Quarter 2020 nd
Issue 97, 2 97, Issue
the U.S. Navy the U.S. Ulysses S. Grant and and Grant S. Ulysses and National Security National and Commercial Satellites Domains
Traditional Traditional Broadening Broadening
JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE NINETY-SEVEN, 2ND QUARTER 2020 Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 https://ndupress.ndu.edu
GEN Mark A. Milley, USA, Publisher VADM Frederick J. Roegge, USN, President, NDU
Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Production Editor John J. Church, D.M.A.
Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich
Copyeditor Andrea L. Connell
Associate Editor Jack Godwin, Ph.D.
Book Review Editor Brett Swaney
Art Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Publishing Office
Advisory Committee Ambassador Erica Barks-Ruggles/College of International Security Affairs; RDML Shoshana S. Chatfield, USN/U.S. Naval War College; Col Thomas J. Gordon, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; MG Lewis G. Irwin, USAR/Joint Forces Staff College; MG John S. Kem, USA/U.S. Army War College; Cassandra C. Lewis, Ph.D./College of Information and Cyberspace; LTG Michael D. Lundy, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; LtGen Daniel J. O’Donohue, USMC/The Joint Staff; Brig Gen Evan L. Pettus, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; RDML Cedric E. Pringle, USN/National War College; Brig Gen Kyle W. Robinson, USAF/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Brig Gen Jeremy T. Sloane, USAF/Air War College; Col Blair J. Sokol, USMC/Marine Corps War College; Lt Gen Glen D. VanHerck, USAF/The Joint Staff
Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; Richard L. DiNardo/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Bryon Greenwald/Joint Forces Staff College; COL James E. Hayes, USA/National War College; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Bert B. Tussing/U.S. Army War College
Cover 2 images (top to bottom): Marines conduct demolition breaching tactics during exercise Bougainville II on Range 9, Pohakuloa Training Area, Hawaii, May 12, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/ Jacob Wilson); Paratrooper assigned to 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, participates in joint forcible entry exercise at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, August 23, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Javier Alvarez); Airmen assigned to Team Eglin take Polar Bear Plunge into Choctawhatchee Bay, January 18, 2019, at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida (U.S. Air Force/Samuel King, Jr.) About the Cover In This Issue Army women’s team and Marines men’s team each came in first during joint quarterly Forum running competition known 2 Executive Summary as Commander’s Cup, held at Presidio’s Soldier Field, on July 4 The Imperative for the 21, 2017, with the Marine Corps U.S. Military to Develop a Detachment Presidio of Monterey Counter-UAS Strategy claiming Commander’s Cup for By Edward A. Guelfi, Buddhika best combined time, Presidio of Jayamaha, and Travis Robison Monterey, California (U.S. Army/ Steven Shepard) 13 The Challenge of Dis-Integrating A2/AD Zone: How Emerging Technologies Are Shifting the Balance Back to the Defense By Alex Vershinin 91 Disciplined Lethality: Expanding Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Competition with Iran in an Defense University Press for the Chairman of the 20 Proliferated Commercial Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship Age of Nation-State Rivalries joint military and security studies journal designed to Satellite Constellations: By Scott J. Harr inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and Implications for other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat National Security 97 Countering A2/AD in the Indo- terrorism; homeland security; and developments in By Matthew A. Hallex and Pacific: A Potential Change training and joint professional military education to Travis S. Cottom for the Army and Joint Force transform America’s military and security apparatus to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting By Hassan M. Kamara freedom today. All published articles have been vetted 30 Electronic Warfare in the through a peer-review process and cleared by the Suwalki Gap: Facing the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review. Russian “Accompli Attack” Recall NDU Press is the National Defense University’s cross-component, professional military and academic By Jan E. Kallberg, Stephen S. 103 Learning the Art of Joint publishing house. Hamilton, and Matthew G. Sherburne Operations: Ulysses S. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations Grant and the U.S. Navy expressed or implied within are those of the By Harry Laver contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views JPME Today of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. 39 Strategic Leader Research: Copyright Notice Answering the Call Book Reviews This is the official U.S. Department of Defense edition By Larry D. Miller and 110 Boy on the Bridge of Joint Force Quarterly. Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Laura A. Wackwitz Reviewed by Bryon Greenwald without permission of the copyright proprietors. JFQ should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted 47 Expanding Atrocity Prevention 111 To Build a Better World from or based on its content. Education for Rising U.S. Reviewed by Walter M. Hudson Submissions and Communications JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent National Security Leaders research from members of the Armed Forces, By David Wigmore 112 The Russian security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, Understanding of War academic specialists, and civilians from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration 55 The Missing Element in Reviewed by Maria Y. Omelicheva to ScholarOne, available at https://mc04. Crafting National Strategy: manuscriptcentral.com/ndupress, or write to: A Theory of Success Joint Doctrine Editor, Joint Force Quarterly By Frank G. Hoffman NDU Press 114 Airbase Defense Falls 300 Fifth Avenue (Building 62, Suite 212) Fort Lesley J. McNair Between the Cracks Washington, DC 20319 Commentary By Joseph T. Buontempo Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 65 The Joint Force Needs a and Joseph E. Ringer Email: [email protected] Global Engagement Cycle JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu/jfq nd By Gregory M. Tomlin 121 Putting the “FIL” into “DIME”: 2 Quarter, April 2020 Growing Joint Understanding ISSN 1070-0692 73 Detention Operations as a of the Instruments of Power Strategic Consideration By Cesar Augusto Rodriguez, Timothy By John F. Hussey Charles Walton, and Hyong Chu 128 Update Features 83 Transforming DOD for Agile Multidomain Command and Control By Douglas O. Creviston Army Project Manager Tactical Network works to find solutions that enable larger numbers of smaller satellites to orbit closer to Earth, April 11, 2019 (Courtesy International Space Station)
Executive Summary
n the inaugural issue of Joint Force create a new combatant command: the Chief of Space Operations joins them Quarterly, space was a part of the dis- United States Space Command. The as a new Service chief. While General I cussion when then–Air Force Chief of new command will give this initiative Jay Raymond, U.S. Space Force, will Staff General Merrill McPeak wrote his its tactical workforce once the details have the smallest force at the table and “Ideas Count” article. General McPeak are finalized. What will it mean to the report to the Secretary of the Air Force, stated, “I believe the Air Force should joint force and to joint warfighting? I as Air Force Chief of Staff General David consolidate all U.S. military operations suspect a great deal after the adminis- Goldfein does, his team has arguably the in space.” A generation later, we have trative actions are worked out. biggest domain to work in. For the joint picked up on his suggestion. The joint In the past decade, we have seen force, U.S. Space Command has returned force has expanded at the strategic and the addition of the National Guard to to the combatant commanders’ table operational levels in a historic move to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and now the in its second life, having first appeared
2 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 from 1985 to 2002. In addition, General Hallex and Travis Cottom discuss how you learn about a range of important Raymond will be dual-hatted as U.S. the rapid increase in commercial satellites joint and strategic issues. Space Command’s commander. will affect our national security. Another This issue’s Joint Doctrine section To readers of JFQ, space as a warf- important, yet sometimes neglected, offers two important articles that speak ighting domain—or the desire to have issue is electronic warfare. JFQ alumnus directly to the seams in joint operations, a separate Service—is not a new idea. Jan Kallberg, Stephen Hamilton, and instruments of power, and the pursuit of However, the idea of a separate Service is Matthew Sherburne discuss how to iden- strategy’s ends. As reliance on using for- one that had to overcome a great deal of tify advances in Russian capabilities that ward-deployed airpower to back up local opposition and bureaucratic inertia. Will the joint force needs to counter. forces in combat operations grows, one this separation allow for a better focus In JPME Today, Larry Miller and question Joseph Buontempo and Joseph on this warfighting domain? Will acqui- Laura Wackwitz discuss how to conduct Ringer address is who will provide airbase sition decisionmaking and management research to support the education of defense. And in an effort to raise aware- of space programs be better? The most strategic leadership in our staff and war ness within the joint force of the financial, important issues that have arisen in recent colleges. With the 75th anniversary of intelligence, and law enforcement aspects years should be at the top of the opera- the liberation of the Nazi death camps of how we employ the instruments of tions and planning staffs’ agendas. How fresh in our minds, David Wigmore national power to fulfill national security to better “control” space in ways that provides us with a solid roadmap on how strategy, Cesar Rodriguez, Timothy might be useful to the other concepts to educate our future national security Walton, and Hyong Chu suggest that of domain control; what responsibilities leaders to prevent atrocities in the future only looking at diplomatic, informational, the force will have in space; and what battlespace. Frank Hoffman returns to military, and economic options often the tactical, operational, and strategic JFQ with his views on the missing part lead to less than optimal strategic results. relationships will be between space war- of our national strategy—a theory for Finally, with many important changes to fighters and their counterparts are just a success. After nearly two decades of war Joint Doctrine coming every month, all few of the issues. A persistent problem with seemingly no obvious prospect of of them can be tracked in our update. will be the still-unresolved issue of how victory in a classic sense, his ideas cannot JFQ has been involved in the dis- to allocate airpower to the land com- be more welcomed. cussion of space since our inception in ponent commander’s preferences when Gregory Tomlin leads off our 1993. The debates on how best to be other domains compete for those limited Commentary section by suggesting that joint, fight joint, and help our partners assets. And the international treaty the development of a global engagement integrate with us has been our bread and obligations for space cannot be ignored cycle is critical to the success of global butter from the start. I look forward to without affecting our relations with other integration. In addition, having recently an increased discussion on the way ahead space-faring nations as well. We look for- served as the Deputy Commander at for the joint force on land, sea, air, space, ward to seeing how U.S. Space Force and Guantánamo Bay detention camp, John cyberspace, and anywhere else our free- U.S. Space Command develop. Hussey reviews the history and lessons to doms need defending. JFQ In the Forum, we offer a variety of be learned from detainee operations. discussions that center on the emerging In Features, Douglas Creviston William T. Eliason technologies of today and tomorrow’s discusses the urgent need to change and Editor in Chief battlespace. As a recent briefing by a U.S. adapt the joint force command and con- commander engaged in the fight against trol structure through a transformation of the so-called Islamic State acknowl- the Defense Department. Scott Harr, in edged, our defenses against unmanned an article written before the recent killing aircraft systems are limited and deserve of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, attention, especially around our fixed offers insights on how lethality can be infrastructure and bases in forward areas. an important part of dealing with Iran as Edward Guelfi, Buddhika Jayamaha, and a rival nation-state. Hassan Kamara dis- Travis Robison discuss the immediate cusses how the U.S. Army and the joint requirement for the development of a force can address A2/AD threats in the strategy to counter these threats. Equally U.S. Indo-Pacific Command region. prominent in security debates has been Harry Laver, in our Recall article, the antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) chal- takes us back to the Civil War to see how lenges to our joint force. Alex Vershinin General Ulysses S. Grant and Andrew posits that technology is shifting the Foote, a naval officer, learned to work advantage back to defense. And as reports together successfully. We also bring you of more than 50,000 satellites will be three excellent book reviews that will help in orbit in the coming years, Matthew
JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Eliason 3 Soldier pushes RQ-7B Shadow unmanned aerial system on Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, February 2020 (U.S. Air National Guard/Matt Hecht)
the U.S. military’s ability to respond The Imperative for to emerging global security challenges. The proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), more commonly referred to as drones, represents one the U.S. Military to of the largest emerging challenges to the joint community since the rise of improvised explosive devices during Develop a Counter- the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Recent conflicts involving state and nonstate actors and the acquisition UAS Strategy priorities of U.S. rivals like Russia and China demonstrate that Soldiers on future battlefields will see the wide- By Edward A. Guelfi, Buddhika Jayamaha, and Travis Robison spread use of drones. For example, Russia and Russian-backed separatists have used various types of drones to ilitary power often emerges at achieve devastating effects during their the nexus of technology, orga- ongoing conflict with Ukraine.2 U.S. nizational processes of force forces in Syria could not retain oper- Major Edward A. Guelfi, USA, is an Executive M 1 Officer at the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery employment, and training. However, ational control of the airspace below Regiment. Dr. Buddhika Jayamaha is a Faculty rapid technological change, the con- 3,500 feet for an extended period of Member at the United States Air Force Academy. stantly evolving character of warfare, time where the so-called Islamic State Lieutenant Colonel Travis Robison, USA, is a Battalion Commander at the 2nd Battalion, 11th and the lingering effects of sustained (IS) conducted lethal and nonlethal Field Artillery Regiment. combat on military readiness constrain drone operations.3 Looking ahead, the
4 Forum / Developing a Counter-UAS Strategy JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Department of Defense (DOD) antic- provided operationally viable persistent 30 years.16 But between 2010 and 2014, ipates that China will soon outspend surveillance capabilities.9 only approximately 2.5 percent of trans- the United States in drone investment, The first operational deployment of ferred drones were armed, so the majority with more than $10 billion dedicated a Predator squadron occurred in Bosnia of UAS transferred abroad have been solely to research and development, and in 1995, where it provided targeting in- unarmed systems primarily intended for may become the world leader in this formation, monitored refugee flows, and reconnaissance.17 The number of armed area by 2023.4 provided battle damage assessments.10 drone exports is increasing, however, For the first time in more than six After seeing the operational benefits given the number of countries actively decades, U.S. ground forces have found of 24-hour persistent surveillance in developing UAS. In particular, China is themselves under aerial attack and are rough terrain and adverse weather con- quickly becoming a leader in exporting generally unable to counter the threat. ditions, Congress more than doubled inexpensive, weapons-capable drones.18 Existing air defense systems have proved the Predator budget and accelerated Commercial UAS are proliferating tragically unable to detect or engage slow, additional UAS programs, which sub- more rapidly than military variants because low-flying UAS.5 Failure to mitigate this sequently became the foundation of of the latter’s higher cost and greater sup- operational risk across the full spectrum current global drone fleets and tactics.11 port infrastructure requirements, as well of conflict will leave the U.S. Army vul- While the United States initiated the as existing international arms trade agree- nerable to the use of drones by state and use of UAS, over the past two decades ments.19 The availability and proliferation nonstate adversaries. This risk results in drones have proliferated throughout the of commercial systems throughout the an imperative for the Army to develop world. Today, more than 90 state and security environment complicate military and implement a more comprehensive nonstate actors possess drone capabilities responses because these drones often have counter-UAS strategy than currently ranging from small, commercial drones comparable capabilities to small military exists and that must include material, to more sophisticated military variants. UAS and can be easily modified for mili- organizational, and Soldier solutions. Moreover, at least 16 countries have tary uses.20 Next-generation commercial Drones present a multidomain challenge, armed drone programs with another 20 drone technology is making these systems so improving the Army’s counter-UAS countries attempting to develop them.12 more like military ones, and they are strategy will provide a framework for The evolution of electronics and software exploiting new operational concepts such developing and integrating counter-UAS technologies and the changing character as swarming.21 As a result, as UAS technol- capabilities into emerging warfighting of warfare converged to influence the ogy continues to advance and proliferate, concepts. This article explains the UAS rapid and widespread proliferation of the distinctions between commercial and threat in terms of technological diffu- civilian and military drones. Today, there military drones will become less clear, fur- sion and patterns of use and provides are more than 600 types of armed and ther enhancing operational risk. counter-UAS recommendations for con- unarmed drones used or being developed As drone proliferation continues, sideration by senior military leaders. around the world.13 military leaders must understand the The accessibility, affordability, and capabilities and limitations of each type of The Threat capabilities of available UAS influence drone to develop effective countermea- Technological Diffusion. The Cold their proliferation. Small, affordable, sures. Currently, DOD classifies drones War demand for persistent surveillance of and commercially available hobbyist into one of five categories based on a sys- the Soviet Union led the Air Force and drones are less capable overall, but they tem’s size, speed, and operational range.22 U.S. intelligence agencies to pursue UAS provide groups with an accessible intel- While helpful in distinguishing between development by the late 1950s, and these ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance a system’s potential use in tactical or drone technologies materialized in the (ISR) capability that often rivals more operational roles, these categories do not early 1960s.6 During the latter part of the sophisticated military variants. For ex- provide a roadmap for understanding two 1960s, the United States employed these ample, the Chinese-made DJI Mavic is a important UAS characteristics as they new technologies to monitor China’s commercially available quadcopter that relate to likely battlefield use: a systems development of nuclear and air defense costs less than $100 and is capable of degree of accessibility or availability, capabilities, as well as to conduct battle autonomous takeoffs and landings, flying and the technology and infrastructure damage assessments during the Vietnam GPS-programmed routes, tracking and required to support using a system. These War.7 Following that conflict, the United following moving objects, and sensing and two characteristics result in a taxonomy States struggled to integrate UAS into its avoiding obstacles.14 The Mavic’s degree of UAS with four categories: hobbyist European operations against the Soviet of autonomous flight currently exceeds drones, midsize military and commercial Union due to technological and airspace that of the U.S. Air Force’s approximately drones, large military-specific drones, and restrictions.8 Regardless, the United $17 million MQ-9 Reaper UAS.15 stealth combat drones.23 Each category States continued to improve drone Israel is currently the largest exporter of drones has distinct capabilities and technologies and by the 1990s had suc- of military UAS, with over 60 percent limitations that provide a foundation for cessfully developed the Predator, which of international transfers over the past determining how to counter a system.
JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Guelfi, Jayamaha, and Robison 5 Hobbyist drones are widely available airspace. Drones can lower the risks of Russia rapidly implemented a drone for purchase by the public and generally certain actions such as violating another development and acquisition program cost less than $3,000. These systems state’s airspace because these systems that entailed purchasing Israeli-made come preassembled or may require operate without placing a human pilot UAS while concurrently investing in assembly; however, they do not require at risk. But the lack of a human pilot domestic sourcing programs.36 During training to operate or any support also lowers the risk of a state using force its incursion into Crimea and Eastern infrastructure. Midsize military and com- against a drone during an incursion. Ukraine in 2014—the latter instance mercial drones are generally unavailable Recent examples of this dynamic oc- widely believed to be the first in which because of their cost and infrastructure curred in 2014 when Turkey shot down every belligerent used drones to pro- requirements. However, these systems are a suspected Russian UAS, and in 2015 duce decisive battlefield results—Russia often sold or transferred by states to for- when Syria reportedly shot down a U.S. and its proxies used tactical drones to eign militaries and nonstate actors. Large Predator, neither of which resulted in provide ISR targeting information for military-specific UAS include reconnais- escalation or retaliation.27 For nonstate supporting artillery units. The near sance and armed variants and are rarely actors, drones may provide a military ca- real-time intelligence from these small operated by actors other than major mil- pability they otherwise would not have.28 platforms improved target location accu- itaries because of the systems’ costs and For instance, Russian-backed Ukrainian racy, counterfire response times, and fire infrastructure requirements. Stealth com- separatists have used drones to spot artil- mission lethality,37 and in one instance bat drones contain highly sophisticated lery strikes.29 Another example occurred in July 2014, Russia used this technique technologies such as jamming resistance in 2016 and 2017, when IS launched air to destroy four Ukrainian army brigades and low observability and are only ac- attacks against Iraqi troops using small preparing to conduct a cross-border cessible to those states that produce the armed drones.30 attack against Russian-backed separatists’ systems. Currently, the United States is The level of tactical and operational lines of supply.38 the only known operator of stealth UAS; risk to U.S. ground forces has increased Whereas Russia demonstrates inno- however, several countries are developing dramatically, as more than 23 countries, vation in drone tactics, Iran displays an stealth combat drones.24 including Russia, China, Iran, and North inclination toward technical innovation. Patterns of Use. Drones are becom- Korea, are known to possess or in the Iran started its drone program decades ing more sophisticated and capable of process of developing armed drone ago during its conflict with Iraq, and it conducting surveillance to lethal attacks, capabilities.31 The list of hostile nonstate is now one of the most developed in the either as a delivery system or as an inex- actors with drone capabilities is also rap- Middle East.39 Iran has also demonstrated pensive precision-guided weapon. The idly growing and now includes terrorist its willingness to share advanced drone ongoing pursuit and development of organizations such as IS, Hizballah, technology with others throughout the artificial intelligence and swarming ability and Hamas and insurgent groups such region. It reportedly flew drones such suggest a future where numerous small as Houthi rebels in Yemen.32 In Africa, as the Shahed-129 over Iraq and Syria, and inexpensive systems might be used Boko Haram recently started employing exported drone technology to Hizballah to achieve localized overmatch against armed drones in cross-border attacks on and Hamas, and may have provided an as- a more capable force such as the U.S. Nigeria and Cameroon.33 Lastly, given al sortment of drones to Houthis in Yemen Army.25 The proliferation, sophistication, Shabaab’s ties with Hizballah, it is likely and shared advanced drone technology and weaponization of commercially avail- only a matter of time before the group with Russia.40 The U.S. military has also able UAS mean that any state or nonstate begins using drones in support of its ter- engaged and destroyed two Iranian-made actor will have access to this technology ror operations.34 drones in Syria that conducted an attack and will likely employ it in novel ways. Russia, China, and Iran have armed against U.S. ground forces. Incidents Moreover, the use of drones may be drone capabilities, and these states have such as these highlight that Iran is con- strategically ambiguous because the inter- demonstrated operational innovation in tinuing to expand its drone programs national perception of the use of UAS in the employment of small tactical drones. and is willing to employ drones as an crises or conflicts is quite different than The behavior of these states in recent asymmetric counter to U.S. military the use of traditionally piloted aircraft in conflicts highlights how the use of drones superiority. Iranian drones have been re- similar circumstances.26 increases the complexity of modern con- ported in locations from Pakistan to Syria Wider use of drones may reshape flict, the effects of operational innovations and throughout the Persian Gulf region. military operational concepts and how and proliferation, and how a near-peer They have also become the centerpiece of states engage in conflict. The strategic competitor might seek to exploit current Iranian technology exhibits used to show- ambiguity inherent in these systems U.S. military vulnerabilities. Together, case their advanced security capabilities increases the military options available to Russia, China, and Iran’s behaviors and despite rigorous international sanctions.41 an actor, particularly in gray zone conflict capabilities highlight what the U.S. Army The extent of China’s UAS develop- or similar contested environments where must expect from adversaries in every ment in support of its military remains multiple parties might claim control over region of potential conflict.35 unclear to Western military analysts and
6 Forum / Developing a Counter-UAS Strategy JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Soldiers from 7th Air Defense Artillery Regiment engage targets with Patriot missile systems at NATO Missile Firing Installation at Chania, Greece, during German-led multinational air defense exercise Artemis Strike, November 2017 (U.S. Army/Jason Epperson)
senior leaders; however, there is evidence actors reveals how quickly and relatively propaganda, armed strike missions, and that China’s efforts are a real cause for easily these groups can disrupt advanced kamikaze-type attacks.47 The Russian concern. Some experts believe that the industrial militaries. Drones are attractive ministry of defense recently reported that Chinese military’s drone efforts focus to these groups because of “the way they in January 2018, its forces in western on swarming technology, increased carry [destructive] power and the dis- Syria experienced an attack by a “swarm payload and operational range, and the tance from which they allow an adversary of home-made drones.” According to the incorporation of artificial intelligence. to control its delivery.”44 Small commer- ministry, Russian forces at Khmeimim In a congressionally mandated report, cially available drones give groups such as Air Base and Tartus naval facility faced analysts noted that the number and IS the ability to field an air force capable a complex attack by 13 drones armed types of China’s domestically developed of collecting ISR and providing limited with small-diameter bombs that caused unmanned aerial vehicles continue to close air support. The evolution of non- casualties and damaged facilities.48 These expand, with five new platforms displayed state actors’ use of small drones began types of swarm-like attacks are particularly at the 2016 Zhuhai airshow.42 China in 2004 when Hizballah used drones to threatening because existing kinetic de- also appears to be betting that swarms challenge the Israeli military.45 Drone use fenses struggle to cope with the agility of of low-tech drones linked with high- by nonstate groups continues to evolve small drones, and swarming would over- tech artificial intelligence will become and demonstrates the ability to conduct whelm most existing countermeasures.49 the weapon of choice in future conflicts complex attacks. For instance, during the and capable of countering any military year-long fight to recapture Mosul, Iraqi Recommendations for force, including that of the United States. security forces faced persistent armed Countering the Threat China’s level of effort in developing UAS drone attacks that slowed their efforts U.S. policy must not only respond to suggests the importance and relevance it to liberate IS-held neighborhoods.46 Of today’s problems, but it should also perceives the technology holds for poten- concern is the increasingly complex and be flexible enough to adapt to tomor- tial future conflict.43 disruptive ways in which nonstate actors row’s challenges. A comprehensive Besides the activities of rival states, the use tactical drones. Hizballah uses these counter-UAS strategy must address the recent employment of drones by nonstate systems for surveillance, manufacturing different nature of threats presented by
JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Guelfi, Jayamaha, and Robison 7 the various types of UAS. It must also then–commanding general of the U.S. means along these three lines of effort to provide solutions for confronting the Army Training and Doctrine Command, regain operational initiative. Along the full scope of UAS challenges by poten- General David Perkins, told an audience, Soldier line of effort, the Army must re- tial state and nonstate adversaries. The “If I’m the enemy, I’m thinking, ‘Hey, train its troops to compete, fight, and win U.S. Army’s current counter-UAS strat- I’m just going to get on eBay and buy as in a drone-saturated environment and to egy does not do this. The discussion many of these $300 quadcopters as I can win in the counter-reconnaissance fight herein shows that U.S. adversaries are and expend all the Patriot missiles out while restructuring its formations to meet learning and adapting, but the Army is there.’”54 If the Patriot and Stinger mis- the added demands of counter-drone re- failing to keep pace. Russia’s operational siles—which cost $3 million and $38,000 quirements. Along the materiel solutions employment of drones in Ukraine, each, respectively—remain the primary line, the Army must continue its reforms Iran’s proliferation of drone technolo- defense means for countering drones, it of an industrial age–acquisition process to gies, China’s emphasis on developing may be possible for an adversary to em- promote rapid, creative, and independent full-spectrum drone capabilities, and ploy tactics such as those IS used against technical solutions through public-private the evolution of drone use by nonstate Russia in Syria to deplete a theater-level partnerships with corporate partners. actors show that Army planners must air defense capacity that costs tens of mil- Lastly, the Army must explore existing anticipate extensive UAS employment in lions of dollars. This low-cost act would and emerging commercial technologies future conflicts. Changes in drone tech- make an entire area of operations vulnera- to identify counter-UAS measures it can nologies and evolving adversary doc- ble to subsequent air attack. rapidly field along with innovative soft- trines suggest that the Army must learn Though the U.S. Army has taken ware solutions compatible with existing from recent conflicts, as the Russians steps to improve its counter-UAS capabil- systems. If no such technologies exist, the did, and recognize that the changing ities, these actions have been insufficient. Army will have to spearhead the develop- character of warfare requires improved The Army recently began the process of ment of effective counter-UAS systems. acquisition processes and training to expanding the availability of short-range The newly created U.S. Army Futures effectively counter the UAS threat. air defense systems in the Active force by Command, whose mission is intended to During the global war on terror, the having its Materiel Command overhaul result in a more rapid acquisition process, Army made the deliberate decision based legacy Avenger systems previously set to can spearhead these efforts. Early success on budget priorities to emphasize long- be destroyed. Though a step in the right in this command along these lines might range air defense systems by significantly direction, reintroducing short-range air provide an opportunity for the Army to reducing and eliminating short-range defense systems will take time, during leap ahead in drone technology and in air defense systems. According to senior which maneuver forces will remain ways to counter the drone threat.57 leaders, this decision was a calculated vulnerable. The Army took additional The Army must place its primary risk taken when leaders believed that steps to mitigate this gap by training and emphasis on the Soldier line of effort, the current and future capabilities of the assigning Stinger teams to its maneuver since this is arguably the most important Air Force would defeat any aerial threat forces, along with developing Stinger in terms of near-term counter-UAS and maintain air superiority.50 As the upgrades to improve their effectiveness effectiveness. This requires redeveloping assumptions underlying this decision have against tactical drones.55 However, this is atrophied air defense warfighting skills been proved invalid, the elimination of a solution that has already been proved necessary in a contested drone envi- short-range air defense systems means the ineffective. When the Army made a sim- ronment. Capability and training in air Army now relies on aging antiaircraft and ilar attempt to integrate Stinger teams in defense skills declined during decades missile intercept systems to counter every the 1990s, senior defense officials noted operating in uncontested airspace and UAS threat.51 Given the proliferation of that the result “was not great, as we counterinsurgency operations. The Army tactical drones, the use of advanced air found that 80 percent, if not more, of all previously trained Soldiers in the fieldcraft and missile defense systems is inappropri- Stinger shots taken by maneuver Soldiers, necessary to conduct active and passive ate due to cost, system availability, and an were done in a revenge fashion, after the air defense. Active measures include tasks inability to defeat slow, low-flying drones. enemy had already destroyed most of the involving the detection and engagement Recently, the Israel Defense Forces formation.”56 As the drone threat contin- of enemy aircraft; passive defense mea- employed their U.S.-made Patriot mis- ues to evolve, so too must the solutions sures include skills related to camouflage, siles against a single small drone from used to counter the threat. concealment, position hardening, disper- Syria that violated Israeli airspace. The The current drone threat is far too sion, and mobility to guard against air Israelis used multiple $3 million PAC-2 complex for a single solution to solve. A attack.58 To its credit, the Army is starting missiles but failed to destroy the target.52 U.S. Army counter-UAS strategy must to reintroduce training related to these This incident highlights the unsustainable provide a framework for a persistent skillsets.59 cost and technical difficulty of employ- and comprehensive approach that links Reintroducing and strictly enforc- ing limited theater-level air defense Soldier, materiel, and software solutions. ing standards of the passive defense assets against tactical drones.53 In 2017, The Army must creatively employ all is a low-cost and rapid solution to
8 Forum / Developing a Counter-UAS Strategy JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Explosive ordnance disposal technician flies DJI Mavic Pro Drone while forward deployed in Middle East, May 2017 (U.S. Marine Corps/Shellie Hall) immediately counter enemy drone must actively engage the threat while collaborating with major manufacturers, threats. If Ukrainian forces at breaking contact to ensure its survival. including foreign manufacturers, will Zelenopillya in July 2014 had imple- The kinetic options to engage an enemy offer the Army insights on the direction mented passive air defense measures, the UAS once detected vary from the simple of system change and potential threats. results of the Russian attack likely would to the complex, but what has proved most This early understanding will provide have been much less severe. The Army effective to date often merges both the time for the Army to develop appropriate should invest in home-station training traditional kinetic and emerging nonki- responses before adversaries employ kits of commercial drone systems like netic options to achieve a layering of joint the systems on the battlefield. As the it did following the emergence of the effect against the UAS platform. It is with Under Secretary of the Army recently improvised explosive device threat in the this approach that all following sugges- announced regarding the creation of battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. Once tions should be considered. No single line Army Futures Command, “We have the Army realized the magnitude of the of effort will be enough to defeat or even to get more agile in how we work with threat posed by these devices, it quickly suppress this threat alone. It will require both of those key constituencies or integrated methods designed to train the layering of all of these efforts for the communities.” He also noted that the deploying units in how to counter and U.S. Army and the joint force to achieve a “entire Department of Defense really defeat the threat. The Service also tested desirable outcome in this new counter-re- divested a lot of its systems engineering preparedness during culminating training connaissance fight. talent back in the 1990s and it’s been a events at its three combat centers. The The blurred distinction between com- challenge for the department for weapon same approach must be applied to count- mercial and military drone production systems development because of not er-UAS training. makes it necessary for the Army to study having that organic capability inside the The arrival and detection of any enemy and understand the future potential of department.”60 UAS can no longer be considered a mere these systems by working with commer- Army Futures Command is the ideal inconvenience to the detected formation cial industry partners. Given the current organization to implement the search for but immediately elevated to the com- reliance of nonstate actors on the com- and development of materiel solutions to mander’s attention, as that origination mercial development of this technology, counter drones. The Army must ensure
JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Guelfi, Jayamaha, and Robison 9 Tim Giles pilots drone during ThunderDrone Tech Expo at SOFWERX in Tampa, Florida, September 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Barry Loo) that the command is properly manned increased battery performance, and software within the existing structure of and given the necessary authorizations to location technologies. Currently, there Army brigade combat team systems. The become an institution that can reform an remain few commercial drones that can first step in formulating these solutions acquisition system that has become unable fly without the aid of a user-directed path, will require developing software for ex- to keep pace with modern technological but this technology is quickly emerging isting systems that enable detecting and change. The U.S. Special Operations along with the application of commer- tracking drones. Current air tracking sys- Command’s relationship with SOFWERX cial artificial intelligence. Advances in tems are already capable of tracking larger provides a model for what larger scale location technologies will also present a operational drones, so the focus must Army materiel collaboration might look significant challenge to the military. The be on smaller tactical UAS, which have like. SOFWERX is a public-private tech- stated goal of companies working in this smaller radar cross sections due to their nology incubator that has recently been area is to build systems that can identify small infrared and electromagnetic signa- preparing to host a series of drone compe- their location without the aid of GPS.62 tures. Therefore, the Army must invest titions to explore how these systems and Combining all the above technological in software for current and future sensors equipment might benefit the command.61 advancements into a single commercial that can better detect tactical drones. The This public-private model would benefit platform—and there is little reason to uncertain budget environment makes the the larger conventional Army and provide suspect that will not happen—will provide acquisition of new radar systems unlikely, a venue to not only discover how drones a potential adversary a commercial version and previous acquisition failures suggest might benefit the Service but also devise of the most advanced military drones in that the Army should not invest limited ways to counter them. the world. The Army must work with in- funds in a specialized counter-drone radar. While global reach on commercial dustry partners that could provide it with Instead, it must develop better software drone systems is still an emerging tech- forewarning of when this may occur and for existing radars like the AN/MPQ-64 nology, the areas that will have significant perhaps influence the timing. Sentinel and AN/TPQ-53 radar systems. impacts on a commercial-to-military The final line of effort for developing The latter system was originally designed crossover remain steadily focused on a counter-UAS strategy is to link Soldier to track rocket, artillery, and mortar improvements in autonomous flight, and materiel solutions with systems rounds, but the Army is testing its ability
10 Forum / Developing a Counter-UAS Strategy JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 to track drones. One advantage that bilities Integration Center, 2016), 5. Notes 14 More information on the DJI Mavic can modern radars have is active electronically be found at Web site of SZ DJI Technology 63 scanned arrays. Radars with this feature 1 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Ex- Co., Ltd., available at
JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Guelfi, Jayamaha, and Robison 11 available at 12 Forum / Developing a Counter-UAS Strategy JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Airman secures Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missiles on flatbed truck at munitions storage area on Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, October 2019, as part of U.S. Strategic Command’s exercise Global Thunder 20 (U.S. Air Force/Christina Bennett) oday, America’s adversaries are The Challenge of building antiaccess/area-denial T (A2/AD) zones to keep the U.S. military out of key strategic regions. A2/AD is a series of sensors; antiship, Dis-Integrating antiaircraft, and ground defenses; and long-range fires utilized by U.S. com- petitors and designed to prevent the A2/AD Zone United States from entering into a close fight.1 We see Chinese A2/AD zones set up to deny U.S. access to Taiwan How Emerging Technologies and the South China Sea. Russia uses A2/AD zones in Kaliningrad, Crimea, Are Shifting the Balance the Kola Peninsula, and the Kuril Islands to block key maritime avenues of approach. In the past, the weakness Back to the Defense of these zones were the command and control nodes, which formed a By Alex Vershinin Lieutenant Colonel Alex Vershinin, USA, is Director of Technical Integration at the Army Futures Command Studies Group. JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Vershinin 13 single point of failure. Utilizing pre- Warning and Control System (AWACS), of these nodes will rapidly dis-integrate cision-guided technology, the United consisting of powerful radars mounted the enemy’s A2/AD defense. The missile States would wage a short, inexpensive on large passenger planes, unmanned launchers will still be there, but they will decapitation campaign aimed at these aerial vehicles, and space assets. The not be able to engage without warning nodes. Their destruction would break augmenting assets are expensive and and targeting data telling them where to up integration of enemy defenses, also available only in small numbers. This shoot. So far, the balance is in favor of the called dis-integration. For decades, the makes them early high-value targets, offense. offense-defense balance was firmly on unlikely to survive prolonged conflict. the offense. Emerging technologies Within a month of conflict, the United Next 10 Years: Advantage in the fields of network, artificial States would destroy most of them, Defense (Adversary) intelligence, and space are shifting forcing the defender to rely on his Emerging technologies are chang- the balance back to defense, making primary systems for early warning and ing this 10-year prediction. One key these zones more dangerous. At the targeting. technology is the miniaturization of same time, the United States may have For the U.S. military, the main strike cameras and satellites. New microsat- overestimated the effects of long-range capability has always been land- and ellites are cheap, small, and effective. strike capabilities after three decades of sea-based airpower. U.S. adversaries’ A single rocket can deliver 80 small fighting nonpeer competitors. Unable solutions were ground-based air defense. photo reconnaissance satellites into to fight a short decapitation campaign, These air defenses are relying on ground- orbit.3 This technology has allowed the the United States may be forced into a based search radar to identify incoming U.S. firm Planet to photograph any prolonged attrition campaign, at unac- strikes and attack radar, which paints the corner of the Earth with one of its 200 ceptable political costs. targets for the defending missile. The satellites, updating images every day search radar has numerous weaknesses. with 2-meter resolution.4 The defender What Is A2/AD? It is stationary; thus, its coverage is lim- does not need to cover all the Earth; he A2/AD zones are composed of intel- ited and can be bypassed. Once turned just needs to cover the conflict zone. ligence, surveillance, reconnaissance on, electronic warfare (EW) aircraft can He can accomplish this by seeding the (ISR), and defensive and offensive strike identify its location and destroy it with orbit over the conflict zone with 300 to systems. ISR systems are utilized to spot standoff antiradiation missiles that home 500 microsatellites, especially if these incoming threats for engagement by in on radar emissions. Historically, an satellites are able to generate imagery defensive strike systems. Offensive strike attacking air force can suppress air de- of 1-meter resolution and transmit data systems attack enemy bases, logistics, fenses after a month-long air campaign.2 every 5 to 10 minutes. This satellite and command and control (C2) infra- Ground search radars can be augmented constellation will have complete photo structure seeking to delay the buildup with AWACS. These aircraft are more coverage of the battlespace and be able of U.S. forces. Adding to the effective- survivable than ground-based radars due to spot any aircraft or ship coming into ness of the A2/AD zones are the decoy to their mobility, but the introduction of the conflict zone. This system is even and deception operations that favor long-range and very long-range air-to-air more dangerous because antisatellite ground-based defenders and increase missiles, together with low observable weaponry is extremely expensive. For the defender’s survivability. Combina- aircraft, are rapidly negating the effects of example, both antiballistic and anti- tions of these techniques with emerging AWACS, retaining advantage for offense. satellite (Standard Missile 3, or SM-3) technologies are making defense the Reliance on ground-based search missiles cost between $15 and $18 stronger form of warfare for the foresee- radar forces the defender to centralize million each. To make matters worse, able future. The key strategic objective the C2 structure. Passing targeting data in 2018 the Department of Defense of the defender is not to defeat the between batteries requires a single central planned to buy only 40 of them.5 There United States in battle, but to increase control node. This weakness is exacer- may simply not be enough antisatellite the costs to the United States until the bated by the effectiveness of suppression missiles to destroy an enemy constella- potential political gain is outweighed by of enemy air defense missions using anti- tion. There are direct energy weapons the loss. radiation missiles. Unable to continuously coming online, and the Russians emit, defenders must rely on rolling emis- recently claimed to have operationalized Current: Advantage sions by several radars to gain a picture of one.6 Yet even those systems are few in Offense (United States) their airspace. It is a process where several number and may not be able to attrit Traditionally, the defender has relied radars cover the same area and turn on a satellite constellation faster than the on combinations of ground-based and off for short durations before mov- enemy can reseed it. In short, this con- radars, human intelligence, and ground ing. Only a centralized headquarters can stellation may be extremely survivable reconnaissance to gain an operational coordinate that effort and tie it in with to the point where an attacker might picture. Wealthier states could afford to defending fighters. This gives the attacker not be able to neutralize it due to the augment these sensors with an Airborne few key nodes for targeting. Destruction large number of targets. 14 Forum / The Challenge of Dis-Integrating A2/AD Zone JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Space-based ISR will be augmented by aerostats. These are high-altitude balloons or blimps. They can maintain a position at 70,000 feet above sea level and have visual coverage of up to 775 miles.7 Aerostats vary in cost but are far cheaper than interceptor missiles and can be easily replaced. Functionally, they are like microsatellites—a cheap and resilient, wide-area ISR system. More powerful high-speed computers allow algorithms to rapidly process thou- sands of surveillance images, identifying incoming aircraft or ships based on pre- programmed image recognition. It also allows prediction of trajectories based on several images collected with the ability to pass that data across the battle network. The United States has been working on a similar capability in Project Maven.8 This data will not be enough for targeting, but it will generate an early warning system robust enough to replace ground-based radar systems without any of their weak- nesses. As computers get smaller, they can be mounted on the microsatellite. This allows data processing to be done in space and only targeting data to be passed across the network. This reduces the bandwidth requirements and speeds up the time to identify targets. Instead of updating target location every 5 minutes, it can be done every minute, resulting in greatly increased effectiveness of early warning systems. Where an attacker can gain an ad- vantage is in the defender’s logistics. Once enemy air defense artillery fires, it requires resupply. An attacker can use the same space-based ISR combined with high-speed computing power to develop algorithms to track resupply vehicles traveling to locations from which Standard Missile-3 Block 1B interceptor missile launches from USS Lake Erie during Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Navy test in mid-Pacific, May 2013 (U.S. Navy) missile launches have been detected. This method will give the attacker a general the emissions of attackers in real time and secure. Quantum computing tech- idea where the enemy defenses are; and determine which targets are real and nology introduces communications that unfortunately, the defender must start which are decoys. It can rapidly identify are long range, difficult to locate, and shooting before it can be utilized. incoming threats that generate emissions nearly impossible to break into.10 This Another defensive advantage is elec- that may have been missed by other network allows data to be rapidly passed tronic warfare. The increased bandwidth systems. Russia has this capability in its between early warning satellites and and processing power of computers Moskva-1 system.9 ground-based defense systems. In addi- allow U.S. adversaries to network their Underpinning the enemy system is tion, the defender owns terrain and will electronic reconnaissance. By networking the network. For any data to be relevant, have time to lay fiber cable between his all his EW reconnaissance assets with an- it must be easily passed from one system battle positions, reducing emissions and alytical systems, the defender can analyze to another. The network must be robust defending its network against jamming. JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Vershinin 15 It will be difficult to isolate specific por- Survivability at six buildings. The second strike was tions of the battlefield. We know that our The next key topic is the survivability purely political in nature and is harder to adversaries are looking to develop such of adversary A2/AD systems. There assess for weapon effectiveness. There are networks and technologies, and it is only are two issues. The first is the effects indications that some of the incoming a matter of time before they succeed.11 that munitions have on targets and missiles (Tomahawks and SCALPs) were the number of strikes needed to fully intercepted. The Russian government has How the New ISR neutralize enemy defenses. The second presented missile remnants showing clear Comes Together is the increased effectiveness of modern damage from air defense artillery (ADA) The defender will retain ground-based decoys and camouflage. fragmentation impacts.16 In addition, search radars but keep them off and rely there is video evidence from Damascus on satellites and aerostats to provide Decreasing Effects of showing incoming missiles intercepted by early warning and to cue attack radars. Long-Range Fires defensive missiles.17 Without emissions by the ground-based The most common long-range fire At sea, the situation has been even radars, the attacker will be unable to systems employed by U.S. forces are more difficult. An attacker’s surface locate enemy antiaircraft and antiship Tomahawks and Joint Air-to-Surface ships entering A2/AD zones are vul- missile batteries before they fire. The Standoff Missile–Extended Range nerable to antiship missiles, especially ground search radars will only be acti- (JASSM-ER) long-range missiles. Their new hypersonic systems such as the vated if the network fails, giving the key advantages are their long range Chinese DF-26 and Russian Zircons. A2/AD complex redundancy should (over 1,000 kilometers), precision, and Even submarine launches are becoming a it be temporarily dis-integrated. Neu- the absence of danger to human pilots. challenge as defending diesel submarines tralizing them will become far more They can be delivered by aircraft, sub- are becoming quieter and increasing their time-consuming and costly in terms of marines, and surface ships. In the past, submerged time thanks to independent munitions expended and aircraft lost. these weapons were fired early in a con- air propulsion. During an April 2018 The penetration of a robust A2/AD flict to destroy search radars, degrade North Atlantic Treaty Organization system requires the attacker to converge airbases, and neutralize key nodes in an (NATO) missile strike, a state-of-the-art complementary capabilities from multi- enemy’s A2/AD system. The effective- British Astute-class nuclear submarine ple units and services. The challenge is ness of these weapons may be overesti- was located and harassed by a pair of the amount of time needed to plan such mated because we have fought nonpeer Russian Kilo-class diesel submarines. It a deliberate operation and the availabil- enemies. During the conflict in Syria, is suspected that it failed to participate in ity of key capabilities. If any capability the United States employed massive the attack because of the harassment.18 such as EW aircraft is not available, then cruise missile strikes on two occasions; The combination of antiship missiles and the entire mission must be canceled. in both cases, the damage inflicted was cheap diesel submarines can be used to The digital network that passes data in no way proportional to the amount keep attacker’s ships away from an A2/ directly from satellite and aerostat early of munitions used. AD zone. It is possible that in the future, warning systems to the ground-based During the strike on Shayrat Airbase aircraft will be the only means of reliably shooters allows the defender to decentral- on April 7, 2017, the United States launching cruise missiles. ize command and control. Data carried fired 59 missiles. Satellite imagery shows The number of missiles required to across the network is generated by each only 44 targets hit, although some may destroy a target is another issue, and reconnaissance node and is seen by all have been hit twice.13 It is possible that there may not be enough missiles in shooting nodes. For example, when a Russian jamming may have diverted U.S. inventories. Official reports indicate satellite constellation picks up a target, some missiles off target, although there that approximately 100 to 150 missiles it automatically puts the data out on the is no way to be certain without access to are purchased every year.19 Quick math network so that every shooting battery classified information. Russia’s Krasukha, shows that missiles introduced in 1983 sees it without headquarters in the loop. an electronic warfare jamming system, would result in 4,500 missiles in stock, Even fighter aircraft can operate inde- was reported in the area at the time of at 125 missiles purchased for 36 years. pendently based on priorities published the strike.14 Regardless, the airbase was About 2,000 have been expended in prior to conflict. This system removes launching airstrikes less than 24 hours combat.20 That leaves an inventory of headquarters as a single point of failure after the attack.15 While the base was 2,500. At 100 missiles per major target, in a defender’s A2/AD zone, making warned an hour ahead of the strike, it was the U.S. stockpile is empty after 25 tar- the task of dis-integrating more challeng- not equipped or postured to endure a gets. Even then, the damage is rapidly ing. A recent speech by General Valery conventional precision strike. repairable as the Shayrat Airbase strike Gerasimov, chief of the Russian general The second strike took place on demonstrated. Once the stockpile is staff, indicates that this is the direction April 14, 2018. A combination of 109 depleted, the United States will be reliant Russia is planning to go.12 JASSM-ERs, Tomahawks, and SCALPs on replacing hundreds of Tomahawks (a European cruise missile) was fired and JASSM-ERs a year. As enemy EW 16 Forum / The Challenge of Dis-Integrating A2/AD Zone JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 and ADA continue to improve, the re- quired expenditure of missiles per target will only go up. Traditionally, the United States could rely on its industrial base to ramp up prior to conflict. This may not be possible. A recent report by an interagency task force points to a decline in U.S. industrial bases’ potential. A decrease of skilled labor, combined with foreign parts in the supply chains, suggest that the United States may not be able to ramp up production prior to conflict. Instead, America may suffer temporary disruption of production.21 Once standoff weapons are expended, the attacker will be forced to rely on manned aircraft to penetrate the A2/ AD zone. This will immediately drive up the cost—in lives, aircraft, finances, and political capital for the attacker. Manned USS Monterey fires Tomahawk land attack missile in U.S. Fifth Fleet area of operations, April 2018 aircraft can generate far more strikes (U.S. Navy/Matthew Daniels) but are vulnerable to the same ADA as a cruise missile. In addition, there is a key takeaway from that battle is that most NATO infrastructure and prevent use of human factor. Faced with incoming fire, damage inflicted on an A2/AD zone is NATO airbases in range of Russian A2/ pilots may choose to drop their muni- temporary and will be repaired given even AD zones. This is highly unlikely. Russian tions and abort. Cruise missiles will press a short respite.22 missiles are newer, and the country has on, no matter the odds. Defenders can use many of the same not had time to build large stockpiles. As A2/AD zones are able to soak up techniques today. Dispersing aircraft noted above, it takes almost 100 missiles tremendous amounts of conventional across multiple airfields, always keeping to close an airfield to operations, and the fire power without long-term effects, a combat air patrol airborne, and using effect is only temporary. The U.S. Air especially those of near-peer competitors highway segments as runways can serve Force adaptive bases concept adds to re- whose industrial base will replace losses to make fixed-wing aircraft more surviv- silience by further spreading out aviation and restore the effectiveness of A2/AD able and allow them to enhance the A2/ assets and increasing the Russian target zones after repeated strikes. AD zone. Strikes at airbases work only if list. The Russians are far more likely to One of the best examples of A2/ aircraft are on the ground. This system’s concentrate their limited missile inven- AD zone resilience is the Siege of Malta, point of failure is sustainment. Using tory on key targets such as C2 nodes and which took place from June 1940 to highway segments increases survivability, logistic support areas, including forward November 1942. The island, sitting in but someone must fuel, rearm, and then fuel storage facilities. the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, park the aircraft. Maintenance is a major was able to conduct air and sea denial issue, especially for fifth-generation air- Decoys and Deception against Axis shipping for the duration craft. During Operation Desert Storm, The capacity of the defense is further of the North African campaign. Despite U.S. F-15s and F-16s generated one increased by decoys and deception committing over 2,000 aircraft during sortie a day. In 2018, F-35s generated countermeasures. These can work both the campaign, German and Italian forces only 0.33 sorties per day while flying ways but usually favor the defender. failed to neutralize the island for any from USS Essex against the Taliban.23 Decoys are used to absorb fire power length of time. When the battle was over, Providing maintenance assets at dis- and divert from real targets. Attackers Malta-based forces had sunk 23 percent persed locations requires considerable can use decoys to mislead a defender of total European Axis shipping. The key coordination. Although both sides have and overwhelm the ADA with targets, to the island’s defenses was heavy ADA, to contend with long-range fires, the but with aircraft being the main striking distribution of aircraft across numerous defender has the advantage because he platform, this becomes more difficult. small airfields, and a constant air patrol. had years to plan and rehearse dispersed In theory, airborne decoys are possible, Logistics were distributed across numer- operations on familiar terrain. but they must fool radar, EW, and the ous small caches rather than one large It is important to note that munition visible spectrum from space-borne ISR supply point. The airfields were rapidly effects cut both ways. There is an assump- assets, all while maneuvering at Mach 2. repaired and put back into action. The tion that Russian missiles will destroy The price tag of this decoy will rapidly JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Vershinin 17 approach the cost of an actual combat minor shrapnel damage, and incorporate penetration of the A2/AD zone is aircraft. Ground systems are much easier radar-reflective coating.27 It is suspected possible. A strike package would consist to hide using underpasses and vegeta- that a battery-powered heater can be of EW protection and attack aircraft to tion, while ground decoys are cheaper used to generate a heat signature. It ap- jam radars and incoming missiles, cyber since they can be stationary. The pears that this technology was tested in attack to disrupt the enemy network, and defender has a major advantage when Syria with satisfactory effects.28 The reg- ground- and sea-based long-range fires it comes to camouflage and deception iment not only hides formations; it can to disrupt enemy ADA and airbases, all operations. also disguise an installation and build a timed to allow strike aircraft to penetrate During the 1999 conflict in Kosovo, fake airfield in 24 hours.29 In addition to the A2/AD zone. A defender’s deception the Serbian army made extensive use setting up decoys and disguising physical operations and the survivability of his of decoys to absorb NATO airstrikes. targets, the formation has capabilities formations will degrade the effects that According to one report filed by the to simulate radio and radar emissions the penetrating strike force has, while U.S. Air Force Munitions Effectiveness for full-spectrum deception operations. attacking platforms are engaged by state- Assessment Team, 90 percent of reported When combined with constant shifting of-the-art air defenses. The attacker will hits were on decoys. In an extreme case, of forces around the battlefield such as penetrate the A2/AD zone and destroy the Serbs even managed to protect a moving aircraft between airfields and targets but at much higher cost and in- bridge by constructing a decoy 300 patches of highways, these tools can be creased duration of the conflict. meters downriver. The decoy bridge was highly effective. designed to be seen from the air and was Systems deployed by formations such Conclusion struck multiple times by NATO aircraft.24 as the 45th regiment are not capable of Attempts to penetrate an A2/AD zone The spoofing did not end in visual range. complete deception, especially against of a near-peer competitor are possible, Serbian air defenses also used extensive higher end space platforms, but they do but at high cost and over a prolonged radar decoys to divert NATO suppression not have to be. They are designed to conflict. By utilizing space- and aero- of enemy air defense missions away from defeat tactical-level collection platforms stat-based ISR, a defender gains a nearly actual radars. Serbian Colonel Zoltán such as the microsatellite ISR described indestructible early warning system. It Dani, commander of the 250th Air earlier. The problem with national-level can protect his ground-based search Defense Missile Brigade, used old radar collection platforms is that there are few radars while maintaining situational sets pulled from obsolete fighters to of them and they are tasked to support awareness. EW reconnaissance systems divert NATO strikes away from search national- and strategic-level targets, not and high-power computers can distin- and attack radars. During the war, his tactical operations. The small number guish decoys from real aircraft. This brigade was engaged more than 20 leaves them vulnerable to enemy antisat- degrades the attacker’s situational times with NATO antiradiation missiles ellite systems. awareness because the defending battery without any effect. The decoys absorbed Another technique is to make all no longer emits until it is ready to all the damage. Using such innovative systems look alike. The proliferation of engage real targets. The real defenses techniques, his brigade was credited standardized containers for international are camouflaged, and realistic decoys are with shooting down two NATO aircraft, shipping is making the camouflage of set up to draw fire away from defensive including a stealth F-117, and damaging weaponry even easier. Recently, both systems. The attacker is then engaged another.25 Russia and China have introduced anti- from unexpected locations by modern The lessons of the Kosovo War were ship missile launchers that are disguised air defenses, including long-range not lost on our adversaries; the Russian as containers.30 Northrop Grumman has surface-to-air missiles and fixed-wing army has institutionalized Serbian also investigated this technology.31 As fighter aircraft. techniques. While Serbian weaponry space-based ISR becomes more resilient The defenders will fight in a de- was a quarter-century behind, the and robust, we can expect all vehicles centralized manner. Also, a defender’s state-of-the-art A2/AD zones in Russia to start looking the same. The attackers higher headquarters will allocate ADA and China are equipped with modern will have no way of knowing if the ob- and antiship assets and allow them to systems. To provide concealment and served truck is carrying a deadly antiship fight on their own with direct access deception, the Russian army has cre- missile or hauling humanitarian supplies to early warning networks. The higher ated the 45th Engineer-Camouflage to a refugee camp. By making all targets headquarters will likely retain control of Regiment. This formation is tasked with look the same, the defender can degrade defending air assets and allocate targets camouflaging targets so they cannot be the effects of enemy fire power and pro- for their own long-range fires, but the found and creating dummy targets that tect his key defense systems. bulk of the fight will be in a decentralized divert an attacker’s fire power.26 The A defender’s techniques are not all manner. This will make dis-integrating Russians make extensive use of inflatable powerful and will not prevent an attack- enemy defenses difficult because C2 cen- decoys. Their dummy tanks can be er’s penetration of the A2/AD zone. ters will not affect the fight to the degree transported in two duffel bags, resist Once key U.S. systems are converged, seen in previous conflicts. Destroying the 18 Forum / The Challenge of Dis-Integrating A2/AD Zone JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 22 defender’s C2 nodes will degrade but not google-microworkers-maven-ai-train-penta- James Holland, Fortress Malta: An Island gon-pay-salary>. Under Siege, 1940–43 (New York: Hyperion, dis-integrate the defense. Furthermore, 9 Samuel Bendett, “America Is Getting 2003). the enemy will likely regenerate damaged Outclassed by Russian Electronic Warfare,” The 23 Jared Keller, “The Navy Says Its F-35C C2 nodes, while networked communica- National Interest, September 19, 2017, avail- Is Ready for a Fight. The Navy’s Own Data tions will continue to function unabated able at JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Vershinin 19 Soyuz-2.1b rocket lifts off from Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, together with 34 OneWeb communication satellites (Courtesy Roscosmos) Proliferated Commercial Satellite Constellations Implications for National Security By Matthew A. Hallex and Travis S. Cottom he falling costs of space launch Commercial space actors—from tiny of these endeavors will result in new and the increasing capabilities of startups to companies backed by bil- space-based services, including global T small satellites have enabled the lions of dollars of private investment— broadband Internet coverage broadcast emergence of radically new space archi- are pursuing these new architectures from orbit and high-revisit overhead tectures—proliferated constellations to disrupt traditional business models imagery of much of the Earth’s surface. made up of dozens, hundreds, or even for commercial Earth observation and The effects of proliferated con- thousands of satellites in low orbits. satellite communications. The success stellations will not be confined to the commercial sector. The exponential in- crease in the number of satellites on orbit Matthew A. Hallex is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Travis S. Cottom is will shape the future military operating a Research Associate at the Institute for Defense Analyses. environment in space. The increase in 20 Forum / Proliferated Commercial Satellite Constellations JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 the availability of satellite imagery and Table 1. Planned Proliferated Communications Constellations communications bandwidth on the open Satellite Operator Proposed Satellites Satellite Design Life (Years) market will also affect the operating environment in the ground, maritime, OneWeb > 2,000 7–10 and air domains, offering new capabilities SpaceX Starlink ~ 12,000 5–7 that can address hard problems facing Boeing > 3,000 10–15 the U.S. military, such as tracking mobile Telesat 292–512 10 targets, operating in the Arctic, or pro- Kepler Communications 140 10 viding resilient space support in the face LEOSat 84 10 of growing counterspace threats. These trends will also create new challenges as Sources: Tereza Pultarova and Caleb Henry, “OneWeb Weighing 2,000 More Satellites,” SpaceNews adversaries ranging from Great Power (February 24, 2017); Jon Brodkin, “FCC Tells SpaceX It Can Deploy Up to 11,943 Broadband Satellites,” Ars Technica (November 15, 2018); Grant R. Cates, Daniel X. Houston, Douglas G. Conley, and Karen competitors to hostile nonstate actors L. Jones, “Launch Uncertainty: Implications for Large Constellations,” The Aerospace Corporation, gain cheap access to space capabilities and November 2018, 2; Caleb Henry, “Telesat Says Ideal LEO Constellation Is 292 Satellites, but Could Be the emergence of space-based Internet 512,” SpaceNews (September 11, 2018). reshapes the cyber battlespace. This article discusses some of the proposed commercial proliferated con- gated Teledesic constellation and the competitive with terrestrial broadband stellations being developed in the United struggles of Iridium in the 1990s.2 communications. This will not only States and abroad and explores the poten- Growing global demand for infor- allow satellite communications to tial effects of proliferated constellations on mation services, the greater availability compete for long-distance backhaul the space, terrestrial, and cyber domains. of capital compared to previous eras of and mobile users but also address It identifies the multidomain challenges commercial satellite growth, the increas- underserved populations. Much of the and opportunities these trends create for ing affordability of access to space launch, developing world lacks access to ter- the warfighter and proposes steps that the and greater economies of scale in produc- restrial broadband infrastructure, and Department of Defense (DOD) and the ing small satellites, however, may make 57 percent of the global population broader national security community can proliferated constellations more viable does not have access to the Internet.3 take to prepare. commercial endeavors. The availability of Mega-constellations could allow the space-based broadband communications, developing world to skip laying costly Emerging Commercial for instance, will likely drive the growth fiber-optic cable in the same way the Proliferated Satellite of Internet-of-Things applications leading proliferation of cellular phone technol- Constellations to further demand for communications ogy provided communications without Commercial proliferated constellations services. Even if only a handful of prolif- the need to build phone lines in the will change how satellite communica- erated constellation efforts succeed, it will developing world. LEO-proliferated tions and Earth observation services are produce both a paradigm shift in how constellations will also be able to provided. Not all the projects detailed space services are provided and a substan- provide communications to high-lat- below will enter service. The total tial growth in the number of satellites on itude populations in Alaska, northern market for high bandwidth communi- orbit. Canada, Scandinavia, and Russia, which cations is estimated to reach 3 terabits are poorly served by terrestrial com- of data by 2024. If all the projected Communications munications infrastructure and outside proliferated communications constel- Satellites in geosynchronous orbit the coverage of GEO communications lations and other projected satellite (GEO) have traditionally provided satel- satellites.4 communications services become acces- lite communications where satellites can OneWeb and SpaceX are pursuing sible, 20 to 30 terabits will be available broadcast to large areas of the Earth. the most ambitious proposals for LEO by that year. The small satellite imagery These satellites have provided low data communications proliferated constella- market is expected to grow from its very rates and relatively high latency commu- tions (see table 1). OneWeb has raised small base, but government customers nications, good enough for niche appli- more than $1.7 billion in investments still dominate the demand for satellite cations but not competitive with fiber to build a first-generation constellation imagery.1 In addition to potential limits optics and other terrestrial alternatives of 648 satellites, expected to enter on demand, some industry experts for broadband communications. Prolif- commercial service by 2020, and plans have raised concerns about shortages erated communications constellations, to expand the constellation with 2,000 in investment capital necessary to com- often referred to as mega-constellations satellites in the future.5 Plans for SpaceX’s plete various competing efforts, and because of their size, are in low-Earth Starlink proliferated constellation are other critics have compared the current orbit (LEO) and aim to provide high even more ambitious. The first genera- era to the failures of the large, disaggre- bandwidth, low latency communications tion of Starlink is planned to consist of JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Hallex and Cottom 21 national security and other government Table 2. Planned Proliferated Earth Observation Constellations purposes.11 Satellite Operator Proposed Satellites Resolution The U.S. Government has been the Planet ~ 150 0.72m–5m largest and most stable customer for Spaceflight Industries 60 1m commercial satellite imagery, including Satellogic 300 1m resources from new imagery prolif- Hera Systems 48 .5m erated constellations. For instance, a significant share of Planet’s growth has UrtheCast 16 0.75m–22m been through multiple contracts with Capella Space 30 1-30m SAR the National Geospatial-Intelligence Canon > 100 1m Agency.12 Commercial Earth observa- DigitalGlobe 6 0.3m tion companies, however, are seeking to diversify their customer base and Sources: “Planet Imagery and Archive,” Planet.com; Jeff Foust, “Spaceflight Raises $150 Million for BlackSky Constellation,” Space News, March 13, 2018; Caleb Henry, “Satellogic on Its Way to Launching reach new markets—to rely less on 300 Satellite Constellation for Earth Observation,” Satellite Today, March 17, 2016; Bhavya Lal et U.S. Government spending and, con- al., Global Trends in Small Satellites (Washington, DC: IDA Science and Technology Institute, July sequently, to potentially reduce its sway 2017); “Sensor Technologies,” UrtheCast.com; Nobutada Sako, “Utilizing Commercial DSLR for High Resolution Earth Observation Satellite,” paper presented at the AIAA/USU Conference on Small over commercial actors. With lower Satellites, Logan, UT, August 2018, 1–3; “CE-SAT 1,” Space Flight 101; Stephen Clark, “DigitalGlobe prices and increasingly on-demand im- Books Two Launches with SpaceX for Earth-Imaging Fleet,” Spaceflight Now, March 28, 2018. agery services, proliferated constellation companies are trying to focus on new, nontraditional satellite imagery markets: more than 4,000 satellites, and SpaceX The most mature of the disaggregated industrial monitoring, agriculture, util- has secured U.S. Government approval Earth observation constellations are those ities, marine transportation analytics, for a final constellation of almost 12,000 operated by Planet and Spire Global. By insurance, resource management, busi- satellites.6 Other proliferated constellation the end of 2017, Planet operated a con- ness intelligence, and other data-driven, proposals have come from established stellation of 140 Dove imagery CubeSats, decisionmaking practices.13 This broader companies such as Boeing and Canada’s 5 RapidEye medium-resolution, and 13 range of services will help drive market Telesat, as well as smaller startups like higher resolution SkySat satellites that expansion, and the Institute for Defense Kepler Communications and LeoSat.7 can image Earth’s entire landmass daily.8 Analyses’ Science and Technology Policy While these are only nascent projects, In July 2018, Spire operated 61 of its Institute projects the overall commercial the potential for large quantities of Lemur satellites (out of a planned 125) small satellite imaging market will grow communications bandwidth entering that track the Automatic Identification from $15 million in 2015 to $164 mil- the market from LEO communications System (AIS) beacons of ships that collect lion in 2020.14 mega-constellations, as well as smaller weather data by monitoring the radio numbers of high-throughput GEO com- occupation of GPS signals.9 Foreign Proliferated munications satellites, have led traditional Traditional remote-sensing providers Constellation Efforts satellite communications providers to such as Digital Globe and other larger, Interest in proliferated constellations is delay purchasing new and replacement established companies including Canon, not confined to the United States and communications satellites that could the Japanese manufacturer of cameras Western commercial space actors—both struggle to compete in the future busi- and other imagery products, are planning China and Russia are pursuing their ness environment. disaggregated imagery constellations own proliferated constellation projects. (see table 2). Additional startup com- The development of foreign proliferated Earth Observation panies are also aiming to join the ranks constellations will allow not only their The Earth observation market has of the more mature Earth observation owners to access these capabilities, but already moved toward commercial constellations offering optical imagery, potentially access also to a wider range constellations of large numbers of small high-revisit, all weather, and nighttime of actors. Given China’s willingness satellites. While these constellations are Synthetic Aperture Radar,10 as well as to allow for commercial dealings with smaller than planned communications radio signal collection satellites that can countries hostile to the United States, mega-constellations, ranging from geolocate signals emissions—essentially these systems could pose a significant dozens to hundreds of satellites, this offering commercial electronic intel- threat to U.S. interests. disaggregation of commercial space ligence capabilities that can support The state-owned China Aerospace capability has increased access to Earth transportation and logistics, emergency Science and Technology Corporation observation capabilities useful for search and rescue, or spectrum mapping (CASC) is planning the 300-satellite national security applications. in addition to its existing applications for Hongyan LEO broadband communica- tions proliferated constellation, and the 22 Forum / Proliferated Commercial Satellite Constellations JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Airman with 707th Communications Squadron Special Missions Flight repairs connection on CubeSat, in Laurel, Maryland, January 2018 (U.S. Air Force/ Alexandre Montes) state-owned China Aerospace Science commercial space capability to bolster its the Russian civil and commercial space and Industry Corporation plans its own military and civil space systems as part programs in recent years, Russia is a less 156-satellite Xingyun communications of its policy of “civil-military fusion,” likely proliferated constellation competi- constellation. The first Hongyan satellite making militarily useful proliferated tor than China. was launched in late 2018, and CASC has constellations likely candidates for gov- established a factory in Tianjin capable of ernment support.16 Chinese proliferated Spillover Effects: producing 130 satellites a year. In 2015, constellations are also likely to be able to Satellite Manufacturing China launched the first of its Jilin com- rely on government financing and other and Space Launch mercial imagery satellites to complement support to offer services to emerging The emergence of proliferated con- the Gaofen civil imagery constellation. markets in Africa, Central Asia, and Latin stellations is reshaping other areas of The Jilin constellation is planned to reach America as part of China’s One Belt, One the commercial space world by driving 60 satellites by 2020 in order to provide Road development and trade initiative.17 expansion of satellite manufacturing global, 30-minute revisit rates, and then Russia also has proliferated con- and space launch capacity. The large 138 satellites by 2030 to obtain 10-min- stellation aspirations. Roscosmos, the numbers of satellites that comprise ute revisit rates worldwide.15 Russian state-owned space corporation, proliferated constellations require sat- While ostensibly commercial, be- has announced plans to build the ellites to be mass-produced quickly and cause China has raised private funds and 288-satellite Efir constellation to provide less expensively—a shift from the usual intends to sell products and services to global broadband Internet by 2025. paradigm of uniquely designed, exqui- stakeholders beyond the government, This project is part of a larger projected site, and expensive space systems. To Chinese proliferated constellations are proliferated constellation comprising 600 produce the hundreds of satellites that likely to be less responsive to market communications and optical imagery will make up the OneWeb constellation, pressures than Western commercial pro- satellites to provide global coverage from Airbus has opened a production line in liferated constellations. China is pursuing low orbits.18 Given the difficulties facing Toulouse, France, and is planning an JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Hallex and Cottom 23 additional high-capacity satellite manu- China wants to build its own prolifer- Debris Program Office suggests that a 99 facturing plant in Florida.19 In August ated constellations for communications percent end-of-life disposal rate may be 2018, Boeing agreed to acquire Millen- and surveillance. The development of necessary to maintain a sustainable orbital nium Space Systems, which is building a proliferated constellations will further environment.26 The disposal level for manufacturing center in California that the democratization of space; capa- LEO satellites, however, has not reached will annually produce hundreds of small bilities will become cheaper and more 20 percent in any of the last 25 years.27 satellites.20 Similarly, in 2018, Planet readily available to a range of state and Unless proliferated constellations become opened a facility in San Francisco that nonstate actors.24 Adapting to the emer- far more reliable, they could pose a long- can produce 40 small imagery satellites gence of proliferated constellation is not term threat to the ability of the United each week.21 simply a problem for space warfighters. States and other space actors to operate The deployment of proliferated It requires a joint multidomain solution safely in space. constellations will continue to drive to take advantage of the operational While potentially threatening the demand for space launch capacity. Small opportunities provided by these systems sustainability of safe orbital operations, satellites have traditionally been launched and to address the new threats in the new proliferated constellations also offer as rideshare or secondary payloads, but space, air, maritime, land, and cyber opportunities for the United States to the demand for these opportunities ex- domains detailed below. increase the resilience of its national se- ceeds the rate of large payload launches. curity space architectures. Increasing the Rideshare opportunities also bound a sat- Satellite Proliferation resilience of U.S. national security space ellite to the orbit of the primary satellite, and Space Security architectures has strategic implications which may not be the optimal inclination The space operational environment is beyond the space domain. Adversaries or orbit for smaller satellites. The lack of increasingly congested, contested, and such as China and Russia see U.S. depen- rideshare availability is driving the small competitive. The emergence of satellite dence on space as a key vulnerability to launch vehicle market; companies such proliferated constellations will accelerate exploit during a conflict. Resilient, pro- as Vector Launch, Rocket Lab, Firefly these trends but will also offer oppor- liferated satellite constellations support Aerospace, and Virgin Orbit are devel- tunities for the United States to better deterrence by denying adversaries the oping new vehicles to capture part of this deter adversaries from initiating con- space superiority they believe is necessary demand. China also has an active small flicts and to address growing adversary to initiate and win a war against the launch program with three operational counterspace capabilities. United States.28 Should deterrence fail, small launch vehicles.22 The OneWeb satellite constellation these constellations could provide assured Demand is not confined to small alone would increase the number of space support to U.S. forces in the face of launch vehicles. Larger launch vehicles operational satellites by almost 50 per- adversary counterspace threats while im- will permit proliferated constellations cent compared to today, and the SpaceX posing costs on competitors by rendering to be rapidly deployed by manifesting constellation would triple the number of their investments in counterspace systems dozens to hundreds of small satellites in operational satellites compared to today.25 irrelevant. Proliferated constellations can a single launch. For instance, in February The addition of hundreds or thousands of support these goals in four main ways. 2017, Planet launched 88 Dove satellites proliferated constellation satellites would First, the extreme degree of disag- on a single Indian Polar Satellite Launch increase congestion, stress existing U.S. gregation inherent in government and Vehicle.23 The relatively short planned space situational awareness (SSA) and commercial proliferated constellations lifespan of proliferated constellation space traffic management capabilities, and could make them more resilient to attacks satellites will also result in a continuous could create a more dangerous debris en- by many adversary counterspace systems. demand for launch services to replace vironment. More satellites and associated A constellation composed of hundreds satellites as they end their service lives, debris would threaten orbital safety and, or thousands of satellites could with- potentially resulting in larger econo- at the very least, increase the number of stand losing a relatively large number of mies of scale that reduce the cost of all conjunction warnings—notices of possi- them before losing significant capability. launches. ble collisions between satellites and other Conducting such an attack with kinetic objects in space—that the Combined antisatellite weapons—like those China Proliferated Constellations Space Operations Center issues, distract- and Russia are developing—would and National Security ing it from its national security mission. require hundreds of costly weapons to While commercial interest is driving the Proliferated constellation operators destroy satellites that would be relatively development of proliferated constella- intend to address the risk of debris from inexpensive to replace. tions, these new space architectures can their satellites by ensuring that they are Second, proliferated constellations provide capabilities previously available disposed of through atmospheric re-en- would be more resilient to adversary elec- only to a few spacefaring great powers. try at the end of their operating lives. A tronic warfare. Satellites in LEO can emit These new useful capabilities will not recent study by the National Aeronautics signals 1,280 times more powerful than only be available to the United States. and Space Administration’s Orbital signals from satellites in GEO.29 They 24 Forum / Proliferated Commercial Satellite Constellations JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket launches Starlink at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida, on May 23, 2019, putting 60 satellites into orbit (U.S. Air Force/ Alex Preisser) also are faster in the sky than satellites in of satellites will drive the development new joint operational concepts to better more distant orbits, which, combined of low-cost launches to a much higher exploit space systems in support of the with the planned use of small spot beams rate than is available today. Inexpensive, joint fight as well as address new force for communications proliferated con- high-cadence space launch could provide protection challenges when fighting stellations, would shrink the geographic a commercial solution to operationally space-enabled state and nonstate actors. area in which an adversary ground-based responsive launch needs of the U.S. Proliferated constellations will jammer could effectively operate, making Government. In a future where space substantially increase the availability of jammers less effective and easier to geolo- launches occur weekly or less, the launch communications bandwidth for military cate and eliminate.30 capacity needed to augment national operations. These satellites would provide Third, even if the United States security space systems during a crisis or to high bandwidth to forces with less latency chooses not to deploy national secu- replace systems lost during a conflict in than existing GEO satellites,32 which, in rity proliferated constellations during space would be readily available.31 turn, would improve access to reachback peacetime, industrial capacity for communications to forward-deployed mass-producing proliferated constellation The Fight on Earth: military forces, and would also help meet satellites could be repurposed during a Opportunities and Threats the growing demand for transfer capacity conflict. Just as Ford production lines The emergence of proliferated con- for data collected by unmanned systems shifted from automobiles to tanks and stellations will lead to easier access to and other forward sensors. aircraft during World War II, one can eas- satellite communications, space imagery, Proliferated LEO communications ily imagine commercial satellite factories and other capabilities that can support constellations would also offer coverage building military reconnaissance or com- U.S. and adversary military opera- in theaters that are poorly served by munications satellites during a conflict. tions in the ground, maritime, and air commercial satellite communications Fourth, deploying and maintaining domains. Adapting to these changes today. Satellites in GEO do not suffi- constellations of hundreds or thousands will likely require the development of ciently support operations in the Arctic JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Hallex and Cottom 25 radar, and electronic intelligence satellites in order to track U.S. carrier groups. Chinese commercial imagery proliferated constellations would bolster these capa- bilities and provide a resilient capability to track U.S. forces worldwide. Nonstate actors will also be able to conduct global surveillance using commercial proliferated constellations. Global Fishing Watch, an environmental nonprofit organization that aims to reduce overfishing, already uses commercial satellites as part of what is essentially a space-based kill chain to eliminate envi- ronmental crime at sea.35 It monitors AIS beacons that seagoing vessels are required to carry to track their locations to avoid collisions. When they detect unusual behavior, such as ships turning off their AIS signals, they use Planet’s imagery Marines lower RQ-21A Blackjack unmanned aerial system from recovery system aboard USS John P. constellation to locate the ship and then Murtha, Gulf of Aden, July 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Adam Dublinske) cue higher resolution satellites to collect and other high-latitude regions that satellites that can see through clouds— images of illegal activity. Hostile actors are growing in economic and national combined with ground processing with goals less noble than environmental security importance.33 Similarly, naval capabilities that can automatically detect conservation—such as pirates, antiship and air forces operating in the Pacific changes in imagery would also make missiles, or armed Houthi rebels—could theater have less access to commercial adversary deception operations less use commercial proliferated constellations communications than other theaters due effective.34 Because the United States is to track and target ships at sea with simi- to the lack of commercial customers in likely to be on the defensive in the most lar effectiveness. the open ocean. Proliferated commer- worrying scenarios for conflict—such as cial LEO constellations would provide defending allies in Eastern Europe or East Space Internet and the greater communications handling in both Asia—these new capabilities will support Cyber Battlespace regions because of their global coverage. U.S. efforts to detect adversary mobiliza- Proliferated constellations may also While unable to provide the high-res- tion and to avoid operational surprise. shape the future cyber battlespace by olution imagery and other specialized Of course, these new capabilities will supplanting the traditional physical capabilities of existing national security also be available to potential adversaries. infrastructure that underlies the Inter- satellites, proliferated LEO constella- The development of proliferated constel- net and creating a new orbital layer for tions could help to address some of the lations allows other nations to replicate cyber operations. intelligence challenges the U.S. military the U.S. ability to support space global Today, more than 90 percent of faces. During the first Gulf War, the power projection. The global coverage Internet traffic is carried by undersea fiber United States was unable to track and LEO communications constellations optic cables that stretch over thousands target Iraq’s Scud missile systems despite enable would also allow China to support of miles of ocean floor. These cables are enjoying almost total air superiority. Since forces deployed far from its mainland, vulnerable to accidental cuts and are likely then, mobile missiles and other elusive including ships deep in the Pacific or de- targets of enemy action during wartime. targets have multiplied as potential ad- ployed to Djibouti or elsewhere in Africa. Speaking at the opening of SpaceX’s versaries seek to defeat U.S. conventional These capabilities will also heighten Seattle location in 2015, Elon Musk precision and nuclear strike systems. the challenge of protecting U.S. forces highlighted SpaceX’s goal of carrying Imagery proliferated constellations could and bases. High-revisit commercial im- “more than half of the long-distance provide continuous or near-continuous agery could also track mobile targets like traffic” on its satellite network.36 Satellite coverage of missile operating areas to bet- U.S. naval vessels or U.S. aircraft using constellations would become increasingly ter enable the United States to find and smaller “adaptive bases” in Europe or the critical infrastructure for the U.S. and eliminate these threat systems. Pacific to avoid attack. In support of its global economy if they facilitated a larger The near continuous imagery “counter-intervention” strategy, China, share of global telecommunication traffic. coverage proliferated constellations like the Soviet Union before it, has in- Ownership of the infrastructure offers—particularly if they include radar vested substantially in optical imagery, that underlies the Internet can produce 26 Forum / Proliferated Commercial Satellite Constellations JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 intelligence and cyber warfighting ad- future, and to better understand the military space capabilities in response to vantages. Analysts have raised concerns strategic consequences that shifting new threats. over the cyber security implications of the balances in space and other domains will In addition to developing and increasing number of Chinese companies have for the competitive balance among deploying its own satellites, DOD that own and operate long-distance fiber the United States, China, Russia, and could improve its engagement with the optic cables. Chinese commercial prolif- other space-enabled state and nonstate industry to better capitalize capabilities erated constellations could augment these threats.39 offered by new commercial proliferated cables to compete for global Internet Potential starting points for this effort architectures. The Defense Department traffic, exacerbating the trend identified include examining how best to integrate has strong ties with traditional aerospace by Eric Schmidt, former Google CEO, of new communications and intelligence, companies, some of which are part of the a bifurcation into Chinese and non-Chi- surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) manufacture and launch of proliferated nese Internets that operate on different capabilities at the tactical level, and what constellations. Many of these new space infrastructure, standards, and levels of kind of denial and deception capabilities systems, however, are being developed government control.37 will best enable U.S. operations in a fu- by small and agile startup companies— Proliferated constellations themselves ture characterized by ubiquitous orbital Silicon Valley tech companies that build are a likely target for cyber operations. surveillance. Experimentation need not satellites rather than apps—that DOD The mass production of satellites for a be limited to tabletop exercises or simu- has struggled to connect with. A key proliferated constellation could easily lations—the lower cost of manufacturing part of the effort to improve DOD’s result in the cyber vulnerabilities of any and launching space systems will allow relationship with Silicon Valley and its particular satellite replicating across a net- DOD to operate more on-orbit exper- broader ability to harness commercial work, making it easier to attack the entire iments. Along with demonstrating and innovation is improving the acquisitions architecture. It may also be easier to carry maturing new space technologies, DOD process. Commercial proliferated con- out a cyber attack on satellites intended can make greater use of prototype space stellation operators aim to offer data and to directly interface with the Internet systems and architectures to support field information services rather than the raw than on satellites that require more exercises and experiments aimed at dis- imagery or transponder leases of tradi- specialized communications interfaces.38 covering how best to use these new space tional commercial space operators. These The challenge of attacking proliferated technologies to support U.S. forces. companies also aim to move quickly— constellations with kinetic counterspace A joint, multidomain campaign of inexpensive, rapidly manufactured, weapons may lead adversaries to a greater experimentation will also help to define frequently launched satellites with short reliance on cyber threats against U.S. new requirements for DOD use of lifespans that enable rapid technology national security and commercial space proliferated satellite constellations. This refresh and evolution of capability. DOD architectures. As the joint force makes should help DOD determine the best processes need to move at the speed of greater use of proliferated satellite con- path to making use of new space capabil- the commercial sector to exploit these stellations, cyber defense of U.S. and ities and the balance between acquiring new space services or to develop U.S. commercial satellite systems will likely be- DOD-operated satellites and improving Government proliferated constellations come an increasingly important mission. engagement with industry to make better to meet military and intelligence needs. use of the commercial proliferated satel- One step in this direction would be A Path Forward for DOD lite capabilities discussed above. the expanded use of waivers that allow Making use of the new capabilities This could involve DOD deploying venture capital funded companies to provided by proliferated satellite constel- its own proliferated constellations. The participate in DOD Small Business lations and addressing the threats posed Space Development Agency (SDA), Innovation Research contracts they are by new adversary space capabilities is established in 2019, aims to develop otherwise excluded from.42 not a niche issue for space warfighters. proliferated constellations that can In addition to developing space capa- Adapting to the future that these new provide communications, ISR, missile bilities to address the needs of the joint space capabilities will create requires a warning, and an alternative to legacy GPS warfighter, DOD needs to prepare for joint, multidomain effort. The heart of satellites.40 The SDA builds on existing new requirements for SSA and space traf- this effort should be a joint campaign of efforts to leverage emerging commer- fic management resulting from increases experimentation—including wargaming, cial constellations such as the Defense in satellites and debris on orbit. Beyond discovery exercises, and prototyping— Advanced Research Projects Agency’s investing in new military capabilities, the that develops understanding of the Blackjack program.41 These efforts would Defense Department should consider challenges and opportunities proliferated produce new satellites to augment exist- investments to improve the integration constellations create for warfighters in ing national security architecture, but at of foreign and commercial SSA data space and other domains, to develop a much lower cost, and could allow for into its systems. Alternatively, DOD new operational concepts to make U.S. fast and inexpensive expansion of U.S. could support the transfer of space traffic forces more capable and lethal in this management responsibilities to a civilian JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Hallex and Cottom 27 agency, which would reduce the burden Iridium to restructure its debt through via/december-2018/greg-wyler-the-defini- tive-2018-interview/>. on existing military organizations.43 bankruptcy. This intervention enabled 6 Jon Brodkin, “FCC Tells SpaceX It Can The Defense Department can also Motorola to spin off Iridium as an inde- Deploy Up to 11,943 Broadband Satellites,” play a large role in shaping the future pendent company that has since become Ars Technica, November 15, 2018, available at commercial space environment by economically viable and provides vital 28 Forum / Proliferated Commercial Satellite Constellations JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 stellation-on-saturday>; Peter B. de Selding, 26 J.-C. Liou et al., “NASA ODPO’s Large 38 Jason Fritz, “Satellite Hacking: A Guide “China Launches High-Resolution Commercial Constellation Study,” Orbital Debris Quarterly for the Perplexed,” Culture Mandala: Bulletin Imaging Satellite,” Space News, October 7, News 22, no. 3 (September 2018), 4–5. of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Eco- 2015, available at JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Hallex and Cottom 29 Soldiers from Michigan National Guard form part of “enemy” force during simulated attack near Suwalki Gap as part of NATO exercise Saber Strike 2017, June 2017 (NATO) he Joint Operating Environ- ment 2035 predicts that for the Electronic Warfare T foreseeable future, U.S. national interests will face challenges from both persistent disorders and states in the Suwalki Gap contesting international norms.1 One of these outfalls could be “accompli” Facing the Russian attacks from near-peer and peer states to exploit disorder, challenge inter- national norms, and enjoy a quick “Accompli Attack” advance with a limited resistance that cannot be realistically reversed. The By Jan E. Kallberg, Stephen S. Hamilton, and Matthew G. Sherburne rapid attack could establish territorial gains requiring a large-scale land war to liberate—with the imminent threat of an escalation to nuclear war—and the potentially massive cost in life, pain, and devastation to reverse the attacker’s gains could be used to get negotiation leverage for the attacker in a final peace Dr. Jan E. Kallberg is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Department of Social Sciences at settlement. The attacker could also the United States Military Academy at West Point and a Research Scientist in the Army Cyber Institute escalate the conflict once its territorial (ACI) at West Point. Colonel Stephen S. Hamilton, USA, Ph.D., is an Academy Professor at West Point and the Technical Director of ACI. Major Matthew G. Sherburne, USA, is Mission Team Lead, 156 Cyber objectives are reached by declaring that Protection Team, at 1st Cyber Battalion, Cyber Protection Brigade, Fort Gordon, Georgia. a counteroffensive by the North Atlan- 30 Forum / Electronic Warfare in the Suwalki Gap JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 tic Treaty Organization (NATO) could time than the Russian advancement. inferior to the United States and NATO, face a tactical nuclear response, practi- Depending on the scenario, the time for the rapid accompli attack expects to cally denying the Alliance the option to ground force formations to arrive from face resistance from only a fraction of free the occupied territory with conven- Western Europe and the continental U.S. and NATO forces during its short tional military means. United States could be several weeks execution. In Eastern Europe, a rapid invasion after factoring in uncertainty for read- The third assumption is that the in various scenarios could create a fait iness, activation, and capacity.4 Recent Russians can break up the joint forces and accompli attack that favors the Russians. joint NATO and U.S. exercises such disallow multidomain operations limit- Possible settings include the Baltic states, as Trident Juncture 2018 have shown ing the fighting abilities of the present the Suwalki Gap to open a corridor to the complexity and time expenditure of ground force. The fourth assumption is Kaliningrad, parts of eastern Poland, moving large formations across Europe. that the adversary’s advantage in elec- or the northern sector of Nordkapp These movements are preplanned and in tronic warfare can neutralize U.S. and and Svalbard as a perimeter defense of peacetime. In a conflict, the sea port of NATO forces’ ability to communicate, Murmansk. According to a U.S. Army debarkation (SPOD) and aerial port of leading to the adversary’s information publication, a “fait accompli attack is debarkation (APOD) can be assumed to supremacy. Indirectly, if the fourth as- intended to achieve military and political be under attack from standoff weaponry sumption is valid, the third assumption objectives rapidly and then to quickly and hypersonic missiles. Even if U.S. and is then validated because the electronic consolidate those gains so that any British forces arrived in the Netherlands, attack on satellite communications and attempt to reverse the action by the Belgium, and Germany, eastern Poland line-of-sight (LOS) tactical radio would [United States] would entail unaccept- is still 800 miles farther east, equal to the deny joint operations and the utilization able cost and risk.”2 distance between Chicago and New York of air strikes and standoff weaponry. In The rapid accompli attack would City. Also, there are three major river a future peer conflict, a strategic surprise likely be well planned because the at- crossings: the Elbe, the Oder, and the by the loss of ability to communicate due tacker would have the time to prepare Vistula. In a darker scenario, disruptions to electronic warfare is a tangible threat and identify targets and goals pivotal for through cyber effects and infrastructure that could break up joint forces, disallow reaching the desired endstate. Today’s sabotage have occurred already, as units multidomain operations, and paralyze the information-rich public environment seek to leave home bases toward ports of defender; meanwhile, the adversary will and public access to infrastructure in the embarkation. advance with momentum and force. potential target area enable the covert The estimates for the arrival of major Senior Army leadership presented the planning of an accompli attack with a U.S. forces to the theater depend on change in the strategic and tactical envi- high level of granularity and certainty variables that are hard to quantify with ronment in an email to the force: “Many regarding the physical environment in the certainty, but we assess it to be several of the conditions we have grown accus- target area. In this planning, the attacker weeks. Partial air assets, smaller forma- tomed to over the past eighteen years will needs to validate assumptions of future tions, and U.S. forces already in Europe not exist in future battles. Control of the outcomes of the engagement with the will arrive sooner. The European NATO air will be contested; Forward Operating defending force, as these assumptions countries are likely not activating and Bases will not provide a safe haven; units must be true for strategic success. mobilizing their main unit formations will be continuously targeted by enemy The first assumption is that the until the accompli attack is under way. fires; and communications and navigation United States and NATO would not be The NATO fixed command and control systems will be intermittent at best.”6 the first to use nuclear arms. Kenneth facilities are likely targeted in the initial For a potential future conflict with Waltz writes, “Deterrence depends on hours of the accompli attack by Russian capable near-peer adversaries such as what one can do, not on what one will ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic weapons. Russia, it is notable that they have heavily do.”3 As long as the United States and This will lead to increased confusion and invested in the ability to conduct elec- the Alliance have nuclear capabilities, this disruption and will lay a foundation for tronic warfare (EW) throughout their assumption is a part of the equation for a Russian information dominance. These force structure. During the Cold War, potential attacker planning an accompli factors add to the concern over the the Soviets advanced electronic warfare attack. Even if NATO has a declared length of time needed for friendly units and used both active EW and passive posture not to be the first actor to use to arrive in theater. means in the electromagnetic spectrum nuclear arms, it is irrelevant, as an actor During the past year, U.S. lawmakers (such as direction finding and signals could change its will and intent within a have raised concerns about the readiness intelligence).7 The Russians benefit from fraction of a second. It cannot ignore the and capacity of military sealift.5 For an decades of uninterrupted prioritization presence of nuclear capabilities. adversarial planner of an accompli attack, and development of EW. Skills and The second assumption is that the this time lapse until major forces arrive techniques inherited from the Soviet movement of larger U.S. and NATO in the theater represents a window of Red Army are today the foundation for forces to the theater will take more opportunity. Even if Russia is strategically Russian ground force EW doctrine. The JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Kallberg, Hamilton, and Sherburne 31 Russian integration ranges from a com- width that does not allow streaming information infrastructure.11 At a stra- pany-size EW unit at the brigade level, video, massive data flows, and larger tegic level, before a conflict takes place, a battalion-size EW unit in the Russian files to be shared. However, it has a the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) combined arms army, to an EW brigade capacity sufficient to transfer short notes the Russian doctrine: “Russian in the military district.8 messages and support command of the propaganda strives to influence, confuse, In the early days of a conflict in ongoing fight. and demoralize its intended audience, Eastern Europe when the primary U.S. The focus in recent years has been often containing a mixture of true and and allied EW assets are still in Western on Russian hybrid warfare and special false information to seem plausible and Europe and the continental United forces, but if there is a future peer-to-peer fit into the preexisting worldview of the States, the Russians would likely have conflict with Russia, the main encounter intended audience.”12 The doctrine seeks a first-mover advantage and would will be with the core of the Russian army: to create cleavages and exploit internal be seeking information supremacy by the infantry and armor. The Russian army tension in targeted societies as well as to denying and degrading the defending focuses on an offensive posture favoring weaken societal cohesion and willingness forces’ communications. In a future an intensive and aggressive initial stance to fight. The formal Russian phrase is in- peer conflict, a strategic surprise by the in the early stages of a conventional formation confrontation, which utilizes all loss of the ability to communicate due conflict.9 The Russian army has inherited means to gain an advantage over another to electronic warfare is a lethal threat. a legacy from the Soviet Union, where state by using information as a vehicle, The Russians are not alone in upgrading electronic warfare is an integrated part and this concept is both technical and their EW abilities. Several potential peer of maintaining speed in the offensive.10 psychological.13 and near-peer adversaries are increasing It enables forward-maneuver battal- The psychological goal is to influence their efforts to counter U.S. forces by ions to engage and create disruption adversary beliefs, perceptions, choices, denial of the radio spectrum through for the enemy and an opportunity for preferences, and decisions, and serves as a jamming and other EW efforts. Especially exploitation. psychological weapon, following the her- vulnerable are satellite communications itage of the Soviet propaganda apparatus. (SATCOM), very high-frequency (VHF), Russian Doctrine and Inherited This information manipulation is often and ultra high-frequency (UHF) line-of- Soviet Offensive Tactics termed “perception management,” which sight communications, all of which U.S. The Russian EW tradition goes deep. is focused on how the target perceives forces depend on in the multidomain In the early days of the Soviet Union, reality and its options instead of its per- fight. The U.S. and NATO forces have the Communist leadership focused on ception of Russian abilities.14 had limited experience with EW against hard science, equating science with The Russian doctrine seeks domi- tactical communications since the end progress. Science, in combination with nance as early as possible in a conflict, of the Cold War three decades ago and ideology, would lead the way to the during the initial period of war.15 When almost two decades of counterinsurgency utopian society that the Communists Russian strategic leaders assess that con- operations. During these recent decades, envisioned. Once they took ownership flict is imminent (and in the accompli U.S. and NATO forces have experienced of the means of production and the attack, they are the first to know), the undisrupted VHF, UHF, and SATCOM. riches of Russia, science would enable a initial stage is entered with the goal These communication modes provide more prosperous and better life. Science of reaching information dominance reliable high-bandwidth communications was knowledge, and in the hands of the to support the speed and mobility of allowing streaming video and high-vol- working class it became an alternative contemporary operations. The force ume data transfers. Friendly forces cannot to religion. This also led to advances is designed to be offensive and to seek assume that there will be undisrupted in math, physics, chemistry, and other dominance early in the conflict, creating communication and bandwidth in the natural sciences. As a result, the Soviets early stage opportunities for exploitation future; the adversary will exploit and had advanced EW abilities in the early by splitting NATO multinational and take advantage of a single point of failure 1950s, and Russia has maintained the joint operations through denial-of-spec- found in the friendly force use of only capability through the years. trum access. Information dominance LOS communication channels. Recently, Russia has executed hybrid becomes the nonnuclear way to break warfare, specifically in the Donbas re- through U.S. and NATO defenses. The Initial Conflict gion of Ukraine. This action displayed Vladimir Slipchenko, the Russian general Hostile electronic warfare elements a doctrine utilizing multiple attack and influential military thinker, wrote deployed within theaters of operation vectors to seek information dominance. that “superiority over an opponent was threaten to degrade, disrupt, or deny These different attacks are information only possible after superiority in infor- VHF, UHF, and SATCOM. In this operations to confuse, cyber attacks mation, mobility, and rapidity of reaction scenario, high-frequency (HF) radio is a and electronic warfare to deny the were assured.”16 viable backup mode of communication. adversary access to the spectrum, and Earlier, the Soviet offensive doctrine HF radio systems have limited band- direct kinetic strikes on the adversary emphasized the use of tactical nuclear 32 Forum / Electronic Warfare in the Suwalki Gap JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Soldiers with Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group Poland arrive in Rukla, Lithuania, after 2-day tactical road march across Eastern Europe, June 18, 2017, as part of exercise Saber Strike 17 (U.S. Army/Justin Geiger) weapons to maintain momentum and The same publication describes com- the defending enemy from the rear, or a thrust in the assault: “Nuclear strikes bined arms: double envelopment, to destroy the main do not represent some kind of isolated enemy forces by unleashing the reserves. act, but a component of combat. The The Soviets identify three types of combat Ideally, a Russian motorized rifle regi- operations of tanks and motorized rifle action—the meeting engagement, the ment’s advanced guard battalion makes units are closely coordinated with them. offense, and the defense. The offense is contact with the enemy and quickly Nuclear strikes and troop operations rep- further subdivided into the attack and its engages on a broader front, identifying resent a uniform and inseparable process exploitation, and pursuit is culminating weaknesses permitting the regiment’s rear joined by a common concept.”17 in encirclement. The offensive is conducted echelons to conduct flanking operations. In the Soviet-Russian army from the by maximizing maneuver, firepower, and These maneuvers, followed by another 1960s and forward, the basic building shock action. motorized regiment flanking, produces block of the order of battle has been the a double envelopment and destroys the motorized rifle regiment, and the domi- The Russian doctrine favors rapid defending forces. nant tactical stance is offensive.18 A DIA employment of nonlethal effects, such The Russian formation is likely to publication titled The Soviet Motorized as electronic warfare, to paralyze and seize and retain as much ground as Rifle Battalion includes a short introduc- disrupt the enemy in the early hours of possible before the enemy can react— tion to Soviet doctrine: conflict.20 The Russian army inherited producing either a decisive victory or a the legacy of the Soviet Union and its prolonged low-intensity conflict. Russian Soviets stress the decisive nature of the integrated use of EW as a component forces need an advantage that paralyzes offensive and emphasize the meeting of a greater campaign plan, enabling NATO and U.S. troops. In World War engagement more than any other type of freedom of maneuver for combat forces. II, the overwhelming massed artillery fire offensive action. High rates of advance are The backbone of Russian doctrine for that fixed or destroyed the enemy paved anticipated from the actions of combined maneuver warfare tactics has remained the way for the advancement of forces. arms units operating in conjunction with almost intact since the Cold War. The During the Cold War, tactical nuclear airborne, airmobile, and special operations rear echelons are postured to to utilize munitions were intended to paralyze and forces in the enemy rear area.19 either a single envelopment, to attack disperse the NATO defenses. JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Kallberg, Hamilton, and Sherburne 33 In the coming decade, it is highly Avoiding Strategic Surprise The HF propagation patterns would send plausible that the Russians could execute The Russian investment in EW capa- signals to broader areas, which allows the an already prepared preconflict EW bilities is significant, and EW units adversary to hear the signal and direct blitz, seeking information dominance are organic to any Russian formation countermeasures, but it also will enable that degrades or denies VHF, UHF, and from the brigade combat team and parts of the propagation to pass through SATCOM. When these communication higher. This can provide a significant sufficiently to get communication es- modes are degraded, having the ability to strategic advantage in the early stage of tablished even in a highly saturated EW use HF communication will enhance the a conflict. The Russian formations can environment. U.S. and NATO ability to communicate. already engage cyber and electromag- HF jamming equipment requires netic effects in the initial period of war. more energy and has a significant sig- Reliance on LOS U.S. and allied ground forces could nature, which enables U.S. and NATO Communications offset initial strategic inferiority with neutralizing attacks with standoff weap- After two decades with uncontested airpower, naval power, and global strike onry and anti-radiation missiles to be spectrum, the Armed Forces are used capabilities, but doing so depends on successful. The Russian armed forces to having available bandwidth, commu- communication channels between utilize HF communications as well, and a nications, and ability to switch between ground forces and joint assets. The focus broad and unrestricted HF jamming can communication channels with limited of the adversary’s electronic warfare degrade and disrupt their own communi- interruption and excellent quality. Coun- is to deny U.S. communications. One cations. There is also a possibility that the terinsurgency operations have provided alternative is to retrograde and utilize HF HF transmission propagates in a way that rear operational areas with a stable communications, which was the commu- cannot be heard by the adversary, provid- energy supply, the ability to set up satel- nication channel of World War II and the ing an undisrupted communication. On lite and radio links, and stable commu- Korean War. HF radio waves propagate the other hand, LOS communications nication channels to higher commands, by bouncing off the ionosphere, allowing have a more narrow propagation channel, air assets, medical resources, and the for beyond-LOS communications. Due which allows the EW attacker higher logistics chain. Our potential near-peer to the skywave propagation pattern, it is certainty that communications are denied adversaries are fully aware of our depen- more difficult for the enemy to perform or degraded. dence on these communications chan- spectrum denial. Also, modern digital All the branches have limited nels and how their loss would impact transmission modes allow for commu- competency with HF radio systems; the U.S. way of warfighting. Satellite nications to occur at low power levels, however, there is a strong case to train communications are especially vulnerable complicating adversary detection. and ensure readiness for the utilization for several reasons. First, the satellites The Army’s ability to employ HF of HF communication. Even in elec- transmit at lower power levels, making radio systems has atrophied significantly tromagnetic spectrum (EMS)–denied them easier to jam. Second, weather and since the Cold War, as the United States environments, HF radios can provide space weather (solar flares) can nega- transitioned to counterinsurgency opera- stable, beyond-LOS communication, tively impact satellite communications. tions. Meanwhile, the Air Force and Navy permitting the ability to initiate a prompt Third, the compact and fragile design have maintained a fundamental ability. global strike. While HF radio equip- of satellites themselves makes them Alarmingly, as hostile near-peer adversar- ment is also vulnerable to electronic subject to failure due to space debris or ies reemerge, it is necessary to reestablish attack, it can be difficult to target when potentially an attack from an adversary’s HF alternatives should VHF, UHF, or configured to use near-vertical incident satellite. Finally, the satellites can be dif- SATCOM come under attack and be skywave (NVIS) signal propagation. This ficult to upgrade and could, over time, lost as viable options for battlefield com- high-angle take-off propagation method be vulnerable to cyber attacks.21 munications. HF communication has its provides the ability to refract signals off Former Deputy Secretary of Defense inherent weaknesses and challenges, but the ionosphere in an EMS-contested William J. Lynn III noted that they do not negate the fact that it can environment, establishing communica- provide communications beyond the line tions beyond the line of sight out to 400 the willingness of states to interfere with of sight, which can serve as an alternative miles. Due to the high-angle signal path, satellites in orbit has serious implications in critical junctures. By stepping back the ability to direction find and target an for our national security. Space systems and being able to retrograde to HF as a HF transmitter is more complicated than enable our modern way of war. They allow resiliency measure, the United States is transmissions from VHF and UHF radios our warfighters to strike with precision, to increasing communication redundancy. that transmit LOS ground waves. Also, navigate with accuracy, to communicate This also adds an asymmetric advantage Russian listening posts located outside with certainty, and to see the battlefield when the adversary has to divert EW of the 400-mile radius cannot intercept with clarity. Without them, many of our assets with a different set of requirements the communications. The recent digital most important military advantages to address the HF ability, which requires modes utilizing 3G Automatic Link evaporate.22 more resources to disrupt and degrade. Establishment (ALE) technology allow for 34 Forum / Electronic Warfare in the Suwalki Gap JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Soldiers from 173rd Airborne Brigade prepare for Joint Warfighting Assessment 18 in Grafenwoehr, Germany, April 2018 (U.S. Army/John Hall) digital communication at lower power lev- After almost three decades of limited seldom properly used or connected in els than what was previously required for interest for ground force HF communi- an HF network.23 The equipment is in voice. This technology allows for tac chat cations, there are knowledge gaps to fill many cases assembled and tested to see if messaging along with digital voice within to ensure the optimal tactics, techniques, it transmits but is not integrated into the a 3G ALE network. Using lower power is and procedures. Science and technology exercises as a fallback when other ways of a crucial advantage when trying to prevent have advanced during these decades; communications fail. All branches of the direction finding, and adding encryption therefore, there are multiple opportu- Armed Forces have through the years ac- to the digital signal helps prevent signal nities to cost-effectively enhance and quired significant knowledge about how interception. These are low-cost opportu- improve the HF communication ability, to use HF, but since the end of the Cold nities for the United States to increase unit especially pushing targeting data through War, the understanding and experience survivability and battlefield effectiveness HF communications. The revival of HF are no longer shared on a large scale. An by achieving a stealthier communication communications as a resilience measure instrumental path to success in an HF channel that potential adversaries will have will posture the joint force in a state of training program is understanding HF difficulty locating. higher readiness for future conflicts. antenna configurations. Since HF is a The expense to attain an improved beyond-LOS communication channel, HF-readiness level is low compared to Recommendations operators must understand how to opti- other Department of Defense initiatives, We propose five activities that would mize antenna arrangements depending yet the return on investment is high. rapidly improve joint force and NATO on where they intend to propagate The equipment (Harris AN/PRC-150) ability to utilize HF as an alternative com- their signal. These skill sets are in many has already been fielded to maneuver munication channel in the future fight. cases today almost nonexistent, even if units. The next step is leaders prioritizing First, each branch of the joint force the unit has fielded HF equipment and soldier training and employment of the must train on the equipment already needs to be trained. This training can be equipment in tactical environments, link- fielded with the focus on establishing supported by online training, applications ing to HF networks, and integrating the communication in an EW-saturated that provide guidance for directions, an- HF networks into the joint force. environment. The HF equipment is tenna configuration, optimal transmission JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Kallberg, Hamilton, and Sherburne 35 Space and Missile Systems Center’s Wideband Global SATCOM-10 encapsulated satellite, mated with Delta IV launch vehicle, stands ready for launch at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida, March 15, 2019 (Space and Missile Systems Center/Van Ha) power, and advice on how to create ad forces. For these forces, HF is an inte- HF ability back into the platform. Each hoc antennas. The ability to communi- grated part of their communications, and branch of the Armed Forces needs to cate using HF within the joint force and the ability to fight as a unified NATO add, modify, and update the HF capacity, with NATO requires that each branch force is strengthened by a coherent ability even if the equipment is fielded to fight- first and foremost can communicate to use HF communications. Joint and ing formations and the ability across the within itself. multinational exercises should include branches is fragmented and not uniform. Second, a revised joint spectrum HF training and maintenance and the Fifth, in our view, the ability to con- management effort within U.S. European ability to relay messages, create simple nect the fight on the ground to joint and Command and other unified combatant HF networks, and transfer tactical and NATO strike abilities is pivotal to delay, commands is necessary to ensure optimal operational data through them. The HF disrupt, and destroy Russian progress in usage of a limited spectrum. The HF networks’ ability to transfer data is lim- an accompli attack and slow down the range provides NVIS, which creates ited, but orders, directions, calls for fire, advance until major NATO formations propagation patterns that cover 300 miles and updates can be text messages that arrive. Joint Terminal Attack Controllers and would serve a theater. The increased parsimoniously use bandwidth. (JTACs) and their NATO equivalent, HF range compared to tactical LOS com- Fourth, HF capacity, once seen as ob- affected by adversarial electronic warfare, munication requires predefined spectrum solete and replaced by VHF/UHF, has are of no operational value if they cannot management. been removed to free up space and lower communicate the targeting information. Third, HF communication must weight in several fixed-wing, helicopter, The rapid injection of JTAC ability across be injected as a part of the operations and vehicle assets. In some cases, versions the theater, even in the territorial forces in joint and multinational exercises. of a particular platform can differ in the of our East European allies (such as the The East European NATO armies have ability to communicate using HF where Polish Territorial Defence Force, which upheld an HF capacity since the Cold the older version has the HF ability as uses HF to communicate), brings the War. In an accompli scenario, the ground delivered from the factory in the 1990s strike abilities of the joint force to NATO forces that are engaged in the initial fight while the updated version has had HF forces on the perimeter that risk being are Baltic, Polish, and East European radios removed. This requires retrofitting overrun by a rapid Russian advancement. 36 Forum / Electronic Warfare in the Suwalki Gap JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Mechanized infantry battalion 45 Painfbat, Regiment Infanterie Oranje Gelderland, Royal Netherlands army, during cold weather training as part of NATO’s exercise Trident Juncture 2018, Norway, October 2018 (Courtesy NATO/The Netherlands/Hille Hillinga) As General Mark Milley stated, “Units Conclusion A pivotal part in the Russian cal- will be continuously targeted by enemy U.S. and Alliance deterrence on the culation is the ability to separate joint fires; and communications and navigation eastern NATO border has several operations and disallow defending systems will be intermittent at best.”24 In a components that depend on each other ground forces access to airpower and combat environment where communica- in the calibrated force posture against standoff weaponry. A key component tion systems will be intermittent, we have Russian aggression and attack. One in achieving separation of joint forces sought alternative solutions to ensure that identified concern is the Russian ability is electronic warfare and the disrup- the JTAC communication goes through to quickly launch an accompli attack tion and denial of U.S. and NATO even if SATCOM and VHT/UHF fails, with limited or no early warning. An communications. where theater-wide HF NVIS was pre- accompli surprise attack is a rapid move, The U.S.-NATO ability to maintain sented as an alternative route. If HF NVIS with little preparation and forewarning, communications that hinder a split of fails, the Military Auxiliary Radio System to establish a fait accompli and to radi- joint operations, even at less quality, (MARS) could fill a new modern role cally strengthen the adversary’s bargain- bandwidth, and reliability, creates un- where JTAC and other tactical informa- ing position. certainty for the potential attacker. Our tion using other than NVIS frequencies If Russia launches a fait accompli attack NATO allies, especially the Eastern propagates out of theater and is received in Eastern Europe, the arrival of sizeable European countries, still maintain an by MARS, which relays the information U.S. and NATO forces in the theater HF communication infrastructure. With to the appropriate receiver. The approach is likely weeks away. If APOD, SPOD, limited investments in time and personnel is nontraditional, but numerous MARS- and transportation infrastructure within and using existing fielded equipment, enrolled radio amateurs comprise a highly Western Europe is under attack, the at- U.S. forces can strengthen the com- knowledgeable asset in HF communica- tacker has additional time, as these attacks munication and information resiliency tion. Our fifth recommendation is to draw will cause delays for the NATO forces. The against massive hostile EW activities. An attention to the complexity and necessity risk is that it is enough time to establish a enhanced U.S. ability to communicate to link JTACs to the joint force facing an fait accompli territorial gain with limited by HF radio would strengthen the accompli attack that rapidly unfolds. resistance against the invading force. ability to conduct joint operations, as JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Kallberg, Hamilton, and Sherburne 37 8 communications could relay through Roger N. McDermott, Russia’s Electron- ic Warfare Capabilities to 2025: Challenging NATO allies to the U.S. joint force. New from NDU NATO in the Electro-Magnetic Spectrum (Tal- The risk that a small and outnum- linn, Estonia: International Centre for Defence Press bered U.S.-NATO ground force can and Security, September 2017). for the Center for Strategic Research sufficiently communicate through an 9 Valeriy Gerasimov, “The World on the Strategic Forum 304 EW-saturated environment to link up Verge of War” [Mir na granyakh voyny], Military Industrial Courier [Voyenno-pro- with the joint force represents a single Baltics Left of Bang: Nordic Total myshlennyy kuryer], March 15, 2017, available Defense and Implications for the point of failure for any Russian fait ac- at 38 Forum / Electronic Warfare in the Suwalki Gap JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Chief Master Sergeant Darin LaCour, 149th Fighter Wing command chief, speaks to enlisted Airmen of importance of professional military education, at Joint Base San Antonio–Lackland, Texas, November 2, 2019 (Air National Guard/Derek Davis) Strategic Leader Research Answering the Call By Larry D. Miller and Laura A. Wackwitz enior Service colleges (SSCs), as leader research: professional military and ence while inspiring intellectual creativ- premier providers of joint profes- academic civilian. All too often, efforts ity. With students and faculty as active sional military education (JPME), to advance strategic thought are ham- participants in problem-solving and idea S 1 are well positioned to produce the range pered by this conflict of constituencies. generation, SSCs can establish a culture of thought and scholarship required to Yet centering strategic leader research wherein ideas are valued for their ability sustain national security during uncer- and writing within JPME could make to positively impact both policy and the tain times. JPME nevertheless struggles possible the bridging of these worlds larger strategic community. From the to meet the needs and expectations of to establish SSCs as innovative centers position of strength engendered by pro- the two primary audiences for senior capable of marshalling warrior experi- ducing senior leaders able to communi- cate innovative ideas, SSCs will not only address the criticisms leveled against Dr. Larry D. Miller is Research Professor of Communicative Arts and an Editor with the U.S. Army War JPME, but they will also sharpen the College Press. Dr. Laura A. Wackwitz is the Director of the Institute of Military Writing. cutting edge of strategic progress. JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Miller and Wackwitz 39 A Conflict of Constituencies enhances judgment, refines instincts, and theory, not people and offices. Senior SSCs are populated by military profes- and improves decisionmaking, opinion is Service colleges, therefore, are readily sionals, many of whom have modest divided regarding the vitality of JPME as criticized for lack of rigor,9 subordination preparation and reluctant motiva- a vehicle for inspiring the habits of mind of intellectual opportunity, minimization tion for rigorous engagement with required to thoughtfully engage complex if not rejection of genuine inquiry, and graduate-level education. Most officers materials.7 questionable commitment to academic are selected to attend by virtue of prior From a JPME perspective, SSCs are freedom. accomplishments and future promise professional military institutions, and A more integrated approach is in with little regard for academic prepara- as such each schoolhouse requirement order—one that challenges conventional tion. Tapped from within a system in constitutes a task to be negotiated or wisdom on both sides without succumb- which “traditional military skills are tolerated en route to higher levels of ing to Derridean-style deconstruction. By rightly valued . . . but cognitive skills responsibility. The impulse is high for capitalizing on the talent and strengths are largely dismissed,”2 matriculating faculty to satisfy both senior leadership at hand, JPME can effectively maneuver officers are mature, highly experienced, and student expectations by delivering away from the box into which it has been and professionally accomplished, yet instruction as systematically, efficiently, placed. Embracing a 21st-century educa- their facility with the conventional tools and conveniently as possible. Because tion requires SSCs to directly engage of graduate education may be lacking. SSC students are successful, well-paid students in meaningful explorations Thus, entering classes do not necessar- military professionals, the operant men- of complex ideas made clear through ily have consistency among students to tality is that if research is necessary, topics research and writing. This must be ac- successfully employ the techniques of to be addressed should be of particular complished with the understanding close reading, careful research, critical importance to senior leadership. Lists that in an academic world populated thinking, and effective writing. of topics, issues, and questions provide by accomplished military professionals, Because of these challenges, some a smorgasbord of opportunities to align word-one is not square-one, and success proponents of JPME maintain that “ivory research efforts with a specific concern is measured not primarily by rank or the tower” tools are overrated; writing and or tasking.8 When asked to conduct next assignment but by contributions. research will neither build nor defend research, students are to select a strategic the Nation’s house.3 Other proponents issue, analyze extant information, and Harnessing the Power of JPME completely eschew pursuing schoolhouse offer recommendations in writing to one The opportunity for JPME to embrace inquiries of any kind. Too much thought, or more designated points of contact the development of warrior-scholars as one extremist argues, “clouds a senior (POCs)—possibly even in the absence of comes at a time when the uncertainty of officer’s judgment, inhibits his instincts, high-quality analysis essential to action- the future has given way to the uncer- and slows his decision-making.”4 The able recommendations. tainty of now.10 Senior U.S. military most vehement critics, on the other From an academic perspective, SSCs leadership continues to lack consistent hand, believe that neither SSC students are professional military institutions abilities to connect war to policy in nor JPME institutions measure up. To granting accredited graduate degrees ways that impact the national strategic them, “no admission standards plus no funded by the American public and, as posture.11 Information absent analysis selectivity (a term civilian universities use) such, should step up to the intellectual and thoughtful interpretation is of little equals remedial education.”5 The logical plate. Viewed as public servants, SSC use to those charged with protecting extension of that argument is to simply students have a golden opportunity to our citizens, maintaining our sover- disband, dismember, or reconfigure expand their capabilities while contribut- eignty, and advancing national inter- SSCs, as some have suggested.6 So what ing to national security—an opportunity ests. Warrior-scholars can bridge the is the solution? not available to the majority of the information-interpretation gap only if At first glance, the situation appears population. Consequently, those who SSCs better educate students to utilize untenable: one institution, or even a fail to make the most of that oppor- research, writing, critical thinking, logic, group of institutions, cannot possibly tunity are regarded as little more than and reason to develop, implement, satisfy two disparate camps anchored by well-paid freeloaders and exploiters of and/or recommend responsive strategic extreme positions. History supports this the public trust. Military emphasis on options to dynamic national security conclusion. But the importance of the “training” and “guidance” alienates issues. This requires a fundamental shift mission must supersede the impulse to most academicians who view education in perspective among JPME institutions continue the practice of dodging profes- as a progressively unfolding inquiry and the commitment to engage in an sional bullets with academic arguments requiring guided exploration more than unprecedented embrace of research and and academic bullets with professional authoritarian direction. To academics, writing as essential leader capabilities ones. Though traditional academics and lists at the graduate level should be read- and valued forms of national service.12 most professionals involved with JPME ing lists, not topic lists. POCs should be Today’s senior military officers would argue that thoughtful inquiry between experience and ideas, practice are some of the most experienced and 40 JPME Today / Strategic Leader Research JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Marine with Headquarters Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, talks about World War II beach landing on Iwo Jima during professional military education brief, Iwo Jima, Japan, November 26, 2019 (U.S Marine Corps/Esgar Rojas) knowledgeable advocates for national Arms in their own right and a teacher to not researchers, strategists, not writ- security in the history of the United those coming along behind.”13 Rather ers,15 the importance of effective written States, yet SSCs consistently fail to bring than allowing JPME to remain lost in communication cannot be understated. student expertise to the fore, opting the quagmire of the civilian-academic Without quality writing and attendant instead to serve as networking centers versus professional-military critique, critical thought, knowledge and valuable for career professionals with a soft intro- faculty, students, and administration must experience are lost. Without research duction to strategy on the side (faculty together embrace a better, more sustain- and perceptive interpretation of ex- efforts to stimulate intellectual growth able reality—one in which the combined perience, insight is debilitated. JPME notwithstanding). To better facilitate knowledge of JPME students and SSC must, therefore, recognize all SSC stu- the development of an effective future graduates can be communicated effec- dents—regardless of their prior writing force built on the ideas and insights of tively by warriors equipped and inspired experiences—as scholars in the making, JPME’s rising strategic leaders, SSCs to become scholars well armed with individuals whose potential and promise must combine the best of two worlds to ideas, information, and the transformative for the future must not be overlooked unite academic inquiry and skill sets with power of words.14 or left undeveloped. SSCs routinely highly experienced military professionals Although the steps to a successful cultivate the abilities of senior leaders to invested in our national future. transformation could take many forms, respond to evolving conditions, employ As General Martin Dempsey, USA four are recommended here. First, critical thinking skills, and exercise solid (Ret.), former Chairman of the Joint abandon the mindset that writing is judgment through sound leadership. The Chiefs of Staff, observed, the call to arms and should remain the province of the logical, indeed appropriate, extension of and the quest for knowledge are united intellectual elite, Ivy League–educated those activities is to simultaneously de- through individual and collective effort: academics, professional researchers, and velop student research and writing skills “Every member of the force should think tank scholars. Though some have such that they will be better able to man- seek to be a scholar of the Profession of argued that JPME develops leaders, age, if not solve, strategic challenges. If, JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Miller and Wackwitz 41 as Charles Murray has argued, the “pro- something distinct from serving”19 or by is absurd. Senior Service colleges would cess of writing is the dominant source of the presumption that military profession- do well to follow the advice of Alfred M. intellectual creativity,”16 it invariably con- als are properly committed to action, not Gray, who stated simply, “Take what you tributes to the types of “refined thinking” contemplation.20 For many students and get, make it what you want.”25 so often sought from strategic leaders.17 faculty alike, the idea persists that subject By adopting a developmental ap- As John T. Gage argues: matter expertise earned through experi- proach with progressively elevated ence, untiring effort, and often grueling expectations for written communication, Writing is thinking-made-tangible, think- service should excuse SSC students from JPME students can become engaged in ing that can be examined because it is “on becoming effective communicators of the refined thinking necessary to respond the page” and not all “in the head,” invis- ably researched and well-reasoned ideas. effectively to an evolving and highly ibly floating around. Writing is thinking This assumption, however, could not dynamic strategic landscape. Research that can be stopped and tinkered with. It be further from the truth. Untiring and and writing skills, like critical thinking is a way of making thought hold still long often grueling service should entitle SSC skills, do not thrive in isolation. Their enough to examine its structures, its pos- students to the best education possible so development must occur in the pursuit sibilities, its flaws. The road to a clearer that they may continue the path of excel- of strategic-level understanding, subject understanding of one’s own thoughts is lence, dedicate themselves to leadership matter expertise, and leadership excel- travelled on paper. It is through the at- at the highest levels, and skillfully con- lence. Absent perceptive faculty guidance tempt to find words for ourselves, and tribute to senior leader discourse as duty and engaged coaching, many SSC to find patterns for ourselves in which to commands and opportunity allows. students produce relatively uninspired express related ideas, that we often come to Though SSC graduates are expected research reports that, while technically discover exactly what we think.18 to “write well,”21 for many, the ability to satisfying institutional requirements, fall prepare original high-quality documents well short of delivering meaningful utility Warriors who rise to the level of that are well researched, thoughtfully with visionary impact. The motivation senior leaders, whether they realize it analyzed, articulate, persuasive, and to write is far greater when the task is or not, are in many ways well primed appropriately sourced remains elusive. perceived as an opportunity for com- for thoughtful scholarship. They are Student facility with the written word, municating essential information and experienced at gathering information, as General David Petraeus, USA (Ret.), important ideas from an informed per- assessing sources, advocating informed aptly noted, may be the “one area” that spective. Mundane writing tasks that are choices, considering arguments, mak- PME students “need to improve across received as little more than artificial exer- ing decisions, and transforming words the board.”22 At first glance, the writing cises absent clear purpose and meaningful into actions. Their training, education, challenges that haunt many senior officers utility are unlikely to produce interesting and field experiences, however, do not are a consequence of demanding profes- thought, let alone good writing. Inspire routinely involve close engagement with sional requirements on the one hand and the desire to communicate interesting the conventional tools for developing rea- antecedent conditions that lie outside ideas and the language to do so will soned discourse: library research, critical SSC control on the other.23 That SSCs do follow, especially under the close guid- reading, argument construction, and pro- not rely on conventional academic admis- ance of committed faculty well armed fessional writing. JPME must fill the gap sion standards has been cited, as evidence with subject matter expertise. Likewise, by abandoning the “good to go, keep that it may be structurally impossible to revisioning writing as an extension of rea- the troops moving” mentality wherein assemble what war colleges desire: a stu- soning and professional knowledge will the expectation for original thought is dent body primed for intellectual success help generate a culture in which fewer reserved for elite students, while others in a condensed graduate-level environ- faculty avoid close engagement with the are permitted to advance with marginal ment.24 Yet this lament over admission ideas and linguistic competencies of their competencies routinely associated with standards serves to obfuscate the reality charges. parroting existing ideas, tweaking stock that, in many ways, SSCs have simply Third, stop perpetuating the false point papers, and crafting visually impres- failed to provide students with the tools notion that in order to have something sive PowerPoint briefings. Long-term and inspiration to become knowledge- meaningful to say, colonels and lieutenant gain must not be sacrificed for short-term able, articulate, and facile with the written colonels must first focus on fundamental convenience and institutional expedience. word. With an exceedingly low student- grammar and punctuation. Language Second, integrate research and writing faculty ratio, abundant library support, mechanics are important but at this across the curriculum and steadfastly re- qualified faculty, and an invested student level should flow from considered ideas. fuse to allow SSC students to bypass the body uninhibited by financial obligations, Suppose, for example, that an officer hard work of learning to research impor- the suggestion that the majority of career has extensive experience with nuclear tant issues and pen effective documents. military professionals—many with prior submarines. She wants to explore the JPME cannot continue to be defined ei- advanced degrees—cannot be taught to relationship between nuclear energy ther by officers who “treat ‘schooling’ as write at the professional graduate level and climate security but lacks linguistic 42 JPME Today / Strategic Leader Research JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 National Defense University’s President’s Lecture Series hosted Dr. Peter Singer, coauthor of LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media, on October 23, 2019, in Lincoln Hall auditorium (NDU/Katie Persons Lewis) sophistication. To develop the skills and sufficient opportunities for students to some academic. Some questions will be confidence to communicate her ideas become confident senior leaders who use directed, others chosen. All approaches effectively in writing, she does not need research and writing skills to generate can be honored and utilized for what remediation. She needs a coach who ideas, help manage problems, and com- they are and for the type of contribution values her ideas for what they are and municate effectively. Rather than simply they make. Full embrace of this dual helps her to find the means to express adding more writing assignments into role will engender institutions capable of them. A shift in focus—away from SSC the preexisting mix, SSCs must foster col- sustaining diverse perspectives and fur- students’ lack of academic preparation laborative interaction between students thering the process of inquiry in its many and toward their vast knowledge and and faculty with meaningful feedback as forms. ideas gained throughout a lifetime of the norm and warrior-scholarship as the SSCs, therefore, must find ways to service—provides JPME institutions with common goal.26 If guided with flexibility provide high-quality, JPME-specific sup- an incredible opportunity to meet stu- and grace, SSC students can themselves port for emerging writers and the faculty dents at their current skill level and help bridge the gap between the academic and who guide them. Writing centers must be them develop ideas into written products. professional military worlds by joining placed front and center, well integrated Traditional methodologies, however, are the community of researchers dedicated into the educational mission, and sup- untenable. Nothing squashes the desire to embracing research of multiple types at ported by strategically grounded faculty to learn new skills more fully than a all levels of investigation. It takes, in fact, who write. Though calls sound across the corrective approach to writing or institu- all kinds of research to build understand- Services for greater written communica- tional reliance on numerous diagnostics ing about all kinds of questions/topics tion skills among senior officers, all too (to study the problem), technological and to meet the needs and expectations often the response is positioned near the interventions (to avoid the problem), of demanding audiences. Some will write institutional margin as an office staffed and editorial drop-off services (to fix the for military audiences, some for civilian; by a small cadre of competent support problem). SSCs must instead provide some will address professional questions, personnel (writing professionals and JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Miller and Wackwitz 43 Marines with Advanced Infantry Training Battalion, School of Infantry–East, explore Aisne-Marne American Cemetery and Memorial during professional military education trip to Belleau, Aisne, June 12, 2014 (U.S. Marine Corps/Nicholas J. Trager) coaches).27 Such offices are typically mod- (for example, softball, family outings, research interests or little graduate-level eled as undergraduate writing centers social events) is far less effective for teaching experience may feel overloaded with a largely remedial task: to spruce creating meaningful connections with by the array of activities and obligations up fundamental writing conventions, in- subject matter relevance. By encouraging associated with professional education cluding voice, grammar, mechanics, and students to affiliate with faculty research at the graduate level.30 Integrating fac- punctuation. One can argue the merits initiatives, productivity will increase, ulty scholarship initiatives with student of a corrective approach for college un- knowledge will advance, and the prospect research and writing expectations can dergraduates, but not for mature college for adopting a warrior-scholar mentality maximize time and labor efficiencies graduates who commonly hold one or will be optimized. that seldom exist when working alone. more advanced degrees in addition to ex- The congressionally mandated SSC As subject matter experts, faculty mem- ceptional credentials in their professional student-faculty ratio of 3.5 to 1 affords bers are expected to maintain currency areas of expertise. an exceptional opportunity for student- in their primary fields. Opting for a Fourth, actively cultivate faculty faculty engagement.28 Many faculty student-faculty relationship built around investment in a revisioning writing members work closely with students and mentoring rather than simply “advising” process that encourages student-faculty are committed to developing student will help reach this goal.31 With the men- collaboration. Advocating a research research and writing expertise. Others, tor serving as an experienced guide (as team mentality will enhance knowledge however, are less invested. Just as General opposed to primarily an arbiter of student contributions while laying the foundation Robert Scales, USA (Ret.), has suggested, work products), the student-mentor for enduring professional relationships some students may be too busy to learn; team can together invest in a strategic grounded by a learner-centric environ- so, too, some faculty may be too busy journey to explore current literature, seek ment. Networking by any other means to teach.29 Faculty who have compelling connections between ideas, and develop 44 JPME Today / Strategic Leader Research JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 fresh insights. Neither the student nor conflicts of perspective that so often us—to bring forth and encourage their the mentor should become subservient plague JPME. Within this construction, candor, intellectual development, and or ancillary. Students must be encour- strategic research is at once academic ability to speak truth to power. SSC stu- aged to find their own voices, conduct and professional, military and civilian, dents have unique perspectives—borne independent research, and return to the theoretical and practical, emerging out of experience and the simple act of mentor for vigorous discussion about and established. The development of seeing from different vantage points— findings, controversies, and actionable critical thinking, writing, and research insights that may well be overlooked ideas. A combination of genuine inquiry competencies is, after all, inexorably tied by higher authority and elite think tank and close collaboration will strengthen to the promise of a more secure nation scholars if those perspectives are not com- the work product of students and faculty capable of “provid[ing] for the common municated with professional elegance and while simultaneously reducing academic defence . . . and secur[ing] the Blessings persuasive clarity. JFQ malfeasance by those who feel isolated of Liberty.”34 The Nation needs those and/or overwhelmed by a seemingly being groomed for the highest levels of complex milieu of unclear expectations.32 military leadership to transition from Notes Adopting a partnership approach will experienced warrior to invested warrior- 1 support student efforts to strengthen scholar. One might rightly predict that For an in-depth overview of professional military education (PME) criticism, shortcom- their investigatory, analytical, and com- our national stature and possibly our ings, and challenges, see Joan Johnson-Freese, munication facility by engaging them in very survival in a world characterized “Why War Colleges?” in Educating America’s a process well known, understood, and by the “broad diffusion of all forms of Military (London: Routledge, 2013). valued in the military—teamwork. power” may well depend on that trans- 2 Jaron Wharton et al., “Looking Beyond Although most SSC graduates will formation.35 We must, as former Chair- Professional Military Education to Evaluat- ing Officers,”War on the Rocks, August 18, not be expected to routinely create man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General 2018, available at JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Miller and Wackwitz 45 the Rigor Problem,” War on the Rocks, March 18 John T. Gage, “Why Write?” in The pdf?ver=2017-12-29-142206-877>. The 15, 2016, available at 46 JPME Today / Strategic Leader Research JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Paul Sobol, survivor of Auschwitz Concentration Camp, watches presentation about horrors of Holocaust during special Holocaust Remembrance Day observance, April 12, 2019, at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Belgium (U.S. Army/Pierre-Etienne Courtejoie) Expanding Atrocity Prevention Education for Rising U.S. National Security Leaders By David Wigmore Sixty-six years since the Holocaust and 17 years after Rwanda, the United States still lacks a comprehensive policy framework and a corresponding interagency mechanism for preventing and responding to mass atrocities and genocide. This has left us ill prepared to engage early, proactively, and decisively to prevent threats from evolving into large-scale civilian atrocities. —Scott Straus, Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention David Wigmore is a Visiting Faculty Member eployed globally, U.S. diplomatic, ties by foreign actors, in some cases at the National Counterterrorism Center and intelligence, and military person- beyond the capabilities and reach of the an Instructor in the War and Conflict Studies nel are positioned to identify and media or private organizations. Some Department, College of International Security D Affairs, at the National Defense University. report potential warning signs of atroci- U.S. Government–sponsored education JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Wigmore 47 Young girl participates in United Nations Headquarters 16th commemoration of International Day of Reflection on 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, honoring victims of genocide with flowers, United Nations, New York, April 7, 2010 (Courtesy United Nations/Paulo Filgueiras) in atrocity awareness and prevention actions to prevent them. It also can do From Understanding to Action exists for military and civilian profes- more to foster prevention regardless of Outreach by the author revealed that sionals; however, this education is not whether there are, will be, or might be courses of various lengths and with offered to a key set of rising leaders and U.S. military operations. This is known varying amounts of content on atrocity does not focus enough on prevention as “upstream prevention.” history and context exist at U.S. Service before the onset of violence. This gap One type of U.S. Government school academies, the U.S. Agency for Interna- could be covered by a new course at convenes rising interagency national tional Development (USAID), the Army the senior Service college (SSC) level. security professionals for nearly a year to Command and General Staff College, The practical objective is to equip rising study issues of strategic significance. In some single-Service SSCs, and the military and civilian national security their 10-month programs, SSCs educate Department of State. Most teach aware- leaders in 10-month SSC master’s students mostly at the rising O-5 to O-6 ness through studying past atrocities and programs to recognize and report on (military), FS-2 to FS-1 (foreign service), genocide (such as the Holocaust) and potential atrocity warning signs in addi- and GS-14 to GS-15 (civil service) levels. may include local museum visits, but if tion to regular duties. The reporting This is a critical juncture where officials they address prevention actions directly, mechanism that a course prescribes who have demonstrated the potential to they do so largely in an operational would activate when other reporting exercise good judgment on issues of na- context of a U.S. military or develop- mechanisms are lacking or when no tional significance will, after graduation, mental agency intervention, often after similar information has been reported. move into senior management positions the onset of violence, to prevent further and assume roles with increasingly strate- violence. This is noble and laudable but Upstream Prevention gic influence. Students take core courses; may be too late to prevent some atroci- U.S. Government education on atroci- they also take electives based on their spe- ties. In contrast to upstream prevention, ties has evolved from awareness to inter- cializations and interests. The proposed prevention in the context of military or vention, the latter in keeping with the course is intended as a core course, but development operations is referred to as aforementioned military training, but there is some room for flexibility, which is “proximate prevention.” can do more to teach skills that lead to discussed later. 48 JPME Today / Expanding Atrocity Prevention Education JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 At the Joint Professional Military tion of “widespread and often system- of national responses to atrocity warning Education (JPME) II level, including at atic acts of violence against civilians or signs or actual atrocities. the National Defense University (NDU) other noncombatants including killing; Scope of Applied Learning. To con- in Washington, DC—the flagship U.S. causing serious bodily or mental harm; tribute to preventing atrocities whether institution for joint Service and inter- or deliberately inflicting conditions of they are directly tied to military conflict agency national security education—no life that cause serious bodily or mental or not. course exists that emphasizes how to harm.”1 A course should not prescribe Recommended Course Textbooks. recognize and assess the often nonviolent a numerical starting point for when These include Scott Straus’s warning signs of atrocities. The goal is to something is an atrocity or a mass atroc- Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass warn senior U.S. decisionmakers who can ity. For example, the killing of an entire Atrocity Prevention3 and Samantha leverage all elements of national power, village of 50 people, or all its adults, or Power’s “A Problem from Hell”: America including but not limited to the military, all its men and boys, versus the killing of and the Age of Genocide.4 Additional to prevent potential atrocities in the mak- 8,000 men and boys in Srebrenica can mandatory course reading is Alison ing. The mere threat of U.S. lethality, both be considered atrocities. However, Des Forges’s “Ten Lessons to Prevent delivered to the right mala fide actors, for illustrative purposes, the massacre Genocide.”5 could lead to such prevention. of 8,000 in Srebrenica is considered a NDU’s deliberately ecumenical al- mass atrocity that was part of the larger Topics of Instruction. lotment of places for interagency and Bosnian genocide.2 •• Why Teach a Specific Set of Atrocity multi-Service students and location in The term national security profes- Prevention Skills at SSCs? the Nation’s capital make it an ideal sionals reflects the interagency civilian •• What Is “Active Bystandership”? candidate to pilot a new course. Having and multi-Service military students who •• Atrocities and Terrorism the Central Intelligence Agency; other attend SSCs. The proposed course objec- •• From Human Security to Respon- Intelligence Community components; tives and topics of instruction follow. sibility to Protect to Obligation to the Departments of Energy, Justice, and Prevent: The Evolving Nature of State; USAID; and other organizations Proposed Course Objectives Atrocity Prevention supplying students and in many cases and Topics of Instruction •• Environments Where Atrocities Can faculty chairs and instructors strengthens Near-Term Desired Learning Happen and the Phenomenon of the justification for this education to be Outcome (1–3 Years). Students should “Heroic Prevention” delivered at NDU. comprehend and be able to apply the •• Learning to Recognize the Stages of thresholds for issuing a report of as- Atrocities Humanitarian and sessed warning signs, as well as produce Strategic Imperatives a warning report incorporating course- Case Studies. There are humanitarian and strategic prescribed elements. Students also should Srebrenica imperatives to devote the curricular remember U.S. legal, policy, and other •• Misuse of Personally Identifiable bandwidth to educate rising leaders at justifications for engaging in atrocity •• Information by Nazi Regime as a SSCs in atrocity prevention. The type prevention. Precursor to Mass Deportations and of rising leader who attends an SSC, Mid- to Longer Term Desired Killings particularly at the JPME II level, will be Learning Outcome (4–5 years). The Potential U.S. Holocaust Memorial tasked with keeping focus increasingly application of precursor recognition •• Museum visit with specific learning on strategic outcomes. and reporting skills has become second objectives and follow-up discussion Rising leaders in the process of gain- nature and is a trait of more and more Reporting Thresholds, Guidelines, ing a credential necessary to earn general ethical U.S. national security leaders. •• and Requirements officer/flag officer status as well as their An annually refreshed active minority of What to Expect Based on Sending a civilian counterparts just below senior rising senior leaders in the military and •• Report level (the senior executive service, senior elsewhere is now prepared to report on foreign service, senior intelligence service assessed atrocity precursors in addition for CIA staff, and senior national intel- to regular duties, and where no other Justification for a New Course ligence service for Office of the Director of reporting exists. There are many justifications for teach- National Intelligence) staff are in positions Overall Desired Learning Objectives. ing atrocity prevention at SSCs. First, of increasing influence in the formulation Although there is no single causal if not prevented, killings of targeted and execution of policy and strategy. roadmap of acts that lead to atroci- unarmed civilian populations will ties, students should evaluate, analyze, continue to claim many lives. USAID Key Definitions comprehend, and remember stages of reports that “tens of millions of civil- For the purposes of this article, the term atrocities through review of two or three ians have lost their lives in the last mass atrocities reflects the Army defini- rubrics. Students should know the types century in episodes of mass killings.”6 JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Wigmore 49 A U.S. Military Academy Pointer View Seventh, atrocities occur in the Study Directive on Mass Atrocities rec- magazine article posits that “genocide context of armed conflicts more often ommendation that DOD “mandate and and mass atrocity have killed three to than not.12 According to the U.S.-based fund the National Defense University to four times as many people as war.”7 nonprofit Stanley Foundation, “Since develop a semester-long course on atroc- As not all warning signs are violent or 1945, two-thirds of episodes of mass kill- ity prevention.”16 The 2016 report also sensational, educating national security ing—defined in the study as a minimum noted the following: practitioners to recognize potential of 5,000 civilians killed intentionally—oc- precursors is critical. Events that fall curred within the context of an armed Few USG-run educational institutions below a media reporting threshold may conflict. Between 1980 and 2010, that offer the kinds of courses that impart more nevertheless warrant being shared with figure was 85 percent.”13 Conflicts that advanced atrocity prevention concepts. policymakers. may not represent existential threats to Currently, the Department of State Second, the cost of prevention likely U.S., ally, or partner interests nevertheless Foreign Service Institute, the USAID is less than the cost in lives and national may be breeding grounds for atroci- University, and NDU do not offer in- treasure of response. National security ties. Doing nothing could harm U.S. depth courses on atrocity prevention. practitioners, including military leaders, credibility. Exceptions are found in the DOD universe: have an ethical obligation to safeguard Eighth, Executive Order 13279, the three [S]ervice academies, the Army both. Relatedly, U.S. national security dated May 18, 2016, states that the Command and General Staff College, professionals have a moral and ethical “Department of Defense (DOD) shall and the Army War College regularly offer obligation to promote human rights, jus- continue to develop joint doctrine and at least one semester-long course on the tice, safety, and security.8 Accordingly, the training that support mass atrocity pre- Holocaust, and/or genocide studies. In proposed atrocity prevention education vention and response operations and shall almost all of these cases, however, the courses aligns with the JPME call for character address mass atrocity prevention and are the result of the individual initiative of development—specifically, ethical and response as part of its general planning professors and instructors with personal or moral leadership.9 guidance to combatant commands and professional interest in the topic. Therefore, Third, on January 24, 2019, the [S]ervices.”14 it is not clear whether the electives would Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Ninth, early recognition of potential survive their departure or retirement. Only Prevention Act of 2018 was signed atrocity warning signs enhances a proac- West Point, with its Center for Holocaust into law. The law, which requires U.S. tive posture for fulfilling the international and Genocide Studies, has created a per- Government–wide efforts to increase moral obligation to prevent atrocities in manent infrastructure—and even in that early warning capacities,10 received broad the spirit of the United Nations (UN) case, it resulted from the support of private bipartisan support and could be leveraged policy of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). donors rather than a formal institutional to generate funding for a new course.11 Pillar 3 of R2P asserts, “If a state is mani- mandate. A related issue is a lack of scaf- Fourth, if atrocity prevention con- festly failing to protect its populations, folding that could help ensure that those tinues to be viewed exclusively through the international community must be who take training at different points in a military-operational lens, the full prepared to take appropriate collective ac- their career are learning concepts compa- potential of U.S. talent and technology tion, in a timely and decisive manner and rable to their experience and needs. The may not be leveraged for prevention, in accordance with the UN Charter.”15 lack of any mandatory training contrib- especially upstream prevention. It is Academic discussion on the efficacy of utes to the problem.17 also important to point out that there is Pillar 3 centers on its dependence on a no guarantee that every atrocity can be UN Security Council whose permanent prevented, but the United States has an members have differing strategic interests Military and Civilian opportunity to increase its capacity with a and where competing Great Powers have Scholarship and Literature new course. played the role of spoiler. A new course’s A 2012 NDU thesis by a Coast Guard Fifth, for some intelligence analysts, prescribed warnings do not depend on officer spoke of the imperative for the traditional focus may be on strategic whether R2P is approved for a given U.S. policy to include diplomatic and decisionmaking in capital cities but not situation; instead, a course would seek military measures to prevent atroci- events that affect populations in the to empower action at the individual ties. He also pointed out that some countryside. This can create scenarios practitioner level—in the spirit of, but not geographic combatant commands cover where atrocity precursors could go unre- tethered to, Pillar 3—akin to “see some- more countries vulnerable to atrocities ported or atrocities may occur. thing, say something.” than others.18 In a 2014 monograph, Sixth, in an era of renewed Great Finally, in a 2016 report titled An an Army Command and General Staff Power competition, there is a risk to U.S. Assessment of USG Atrocity Prevention College student wrote that “the military credibility in doing nothing in the face of Training Programs, a former advisor on is not properly trained at the individual atrocity warning signs. This is discussed atrocity prevention to the Secretary of level” for atrocity prevention opera- later in detail. Defense reiterated the 2011 Presidential tions. The author framed and justified 50 JPME Today / Expanding Atrocity Prevention Education JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Memorial with 17,000 quarry stones marks site of Nazi Germany’s extermination camp called Treblinka II, in occupied Poland, where approximately 870,000 to 925,000 Jews and others were murdered, November 6, 2010 (Courtesy Adrian Grycuk) atrocity prevention along a Clausewit- discussed, but should not be the back- and partners prevail against morally am- zian model, arguing that both war and bone of a new course. bivalent competitors. genocide are extensions of politics.19 Moreover, in “A Problem from Hell”: Additional publications stand out in America and the Age of Genocide, men- Atrocity Prevention and informing a course syllabus. The special- tioned above, former UN Ambassador Great Power Competition ized and expertly crafted Mass Atrocity Samantha Power notes that “in the China’s People’s Liberation Army pub- Response Operations (MARO) and arena of foreign policy, morality is like lications argue that China will take on a Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response the emperor’s clothes: everyone pre- greater humanitarian intervention role Operations (MAPRO) manuals20 fall tends it is there. Despite lofty rhetoric and that they view such operations as a under U.S. peace and stabilization opera- by politicians of all colors, in the end way to project soft power, gain experi- tions; prevention in this context is the Realpolitik overwhelms Moralpolitik.”23 ence, and expand their global footprint aforementioned proximate prevention.21 Nevertheless, Great Power competi- and reach.25 Accordingly, Beijing’s basing While valuable for some practitioners to tion, as reflected in the 2018 National strategy could be sold as creating logisti- learn, the gap the proposed course seeks Defense Strategy,24 may do well to be cal hubs to assist humanitarian opera- to address is the teaching of equally and informed by Moralpolitik, where the tions, including in support of its Belt and universally relevant upstream-prevention U.S. comparative advantage in morality Road Initiative.26 The U.S. intention to skills.22 MARO and MAPRO will be is leveraged to help the United States leverage its perceived moral obligation JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Wigmore 51 Wall of names at Srebrenica–Poto˘cari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of 1995 Genocide, near Srebrenica, March 18, 2009 (Courtesy Michael Büker) to engage globally grates on the Chinese This article assesses that only the United parabellum, or “beside war.”32 U.S. military and is referred to as “the Ameri- States can lead in atrocity prevention military might deters China, but China can attitude that ‘I am responsible for based on its moral underpinnings, competes with the United States on other every place under the sun.’”27 strong tradition of equipping national fronts, leveraging its perceived or actual For the moment, China’s efforts to security professionals with ethics, and comparative advantages. Shambaugh project soft power through humanitarian the reach and might of the Nation itself. implies that either the United States ad- assistance appear confined to noncomba- There will be strategic challenges and dress this or risk strategic diminishment, tant evacuation operations, famine aid, even dilemmas. For example, the treat- perhaps without a shot being fired. Not and disaster relief, mimicking what it ment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang Province every atrocity may be prevented, but in- has seen the United States do. Its forays provides an example of how China creased U.S. focus on atrocity prevention into humanitarian work are increas- manipulates moral outrage. A cycle of could keep its “moral suasion” reservoir ing, however.28 Reduction of global escalating to deescalate, where each “new filled in a period of Great Power competi- crises could make it more difficult for normal” is worse for a vulnerable popula- tion where attracting partners based on China to justify military expansion on tion than the status quo ante, may be in shared interests—including beyond the “humanitarian” grounds.29 This informs store. Furthermore, China’s manipula- purely economic—remains a U.S. com- and further justifies an SSC mass atroc- tion of humanitarian issues for its own parative advantage.33 ity prevention syllabus by suggesting gain has played out with Beijing’s votes that there are strategic benefits to the on quashing UN reporting on the plight Further Considerations United States expanding its mass atroc- of Rohingya Muslims.31 and Recommendations ity prevention capacity, which would be David Shambaugh suggests that A proposed course is not intended to improved by educating more officials.30 China’s strategic culture is one of equip SSC students to meet a prosecu- 52 JPME Today / Expanding Atrocity Prevention Education JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 torial threshold of proof that an atrocity Inauguration of a new course would champions. Institutions such as the U.S. could occur or is occurring, but rather benefit from one or more statements Holocaust Memorial Museum can serve to be able to provide early warning to from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of as resources and reservoirs of support. higher level decisionmakers that condi- Staff and other leaders whose personnel Continued engagement with the mu- tions may be favorable for one to occur. attend SSCs that reporting on assessed seum is recommended. A syllabus must incorporate a vali- atrocity warning signs is authorized, ex- As a near-term next step, the small but dated formula where circumstances cross pected, and required. SSC provosts/vice diverse group of interested parties and a threshold requiring communication. presidents of academic affairs and the experts who have already met to discuss a Although atrocity environments can be head of Joint Force Development (J7) new course should host a symposium that complex, a notional diagnostic framework also must endorse a proposal. Whether calls on additional experts and additional and reporting threshold will be designed the reporting requirement is or should representatives from NDU. for busy professionals whose sole occupa- be the purview only of officials who tion is not atrocity precursor diagnosis. are recipients of the prescribed educa- Conclusion Making reporting of assessed po- tion should be a decision for individual Atrocities happen in the proverbial tential atrocity precursors a critical departments and agencies to make; shadows or in plain sight, in slow intelligence requirement for combat- however, an effort should be made to motion or fast, noisily or quietly, but ant commanders and issuing a similar cultivate an interagency professional not without warning signs.36 Not all directive for Intelligence Community culture that is geared toward preventing are overtly violent. This article covers personnel would strengthen the impact atrocities. The more places such educa- the strategic and humanitarian benefit, of the new learning. Having military tion is provided, the more this will be surrounding literature, relative cost critical intelligence requirements and the case. savings, and additional justifications for Intelligence Community directives The proposed syllabus, albeit trun- increasing U.S. capacity to recognize overlap is preferable to having gaps cated above for the purposes of this and assess potential atrocity warning between them, but care should be taken article, is intended to fit a semester-long, signs and prevent targeted killings of to ensure they do not contradict one mandatory core course for all SSC mili- unarmed civilian populations on and off another. A new course also may require tary and civilian students in 10-month the battlefield. Accordingly, the article new instructions in the Foreign Affairs programs. A semester-long elective may proposes education not limited to any Manual. be a second-best scenario if the cur- military operational phase. The educa- It merits mentioning that while this ricular bandwidth will not allow for all tion applies to the military students article is not about atrocious acts that to take such a course. A hybrid may be prevalent at SSCs and their civilian could be committed by unethical U.S. an elective for some and a mandatory counterparts who may be slightly lesser personnel, it might raise consciousness. course depending on a student’s chosen in number but are nevertheless well Related to ethics, a study conducted program. A third, less desirable option represented in the NDU classroom. The among civilian and military students at (because it may leave out important proposed education imparts portable NDU indicates that SSC-educated civil- topics) would be to teach precursor skills relevant to practitioners at home ians are more likely to engage in ethical recognition and reporting thresholds as and abroad. behavior, even if it is not specifically a shorter module. Teaching key elements Even if SSCs only taught military required, based on the ends justifying as part of distance learning or a mobile students, the proposed education would the means in a scenario—perhaps sug- course also should be explored. garner benefits. Continued and increased gesting that civilian national security Periodically, based on classroom engagement in atrocity prevention, bol- professionals might be more inclined observations and student surveys, a stered by capacity-growing education, than their military officer counterparts syllabus should be evaluated and modi- would make deposits into a strategic to issue some kind of report of observed fied as warranted. Readings should be credibility account the United States can atrocity precursors regardless of report- reviewed annually for potential updates. draw on later. Including international ing requirements. In contrast, following Educators should consider incorporat- students in the education may extend the existing guidance and maintaining ing an updated version of the Shrouded benefit. If the education prevents harm to norms were the higher motivation to en- Horizons tabletop exercise from NDU’s a single population, it will be worth the gage in ethical behavior for military SSC Center for Applied Strategic Learning effort. students who were part of the study.34 into a syllabus.35 A course could fall under Selection to attend SSCs reflects Regardless of the prevailing pathways ethics or leadership departments or be individual maturity and potential; equip- to engaging in ethical behavior that the cross-coded. ping SSC students with measures to study results indicate, learning atrocity Faculty retention and turnover will warn about observed atrocity precursors prevention skills would be useful for ci- contribute to a course’s endurance and represents a sound investment in the vilian and military SSC students alike, as vitality. Atrocity prevention education will right people. Filling this gap in atrocity well as being in the U.S. interest. benefit from individual and institutional prevention education at SSCs will foster a JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Wigmore 53 13 27 continuum of educated national security Alex J. Bellamy, Mass Atrocities and Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare. Armed Conflict: Links, Distinctions, and Impli- 28 Andrea Binder and Björn Conrad, leaders as well as a shared vocabulary cations for the Responsibility to Prevent, Policy China’s Potential Role in Humanitarian As- and diagnostic toolkit. A new course will Analysis Brief (Muscatine, IA: The Stanley sistance, Humanitarian Policy Papers 2 (Berlin: educate leaders who may not have had Foundation, 2011), 2, available at 54 JPME Today / Expanding Atrocity Prevention Education JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 U.S. and Gulf Cooperation Council forces conduct final field-training event of exercise Eagle Resolve 2017, which focuses on regional challenges associated with asymmetric/ unconventional warfare, in Kuwait’s Shuwaikh Port, April 6, 2017 (U.S. Army/Frank O’Brien) The Missing Element in Crafting National Strategy A Theory of Success By Frank G. Hoffman By the end of the 19th century, the study of strategy had become routine for practitioners, but of little interest for theorists. By the end of the 20th century, it had become a matter of endless fascination for theorists, but a puzzle for practitioners. —Lawrence Freedman, “The Meaning of Strategy, Part II” here are fervent debates today ceptual minefield.2 Gallons of ink have Dr. Frank G. Hoffman is a Distinguished about strategy, especially U.S. been spent on definitions, but these Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic grand or national-level strategy.1 debates have done little to enhance Studies, Institute for National Strategic T Studies, at the National Defense University. The study of grand strategy is a con- U.S. strategic thinking or performance. JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Hoffman 55 UH-1Y Venom helicopter takes off from flight deck of USS Boxer, Strait of Hormuz, July 18, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Dalton Swanbeck) Some academics dismiss national about the basic process and central, central idea and another technique for strategies as vain and hubristic, more causal logic inherent to sound strategy.5 assessing a national strategy and its core grandiose than practical plans to obtain Most schools teach a general and linear elements. Hopefully, this article inspires goals. Others criticize the tendency in process model, and there is a growing debate on best practices in strategy for- U.S. policy circles to confuse grandiose recognition about the need for an explicit mulation and assists those who teach the objects and rhapsodic prose with prag- causal logic in strategy formulation. As disciplined process of strategic thinking. matic plans and appropriate means. But noted briefly in this journal 2 years ago, others contend that policymakers and a theory of victory or success should be The Silent Ways their military advisors cannot escape central to national planning processes.6 Some scholars dismiss the importance the need to intelligently craft strategies This is an overlooked element of strategy of disciplined process and rigorous to advance the Nation’s interests. As today both in the classroom and in the analysis, contending that strategy “is at Hal Brands notes, “grand strategy is U.S. Government. Filling that gap will the mercy of uncontrollable and often neither a chimera nor an elusive holy materially enhance our odds of gaining unpredictable political, economic, and grail, but rather an immensely demand- strategic success in the future and solve military winds and currents.”8 They ing task that talented policymakers have the puzzle for strategic practitioners.7 It stress the need to embrace the study of still managed to do quite well.”3 is not a panacea to strategic competence, history and adaptability over foresight Yet scant practical work has been which involves many elements, but it is in the formulation of grand strategy. offered to help the next generation of central to strategic success. Historians find that the informed intu- practitioners create strategies in the This article examines the theoreti- ition of great individuals and idiosyn- midst of a disruptive strategic environ- cal debates over strategy, its constituent cratic process is more important “than a ment. Many books have been written, elements (ends, ways, and means), and clearly thought through approach to the and numerous laments about lapses in how we have conducted or designed such world.”9 Others despair of bureaucracy U.S. strategy have been published. There strategies in the past. Next, it reviews and strategy by committee or formula.10 is more art than science to designing a how U.S. national strategies have been Yet process and comprehensive building grand strategy, but the practice of strategy constructed in the past, too often over- blocks do have a role in formulating has always been a pragmatic art.4 Scholars looking the causal logic that should be and implementing strategy, grand or at professional military education (PME) the most crucial component of strategic otherwise. schools admit that more needs to be thinking. The article next discusses one In our joint PME community, done to educate the joint community technique for formulating an actionable the construct of strategy as a linkage 56 JPME Today / The Missing Element in Crafting National Strategy JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 among ends/ways/means is a common crucial element of ways in their work.16 than a source of strength that may well be shorthand recently subjected to acute One book used in JPME claims that “the unassailable.22 Richard Rumelt found that criticism. It admittedly has the potential marriage of ends and means was the heart to exploit leverage, a leader has to create to be abused in application.11 It is sim- of strategy.”17 Another popular book is and concentrate strengths against a criti- plistic and formulaic, if one reduces it quiet on the issue of ways as well, stress- cal vulnerability (not always singular) of to an equation or mindlessly uses it as a ing the importance of balancing ends and the opponent, or what he calls a pivot.23 recipe. Used in such a way, it would fail means.18 This might seem to readers to stand at to capture the artistry and deep experi- This author’s own study of the odds with the Clausewitzian concep- ence required to conceive of national elements of strategy, with an allitera- tion of a center of gravity as a source of strategy. Yet it captures the basic building tive list of fundamental considerations, strength. Rumelt argues that strategy blocks and underscores the necessity of also contains a serious similar shortfall. is not only defining sources of strength tying together the main components of a I emphasized the coherence of the but also quintessentially about bringing strategy in a holistic or coherent manner. three-legged stool but failed to identify “unexpected strength against discovered But the underlying hard work of diag- causation as a critical factor.19 As noted by weakness. Not simply the deft wielding of nosis, assumptions, and risk are requisite Army War College researchers, however, power, but the actual discovery of power supporting elements toward crafting a “Cause-and-effect relationships lie at the in a situation, an insight into a decisive comprehensive approach as well. heart of all strategic decision-making.”20 asymmetry.”24 Other security scholars The most important and creative This consideration is the essence have made the same point. aspect of strategy is often silent in the of the strategy function, whereby the many books on the topic. Critical to the strategist exploits the comprehension Strategy as Hypothesis selection of the most appropriate way in generated from context and cognitively This brings us to the central question a strategy is a hypothesis as to its causal creates a strategic concept and logic that of how one frames this fundamental logic. This important concept is rarely represent an untested hypothesis that determination in the strategy process, discussed in strategic theory. It is largely promises to attain policy ends within especially national strategies. How does absent in the writings of today’s most the means allotted and the constraints a strategy team develop decisive asym- prominent thinkers. that exist. A good strategy must have an metry and leverage? This is a gap in our As Lawrence Freedman stresses, internal logic that ties policy to both ways understanding of strategy and how to strategy “is about getting more out of and means to create desired strategic ef- educate students in the formulation of a situation than the starting balance of fects. That logic is a continuous thread sound strategy. This is the “essence of power would suggest. It is the art of cre- of thinking that provides strategic intent the strategy function,” as stressed in my ating power.”12 This insight underscores and informs ways and creates linkages in earlier study, where a strategist “cog- the creative aspect of good strategy: get- strategic design that drive the application nitively creates a strategic concept and ting more out of a situation than might of means via military operations. This logic that represents an untested hypoth- have been expected by the preponderance factor is the component that involves esis that promises to attain policy ends of power. Bringing this creative aspect of calculation, cunning, and the creation of within the means allotted and the con- strategy to the forefront is important, but a strategic logic or chain of effects. The straints that exist.”25 At the U.S. Army we need to know more about just how strategist’s art or most important skill War College, the best academics stress to generate power and how to apply it is devising a strategic logic that obtains that the establishment of an if/then creatively. policy’s goals within the given constraints hypothesis is central to the develop- This aspect of strategy is largely ab- and means. ment of strategy.26 This consideration, sent in U.S. academic literature as well. Military strategists are enjoined to “Involves calculation, cunning, and the Western theorists orient on balancing think identifying the center(s) of gravity creation of a strategic logic or chain of ends and means. Strategy, B.H. Liddell of the opponent. Grand masters contend effects.”27 Hart claimed, “depends for success, first that we should ignore this aspect of mili- Overall, strategy formulation should and most, on a sound calculation and co- tary theory. They argue that strategists rigorously examine different conceptual ordination of the end and the means.”13 should seek to gain a positional advantage approaches framed around a hypothesis John Lewis Gaddis avoids direct contact or competitive edge.21 One of the keys about how each strategic option can with the necessity of causality and de- to sound strategy is focusing power and obtain the specified desired aims. Some fines grand strategy as “the calculated effort where it will have the greatest military strategies may be thought of as a relationship of means to large ends.”14 impact. The goal is to build and apply “theory of victory,” obtaining a distinc- Later, he found strategy as the alignment situations of strength, positional advan- tive goal over an opponent or adversarial of potentially unlimited aspirations with tage, or exploiting leverage. coalition. The idea of a theory of vic- necessarily limited means or capabilities.15 Others have long argued that the tory is well established at the Army War Other noted scholars emphasize the bal- targeting of critical vulnerabilities of one’s College and studied by students at the Air ancing of ends and means and avoid the adversary is a better orientation rather University.28 But as Eliot Cohen and Jeff JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Hoffman 57 Navy officer answers questions from U.S. and international students of U.S. Army War College during tour of USS America, San Diego, California, March 1, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Kyle Hafer) Meiser note, it is useful to define strategy, and forces strategists to clarify exactly of the process.32 Some find the ends/ especially grand or national strategies, as a how they plan to cause the desired end ways/means framework to be a procrus- theory of success.29 Given that their pur- state to occur.”31 It is difficult to disagree. tean tyranny.33 The only tyranny from the pose is rarely to defeat an adversary but This is the critical component of the proverbial three-legged stool one escapes instead is to develop institutional muscle process and the place where the strategist from by abandoning such a framework is and apply statecraft to desire strategic earns his keep, crafting a solution that strategic discipline, founded on a coher- ends, this is more compelling than victory describes how proposed efforts gain the ent conversion of desired policy ends and (and defeat) per se.30 The common bene- achievement of the stated aim. Meiser, means into appropriate action. Instead, fit from both concepts is the requirement however, removes one “sin” of American we should fix the broken leg with quality to define, in general terms, the causal strategic competency, its means-centricity, strategy education. relationship that converts ways and means by overemphasizing the missing aspect Among strategic scholars, Colin Gray into the desired end(s) for testing during of ways. But a way-centric application seems to have gotten this element of strategy refinement. is just as faulty, and also problematic. theorizing correct. As he emphasizes in Meiser goes on to argue that Ultimately, ways do have to be resourced, Teaching Strategy, “The military planner “Defining strategy as a theory of suc- either by applying existing sources is, ipso facto, a theorist. A plan is a theory cess gives a clear sense of how strategy of power or creating them. In short, specifying how a particular goal might is distinct from means-based planning Meiser correctly identifies the missing be secured. Until the course of future and facilitates a superior strategy-making component—a plausible if not rigorous events unfolds, the chief planner and the process.” He further notes, “Defining logic embedded in a stated theory of commander, who may be one and the strategy as a theory of success encour- success. There must be more than “stuff same person, are deciding and acting ages creative thinking while keeping the happens,” when it comes to ways, and only on the basis of a theory of success.”34 strategist rooted in the process of causal a theory of success has merit because it He goes on to observe that “strategies analysis; it brings assumptions to light focuses greater attention to this element are theories, which is to say they are 58 JPME Today / The Missing Element in Crafting National Strategy JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Platoon commander with 2nd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, gives professional military education class explaining strategy the Marines of 2/8 used when they landed on Red Beach 3 in November 1943, Betio, Kiribati, July 22, 2018 (U.S. Marine Corps/Timothy Hernandez) purported explanations of how desired never identify who, when, and how po- internal decay of the Soviet Union.38 effects can be achieved by selected causes litical leaders and their strategists define The implied theory of success in the of threat and action applied in a particular any theory of success in the case studies. Eisenhower-era “New Look” strategy sequence.”35 However, despite a wealth Too often policymakers and military was a not-so-subtle threat to deploy of published books on strategic theory leaders make implicit and untested as- nuclear weapons against challenges large and original contributions to strategic sumptions about causality. But causality and small. The logic presumed that thought, Gray offers limited guidance on and its underlying hypothesis should be an emphasis on efficiency through the how to enhance the application of theory explicit so that it can be rigorously ex- threat of a massive offensive retaliatory to practice. plored for historical and logical validity. capability would offer a sustainable strat- A rare example of any reference egy.39 A reliance on strategic weapons is to the inherent theory of success in Case Histories preferred, Secretary of State John Foster historical studies is found in Successful Historical examples may shed some Dulles stated, “Instead of having to try Strategies. In this book, the editors argue light. President Abraham Lincoln held to be ready to meet the enemy’s many for more than balancing ends and means, to a theory of victory and struggled choices. That permits . . . a selection of as success “hinges almost entirely on the to find a general both to accept and military means instead of a multiplica- conformity of strategic aims to available to apply his formulated “way” to pre- tion of means. As a result, it is now military means and the validity of the serve the Union.37 George Kennan’s possible to get, and share, more basic theory according to which the latter are assessment of Russia’s deeply inbred security at less cost.”40 A close reading committed.” While failure is often the faults was more accurate and logical for of the basic document and Dulles’s product of overextension beyond one’s exploitation. Thus, the Cold War grand comments reveals a blurry if not flawed means, this team of editors notes, failure strategy of containment was based on linkage between cause and effects.41 is “perhaps more likely to reflect mis- a clear theory of success, predicated on Moreover, the New Look denied the taken theories of success.”36 But the editors Kennan’s assessment of the ineluctable adversary any real vote. The underlying JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Hoffman 59 John Lewis Gaddis, front left, Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History at Yale University, speaks to U.S. Naval War College faculty during Teaching Grand Strategy workshop, in Newport, Rhode Island, August 16, 2012 (U.S. Navy/Eric Dietrich) logic and its political fallout with allies Arguably, we had a narrow and of retribution against the Taliban and made it problematic.42 implicit theory of military victory for drove it from power. General Stanley The Nixon administration had a more Afghanistan in 2002 and in Iraq in 2003, McChrystal notably used “strategy of implicit logic in its national strategy. It but the United States lacked a more success” several times in his commander’s understood that U.S. power and credibil- comprehensive theory of success. General assessment in Afghanistan in the sum- ity had been decremented by the costly David Petraeus’s question, “Tell me how mer of 2009.51 Yet it remains America’s and protracted Vietnam War and that this ends?” is poignant.47 A theory of suc- longest war today. Was it predicated on domestic support for extended strategic cess should have answered that question. a narrow theory of victory, or did con- objectives was lacking. Yet the Nixon/ Such a theory would tie together the ditions change that required a shift in Kissinger team remained confident that desires of policy to what defined ends and political aim and an altered strategy? deft diplomatic maneuvers could buy ways are being employed. It appears to More recently, a number of new U.S. time, reduce risk, and still sustain U.S. have been completely lacking.48 strategic documents have been issued. interests.43 The first war against Iraq had a lim- The current National Security Strategy The Reagan Presidency also issued ited theory of victory, freeing Kuwait has an implicit logic, emphasizing rees- a grand strategy, one that reversed from Saddam’s invasion. However, his- tablishing a competitive economic basis the pessimism and constraints of the tory suggests that it produced a triumph for prosperity first and a modernized Eisenhower/Nixon years with a force without victory or success over the long and somewhat larger military to preserve buildup and the resumption of an ideo- run.49 The second war against Iraq, security at home and abroad.52 The logical element to defeat rather than after a decade of sanctions and enforce- Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy contain communism.44 More specific ment actions, embraced a larger theory seeks an endstate that restores a favorable policy statements on the Soviet Union of military victory, yet it too failed to balance of power in Asia and Europe. It were issued a year later, with more connect to a larger and more politically has an explicit theory of success, predi- granularity but little effort at prioritiza- relevant theory of success.50 It is difficult cated around the integration of three tion and no evident logic or theory of to assess when the United States ever major lines of effort: extensive modern- success.45 Arguably, there was an implicit framed a coherent theory of strategic ization, a strengthened network of allies hypothesis to Reagan’s thinking and success in Afghanistan that would ensure and partners, and a reformed bureaucracy that of his counselors. It was a successful a politically viable and stable country. that drives greater performance and inno- strategy, credited by many with ending The emergent strategy of 2002 effec- vation into the joint force.53 The defense the Cold War.46 tively and efficiently produced a victory innovation enterprise must generate more 60 JPME Today / The Missing Element in Crafting National Strategy JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 value rapidly and at lower costs. Each Table 1. Causal Mechanisms element of the strategy leverages assumed competencies: joint warfighting, alliance Inform/Influence/ To disseminate information that shapes perceptions and influences target Persuade audiences toward a desired perception. leadership, and an innovation ecosystem. To bargain with the intent of gaining desired objective(s) while offering to Negotiate Revitalizing these competencies at scale compensate another actor with benefits or compromises. and in time is the central hypothesis To offer incentives, without formal agreement, to influence the actor or an Induce behind the Pentagon’s strategy. Both actor in the network of the target actor. the classified strategy and unclassified To create an institutional competency or capacity lacking in U.S. institutional Create summary contain an explicit theory of capacity or arsenal or one of its allies or partners. 54 success. But it does not appear to have Security or economic development designed to buttress or augment extant Enable universally reached across the larger joint capabilities, to selectively strengthen a desirable component of U.S. or allied state. warfighting community. To selectively weaken or make inoperable a critical component of the Disable adversary’s defensive system or governance capacity. Formulating the To threaten to employ direct force or deny the target actor access to a Theory of Success Coerce resources or benefit, by threat or sanction, to make the adversary withdraw or How does a policymaker and staff con- settle. To apply violent force and means to force an adversary to stop doing something sider constructing a way that solves the Subdue/Compel already initiated. central problem or gains the specified desired aim? The question is not “Tell Neutralize/ To apply violent force in such a way that it severely degrades or eliminates the Destroy opponent’s capacity to defend itself. me how this ends?” The central ques- tion is “How and why does this work?” Inherent to the strategy is an argument Figure. Notional Strategic Action Mechanisms that the solution solves the central a) Persuade Europeans to extend NATO C2/readiness levels and enable NATO’s forward forces in aim or problem. This is often derived Baltics and Poland to increase deterrence (DOD, DOS, NSC, OMB). from a supporting theory. “The role of b) Coerce Russia economically by threatening energy exports with alternative sources and theory in practicing the art of war,” P.J. trade barriers, coupled with persuading EU countries to diversify energy imports (DOS, Treasury, Maykish argues, “is particularly critical Commerce, NSC). since war provides little or no oppor- c) Enable Ukrainian defenders to enhance their training/lethality via advisors and security tunity for hypothesis testing before life cooperation programs (DOD/SOCOM, DCSA, DOS, and NSC). and death is upon the strategist, states- d) Negotiate with Russia to address its theater missile defense concerns with NATO (DOS, NSC, DOD). man, warrior, and civilian.”55 Yet if strat- egy is applied theory, the merits of the underlying theory (strategic airpower, generate advantage by combinations of These approaches can be combined paralysis, industrial web, “maximum assets. The strategic cell strives, in the in an orchestrated way into the overall pressure”) should be understood and words of the Royal Defence Academy, strategic approach to develop and justify a testable. “to develop the ‘big ideas’ that could causal logic.61 The National War College So how does a national strategy team unite ends, ways and means in an innova- employs a technique using “objective develop a theory of success? Is a theory tive and creative manner that confers instrument packages” to help students of success captured in a single concept competitive advantage.”58 operationalize their strategies toward de- like containment, or is it an orchestrated Of course, big ideas are simply that, a fined objectives.62 This is one method of series of strategic activities akin to a cam- generalization. A strategy should convert translating a big idea or combination of paign plan? This is what Rumelt called a or amplify that general guiding idea into activities into specific mechanisms across “guiding policy.”56 Our colleagues in the objectives and actionable tasks to bring all instruments of national power into a United Kingdom call this the “big idea,” it to life. Table 1 presents a number of comprehensive strategy of action. with the Royal Defence College claiming what might be termed causal mechanisms The figure shows a notional suite of that a “strategy which has no unifying and their definitions. These are adapted such packages that are directed toward a idea is not a strategy. The importance of from the National War College’s national national strategy against Russian aggres- strategic ideas is often over-looked. The security strategy primer, which gives con- sion in Europe. In support of a strategic innovative and compelling ‘big idea’ is siderable attention to approaches in the concept that seeks enhanced stability and often the basis of a new strategy. It must development of ways.59 These range from a deterred Russia, this approach exploits not only bind the ends, ways and means nonviolent means to total military defeat. combinations of mechanisms that a strat- but also inspire others to support it.”57 Defeat by maneuver and attrition remains egy team must develop.63 The astute team This guiding policy or strategic concept viable and necessary causal mechanisms accepts the utility of combinations and may evolve iteratively as the strategy team when reduction of the opponent’s capac- sequencing in the formulation of strategy. evaluates different ways and attempts to ity to resist is needed.60 In developing such a suite or combination JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Hoffman 61 Table 2. Final Assessment Questions framework was used during the develop- ment of the 2018 U.S. Defense Strategy. Stages Critical Considerations Questions 5 through 9 deal with the Does the strategy rigorously diagnose the environment, including friendly and opposing actors? consideration of ways and causality. The Does the diagnosis account for critical interests and identify where they are at risk? list is not a checklist or a recipe, nor is it Diagnosis Does the diagnosis identify the central challenge(s) or problem? a crutch for incurious policymakers or Does the strategy process reflect the interactive nature of competition and lazy strategists. (Anyone expecting short- anticipate adversary reactions? cuts and magic potions should shift to Does the strategy generate a better outcome than the initial power position; another line of work.) Equally, a strategy does it build upon or create new sources of leverage and influence? team that has not thought through the Does its central logic generate a competitive advantage at the strategic and/or answers to these questions has not com- operational level? pleted its mission. Does the selected approach have a causal link to desired policy aims? Strategy is more art than science, and Does the central “way” degrade or defeat the opponent’s strategy or shift the Formulation the practitioner, whether policymaker competition to a different domain? or military strategist, needs to recognize Does the strategy and its logic create a compelling argument for consensus and 68 resourcing? the need for humility. The rigor of the Does it apply resources efficiently and gain priority goals within available assessment process cannot dilute that resources? reality, but it can mitigate consequences Does the strategy prioritize objectives and capability investments? of flawed assumptions, poor decisions, Does the strategy acknowledge risks, and prudently address them? and biases. More important, this set of Does it have an implementation plan, with metrics or signposts for assessment? questions expands on existing doctrine to Implementation Is there a communications plan? Will the strategy be presented to stakeholders/ focus on the causal links in the logic train allies? about its approach, not just the balance of ends to means. The confluence of contingency and of approaches, the strategy cell presents the strategy’s formulation. That assess- competitiveness produces the need for an an explicit claim for testing and discourse ment would identify friendly strengths additional component—that of constant that these activities, properly orchestrated and potentially critical vulnerabilities that evaluation of ongoing operations and con- and sequenced, will produce the desired could be leveraged. This is why under- tinuous measurement of progress. “Like change in context or Russian behavior standing context, founded on a thorough a vessel under sail,” notes retired Army desired. Collectively, they constitute an diagnosis, is so critical to strategy. For strategist Rick Sinnreich, “grand strategy implicit theory of success. But that theory this reason, the National War College is at the mercy of uncontrollable and often should be explicit and debated. Per includes a comprehensive understanding unpredictable political, economic, and Professor Tami Davis Biddle’s conception, of the strategic environment as a fun- military winds and currents, and execut- if these actions are taken, then the desired damental element of the strategic logic ing it effectively requires both alertness to political outcome of a deterred Russia process.65 The primer also appropriately those changes and constant tiller correc- and stabilized Ukraine is theoretically fea- incorporates risk and cost/benefit analysis tion.”69 This is the basis for co-adaptation sible.64 The strategy team should explore as part of its overall strategic logic.66 in form and function as our strategy in- that logic and ensure it is the most feasible teracts with the real world and the will of course of action and explicitly state it in Assessing Strategic Logic an opponent. We must recognize that in the strategy. The formulation of a strategy is the first both Great Power competitions and war, The multi-instrumental character of step, and its implementation (includ- the execution of strategy is locked into an national strategies adds complexity to the ing assessment and adaptation) is just iterative relationship, which rests on an process and challenges the internal coher- as much of the process as the initial inherently dynamic and changing situation ence of any strategy. This is the element diagnosis of the environment. Prior to and which has to respond to the counters in the ends/ways/means (plus policy and implementation, a final step is included of the enemy.70 No strategy should be risks) construct where strategists are most in most descriptions of the strategy seen as unalterable or a fixed blueprint challenged. It may initially come off as formulation process. The National War written in stone; the critical questions and formulaic, but it arguably helps ensure College primer includes a set of five the central logic should be continuously some discipline without prescriptively evaluative elements, including feasibility, questioned.71 shoehorning the creativity needed by the which addresses the ends/ways linkage.67 policy and strategy community. This aspect of the strategy process is a Conclusion The figure is entirely illustrative and final check on its integrative coherence Hopefully this brief article catalyzes an must be drawn from the diagnosis and and logic. A more extended assessment extended conversation about causal- strategic assessment conducted earlier in process is offered in table 2. A similar ity and theories of success/victory. It 62 JPME Today / The Missing Element in Crafting National Strategy JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 3 may not clear the messy minefield of For the former, see Simon Reich and (Fall 2014), 472–485. Peter Dombrowski, The End of Grand Strategy: 20 Hill and Gerras, “Stuff Happens,” 14. grand strategy. If it achieves anything U.S. Maritime Operations in the 21st Century 21 Lawrence Freedman, “Stop Looking for at all, the argument should stimulate (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017), 1, the Center of Gravity,” War on the Rocks, June the community to turn the corner from 161. For a more optimistic perspective, see Hal 24, 2014, available at JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Hoffman 63 37 Kenneth T. Williams, Lincoln Finds a 1 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University 64 Biddle, Strategy and Grand Strategy. General: A Military Study of the Civil War, vol. Press, 2011), available at 64 JPME Today / The Missing Element in Crafting National Strategy JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Fire controlman installs radiation cover onto Phalanx close-in weapon system aboard USS Russell, January 29, 2020, Pacific Ocean (U.S. Navy/Sean Lynch) The Joint Force Needs a Global Engagement Cycle By Gregory M. Tomlin Both revisionist powers and rogue regimes are competing across all dimensions of power. They have increased efforts short of armed conflict by expanding coercion to new fronts, violating principles of sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and deliberately blurring the lines between civil and military goals. —2018 National Defense Strategy tep into any joint or coalition fires. From developing target systems operations center and you will that support the commander’s objec- S find planners, intelligence ana- tives, to validating and prioritizing lysts, and operators bustling between individual targets, to assigning forces Lieutenant Colonel Gregory M. Tomlin, USA, Ph.D., is Chief of the Targeting Doctrine and Policy working groups and decision boards and assessing mission execution, the Branch, Directorate for Intelligence, Joint Staff J2. related to the synchronization of joint Joint Targeting Cycle (JTC) often JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Tomlin 65 Lieutenant Commander Erika Schilling, left, and Lieutenant (junior grade) Natalie Spritzer teach Helping Babies Breathe class to local Chuukese women and girls during largest annual multinational humanitarian assistance and disaster relief preparedness mission conducted in Indo-Pacific, Pacific Partnership 2019, in Chuuk, Federated States of Micronesia, March 31, 2019 (U.S. Navy/Tyrell K. Morris) drives the battle rhythm for combat Odyssey Dawn, and Inherent Resolve has adequately integrate and synchronize operations. This process enables a staff led some commanders to adopt the JTC the joint information function into all to match available capabilities with to integrate other joint functions—par- military operations, it is time to develop desired lethal and nonlethal effects ticularly information—during planning a Global Engagement Cycle (GEC) that against an adversary, and it synchro- and operations. This misconception has will free information planners from the nizes intelligence, surveillance, and caused serious challenges by conflating awkward and misaligned requirements reconnaissance (ISR) efforts with the the information and fires domains and of the JTC. This article proposes an ex- deployment of ground, maritime, air, forcing the distinct information function panded DOD definition for engagement, and cyber assets responsible for execut- into the confines of the phases and tempo conceptualizes a new GEC for inclusion ing joint fires. of a targeting cycle intended to generate in joint doctrine, and argues for estab- Since its inception after Operation air tasking orders and fire support plans. lishing a Joint Staff Global Engagement Desert Storm, the JTC has been a critical Below the threshold of armed con- Division to lead the global integration of methodology for integrating fires with flict, the Department of Defense (DOD) the joint information function into any other joint functions to achieve military must be prepared to support whole-of- military operation. objectives. Codified in Joint Publication government efforts or operate unilaterally (JP) 3-60, Joint Targeting, the six- to counter disinformation by influencing Defining Engagement phased cycle facilitates deliberate and foreign individuals and populations. As U.S. competitors exploit the infor- dynamic targeting, regardless of time Many information operations require the mation domain to gain a competitive constraints, and provides the flexibility long-term, sustained delivery of strategic advantage over the United States and its to conduct some phases concurrently.1 communications; others require immedi- allies, the need to integrate information- Unfortunately, its success in Operations ate responses to inflammatory stories related capabilities (IRCs), including Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, posted on social media platforms.2 To cyber and electromagnetic spectrum 66 Commentary / The Joint Force Needs a Global Engagement Cycle JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 assets, into the joint force continues to change the function of a target. While to influence a host-nation population grow. Joint doctrine defines an IRC as the dichotomy between direct and to obey the rule of law, in humanitarian a “tool, technique, or activity employed indirect fires appears evident, parsing operations to inform internally displaced within a dimension of the information which IRCs constitute joint fires can be people where to find food and medical environment that can be used to create nebulous. The best method for deter- care, in peacetime to counter disinforma- effects and operationally desirable mining whether to categorize an IRC tion about U.S. troops stationed overseas. conditions.”3 The proliferation of IRCs as a joint fires capability would be to Unfortunately, the DOD dictionary enables potential adversaries to jam ter- confirm whether planners intend to use limits the definition of engagement to restrial communications and deny access it to affect a target. Joint doctrine de- “an attack against an air or missile threat to global positioning satellites that are fines a target as an “entity or object that [or] a tactical conflict, usually between critical for navigation, surveillance, and performs a function for the threat con- opposing lower echelons maneuver the delivery of precision munitions. sidered for possible engagement or other forces.”8 Nonetheless, from the squad IRCs can also propagate disinfor- action.”7 With targeting enabling the leader to the combatant commander, no mation through social media, seeding joint force to prioritize targets and match Servicemember who receives an order to international doubt about the motives the appropriate response to them, IRCs conduct a key leader engagement believes behind U.S. policies, the presence of for- provide the flexibility to affect some for a moment that he or she must carry ward-deployed U.S. forces, and the value targets without causing physical dam- out an assassination. of alliances, such as the North Atlantic age. For example, in lieu of influencing Some nonlethal engagements in- Treaty Organization (NATO).4 Those terrorists to surrender by destroying an volve one-on-one dialogue based on who do not seek a direct confrontation Islamic State training camp with an artil- preplanned messages to provide clarity with the United States, or who lack the lery barrage, a commander might airdrop and build trust during the conversation. conventional military means to achieve leaflets describing the overwhelming Similarly, engaging the masses through their objectives, will develop alternative capabilities of coalition forces. press conferences and social media re- methods to dominate through the infor- In other military operations, a quires the development of talking points mation domain. This is evident in China’s commander may use IRCs to affect connected to strategic communications current military strategy that directs the individuals and populations who do not themes. This process depends on ad- People’s Liberation Army to gain control perform a function for an adversary. vanced planning to identify whom to of the “information sphere” and in the Indeed, many information opera- engage, to craft meaningful messages Russian defense strategy that requires its tions do not affect targets catalogued intended to influence someone’s think- military forces to gain supremacy in any in the Defense Intelligence Agency’s ing or behavior, and to assess whether an “information confrontation” that could Modernized Integrated Database engagement achieved the desired military occur in times of war or peace.5 (MIDB)—an extensive collection endstate. In describing the seven joint func- ranging from individual terrorists to In light of the practical use of the tions, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, explains chemical weapons production facilities word engagement by the joint force, it is that a commander’s mission requirements to the order of battle for conventional time to expand the doctrinal definition will limit the use of the fires function, forces. In Afghanistan, for example, the of the term beyond its current lethal de- while the information function applies International Security Assistance Force scription by codifying a complementary to all military operations.6 Although fires (ISAF) would not classify a women’s nonlethal definition, as proposed here: involve the use of lethal and nonlethal rights organization in Kabul as a threat, “An attack against an air or missile threat; military force, the term joint fires does yet coalition forces would still want to a tactical conflict, usually between op- not include direct fire weapons because co-opt the activists to expand their ef- posing lower echelons maneuver forces; those systems fall under the joint function forts beyond the capital city to advance a nonlethal action, usually employing of movement and maneuver. The U.S. education and employment equality in information-related capabilities, to influ- Army’s Fires Center of Excellence does rural areas. Without cataloguing the ence the decisionmaking of an individual not teach Soldiers how to employ Abrams women’s group in the MIDB or adding or audience not considered to be a threat tanks or Bradley fighting vehicles, nor a scheduled bilateral meeting to the air at the present time.” does the U.S. Air Force Weapons School tasking order, the joint force still has a Introduction of this definition instruct future weapons officers on how responsibility to synchronize this deliber- into joint doctrine would provide the to best position machine guns around ate information operation with its other joint force, at any echelon, with the an airbase. Rather, these schools provide lines of effort and assess the outcome’s flexibility to either employ IRCs in curricula on indirect fires. contribution to the commander’s desired support of the joint fires function or The preponderance of joint fires endstate. retain them in a separate line of effort involves cannon and rocket artillery, Outside of hostilities, information op- for the joint information function. The precision munitions from aircraft, and erations enable the joint force to engage proposed nonlethal engagement termi- missiles launched from naval vessels to with nonadversaries: in peacekeeping nology would clarify how information JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Tomlin 67 Figure 1. The Joint Targeting Cycle from JP 3-60, Joint argeting IRCs, particularly special access cyber and electromagnetic spectrum programs re- quiring authorization from the President 1. Commander’s and/or Secretary of Defense. objectives, targeting Target development and prioritiza- guidance, and intent tion incorporate a variety of intelligence disciplines to build target systems, their components, and individual targets. Entities validated as targets appear on the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List 2. Target development (JIPTL), and advanced target develop- 6. Combat assessment and prioritization ment continues through the capabilities analysis phase of the Joint Targeting Cycle: mensuration of the target location (its latitude, longitude, and elevation), weaponeering calculations to match the best capability with the target, and a col- lateral damage estimation of potential 5. Mission planning and 3. Capabilities analysis lethal effects. Although essential for force execution employing precision munitions, this ca- pabilities analysis format is not conducive for determining how best to influence a diffused virtual audience through 4. Commander’s decision the information domain. Moreover, and force assignment the limiting factor of target selection for nonlethal engagement remains the omission of nontarget entities from the operations could influence individuals As with all other facets of the joint JIPTL approved by the Joint Targeting and audiences not associated with an planning process, targeting begins upon Coordination Board. Information plan- adversary, and the joint force would gain receipt of the commander’s guidance, in- ners need an independent board to confidence in its ability to employ IRCs cluding operational objectives, authorized prioritize the individuals and groups who to support the achievement of opera- actions against targets, and any delegated cannot be catalogued in the MIDB and tional and strategic objectives outside of responsibilities for target validation and to select the most appropriate IRCs to the Joint Targeting Cycle. engagement. The commander’s targeting engage them. guidance serves as the basis for selecting In combat operations, the timing The Limits of the JTC target systems and articulating desired of the commander’s decision to engage Depending on the military operation, effects to achieve an endstate. Targeting targets and assign forces to execute joint the tempo of the Joint Targeting Cycle guidance does not always apply to infor- fires aligns with the battle rhythm to can be too robust or, conversely, too mation planners because of its focus on publish the daily air tasking order. In the slow to develop, execute, and assess accomplishing a series of tactical tasks in Air Tasking Cycle, joint planners overlay nonlethal engagements. Information one specific phase of a larger campaign. targets from the JIPTL with available operations to deter disenfranchised Typically, a staff publishes an execution munitions and aircraft for a 24-hour youths from joining the Islamic State order to achieve one objective and, while period, which enables bomber and fighter may take years, while a salacious alle- subordinate units initiate movement, the squadrons to publish orders for mission gation against U.S. forces posted on staff regroups to publish a fragmentary execution. The need to publish an order social media demands a response that order with details for achieving the next early enough for forces to prepare for cannot wait for the next day’s Joint objective. IRCs may contribute to ac- operations requires a disciplined staff Targeting Coordination Board. Before complishing the immediate objective but process that drives the nomination and outlining the proposed Global Engage- other information operations require the validation of targets for the next 48 and ment Cycle, it is worthwhile to con- commander to articulate strategic-level 72 hours. sider why JTC requirements make that guidance for how to shape messages Each 24-hour iteration of the Air process problematic for synchronizing over the entirety of the campaign. Tasking Cycle serves a valuable purpose, the nonlethal engagement line of effort Furthermore, the delegated target valida- but not for many of the deliberate for the joint force (see figure 1). tion and engagement authorities may shaping operations in the informa- not apply to the employment of certain tion domain, where it is unrealistic to 68 Commentary / The Joint Force Needs a Global Engagement Cycle JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 influence someone’s thinking or behavior Figure 2. Proposed Global Engagement Cycle in just 1 day, or even 3. An IRC could momentarily deceive an adversary about the location of the joint force’s main 1. Commander’s effort during a ground offensive, and objectives, engagement guidance, and intent that would constitute a joint fires task to achieve an effect on a specified target. However, when influencing Islamic State terrorists to surrender, nonlethal engagements may require months or 2. Audience selection years of sustained messaging through the 6. Influence assessment employment of multiple IRCs before the and prioritization joint force can observe a decrease in the number of voluntary fighters. Assessing how well mission execution changed the function of a target will ei- ther complete the JTC or inform its next iteration. The combat assessment phase 5. Mission planning and involves three specific steps: the intelli- 3. Capabilities analysis force execution gence analyst’s battle damage assessment of physical and functional damage, the operator’s munitions effectiveness assessment (“Did the weapon func- tion properly?”), and, as required, the 4. Commander’s decision and force assignment recommendation to reattack the target. As with capabilities analysis, the combat assessment phase can be problematic for information planners. Many nonlethal To initiate the cycle, information and prioritization phase would provide engagements are never intended to cause planners would draft the commander’s planners with a standardized template for physical damage to a target or target nonlethal engagement guidance to spec- cataloguing individuals and groups for system. Every information operation ify how to use the information function the joint force to consider influencing. requires an assessment, but not one to support the joint force’s short- and The information operations community based on the 24-hour cycle that the Joint long-term objectives. This would ensure would need to develop a format for Targeting Coordination Board depends that the staff understands the com- entries, identify an agency to maintain on to select new targets for the next day’s mander’s expectations for achieving the database, and agree to who should air tasking order. certain tasks in the information domain have access to the material. Drawing from during the current phase of the operation all-source intelligence, each entry should A New Global Engagement Cycle and what tasks would require the entirety provide the name and location of an The structure of the Joint Targeting of the campaign to accomplish. Both are audience (individuals as well as groups), Cycle provides a familiar and appropri- critical for expectation management, as explain the audience’s relationship to a ate framework to design a new Global time constraints determine the frequency larger population or social network, and Engagement Cycle (see figure 2). Not of working groups to develop audi- identify its current opinions toward U.S. intended to duplicate the established ences, decision boards to validate IRC policy. process for integrating joint fires, this employment, and assessments of mission An individual audience could be the proposed methodology would synchro- execution. Engagement guidance should chief of defense forces for a country who nize nonlethal engagements by requiring specify message themes to incorporate or is known to be the most trusted member specific information function inputs from avoid, especially when considering inter- of a prime minister’s cabinet and who commanders, planners, and the joint agency or coalition partner information personally supports the presence of U.S. force. By recognizing nonlethal engage- operations in the same operations area. forces in his country. A group audience ments as a distinct line of effort, a head- Guidance should authorize IRCs for non- might transcend the boundaries of a quarters could update its battle rhythm lethal use and delegate responsibilities for geographic combatant command by with the six phases of the GEC and audience validation and engagement. including thousands of anonymous mem- establish working groups and coordina- Similar to the electronic target folders bers of an Internet chatroom advocating tion boards to select, validate, and priori- created in the MIDB during target de- for the dissolution of NATO. As mercu- tize audiences to engage with IRCs. velopment, the GEC audience selection rial as this type of audience may be, with JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Tomlin 69 individual members joining and leaving an audience must be refined at echelon. Adoption of the cycle would not exempt the chatroom at any time, online forums The joint force cannot deliver the same information planners from supporting remain viable groups for the joint force platitudes to the citizens of Venezuela the joint targeting process, since cyber, to influence in order to achieve a desired and Syria and expect to achieve separate electromagnetic spectrum, and informa- peacetime endstate to strengthen solidar- objectives for U.S. Southern Command tion operations specialists must continue ity for the Alliance. (USSOUTHCOM) and U.S. Central to participate in target development Capabilities analysis for nonlethal Command (USCENTCOM). Rather, working groups and Joint Targeting engagement involves two components: USSOUTHCOM planners must find Coordination Boards to explain how developing messages and selecting the ways to inform Venezuelans about the IRCs could achieve desired effects on best IRC to influence an audience. To U.S. commitment to representative gov- targets. However, the commander must prepare culturally suitable language that ernment, while USCENTCOM’s staff provide information planners with the would gain credibility with an audience, needs to develop ways to deter Syrians flexibility to develop audiences and assess message development requires collabora- from supporting the Islamic State. nonlethal engagements over an entire tion among intelligence, information military campaign and in peacetime. operations, public affairs, civil affairs, and The Tempo of Nonlethal Instilling confidence in a strategic ap- legal specialists. Matching IRCs with an Engagements proach to nonlethal engagement would audience requires staff members to un- Engagement in the information domain help to change the current DOD culture derstand the capabilities available to the cannot occur without an assessment that instinctively associates the infor- joint force, including special access cyber through face-to-face conversation or mation function with the fast-paced and electromagnetic spectrum assets. the use of ISR assets to determine the planning, execution, and assessment of Returning to the chief of defense audience’s reaction to messages. When joint fires. forces example, the staff may determine the commander’s nonlethal engagement While the desire to influence an audi- that the best way to influence the indi- guidance includes a timeline for achiev- ence’s thinking or behavior may involve vidual would be for the U.S. geographic ing objectives, the staff can synchronize years of nonlethal engagements and as- combatant commander to develop a collection assets required to assess how sessments, many scenarios necessitate a personal relationship over a series of key well an IRC influenced the thinking response from the joint force within 24 leader engagements at conferences, office or behavior of an audience. Measures hours. Information planners should con- calls, and social events. Each engagement of effectiveness should be quantifiable, sider ways to conduct dynamic nonlethal would require talking points to facilitate such as a decrease in the number of engagements by conducting some phases a dialogue intended to influence the followers of an anti-NATO Twitter of the Global Engagement Cycle concur- defense chief’s views on a specific topic. account, or an increase in favorable rently or external to established decision In contrast, an information campaign to host-nation opinions of the presence of boards. Although nonlethal engagement deter disenfranchised youth from join- U.S. forces in their country. may start within minutes of the release ing terrorist organizations may require By acknowledging that nonlethal of a fake story on the Internet, the staff multiple IRCs and minimal face-to-face engagement and assessment may take must apply the GEC dynamically to select conversation. For example, while an of- longer than a yearlong deployment to appropriate audiences, develop coherent fensive cyber attack could shut down Boko influence an audience (let alone the messages tied to strategic communica- Haram’s recruitment Web site to prevent artificially accelerated tempo of a 2-week tions themes, assign IRCs for mission Nigerians from accessing it through their exercise), the staff should extend the as- execution, and articulate measures of smartphones, a more effective means to sessment phase well past the traditional effectiveness for the post-engagement influence youth in Chad could be radio turnaround time required for the combat assessment. broadcasts if Internet access is not as assessment of a precision munition strike For example, an anonymous report widely available in that country. against an adversary’s chemical weapons on WhatsApp that falsely accuses the U.S. Once the commander authorizes a production facility. Indeed, assessments Air Force of killing dozens of civilians nonlethal engagement and assigns forces, in the information domain often depend in an airstrike on a Kandahar hospital is subordinate units complete final prepara- on numerous intelligence sources moni- likely to elicit an emotional international tions to employ IRCs. Joint targeting toring the attitudes and behavior of an outcry, especially if the account includes requires refinement of each target, and audience on multiple occasions, especially gruesome photos of deceased women so should nonlethal engagement mission when determining the secondary and and children. To prevent a violent mob planning involve refinement of orders tertiary effects of a nonlethal engagement from attacking the U.S. Embassy in from a higher headquarters. Just as a on a larger population or social network. Kabul and protect U.S. military advi- joint terminal attack controller on the The Global Engagement Cycle would sors operating across the country, ISAF ground must verify a target location be- liberate information planners from the cannot wait for the next day to respond. fore requesting a pilot to drop a precision rigid 24-hour process critical for the Available capabilities to refute this dis- munition, determining how to engage timely publication of air tasking orders. information may involve coordinating 70 Commentary / The Joint Force Needs a Global Engagement Cycle JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 with social media companies to remove a trans-regional, multi-functional chal- Should USEUCOM choose to use viral post from their platform, a counter- lenges across all domains.”10 Within the broadcasting or social media to influence cyberattack against the online profile of Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence Russian-speaking Estonians, the Joint the originator of the story, sharing intelli- (J2), the Targeting Division serves as Staff could collaborate with the U.S. gence about the hospital with city leaders the global integrator for joint targeting. Agency for Global Media, since this non- in Kandahar, or a robust public affairs This includes writing national targeting DOD entity may be better positioned to presence through social media and press policy, federating target development engage appropriate audiences through conferences. between combatant commands and the Voice of America’s Russian-language Intelligence Community, and recom- service, the Polygraph.info fact-checking A Global Integrator mending enterprise-wide solutions to Web site, and Current Time TV. for Information share target material. In contrast, when it Due to IRCs’ reach beyond regional comes to the joint information function, A New Global boundaries, it is no longer feasible to the Joint Staff Directorate for Operations Engagement Division rely on each combatant command to (J3) does not possess a comparable divi- If the Joint Staff J3 established a Global synchronize its own nonlethal engage- sion resourced to serve as the global Engagement Division, it would not ment in isolation from one another. As integrator of nonlethal engagements. only serve as the interlocutor between Peter Singer and Emerson Brooking Consider the success of Russia’s infor- the combatant commands and inter- argue in LikeWar: The Weaponization mation campaign directed toward Estonia agency partners but also integrate the of Social Media, competitors in the in influencing a significant portion of commands’ collective efforts to achieve information domain have already influ- the Russian-speaking minority to believe a common endstate. The division enced international opinions and values they are marginalized within the country. could ensure that functional com- formerly taken for granted. Computer Polling indicates that some who trust mands, such as U.S. Cyber Command bots generate fake news stories on Russia’s RT and Radio Sputnik as cred- (USCYBERCOM), do not develop popular blogs, and offices filled with ible news sources question the value of audiences or conduct nonlethal engage- state-funded trolls malign public figures the European Union in improving their ments without synchronizing with the in other countries by derailing conversa- quality of life and believe that Estonia appropriate geographic command. Not tions in reputable chatrooms.9 has more in common with the Russian only would this reduce staff work by From questioning who shot down a Federation than NATO.11 In response, ensuring that commands share their Malaysian airliner over Ukraine in 2014 the commander of U.S. European products with one another, but it also to influencing public discourse in another Command (USEUCOM) could direct would prevent “information fratricide.” country’s democratic elections, the ubiq- his staff to develop a counterinformation This form of fratricide might involve uity of disinformation has sown doubt campaign to bolster Estonian support USCYBERCOM shutting down a Web in traditional democratic norms, news for NATO. However, the geographic site in Estonia without realizing that a sources, national governments, and alli- combatant command could not do this USEUCOM public affairs officer was ances. Countering these challenges before alone, and its staff should be able to turn actively participating on the site by the next armed conflict erupts depends to the Joint Staff for assistance in coordi- posting favorable stories about NATO on implementing a Global Engagement nating nonlethal engagement efforts with partnership exercises in the Baltic states. Cycle to establish credibility with foreign functional commands and interagency To accomplish this level of inte- audiences in advance, so that those same partners. gration, the CJCS should consider audiences would be more trusting of U.S. While USEUCOM could collabo- resourcing the Deputy Directorate for and coalition information sources before rate directly with the U.S. Embassy in Global Operations J39 to establish a new the cacophony of disinformation grows Estonia, the Joint Staff is better situated Global Engagement Division. To func- exponentially. to involve other parts of the Department tion as the global integrator for nonlethal As combatant commands reorganize of State in the planning process—namely, engagements crossing geographic bound- their staff and battle rhythm to better the Global Engagement Center and aries and functional domains, the division integrate the joint information func- the Bureau of European and Eurasian could organize into three branches: tion, they will turn to the Joint Staff for Affairs. In addition to liaising with operations and plans, automation, and cross-geographic and cross-functional Intelligence Community partners that doctrine and policy. command integration. In 2018, the possess unique insight into the political, The most robust branch would need Secretary of Defense designated the social, and economic systems in Estonia, to be operations and plans, with each Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge action officer assigned a combatant (CJCS) as the Global Integrator, respon- National Laboratory studies the popula- command portfolio. By participating sible for “the arrangement of cohesive tion densities of urban areas around the via video teleconference in working Joint Force actions in time, space, and world, which could shape where the joint groups and decision boards with the purpose, executed as a whole to address force directs its nonlethal engagements. command’s information planners, the JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Tomlin 71 Joint Staff representative could clarify function in 2017, he directed DOD the joint force must resort to placing supported and supporting command to consider the implications across Servicemembers in harm’s way. JFQ roles for developing nonlethal engage- doctrine, organizations, education, ments toward specific audiences. When a and personnel.12 An expanded joint commander’s objective or the complex- definition of engagement would allow Notes ity of an information campaign exceeds commanders and planners to reframe 1 the capacity of one command to plan how they develop and achieve nonlethal Joint Publication (JP) 3-60, Joint Target- ing (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, Septem- and execute, the Joint Staff action of- effects. Adopting the Global Engage- ber 28, 2018), II-3. ficer could recommend ways to federate ment Cycle as an alternative to the Joint 2 Gregory M. Tomlin, “#SocialMediaMat- audience and message development with Targeting Cycle would provide a greatly ters: Lessons Learned from Exercise Trident other DOD components or advocate for needed methodology to address current Juncture,” Joint Force Quarterly 82 (3rd Quar- allocating additional interagency or coali- inadequacies with how the joint force ter 2016). 3 JP 3-13, Information Operations (Wash- tion partner IRCs to support nonlethal integrates the information function into ington, DC: The Joint Staff, November 20, engagements. all military operations. Information 2014). For the operations and plans branch planners and IRCs remain critical to 4 “Special Edition: Countering Russian to serve a decisive role in advancing the Joint Targeting Cycle, but efforts Propaganda,” Per Concordiam: Journal of Euro- global integration, it would depend on to influence the thinking and behavior pean Security and Defense Issues 7 (2016). 5 Challenges to Security in Space (Wash- the automation branch developing new of nonadversarial audiences require a ington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, computer applications or integrating into separate process to counter the revision- January 2019), 14, 29, available at 72 Commentary / The Joint Force Needs a Global Engagement Cycle JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Korean prisoners of war, Koje (Geoje) Island, Korea, 1953 (U.S. Army/Donald K. Grovom) Detention Operations as a Strategic Consideration By John F. Hussey n major conflicts dating back to detention operations correctly in this critical aspect of planning, the same World War II and continuing Afghanistan, Iraq, and at Guantánamo mistakes will be repeated, and the U.S. I through recent operations in Iraq and Bay. This has resulted in tactical-level military will lose its credibility, both do- Afghanistan, military planners have not failures that have had significant opera- mestically and internationally. Moreover, conducted the necessary planning and tional- and strategic-level impacts on if these mistakes are not rectified, the logistical support with regard to enemy the conduct of military operations. It Nation could fail in the other phases prisoners of war (EPWs) and detainee is time to change this paradigm and no of combat operations. This article thus operations (DO). Many current mili- longer treat EPW operations and DO as conveys historical examples of insufficient tary and political leaders believe that an afterthought. and ineffective planning for DO and how the United States did not conduct The U.S. military continues to make these deficiencies have tarnished the joint errors in the vitally important mission of force. The article also provides recom- DO and has reduced its ability to achieve mendations to future planners that may national objectives and, in some cases, reduce errors in DO, thus avoiding awk- Major General John F. Hussey, USAR, is the Commanding General of the 200th Military Police created international embarrassments. If wardness and assisting in achieving both Command, U.S. Army Reserve. we do not place significant emphasis on military and national objectives. JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Hussey 73 Let us begin by defining who a de- over half a million North Korean forces also signed the same documents titled tainee actually is. It can be any person were caught between MacArthur’s “Korean-Chinese Prisoners’ Grievances captured, detained, or otherwise under the landing force and the U.S. 8th Army to the World” and “UNC POW [prisoner control of Department of Defense (DOD) that had been pushed to the southern of war] Camp Affidavits.”6 These docu- personnel. An EPW is categorized as a bel- tip of the peninsula. As the fighting ments, in essence, gave the impression to ligerent, which is defined as a person who mounted, coalition forces were left with the international community that the U.S. is engaged in hostilities against the United over 176,000 North Korean EPWs by military was not treating EPWs humanely States or its multinational partners during the end of October 1950.2 While this and thus resulted in the United States los- an armed conflict.1 A belligerent is classi- may have been good news for the land ing legitimacy on the international stage. fied under the umbrella term of detainee. component commander, there was also Based on American actions within Presently, the National Defense a dark side in that there was simply no the operation, and including what many Strategy outlines an approach that names plan to handle so many prisoners. EPW deemed to be unnecessary violence, Russia and China, North Korea and Iran, operations were an afterthought. In the the United States received condemna- and violent extremist organizations (the end, the EPW camp on Geoje Island tion in the British and American media. so-called 2+2+1 strategy) as potential was “born of expediency.”3 An editor from a magazine in Moscow engagements that the U.S. military may Unlike previous wars, the North compared Geoje Island to Maidenek and confront in the near future. We will likely Koreans mounted a strategic-level Dachau, both Nazi death camps.7 Over face a complex global security environ- campaign to continue the war within the period of 3 years, there had been a ment involving near-peer competition that the camp. Several North Korean senior total of at least 14 leaders, and the camp includes massive combat formation unpar- leaders allowed themselves to be caught became known as “the graveyard of com- alleled since World War II or the Korean with the sole intent of going into the manders.”8 Both Dodd and Colson were War. We can also expect that these conflicts EPW camps, rallying the forces, and relieved from their duties at Geoje-do may devolve into a hybrid type warfare causing strategic-level embarrassment and reduced in rank to colonel. with any of the nations noted, which for U.S. and South Korean forces. For The following comments were made means that American forces will be dealing instance, Colonel Lee Hak Ku surren- by senior military and political leaders with some form of insurgency. Despite dered on his own volition. He left his describing DO during the Korean War.9 clear guidance provided by the President, unit in the mountains and approached They demonstrate that DO has been Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the American lines at night with the sole problematic for the U.S. military for an the Joint Chiefs of Staff in various strategy purpose of being captured.4 Lee played a extended period of time. More concern- documents, how much thought and plan- prominent role as a senior leader within ing is the fact that military planners have ning have combatant command (CCMD) the camps and was the EPW spokesman failed to appreciate the gravity and depth staffs given to DO in the area of operations in the riot and hostage-taking that oc- of the DO mission and have also failed to that we may engage in? curred there. The highest leaders within study the lessons of past conflicts and the the Communist Party of North Korea importance of proper planning for this Background candidly admitted that they planned for strategic mission. The Korean War is perhaps most the covert infiltration of agents into the UN Commander General Mark Clark, emblematic of the devastating effects prison camp at Geoje-do for the express •• USA, referred to the situation in which that may result due to inattention to purposes of “masterminding incidents Dodd was taken hostage at Geoje-do the DO part of an overall plan. The within the United Nations Command as “the biggest flap of the war.”10 Korean War EPW plan highlights many [UNC] prisoners of war camps.”5 Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., of the errors that the United States As part of the North Korean strategic •• chastised Colson for making “mis- made in this operation and failed to plan, prisoners rioted in Geoje-do in May leading and embarrassing” conces- learn in subsequent operations. Ini- of 1952. This rioting created a dilemma sions to the POWs to secure Dodd’s tially, the Army identified Pusan, a port for the guards and senior leaders of the release. These same signed confes- city on the southeast portion of the camp. In response, Brigadier General sions were used by the enemy against Korean Peninsula, as the holding area Francis T. Dodd decided to enter the the United States in the media and at for captured North Korean forces. By camp in an effort to mitigate the distur- the peace settlement talks.11 August 1950, the United States and its bances. Shortly thereafter, Dodd was taken Senator Styles Bridges made a press allies had captured approximately 1,900 hostage and held for approximately 80 •• statement describing Dodd’s perfor- prisoners. General Douglas MacArthur hours. During this arduous time, Brigadier mance during the hostage incident as conducted his famous Inchon landing General Charles Colson was in charge of “stupidity” and threatened an imme- on September 15, 1950. The landing camp operations. In his haste to secure diate Armed Services subcommittee at Inchon cut the North Korean lines the release of a fellow general officer, investigation.12 of communication and routed the he signed documents prepared by the North Korean military. Consequently, Chinese and North Korean EPWs. Dodd 74 Commentary / Detention Operations as a Strategic Consideration JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 •• Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, senior UN delegate to the truce talks at Pan- munjom, stated, “I’m certainly going to take a beating over this at the conference table.”13 He was referring to his continued dialogue with the North Koreans and Chinese during peace settlement talks to end the war. The failure to plan for and conduct DO correctly in Iraq is similar to the fail- ures at Geoje Island. I spoke to a fellow officer who was assigned to the Military Police (MP) brigade responsible for the- ater-level DO during the initial invasion. I asked him a simple but pointed ques- tion regarding DO: “What really went wrong?” He told me that there was no DO plan and that when he pressed higher headquarters for answers on what to do, he was told to “Figure it out, major.” A major can figure out where to put the sally port on a detention facility or what time meals should be served. However, a major does not have the authority and, therefore, cannot order certain assets such as an Engineering brigade to con- struct and set up more camps in theater. A major cannot requisition additional MP brigades and MP battalions into theater, nor can he figure out a method to re- place Army Reserve and National Guard Soldiers who were wounded or went Marine with Combined Anti-Armor Team 1, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, escort enemy prisoner home based on their orders terminating of war away for questioning after discovering illegal drugs and improvised explosive device–making material, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, October 19, 2009 (U.S. Marine Corps/John McCall) in accordance with their mobilization time. These are decision at a much more all detention facilities allowed for the MP C2 element planned and resourced. The senior level and should be part of a well- and Military Intelligence (MI) missions failures at Abu Ghraib also resulted in the coordinated DO plan. to cross barriers and come into conflict, loss of U.S. credibility at home and on So what really did happen at Abu thereby creating ambiguity, most particu- the international stage.15 Ghraib? There was a failure to plan for larly in who was actually in charge. The American DO plan for DO at all levels. At the operational level At the tactical level, Soldiers were Afghanistan suffered flawed planning as of war, the proper command and control not trained properly at mobilization well. There were no trained DO units (C2) element was never considered. This platforms, and there were no standard in theater at the onset of the war. While failure resulted in facilities not being operating procedures within the camp. this is understandable based on the vari- properly resourced, maintained, and There was a mix of uniformed person- ous aspects of the plan, nevertheless it manned. Perhaps just as important was nel interacting with contractors, and had consequences. Over 3,500 Taliban the fact that the MP units assigned to little oversight of either. The Geneva surrendered in the Kunduz area and the DO mission were not a high priority. Conventions were routinely violated, were under the control of the Northern Therefore, they were not placed high on and much of the day-to-day care and Alliance at a prison in Mazar-e-Sharif. the time-phased force deployment data custody of the prisoners was abdicated to Riots ensued in which detainees over- list (TPFDL) and, as a result, arrived in MI personnel and contractors. All these powered untrained guards. The prison theater late, and in many cases their per- issues were contributing factors that led had to be retaken by force, resulting in sonnel and equipment arrived scattered.14 to the abuse. Many of these issues could the death and injury of U.S. and allied The failure to provide an overall com- have been avoided if the DO plan had personnel. Additionally, over 500 detain- mander of DO with C2 authorities over been appropriately staffed and a proper ees were killed.16 There were allegations JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Hussey 75 Jordan Armed Forces–Arab Army Quick Reaction Force Female Engagement Team member practices physical search procedures on U.S. Marine with 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit Female Engagement Team during detainee operations in Jordan, August 5, 2019 (U.S. Army/Shaiyla B. Hakeem) that the Northern Alliance abused de- The failure to successfully conduct sary consideration that any aspect of an tainees and that maltreatment resulted in DO in the Korean War led to the relief of operational plan deserves. DO simply unnecessary death. Some tried to link this senior officers involved. Not surprisingly, cannot be a “hand-wave,” that is, a debacle to the U.S. military. the same results occurred in Iraq. The ca- non-issue deemed as unimportant and U.S. policy dictated that captured al lamity at Abu Ghraib resulted in the end glossed over. The following provides Qaeda prisoners were not covered by the of two general officers’ careers. Consider staffs with various considerations when Geneva Conventions and were referred that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld planning for theater-level DO. to as “detainees.” Although afforded found that Lieutenant General Ricardo Initially, staffs need to ask the right many of the same rights and privileges Sanchez had been derelict in overseeing questions when wargaming for DO. as EPWs, the treatment they received detention in Iraq. Many speculate that They must plan to avoid many of the in Afghanistan and at Guantánamo the mistreatment of detainees at Abu pitfalls that have been detrimental to Bay—and the reported cases of abuse— Ghraib resulted in Sanchez not being commanders and senior leaders in past has resulted in increased international nominated for his fourth star.18 Brigadier conflicts. According to a RAND study, scrutiny. Questions began to surface General Janis Karpinski, who oversaw the U.S. military does not plan well for regarding the treatment standards of DO at Abu Ghraib, was reprimanded, DO, and as a result it has been hampered detainees, and much of the debate cen- relieved of her command, and demoted by failures in this part of the campaign tered on the appropriate classification of to colonel.19 Presently, the detainee situa- planning.20 It is time to reevaluate the captured Taliban and al Qaeda fighters tion from the war in Afghanistan remains concept of operations and the DO por- and what, if any, legal status they held.17 unresolved, with some 40 detainees re- tion of a plan. More than likely, in the Planners never considered the legal maining in custody at Guantánamo Bay. past, some lead mid-grade officer sat in authority to detain individuals captured a room, drew up a plan either individu- on the battlefield, nor did they discuss Crunching the Numbers ally or with a small group of personnel the standard of treatment that a detainee The historical examples cited should operating in a vacuum with no oversight should receive. motivate planners to give DO the neces- or staff input, and never synchronized the 76 Commentary / Detention Operations as a Strategic Consideration JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Table 1. Detainee Operations Projections in a 2+2+1 Strategy Country Number of active-duty troops Number of reserve troops Total troop strength China 2,183,000 510,000 2,693,000 Russia 1,013,628 2,572,500 3,586,128 North Korea 945,000 5,500,000 6,445,000 Iran 534,000 400,000 934,000 Estimated number of active Salafi-Jihadist fighters 100,000–230,000 Not applicable 100,000–230,000 (The number of troops used for the projections was provided by Global Firepower.1 The projections for Salafi-Jihadist Fighters was provided by a report from Dr. Jones.) Notes 1 Global Firepower, available at JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Hussey 77 Table 2. The 2+2+1 Strategy as It Relates to EPW Number of total Number of total Number of active- Number of reserve estimated EPWs based estimated EPWs based Country duty troops troops Total troop strength on 5 percent on 10 percent China 2,183,000 510,000 2,693,000 134,650 269,300 Russia 1,013,628 2,572,500 3,586,128 179,306 358,612 North Korea 945,000 5,500,000 6,445,000 322,250 644,500 Iran 534,000 400,000 934,000 46,700 93,400 Estimated number of active 100,000–230,000 Not applicable 100,000–230,000 5,000–11,500 10,000–23,000 Salafi-Jihadist fighters and provide humane treatment for up to has three groups of dialects: northern, throughout the area of operations. 4,000 detainees; however, certain mis- southern, and central, with the latter Camp location and construction are sions may require additional resources heavily influenced by the other two. of significant importance. In Iraq, the and manning.26 The requirements regard- The official language of Iran is Persian camps were large enclosures surrounded ing personnel, materiel, and logistical (Farsi); however, seven more languages by wire. This was similar to Geoje-do. issues are immense. are recognized as regional languages. The MP guard force could not enter The U.S. military may be engaged in a In North Korea, U.S. forces can expect the camp with great ease and, therefore, conflict for an extended period of time and three different dialects spoken by forces they often avoided entering the camps will not have the capacity to rotate forma- there. Two are spoken by residents of at all. This ceded control of the camps tions and still meet the requirements. In Pyongyang, thus indicating a potential to the detainees. The detainees used Iraq, the MP corps had to take Soldiers for being in the inner circle of North rocks found in the camps as weapons from other military occupational skills and Korean politics. This is extremely impor- to throw at guards. In some instances, train them to be the guard force within tant for the interrogators who may be the end result was lethal force being its camps. On occasion, other Services targeting these individuals as high-value used against detainees. In both Camp provided troops to serve as guards in DO detainees and for the housing of North Bucca and Abu Ghraib, detainees took facilities. Lastly, consider that many of Korean detainees. Regarding various ter- advantage of the inability of the guard these assets reside in the National Guard rorists who may be captured, there are an force to penetrate into the compounds and Army Reserve and have not had train- array of languages that these individuals and began to tunnel out. This may be ing to prepare for the care, custody, and may speak. U.S. military interpreters are addressed by reversing an expeditionary control of 4,000 detainees. The number divided into categories based on citizen- mindset and building a structure that of potential EPWs will, in turn, require ship and clearances.While it is important can prevent such problems. greater attention from the CCDR and to have these individuals to conduct The prison complex in Afghanistan JFLCC as to the quality and quantity of DO, there will be a need for MI to have cost a great deal more money than tactical-level personnel. This may also interpreters of similar language capabili- other ones; however, there were fewer require that National Guard and Army ties present to conduct interrogations riots. With the right construction and Reserve DO planners are involved in the and exploit captured materials, including efficiencies built in, the guard force can planning prior to battle and it may require computer hard drives that will be in a be reduced because it had control of the an adjustment to the TPFDL to ensure foreign language. Does the DO plan ac- facility. Although U.S. forces may be the correct DO assets to support the plan count for this? Are contracts identified expeditionary, these camps are function- are in theater prior to the start of Phase III and payment ready to proceed in the ing for several years, so they are not really operations. event of ground conflict? How fast can expeditionary. Small camp compounds Moreover, the U.S. military lacks and will these interpreters arrive in the- provide better guard force control. sufficient language skills capacity to ater? How will they be cleared and how Construction should include concrete cover the 2+2+1 scenario. Each of the long will that take to do so? pads to prevent tunneling and improvised nations listed in table 2 has numerous weapons availability to detainees. Divide dialects that planners must account for. Additional Tactical camp areas into smaller communal cells. For example, there are seven Chinese Considerations for Provide individual segregation cells for dialect groups, with the predominant Staff Planning high-value detainees who are being being Mandarin from the north/south- Prior to the processing of detainees, interviewed by military intelligence, west areas of the country. This dialect commanders and their staffs have a investigators, and other assets. The segre- comprises approximately 72 percent of variety of issues and conditions to think gation cells will also serve to house those the population. Although Russia is vast about. One consideration is the actual detainees not in compliance with camp in geographical landscape, it basically location of the camps that will be used rules. The forward edge of combat areas 78 Commentary / Detention Operations as a Strategic Consideration JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 is subject to change; the chief of staff at U.S. military built wooden commodes incoming detainees and tailor detention each CCMD should ensure that camp for the EPWs to use. In the Middle East, experiences accordingly. More specifically, locations can adapt to geographical limi- they do not defecate by sitting on a com- when and where practical, captured unit tations that may affect flow of detainees, mode; rather, they squat over a hole in information and available intelligence data materials, and personnel in support of the ground. The EPWs literally stood on should be used to broadly classify detain- camp operations. The camp locations and the commode and defecated on the wall ees on a limited number of characteristics, detainee flow must be compatible with behind them, thus raising sanitation con- perhaps including political indoctrination, the overall plan and ensure that there cerns. Even the color of prison garments radicalization, seniority, experience, and are ample air and land assets available to must be considered. In Geoje-do, each education and/or work skills. move detainees without affecting Phase prisoner was issued a summer uniform of Once classified, the detainees should III operations. bright red, thus delighting the Chinese be placed in a facility that has been The plan must also include provisions communists who believed that red sym- adequately configured to segregate for appropriate medical care within the bolized good luck and health. Conversely, those considered to be less radicalized. camp. The overall footprint of the camp the uniform selection angered the Segregating and housing detainees on the should be considered because detainees Koreans, both communist and noncom- lower end of any of these trait scales with will have to be moved both to interroga- munist, who associated the red uniform those on the higher end risks facilitating tions and to medical appointments. In with the Japanese occupiers of World substantial indoctrination and training in addition, they may have to be transported War II. The Japanese issued red uniforms a detention facility. This would also hold to civilian courts. If the camp is large, to those prisoners condemned to death. true for nations that have an authoritar- movements will be complex and often Orange jumpsuits seemed to anger many ian type structure. It would be best not require multiple simultaneous move- of the militant leaders in the Middle to house common soldiers with senior ments resulting in a larger guard force East. This was the same jumpsuit used by leaders within the military who are also requirement. Is the camp near an airfield American forces who housed detainees at part of the political establishment that we if air operations are part of the overall Guantánamo Bay. Terrorist organizations may be in conflict with. Remember, the plan? What is the road structure in and in Iraq, as well as the so-called Islamic Eastern way of war is far different from around the potential camp location? If State, placed individuals into orange the Western way of war, and that also the location is near an urban area, it may jumps suits prior to their beheadings. holds true in DO. Finally, it is imperative offer enemy forces surrounding higher The DO plan must take into consider- to have the correct number of screened terrain that will allow for observation ation the political or religious ideologies and trained linguists identified and and enemy attacks on the facility. Will of those being detained by U.S. military ready to perform the mission. In many the location of the camp be compatible forces. The inability to predict insurrec- instances, U.S. personnel are uneducated with the necessary access to support both tion within the confines of the prison will on the culture of the detainee popula- Secret Internet Protocol Router Network lead to continued violence and injuries tions, and therefore a cultural advisor and Nonclassified Internet Protocol among the detainee population as well as is essential. Psychological operations Router Network? Does the environment the guard force. The failure to observe personnel should be augmenting DO support a camp structure—that is, will it and interpret detainee behavior through personnel. The purpose of psychologi- flood during the rainy season or will the subjective indicators such as will, motiva- cal operations is to help the commander metal facilities rust prematurely based on tion, morale, health, and welfare are all change behavior. The after-action report environmental impacts? Engineer assets elements that will affect the atmospherics from the 800th MP Brigade in Operation must be robust to repair infrastructure within the camp and directly correlate Desert Storm notes that much of the destroyed by detainees who will keep into the size of the guard force and the credit for smooth operations rests with the “war” going on within the camp. housing of particular detainees. the work of psychological operations They will also be needed for routine Many have suggested that detention personnel.28 maintenance, normal wear and tear on facilities in both Iraq and Afghanistan infrastructure, and expanding structures served as recruiting and training grounds Establishing a Combined within the camp or building new struc- for insurgents and terrorists.27 It is widely Joint Interagency Task tures based on new requirements. accepted that high-value detainees should Force Headquarters Geoje-do had approximately 138,000 not be housed with “common criminals.” Joint Task Force (JTF) 134 was estab- EPWs. Logistics considerations included A threat assessment must be developed lished after the Abu Ghraib scandal. Its feeding a large population three times for each detainee that considers the vari- responsibility was the proper care and daily, and sanitation facilities must be ances in radicalization, seniority within custody of the detainees throughout the a contributing factor to camp design. the military or political structure, and Iraqi area of operations. Included in the The culture of the detainees must also experience and standing among those custody of the detainees was the mission be taken into consideration during the labeled as a high-value detainees. Planners command of MP operations, MI opera- design of a DO camp. In Desert Storm the must consider how to assess the nature of tions, and the medical commands that JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Hussey 79 were responsible for detainee medical JITF commander will be responsible for willing to take them back. This is now a care.29 The same type of mission the disposition of those detainees who problem in the Middle East with the de- command structure was established in are held in the custody of the U.S. mili- feat of the so-called Islamic State in Syria. Afghanistan around the same time. In tary. Planners familiar with the Powell Once detained, what if any training or 2009, the commander of U.S. Central Doctrine should be familiar with the reentry programs should be considered Command, General David Petraeus, premise that requires there be a plausible for detainees upon repatriation? How will initiated a comprehensive review of exit strategy to avoid endless entangle- that work with the international com- U.S. detention operations in Afghani- ment. In DO, this translates into a plan munity and the host nation to ensure stan. The resulting 700-page report to turn over detainees at the conclusion released detainees are not a continued highlighted both the very poor condi- of hostilities. In the Korean War, the threat on the battlefield and to the na- tions inside Afghan prisons and the repatriation of prisoners became the tional security of the United States and potential for radicalization of detainees, primary disputed issue during armistice its allies? and recommended the establishment negotiations. This sticking point in the of a dedicated detentions command negotiations prolonged the war by a year Strategic Communications and in Afghanistan. Based on that assess- and a half and resulted in many more Public Affairs Considerations ment, in July of 2009 General Stanley casualties.32 According to the Geneva Conventions, McChrystal, the commander in Afghan- At the conclusion of Desert Storm, the the detaining power is responsible for the istan, requested approval to establish 800th MP Brigade and its advisory teams treatment provided. Within that respon- JTF 435 to centralize all detentions, were involved in the transfer of Iraqi sibility, it is specified that the detaining interrogations, medical care, and rule of EPWs to the Saudi Arabian ministry of nation will provide safe, humane, and law functions in Afghanistan.30 defense. Initially, senior members of the legal custody of all detainees in their The CCDR, in accordance with joint brigade were not invited to meet with the custody. Detainees must be fed, shel- doctrine, is authorized and should im- Saudi officials, which caused problems tered, and provided medical care. Most mediately establish a Combined Joint because those who did the initial plan- U.S. commanders are committed to Interagency Task Force (CJITF) or Joint ning had little knowledge of the Geneva upholding policies and international law Interagency Task Force (JITF) to con- Conventions; requirements for process- that support human rights based on our duct mission command for DO. This is ing, transfer, and support of EPWs; or values and because of the order/safety the most logical conclusion that should Saudi camp capacities. Many of the Iraqi that humane treatment brings to a facil- be drawn for future operations in which prisoners did not want to go back to Iraq, ity or camp. To ensure these mandates large numbers of detainees are expected. resulting in approximately 13,418 prison- are met, those responsible for the care, These headquarters need to include staff ers wanting to remain in Saudi custody.33 custody, and control of detainees can judge advocates, public affairs person- In Afghanistan, U.S. forces were up expect to be visited by the ICRC. The nel, and MP planners. Each day, senior against a mandated timeline in which mission statement of the ICRC calls for American commanders wake up with the their authority to hold detainees would an impartial, neutral, and independent best of intentions. Unfortunately, many expire on December 31, 2014. There organization whose exclusively humani- of the errors that have occurred in DO was a lack of clear guidance as to what to tarian mission is to protect the lives have involved the leadership responsible do with the remaining detainees, and at and dignity of victims of armed conflict for DO. These failures include ambiguity the tactical level it proved problematic. and other situations of violence and to in the chain of command, poor leader- Issues of this nature must be worked out provide detainees with assistance. Detain- ship, a lack of discipline and training, well in advance. ees are protected by the Geneva Conven- and vague rules of engagement.31 Thus, Lastly, current laws are outdated and tions, which also give the ICRC the right it is important to have a general officer/ have not been reevaluated to consider that to visit them. The main ICRC concern flag officer (GO/FO) as the commander we are not always going to be involved is that detainees are treated according to and deputy commander of this task in conflicts with nation-states. Both international humanitarian law. force. The immediate appointment of a U.S. statutes and international law must Camps and the process/methodol- GO/FO will allow the commander to be revamped to reflect the fact that the ogy of DO will be under scrutiny from conduct mission analysis and mission world has changed and nations may be in external sources such as the ICRC and command with a functional staff and conflict with terrorist organizations, trans- potentially allied nations that entrust the plan for DO appropriately. national criminal organizations, and lone United States to conduct theater-level The commander and deputy terrorist cells (or individual terrorists), all DO. A commander can also expect the commander will have an obligation of which make DO even more complex. national and international media to be to interact with the International These individuals may come from a very interested in reporting on DO. Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), failed or fragile state without an effective Regardless of how well a nation’s military international media, and key host-nation government or laws. There may be no is trained and resourced, there are going government officials. Lastly, the CJITF/ functioning government or government to be difficult times, and the media will 80 Commentary / Detention Operations as a Strategic Consideration JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Iraqi soldiers from 3rd Brigade, 5th Iraqi army, question apprehended insurgents at detainee collection point during Operation Peninsula, in Wasit Provence, Iraq, May 20, 2005 (U.S. Army/Arthur Hamilton) be there to exploit and report on the Bay), the planning, if done at all, was devote the time and manpower to DO errors of this operation, thus exposing not staffed or tested. Senior leaders must planning. Some may argue that it was potential incompetence or detainee consider the friction of war as described not a major concern, while others might mistreatment to the international com- by Carl von Clausewitz. Friction is caused suggest it just was not what warfighters munity. Detainees will ensure there are mainly by the dangers of war, its demand- do. Combat operations are hard, and mistakes and errors made by the guard ing physical efforts, and the presence of American Forces are subject to death. force as a means of continued resistance. unclear information—that is, the “fog There is no one that can disagree with This mission will also draw the interest of of war.” Additionally, one must always that reasoning. However, the United various entities within the Department of consider that everything in war is simple; States can ill-afford to win certain Defense, and the DO camp commander however, even the simplest thing can be phases while losing others, particularly will be inspected by various U.S. military difficult. Lastly, especially regarding DO, one that has captured the attention of entities to ensure compliance with appro- remember the old adage that the enemy the international media and various priate rules and regulations. will always get a vote and “Murphy” will human rights groups. The inability to If senior leaders are still concerned always be present. The failure to consider properly plan and resource DO has about “blowing things up,” they are at and plan for DO will create media sensa- resulted in unnecessary injury and death the tactical level of war and need to get tions, public discourse, and continued for American and allied warfighters. out of that mindset. GO/FOs responsible legal battles over detention procedures It has also resulted in increased scru- for the strategic/operational plans need that have the potential to jeopardize the tiny and embarrassment for the U.S. to conceptualize the battlefield and how mission. military, in particular senior leadership. the campaign will progress and plan both Elected officials have also come under strategically and operationally. In both the Conclusion inquiry based on this aspect of the plan. Korean War and the war on terror (includ- There may be great reasons why plan- Based on the foregoing discussion, no ing Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantánamo ners in previous engagements did not one can dispute the fact that tactical-level JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Hussey 81 15 DO can have strategic implications in the Ibid. 16 Richard W. Stewart, The United States international arena. Based on that logic, Army in Afghanistan: Operation Enduring New from NDU would it not make more sense to ensure Freedom, October 2001–March 2002 (Wash- the plan is intact while we are at peace, ington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military Press rather than try to create a plan, or im- History, n.d.). Center for the Study of Chinese prove on an unstaffed plan, during actual 17 See Adam Roberts, “The Prisoner Ques- Military Affairs tion: If the U.S. Has Acted Lawfully, What’s conflict? If the latter choice is made, then the Furor About?” Washington Post, February Strategic Forum 303 truly more Americans will be subjected 3, 2002. The PLA Beyond Asia: China’s to the brutalities of combat based on a 18 Eric Schmitt, “Career of General in Growing Military Presence in the Red changing or untested plan. This article Charge During Abu Ghraib May End, New Sea Region should serve as a notice to GO/FO and York Times, December 5, 2006. By Joel Wuthnow 19 Samuel L. Brenner, “‘I Am a Bit planners on CCMD staffs as to what they China has Sickened’: Examining Archetypes of Congres- can expect in this difficult but important sional War Crimes Oversight after My Lai and gradually mission. The U.S. military can no longer Abu Ghraib,” Military Law Review 205 (Fall expanded muddle its way into this aspect of the plan 2010), 1. its military 20 and then hope for success. Historically, Cheryl Benard et al., The Battle Behind footprint in the Wire: U.S. Prisoner and Detainee Operations that has proved ineffective and costly. JFQ the Red Sea from World War II to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011). region, an 21 Niall Ferguson, “Prisoner Taking and area of critical Notes Prisoner Killing in the Age of Total War: importance Towards a Political Economy of Military for global maritime commerce and 1 Defeat,” War in History 11, no. 2 (April 2004), Joint Publication (JP) 3-63, Detainee energy production. Key aspects Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 148–192. November 13, 2014). 22 Ibid. include a People’s Liberation Army 2 Allan R. Millet, The War for Korea, 1950– 23 Arnold Krammer, “Japanese Prisoners of role in United Nations peacekeep- 1951: They Came from the North (Lawrence: War in America,” Pacific Historical Review 52, ing, anti-piracy patrols, and a new University Press of Kansas, 2010). no. 1 (February 1983), 67–91. base in Djibouti. China’s military 3 24 John R. Brinkerhoff, Ted Silva, and John T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: The presence—its largest outside the Classic Korean War History (Washington, DC: Seitz, United States Army Reserve in Operation Potomac Books, Inc., 2000). Desert Storm. Enemy Prisoner of War Opera- Indo-Pacific—supports Beijing’s 4 Monica Kim, “Humanity Interrogated: tions: The 800th Military Police Brigade (Alexan- diplomatic relations in the region, Empire, Nation, and the Political Subject in dria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1992). contributes to China’s maritime U.S. and UN-Controlled POW Camps of the 25 James B. Brown, Erik W. Goepner, and security interests, and provides useful James M. Clark, “Detention Operations, Be- Korean War, 1942–1960” (Ph.D. diss., Univer- lessons in building an expedition- sity of Michigan, 2011). havior Modification, and Counterinsurgency,” 5 Lindesay Parrot, “Koje Riots Linked to Military Review, May–June 2009. ary capability. U.S. officials need to Truce Leaders,” New York Times, January 29, 26 Field Manual 3-63, Detainee Operations address operational safety and coun- 1953. (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department terintelligence issues and determine 6 Richard Peters and Xiaobing Li, Voices of the Army, 2014). whether China’s presence—which 27 Anne Speckhard and Ardian Shajkovci, from the Korean War: Personal Stories of Ameri- also includes military diplomacy and can, Korean, and Chinese Soldiers (Louisville: “Prison: Militant Jihadist Recruiting Grounds University Press of Kentucky, 2005). or Refuge for Rehabilitation?” Homeland Secu- arms sales—is eroding traditional 7 Fehrenbach, This Kind of War. rity Today, December 11, 2018. U.S. advantages as a security partner. 8 Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fight- 28 Brinkerhoff, Silva, and Seitz, United Opportunities for military coop- ing Front, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Office of States Army Reserve in Operation Desert Storm. eration should be explored in areas 29 Benard et al., The Battle Behind the Wire. the Chief of Military History, Department of where U.S. and Chinese interests the Army, 1970). 30 Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 9 The entire episode can be found in 435, After Action Report, November 2015. align, such as disaster management Harold J. Vetter, Mutiny on Koje Island (North 31 Paul T. Bartone, Lessons of Abu Ghraib: and maritime safety. Clarendon, VT: C.E. Tuttle Company, 1965), Understanding and Preventing Prisoner Abuse a must-read book for any officer involved in in Military Operations, Defense Horizons 64 detainee operations, including general and flag (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2008). officers. 32 William Roskey, Koje Island: The 1952 10 George Forty, At War in Korea (New Korean Hostage Crisis, The Land Warfare Pa- York: Random House, 1985). pers, No. 19 (Arlington, VA: Association of the 11 Vetter, Mutiny on Koje Island. United States Army, September 1994). 12 Ibid. 33 Brinkerhoff, Silva, and Seitz, United 13 Ibid. States Army Reserve in Operation Desert Storm. 14 James R. Schlesinger, chairman, Final Visit the NDU Press Web site for Report of the Independent Panel to Review more information on publications DOD Detention Operations (Washington, DC: at ndupress.ndu.edu Department of Defense, 2004). 82 Commentary / Detention Operations as a Strategic Consideration JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Screening Obscuration Module attached to Utility Task Vehicle activates autonomously during Robotic Complex Breach Concept on Yakima Training Center, Yakima, Washington, April 26, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Nathaniel Q. Hamilton) effective decisionmaking. While human intelligence is capable of operating in Transforming DOD a sparse data environment, many AI applications require big data sets to come into existence and continuous for Agile Multidomain data flows to effectively operate. Unlike the airplane and nuclear weapons, AI and autonomy will be best operational- Command and Control ized not by a dedicated Service or force structure devoted to their employment, but by their incorporation into the By Douglas O. Creviston existing forces in all domains. How might DOD need to change policy, leadership structures, and culture dvances in artificial intelligence weapons, these technologies are so regarding data in order to enable the (AI) and autonomous systems significant that the Department of adoption and maximum benefit of AI A offer enhanced military capa- Defense (DOD) should expect to and autonomous system technologies? bilities to those nations that adopt transform in order to fully realize their From the academic and business and operationalize these technologies. benefits. Without data, neither human communities, data science is defined as Much like the airplane or nuclear nor artificial intelligence has a basis for a “multidisciplinary field that concerns technologies, processes, and systems to extract knowledge and insight from Colonel Douglas O. Creviston, USAF, is Director of the Comparative Technology Office in the Office of the data and to support reasoning and Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. decisionmaking under various kinds JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Creviston 83 of uncertainty.”1 The field of data sci- A C2 support system, which includes in- analytical tools that enable real-time ence may be divided into two primary teroperable supporting communications governance of interactions and linkages activities: managing the data and using systems, is the JFC’s principal tool used to as determined by the JFC’s allocation (analyzing) the data. Many of the activi- collect, transport, process, share, and protect of decision rights. In addition, data ties of data science use AI and in turn data and information. To facilitate the science should be applied to each tenet support the development and operation execution and processes of C2, military and subdomain of C2—for example, by of autonomous systems. communications systems must furnish using recommender systems (market Advances in AI, autonomous rapid, reliable, and secure information basket analysis or others) to curate systems, and big data analytics are es- throughout the chain of command.4 information flows to decisionmakers pecially relevant to emerging concepts and operators at every level and in every of multidomain battle and associated Agile C2 theory helps explain the domain. multidomain command and control linkage between the function of C2 and David Perkins and James Holmes (MDC2). Existing C2 systems and con- the tool of the C2 support system by have described the concept of multido- cepts should be reconsidered in light of defining three dimensions that can char- main battle and the reason it is needed. the transformative potential of AI and au- acterize any approach to fulfilling the C2 Historically, each Service has developed tonomy. Such a reevaluation should start function: federated solutions (weapons, concepts, with proven C2 theory, modify existing capabilities) in that Service’s operational how decision rights are allocated C2 doctrine if needed, and redesign C2 •• domain. These were then “synchronized” how entities interact with one concepts and systems in order to gain ad- •• in a tailored joint response to a specific another (interactions) ditional capability. problem. The time and effort required how information is distributed While the development of data sci- •• to synchronize will not support future (linkages).5 ence technologies is important and mission success, and currently possible necessary, it is not sufficient. This article The JFC should define these dimen- mash-ups of federated capabilities will focuses on insights from the academic sions depending on the objectives, threat, still be vulnerable to fracture along and business data science communi- and environment. MDC2 fundamentally Service boundaries.7 Future C2 systems ties concerning the process and system asserts that future conflicts will require are already in development, includ- changes necessary to transform DOD C2 agility—the ability to alter decision ing the Air Force’s in-house reboot of to adopt AI and autonomy to MDC2. rights, interaction patterns, and informa- the canceled Falconer 10.2 upgrade, The recently released DOD Digital tion distribution to effectively integrate as well as the Army’s restructuring of Modernization Strategy contains objec- and synchronize operations across mul- the Warfighter Information Network– tives to modernize C2 infrastructure and tiple domains—in order to prevail. Tactical program and modernization of improve allied interoperability.2 The aca- the Nuclear Command, Control, and demic field of data science combines with Design for Agility in MDC2 Communication system. As these systems the theory of agile C2 to provide recom- C2 support systems should be designed are developed, key performance attributes mendations to enable agile, integrated to offer the JFC the maximum design should include integration and agility in MDC2 through the adoption of AI and space along the three dimensions of addition to basic network requirements autonomy. These recommendations agile C2 theory: decision rights, inter- such as cyber security, resilience, and so suggest policy and cultural changes to actions, and linkages.6 Design space forth. transform DOD for cognitive, algorith- is here used as the range of possible Future C2 systems must be integrated mic warfare. options for each of the three dimen- and agile. Joint Publication 1, Doctrine sions. Current C2 support systems for the Armed Forces of the United States, Agile C2 Theory constrain the C2 design space; deci- posits, “The simplest and most stream- Applied to MDC2 sion rights might not be allocated to lined chain of command can be thwarted According to joint doctrine, the desired subordinate commander by an absence of interoperability among “Command is the most important role because interactions and linkages are the components’ forces and systems.”8 undertaken by a JFC [joint force com- either not possible or do not meet Interoperability is no longer enough, as mander]. C2 is the means by which a requirements for rapidity, reliability, or Perkins and Holmes imply when they JFC synchronizes and/or integrates security. For example, a JFC may want state, “We must shift from a model of joint force activities. C2 ties together all to allocate the decision rights for air interdependence to one of integration.”9 the operational functions and tasks and defense of a certain sector to a particular Such an integrated architecture would applies to all levels of war and echelons field commander, but the interactions support the improvement they cite as of command.”3 The function (or action) and linkages may not support the flow most important: sensor-to-shooter webs. of command and control is separate of requisite data to the desired level of Investment should be made in automated from the C2 support systems and struc- field command. Data science can help data management tools (for example, a tures that enable it: through infrastructure designs and unit assigned a mission will automatically 84 Features / Transforming DOD for Agile Multidomain C2 JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Seaman uses handheld tablet to request resupply during Office of Naval Research demonstration of Autonomous Aerial Cargo/Utility System, giving capability to helicopters for unmanned flight, Quantico, Virginia, February 25, 2014 (U.S. Navy/John F. Williams) be routed intelligence feeds related to information and authority to all the right developing those networks. The Services that mission and operational feeds related nodes becomes immense.11 C2 agility is develop networks to meet their own to relevant missions in every domain). required to meet this challenge. needs, on their own acquisition sched- As an example, near-future inte- Agility is here defined as adaptability ules, with interoperability requirements grated air and missile defense (IAMD) (ability to change with the situation) with imposed from the Joint Staff. This lack of against peer competitors in an anti- the added qualities of ease and timeli- synchronization in acquisition and devel- access/area-denial environment will ness of adaptation.12 Agility is achieved opment results in integration challenges rely on improved integration and in different ways depending on the at- and reduced C2 capability.13 information-sharing between sensors tribute that must be changed. Agility Current C2 systems constrain the (often multirole) and shooters (often in infrastructure may mean procuring JFC’s ability to allocate decision rights multiuse).10 Rear Admiral Archer Macy, multiple pathways for data and design- by limiting the linkages that are possible USN (Ret.), now a member of the ing automated or low-work methods for or permissible and what information can Missile Defense Project at the Center switching between them. Agility in analy- flow over the set of possible linkages. for Strategic and International Studies, sis may come through data management They are not integrated or agile enough identified employment and C2 doctrine able to provide comprehensive data in an to support MDC2. These systems have as one of the biggest challenges facing environment populated with open-source grown out of organizational, cultural, IAMD in the transition to a distributed or licensed tools and a workforce trained and security decisions that shaped previ- defense approach. When two military to use them. ous system design and operational use. Services are shooting using sensor data The need for tactical and C2 networks At the turn of the century, DOD leaders from four military Services and national to be integrated runs counter to the sought to apply network technology and agencies, the challenge of allocating organizational and funding approaches to concepts to remake the Armed Forces. JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Creviston 85 What can we learn from the 2003 DOD changes to adapt. What factors limited DOD problems with implementa- Net-Centric Data Strategy and resulting the realization of the strategy? tion of the strategy have cost billions of attempts to remake C2 networks and Priscilla Guthrie, a key instigator of dollars, years of effort, and lost combat tactical network systems? the strategy and DOD deputy CIO at the effectiveness. As a foundational step time, identified communication as a cen- toward effective MDC2, senior leaders Lessons from the DOD Net- tral shortcoming. In 2003, data science should address the key factors contribut- Centric Data Strategy advocates failed to clearly communicate ing to that failure. The strategy was not Network-centric warfare was introduced the business and operational case for im- a perfect document, and network-centric by Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, plementing the data strategy. The theory warfare was not a perfect concept, but Dave Alberts, and John Garstka in of information, semantic technology, those imperfections will be an inherent the late 1990s. It sought to maximize technical capabilities of information tech- part of current and future strategy and combat power through the effective nology, and computer science jargon was concept development. The new DOD linking (networking) of geographically meaningless to most DOD senior leaders, Digital Modernization Strategy outlines dispersed forces, resulting in shared military and civilian alike.17 Private-sector a strategic plan for resource investment battlespace awareness that enables self- examples of effective data science existed, in fiscal years 2019 to 2023 and con- synchronization and synergistic action.14 but they were nascent. In this respect, tinues with many themes evolved from The information technology imple- the situation is somewhat better in 2020 network-centric warfare and the 2003 mentation of network-centric warfare as private-sector success stories abound data strategy, but with greater specific- inspired the 2003 strategy.15 in the business results of data-centric ity of mission objectives and a plan for The strategy sought to remake companies such as Google, Amazon, incorporating cutting-edge information department data flow from prescribed Microsoft, and Facebook, and popular in- technologies. To effectively execute digi- point-to-point transfers across highly terest in AI/machine learning is captured tal modernization of DOD, senior leaders controlled interfaces to flexible many- by public demonstrations from AlphaGo will need to resolve important cost- to-many interchanges within a global to autonomous package delivery. benefit tradeoff decisions that were and enterprise data environment. It sup- Leadership support in 2003 was will be inherent to any major policy, or- ported the DOD chief information neither sustained nor strong due to ganizational, and resourcing shifts. Data officer (CIO) goal to “populate the leadership transitions and lack of under- science as an academic discipline offers network with all data (intelligence, non- standing. According to Guthrie, DOD insights that can guide leadership deci- intelligence, raw, and processed)”—a did not have the human resources to ef- sions. Individual applications will pose wide goal that has not been realized fectively acquire, implement, and operate unique challenges and require unique to this day with separate networks for a modern data infrastructure and failed solutions, but data science provides the intelligence and non-intelligence data. to develop viable contract vehicles to theoretical principles and disciplined Furthermore, the strategy proposed to remedy the shortfall.18 Implementation process by which the department can change the paradigm to “post before of the data strategy also stalled because adopt AI and autonomy to turn data into processing” rather than waiting to post of the failure to field a viable metadata military capability. after completion of a “processing, ex- registry and data catalog, necessary to ploitation, dissemination” cycle. Other any effective execution of data science. Data Science Defined features still relevant yet unfulfilled DOD failed to enact a viable resourcing To reiterate, data science is “a multidis- include an enterprise metadata registry, plan to support the strategy. As a cross- ciplinary field that concerns technolo- a data catalogue, and establishment of cutting, foundational capability, data gies, processes, and systems to extract interface standards to facilitate flexible infrastructure needed a single champion knowledge and insight from data and to interfaces unforeseen during develop- to advocate for investment and a stable, support reasoning and decisionmaking ment of an information system. The multiyear funding stream. under various kinds of uncertainty.”19 strategy defined data attributes essential The 2003 strategy was a forward- This field may be divided into two to meeting performance goals—data thinking document that failed to achieve primary activities: managing the data was to become visible, accessible, insti- the desired result. The primary reasons and using (analyzing) the data. Data tutionalized, understandable, trusted, for that failure were lack of leadership management encompasses the collec- interoperable, and responsive to user support due to lack of understand- tion, storage, cleaning, engineering, needs.16 The goals of the strategy are ing; failure to make necessary cultural, and monitoring activities required to echoed in recent DOD and Service organizational, and policy changes; give data the desired attributes that guidance; they are still relevant and inadequate in-house human resources make it useful.20 To be useful, data must desirable but have proved elusive. The and failure to acquire adequate external be visible, accessible, understandable, strategy accurately understood impor- human resources; and inadequate finan- trustworthy, and interoperable.21 Data tant shifts in the global information cial resources due to a flawed funding is used through data analytics in activi- environment and proposed sweeping strategy. ties also known as business intelligence 86 Features / Transforming DOD for Agile Multidomain C2 JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Fourth-year Ph.D. student Mark Velednitsky, University of California, Berkeley, discusses his research during Naval Postgraduate School Operations Research Department’s second annual Day of Data, Decisions, and Defense, Monterey, California, August 27, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Javier Chagoya) and big data analytics and encompasses Internet of Things promises penetration and processing of data at the point of descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive of this sense/store/compute/network storage (virtualization). These advances analytics. This article includes within structure into previously data-sparse combine to make statistical concepts that the definition of data science the man- environments. The resulting flood of were prohibitively expensive in either agement and organizational processes data renders legacy human-centered time or money practical for a wide range and systems necessary to enable the approaches to analysis and decisionmak- of users. application of data management and ing ineffective; the dominant challenge Data science enables one to sense analytics technologies—sometimes also has changed from one of sensing and reality in many ways and then perform referred to as the “digital transforma- collecting data to one of processing, computationally expensive but con- tion” or “digital modernization” of an cataloguing, searching, and verifying ceptually simple algorithms to allow organization. useful data. These forcing technologies an intelligence (human or artificial) to have combined to increase the volume, understand reality more fully and ac- Data Science: Forcing, Enabling, velocity, and variety of relevant data curately. Technologies enabled by data and Enabled Technologies beyond the capability of legacy infra- science include descriptive, predictive, Forcing technologies push data science structure and analytic capabilities. and prescriptive analytics, AI, and au- by creating data problems requiring Data science often uses statistical tonomy. Major technological trends have data science to solve. The prolifera- methods that are old concepts applied in dramatically changed the volume, variety, tion of sensors, storage and computing new ways. The key enabling technologies and velocity of data available for MDC2 power, and network connectivity has have been increased computing process- as well as the operational benefit that may resulted in substantial growth in the ing power and memory at decreased cost, be gained from that data. Extracting that volume and variety of data that must increased data generation throughout the operational benefit requires overcoming be managed. Practicing data analyt- environment, and massive parallel data the obstacles that derailed full implemen- ics creates new data about data. The architectures that enable efficient storage tation of the 2003 data strategy. JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Creviston 87 Recommendations make foundational decisions to achieve policy. Leaders from the top down should for Agile MDC2 coherence among data management, data recognize the value of sharing data and Proposals to enable effective MDC2 are analytics, and the overall strategy and tra- require open analysis, including the shar- derived from historical examples and jectory of DOD as AI and autonomous ing of underlying data as well as analytic civilian literature on digital transforma- technologies are acquired and fielded. At methodologies to support evidence-based tion of complex business operations. the department level, leaders can learn decisions. To support and encourage a DOD has repeatedly fallen short of from civilian management experiences of culture of data-sharing, policy should be strategic goals relative to data and transforming companies and institutions shaped to promote the needed analysis to network-centric warfare, in part due to to inform difficult tradeoff decisions. generate decision-quality evidence with excessive focus on the technology and Transitioning C2 from an industrial-age the minimum interference required for acquisition thereof. The Defense Inno- approach to an AI-enhanced one will governance and security needs. vation Board captured the link between require leaders to initiate and sustain the Recommendation Three: Leadership the first three recommendation areas transformation with a changing threat Should Issue Clear, Consistent Policy when it stated, “Since many of the environment and emerging multidomain Promoting Data Availability at Department’s challenges with data are battle concepts. This includes the devel- Acceptable Risk. Senior leader calls for cultural (that is, DOD organizations are opment and acquisition of C2 support innovation and rapid acquisition are not used to collecting or sharing data), systems that maximize the design space sometimes undercut by data governance the Secretary’s role in this endeavor is available to JFCs and that are delivered policy (or lack thereof) that allows critical, particularly because new policy integrated and agile to support joint and compartmentalization to persist. This and legal frameworks will be necessary coalition operations. The acquisition of is a problem that subordinate units to change the status quo.”22 None of such systems may require a different al- are unable to solve in a timely manner. these recommendations are binary; each location of acquisition resources and/ Governance policy should cover data requires leadership judgment to select or oversight in order to synchronize ownership, access, use, protection, and an approach that balances present and disparate efforts. Instead of viewing data disposition. In addition, governance future risk, funding limitations, statu- science (or AI or autonomy) as a tool to could extend to validation of data sets as tory authority, and so forth. Leandro be bought, commanders should recog- authoritative or of analysis as technically Dallemule and Thomas Davenport nize data science as a discipline practiced sound. Data sets will have unique risk/ have discussed how leaders can define to enable better decisionmaking.24 This reward characteristics based on their the overall posture of an organization recognition should include experimenta- content and potential uses. As with any relative to “offensive” and “defensive” tion with different allocations of decision policy, data governance policy should be uses of data and show how different rights, interactions, and linkages to clear and consistent to define the bound- governance, organizational structures, explore the effects of different concepts aries of acceptable action and promote and resourcing approaches are best in contested peer conflict. Without senior freedom within those boundaries. In suited to each set of uses.23 The foun- leader support to initiate and persistently addition to clarity and consistency, policy dational concept behind these recom- support the application of data science, should be evaluated over time to deter- mendations, born out of a reading of the existing conflicts among policy, mine effectiveness. This evaluation should the civilian literature on data science organizational priorities, and parochial be an explicit part of joint exercises and and digital modernization, is that senior interests will continue to forestall system operations; if data-sharing policy does not leaders should take a holistic approach design, acquisition, experimentation, and support mission success, the policy must to transform DOD for the application operational execution of MDC2. be changed. of AI and autonomous technologies, Recommendation Two: DOD Senior Recommendation Four: Develop for both MDC2 and other mission Leaders Should Promote Cultural a Methodology for Assessing the Value areas. The 2019 DOD Digital Modern- Values of Data Collection, Evidence, of Sharing Data. For classified and ization Strategy outlines ambitious and and Cooperation (Data-Sharing). DOD compartmented data, “need to know” much-needed goals and objectives to does not appropriately value data. Data is is a policy, not only a cultural mindset. transform DOD. What are the difficult valued relative to the primary purpose for Security policy is authoritative, com- policy, cultural, and organizational which it is collected. One tenet of data municating leadership decisions about tradeoffs leaders should expect to make, science is that data is inherently valuable the acceptable risk/reward ratio for and what resources are available to and may be used to extract value in many data access. To support those decisions, support those decisions? ways beyond the purposes for which it estimates should be developed for the Recommendation One: Senior was originally collected. damage to national security due both to Leaders Should Implement Data Science The dominant DOD cultural value information escape and ill-informed deci- as a Multidisciplinary Field to Guide regarding data is one of protection within sions or to operational failures because Transformation of Policy, Organization, organizations on the smallest level—ex- of incomplete information. A well-struc- and Resourcing Decisions. Leaders must cept where forced by leader action or tured data science effort should consider 88 Features / Transforming DOD for Agile Multidomain C2 JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Army UH-60 “Blackhawk” flies in formation over Yamaguchi Bay, Japan, during premier U.S. Army and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force bilateral field training exercise Orient Shield 2019, September 9, 2019 (U.S. Army/Jacob Kohrs) a means of quantifying these two esti- in information security that comes with of operational or intelligence data to a mates (loss due to sharing and loss due increased access to the information. subordinate decisionmaker or operator). to not sharing) into a decision support Recommendation Five: Vest Security Furthermore, some intelligence and system for information-sharing decisions. Decision Authority Where Risk and acquisition agencies restrict the range of Such decisions may include lowering the Reward Meet, at an Appropriate possible information linkages available classification level of information over Level Within the Chain of Command. to the operational commander through time, sharing information with certain Commanders at every level should compartmentalization or special access allies or coalition partners, or removing be given clear, expanded “right to programs. The chain of command should a compartmentation or special access share” authority over information and be given a right to share authority over program caveat to allow wider aware- information systems. In addition to all information the commander has access ness and incorporation of an operational providing a decision support system for to for all members, U.S. and coalition, capability. Leadership statements about information-sharing decisions, policy under his or her command. This right to the importance of concepts, such as should be changed to vest those deci- share will likely require limits to protect sensor-shooter networks in multidomain sions in the chain of command. Existing strategic interests and/or prevent the battle and technologies such as AI, to vic- policy puts operational effectiveness at present chain of command from reaping tory in future conflict must be converted risk by endowing security professionals current rewards at the cost of increased into security policy changes that permit outside and disconnected from the chain future risk. adoption of those concepts and technolo- of command with final authority for As an example, a joint task force gies with appropriate, accepted risk to information-sharing decisions, at both commander may be given authority to information flows. There are technologies the infrastructure level (network infra- share classified information not specifi- to improve the risk/reward ratio of in- structure authority to connect/authority cally cleared for foreign disclosure with a formation-sharing decisions, but these do to operate) and the operational level (the coalition partner who possesses a compa- not fully resolve the inherent reduction ability to disclose a particular element rable security clearance. As an additional JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Creviston 89 10 example, a combatant commander may even integration, of data networks to Thomas Karako and Wes Rumbaugh, Distributed Defense: New Operational Concepts be given authority to grant access to be successful. Across the range from for Integrated Air and Missile Defense (Wash- special access programs to members of competition to conflict, joint force com- ington, DC: Center for Strategic and Interna- his or her command deemed necessary, manders will need maximum design tional Studies [CSIS], January 2018), available but subject to the limitation that those space in the three agile C2 dimensions at 90 Features / Transforming DOD for Agile Multidomain C2 JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Marine with 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, carries sandbag to strengthen security post during reinforcement of U.S. Embassy Compound in Baghdad, January 4, 2020 (U.S. Marine Corps/Kyle C. Talbot) Disciplined Lethality Expanding Competition with Iran in an Age of Nation-State Rivalries By Scott J. Harr he United States had formerly neither new nor unanticipated. As artic- power in efforts to “expand” the compe- enjoyed distinct competitive ulated in the 2018 National Defense tition, which implies a preference to keep T advantages prosecuting armed Strategy (NDS), strategic competition competition at levels of confrontation at conflict in the war on terror around the between the world’s Great Powers will the level beneath open warfare. As one of globe. However, the swift ascension of define the new operational environ- the four states identified in the NDS and states such as China, Russia, and Iran ment moving forward.1 Rising near- the Middle East’s preeminent near-peer in terms of regional and global capabili- peer competitors are using innovative adversary of the United States, Iran natu- ties to project power, coupled with the technology and seizing on ambiguities rally dominates discussions on emerging exhausting U.S. focus on defeating within the new and emerging bat- security challenges, and senior leaders violent extremist organizations over tlespace to make strategic gains on the from the highest echelons of defense the better part of two decades, requires margins of peace that nullify or bypass policy have prioritized countering Iran’s a reevaluation of strategy. This shift is traditional American strengths. “malign” influence in the region.3 The NDS has fittingly put a premium Given the above, the intent of this on “expanding the competitive space” article is to analyze the nature and pros- with adversaries.2 While prioritizing lethal pects of expanding strategic competition Major Scott J. Harr, USA, is a Company Commander in 5th Special Forces Group force, the NDS also identifies the impera- with Iran in the Middle East. In order to (Airborne). tive to leverage all elements of national best understand the nature of strategic JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Harr 91 Republic of Korea army soldiers stand resolute at Joint Security Area where South and North Korean soldiers stand face-to-face across Korean Demilitarized Zone, Panmunjom, South Korea, June 19, 2018 (U.S. Army/Richard Colletta) competition with Iran, it is first necessary the best chance to stabilize the Middle tive strategy with an eye toward recom- to identify some unique aspects of Iran East amid robust Iranian efforts to the mending effective counterstrategies, it as a near-peer adversary compared to contrary. is useful to compare the attributes of other states. This article first distills the how the four states directly compete salient factors that impact approaches to Gray Zone Competition: A with the United States on the global strategic competition with Iran. Next, Near-Peer Without Peer stage. In defining direct competition, it analyzes the pertinent dynamics gov- The NDS primarily speaks of national the avenues available for direct engage- erning strategic competition given the threats emanating from four nations: ment, the presence or lack of direct prevailing competitive approaches that China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. threats emanating from competitor undergird each country. Finally, based All these states currently compete countries, and the level of innovation on the preceding analysis and findings, against the United States in what some involved in actions that directly target it offers recommendations for strategic have termed the gray zone, which, as the United States comprise the lens for actions to guide U.S. competition against noted by scholar Van Jackson, gener- this analysis. While other important Iran and steer approaches to favorable ally denotes types of conflict “short and significant indirect categories of outcomes for U.S. interests. Competitive of war” or, essentially, “non-war interaction exist, such as economic actions and strategies that are attuned to competition” between states.4 Near- relations and the third-party allies and the unique aspects of Iran as a near-peer peer competition in the gray zone is adversaries of the state threats, this adversary and that account for the exist- not created equal, and the four states analysis focuses on direct actions only. ing dynamics governing Iran’s approach identified in the NDS go about their In this way, unique elements of Iran’s to competition in the Middle East stand competition differently and take up direct competitive tactics and strategy a better chance of thwarting Iranian decidedly diverse competitive strategies emerge that ultimately impact the attempts to undermine U.S. power and tactics undermining U.S. interests range of feasible and desirable U.S. and influence in the space between war and sovereignty. Therefore, in order to approaches to engaging in strategic and peace. Such actions also represent isolate the character of Iran’s competi- competition with Tehran. 92 Features / Disciplined Lethality JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 As a starting point for analyzing the such, a broader range of options likely and asserts its foreign policy objectives direct attributes of near-peer competition exists for the United States to engage in even without a buildup of conventional from the four states, it is perhaps best to strategic competition options that inte- military power. Lacking the resources examine what (if any) other elements of grate all elements of national power and of a Great Power state, Iran neverthe- national power (besides military action) imply a supporting role for the military. less effectively undermines the security exist as a venue for engagement. Both On the other hand, both North Korea interests of more powerful ones (namely Russia and China maintain diplomatic and Iran routinely issue hostile threats the United States and Israel) by training, relations with the United States, which of lethal force against the United States arming, and advising capable nonstate instantly expands the possibilities for while openly flaunting destabilizing actors. As noted by Van Jackson, the use strategic competition by leveraging military activities such as ballistic missile of proxies is a classic tactic employed in diplomacy as a cornerstone element of testing. These bellicose threats, coupled gray zone competition and allows the ag- U.S. power. President Donald Trump has with the lack of diplomatic relations, gressor to offer credible threats of force/ held direct talks with both his Russian restrict the elements of national power retaliation while also obfuscating the ac- and Chinese counterparts during his that can be leveraged in competition tual role of official state apparatus in the term.5 Such avenues for dialogue make while also instantly ushering the military support of proxy forces.13 communicating intentions and potentially to the forefront of competitive actions to Using the analytical framework dis- de-escalating tension profoundly simpler counter the threats. cussed above, Iran’s direct approach to and, by default, augment the range of op- Finally, the nature of strategic com- strategic competition is unique among tions available during gray zone conflict. petition between the United States and the four states. In general, it may be By contrast, limited diplomatic channels the four states can be examined in terms stated that the Iranian “brand” of com- exist between the United States, North of the level of innovation demonstrated petition restricts the use of all elements Korea, and Iran. This characteristic in competitive actions. As noted by of national power, takes an overtly hostile is primarily what distinguishes these General Joseph Dunford, modern war- tone, and employs traditional tactics of states as “rogue” regimes in the NDS. fare is changing with the advent of new gray zone warfare. In this sense, Iran rep- While President Trump has held direct technologies that near-peer states exploit resents a “near peer without peer”—that talks with Kim Jong-un and offered to to make operational gains at the expense is, competitive responses to Iran will have meet with President Hasan Rohani, the of U.S. power.9 For instance, Russia has to address a distinctly Iranian brand of lack of official relations and absence of used information operations in creative competition. These aspects also ensure U.S. Embassies in either country pro- and plausibly deniable ways to hedge the that the starting point for strategic com- mote hostility while straining efforts at sovereignty of neighboring states and petition with Iran appears decidedly more communication.6 even allegedly influence democratic elec- aggressive in nature than other threat Related to the presence or lack of tions in the United States.10 Likewise, states and perhaps diminishes the pros- diplomatic channels between the United North Korea allegedly perpetrated a pects for expanding competition using States and the four states is the presence massive cyber hack of Sony to undermine softer elements of national power that or absence of overtly hostile threats of and delay the release of a commercial film keep the competition beneath thresholds force emanating from these competitors. portraying the North Korean regime in of warfare. Both China and Russia have refrained a negative light.11 Not to be outdone, from issuing direct threats of lethal China continues to build man-made Hard Truths About force against the United States despite islands to extend its sovereignty in the Soft Approaches pointed clashes over issues of sovereignty South China Sea and use “debt warfare” In addition to seemingly having fewer and economic flashpoints. Indeed, the in Africa to assume control of massive elements of national power at its dis- United States and Russia have gone resources and infrastructure on the posal to expand competition with Iran, to great lengths to coordinate and de- continent.12 the United States must contend with conflict their respective actions in the All these activities represent innova- several constraining dynamics regarding military conflict in Syria to avoid direct tive competitive actions that exploit its competition with Iran that impact confrontation, despite finding them- technological advances that make attribu- its strategic approach. Perhaps chief selves on opposite sides of the conflict.7 tion difficult or sovereignty issues where among these dynamics is what might For its part, China and the United States policy to guide behavior is currently be termed the competition paradox have recently entered a period of détente limited or vague. Iran stands alone in its that governs the competitive actions of in a bitter contest of wills regarding in- competitive activities in that it has primar- both the United States and Iran in the ternational trade and commerce.8 These ily relied on more traditional tactics to Middle East. Simply put, the competi- dynamics signify that nations, while compete in the gray zone. Using a net- tion paradox theorizes that the freer a fiercely competitive and assertive in work of proxy forces across the Middle country’s civil society, the less free it fighting for their interests, are reticent to East (notably in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and is to compete in the gray zone. Coun- escalate competition to open warfare. As Yemen), Iran successfully projects power terintuitively, a free society’s liberal JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Harr 93 values and democratic processes have a and societal freedom than Iran, from the According to the competition para- constraining effect on the range of com- strategic competition standpoint dictated dox, Iran is both freer to compete in the petitive actions available in gray zone by the competition paradox, Iran is free Middle East and more resolved to do so. competition. Societies based on liberal and the United States is not. Iran, there- Perhaps no one better personified these democratic ideals that cherish pluralism, fore, enjoys a competitive advantage as it advantages and their effects on Iran’s individual liberty, and universal human presses its foreign policy objectives in the approach to competition in the Middle rights will in general impose limits on Middle East. East than General Qasem Soleimani, the their leaders that restrict competitive Iran’s competitive advantage over leader of Iran’s special forces (Quds Force) actions that fall outside liberal societal the United States is not only derived and trusted advisor and instrument of values. Activities such as arming ter- from the greater degree of freedom it the supreme leader himself. His recent rorist groups, conducting cyber attacks enjoys prosecuting its competitive ac- death only highlights his impact within on civilian populations, and blatantly tions but also stems from diverging and Iran and in the region. As a main architect violating national sovereignty (all misaligned perspectives on the stakes of and executor of Iran’s foreign policies in actions taken recently by nondemocratic the competition itself. For Iran, the stakes the Middle East, Soleimani was revered near-peer competitors) represent unac- of its competition are its very existence, in military circles for his success in pros- ceptable actions that will likely not be and it therefore perceives its competitive ecuting asymmetric military operations sustainable or viable by the ruling elite actions as moves made in a “war of ne- that stymied many regional adversaries in a democratic country with a free civil cessity,” waged for its survival. As noted and blunted the objectives of regional society. by Afshon Ostovar in his seminal work and foreign powers—including the Naturally, there is some subjectivity Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, United States—in the Middle East. While and relativism at play here. The United and the Revolutionary Guard, since the Soleimani was undoubtedly a gifted leader States, as a leading democratic state, has establishment of the Islamic Republic who deserved credit for his role helping undoubtedly perpetrated questionable or of Iran in 1979, Iran has viewed Israel Iran achieve its foreign policy objectives dubious competitive actions to achieve as a mortal and existentially threatening through asymmetric military approaches, its interests in the past in spite of societal enemy. Its foreign policy actions, there- he did not have the mystical prowess or values. However, the important principle fore, endeavor to combat and ultimately supernatural special warfare abilities fre- that undergirds the competition paradox defeat Israel. Indeed, Iran has persistently quently alluded to or ascribed to him in is that in a free civil society, opposition framed its wars and conflicts in terms contemporary literature. He was, rather, voices are always present and active, and of creating a “road to Israel” to destroy the beneficiary of the dynamics described when thresholds of discontent emerge its nemesis.14 In this regional power above: freer to compete and competing from the public, democratic mechanisms imbalance, as Kenneth Waltz observes, with more resolve. Bluntly, Soleimani’s exist to transition the ruling political Iran views itself as a lone Persian state gloves were off in competitive approaches power to entities more aligned with the surrounded by Arabs and within striking designed to preserve and save the Iranian dominant societal values. Conversely, in distance of an enemy capable of destroy- state, while U.S. gloves remain cautiously less free states (like Iran), no mechanisms ing it.15 In this context, the stakes could on as it fights to merely protect its interests exist to transition political power, which not be higher for Iran, and thus Iran’s abroad. The implications of the U.S.- makes leaders freer to pursue whatever risk tolerance and resolve to engage in Iranian competitive dynamics described agenda and interests they choose with lit- competition are high. conveyed decisive advantages to Iran and tle restraint and no political constituency Conversely, for the United States, cast doubt on the viability and prospects to worry about. In Iran, the religious rul- conflicts in the Middle East represent a of U.S. efforts to expand the competition ing elite have effectively eliminated civil war of choice, where only interests—not using reciprocal and/or softer means. society and concentrated all meaningful existence—are at stake. The risk tolerance Only time will tell if his death will change political power in unelected bodies and and resolve for competitive actions in these dynamics and in what ways. individuals. Their actions and foreign wars of choice are decidedly lower. This policy agendas are carried out with lim- misalignment in perspectives between A Color Evolution: Green- ited or no opposition and with nothing Iran and the United States regarding Lighting Red Lines in but the whim of the supreme leader to strategic competition is presumably why the Gray Zone guide and direct them. This is one reason Iran is seeking to develop its lethal ca- Those who are quick to call for regime why Iran can arm paramilitary groups and pabilities, apparently unafraid to escalate change or war with Iran are often nonstate proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, the conflict, while the United States is pejoratively labeled Iran hawks for their and Yemen that degrade regional stability seeking to de-escalate the competition aggressive stance. By definition, Iran and engage in terrorist tactics that have by expanding it to elements of national hawks have given up hope on the pros- been widely condemned by the inter- power that stand a better chance of keep- pects for competition in the gray zone. national community. While the United ing the competition beneath the level of Yet even given the grim prognosis on the States enjoys vastly greater individual open warfare. current state of competitive play between 94 Features / Disciplined Lethality JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 the United States and Iran, prospects and that negotiations with U.S. officials lethal response as inevitably escalating for effective competition in the gray represent fruitless and capricious efforts. the conflict into just the type of open zone with Iran exist and should be fully As a result, the Middle East remains a and large-scale warfare that competitive explored before giving in to the gravi- gray zone competitive arena that has seen strategies should be avoiding. However, tational pull of yet another large-scale an increase in Iranian capabilities and lethal responses to Iran should not be military conflict in the Middle East. influence with a corresponding decrease automatically equated with an invitation Van Jackson notes that aggressors in U.S. credibility and capability to deter to open warfare. It is possible to leverage often make operational gains in the gray Iranian behavior. lethal capabilities in competition without zone by taking advantage of either weak To decisively reverse this trend, escalating the conflict to open warfare. or nonexistent red lines from defenders.16 the United States can introduce and The U.S. response to the Syrian regime’s In this context, red lines refer to explicit, implement red lines that clearly specify use of chemical weapons in Ghouta il- clearly communicated, and/or codified in unacceptable Iranian behavior and, criti- lustrates this point. After the Syrian regime international law boundaries that serve to cally, enforce them with disciplined lethal reportedly used chemical weapons in an govern behavior in the gray zone. These actions to ensure Iran pays a proportion- attack on opposition fighters, U.S. planes lines specify consequences for aggressive ate price for unacceptable competitive bombed regime infrastructure to send a actors that cross them. Additionally, the actions. Implementing red lines with message that such behavior would not be consequences specified for crossing red lethal consequences yields two advantages tolerated.17 In a crisis where U.S. and re- lines must be credible in order to have to U.S. competition with Iran. First, it gime forces have delicately avoided direct the desired deterrent effect. That is, clearly delineates acceptable and unac- confrontation, the bombing did not lead aggressors must believe that defenders ceptable behavior in the gray zone that to an escalation in conflict. Additionally, it will follow through on the punitive ac- would diminish Iran’s ability to exploit is worth reiterating that the centerpiece of tions promised for violations of red lines. ambiguity in the Middle East. Identifying Iranian competitive activity in the Middle Without clear and credible red lines, ag- such actions as transporting lethal aid East hinges on proxy forces created and gressors can exploit ambiguity and a lack shipments to proxy forces, conducting leveraged specifically because Iran lacks of credibility to make competitive gains. ballistic missile tests, and closing the the military resources to support large-scale In the current U.S.-Iranian competitive Strait of Hormuz as unacceptable and conflict with an advanced state. Bluntly, environment, Iran exploits this dynamic punishable behavior begins to clarify Iran uses proxy forces because it has to to increase its capabilities to wage war in expected behavior in U.S.-Iranian com- use them, as it lacks fully developed con- the Middle East at the expense of U.S. petition. Second, imposing disciplined, ventional military capabilities. This reality credibility. U.S. responses lack either lethal costs on Iran for unacceptable lessens the chance that targeted lethal the force or credibility to deter Iranian behavior activates and leverages the main strikes against Iran would goad it into a competitive gains. Sanctions, for example, U.S. strength in interstate competition: war that it is clearly unprepared to fight. while crippling the Iranian public and lethal capabilities. Targeting the Iranian Second, critics of this proposed inducing massive hardship in society, are military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard strategy will also cite the risks to U.S. too easily circumvented by the ruling Corps, or the regime’s infrastructure and allied forces from the highly capable regime and its international allies to stand after red line violations would be lethal Iranian proxies in the region. In this line a real chance at dislodging the regime or enough to send a strong message. It of thinking, lethal strikes from the United compelling it to change its foreign poli- would degrade Iranian capability but States would beget lethal responses from cies. In this case, the U.S. competitive be sufficiently targeted to impose costs Iranian proxies that could potentially action lacks the force necessary to counter only on the offending security or state devolve into a violent back-and-forth Iranian competition. A competitive action apparatus so as not to signal an appetite contest of wills between U.S. allies in that is an example of a lack of credibility for large-scale combat. Imposing red lines the region and Iranian proxies leading is the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint in the U.S.-Iranian competition enforced to destabilization. But these proxies are Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). with lethal capabilities applied in a tar- already destabilizing the region with With that agreement in 2015, the United geted fashion represents the best way to relative impunity. Backing Palestinian States and its allies attempted to impose effectively compete in a Middle Eastern terrorist groups against Israel, stalling the limits on Iran’s potential to develop gray zone, where Iran already holds many formation of a legitimate government nuclear weapons capabilities in exchange advantages, without giving in to hasty in Lebanon, forming paramilitary forces for sanctions relief. However, less than and myopic Iran hawk impulses advocat- in Iraq, and arming a violent insurgency 2 years after the deal’s implementation, ing regime change through large-scale in Yemen show that Iran’s destabiliz- President Trump withdrew from it. combat. ing fingerprints are all over the major Among other consequences of scrapping Critics of this recommendation are regional conflicts. Implementing red the JCPOA, the withdrawal likely sent likely to raise two main issues with the lines that carry a lethal response would a clear message to Iran that American red line and lethal strike competition simply make Iran pay a price for actions actions and agreements lack credibility strategy. First, they are likely to see the it already conducts. Furthermore, Iran’s JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Harr 95 ability to scale and obfuscate its support approach. The competition paradox Jong Un,” Washington Post, March 8, 2018, available at 96 Features / Disciplined Lethality JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Combat controller watches as C-17 Globemaster III, assigned to 17th Weapons Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, lands on airstrip in Nevada Test and Training Range during joint forcible entry exercise, June 16, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Kevin Tanenbaum) he nature of troop dispositions coupled with the expanse of Countering A2/AD in T ocean and numerous islands scattered in the Indo-Pacific region compels the redevelopment of con- the Indo-Pacific ventional forcible-entry amphibious capability in the U.S. Army for deploy- ment and maneuver. As Commander- A Potential Change for the in-Chief Far East, General Douglas MacArthur made this assessment over Army and Joint Force half a century ago, but it deserves intel- lectual inquiry and dialogue in the con- By Hassan M. Kamara temporary period based on the growing strategic competition and potential for conflict between the United States and its allies and China in the Indo-Pacific. The Commander-in-Chief, Far East, considers amphibious Furthermore, this assessment deserves contemplation based on the Army’s training to have unusual significance and importance in the ongoing conceptualization of multido- Far East Command since the nature of troop dispositions and main formations to help future joint force commanders apply the Service’s geography in the theater are such that a continuous requirement capabilities across all domains, thereby exists for the training of troops in over-water movement. —Letter from General HQ, Far East Command to ACofS G3 Operations, Headquarters Department of the Army, April 3, 1950 Major Hassan M. Kamara, USA, is an Officer in the U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center. He recently served on the Army Future Studies Group. JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Kamara 97 Paratroopers of 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, conduct joint forcible entry operation during brigade’s Mungadai event, on Fort Bragg, North Carolina, April 5, 2016 (U.S. Army/Jason Hull) presenting multiple and compounding maneuver the U.S. military’s decisive and fight as landing forces in joint forc- dilemmas for an adversary.1 ground force (the Army) through the ible entry amphibious operations. A conflict with China in the Indo- maritime domain.3 This proposed change Landing forces are central to amphibi- Pacific region will most likely involve is congruent with the mission of the ous operations. In fact, Joint Publication regional access-denial efforts by China, Army as a component of the joint force. (JP) 3-02, Amphibious Operations, resulting in a counter-antiaccess/area According to Army Doctrinal Publication defines an amphibious operation as “a denial (A2/AD) campaign by the United 1, the Army’s mission is “to fight and win military operation launched from the sea States and its allies. U.S. joint doctrine the Nation’s wars through prompt and by an amphibious force (AF) embarked in anticipates the possibility of engaging in a sustained land combat, as part of the joint ships or craft with the primary purpose of counter-A2/AD campaign and mandates force.”4 Strategic and tactical mobility introducing a landing force (LF) ashore that “the Armed Forces of the United are inherent to the Army’s mission, and to accomplish the assigned mission.”5 States must be capable of deploying and amphibious operation—as a basic means Also, a landing force can be comprised of fighting to gain access to geographical of deploying and maneuvering Army either Army or Marine units.6 areas controlled by forces hostile to U.S. forces—is vital to the accomplishment interest.”2 U.S. forces conduct joint forc- of the Army’s mission and its role in the Justification for Studying ible entry operations to gain and maintain joint force. Redevelopment access to areas against armed opposition. It bears emphasizing that the Army Contemporary advancements in military The redevelopment of conventional has amphibious-capable logistics forces A2/AD capabilities and regional eco- forcible-entry Army amphibious forces that support joint operations (for ex- nomic and security trends underscore will enhance the joint forcible entry ample, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore). the need to study this topic and foster capability and capacity of U.S. forces in However, the Service lacks conventional dialogue. First, the sophistication of a potential counter-A2/AD campaign (regular Army, non–special operations) the integrated air defenses of America’s against China in the Indo-Pacific by combat arms formations that are orga- potential near-peer adversaries makes the enabling commanders to deploy and nized, trained, and equipped to deploy contemporary construct of air superiority 98 Features / Countering A2/AD in the Indo-Pacific JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 as a condition for deploying and maneu- A2/AD. Antiaccess is described in the rubric to highlight how the redevelop- vering ground forces unrealistic in future 2012 JOAC as “those actions and capa- ment of forcible-entry Army amphibious counter-A2/AD operations. The U.S. bilities, usually long range, designed to forces would enhance the joint forcible Army Training and Doctrine Command prevent an opposing force from entering entry capability and capacity of U.S. (TRADOC) acknowledges the challenge an operational area.” The JOAC differen- forces in a possible counter-A2/AD cam- posed by modern A2/AD capabilities tiates antiaccess from area denial. It states paign against China in the Indo-Pacific. and argues that “integrated air defense that “area denial refers to those actions Since these precepts are inherently networks complicate joint operations and capabilities, usually of shorter range, oriented toward meeting the challenges because hidden, lethal, and dispersed air designed not to keep an opposing force that will be presented to U.S. joint defenses can allow the enemy to establish out, but to limit its freedom of action forces by the A2 campaign of a potential air superiority from the ground and take within the operational area.”10 peer adversary like China, their use as away an essential condition for effective The JOAC expects U.S. adversaries units of analysis is appropriate. In other joint force operations.”7 This anticipated will use A2/AD strategies to offset U.S. words, these precepts are an excellent contest in the air domain, and the poten- strategic superiority in multiple domains, lens to highlight and appreciate the po- tial that the United States could lose its and it presents conceptual alternatives tential utility of the Army redeveloping forward bases early in a Chinese A2 cam- to counter them. In the Indo-Pacific, conventional forcible-entry amphibious paign, precipitate the need to find ways the joint force should expect China to forces to enhance the joint force. The and means of deploying and maneuver- employ an A2/AD strategy that will following are the selected precepts of ing decisive ground forces through challenge theater access and freedom of operational access—highlighted in the potential corridors of opportunity in the maneuver in a potential conflict. Based on 2012 JOAC—that comprise the units of maritime domain. the ability of U.S. adversaries to challenge analysis for this study: Contemporary economic and security the joint force’s legacy counter-A2/AD Seize the initiative by deploying and affairs in the region further underscore capabilities, TRADOC writes that “the •• operating on multiple, independent the need to study this topic and foster joint force should anticipate disrupted lines of operations. dialogue. Armed conflict between the deployment and sustainment operations Exploit advantages in one or more United States and its allies and China in and degraded effectiveness of the standoff •• domains to disrupt enemy A2/AD the Indo-Pacific is likely because China targeting and strikes currently required to capabilities in others. views the South China Sea as a long-term gain access and seize the initiative.”11 Maneuver directly against key resource vital to meeting its needs and The 2012 JOAC. The 2012 JOAC •• operational objectives from strategic so seeks to control it. This is evident in describes how the U.S. military envisions distance.14 China’s ongoing construction and force its response to emerging A2/AD capabil- buildup on artificial islands and its armed ities of potential adversaries, who seem to The Precepts maritime confrontation with other na- view the latter as a preferred method to Through the lens of the following tions over its appropriation of islands. counter U.S. strategic superiority across precepts of operational access, it is Geoffrey Till concurs and writes that the domains. Through its central thesis of conceivable that the redevelopment South China Sea is a “stock resource” cross-domain synergy and its principles or of conventional forcible-entry Army that China sees “as an economic resource precepts, “the JOAC describes how the amphibious forces will enhance the joint vital to its future prosperity” because of future joint forces will achieve operational forcible entry capability and capacity of the oil, gas, and fish that will support access in the face of such strategies [anti- U.S. forces in a potential counter-A2/ its growing energy and human needs.8 access and area denial].”12 AD campaign against China in the Robert Kaplan writes that “at some Cross-Domain Synergy. The concept Indo-Pacific. point, China is likely to, in effect, be able of cross-domain synergy outlined in the Seize the Initiative by Deploying and to deny the U.S. Navy unimpeded access 2012 JOAC advocates the “comple- Operating on Multiple, Independent to parts of the South China Sea.”9 This mentary” versus the merely “additive” Lines of Operations. The redevelopment will precipitate conflict with the United employment of joint force capabilities to of conventional forcible-entry Army States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. optimize exploitation of the asymmetric amphibious forces will enhance the advantages inherent in each Service’s joint force’s capability and capacity to Concepts and Framework capabilities.13 mount multiple lines of operations across of Analysis The Analytical Framework. The domains. The latter can compound the Articulating the concepts and the concept of cross-domain synergy as pre- number of avenues of approach an enemy framework used for the ensuing analysis sented in the 2012 JOAC rests on certain has to defend in its A2 campaign. The is necessary to foster understanding. precepts intended to help guide think- JOAC concurs and posits that “operating The concepts discussed include A2/AD, ing and planning for future counter-A2 on multiple lines in multiple domains the Joint Operational Access Concept campaigns. The following analysis uses simultaneously can help joint forces to (JOAC), and cross-domain synergy. a selection of these precepts as a lens or JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Kamara 99 seize the initiative by overloading the surface-to-air missile unit, and several a unique role as America’s elite light ex- enemy’s ability to cope.”15 units of the Shorts Blowpipe and SA-7 peditionary ground combat force, a role During his 1944 World War II Pacific Grail man-portable air-defense systems.17 for which the Army, with its greater mass campaign, General MacArthur success- British military planners were for sustained ground combat operations, fully seized Saidor, New Guinea, from the compelled to exploit the Royal Navy’s is ill suited. The transformation proposed Japanese by deploying Army, joint, and al- capabilities in the maritime domain in this article is not targeted at having lied forces on multiple lines of operations for deployment and decisive ground the Army usurp the role of the Marine across domains. His combat report fol- maneuver because the Argentine air Corps but rather at giving future U.S. lowing the seizure of Saidor proves this: defense threat precluded airborne joint force commanders and planners the forcible-entry operations. Additionally, ability to deploy and maneuver the Army We have seized Saidor on the north coast there was no host nation bordering the through temporary maritime corridors of New Guinea. Lit a combined operation Falkland Islands that could be used for of opportunity provided by the Navy to of ground, sea and air forces, elements of forward staging and maneuver. Michael apply its unrivaled capacity for sustained the Sixth Army landed at three beaches Clapp, the commander of the British ground combat in the Indo-Pacific. under cover of heavy air and naval Amphibious Task Group at the time, The counterargument that the am- bombardment. The enemy was surprised writes that quite early in their prepara- phibious capability of the Marine Corps is both strategically and tactically and the tion, British military planners appreciated prodigious enough to preclude the need landings were accomplished without loss. the disconcerting fact that “there would for complementary amphibious capability The harbor and airfields are in our firm be no ‘host-nation’ and we would there- in the Army also fails to take into account grasp. Enemy forces on the north coast fore have to offload (possibly during the the potential for China, like Argentina between the Sixth Army and the advancing opposed landing always considered so in the Falklands War, to field forces with Australians are trapped with no source unlikely by the Government), protect capabilities and such mass that it becomes of supply and face disintegration and ourselves and deploy forward using our necessary to employ the Army for its destruction.16 own assets and fuel.”18 mass and endurance in ground combat. Given the mass or troop strength of This counterargument also neglects the Exploit Advantages in One or Argentinian forces on the Falkland Islands, possibility that an adversary may widely More Domains to Disrupt Enemy A2/ retaking them required the decisive distribute its forces among the many dis- AD Capabilities in Others. Growing ground forces of the British army in addi- connected land masses in the Indo-Pacific conventional forcible-entry amphibi- tion to Royal Marine commando forces. (consider Japan in the World War II Pacific ous capability in the Army will enable This understanding required deploying campaign) to necessitate employing the joint force commanders to deploy and both Royal Marine commando forces Army’s decisive ground forces as part of a maneuver the Service’s decisive ground and the non-amphibious, decisive ground joint and allied effort to dislodge them. forces through the maritime domain, forces of the British army into a maritime- The British experience in the not just the air domain, which creates centric theater where the enemy was Falklands campaign shows that in a a dilemma for an adversary’s A2/AD contesting access by air and sea. Michael counter-A2/AD campaign, particularly campaign planning. This transformation Clapp writes that “it was clear . . . that in a maritime-centric region like the will provide an asymmetrical advantage merchant ships would be required and Indo-Pacific, the complementary versus critical for maneuvering against enemy that the 3rd Commando Brigade, Royal the merely additive employment of joint positions on the many disconnected land Marines, would be enhanced by further force capabilities is critical to optimal masses that will constitute objectives in Army forces.”19 exploitation of the asymmetric advantages a potential counter-A2/AD campaign Clapp’s statement compels conten- inherent in each Service’s capabilities. The against China. The British experience in tion with a major counterargument to British complemented the amphibious the 1982 Falkland Islands campaign is redeveloping forcible-entry amphibious commando forces of the Royal Marines instructive in this regard. capability in the U.S. Army for employ- with shipborne army paratroopers to fully Following its full occupation of the ment in the Indo-Pacific, which is that exploit the Royal Navy’s sea control for Falkland Islands on April 2, 1982, the the amphibious capability of the U.S. deployment and decisive ground maneu- Argentinian military developed an inte- Marine Corps is prodigious enough to ver against Argentine forces. grated air defense system in and around preclude the need for complementary Maneuver Directly Against Key Port Stanley with the aid of an AN/TPS- amphibious capability in the Army. This Operational Objectives from Strategic 43 Search radar and a command, control, counterargument indirectly suggests that Distance. Redeveloping forcible-entry and communications center (Centro redeveloping forcible-entry amphibious amphibious capability in the Army will de Información y Control). According capability in the Army can make it dupli- afford joint force commanders the flex- to Rodney Burden and his co-authors, cative and therefore capable of replacing ibility of deploying America’s decisive Argentinian forces deployed several the Marine Corps. This suggestion is ground forces directly into combat from batteries of antiaircraft guns, a Roland groundless because the Marine Corps has the U.S. mainland and other overseas 100 Features / Countering A2/AD in the Indo-Pacific JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Marines take new Amphibious Combat Vehicle out for open-ocean low-light testing at Del Mar Beach on Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, December 17, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Andrew Cortez) bases—thereby complicating enemy airpower against critical U.S. forward corridors facilitated by the Royal Navy’s defensive preparations by wielding an bases like Kadena Air Force Base, Japan, control of the sea. Subsequently, the Army that is not tied to fixed forward and Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. The British military hastily requisitioned sev- bases or restricted solely to deployment study’s “analysis shows that China’s con- eral merchant ships taken up from trade and maneuver through the air domain ventional missile forces have expanded (STUFTs) to transport ground forces (for example, airborne forced entry). their capabilities over the past 15 years to the Falkland Islands. Many STUFTs According to the 2012 JOAC, “some to the point that the PLA [People’s were hurriedly retrofitted for transporting elements of the joint force will oper- Liberation Army] can now contest U.S. Army and Marine commando troops. ate directly against key objectives from air base operations within roughly 1,500 Among the STUFTs was the North Sea points of origin or other points outside km of Chinese territory. This capability ferry MV Norland, which transported the theater without the need for forward will indirectly impinge on a much larger 840 paratroopers from the British army’s staging.”20 The JOAC cautions that the range of U.S. capabilities, complicating Second Battalion, Parachute Regiment.23 assured regional access afforded by U.S. the air superiority battle.”22 Another STUFT used to move troops forward bases can be degraded by attacks The British army’s experience in the in the counter-A2 campaign was the SS on those bases and consequently “calls 1982 Falklands War offers insight on the Canberra, a cruise ship. for some elements of a joint force to ma- subject of maneuvering directly against neuver against key operational objectives key operational objectives from a strategic The Way Ahead: directly from ports of embarkation.”21 distance. Given that the airspace over Recommendation According to a 2015 RAND study the South Atlantic was contested by the There are many considerations inherent of U.S.-China military capabilities and Argentine air force, and the objective was in redeveloping conventional forcible- capacity in simulated Taiwan and Spratly an island without a land-bordering “host- entry amphibious capability in the Islands campaign scenarios, the Chinese nation,” the British army had to deploy Army. Two broad yet critical consider- military will be able to contest U.S. air and maneuver directly against operational ations are examined herein. First, as part superiority through the use of conven- objectives in the Falkland Islands from of any effort to redevelop conventional tional precision standoff weapons and the United Kingdom using maritime forcible-entry amphibious capability JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Kamara 101 in the Army, this Service and the joint force’s ability to deploy and maneuver 102 Features / Countering A2/AD in the Indo-Pacific JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 n February 1862, Major General George B. McClellan sent his appre- I ciation to Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant and Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote of the U.S. Navy for the recent capture of Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River in Tennessee.1 Ten days earlier, the two officers and their commands had captured Fort Henry on the Tennessee River, just 10 miles to the west. Confederate generals had counted on the two forts to stop Federal forces from moving south along the two rivers, both natural avenues of advance—the Tennessee reaching into the piney woods of northeast Missis- sippi, the Cumberland bending south- east toward Tennessee’s Confederate state capital of Nashville. With those fortifications now in Union hands, the heart of the western Confederacy was laid open to further operations by U.S. forces. McClellan’s commendation ac- knowledged that the operations’ success resulted from cooperation between Grant’s land and Foote’s naval forces. While the term joint operations had not yet become part of the profession’s language, the concept was anything but new, as centuries of warriors had rec- ognized the advantages of soldiers and sailors working together. In a practical way, the two Services have always been complementary, with armies fighting on General U.S. Grant, ca. 1855–1865 land, seizing and occupying terrain, while (Library of Congress/Brady-Handy) navies provided transportation, sustain- ment, and, when possible, fire support. Effectively conducting such operations, however, presents challenges not en- countered by a single Service operating alone. Among the inter-Service gaps to be bridged are differences in doctrine, Learning the Art of technology, weapons, planning, and more abstract factors such as culture. As Milan Vego points out, joint operations are inherently complex “because of the Joint Operations need to sequence and synchronize the Ulysses S. Grant and movements and actions of disparate force the U.S. Navy Dr. Harry Laver is a Professor of Military History at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff By Harry Laver College. JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Laver 103 elements. Sound command and control the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. Their Grant decided to move against Belmont, can be especially challenging.”2 exchanges were professional, typically however, communication with Walke Vego’s observation is just as appli- couched as requests rather than as orders. broke down. The naval commander first cable to the Civil War period as it is today, The exception was a minor dispute over learned of the operation verbally late in if not even more so. In the mid-19th control of the Graham, a “wharf boat” the evening of November 6, less than 12 century, the principle of unity of com- used for storing supplies. Grant, citing hours before movement began. Grant’s mand had not been defined, at least not a lack of sufficient storehouses on land, written orders then arrived around 3:00 formally. Today, that concept is meant to first appropriated it, thereby initiating a.m., instructing Walke that the transit mitigate the confusion and complexity an exchange with Foote over who most of troops would begin a mere 3 hours of joint operations—as Joint Publication needed the boat. Neither man was pre- later. Walke set the Navy in motion with 3-0, Joint Operations, points out—by pared to concede, so Foote appealed to all possible speed, but one can imagine assigning “a single commander with the the senior officer in the area, General his frustration at the lack of prior notice. requisite authority to direct all forces John C. Frémont, for arbitration. Grant, perhaps overly concerned about employed in pursuit of a common pur- Resolution came when Foote and operational security, had withheld details pose.”3 In the 1860s, however, without Grant together, or so it seemed, worked until the last minute even from some of such a formal directive, officers had to out a compromise to divide the ship’s his own officers.6 rely on cooperation developed through space in half. Writing to Grant, Foote Despite the short notice, Walke and personal relationships to make joint oper- confirmed that the Army “will retain his Sailors all performed proficiently and ations work. Over the course of the war, one half of the Boat, offices included, professionally before, during, and after Grant learned the art of joint operations and we will endeavor to get on with the the battle, landing the Army just north of by working with his naval counterparts to other half,” all “to promote conjointly Belmont, providing supporting artillery form relationships built on trust, honesty, the highest interest of the government.” fire, and facilitating the Soldiers’ escape mutual respect, and a commitment to The spirit of cooperation, however, had when the Confederates counterattacked. the ultimate objective of winning the not in fact prevailed, as Foote revealed in Walke was proud of his command, not- war. Such relationships do not occur by a subsequent letter to Washington, DC, ing, “with what zeal and efficiency they chance, as Grant learned working with when he noted that Grant “would not all performed,” in spite of being “appar- Foote. Grant’s experiences in learning to give a place assigned . . . to our store, had ently new material.” Grant agreed with cooperate with the Navy are a reminder it not been a positive order from Genl. Walke’s self-assessment, complimenting that interpersonal relationships, inter- Frémont.” Still new to command, and the Navy’s “most efficient service. . . . Service respect, and learning from one’s especially inexperienced in working with They engaged the enemy’s batteries . . . missteps are essential ingredients of effec- the Navy, Grant had yet to learn that his and protected our transports through- tive joint operations. effectiveness as an Army commander was out.” Importantly, Grant shared that dependent on a working relationship praise with Walke and his Sailors, ac- First Battles, First Missteps with his naval peers, who controlled es- knowledging the Navy’s participation and In the summer of 1861, Grant was sential capabilities the Army itself could their essential contribution to the Army’s barely back in uniform when he began not provide. Nevertheless, in the midst success.7 working with elements of the Navy’s of this tug of war, Foote wrote to naval Captain Foote, Walke’s command- Western riverine fleet. During a futile secretary Gideon Welles that “I am on ing officer, however, was less than search for Confederate officer Thomas good terms with the army officers.” Less pleased with how Grant conducted the Harris in July 1861, naval transports than a month later, Grant would make operation—specifically, the lack of com- ferried Grant’s force across the Missis- another misstep with Foote, from which munication between Grant and himself as sippi River from Illinois to Missouri. the Soldier would come to appreciate the the senior naval officer in the area. In his Two months later in early September, necessity of open communication with report to Secretary Welles, Foote com- Grant and his troops occupied Paducah, the Sailor.5 plimented the performance of the Army, Kentucky, the first Federal presence During the movement to and stating that the horses of both Grant and in the Bluegrass State; their transit from the Battle of Belmont, Missouri, General John McClernand had been hit from Cairo, Illinois, across the Ohio on November 7, 1861, six steamers during the fight, evidence of the officers’ River was facilitated by two gunboats transported Grant’s infantry across the courage. Nevertheless, Grant had failed and three steam transports of Foote’s Mississippi, while the gunboats Tyler and to honor their agreement: command.4 Lexington provided fire support. In the As summer turned to fall, Grant and weeks leading up to the battle, Grant and to inform me . . . whenever an attack upon naval commanders continued to com- Commander Henry Walke worked closely the enemy was made requiring the coopera- municate about simple matters such as on the deployment of watercraft on the tion of the gunboats. . . . No telegram was positioning gunboats and reconnaissance Mississippi River, especially the gunboats, sent me, nor any information given by operations around the confluence of mostly around Cairo, Illinois. When General Grant when the movement upon 104 Recall / Ulysses S. Grant and the U.S. Navy JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Commodore Andrew H. Foote, ca. 1860–1865 (National Archives and Records Administration/Mathew Brady) Belmont was made. . . . I deeply regret the which the expedition was prepared, until The coming campaign against Fort withholding of this information from me, it was too late for me to arrive in time to Henry and Fort Donelson would dem- as I ought not only to have been informed, take command.” The explanation was onstrate that Grant had indeed learned in order that I might have commanded the plausible, and one that Foote accepted. something over the previous months and gunboats, but it was a want of consider- Grant took responsibility for the error that his approach for dealing with the ation toward the Navy, a cooperating force and, more important, learned a valuable Navy had matured.12 with the army on such expeditions.8 lesson about the necessity for cooperation with the Navy.10 Lessons Learned, Foote concluded by asking Welles Perhaps it was Foote’s promotion to Lessons Applied either to send a more senior naval officer flag officer, Grant’s new appreciation for The improved relationship between the who would have “immunity from the the Navy and its capabilities, or a combi- Services paid off in mid-January when orders of brigadier-general down to lieu- nation of both, that prompted Grant to one of Grant’s subordinates, Brigadier tenant-colonel, who are inexperienced in modify his interactions with his naval col- General Charles F. Smith, reported naval matters” or to promote him to the leagues following the battle at Belmont. that Fort Henry, the Confederates’ rank of flag officer, equivalent to Grant’s From late 1861 into the first weeks of the safeguard of the Tennessee River, was rank of brigadier. Welles recognized new year, Grant’s relationship with Foote vulnerable. Reacting to Smith’s assess- that Foote’s request was well-founded and Walke was professional, respectful, ment, on January 23 Grant headed to and necessary; the promotion came on open, and honest. Consultation was the St. Louis where he proposed to Major November 13.9 watchword for inter-Service interaction.11 General Henry Halleck, the senior Foote was correct in his criticism Fortunately for the Union, Grant and officer in the region, an expedition in of Grant, not only for failing to follow Foote shared a commitment to the cause conjunction with the Navy to seize Fort through on their agreement, but also of which both were a part, recognizing Henry. Halleck, Grant recalled, received for a lack of consideration for a fellow that cooperation would advance the him with “little cordiality,” and within officer and sister Service. Either through day of final victory. Foote believed that a few minutes “cut short” the inter- belated self-awareness or the prompting the Army and Navy “were like blades view, “as if my plan was preposterous.” of another—Grant left no record of the of shears—united, invincible; separated, Grant returned to Cairo “crestfallen” incident—the general sought out Foote almost useless,” a philosophy Grant was but not cowed. The following day he shortly after the battle and “expressed coming to share. And perhaps because telegraphed Halleck, “With permission his regret that he had not telegraphed as Grant was still learning the lessons of I will take Fort McHenry [sic] on the he had promised, assigned as the cause joint operations, Foote was willing to Tennessee and hold and establish a large that he had forgotten it, in the haste in forgive errors of initiative and aggression. camp there.” Given the rebuff he had JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Laver 105 after a “severe and closely contested action” between his gunboats and the Confederate batteries, “the rebel flag was hauled down” as the fort’s garrison surrendered to the U.S. Navy. Grant’s infantry arrived shortly after to occupy the fort and take charge of the prisoners. For his part, Grant commended Foote’s success. Walke recalled that once the fort was secure, Grant joined him on the USS Carondelet and “complimented the of- ficers of the flotilla in the highest terms for the gallant manner in which they had captured Fort Henry.” Grant then notified Halleck’s headquarters that “in little over one hour all the batteries were silenced and the fort surrendered.” The Army commander showed no sign of jeal- ousy or resentment, but instead saw the Navy’s victory for what it was—a Union victory—and that was something he would celebrate, no matter who received the credit.14 The working relationship that Grant and Foote had cultivated over the preced- ing months had now borne fruit. Their like-minded approach to fighting the war and spirit of “consultation” had won a significant victory, and that shared perse- verance would now carry them forward, specifically 10 miles to the east, where the Confederate garrison at Fort Donelson offered the next prize. As Union infantry were settling into Fort Henry on February 6, Grant and Walke continued to cooperate by sending a joint force south on the Tennessee River to destroy a bridge on the critical Memphis, Clarksville & Louisville Railroad. The primary ob- jective, however, was Fort Donelson, Captain Henry Walke, ca. 1861–1865 (Library of Congress/Mathew Brady) tantalizingly close on the Cumberland just received at the hands of Halleck, permanently occupied. Have we your River where it blocked Federal access to why would Grant have any expectation authority to move?” With Foote now Nashville. “I was very impatient to get of a different response? Because this backing the idea, Halleck looked past to Fort Donelson,” Grant later wrote, time, he had Foote on his side. Grant his reservations about Grant to see the wanting to strike before the arrival of wrote later that he and Foote had soundness of the proposal, and shortly Confederate reinforcements. He made “consulted freely upon military matters after not only gave his blessing but also his intentions clear when he told Halleck and he agreed with me perfectly as to claimed to have originated the idea: “I that he intended to move immediately on the feasibility of the campaign up the made the proposition to move on Fort Donelson, a determination with which Tennessee.” Arriving the same day as Henry first to General Grant.”13 Foote could sympathize and willingly Grant’s telegram, a note came from With approval secured, on February support, if not for the practical concerns Foote, informing Halleck that “General 3 the joint force headed south on the of needing to refit his small fleet because Grant and myself are of the opinion that Tennessee River. Three days later, of the damage suffered in the duel for Fort Henry . . . can be carried . . . and Foote informed Secretary Welles that Fort Henry.15 106 Recall / Ulysses S. Grant and the U.S. Navy JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 To undertake those repairs, Foote immediately proceed up the Cumberland pilot and wounded Foote. The one bit and most of his force returned to Cairo, River and in cooperation with the army of luck the Sailors had that day was the where on February 10 he received a make an attack on Fort Donelson.” Cumberland’s current carried the dam- request from Grant to hurry along what- Foote made the order despite his own aged vessels away from the Southern ever boats he could to Fort Donelson reservations; he confessed to Secretary batteries rather than deeper into the as soon as possible. Revealing his frus- Welles, “I go reluctantly, as we are short killing zone. Grant, who observed the trations with the campaign’s waning of men. . . . [Nevertheless] I shall do all fight from the riverbank, wrote of his dis- momentum, Grant wrote that he had in my power to render the gunboats ef- may as he watched Confederate rounds “been waiting patiently for the return of fective in the fight, although they are not repeatedly find their mark, followed by the gunboats.” “I feel that there should properly manned.”17 the withdrawal of Foote’s flotilla. Having be no delay” in moving on Donelson, he By February 12, Grant’s army had ar- witnessed the Navy’s rebuff if not defeat, continued, but conceded the advantages, rived at Donelson and took up positions he and his Soldiers were “anything but if not the necessity, of a joint operation: that pinned the Confederate garrison comforted.” Facing the likelihood of a “I do not feel justifiable in going without against the Cumberland River. The Navy lengthy siege as temperatures sank to well some of your boats to co-operate.” If it arrived the same day in the form of the below freezing, Grant anticipated having would help “expedite matters,” Grant Carondelet and Commander Walke, who “to intrench my position, and bring up offered some of his artillerymen “to ordered “a few shell[s] [thrown] into tents for the men or build huts.”20 serve on the gunboats temporarily.” Fort Donelson to announce my arrival The sun had yet to crest the horizon Concluding, he wrote, “please let me to General Grant.” Walke’s means of the next morning when Grant received know your determination in this matter signaling his approach was effective, and a note from Foote asking for a meeting and start as soon as you like. I will be the next morning Grant asked him to aboard his flagship to discuss their course ready to co-operate at any moment.” “advance with your gun boats” to divert of action given the preceding day’s set- Brigadier General Lewis Wallace, one of Southern attention, while the infantry back. Foote apologized for not traveling Grant’s division commanders, confirmed extended and strengthened its positions himself but explained that his wound Grant’s hesitancy to move without Foote around the fort. Walke responded in the prevented ease of movement. Grant im- when he wrote that Grant “relied upon affirmative, and at the agreed time his mediately set off for the river, and if he Flag-Officer Foote and his gun-boats, gunners sent into the fort nearly 150 had any doubts about the beating the whose astonishing success at Fort Henry shells, followed by another 45 rounds Confederates inflicted on the Navy, seeing justified the extreme of confidence.”16 later in the day. That evening Foote the damage to St. Louis surely must have Despite Grant’s impatience, his em- himself finally arrived with five gunboats convinced him of the intensity of the fight. phasis on cooperation demonstrates how to supplement the firepower of Walke’s Once in conversation, Foote explained his manner of dealing with Foote had Carondelet.18 that the damaged vessels had to return evolved since the previous November. The next day, February 14, the re- north for repairs before they could join in Evidenced by his offer of men to serve united Army and Navy commanders set another attack, an assessment with which on gunboats, he now understood that their plan in motion. The joint attack, as Grant immediately concurred. “I saw the to achieve the greatest possible effects, Grant understood it, “was for the troops absolute necessity of his gunboats going the Army and Navy had to support to hold the enemy within his lines, while into hospital,” Grant recalled, but even each other and that he shared in the the gunboats should attack the water with Foote’s expectation of returning responsibility for that cooperation. He batteries at close quarters and silence his within 10 days, Grant’s fears remained therefore sought the assistance of a co- guns.” In short, they sought a repetition of having to undertake a lengthy siege. equal, recognizing that another Service of the Fort Henry operation that had Foote sent word to Secretary Welles that provided critical capabilities and that the proved so successful just a week earlier, after “consultation with General Grant . . sum of their combined efforts was greater but Fort Donelson presented a differ- . I shall proceed to [Cairo] with the two than the individual components. To ac- ent challenge altogether with its higher disabled boats, leaving the two others here complish the mission, Grant wisely and elevation, clear sight lines toward the . . . to make an effectual attack upon Fort correctly sought Foote’s commitment approaching gunboats, and determined Donelson.” Despite the recent failures, rather than his compliance. gunners.19 both men were determined to take the Foote, who was receiving addi- At 3:00 that afternoon, Foote led Confederate stronghold. The only ques- tional pressure from Halleck to get the forward his four ironclads abreast, with tion was whether that would happen gunboats moving up the Cumberland the two wooden gunboats following. In sooner or later.21 to Donelson, took action almost im- the artillery duel that followed, all the The answer came quicker than either mediately on receiving Grant’s request ironclads suffered significant damage, man would have predicted, for as they of February 10. Orders went out with two being disabled—including concluded their meeting, word came to Lieutenant Seth Ledyard Phelps Foote’s St. Louis, which suffered a direct that the Confederates had attacked in “that all the available gunboats should hit on its wheelhouse that killed the an attempt to escape Fort Donelson. JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Laver 107 Surrender Grant” received most of the credit, this was indeed a victory of effec- tive joint operations.23 In just 10 days, the Army and Navy, thanks primarily to the close collabora- tion of their respective commanders, had captured two forts and shattered the Confederates’ defensive line on which they had entrusted their Western strategy. The Tennessee and Cumberland rivers now lay open to further exploitation by Union forces, an opportunity both Grant and Foote pursued, culminating in the capture of Nashville on February 25, 1862, the first Confederate state capital to fall to Federal forces. Mutual Respect and Professionalism The occupation of Nashville marked the Battle of Fort Donelson (Library of Congress/Sarony, Major & Knapp) successful conclusion of the campaign, and also the last time Grant and Foote Grant’s concerns about a long siege commanders had established over worked directly with one another. They thus proved unfounded because, as he the preceding weeks, or would they had been together for a relatively brief later wrote, “the enemy relieved me of leave Grant and the Army to fend for time, from the fall of 1861 to March this necessity.” Upon his return to the themselves, a pardonable position 1862, and from the start, Foote was front, Grant quickly and correctly as- given the previous day’s losses? Upon committed to developing a collaborative sessed the situation, ordering his three receiving Grant’s request for assistance, relationship with Grant and the Army. divisions to counterattack, and while his Commander Benjamin M. Dove, now in The naval commander was 16 years decisiveness indicated a degree of cour- charge of the naval element at Donelson, older than Grant, a difference in age and age and confidence, his request to the did not hesitate, and after quickly sur- perspective that brought greater maturity Navy for assistance suggests the depth veying his gunboats determined that and appreciation for the effectiveness and of his concern. At about 2:00, he sent a only the St. Louis and Louisville were fit necessity of joint operations. Recogniz- message to the “Commanding Officer to respond. They immediately moved ing that personal relations mattered, Gun Boat Flotilla,” being uncertain who forward, lobbing shells into the midst of Foote demonstrated professionalism was in command since Foote’s depar- the Confederate position, marking the and respect from the war’s beginning, ture earlier in the day, asking that the first time in the campaign that the two always being liberal with his praise for gunboats “immediately make their ap- Services were simultaneously and coop- the Army. In the days after the victory pearance to the enemy. . . . Otherwise all eratively engaged in a fight. The effects of at Fort Donelson, Foote wrote that the may be defeated. . . . If the Gun Boats the naval salvos were more psychological “army has behaved gloriously,” that do not show themselves it will reassure than physical but were useful nonetheless. they “fought like tigers,” and of his the enemy and still further demoralize After the battle, Lew Wallace, Grant’s relationship with Grant and Union divi- our troops.” Understanding the terrific Third Division commander, recalled “the sion commander Charles F. Smith, he damage the vessels suffered the previ- positive pleasure the sounds gave me” believed “we are all friendly as brothers.” ous day, Grant made clear the modest when the naval guns opened fire. He Responding to news of Grant’s promo- assistance he sought: “I do not expect continued, “That opportune attack by tion at the campaign’s conclusion, Foote the Gun Boats to go into action, but to the fleet was, I thought, and yet think, congratulated the new major general make their appearance, and throw shell of very great assistance. . . . It distracted with the affirmation that “you have at long range.” Support, any support, the enemy’s attention.” Grant’s coun- placed your name so high on the pages of was sorely needed.22 terattack, aided by Dove’s timely arrival your country’s history.” Grant conveyed Grant must have wondered how and the diversion his gunners created, a reciprocal sentiment, telling Foote responsive the Navy would be given drove the Confederates back into Fort “you are appreciated, deservedly, by the Foote’s absence. Would Foote’s Donelson, where, recognizing the futility people . . . of this broad country.”24 subordinates maintain the inter- of continued resistance, they surrendered Grant had come to admire Foote, a Service cooperation that the two senior the following day. While “Unconditional likeminded warrior who, despite some 108 Recall / Ulysses S. Grant and the U.S. Navy JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 15. significant differences in personality and 1862 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Grant to Walke, February 7, 1862, Press, 1967–2005), 5; Grant to Henry Walke, PUSG 4:168–169; Grant, Memoirs and Selected command style, shared a desire to main- October 6 and 7, 1861, PUSG 3:22, 27; Walke Letters, 197; Smith, Grant Invades Tennessee, tain momentum and the initiative, a belief to Grant, October 18, 1861, PUSG 3:55–56n; 137–138. in unity of effort and the efficacy of joint Grant to Walke, October 31, 1861, PUSG 16 Grant to Foote, February 10, 1862, operations, and a commitment to the 3:99–100. For the exchange relating to the PUSG 4:182; Lewis Wallace, “The Capture of Union cause. Their personal relationship, wharf boat, see the exchange of letters, October Fort Donelson,” in Battles and Leaders, 1:412; 17 through November 2, 1861, PUSG 3:46– Smith, Grant Invades Tennessee, 137–138. along with Foote’s experience and profes- 48n2, 62n; Foote to Gideon Welles, October 17 Halleck to Brigadier General G.W. Cul- sional wisdom, likely helped Grant grow 23, 1861, ORN ser. 1, 22:376. lum, February 9 and 10, 1862, ORN 22:577– and mature as a commander. Foote’s firm 6 For examples of Grant and Walke’s com- 578; Halleck to Foote, February 11, 1862, but fair criticism of Grant’s failure to com- munications, see Grant to Walke, October 6, ORN 22:582; Foote to Lieutenant S.L. Phelps, municate at Belmont taught the young 7, 9, 22, 1861, ORN 22:362–363, 365, 376; February 10, 1862, ORN 22:583; Foote to Grant to Walke, November 7, 1861, ORN Welles, February 11, 1862, ORN 22:550. general the value and necessity of open 22:402; Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes, Jr., The 18 Grant to Walke, February 13, 1862, communication, along with consideration Battle of Belmont: Grant Strikes South (Cha- PUSG 4:202; Walke to Foote, February 15, and respect for peers, including those in pel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1862, PUSG 4:202–203n; Smith, Grant In- the Navy. From that experience Grant 1991), 48–49. vades Tennessee, 177–178. left behind a dismissiveness toward the 7 Report of Walke, November 9, 1861, 19 Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters, 202; ORN 22:400–401; Report of Brigadier General Smith, Grant Invades Tennessee, 244–254. Navy—or, perhaps more accurately, he Grant, November 17, 1861, ORN 22:405; 20 Report of Foote, February 15, 1862, found an appreciation for the resources Henry Walke, “The Gun-Boats at Belmont and ORN 22:585–586; Grant, Memoirs and Selected and capabilities the sea Service could Fort Henry,” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil Letters, 202–203. contribute to a campaign’s success. The War, ed. Robert U. Johnson and Clarence 21 Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters, 203; experiences of Grant and Foote remind Clough Buel, vol. 1, The Opening Battles (New Report of Foote, ORN 22:586. York: Century Company, 1887–1888), 361. 22 Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters, 204; us that in an era when there was no joint 8 Report of Foote, November 9, 1861, Grant to Commanding Officer, February 15, doctrine, effective inter-Service coop- ORN 2:399–400. 1862, PUSG 4:214. eration and effectiveness depended on 9 Smith, Grant Invades Tennessee, 35. 23 Benjamin M. Dove to Foote, February mutual respect and professional interper- 10 Report of Foote, November 9, 1861, 16, 1862, ORN 22:588–589; Testimony of sonal relationships. Today, despite libraries ORN 2:400. Major-General L. Wallace, ORN 22:589–590; 11 For examples, see Grant to Walke, No- Smith, Grant Invades Tennessee, 330–331; of joint manuals, publications, and doc- vember 15, 1861; Grant to Foote, December Bruce Catton, Grant Moves South, 1861–1863 trine, the same still holds true. JFQ 13, 1861; Grant to Foote, January 2, 1862; (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1960), 168. Foote to Welles, January 9, 1862, ORN 24 Foote to Welles, February 17, 1862, 22:431, 461–462, 482, 489; Grant to Foote, ORN 22:584; Foote to Caroline A. Foote, Notes January 9, 1862, in War of the Rebellion: A February 18, 1862, in James M. Hoppin, Life Compilation of the Official Records of the Union of Andrew Hull Foote, Rear Admiral United 1 Timothy B. Smith, Grant Invades Ten- and Confederate Armies (Washington, DC: States Navy (New York: Harper and Bros., nessee: The 1862 Battles for Forts Henry and Government Printing Office, 1880–1901), ser. 1874), 230–231; Foote to Grant, March 8, Donelson (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1, 7:541. Grant also supported naval opera- 1862, ORN 22:660; Grant to Foote, March 2016), 392. tions, for example, by ordering out the cavalry 3, 1862, PUSG 4:314. Writing in the 1870s, 2 Milan N. Vego, “Major Joint/Combined to screen a reconnaissance by three gunboats William T. Sherman remembered the old Navy Operations,” Joint Force Quarterly 48 (1st down the Mississippi River toward Columbus, commander “as full of enthusiasm and adven- Quarter 2008), 113. Missouri; see Grant to Brigadier General El- ture as a young man,” who was “the subject of 3 Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations eazer A. Paine, January 6, 1862, PUSG 3:377. universal praise, especially by the army that saw 12 (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January Foote, “Notes on the Life of Admiral and appreciated the gallantry of his conduct, 2017), A-2. Foote,” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, and its important bearing on the campaign.” 4 Brooks D. Simpson, Ulysses S. Grant: 1:347. See Hoppin, Life of Andrew Hull Foote, 390. 13 Triumph Over Adversity, 1822–1865 (Boston: Charles F. Smith to John A. Rawlins, Jan- Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2000), 86–87; uary 22, 1862, PUSG, vol. 4, January 8–March Report of Brigadier-General Grant, September 31, 1862, 91n; Grant to Mary Grant, January 6, 1861, Official Records of the Union and 23, 1862, PUSG 4:96; Ulysses S. Grant, Mem- Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion oirs and Selected Letters, ed. Mary D. McFeely [ORN] (Washington, DC: Government Print- and William S. McFeely (New York: Library of ing Office, 1908), ser. 1, 22:317.Editor’s note: America, 1990), 190; Grant to Henry Halleck, All titles for ORN entries have been shortened January 28, 1862, PUSG 4:99; Foote to Henry for this article. Halleck, January 28, 1862, ORN 22:524; 5 For examples of general communications, Smith, Grant Invades Tennessee, 137–140. 14 see Grant to Andrew Foote, September 22, Report of Foote, February 7, 1862, 1861, ORN, ser. 1, 22:345; Foote to Grant, ORN 22:538; Grant to Captain J.C. Kelton, September 23, 1861, ORN, ser. 1, 22:346; February 6, 1862, PUSG 4:157; Walke, “The Grant to Foote, October 1, 1861, in The Gun-Boats,” 367. Papers of Ulysses S. Grant [PUSG], ed. John Y. Simon, vol. 3, October 1, 1861–January 7, JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Laver 109 that tells a compelling story and offers for the rest of his career, including a tour the reader a window into the surprising in Vietnam. life of an American success story. As formative as those early years were, As Marble highlights, General Shali, as it was his service as a general officer that he preferred to be called, was a reserved, commends Shali to history. As the deputy self-effacing consensus-builder who liked commander of U.S. Army Europe in to avoid conflict and enjoyed giving others 1990, Shalikashvili was responsible for credit for actions he clearly set in motion. moving VII U.S. Corps from Germany He shied away from publicity, albeit while to Saudi Arabia to provide General H. making history. He twice told Secretary Norman Schwartzkopf with enough of Defense Les Aspin and President Bill combat power to eject the Iraqi army Clinton that he did not want to be the from Kuwait, an immense multinational Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. logistical undertaking. Immediately after Shali was not the sort of man nor had the the Persian Gulf War, Shali’s greatest type of military career that normally pro- achievement came as the commander duces great biography. After Colin Powell, of Operation Provide Comfort, the few Chairman have risen to any level of 30,000-strong multinational relief effort historical prominence. Still, from the to save 500,000 Kurds who had fled Iraqi opening pages of Boy on the Bridge, the forces into the high desert mountains and reader will be surprised by Shali’s life and were dying by the thousands from harsh all he achieved. Indeed, his life reflects the conditions, malnutrition, and disease. intermingling of society, culture, and war Shali organized forces from 13 countries th Boy on the Bridge: The that was so prevalent in the 20 century. and over 50 international and nongovern- Story of John Shalikashvili’s His maternal grandfather served mental organizations to establish supply American Success in the high command of Russia’s Tsar routes and basic infrastructure across an Nicholas II. His father, Dimitri, fought area of 83,000 square miles. Later, as By Andrew Marble in World War I on the Russian side but Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, University Press of Kentucky, 2019 returned to Georgia after the Bolshevik he traveled throughout Eastern Europe 416 pp. $36.95 Revolution. After the war, Dimitri moved encouraging newly independent nations ISBN: 978-0813178028 to Poland, where he married Shali’s and calming Russian fears. Finally, as Reviewed by Bryon Greenwald mother, Maria “Missy” Rudiger. When Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Germany attacked Poland in September 1993 to 1997, General Shali oversaw the 1939, Dimitri fought with the Poles, and deployment of forces to Somalia, Haiti, iographies are frequently hit or in a twist of geopolitics, served at the end and Bosnia and provided a steady hand miss and often tell linear, one- of the war as a member of the Georgian during the reduction in forces following B dimensional stories. The value of Legion supporting the Germans in the end of the Cold War. He died in 2011 a biography as a contribution to a larger Normandy and Italy before ending the from complications following a stroke. history depends on how broad an intel- war supporting Italian partisans against Marble’s fine biography offers much lectual swath the author cuts and how the communists in northern Italy. As a to the military reader. Beyond his sig- extensive and probing the research. The child, Shali witnessed the starvation and nificant accomplishments, General Shali wider the cut, the greater the chance privation of Polish Jews in Warsaw before is best known and remembered for his the reader will learn not only about fleeing with his mother, brother, and sis- patience, empathy, and calm demeanor. the subject but also about the greater ter to Germany to escape the oncoming In a world of Type A officers and leaders, social, cultural, political, and techno- Soviet Army. There, on April 24, 1945, he was a competent and capable Type logical aspects of the subject’s lifetime. in Pappenheim, Germany, 8-year-old B who treated everyone with dignity The deeper the research, the more one John Shalikashvili met his first Americans, and respect, who set high standards and learns both about the subject and the members of the 86th Infantry Division looked after those with whom he served, key events during his or her career. Boy that had chased German SS troops out and who rose from extremely desperate on the Bridge: The Story of John Sha- of the small town. In 1952, Shali im- beginnings to become the most senior likashvili’s American Success, Andrew migrated to America and went to high man in the American military. JFQ Marble’s thoroughly researched and school in Peoria, Illinois. He attended exquisitely crafted biography of former college and entered the Army through Army general and Chairman of the Officer Candidate School, served in the Dr. Bryon Greenwald is a Professor of History in the Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Joint Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili, Artillery and Air Defense when it was a Forces Staff College, at the National Defense is an excellent example of a biography single branch, and then in the Artillery University. 110 Book Reviews JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Then, in the blink of an eye, the Cold decisions of their time. The portrait of War ended and the Soviet Union ceased Mikhail Gorbachev is sympathetic yet ul- to exist. Talk of America’s decline was timately unflattering. George H.W. Bush consigned to history’s ash heap and the and Helmut Kohl, on the other hand, American Century appeared unassail- are highlighted as capable stewards and able. Things are hardly so sanguine now. leaders, and, in Kohl’s case, the German Nonetheless, the end of the Cold War— chancellor is portrayed as a near-visionary with the free market system and the statesman. democratic order vindicated—still seems However, Zelikow and Rice do not something a little short of miraculous. only offer interesting character studies; But perhaps it was not so. Human agency the book is more fundamentally about decisively intervened at every point. The strategic choices and the strategy of de- end, as the authors make explicit in the cisionmaking. Too often, histories that book’s subtitle, was determined by choices focus on so-called grand strategy appear made. Zelikow and Rice’s “analytical his- as roadmaps to preordained destina- tory of the major choices” zooms in on tions. The “blindness of hindsight,” as human beings and the choices they made Zelikow and Rice observe, is powerful. during one of the 20th century’s great Retrospection confers a sense of the pivot points. inevitable on events. Historians discern Zelikow and Rice have done a very patterns in policymakers’ decisions that fine, scholarly job. Of course, they write operate in accordance with Alexander not only as scholars but also as actors George’s famous phrase, “operational To Build a Better World: Choices who played parts in that history. This codes.” To do strategy is to have a to End the Cold War and Create opens them up to some criticism—how mapped out “plan.” In senior Service a Global Commonwealth can they be objective? They are, however, college terms, having a strategy is to have forthright about it and occasionally place determined “ends, ways, and means.” By Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza themselves in the narrative, a seeming But strategy is not simply planning; Rice overt acknowledgment of this sort of it is doing, which means strategist-states- Twelve, 2019 participant history. And it is familiar men are constantly choosing what to do. A 528 pp. $22.99 scholarly territory for them, both having strategy is often far less a set of rock-solid ISBN: 978-1538764671 previously navigated this subject matter propositions that become long-range Reviewed by Walter M. Hudson in their Germany Unified and Europe goals and more a series of tentative ques- Transformed: A Study in Statecraft tions that require immediate answers. (Harvard University Press, 1995). That Zelikow and Rice’s excellent work offers hilip Zelikow and Condoleezza was a good study, but still a case of near- a thorough appreciation of strategy as Rice’s To Build a Better World first impression. Deeper scholarship, choice-making. P begins in early 1989, with two more declassification, and the passage In order to unpack how strategic nobodies: one, a dutiful KGB officer in of time provide for greater context and choices are made, they rely on “Vickers Dresden; the other, a research scientist make the current title a much richer Triangle,” a formulation composed by at the East German Central Institute of work. the brilliant British polymath Geoffrey Physical Chemistry. Like the rest of the Zelikow and Rice demonstrate im- Vickers. This triangle is composed of world, they do not know what will take pressive multiarchival, primary source values (what one cares about), realities place through the course of that pivotal research in a variety of languages to (what the facts are), and actions (what year, or how the aftermath will one day buttress their insights. This scholarship one can actually do). Values, realities, lead these two unknowns, Vladimir makes it a worthy addition to the grow- and actions, as opposed to ends, ways, Putin and Angela Merkel, to the pin- ing body of literature examining the end and means, are not linear; they are, in a nacle of power. of the Cold War, and, at a minimum, Clausewitzian sense, relational. They con- It is a fitting introduction; how little their book supplements traditional Cold stantly react and interact with each other do we really know about how events will War histories, such as the recent magiste- to create new issues, new questions, and unfold? The so-called experts certainly rial work of Odd Arne Westad, and earlier new understandings. They form a cru- did not have it right. Well into the late works by Cold War deans John Lewis cible from which judgments and choices, 1980s, the accepted thinking among the Gaddis and Melvyn Leffler. framed and reframed, are made in the intelligentsia was that the Cold War would The book is also highly accessible urgency of the moment. continue into the foreseeable future and and offers carefully sketched portraits Thus, Zelikow and Rice frequently that the “American Century” was ending. of key world leaders grappling with the break in medias res and present “issue JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Book Reviews 111 maps” that pose a large geopolitical stra- military thought about war from the tegic issue, such as “Ending the Cold War early Soviet period through contempo- in Europe.” Below that issue, the authors rary times. According to Jonsson, the posit broad themes such as “Security in nature of war—traditionally understood Europe.” They then pose a series of ques- in Russia as armed violence for political tions that lead to choices such as “Should purposes—had not changed much until the U.S. keep troops in Europe or not?” recently. The advent of information-psy- Such questions, sifted through the chological warfare has led to the blurring interaction of values, realities, and ac- of the boundary between war and peace. tions, had to be answered. Choices had Having observed the role of informa- to be made. This is what strategy formu- tion in “altering the consciousness of a lation was during the end of the Cold country” and undermining public trust in War. Indeed, one could argue that this is state institutions “to the degree that citi- what strategy always is: fork-in-the-road zens are prepared to revolt, creating color decisions made with incomplete and revolutions,” Russian strategists began sometimes confusing data. Some leaders, conceiving of information as a weapon such as Gorbachev, made decisions that and a more effective means of achieving tended to be more wrong than right; strategic outcomes than armed force. others, such as Bush and Kohl, made The surge of interest in Russia’s ones that tended to be more right than thinking stems from the growing aware- wrong. For policymakers, warfighters, ness that Western strategic and military and students of strategy throughout the concepts may have limited utility for joint force, the insights offered should be The Russian Understanding deciphering Russia’s purposes, per- of immediate value. of War: Blurring the Lines spectives, and mental models on war. The Cold War ended three decades Between War and Peace Notwithstanding an appreciation of the ago. For a brief moment, history itself fundamental differences in countries’ By Oscar Jonsson appeared to have ended in a way that conceptions of war, Jonsson chooses Georgetown University Press, 2019 signaled the ascent of American ideals to approach Russia’s views on armed 208 pp. $98.95 worldwide, in perpetuity. That moment conflict from a longstanding Western ISBN: 978-162617339 has passed, no doubt. Nonetheless, as military theoretical background informed Zelikow and Rice point out, we would do Reviewed by Mariya Y. Omelicheva by a Clausewitzian perspective, rather well to remember our triumphs as well than alternative “lenses” grounded in as our defeats, and recall that both result Russia’s own military theory. By doing from deliberate choices and not simply f you know the enemy and know so, the author falls into the same trap of historical accidents. JFQ yourself, you need not fear the result ascertaining the seemingly novel Russian I of a hundred battles,” wrote the approach to operations for a fundamen- influential Chinese military strategist tally new conception of war, as many Colonel Walter M. Hudson, USA, is an Assistant Sun Tzu in The Art of War. Russia’s other writers on hybrid warfare and the Professor and Deputy Chair of National Security and Economic Policy in the Eisenhower School of ongoing efforts to reshape the world Gerasimov doctrine have been caught in National Security and Resource Strategy at the in ways that are at odds with Ameri- before. National Defense University in Washington, DC. can values and interests have turned Russia’s information-psychological Moscow into a dangerous adversary. operations are anything but new. They Countless analyses have appeared in repurpose tried-and-tested malign influ- recent years that venture to understand ence campaigns used by the Soviets in how Russian leadership thinks, what Eastern and Western Europe. Similar to Russia wants, and how it plans to get modern Russian strategists, the Soviet it. Oscar Jonsson’s The Russian Under- military and political elite recognized standing of War is a valuable addition the economic and technological supe- to the corpus of knowledge on Russia’s riority of the United States and sought military thinking about war. to compensate for capability gaps by Relying on a close reading of Russian exploiting cultural values and psychologi- security, military, and foreign policy cal biases in individual decisionmaking doctrines and the writings of Russian processes. Questions about the nature military, academic, and political elites, versus the character of war were not at Jonsson traces the evolution of Russian the forefront of Soviet thinking, which, 112 Book Reviews JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 as Jonsson aptly discusses in his book, conjunction with other studies in Russia’s was highly ideologized and focused on decisionmaking, such as Marlene Laruelle New from NDU issues of just war versus unjust war. The and Jean Radvanyi, Understanding Soviet holistic approach to war, which Russia: The Challenge of Transformation Press treated armed conflict as a complex (Rowan and Littlefield, 2018); Bettina for the Center for Strategic Research sociopolitical phenomenon and part Renz, Russia’s Military Revival Strategic Forum 302 of a single synthetic system, stands in (Polity, 2018); Roger E. Kanet, ed., The European Union’s Permanent stark contrast to Western and American Routledge Handbook of Russian Security Structured Cooperation: Implications analytical perspectives. Soviet military (Routledge, 2019). These works offer a for Transatlantic Security thinkers envisioned the enemy as a sys- comprehensive collection of chapters on By Jonathan Dunn tem, and the operational logic that built all aspects of Russian security and foreign Many U.S. on this approach required neutralizing policy. defense the enemy’s ability to attain its goals. Although an authoritarian regime, the officials Information-psychological operations Kremlin is captive to opaque and intricate expressed were instrumental and remain ingrained inner power struggles and attentive to concern over in modern Russian military thinking. public sentiments. These domestic con- the EU’s The key premise of the book, how- siderations can either amplify or lower the November ever, remains timely and valid. Knowing threshold for the use of force and the ac- 2017 launch one’s opponent is the first step to ceptance of risk, thus affecting the use of of its Perma- developing effective countermeasures. information operations. It is also vital to nent Structured Cooperation. They The core argument of Jonsson’s study recognize that Russian policymakers and fear that a more capable EU would emphasizes the fact that Russia has strategists perceive the world through make it a competitor to NATO conceptualized war as a continuation of mirror images. The Kremlin ideologues for European security issues, and politics, and politics as a continuation of are convinced that the West uses similar, in so doing reduce U.S. influence war, thus rendering the binary “peace if not the same, concepts and methods of in European security. Concerns or war” paradigm of the operational information war against them. Therefore, about diminished U.S. influence environment obsolete. Many joint force it is not that Russian conduct always and EU divergence from NATO as operational and strategic concepts are follows Russian theorizing about war, a result of PESCO are misguided. developed wholly or in part on the as- but Russian theorizing about war can be Rather than be concerned about sumption of operations taking place in used to justify Russia’s own conduct and the remote possibility of European either a distinct state of peace or war. criticize the West. Lastly, the emphasis strategic autonomy, the United The Joint Operating Environment 2035 on understanding Russia’s information States should throw its full support envisions challenges that are significantly warfare should not blind us to Russia’s behind the PESCO initiative and different from those of recent decades. readiness to use military force. other attempts to strengthen One of the main challenges—the contest The Russian Understanding of War European defense. That said, the over ideas and norms—will take place is a useful read for all national security United States has an interest in entirely in the information domain. analysts and strategists, as well as Russia- the direction that the EU takes Jonsson’s volume speaks directly to the watchers throughout the joint force. with PESCO and should therefore joint force concepts for operating in the Ultimately, Jonsson succeeds in his goal attempt to shape it constructively. information environment by reminding of providing a helpful guide to under- us that Russia has conceptualized infor- standing an adversary that has embraced mation holistically, embracing not only a form of conflict at odds with Western the technological aspects of information notions of war and peace. JFQ but also its psychological aspects. U.S. and Western approaches to informa- tion tend to be more technologically Dr. Mariya Y. Omelicheva is a Professor of Strategy at the National War College at the National biased and infrastructure-centered, not Defense University in Washington, DC. sufficiently integrating less tangible (cognitive and perceptual) methods of manipulation. To truly understand an adversary requires delving deeper into its politics, culture, and society. While a valu- Visit the NDU Press Web site for able guide to Russia’s thinking about more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu war, Jonsson’s book should be read in JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Book Reviews 113 F/A-18F Super Hornet assigned to “Diamondbacks” of Strike Fighter Squadron, attached to Carrier Air Wing 5102, conducts flight operations, Atsugi, Japan, January 29, 2020 (U.S. Navy/Alex Grammar) assuming a prominent role in basing Airbase Defense Falls deliberations. For all their advanced technology, aeronautical superiority, and advanced situational awareness capabilities, fifth-generation aircraft Between the Cracks share a feature with the Curtiss P-1 Hawk of the 1920s: they are vulnerable By Joseph T. Buontempo and Joseph E. Ringer while on the ground. Over the last few decades, locat- ing U.S. overseas airbases far from the enemy has been sufficient to protect he fielding of fifth-generation counter Air Force superiority. The sur- them during large-scale military op- aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 vivability of these assets is paramount erations. With the return of better underscores the U.S. Air Force’s to mission success. Furthermore, unlike T organized, trained, and technologically ability to contribute to national-level the setbacks stemming from attacks equipped near-peers, however, distance objectives by refocusing on threats on airbases in past wars, when aircraft is unlikely to provide refuge from posed by surging strategic competi- replaceability played a muted role in the long reach of these more capable tors such as Russia and China. These basing considerations, today’s jets, with adversaries. This article considers two latest generation aircraft are primed to unit costs of $100 million or more, types of threats that could pose a serious continue America’s dominance in the considerably escalate the consequences challenge to airbases in the near future. air. But what happens when they are on of failing to secure the airbase from The first is direct and indirect attacks to the ground? On an airbase, the latest attacks. These economic considerations rear-area operations by adversary special in stealth aircraft technology is not are now a factor for beddown of any operators, and the second is theater likely to cloak these aircraft from forces fifth-generation aircraft during combat ballistic and cruise missile attacks. The seeking an asymmetric advantage to operations, with replaceability also Department of Defense (DOD) places responsibility for protecting airbases against such threats with the Air Force Dr. Joseph T. Buontempo is Assistant Director of the System Evaluation Division at the Institute and Army (and host-nation forces as ap- for Defense Analyses. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Ringer, USAF, is Senior Program Evaluator in Investigative Oversight and Special Investigations and Review at the Department of Defense Office plicable). Unfortunately, airbase defense of Inspector General. can fall between the cracks. The resulting 114 Joint Doctrine / Airbase Defense Falls Between the Cracks JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 deficit, which is likely to continue long the same weapon systems, may have consequences due to insufficient planning into the future, can result in significant served to further downplay the threat. and resourcing for base defense and force gaps in the defense of airbases. But as the Air Force looks to grow its protection. In the 2012 ground attack on operational squadrons by 25 percent, Camp Bastion in Afghanistan, a team of Defense Against base defense planners must reassess the 15 heavily armed and well-trained—but Special Operators impact this increase in beddown require- not to the level of special forces—Taliban Highly trained and well-equipped ments will have on base defense forces insurgents successfully infiltrated the special operators and extensive agent and resources within a risk-based frame- base boundary and perimeter defenses to and sleeper cell networks, whose work. The risk presented by threats such destroy six Marine Harrier aircraft with mission is to engage the fixed locations as special operations forces, irregular antipersonnel grenades. They also dam- where airbase operations occur, present forces, and small tactical units, particu- aged ten other aircraft along with support an acute threat to U.S. air operations. larly from standoff weapons, is widely facilities and assorted equipment.5 History provides many case studies on known yet insufficiently addressed. Furthermore, 2 friendly forces were the devastating effect ground attacks Given the history of conflict, particularly killed and 17 individuals wounded.6 A can have on air operations. For insight during the latter half of the 20th century, subsequent U.S. Army investigation into on what this shift could mean to base when standoff weapons attacks proved the attack cited “failure to ensure that defense, the Air Force needs to look no to be particularly effective in damaging an integrated, layered, defense-in-depth further than the Vietnam War, where and destroying aircraft,4 effective con- was in place” as the causal factor for this roughly 1,600 aircraft were damaged trols and countermeasures to manage base defense failure.7 It also listed under- or destroyed by Vietcong and North the risk posed by this threat are crucial estimation of the enemy, lack of unity Vietnamese rocket and mortar attacks.1 for fielding fifth-generation aircraft. The of command for security, and failure to Likewise, the efficacy of British Special emergence of small unmanned aerial manage risk and vulnerabilities as contrib- Air Services attacks on Axis airfields systems as a threat to airbase operations uting factors.8 Airbase commanders faced across North Africa during World War adds even more incentives. a similar dilemma in Vietnam, where II, destroying 367 aircraft plus support Within joint operating areas, airbases base defense was not viewed as a high facilities and equipment,2 should remind are intended to be protected in layers and priority for resources by higher echelons airbase planners of the destructive preci- in depth. Typically, base security forces of command and, as a result, remained sion of highly trained special operators defend from the base boundary inward, vulnerable to ground attack throughout and the ineffectiveness of distance as and U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery the war.9 a means for security. Undoubtedly, units, when available, provide cover from Joint doctrine recognizes the in- today’s advances in weapons, such as attacks from the air. Mobile security creased vulnerability of aircraft to attacks GPS-guided mortars, small unmanned forces and, as required, Army tactical staged from areas contiguous to airbases aerial systems, and large-caliber sniper combat forces or host-nation security during takeoff and landings, as well as rifles, will serve to enhance the effective- forces provide external defense from the when parked.10 It even highlights the ness and lethality of these elite forces. base boundary outward. However, with need to coordinate with area command- While true worldwide, it is particularly base security forces as the lone exception, ers to ensure base boundaries are adjusted acute on the Korean Peninsula where it none of the entities responsible for secu- to provide adequate protection from is estimated that North Korea employs rity outside the base boundary are under rocket, artillery, and mortar attacks. But nearly 200,000 special operations forces the operational or tactical control of the joint doctrine stops short of prescribing specifically trained to establish a second airbase commander. This particularly inclusion of the effective ranges of these front, conduct sabotage operations, consequential concern is made worse if indirect fire weapons, also referred to as and attack high-value targets such as the base boundary does not encompass a “footprint,” within the airbase bound- command and control nodes and air- the effective range of standoff weapons or ar y. 11 Yet, to be effective, the base defense bases in South Korea.3 if host-nation restrictions preclude U.S. plan must include key terrain outside the In many ways, the limited number forces from venturing “outside the wire.” base boundary from which the enemy of attacks on airbases experienced in Thus, defense outside the base bound- could affect air and space operations, recent wars and insurgencies has stunted ary is often subject to limited ground in addition to the area inside the base U.S. development of airbase defense force availability and competing area boundary. concepts and schemes to counter the commander or host-nation commander Guided by the principle that air and capabilities of highly trained special op- requirements. These demands, which can space assets are most vulnerable on the erators. Moreover, the recently observed result in the absence of defending forces, ground, Air Force Security Forces protect ineffectiveness of insurgents’ use of may produce seams and gaps within the the base from the boundary inward by standoff weapons, which should not be joint force’s defense of airbases. conducting operations to deter, delay, confused with the lethal precision with Events in recent conflicts have ac- and defeat threats ranging from agents, which advanced special operators employ centuated the potential for disastrous partisans, and terrorists to small tactical JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Buontempo and Ringer 115 units and special operations forces.12 required before the base boundary can be potentially enable it to reach targets in Using an Integrated Defense concept to adjusted to account for standoff threats. most of NATO’s European countries.24 meld various Air Force capabilities into Within the BSZ, efforts of security Alarmingly, both Russia and China are a comprehensive base defense strategy, forces, or other base defense forces as- also developing maneuverable hypersonic base defense planners seek to leverage as- signed area security duties, to suppress glide vehicles, which can glide at Mach 5 signed resources against adaptive threats indirect fire threats consist of physical or greater at low altitudes.25 to protect U.S. and coalition missions presence, aggressive patrolling, and lim- Russia or China could use ballistic and and personnel. However, the Air Force’s ited active defensive measures designed cruise missiles to target U.S. airbases to base defense inventory does not include to deny adversaries access to the standoff make the task of generating sorties dif- organic counter-rocket, -artillery, and footprint.17 Intriguingly, however, in ficult. RAND has examined the potential -mortar capabilities or the associated what amounts to a significant omission effects of Chinese ballistic and cruise threat early warning alert systems. This for joint security operations planning, the missiles on U.S. airbases in the Pacific.26 capability must be coordinated with the BSZ is recognized as a planning construct They found that approximately 30 to 50 Army or host-nation forces, if available.13 that is used only by the air component.18 ballistic missiles targeting an airbase could While joint doctrine does not assign destroy air defenses and aircraft parked in responsibility for counter–indirect fire to Defense Against Ballistic all open parking areas and crater runways any Service component specifically, U.S. and Cruise Missiles to prevent launching and recovering air- Army considers the ability to attack and Russia and China continue to develop craft. In addition, if China simultaneously defeat enemy rocket, artillery, and mortar ballistic and cruise missiles with increas- launched another 30 to 50 cruise missiles attacks to be an air and missile defense ing accuracy, range, and complexity, against the same airbase, they could also competency that is executed by the and in increasing numbers, which could damage or destroy aircraft shelters, as well Army within authorities granted by the present a significant threat to U.S. as fuel, maintenance, and other facilities. joint force air component commander.14 forces in theater.19 Currently, China has Based on its analysis in a combat scenario, Undoubtedly the Army’s capacity to robust capabilities against bases and RAND concluded that, by comparing support airbases with counter–indirect facilities extending to the First Island the numbers of missiles needed “to close fire systems and associated threat early Chain in the Pacific Ocean, is acquiring bases with the numbers that China is cur- warning alert systems will be further an increasing number of medium-range rently fielding, clearly the United States stressed by the Air Force’s force structure ballistic missiles and cruise missiles that could face extended periods of time expansion plans and emerging concepts could hold at risk U.S. bases in Japan, where few, if any, of our bases near China for distributed operations. and is looking to expand its capabilities are operating.”27 To account for the standoff range of to attack targets throughout the western Countering air and missile threats to indirect fire weapons, Air Force base de- Pacific Ocean, including U.S. bases and protect airbases and other critical assets fense planners developed the base security facilities on Guam.20 Although its long- is described in Joint Publication 3-01. At zone (BSZ) concept. The BSZ is an Air range strike capabilities currently have the theater level, the counterair mission Force–unique construct that considers limitations, “China’s commitment to “is the foundational framework”28 for the area outside the base boundary— continuing to modernize its strike capa- countering air and missile threats and “is from which standoff and indirect fire bilities indicates the risk will likely grow inherently a joint and interdependent weapons can engage the base and aircraft going forward.”21 endeavor.”29 It consists of defensive on approach and departure—in base Russia has made a priority of develop- counterair (DCA) operations supported defense planning.15 After identifying the ing cruise and ballistic missiles in the 21st by offensive counterair (OCA) attack BSZ, the installation commander must century.22 In particular, Russia has made operations. DCA operations consist then negotiate adjustment of this bound- “significant progress over the last decade of both active defenses, which engage ary to include those areas of concern operationalizing its long-range precision- and attempt to destroy attacking air- that may extend far beyond the original strike capabilities, which could pose a craft and missiles, and passive defenses, base boundary.16 Conceptually, establish- significant threat to U.S. and NATO which include all the other measures ing the BSZ is intended to expand the [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] used to reduce the effectiveness of the installation commander’s authority and bases, ships, and other military and civil- threats.30 Some of the major active de- ability to directly address ground-based ian infrastructure targets in the European fense weapons systems include the Air threats to airfield operations. However, theater.”23 Notably, since 2014, the Force surveillance and fighter aircraft, in practice, it is not quite that simple, as United States has found Russia to be in U.S. Army Patriot defense systems, U.S. the battlespace outside the base boundary violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Navy Aegis ships and Standard Missile is defined and controlled by the Army Nuclear Forces Treaty by developing interceptors, and Terminal High Altitude or host-nation forces, and approval from and deploying a ground-launched cruise Area Defense (THAAD) systems. Passive the area or host-nation commander is missile with a range of 500 kilome- defenses include detection and warning ters (km) to 5,500 km, which would systems; camouflage, concealment, and 116 Joint Doctrine / Airbase Defense Falls Between the Cracks JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Senior Airman, response force leader with 791st Missile Security Forces Squadron, performs security sweep of landing zone near Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, on January 25, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Brandon Shapiro) deception; dispersal of assets; and harden- due in part to the significant deployment power.”36 Although the Army continues ing of structures. If the United States is rates experienced over the last couple of to invest in improving its capabilities to unable to conduct attack operations prior decades and to shortfalls in the numbers defeat ballistic and cruise missiles, this to threats being launched, “DCA, which of pilots and aircraft maintainers.33 For spending must also be used for pro- is by nature reactive, must be flexible example, the 2017 mission-capable rates grams, such as the Stryker-based Initial enough to prevent the enemy from gain- are approximately 49 percent for the Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense ing the initiative.”31 F-22A, 55 percent for the F-35A, and 70 system,37 intended to protect maneuver Although a comprehensive doctrine to 75 percent for the F-15 variants.34 forces. THAAD and some Navy Aegis exists for countering air and missile The United States also does not have ships can help provide protection against threats, in practice the Services can enough Army air and missile defense ballistic missiles if they are positioned to struggle to follow this doctrine. For systems to protect every critical asset do so. However, as former Chief of Naval instance, not only are a fixed number of or enough interceptors to engage large Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft needed threat salvos. Although DOD has invested and former Army Chief of Staff General for both DCA and OCA attack op- in these capabilities, it “still lacks the Raymond Odierno recently emphasized, erations, they are also needed for three ability to defeat large numbers of ballistic there are “growing challenges associ- other OCA operations—suppression of missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned air- ated with ballistic missile threats that are enemy air defenses, fighter escort, and craft, and other emerging guided weapons increasingly capable, continue to outpace fighter sweep—and also to support other threats.”35 Patriot systems, for instance, our active defense systems, and exceed missions, including strategic attack, air “are expensive and their combined ca- our Services’ capacity to meet Combatant interdiction, and close air support.32 pacity would be insufficient to protect Commanders’ demand.”38 Compounding this problem are the airbases and other military infrastructure Even when they are available to challenges the Air Force is facing in main- that U.S. and allied forces would depend defend airbases and other critical as- taining the readiness of its fleet of aircraft, on during a major conflict with a great sets, active defense systems can have JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Buontempo and Ringer 117 performance limitations against advanced weapons in areas contiguous to airbases to the BSZ. But by establishing the threats that reduce their effectiveness and suggests the base boundary should BSZ as a battlespace within the joint against these threats. To illustrate, a be adjusted to account for these threats. operating area, a premise that considers ballistic missile can challenge missile It also recognizes the BSZ, but only as threats to air operations across multiple defense systems by following a depressed an air component planning construct. domains will be formalized for use during trajectory or releasing a maneuvering But these two points represent the issue; campaign, deliberate, and crisis action warhead or can carry penetration aids if it remains a suggestion, or something planning for joint operations. that attempt “to deceive, obscure, or jam that should happen in air component In addition, the Air Force should for- sensors used to detect and track missiles planning, the default starting point for mally adopt a risk-based planning strategy and [reentry vehicles].”39 Likewise, cruise airbase defense planning remains status for establishing airbases. This approach missiles can attempt to hide from air quo at best, and a point of conten- would explicitly account for defenses defense radars by flying at low altitude or tion at worst. Current joint guidance against the spectrum of likely threats as behind terrain features or by incorporat- discusses what should be done, but the a critical planning factor. In doing so, ing stealth design features.40 In addition, BSZ construct represents how it ought the Air Force would address the multiple salvos of ballistic and cruise missiles to be done to maximize effectiveness— tradeoffs needed to effectively execute can be launched in a way to simultane- succinctly and without ambiguity—from its mission while protecting its airbases. ously strike an airbase in an attempt to an air-minded perspective. For example, an airbase could be located overwhelm the raid handling capabilities Codifying the BSZ as a joint security beyond the reach of relevant threats, of defensive systems. Finally, as stated operations planning construct and bat- but this might require strike aircraft to above, Russia and China are developing tlespace, and identifying the installation travel longer distances, resulting in less hypersonic glide vehicles, and the “com- commander as the battlespace owner, time spent on station, reduced sortie bination of high speed, maneuverability, would eliminate the need to negotiate generation rates, and the procurement and relatively low altitude makes them adjustments to the base boundary to ac- of additional tanker support. Risk-based challenging targets for missile defense count for the effective range of indirect airbase planning would also incentivize systems.”41 fire threats. This would save time and planners to adopt, wherever possible, The challenges associated with active potentially eliminate confusion related methods to reduce the dangers posed defense make difficult the task of protect- to boundary and area adjustments. by such threats. Passive defenses, in par- ing airbases from air and missile threats. Service components would need to as- ticular, are likely to play a significant role. Moreover, because of the luxury of being sess the impact of such a decision, since Perhaps most important, airbase threat able to use distance to help provide pro- one potential outcome is an increase in detection and warning systems could tection over the last few decades, passive the demand for base security forces and enable Airmen to adequately take cover defense measures have received short resources. The BSZ concept also would when necessary. Other passive measures shrift for airbase defense. Although this facilitate deliberations about who defends include camouflage, concealment, and situation could likely be improved, the what and to what extent, as seen through deception; dispersal of on-base assets; and seam between Air Force and Army re- the eyes of the battlespace owner—an hardening of structures. Likewise, ex- sponsibilities for providing air and missile Airman. A battlespace that includes peditionary basing and dispersed basing protection allows each Service to im- standoff threats, previously the respon- might help protect bases by making them plicitly assume that the other will fill any sibility of the commander of the joint more difficult for the enemy to monitor, gaps, resulting in persistent limitations in security area, would now be under the target, and attack. However, this is not protection. authority of the airbase commander. This without its own set of base defense chal- is not intended to imply the joint force lenges. Multiple and likely smaller bases The Way Forward commanders’ authority to make force might not be capable of supporting the To better prepare for the reemergence and resource allocation decisions, above infrastructure available on permanent of highly capable nation-state actors, the base and area security commanders’ bases. Also, using many bases requires joint effort is needed to reduce the level, should be changed; rather, the joint more forces and resources for protection number of seams in airbase defense force commanders’ decisions regard- and defense. In fact, given force structure and to close gaps where possible to ing the shape of, and assets assigned to, limitations, it is doubtful that the Army help ensure the availability of airpower the BSZ would influence which aircraft or host-nation equivalent will be able to within a contested environment. One operated from a given location within a support simultaneous base defense tasks solution is to include the BSZ in joint greater risk-management framework. across a theater. doctrine as a construct for joint secu- The complex nature of the environ- The planning process described rity operations planning as opposed to ments where the Air Force may be tasked above—not to be confused with the merely a tool used by air component to operate, combined with the availability risk-based model the Air Force currently planners. Currently, joint doctrine of joint and host-nation support, will un- uses for Integrated Defense—would sup- recognizes the threat posed by standoff doubtedly necessitate some adjustments port deliberate and crisis action planning 118 Joint Doctrine / Airbase Defense Falls Between the Cracks JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Army test-fires Patriot missile, March 27, 2019 (U.S. Army/Jason Cutshaw) in determining where assets should be easier to replace or have a smaller role in area immediately outside of the bound- based and what level of security will be the overall campaign strategy. The result ary, where area security operations occur. assigned to each location. Under the is a tiered and scalable assessment of Two forces, Soldiers and Airmen, under most desirable conditions, sites capable of potential airbases. This assessment, based two different commands in two separate supporting the BSZ construct under the on available and fixed vulnerability miti- areas of responsibility, conduct defensive command of one commander, without gating measures, would enable risk-based operations near one another in order to constraints imposed by the host nation or decisions regarding aircraft beddown in deny access to the base and deter use of geographical features, would be assigned support of theater operations. standoff weapons. Though battlefield co- organic base defense forces to defend ordination processes that are designed to and patrol the entirety of the BSZ. Air Conclusion protect critical resources and reduce the defense assets could also be assigned to Joint, Air Force, and Army doctrine likelihood of fratricide appear throughout provide cover from theater missile threats. on airbase defense converge to form joint doctrine, the complexity and sheer In particular, these assets could be used a complex system of systems. But the number of these processes give rise to to protect capabilities not protected by merge points of these concepts create opportunities for miscommunication, passive measures. The comprehensive de- seams and gaps that are ripe for exploi- misunderstandings, and divergent priori- fensive scheme of these locations would tation by countries such as China, ties. The latter case yields particularly dire present a reduced risk from ground Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Consid- consequences. Another prominent seam and missile threats, and consequently ering America’s technological advantage occurs in air and missile defense. Joint could serve as the beddown locations for in the air, asymmetric attacks intended doctrine indicates that airbases will be high-demand, low-density assets such to disrupt and harass air operations on protected by Air Force DCA operations as fifth-generation aircraft. Conversely, the ground remain a prudent and likely and Army active defense systems. In locations that could not support these course of action for these nation-states. practice, however, one Service implicitly base defense considerations could be One prominent seam occurs at the assumes that the other will fill any gaps in considered for basing aircraft that are interface of the base boundary and the defenses, resulting in limited protection. JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Buontempo and Ringer 119 25 The return of near-peer adversaries Bragg, NC: Headquarters U.S. Army Forces Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 8. Command, August 19, 2013), 2. 26 Jeff Hagen, Potential Effects of Chinese necessitates that the Air Force analyze 6 Ibid. Aerospace Capabilities on U.S. Air Force Opera- all threats to airbases—the points of 7 Ibid., 20. tions (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, May 20, origin for all Air Force sorties flown. 8 Ibid., 24, 25, 29. 2010). The formal adaptation of a risk-based 9 Roger P. Fox, Air Base Defense in the 27 Ibid., 3. airbase planning strategy will put the Air Republic of Vietnam: 1961–1973 (Washington, 28 JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile DC: Office of Air Force History, 1979), 27. Threats (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April Force in a stronger position to decide 10 Joint Publication (JP) 3-10, Joint Security 21, 2017), I-1. the best courses of action for protecting Operations in Theater (Washington, DC: The 29 Ibid., I-4. airbases while executing its missions, Joint Staff, July 25, 2019), I-7, IV-17. 30 Ibid., I-6 to I-7. and to decide how to judiciously employ 11 Ibid., IV-17. 31 Ibid., V-3. the limited defense capabilities that the 12 Air Force Handbook (AFH) 31-109, In- 32 Ibid., I-6. tegrated Defense in Expeditionary Environments 33 Stephen Losey, “Fewer Planes Are Army and host nations might bring. (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department Ready to Fly: Air Force Mission-Capable Rates Central to this strategy is formalizing of the U.S. Air Force, May 1, 2013), 5–6; Air Decline Amid Pilot Crisis,” Air Force Times, the BSZ as a planning construct for joint Force Policy Directive 31-1, Integrated Defense March 5, 2018. security operations. By examining all the (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department 34 Ibid. relevant threats, tradeoffs, and mitigation of the U.S. Air Force, 2018), 2-3; JP 3-10, 35 Carl Rehberg and Mark Gunzinger, IV-18. Air and Missile Defense at a Crossroads: New measures pertaining to the BSZ, the Air 13 JP 3-10, IV-18. Concepts and Technologies to Defend America’s Force would also be better postured to 14 Army Doctrine Reference Publication Overseas Bases (Washington, DC: Center for advocate for additional passive, active, 3-09, Fires (Washington, DC: Headquarters Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2018), 1. and nonkinetic defenses, in terms of both Department of the Army, February 2013), 1, 4. 36 Ibid., 11. procuring additional systems and devel- 15 AFH 31-109, 19–20. 37 Ashley Tressel, “Army Readying for 16 Annex 4-0, Combat Support, Curtis E. IM-SHORAD Production,” Inside Defense, oping new systems. The Air Force, then, LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and February 12, 2019. must examine the tradeoffs between Education, January 5, 2020, available at 120 Joint Doctrine / Airbase Defense Falls Between the Cracks JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Dr. Valbona Zeneli, Marshall Center’s professor of National Security Studies, talks about “Crime and Corruption,” August 12, 2016, during Program on Countering Transnational Organized Crime (George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies/Christine June) Putting the “FIL” into “DIME” Growing Joint Understanding of the Instruments of Power By Cesar Augusto Rodriguez, Timothy Charles Walton, and Hyong Chu Despite how long the DIME has been used for describing the instruments of national power, U.S. policymakers and strategists have long understood that there are many more instruments involved in national security policy development and implementation. —Joint Doctrine Note 1-18, Strategy hile the U.S. military tends Major Cesar Augusto Rodriguez, USAF, is Chief of the Air Force Section Honduras, U.S. Military Group, U.S. Embassy Tegucigalpa. Major Timothy Charles Walton, USA, is an Effects Integrator in the Counter- to view the instruments of Facilitation Task Force at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Lieutenant Commander Hyong Chu, W power (IOPs) strictly through USN, is Supplier Relations and Program Management Division Chief of the Strategic Acquisition the lens of the diplomatic, informa- Programs in Defense Logistics Agency Land and Maritime. JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Rodriguez, Walton, and Chu 121 tional, military, and economic (DIME) and partners to “integrate all instruments the new environment of Great Power framework, it is increasingly imperative of U.S. and partner national power . . . competition. to consider additional IOPs such as DIME-FIL.”4 Clarifying the definition of FIL IOPs, finance, intelligence, and law enforce- U.S. strategic direction and joint identifying key mission partners, and ment (FIL). The U.S. military focuses doctrine state the importance of detecting potential applications for each primarily on the kinetic employment synchronizing and incorporating a whole- of the new FIL instruments can mitigate of the military, prioritizing the big of-government approach in order to the gap in doctrine and planning. An M to demonstrate power, destroy the utilize all IOPs for unity of effort. The increased understanding of the FIL IOPs enemy, and celebrate victory. This Joint Force 2020 concept of globally will allow the U.S. military to update military-centric approach often neglects integrated operations argues for a transre- doctrine, synchronize the IOPs, become other IOPs, resulting in suboptimal gional, all-domain, and multifunctional more globally integrated, and perform in use of resources, the creation of an approach and urges the joint force to pre- the competitive environment, ultimately echo chamber, and poor transitions to pare for the future competitive security achieving unity of effort and effectively other organizations, agencies, and/or environment by leveraging Service capa- protecting national interests. national governments. The emergence bilities.5 However, this approach ignores of a new strategic environment neces- the necessity of incorporating interagency Understanding the sitates an orchestration of multiple and global partners and capabilities. FIL Instruments instruments of power. As a result, it Thus, a more strategic global integration Financial. The financial IOP was is perhaps time to transition from a concept is vital in today’s environment. born during the war on terror, as the DIME to DIME-FIL concept. Global integration is defined by Chairman United States sought to disrupt and U.S. peer competitors, namely Russia of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction dismantle global terrorist financial net- and China, have already developed 3100.01D and the Summary of the 2018 works. The National Security Strategy alternative concepts to leverage IOPs National Defense Strategy of the United for Combatting Terrorism identified to compete below the threshold of States of America as “the arrangement the importance of affecting financial conflict. For example, Russia conceptual- of cohesive joint force actions in time, systems used by terrorist organizations izes political warfare using nonmilitary space, and purpose, executed as a whole that support their survival and continued and above-military categories (political, to address transregional, multifunctional operations.7 In relation to violent extrem- network, economic, financial, intelli- challenges across all domains through the ist organizations (VEOs), the financial gence, legal, cultural, propaganda, drug, seamless integration of multiple elements IOP is characterized as the specific and so forth), which are similar to the of national power—diplomacy, informa- means by which insurgents acquire and DIME-FIL IOPs while continuing to tion, economics, finance, intelligence, law distribute capital, whether via formal or emphasize the military instrument.1 As enforcement and military.”6 The concept informal banking and monetary exchange peer competitors develop such fluid and addresses the importance of a unified systems.8 The routine use, success, and threshold-based gray zone concepts, the effort across all elements of national precision of the financial IOP over the United States must adapt in order to power and could provide a framework past two decades prove that it is an es- compete in a changing threat environ- to incorporate global integration for the sential addition to DIME. Although the ment. To succeed, commanders and their commander and planners to truly lever- focus of the financial IOP has been on staffs will need to understand, select, and age all government agencies’ strengths, the VEO threat, it could be expanded to synchronize IOPs to ensure a whole-of- achieve military objectives, and ultimately address other threats and actors including government and international approach protect national interests. transnational crime organizations, state to these problem sets. However, there is little explicit in- proxy groups, nonstate actors, and states. Currently, doctrine and planning formation on the new IOPs and even Generally, the financial instrument should emphasize the DIME model.2 The scant less guidance regarding the potential be understood as the denial of access to literature on IOPs mentions the addi- application of a more granular conception specified individuals or groups from a for- tion of FIL, but the focus has been its of IOPs in a competitive environ- mal or informal financial system, network, application to combating terrorism. The ment. Failing to clarify or ignoring the or source of funding. first mention of FIL pertaining to the DIME-FIL concept leads to a lack of At first glance, the financial and National Security Strategy was in 2003, synchronization and global integration economic IOPs appear similar; however, in a document that called for defeating in the whole-of-government approach. they are fundamentally different in scope, terrorism through the direct and indirect Therefore, U.S. military leadership enabling instruments, and associated ac- use of DIME-FIL IOPs.3 Subsequently, should consider adding the FIL IOPs to tivities. The economic IOP is used at the similar language appeared in the 2006 the DIME construct and incorporating political level to influence the behavior National Military Strategic Plan for the it into joint doctrine to improve interor- of another state or organization.9 This is war on terror and focused on coopera- ganizational planning for an international normally achieved through foreign aid, tion among U.S. agencies, coalitions, and intergovernmental approach in trade agreements, tariffs, embargos, or 122 Joint Doctrine / Putting the “FIL” into “DIME” JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Air battle manager with 16th Airborne Command and Control Squadron monitors radar system on E-8 Joint STARS aircraft flying off coast of Florida, July 14, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Marianique Santos) economic sanctions. These actions tend Crimes Enforcement Network requires dominance in the financial sector. In to be broader in scope and political in financial institutions, as of May 2018, to 2014, the U.S. dollar was involved in 87 nature as they impact entire nations. As a know their customer and perform cus- percent of the world’s foreign exchange result, the economic instrument relies on tomer due diligence to ensure customers transactions, proof of its ability to influ- the diplomatic instrument to carry out are not involved in illegal activity and to ence financial institutions to comply.13 these actions. cooperate with government agencies to The intelligence IOP often pairs with the The financial IOP relies heavily on detect and prevent money laundering.11 financial to detect and contain, and then the Department of the Treasury, in close Leveraging key mission partners enables the financial IOP deters and disrupts tar- cooperation with banks, corporations, the U.S. Government to prevent or deny get adversary individuals or groups. The organizations, and international partners, access to financial systems to those actors financial and intelligence IOPs are closely in order to protect U.S. financial systems, that threaten national interests. linked, delivering more precise effects combat adversary actors, administer sanc- The financial IOP tends to be more related to financial systems and funding, tions, and freeze assets. Treasury wields a agile in nature as it can specifically target whereas the economic IOP is tied to the significant amount of power through the countries, organizations, companies, diplomatic IOP, broader in scope and USA PATRIOT Act, requiring foreign and individuals utilizing banking systems related to interstate commerce. banks to establish a contact for receiv- to project power. A disruption of fund- The benefit and relevance of the ing subpoenas, scrutinize deposits from ing for a target entity can be achieved financial IOP is its precision. When tar- residents of nations that do not cooperate through compelling private banking insti- geting specific actors, the United States with U.S. officials, and impose sanctions tutions to deny currency loans or credit; can achieve desired effects by focusing on banks that do not provide informa- blacklisting individuals, corporations, on critical vulnerabilities and capabilities tion to law enforcement agencies.10 or states; utilizing financial sanctions; or without suffering second- and third-order Through the PATRIOT Act and the freezing assets.12 Disruptions are made effects caused by the economic IOP. This Banks Secrecy Act, Treasury’s Financial possible because of U.S. worldwide in turn can reduce the suffering of the JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Rodriguez, Walton, and Chu 123 Afghan and coalition security force members conceal themselves in field during operation in search of Taliban facilitator in Sayyid Karam District, Paktia Province, Afghanistan, June 5, 2013 (U.S. Army/Codie Mendenhall) population and improve U.S. legitimacy investment, mergers to steal intellectual activities, products, and organizations. and credibility. The focus of the financial property, technology, and sensitive The organizations participate in the IOP has historically been VEOs, but it data, the Trump administration recently activities of “collection, processing, applies to all problem sets. In 2017, the expanded the power of the Committee integration, analysis, and interpretation United States targeted North Korea’s on Foreign Investment in the United of available information” of hostile or ability to generate funds by potentially States. National security reviews now potentially hostile forces that result in “suspending U.S. correspondent account include transactions in which a foreign intelligence products.17 Activities are access to any foreign bank that knowingly investment was merely a minority interest often associated with processes (such conducts or facilitates significant transac- instead of a controlling share and extend as the Joint Intelligence Preparation of tions tied to trade with North Korea or review powers into the real estate sector. the Operational Environment process, certain designated persons.”14 In 2018, Similarly, citing national security con- the targeting process, the intelligence the restoration of sanctions on Iran tar- cerns, Australia, Canada, the European process, etc.), as well as intelligence geted financial institutions, companies, Union, France, Germany, Japan, and disciplines.18 The products are typically and individuals tied to Iran’s shipping, the United Kingdom have all joined an intelligence estimates and assessments financial, and energy sectors, resulting in unprecedented global backlash against that are often broken down into catego- 700 additional companies and individuals Chinese capital. Although many U.S. ries and could be in the form of written on the sanction rolls, causing concern peer competitors tend to have national- documents or verbal presentations, hard- from the Iranian public and flaming po- ized industries, they must participate in copy publications, or electronic media.19 tential unrest toward the regime.15 the global market in order to be profit- Organizations can be broken down into After the Ukraine conflict, the Office able, thus making them vulnerable to Department of Defense (DOD) agencies, of Foreign Assistance Control created a exploitation via the financial IOP. In other national agencies, foreign agencies, blacklist to paralyze the financial deal- turn, the use of these actions can result host-nation or local sources, and corpora- ings of a Russian billionaire friendly to in slowing peer expansion and protecting tions. According to Craig Mastapeter the Kremlin, blocking transactions and U.S. national interests. in his Naval Postgraduate School thesis, payments from his bank by JPMorgan Intelligence. The multifaceted “The intelligence instrument, or element, Chase, Visa, and MasterCard at a nature of intelligence makes it difficult of national power integrates foreign, mili- Russian embassy in Kazakhstan.16 In to define. However, intelligence can be tary, and domestic capabilities through an attempt to halt Chinese global broadly broken down into three parts: policy, personnel, and technology 124 Joint Doctrine / Putting the “FIL” into “DIME” JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 actions to provide decision advantage to the private sector provides independent be necessary to navigate the sea of big policymakers, diplomats, financiers and investigation and analysis. data and to select and combine data in economists, strategic communicators, Access, speed, insight, the ability useful ways for decisionmaking. Finally, warfighters, homeland security officials, for direct action, and cover for U.S. information-sharing between agencies and law enforcement.”20 A more succinct interests are the advantages of utilizing and partnerships with external agencies and functional definition of the intel- mission partners outside of the United and nations will be paramount to opti- ligence IOP that corresponds to both the States.22 Commanders, however, must mize intelligence activities, make faster joint concept and Mastapeter’s definition be judicious in their use of the foreign decisions, and create unity of effort with is the products, interdisciplinary activities, intelligence and host-nation and private- mission partners. and organizations that convert disparate sector entities due to the disadvantages Law Enforcement. Under the cur- data about the environment, future capa- of conflicting interests, hostile collection, rent DIME construct, the diplomatic bilities and intentions, and relevant actors poor information gathering, and moral and military IOPs’ legal efforts are not into coherent information to provide de- hazards.23 sufficient and are extremely complex. As cision advantage for decisionmakers, both It is vital to refocus U.S. intelligence a result, a separate IOP is necessary. The policymakers and commanders. efforts from the VEO threat to peer law enforcement IOP is challenging to The term intelligence is often con- competition with Russia and China. define because it has two parts (legal and fused by operators and planners with Since 9/11, the reorganization of U.S. enforcement); encompasses the political, the term information. Fortunately, the intelligence agencies has proved vital strategic, operational, and tactical levels; recent designation of information as a in disrupting terrorist and criminal operates through other IOPs;26 and relies new joint function helped to shed some organizations. To dismantle the VEO heavily on national, international, foreign clarity on the difference in terms. As and criminal networks and neutral- state, and local partners and organiza- with all instruments of power, there is ize high-value individuals, the U.S. tions. Unlike other IOPs, the legal IOP overlap, but the major difference is in the Government and military have focused is complex, incredibly diverse, and rapidly purpose, players, audience, and activities intelligence at the operational and tacti- changing over short periods of time. A involved in each instrument. The focus cal level for the past 20 years, relying functional definition of the law enforce- of the intelligence IOP is the production heavily on intelligence, surveillance, and ment IOP is the understanding and of value-added data for the commander reconnaissance; dynamic targeting; and adherence to national, international, and or decisionmaker to make informed nodal analysis. The National Intelligence local laws and the activities to support or decisions. Distinctly, the focus of the Council’s Global Trends Report indi- carry out the enforcement of those laws information IOP is to affect decision- cates that the blurring of peacetime and and thereby restore order. making in the cognitive, informational, wartime, the ease of disruption caused The law portion of law enforcement and physical dimensions of the target by nonstate groups, increase in standoff pertains to the legal expertise required audience—whether friendly, neutral, or and remote attack capabilities, and new to understand national law, international adversary—to create a desired effect.21 concerns about nuclear weapons and law, and foreign laws. This aspect is For example, the intelligence IOP may weapons of mass destruction are shap- more strategic in nature and requires provide the critical information necessary ing conflicts that are more “diffuse,” synchronization with the diplomatic for the commander to make a decision “diverse,” and “disruptive.”24 The instrument to avoid missteps in inter- whereas the information IOP would help 2019 National Intelligence Strategy national and host-nation legal systems, to create a desired effect in the target provides some guidelines on the trends carefully balancing the laws and interests audience. Ultimately, the intelligence and focus areas such as strategic intel- of all national, international, and foreign IOP provides decision advantage, and the ligence, anticipatory intelligence, current entities. The enforcement aspect requires information IOP is meant to influence a operations intelligence, and cyber threat law enforcement agencies to work closely target audience. intelligence.25 via the diplomatic IOP with data from The intelligence IOP involves many The United States will need to har- the intelligence IOP to prosecute crimes mission partners, all with varying and ness the intelligence instrument to meet and conduct activities at the tactical level important missions articulated in the the new environment. Indications and through the military IOP or local law following categories: national agencies, warning intelligence as well as counter- enforcement. allied partners and agencies, host-nation intelligence will be critical to enable U.S. There are many key mission partners resources, and private sources. The U.S. military and information instruments. involved with the law enforcement IOP Government has 17 national agencies Intelligence will need to emphasize at- that include national, international, and with different mission sets utilized for in- tribution to identify criminal cyber and foreign legal departments and law en- telligence-sharing and cooperation. Allied proxy actors that enable financial and forcement agencies. partners provide partnerships for intelli- law enforcement instruments to act. The key U.S. organizations for gence-sharing and verification. Partner Data superiority and managing artificial the legal aspect are the Department of nations assist with local intelligence, while intelligence and machine learning will State and Department of Justice, which JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Rodriguez, Walton, and Chu 125 provide legal expertise for national and Recommendations: Putting spectrum that will be transnational, all international law while working with the FIL into DIME domain, and multifunctional, so agility partner-nation justice departments to The DIME construct is overused and is key. Each line of effort will require a achieve an understanding of key legal outmatched in our current environ- distinct and harmonious combination of issues. U.S. agencies, regional agencies, ment. In order to perform in the the IOPs. Having a solid understanding intergovernmental organizations, and competitive environment and navigate of the key mission partners and their host-nation partners are critical to enforc- the gray zone, a full understanding of strengths across the DIME-FIL will ing laws and protecting the population. all IOPs is necessary. A more polished enable commanders and planners to Through the diplomatic, intelligence, and understanding of the new FIL IOPs is develop more creative plans that share financial IOPs, the law enforcement IOP required to achieve unity of effort. In the mission, tasks, and successes through is able to balance enforcing U.S. national order to address the gap in understand- a whole-of-government, international, laws and sovereignty with adhering to ing the FIL IOPs, it is critical to define and interorganizational approach. international law to maintain legitimacy concepts, incorporate them into doc- Incorporating partners early into plan- while proactively detaining criminals to trine, identify the appropriate mission ning will garner mutual trust and buy-in protect U.S. citizens and assist mission partners, and apply DIME-FIL to the from partners who have a better under- partners with their security needs. competitive environment. The follow- standing of their particular instruments. A key U.S. strength is its alliances ing recommendations will improve the The U.S. military has more resources and and leadership in the international understanding and implementation of planning experience compared to other system. U.S. competitors seek to at- the DIME-FIL framework and allow agencies and partners, which provide a tack partnerships, use the international the U.S. military to address the global tremendous opportunity to coordinate, system to slow actions, and delegitimize problem sets, ultimately achieving unity synchronize, and harmonize the instru- efforts across the globe. U.S. military of effort and effectively protecting ments and subsequently the mission legal expertise should broaden to in- national interests. partners involved. ternational law and be incorporated Update Joint Doctrine with Train and Plan with DIME-FIL into planning (not just law of armed DIME-FIL. The acronym DIME-FIL for Near-Peer Threats. Training should conflict and rules of engagement). is colloquially being used in the joint not be singularly focused on the big M Commanders should also incorporate lexicon, but the term has not been spe- and conventional warfare. Opening the legal expertise from State or Justice cifically defined or included in doctrine. aperture and adding more instruments into planning. Commanders could Definitions provide the foundation for of power to the U.S. lexicon signal improve U.S. legitimacy with strategic a common understanding of concepts that warfare has changed and that all communication, clarifying the message and terms. The preliminary definitions instruments and partners are necessary that the United States wants to enable addressed for the finance, intelligence, for success. Planning should seriously countries to establish their own rules and law enforcement instruments provide consider harmonizing DIME-FIL, of law and improve their security and a solid starting point to incorporate and whole-of-government, and interorga- stability. Additionally, peer competi- update joint doctrine related to strategy, nizational concepts in the U.S. peer tors increasingly use proxy, cyber, and concepts, and planning. A clear defini- competition environment to compete in criminal actors. International law and tion can assist in the understanding, the gray zone and address U.S. problem international law enforcement are key application, and synchronization of the sets. The DIME-FIL concept is a natural capabilities for defeating terrorist and IOPs for unity of effort in a competitive progression to a globally integrated ap- adversary networks that span multiple environment. Some logical publica- proach that could be achieved through national boundaries. It is therefore criti- tions to address the gap by defining, incorporating the key mission partners cal to reinforce whole-of-government, explaining, or listing the FIL IOPs are of all instruments in interorganizational international, and interorganizational Joint Doctrine Note 1-18, Strategy; exercises, the global campaign plan, partnering to quickly identify, locate, and Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for and stability operations planning. These detain criminals anywhere on the globe, the Armed Forces of the United States; JP instruments should focus on creating ef- shortening our observe-orient-decide-act 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation; fects on adversary critical capabilities and loop compared to our competitors and and the Joint Concept for Integrated vulnerabilities, many of which will not communicating attribution while de- Campaigning. be military in nature. Some key themes fending U.S. national interests. The law Identify the Mission Partners that may help us in the new environment enforcement IOP is crucial to achieving Involved with Each Instrument and are partnerships, strategic messaging, legitimacy by balancing national, inter- Incorporate Them Early and Often in legitimacy, information sharing, decision national, and foreign law with national Planning. Planners and commanders advantage, technology, attribution, and interests and partnering with local law are tasked with implementing the con- tempo. enforcement entities to achieve unity of cept of global integration and executing Additional IOPs have been identi- effort and accomplish objectives. different types of missions across the fied, along with key mission partners, 126 Joint Doctrine / Putting the “FIL” into “DIME” JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Coalition-aligned security force Maghaweir al-Thowra seize $3.5 million in illicit drugs, including nearly 850,000 regional amphetamine Captagon pills, used to fund so-called Islamic State operations, in southern Syria, October 23, 2019 (U.S. Army/Kyle Alvarez) that have the potential to result in the Treasury Department, providing of the FIL IOPs allows the joint com- better resource utilization, diversity of precision effects and denying adversaries munity to update doctrine, synchronize, thought, and smoother transitions. It is access to financial systems. The intel- and involve mission partners early in the responsibility of planners and com- ligence instrument delivers decision planning and perform in the competitive manders to synchronize the instruments advantage through activities, products, environment, ultimately achieving unity and create a more strategic globally inte- and organizations, mainly through of effort and effectively protecting na- grated approach. The current doctrinal national and international intelligence tional interests. The DIME-FIL concept approach stymies the understanding of agencies, enabling value-added data for lends legitimacy to the U.S. cause and new IOPs, leaving commanders with the rest of the IOPs. The two-pronged utilizes global integration to synchronize plans that result in a limited conceptual- law enforcement instrument focuses on efforts, compete, and win in the strategic ization, a lack of creativity, and an echo adherence to and enforcement of laws environment. JFQ chamber of DIME-centric operational mainly through State and Justice, as well approaches. By defining each of the FIL as DOD, granting the United States instruments, identifying key mission authority and legitimacy to take action Notes partners, and determining its applica- and enabling the United States to detain 1 tion in the near-peer environment, criminals and restore order. Katerina Oskarrson and Robin Barnett, “The Effectiveness of DIMEFIL Instruments of commanders and planners are able to The “America First” strategy relies Power in the Gray Zone,” Open Publications 1, achieve understanding and apply the on U.S. partners to do more, which no. 2 (2017), 8. DIME-FIL framework to their way requires joint planners and commanders 2 Joint Doctrine Note 1-18, Strategy of thinking and approaching complex to leverage all resources, capabilities, (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2018), problem sets. The key aspect of the and instruments in a concerted effort to available at JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Rodriguez, Walton, and Chu 127 (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, March, 2013), available at 128 Joint Doctrine / Putting the “FIL” into “DIME” JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 New from NDU Press A Persistent Fire: The Strategic Ethical Impact of World War I on the Global Profession of Arms Edited by Timothy S. Mallard and Nathan H. White 2020 • 412 pp. Since “the war to end all wars” witnessed the rise of global war among competing nation- states conducted in often tenuous alliances with nascent professional militaries—characteristics that continue to mark contemporary warfare a century later—then studying that conflict’s impact seems a relevant method to decide ways in which the profession of arms will develop in the next 25 to 50 years. Indeed, like a smoldering, persistent fire that threatens to re-erupt into a fresh conflagration, World War I continues to deeply shape and guide the profession of arms today. Download the EPUB, MOBI, or PDF version for free. Scan the QR Code above or go to: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/ Books/A-Persistent-Fire JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE NINETY-SEVEN, 2ND QUARTER 2020 Flickr Pinterest Facebook Twitter You can also find us on: can also find You Visit us online at: https://ndupress.ndu.edu Visit articles, occasional papers, books, and other publications. site is a great place to find information on new and upcomingsite is a great place to find information With 20,000 unique visitors each month, the NDU Press WebWith 20,000 unique visitors each month, JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY National Defense University, Washington, DC National Defense University, Washington, The Armed Forces Officer“This new edition of The Armed Forces articulates the ethical and moral underpin- nings at the core of our profession. The special trust in us by the Nation and confidence placed we protect is built upon this foundation. I commend members of our officer corps to embrace the principles of this important book and practice them daily in the performance of your du- I expect you to imbue these values in the next generation of leaders.” ties. More importantly, Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1159223/the-armed-forces-officer/ From NDU Press From NDU Officer The Armed Forces 2017 • 212 pp. Dunford, Jr.: From the Foreword by General Joseph F. C. Marshall, then serving George “In 1950, the great Soldier-Statesman Secretary as the of Officer page for a new book titled The ArmedDefense, signed a cover Forces . That original Marshall, who later explained that was written by none other than S.L.A. version of this book Secretary Marshall had ‘inspired the undertakingpersonal conviction that American due to his military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground morally.’ ethically and it addressed an of the Cold War, emergence at the dawn of the nuclear age and the Written officer a strategy of nuclear deterrence, corps tasked with developing facing unprecedented deployments, and adapting to the creation of the Department- of Defense and other new orga nizations necessary to manage the threats of a new global order. Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff University Press by National Defense Have you checked out NDU Press online lately? Have you checked