Willing & Able

MORE WILLING & ABLE: Charting China’s International Security Activism By Ely Ratner, Elbridge Colby, Andrew Erickson, Zachary Hosford, and Alexander Sullivan Foreword Many friends have contributed immeasurably to our research over the past two years and to this culminating report. CNAS colleagues including Patrick Cronin, Shawn Brimley, Jeff Chism, Michèle Flournoy, Richard Fontaine, Jerry Hendrix, Van Jackson, JC Mock, Dafna Rand, Jacob Stokes, and Robert Work provided feedback and guidance throughout the process. We are also grateful to our expert external reviewers: Scott Harold, Evan Montgomery, John Schaus, and Christopher Yung. David Finkelstein and Bonnie Glaser lent their wisdom to workshops that greatly informed our subsequent efforts. The research team is indebted to the School of International Studies at Peking University, the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, China Institute for Contemporary International Relations, and China Foreign Affairs University for hosting discussions in Beijing. We were guided and assisted throughout by colleagues from the State Department, the Department of Defense, the White House, and the U.S. intelligence community. Kelley Sayler, Yanliang Li, Andrew Kwon, Nicole Yeo, Cecilia Zhou, and Hannah Suh provided key research, editing, and other support. The creativity of Melody Cook elevated the report and its original graphics. We are grateful as well for the assistance of Ellen McHugh and Ryan Nuanes. Last but not least, this research would not have been possible without the generous support of the MacArthur Foundation. While many colleagues contributed to the research effort, the views herein are the authors’ alone, along with any errors of fact, omission, or interpretation. MORE WILLING & ABLE: Charting China’s International Security Activism By Ely Ratner, Elbridge Colby, Andrew Erickson, Zachary Hosford, and Alexander Sullivan TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary 3 Introduction: The globalization of Chinese national security policy 6 Part 1: Key trends in China’s international security activism 11 Loosening of the noninterference principle 12 Deepening security partnerships 19 Growing force projection capabilities 28 Part 2: Implications for U.S. strategy and policy 42 Engagement: Seizing the benefits of a more active China 43 Shaping: Building the international security order 49 Balancing: The military challenge 58 Conclusion: Summary recommendations 63 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM About the Authors Dr. Ely Ratner is a Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. Elbridge Colby is the Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at CNAS. Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is an Associate Professor in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College. Zachary Hosford, at the time of writing, was an Associate Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. Alexander Sullivan is an Associate Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS and a prospective Ph.D. student in political science at Georgetown University. 3 | Executive Summary MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG EXECUTIVE SUMMARY China’s external behavior has entered a period of profound evolution. The rapid expansion of Chinese economic, political, and security interests around the world, backed by greater capabilities to advance and defend those interests, is driving Beijing to become increasingly active in international security affairs. Although the ultimate character of China’s future foreign policy remains uncertain – including to leaders in Beijing – China has already begun deviating from long-standing foreign policy practices in ways that reflect its changing constellation of interests and capabilities. Part I of this study considers what we assess to be the three most significant and transformative trends in Beijing’s international security activism. Taken together, these developments portend a China increasingly willing and able to play a prominent and decisive role in international security issues: LOOSENING OF ITS POLICY OF NONINTERFERENCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES’ 1 DOMESTIC AFFAIRS Although China’s noninterference principle continues to serve a variety of foreign policy goals, it is under considerable strain from demands to protect China’s growing overseas interests. We catalog how China is taking a more flexible approach to noninterference when key national interests are at stake, engaging in a range of economic, diplomatic, and military activities that depart from traditional definitions of noninterference. Executive Summary DEEPENING SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS WITH COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD 2 The globalization of China’s national security interests has also led Beijing to embark upon efforts to develop deeper security relations around the world. We describe how over the last decade China has enhanced its security ties across the spectrum of defense activities, including military diplomacy, combined training and exercises, and arms exports. INCREASING POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES 3 While still facing considerable limitations, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is becoming more sophisticated across the spectrum of power projection capabilities. In the next 10 to 15 years, we assess that China will likely be capable of carrying out a variety of overseas missions, including major international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation operations, securing of important assets overseas, defense of sea lanes, counterterrorism strikes, and stabilization operations. | 5 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM The expanding scope and scale of China’s interna- efforts, the United States should consider ways to tional security activism demand that Washington engage and shape Chinese-led multilateral initia- widen the aperture of its hedging policy toward tives and organizations. China in several domains. Part II considers the implications for U.S. strategy and offers policy Maintaining a competitive military balance in the recommendations. Western Pacific will be a crucial element of limit- ing the potentially destabilizing effects of the PLA’s U.S. military-to-military engagement with China expanding partnerships and power projection should continue focusing on developing opera- capabilities. Failing to do so would enable China to tional safety and crisis management mechanisms, field greater capacity for extraregional power pro- expanding existing agreements, and finding jection more quickly, render it able to focus more ways to ensure they will be used effectively when resources on deploying to a broader set of regions, needed. The Department of Defense should also and allow it to operate more effectively and deci- seek measures to reduce the likelihood of incidents sively across a greater set of domains. and accidents between China and U.S. allies and partners. As a result, even as the United States and its allies and partners must take due account of the military U.S.-China security cooperation will continue challenges posed by a more globally active PLA, it to be limited by legal and political constraints, still makes sense for Washington to concentrate on although there may be opportunities for coopera- maintaining key advantages over Chinese military tion on nontraditional security challenges and power at its leading edge in the Western Pacific. possibly new areas to include counterterrorism, This argues against military strategies that cede the maritime security, and arms control. Within exist- near seas and the airspace above them to China. ing engagements, the United States should pursue with China more interagency interactions, at lower Finally, U.S. defense cooperation in areas of levels and with third countries. expected PLA activism should be geared in part to assist countries in developing their own defen- To shape the environment in which China’s inter- sive counterintervention capabilities. This should national security activism occurs, the United States reduce China’s ability to project power in destabi- should seek to increase U.S. military access and lizing ways by making such efforts more difficult presence in areas where the PLA is most likely to and costly for Beijing. operate away from China’s shores, particularly in the Indian Ocean region. As China increasingly These recommendations and more are discussed in has both the political will and the military capabil- greater detail herein. ity to serve as an important security partner, the United States should also take measures to sustain and deepen its alliances, as well as augment its diplomatic engagement on China-related issues with countries that could be strategically significant for Chinese power projection. Supporting the development of more capable and effective multilateral institutions will also be critical to managing China’s international security activism in a number of regions, including Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, Central Asia, the Pacific Islands, and the Arctic. As part of these 6 | Introduction THE GLOBALIZATION OF CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM INTRODUCTION: THE safeguarding China’s expanding interests around GLOBALIZATION OF CHINESE the world.4 His more ambitious successor, Xi, has NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY built upon the idea of achieving greater reach into world politics by calling for China to become a For more than three decades, leaders in Beijing “maritime power” and articulating visions of a have sought to enhance the

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