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MORE WILLING & ABLE:

Charting China’s International Security Activism

By Ely Ratner, Elbridge Colby, Andrew Erickson, Zachary Hosford, and Alexander Sullivan

Foreword

Many friends have contributed immeasurably to our research over the past two years and to this culminating report. CNAS colleagues including Patrick Cronin, Shawn Brimley, Jeff Chism, Michèle Flournoy, Richard Fontaine, Jerry Hendrix, Van Jackson, JC Mock, Dafna Rand, Jacob Stokes, and Robert Work provided feedback and guidance throughout the process. We are also grateful to our expert external reviewers: Scott Harold, Evan Montgomery, John Schaus, and Christopher Yung. David Finkelstein and Bonnie Glaser lent their wisdom to workshops that greatly informed our subsequent efforts. The research team is indebted to the School of International Studies at Peking University, the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, China Institute for Contemporary International Relations, and China Foreign Affairs University for hosting discussions in Beijing. We were guided and assisted throughout by colleagues from the State Department, the Department of Defense, the White House, and the U.S. intelligence community. Kelley Sayler, Yanliang Li, Andrew Kwon, Nicole Yeo, Cecilia Zhou, and Hannah Suh provided key research, editing, and other support. The creativity of Melody Cook elevated the report and its original graphics. We are grateful as well for the assistance of Ellen McHugh and Ryan Nuanes.

Last but not least, this research would not have been possible without the generous support of the MacArthur Foundation.

While many colleagues contributed to the research effort, the views herein are the authors’ alone, along with any errors of fact, omission, or interpretation.

MORE WILLING & ABLE:

Charting China’s International Security Activism

By Ely Ratner, Elbridge Colby, Andrew Erickson, Zachary Hosford, and Alexander Sullivan

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

Executive Summary

36

Introduction: The globalization of Chinese national security policy Part 1: Key trends in China’s international security activism

Loosening of the noninterference principle Deepening security partnerships
11 12 19

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  • Growing force projection capabilities

Part 2: Implications for U.S. strategy and policy

Engagement: Seizing the benefits of a more active China Shaping: Building the international security order Balancing: The military challenge
42 43 49 58

Conclusion: Summary recommendations

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MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

About the Authors

Dr. Ely Ratner is a Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. Elbridge Colby is the Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at CNAS. Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is an Associate Professor in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College.

Zachary Hosford, at the time of writing, was an Associate Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS.

Alexander Sullivan is an Associate Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS and a prospective Ph.D. student in political science at Georgetown University.

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Executive Summary

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E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y

China’s external behavior has entered a period of profound evolution. e rapid expansion of Chinese economic, political, and security interests around the world, backed by greater capabilities to advance and defend those interests, is driving Beijing to become increasingly active in international security affairs. Although the ultimate character of China’s future foreign policy remains uncertain – including to leaders in Beijing – China has already begun deviating from long-standing foreign policy practices in ways that reflect its changing constellation of interests and capabilities.

Part I of this study considers what we assess to be the three most significant and transformative trends in Beijing’s international security activism. Taken together, these developments portend a China increasingly willing and able to play a prominent and decisive role in international security issues:

LOOSENING OF ITS POLICY OF NONINTERFERENCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES’ DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

1

Although China’s noninterference principle continues to serve a variety of foreign policy goals, it is under considerable strain from demands to protect China’s growing overseas interests. We catalog how China is taking a more flexible approach to noninterference when key national interests are at stake, engaging in a range of economic, diplomatic, and military activities that depart from traditional definitions of noninterference.

DEEPENING SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS WITH COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD

e globalization of China’s national security interests has also led Beijing to

2

embark upon efforts to develop deeper security relations around the world. We describe how over the last decade China has enhanced its security ties across the spectrum of defense activities, including military diplomacy, combined training and exercises, and arms exports.

INCREASING POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES

While still facing considerable limitations, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

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is becoming more sophisticated across the spectrum of power projection capabilities. In the next 10 to 15 years, we assess that China will likely be capable of carrying out a variety of overseas missions, including major international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation operations, securing of important assets overseas, defense of sea lanes, counterterrorism strikes, and stabilization operations.

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MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

e expanding scope and scale of China’s international security activism demand that Washington widen the aperture of its hedging policy toward China in several domains. Part II considers the implications for U.S. strategy and offers policy recommendations. efforts, the United States should consider ways to engage and shape Chinese-led multilateral initiatives and organizations.

Maintaining a competitive military balance in the Western Pacific will be a crucial element of limiting the potentially destabilizing effects of the PLA’s expanding partnerships and power projection capabilities. Failing to do so would enable China to field greater capacity for extraregional power projection more quickly, render it able to focus more resources on deploying to a broader set of regions, and allow it to operate more effectively and decisively across a greater set of domains.
U.S. military-to-military engagement with China should continue focusing on developing operational safety and crisis management mechanisms, expanding existing agreements, and finding ways to ensure they will be used effectively when needed. e Department of Defense should also seek measures to reduce the likelihood of incidents and accidents between China and U.S. allies and partners.
As a result, even as the United States and its allies and partners must take due account of the military challenges posed by a more globally active PLA, it still makes sense for Washington to concentrate on maintaining key advantages over Chinese military power at its leading edge in the Western Pacific. is argues against military strategies that cede the near seas and the airspace above them to China.
U.S.-China security cooperation will continue to be limited by legal and political constraints, although there may be opportunities for cooperation on nontraditional security challenges and possibly new areas to include counterterrorism, maritime security, and arms control. Within existing engagements, the United States should pursue with China more interagency interactions, at lower levels and with third countries.
Finally, U.S. defense cooperation in areas of expected PLA activism should be geared in part to assist countries in developing their own defensive counterintervention capabilities. is should reduce China’s ability to project power in destabilizing ways by making such efforts more difficult and costly for Beijing.
To shape the environment in which China’s international security activism occurs, the United States should seek to increase U.S. military access and presence in areas where the PLA is most likely to operate away from China’s shores, particularly in the Indian Ocean region. As China increasingly has both the political will and the military capability to serve as an important security partner, the United States should also take measures to sustain and deepen its alliances, as well as augment its diplomatic engagement on China-related issues with countries that could be strategically significant for Chinese power projection.
ese recommendations and more are discussed in greater detail herein.

Supporting the development of more capable and effective multilateral institutions will also be critical to managing China’s international security activism in a number of regions, including Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, Central Asia, the Pacific Islands, and the Arctic. As part of these

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Introduction

THE GLOBALIZATION OF CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

safeguarding China’s expanding interests around

I N T R O D U C T I O N : T H E

the world.4 His more ambitious successor, Xi, has built upon the idea of achieving greater reach into world politics by calling for China to become a “maritime power” and articulating visions of a continental “New Silk Road” and “Maritime Silk Road” that aspire to tie Asia, the Middle East, and Europe more closely to China through enhanced trade and investment.5

G L O B A L I Z A T I O N O F C H I N E S E N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y P O L I C Y

For more than three decades, leaders in Beijing have sought to enhance the power and legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) through sustained economic growth, promotion of a stable regional security environment, and the safeguarding of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity. China’s external behavior, official media, speeches, and government documents all reflect these enduring foreign policy priorities.

... today, in important respects, China is finished hiding its

e principles through which China has pursued these aims were long equally persistent. Even aſter the opening of its economy to the world in the late 1970s, China’s external behavior has been relatively limited and ideological, reflecting an inward-looking country primarily concerned with domestic stability and economic development, lacking the means or interest to play a more active role on the global stage.1 If anything, China’s leaders eschewed international responsibility, seeking instead to defend the country from outside interference and rebuild China from within until it had sufficient power to reassume its rightful position as a great power – a long-standing goal that President Xi Jinping and his predecessors have called the “great renewal of the Chinese nation.”2 e mantras describing and guiding Chinese foreign policy during this period have included Deng Xiaoping’s oſt-cited dictum of “hiding’s one’s strength and biding one’s time” and the notion of China’s peaceful rise and development.3

strength and biding its time. A confluence of factors emerging over the last decade is compelling the People’s Republic of China to become active in global affairs as never before, with leaders in Beijing now pursuing a greater role for Chinese diplomacy and the People’s Liberation Army beyond China’s borders.

ese efforts reflect the rapid expansion of Chinese economic, political, and security interests around the world, backed by greater capabilities to advance and defend those interests. Together, these trends are pulling at the seams of what the world had come to understand as the traditional fabric of Chinese foreign policy.
But today, in important respects, China is finished hiding its strength and biding its time. A confluence of factors emerging over the last decade is compelling the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to become active in global affairs as never before, with leaders in Beijing now pursuing a greater role for Chinese diplomacy and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) beyond China’s borders. en-President Hu Jintao articulated “new historic missions” for the PLA in 2004 that included
China’s remarkable economic rise is a well-known story. Clocking double-digit growth for three decades, it has become the world’s second-largest economy. is has resulted in growing connectivity between China and the outside world. According

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CHINA IS INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

Its reliance on imported natural resources, such as oil, is creating new overseas interests and vulnerabilities.

China’s Oil Imports by Origin, 2013

Saudi Arabia
Angola Others Russia Oman Iraq Iran
Venezuela Kazakhstan
UAE Kuwait Congo Brazil

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, “China Country Analysis,” February 4, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ch.

  • 0%
  • 5
  • 10
  • 15
  • 20%

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MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

economy depends on seaborne trade.11 Within that trade, China is heavily reliant on overseas natural resources to fuel its economy, which remains manufacturing-focused and energy-intensive. China imported more than half its oil in 2013, a figure the U.S. Energy Information Administration expects to grow to 66 percent by 2020 and 72 percent by 2040.12 is places a high value not only on the sea lanes themselves, but also upon the stability of key suppliers in the Middle East and Africa. to official Chinese statistics, in 2013 China’s total trade in goods reached $4.2 trillion, an amount larger than the entire Chinese economy in 2007.6 Outward direct investment from the mainland has exploded as well, increasing fortyfold between 2002 and 2013, placing the PRC as the third-largest overseas investor, behind the United States and Japan.7

is economic activity and its concomitant wealth creation have also led to a surge in Chinese citizens going abroad as businesspeople, laborers, students, and tourists. e numbers are staggering, with more than a million Chinese citizens employed around the globe in Chinese investment projects, almost 400,000 Chinese students studying abroad, and over 60 million Chinese tourists going overseas annually.8
But Beijing’s increasingly outward orientation is about more than just moving goods to and from China. e presence of Chinese citizens, businesses, and investments overseas – many in dangerous, far-flung places – increases the salience for Beijing of regional and domestic stability outside its borders. As a result, transnational threats such as terrorism, extremism, and piracy are reverberating back on China in ways that challenge vital economic and political interests.
e tremendous growth of PRC equities in the world underscores China’s growing power and influence but has also created economic and political exigencies that are vastly increasing the complexity and scope of China’s national security agenda. As Xi has declared, “China’s dependence on the world and its involvement in international affairs are deepening, so are the world’s dependence on China and its impact on China.”9
Finally, all of these vulnerabilities are magnified by rising domestic awareness and expectations among the Chinese public that Beijing will protect China’s interests wherever they lie. A more diverse and vibrant media landscape in China, including an explosion in social media, is placing additional pressure on China’s leaders – sometimes buoyed by the government’s own nationalist propaganda – to be sensitive and responsive to the country’s overseas interests.
Managing and maintaining this interconnectedness with the world will shape Chinese foreign policy for decades to come.

China’s economic miracle, aſter all, has been predicated on interdependence with the rest of the world, which, according to the World Bank, provided “a supportive global environment that undoubtedly assisted and accommodated China’s rapid growth.”10 An open global system, especially among developed countries, has provided market access for Chinese goods, capital flows, transfers of technology and expertise, and access to critical resources such as energy – all enablers on which Beijing will continue to depend.
Leaders in Beijing are clearly cognizant of these trends. e Chinese government’s official 2013 defense white paper noted that:

“With the gradual integration of China’s economy into the world economic system, overseas interests have become an integral component of China’s national interests. Security issues are increasingly prominent, involving overseas energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and Chinese nationals and legal persons overseas. Vessel protection at sea, evacuation of Chinese nationals overseas, and emergency rescue have become important
Similarly, open and secure shipping lanes are crucial for China given that nearly half of its

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ways and means for the PLA to safeguard national interests and fulfill China’s international obligations.”13 its changing constellation of interests and capabilities. It should therefore come as no surprise that, as Michael Swaine has assessed, Xi is calling for “a more activist, involved, and security-oriented approach to Chinese diplomacy and foreign relations.”16 Moreover, the underlying trends driving Beijing’s deeper engagement with the outside world are likely to intensify rather than dissipate.
At the same time, Beijing’s capacity to address these emergent challenges has grown considerably. For decades, China had few means to influence outcomes overseas; as with many weak states, ideology served as a convenient fig leaf for relative impotence. Now, however, China has growing geopolitical clout, an economy and military budget second only to that of the United States, and an increasingly sophisticated foreign policymaking and diplomatic apparatus. In short, it has more tools than ever with which to advance its international preferences through both inducements and coercion.

... dynamic changes in China’s rise are producing a country increasingly willing and able to play a more active role on defense and security matters around the world.

Without a doubt, China’s international activism still faces significant constraints. Much of its foreign policy remains a refraction of domestic and bureaucratic interests as leaders in Beijing wrestle with a bevy of internal issues, including environmental devastation, political instability, ethnic unrest, rising inequality, an aging population, corrupt institutions, and an uncertain economic future. ese challenges demand substantial attention and resources, distort China’s foreign policy, and limit its ability to wield soſt power.14 Moreover, China in many respects remains a “free rider,” a “partial power,” and even a “selfish superpower,” happy to let others carry the burden and oſten unable to do so itself regardless.15 Despite these constraints, dynamic changes in China’s rise are producing a country increasingly willing and able to play a more active role on defense and security matters around the world.
Although the most visible manifestations of these trends have mostly occurred in the economic realm, major changes are already underway reshaping China’s national security and defense policy. is study considers what we assess to be the most important of these evolutions out to approximately 2030, the current horizon of unclassified U.S. government documents.17 ree trends stand out as most likely and most significant from the perspective of the United States:

• e loosening of China’s policy of noninterference in other countries’ domestic affairs;

• China’s deepening security relationships with countries around the world; and
e resulting globalization of China’s national security interests will serve as one of the most consequential trends affecting the future of U.S. national security policy and strategy. However burdened by the weight of ideology, propaganda, and bureaucracy, China’s external behavior has entered a period of profound evolution. Although the ultimate character of China’s future foreign policy is uncertain – including to leaders in Beijing – China has already begun deviating from its longstanding foreign policy practice in ways that reflect
• e PLA’s increasing power projection capabilities.

Each of these trends is addressed in turn. e second half of the report considers the strategic implications for the United States and offers recommendations for U.S. policy.

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PART 1

KEY TRENDS IN CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

We assess three trends in China’s international security activism that are likely to have significant effects on global politics and U.S. interests:

123

Loosening of the noninterference principle; Deepening security partnerships; and Growing force projection capabilities.

Together, these trends augur a China increasingly willing and able to engage on international security issues.

Part 1A

LOOSENING OF THE NONINTERFERENCE PRINCIPLE

Key Takeaways:

Although China’s noninterference principle continues to serve a variety of foreign policy interests, it has come under considerable strain from demands to protect China’s growing overseas interests.

As a result, China is taking a more flexible approach to noninterference when its national security interests are at stake. Over the last decade it has increasingly engaged in economic, diplomatic, and military activities that exceed traditional definitions of noninterference.

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    U.S.A. :)>27·95 CANADA $34.00 rom two of our most fiercely moral voices, a Fpassionate call to arms against our era's most pervasive human rights violation: the oppression of women and girls in the developing world. With Pulitzer Prize winners Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn as our guides, we under­ take an odyssey through Africa and Asia to meet the extraordinary women struggling there, among them a Cambodian teenager sold into sex slavery and an Ethiopian woman who suffered devastating injuries in childbirth. Drawing on the breadth of their combined reporting experience, Kristof and WuDunn depict our world with anger, sadness, clarity, and, ultimately, hope. They show how a little help can transform the lives of women and girls abroad. That Cambodian girl eventually escaped from her brothel and, with assistance from an aid group, built a thriving retail business that supports her family. The Ethiopian woman had her injuries repaired and in time became a surgeon. A Zimbabwean mother of five, counseled to return to school, earned her doctorate and became an expert on AIDS. Through these stories, Kristof and WuDunn help us see that the key to economic progress lies in unleashing women's potential. They make clear how so many people have helped to do just that, and how we can each do our part. Throughout much of the world, the greatest unexploited economic resource is the fema le half of the population. Countries such as China have prospered precisely hecause they emancipated women and brought them into the form al economy.
  • May 12, 2006 Exhibits a Through F

    May 12, 2006 Exhibits a Through F

    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 ) CR. NO 05-394 (RBW) v. ) ) I. LEWIS LIBBY, ) also known as "Scooter Libby" ) EXHIBITS A THROUGH F Respectfully submitted, PATRICK J. FIT~ERALD Special Counsel Office of the United States Attorney Northern District of Illinois 2 19 South Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604 (312) 353-5300 Dated: May 12,2006 Page 2 The New York Times May 6,2003 Tuesday 1 of 1 DOCUMENT Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company The New York Times May 6,2003 Tuesday Late Edition - Final SECTION: Section A; Column 1; Editorial Desk; Pg. 31 LENGTH: 726 words HEADLINE: Missing In Action: Truth BYLINE: By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF; E-mail: [email protected] BODY: When I raised the Mystery of the Missing W.M.D. recently, hawks fired barrages of reproachful e-mail at me. The gist was: "You *&#*! Who cares if we never find weapons of mass destruction, because we've liberated the Iraqi people frOm a murderous tyrant." But it does matter, enormously, for American credibility. After all, as Ari Fleischer said on April 10 about W.M.D.: "That is what this war was about." I rejoice in the newfound freedoms in Iraq. But there are indications that the U.S.government souped up intelligence, leaned on spooks to change their conclusions and concealed contrary information to deceive people at home and around the world. Let's fervently hope that tomorrow we find an Iraqi superdome filled with 500 tons of mustard gas and nerve gas, 25,000 liters of anthrax, 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin, 29,984 prohibited munitions capable of delivering chemical agents, several dozen Scud missiles, gas centrifuges to enrich uranium, 18mobile biological warfare factories, long- range unmanned aerial vehicles to dispense anthrax, and proof of close ties with Ai Qaeda.
  • OPC Forges Partnership to Promote Journalists' Safety Club Mixers To

    OPC Forges Partnership to Promote Journalists' Safety Club Mixers To

    THE MONTHLY NEWSLETTER OF THE OVERSEAS PRESS CLUB OF AMERICA, NEW YORK, NY • November 2014 OPC Forges Partnership to Promote Journalists’ Safety By Marcus Mabry compact between Your OPC has been busy! Since news organiza- the new officers and board of gov- tions and journal- ernors took office at the end of ists, in particular the summer, we have dedicated freelance, around ourselves to three priorities, all safety and profes- designed to increase the already sionalism. We have impressive contribution that the only just begun, but OPC makes to our members and our partners include our industry. the Committee to We have restructured the board Protect Journalists, to dedicate ourselves to services Reporters Without for members, both existing and po- Borders, the Front- tential, whether those members are line Club, the In- Clockwise from front left: Vaughan Smith, Millicent veteran reporters and editors, free- ternational Press Teasdale, Patricia Kranz, Jika Gonzalez, Michael Luongo, Institute’s Foreign Sawyer Alberi, Judi Alberi, Micah Garen, Marcus Mabry, lancers or students. In addition to Charles Sennott, Emma Daly and Judith Matloff dining services, we have reinvigorated our Editors Circle and after a panel of how to freelance safety. See page 3. social mission, creating a committee the OPC Founda- dedicated to planning regular net- tion. We met in September at The you need and the social events you working opportunities for all mem- New York Times headquarters to want. And, just as important, get bers. So if you are in New York – or try to align efforts that many of our friends and colleagues who are not coming through New York – look us groups had started separately.
  • Floyd Abrams

    Floyd Abrams

    Potential Witnesses and Names that may be Mentioned during the Trial • Floyd Abrams (Partner at the law firm • Donald Fierce (Government Relations Cahill, Gordon & Reindell) Consultant) • Spencer Ackerman (Journalist) • Alan Foley (CIA Official) • David Addington (Vice President • Carl Ford (State Department Official) Cheney’s Chief of Staff) • Gerard Francisco (Office of Special • Mike Allen (Washington Post Counsel) Reporter) • Paul Gigot (Journalist for the Wall • Michael Anton (National Security Street Journal) Council Official) • David Gregory (Chief White House • Kirk Armfield (FBI Agent) Correspondent for NBC News) • Richard Armitage (Former Deputy • Robert Grenier (Former CIA Official) Secretary of State) • Marc Grossman (Former • Daniel Bartlett (Counselor to the Undersecretary of State) President) • Stephen Hadley (President Bush’s • Robert Bennett (Partner at the law National Security Advisor) firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & • John Hannah (Vice President Flom) Cheney’s National Security Advisor) • Deborah Bond (FBI Agent) • Bill Harlow (CIA Official) • Massimo Calabresi (Time Magazine • Debra Heiden (Assistant to the Vice Reporter) President) • Andrew Card (President Bush’s • Seymour Hersh (Journalist, former Chief of Staff) Contributor to The New Yorker) • Jay Carney (Time Magazine Editor) • Richard Hohlt (Consultant) • Vice President Richard B. Cheney • Bob Joseph (Under Secretary of State) • Matthew Cooper (Time Magazine • John Judis (Editor, The New Reporter) Republic) • John Dickerson (Journalist) • Glenn Kessler