling uncom- partners that was dramatically extended fortable by their friends’ politics. and solidified by the Afghan campaign of This study concludes by considering the last decade. For Sloan, political prin- the implications these findings carry ciple both in Europe and globally amount for the norms of an apolitical, non- to the same thing: a liberal-democratic partisan military. reservoir of energy supportive of the U.S.-led international order. However, it is a potential for support that will be realized only by steady political leadership and continued engagement. Secretary Mattis’s new defense strategy contains an entire line of effort that appears to recog- nize that. Sloan has, over the course of decades, Visit the NDU Press Web site for tracked the trans-Atlantic bargain and more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu probed the potential for a fully fledged JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Book Reviews 101 U.S. Coastguardsman offloads cocaine at Coast Guard Station Miami Beach, Florida, September 18, 2014 (U.S. Coast Guard/Jon-Paul Rios) The U.S. Government’s Approach to Economic Security Focus on Campaign Activities By George E. Katsos hreats to economic security consistent access to employment oppor- ate measures, which frequently include and their potential effects often tunities, personal assets, and assured uprooting from their established com- T disrupt or fracture societies. For income. While human ambitions can munities in search of a better standard nations, economic security perpetuates inflame pressures on economic secu- of living. As these issues overwhelm stability and underpins national institu- rity, oppressive government practices institutional capacities and disturb tions that provide and maintain it. For can lead to job loss, unemployment, regional norms, the demand for inter- populations, economic security involves persistent poverty, and lack of access to vention from security provider nations income. Moreover, living conditions such as the United States is expected to worsened by instability and politi- not only continue but also increase. cal uncertainty can elevate fears and To compare present day distinctions Colonel George E. Katsos, USAR (Ret.), is the Department of Defense Terminology Program hopelessness. These circumstances can of economic security, descriptions and Manager and a Joint Doctrine Strategist. engender civilians to consider desper- definitions are presented from both U.S. 102 Joint Doctrine / The U.S. Government’s Approach to Economic Security JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Government (USG) and non-USG orga- and customs duties.5 Between world economic stability.9 Organizations nizational documentation. In 2017, the wars, Congress created the Federal created by the end of post–World War National Security Strategy described eco- Reserve System to supervise, regulate, II included the International Monetary nomic security as an element of national maintain, and stabilize the financial Fund, International Bank for Recon- security and stated that economic vitality, system; produced reforms to recover struction and Development (IBRD), growth, and prosperity are absolutely from an economic depression; and World Bank Group (the IBRD and necessary for American power and influ- enacted trade restrictions on Japan in International Development Association ence.1 The Department of Homeland response to its aggressive expansion are better known as the World Bank), Security (DHS) economic security in Asia. Postwar, Congress established and General Agreement on Tariffs and perspective is based on the increasing de- an economic advisory council, foreign Trade that later transitioned into the pendence on the flow of goods, services, assistance and financial assistance orga- World Trade Organization.10 Further- people, capital, information, and technol- nizations (for example, the U.S. Trade more, global summits (for example, the ogy across borders.2 The Department of and Development Agency and Overseas G-8) were created to resolve differences Defense (DOD) defines economic security Private Investment Corporation), and a between wealthy nations regarding as the ability to protect or advance U.S. special trade representative to conduct economic decisionmaking. The UN economic interests, shape international U.S. trade negotiations.6 Between 1963 also created the UN Development Pro- interests to American liking, and possess and 1971, the United States lifted itself gramme to help manage organizational material resources to fend off non-eco- off the gold standard and from silver economic development efforts and nomic challenges.3 The United Nations certificates.7 Further legislation attempts established exclusive economic zones (UN) focuses on an assured basic income, were to eliminate poverty, expand (EEZ) at sea where nations can explore while the International Committee of educational opportunities, increase the and use marine resources for economic the Red Cross defines economic security safety net for the poor and unemployed, purposes.11 as the ability of individuals, households, and tend to the health and financial or communities to cover their essential needs of the elderly.8 The Executive Branch needs sustainably and with dignity.4 For Economic security underpins national purposes here, economic security includes International Engagement security and is the foundation for the aforementioned but focuses on USG The U.S. Government works within national power capabilities. The commitments and stabilization efforts. established international economic President signs the National Security This analysis is based on research and agreements developed by political enti- Strategy, which articulates overarch- informal discussions and is categorized ties of similar interest. From one end ing strategic policy goals and national into the following sections: legislation, in- of the economic security spectrum, the power direction on matters related ternational engagement, executive branch United States identifies and cooper- to economic security. Subsequently, strategy and activities, and military cam- ates with some countries on a “most executive branch departments produce paign activities in support of economic favored nation” or “permanent normal organizational strategies and plans in security efforts. economic relation” status. Toward support of the strategy. The President the opposite end, activities within a can also issue policy direction through Legislation cooperative environment can become executive orders. Such orders included Per the Constitution, Congress has more competitive with tariffs, financial/ a response to the pre–World War II authority over Federal financial and import/export restrictions, organized economic depression and the creation budgetary matters. Its exclusive power boycotts, asset freezing, economic sanc- of the National Economic Council to to appropriate funds and regulate com- tions, trade/technology/travel bans, coordinate and advise the President on merce allows it to pass revenue and embargoes, no-fly/no-drive zones, economic policymaking.12 Executive related crisis-mitigation legislation and blockades and can deteriorate into orders issued specifically for national when the country is under considerable conflict. After World War I, the League security purposes are called Presidential economic pressure. The Constitution of Nations was created to assist in miti- directives. To better review a break- also provided Congress with authority gating future conflict, but by the end of down of USG economic security efforts, to establish a monetary system of paper World War II, the League was replaced the following overview captures them in currency that at the time was based by the UN, which also supported three cascading categories: significant, on precious metals (gold and silver). economic development efforts, job additional, and remaining. Today, the U.S. Government practices creation, and poverty elimination. The Significant Efforts. Two organiza- stabilization abroad in many areas and UN Monetary and Financial Confer- tions that lead USG efforts in foreign protects American citizens from eco- ence, also known as the Bretton Woods policy and economic assistance are the nomic shocks stateside. From American Agreement, subsequently established Department of State and U.S. Agency for independence to World War I, Congress an international monetary system tied International Development (USAID). generated revenue through taxes, tariffs, to gold that provided international While State manages foreign affairs JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Katsos 103 Visit, board, search, and seizure team from USS Halsey approaches two Yemeni dhows intercepted during routine maritime security operations, Gulf of Aden, February 5, 2012 (U.S. Navy/Krishna M. Jackson) for the President, USAID integrates Treasury cuts the lines of terrorist fi- and business activities (including agricul- economic development and disaster as- nancial support, fights financial crime, tural) to health and develops economic sistance expertise to implement abroad. enforces economic sanctions against opportunities that are sustainable and Both organizations are structured under rogue nations, and combats financial sup- economically viable.16 Furthermore, the Secretary of State and follow guid- port tied to weapons of mass destruction Commerce’s Census Bureau captures ance outlined in strategic documents (WMD) proliferation.14 Abroad, Treasury and releases poverty statistics in the that include economic reforms, combat- assists multilateral development banks, United States, the International Trade ing corruption, building markets for strengthens relationships with trading Administration promotes U.S. exports U.S. goods and services, and assisting partners, and negotiates trade agreements of nonagricultural services and goods, other nations in crisis, including those that benefit the United States. At home, and the Economic Development disrupted by natural disasters. Through Treasury identifies social safety programs Administration provides grants and tech- diplomacy and assistance, both State and to help protect American citizens from nical assistance to economically distressed USAID provide a competitive forward- negative economic shocks as well as man- communities.17 deployed political capability that can ages government revenues, produces Additional Efforts. Other depart- achieve national economic security objec- currency and coinage, collects taxes, pays ments make substantial contributions tives.13 State also implements diplomatic government bills, and supervises banks.15 to USG economic security efforts. The pressure through its Defense Trade Commerce strengthens the Nation’s Department of Homeland Security Controls Directorate. digital economy and promotes job cre- identifies vulnerabilities to U.S. economic Two other departments that play sig- ation and improved living standards by security, collaborates to secure global nificant roles in achieving USG economic creating a domestic infrastructure that systems, collects customs revenue, en- security objectives are the Department encourages economic growth, techno- forces U.S. law, and provides domestic of the Treasury and Department of logical competitiveness, and sustainable economic security and stability through Commerce. Treasury activities are development. As the coordinating agency coordination mechanisms managed by its meant to preserve confidence in the for the National Disaster Recovery Federal Emergency Management Agency U.S. economic system. Informed by its Framework’s Economic Recovery (FEMA).18 Furthermore, Homeland own in-house intelligence expertise and Support Function, Commerce leads ef- Security administers the Coast Guard and its Office of Foreign Assets Control, forts that support the return of economic U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 104 Joint Doctrine / The U.S. Government’s Approach to Economic Security JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 which facilitate the legitimate use of policies in support of Israel during the DOD campaign activities support waterways subject to U.S. jurisdiction— Arab-Israeli conflict, significantly impact- USG contributions to international, including the EEZ—and monitor border ing economies dependent on the natural regional, and national approaches that crossings, respectively.19 The Department resource. In 2006 and 2009, the Russian can create secure operational areas where of Justice and its Federal Bureau of Federation shut off natural gas support economic activity can thrive and adver- Investigation (FBI) promote economic to Ukraine to coerce higher payments sarial behavior can be influenced to be security by upholding and reinforcing and influence behavior of others depen- more in harmony with local population legal paradigms that support growth and dent on its Cold War–era prepositioned needs and U.S. vital interests. At the recovery by investigating and prosecut- pipeline systems.23 In Asia in 2016, international level, DOD supports USG ing economic crimes.20 DOD supports China tried to establish an air defense peacekeeping efforts to stabilize nations USG economic security efforts primarily identification zone (no-fly zone) over the and their economies through force con- through its military workforce.21 Besides South China Sea to protect its economic tributions and individual expertise. These providing physical security, DOD as- benefits by controlling the region.24 Last efforts involve cooperation with other sists to disrupt and prevent predatory year the Russian Federation published nations and entities. At the regional level, economic practices, provides assistance its first economic security strategy in DOD supports USG cooperation efforts in all kinds of environments, and rebuilds over 20 years to monitor and assess its with entities such as the North Atlantic and sustains economic infrastructure dis- domestic economic security and provide a Treaty Organization (NATO) with force rupted by instability and conflict. warning to other nations that it will neu- contributions and individual expertise. In Remaining Efforts. Remaining ef- tralize both internal and external threats support of domestic efforts, combatant forts include the Department of Energy’s related to the competitive advantages of commanders conduct homeland defense support of technologies to create jobs developed countries.25 Most recently, the missions, offer defense support (as well and growth of the national economy, U.S. and Chinese governments elevated as training and exercises) to civil authori- the Department of Housing and Urban threats and actions against each other on ties, and participate in special events and Development’s Promise Zones initiative trade tariffs, taxes and duties, and invest- public engagement that can gener- to drive the revitalization of high-poverty ment restrictions. Issues similar to and ate confidence in the U.S. economic communities, and the Departments such as these can ignite concerted USG structure. The following two sections of Education and Agriculture’s focus diplomatic action and even DOD work- articulate some of the ways that combat- on helping find solutions to alleviate force employment. ant commanders can support USG efforts conditions that reinforce the prevalence to apply and relieve economic pressure in of high-poverty neighborhoods and Military Campaign Activities potential operational areas. persistent poverty.22 Additionally, the Threats that national economies Enforcement. DOD campaign activi- Department of Transportation assures encounter may likely involve a response ties can apply pressure on physical and the accessibility and health of Federal from security institutions such as DOD. virtual freedom of movement (divert, thoroughfares on land and water (roads, In support of USG activities, combatant disrupt, delay, destroy) through land, sea, bridges, rail). commanders and their staffs integrate air, space, and cyberspace in order to as- As USG entities continue to develop economic considerations into plans, sist in upholding international, regional, plans that include support of national preparation, training, and missions to or USG economic restrictions into or out economic security policy objectives, the influence adversarial behavior, maintain of a nation or specified area. Combatant government is uncertain how it will react order, prepare for relief, or attempt commanders enforce diplomatic policies to international economic system disrup- to mitigate issues impacting local and and political decisions to control ac- tion, complete collapse, or aggressive regional stability, such as poverty and cess to areas of interest defined by the competitor measures within the global unemployment. However, economic President. This includes enforcing strong economy. Free of concerns from Western considerations may not always be diplomatic measures such as embargoes democracies, some foreign governments feasible during implementation due (banning or blocking the flow of trade or and entities take aggressive stances in to competing operational interests personnel), economic sanctions (specific defining themselves and pursuing their that a commander must assess, such economic penalties), no-fly/no-drive own political dominance. In 1948, the as the inherent right of self-defense zones, and other control methods (freez- Soviet Union conducted a yearlong land and combat. To socialize the DOD ing of assets).27 For example, a blockade blockade of Berlin that prevented food, economic security role, discussions and at sea monitors, intercepts, and enforces commerce, and other resources from implications appear in joint doctrine.26 the stop of flow of commerce or op- flowing into the city in an effort to dis- While many terms can be used to position force movement. In support of rupt and deter U.S. and Allied influence describe DOD economic security efforts plans, mandates, or orders, a geographic in the region. In 1973, the Organization (investments, deployments, operations), combatant commander’s maritime inter- of Petroleum Exporting Countries es- this discussion refers to them as cam- ception capability can establish a barrier tablished an oil embargo in response to paign activities. that authorizes armed boarding parties JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Katsos 105 to visit merchant ships, examine docu- U.S. Pacific Command, DOD person- civilians are able to conduct commerce ments and cargo, search for evidence nel partnered with Treasury analysts and business activity as well as be available of contraband including WMDs, divert to identify terrorist support networks as local labor for quick impact projects. In vessels failing to comply with guidelines and their finances in Southeast Asia. In Afghanistan and Haiti, the United States set forth by a sanctioning body or nation, USAFRICOM, DOD personnel worked participated in economic reconstruction seize suspect vessels and their cargo that with Treasury analysts in efforts to coun- efforts where DOD provided funding refuse to divert, and destroy vessels and ter terrorism, drug activities, and threat that focused on local production, con- cargo if necessary.28 Historical examples networks and their financial support.33 sumption, and export of goods.37 For include the 1862 Union unilateral naval Combatant commands also conduct assistance, combatant commanders can blockade of Confederate territory during campaign activities in defense of the coordinate early with partners and stake- the American Civil War to deter foreign homeland and USG interests, to include holders to request flexible and immediate assistance and trade, the 1962 unilateral illegal WMD acquisition and cyber at- funding for work initiatives similar to U.S. naval blockade (politically labeled tacks of significant consequence that can the USCENTCOM Commander’s a “quarantine”) established to deter produce serious economic impact on the Emergency Response Program utilized in Russia from delivering offensive weapons United States.34 Afghanistan and Iraq that quickly imple- to Cuba, the 1990 U.S. contribution Assistance. DOD campaign activities mented postconflict stabilization and to a coalition naval blockade (politically can relieve pressure on unstable econo- reconstruction programs. labeled an “interdiction”) to enforce a mies and host-nation governments, their Combatant commanders and their UN international embargo against Iraq, populations, and uprooted civilians. forces also address underlying economic and the 1992 U.S.-supported NATO Civilian-military cooperation can increase drivers of conflict by assisting in assuring naval blockade authorized by the United the role of economic development in ad- access to basic income and employ- Nations to deter international water ship- vancing national security priorities along ment and, when necessary, providing ments to the former Yugoslavia. with defense and diplomacy.35 Civilian government-financed social safety nets, On land, similar campaign activities entities such as State or USAID normally agriculture and economy diversification, involve blocking movements or check- have the USG lead responsibility, but and reconstruction protection of critical points. In 1990, U.S. troops under U.S. combatant commands may render sup- economic infrastructure. Furthermore, Central Command (USCENTCOM), port to efforts, such as the restoration combatant commands assist in critical in support of an allied coalition, created of functioning economic production infrastructure program implementation a land defense of Saudi Arabia to deter and distribution (restoring employment via the Army Corps of Engineers and Iraqi ground expansion from occupied opportunities, initiating market reform, naval construction battalions to bolster Kuwait. Other campaign activities sup- mobilizing domestic and foreign invest- economic stabilization and rebuild fa- port no-fly/no-drive zones and block or ment, supervising monetary reform, and cilities such as sea and airport dual-use control the flow of traffic on the ground rebuilding public structures). Assisting infrastructure. Combatant commands and in the air. In 1990, USCENTCOM USAID in conflict prevention, combatant also support USG restoration programs supported UN-mandated no-fly/ commanders support USG stabilization of revenue-earning thoroughfares (land, no-drive zones to protect civilian popu- and reconstruction efforts, development water) and enterprises (for example, Iraq lations in Iraq.29 In 2011, U.S. Africa and cooperation efforts, and hazard oil and Guinea aluminum ore mining) to Command (USAFRICOM) supported response and relief to break cycles of accelerate economic recovery as well as a UN-authorized no-fly zone over Libya violence abroad caused by unemploy- provide assistance to develop monetary to prevent government forces from ment and poverty. Campaign activities policy and a central bank system.38 approaching rebel strongholds and transi- in support of USG stabilization and Larger scale and longer term projects tioned it to NATO management.30 reconstruction efforts are small-scale and are designed to promote strategic objec- Other campaign activities conducted short-term projects designed to promote tives and partnerships.39 Combatant with interagency personnel develop stability on the ground. Through the commanders support these development evidentiary records against terrorist and provisions of special operations forces and cooperation efforts to build partner criminal networks through their finances. training, civil-military interaction, and capacity and host-nation economic For example, combatant commanders Provincial Reconstruction Team over- security. Normally, these activities are con- cooperate with agencies like Homeland sight like those conducted in Afghanistan ducted by USAID; however, campaign Security and the FBI to share threat and Iraq, combatant command personnel activities socialized with Chief of Mission information on corruption and mali- monitor and partake in economic stability and other country managers may be cious cyber activities.31 Recently, DOD tasks as well as identify the most effective necessary when conditions restrict civilian cooperation with Justice and Treasury transition of military activities into civilian movement or when civilian agencies have led to freezing assets of one Iranian entity economic efforts.36 not yet arrived in the area. USAFRICOM and 10 Iranian individuals for significant Campaign activities can include es- personnel presently engage with part- malicious cyber-enabled activities.32 In tablishing secure economic zones where ners and organizations through security 106 Joint Doctrine / The U.S. Government’s Approach to Economic Security JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 5 cooperation to develop self-sustaining ca- Sheila R. Ronis, ed., Economic Security: Treasury, January 18, 2017, available at JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Katsos 107 pdf>; U.S. Department of Agriculture Stra- tegic Plan FY 2014–2018 (Washington, DC: Department of Agriculture, 2014), 6, available at 108 Joint Doctrine / The U.S. Government’s Approach to Economic Security JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 From NDU Press Charting a Course: Strategic Choices for a New Administration 2016 • 396 pp. The Trump administration takes office in a time of great complexity. The President faces a national security environment shaped by strong currents: globalization; the proliferation of new, poor, and weak states, as well as nonstate ac- tors; a persistent landscape of violent extremist organizations; slow economic growth; the rise of China and a revanchist Russia; a collapsing Middle East; and domestic policies wracked by division and mistrust. While in absolute terms the Nation and the world are safer than in the last century, today the United States finds itself almost on a permanent war footing, engaged in military operations around the world. This book, written by experts at the Defense Department’s National Defense University, offers valuable policy advice and grand strat- egy recommendations to those senior leaders who will staff and lead this administration in national security affairs. The President and his staff, Members of Congress, and the many leaders throughout government concerned with the Nation’s security interests should find this book valuable. Their task is not an easy one, and this volume’s insights and reflections are offered with an ample dose of humility. There are no silver bullets, no elegant solutions to the complex problems confronting America and its leaders. This volume provides context and un- derstanding about the current national security environment to those in the Administration as they prepare to lead the Nation during challenging times. To those senior leaders who bear the heavi- est responsibilities, these policy insights may chart a course forward. The lessons encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq at the strategic level inform our understanding of national security decisionmaking, intelligence, the character of contemporary conflict, and unity of effort and command. They stand alongside the lessons of other wars and remind future senior officers that those who fail to learn from past mistakes are bound to repeat them. Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Books/charting-a-course/ JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE NINETY, 3RD QUARTER 2018 Flickr Pinterest Facebook Twitter www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm You can also find us on: can also find You Visit us online at: http://ndupress.ndu.edu Visit JFQ is available online at the Joint Electronic Library: articles, occasional papers, books, and other publications. site is a great place to find information on new and upcomingsite is a great place to find information With 20,000 unique visitors each month, the NDU Press WebWith 20,000 unique visitors each month, JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY National Defense University, Washington, DC National Defense University, Washington, The Armed Forces Officer“This new edition of The Armed Forces articulates the ethical and moral underpin- nings at the core of our profession. The special trust in us by the Nation and confidence placed we protect is built upon this foundation. I commend members of our officer corps to embrace the principles of this important book and practice them daily in the performance of your du- I expect you to imbue these values in the next generation of leaders.” ties. More importantly, Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1159223/the-armed-forces-officer/ New from NDU Press New from Officer The Armed Forces 2017 • 212 pp. ChairmanStaff: of the Joint Chiefs of Dunford, Jr., From the Foreword by General Joseph F. C. Marshall, then serving George “In 1950, the great Soldier-Statesman Secretary as the of Officer page for a new book titled The ArmedDefense, signed a cover Forces . That original Marshall, who later explained that was written by none other than S.L.A. version of this book Secretary Marshall had ‘inspired the undertakingpersonal conviction that American due to his military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground morally.’ ethically and it addressed an of the Cold War, emergence at the dawn of the nuclear age and the Written officer a strategy of nuclear deterrence, corps tasked with developing facing unprecedented deployments, and adapting to the creation of the Department- of Defense and other new orga nizations necessary to manage the threats of a new global order. Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff University Press by National Defense Have you checked out NDU Press online lately? Have you checked