MORE WILLING & ABLE: Charting China’s International Security Activism

By Ely Ratner, Elbridge Colby, Andrew Erickson, Zachary Hosford, and Alexander Sullivan Foreword Many friends have contributed immeasurably to our research over the past two years and to this culminating report. CNAS colleagues including Patrick Cronin, Shawn Brimley, Jeff Chism, Michèle Flournoy, Richard Fontaine, Jerry Hendrix, Van Jackson, JC Mock, Dafna Rand, Jacob Stokes, and Robert Work provided feedback and guidance through- out the process. We are also grateful to our expert external reviewers: Scott Harold, Evan Montgomery, John Schaus, and Christopher Yung. David Finkelstein and Bonnie Glaser lent their wisdom to workshops that greatly informed our subsequent efforts. The research team is indebted to the School of International Studies at Peking University, the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, China Institute for Contemporary International Relations, and China Foreign Affairs University for hosting discussions in Beijing. We were guided and assisted throughout by colleagues from the State Department, the Department of Defense, the White House, and the U.S. intelligence community. Kelley Sayler, Yanliang Li, Andrew Kwon, Nicole Yeo, Cecilia Zhou, and Hannah Suh provided key research, editing, and other support. The creativity of Melody Cook elevated the report and its original graphics. We are grateful as well for the assistance of Ellen McHugh and Ryan Nuanes. Last but not least, this research would not have been possible without the generous support of the MacArthur Foundation. While many colleagues contributed to the research effort, the views herein are the authors’ alone, along with any errors of fact, omission, or interpretation. MORE WILLING & ABLE: Charting China’s International Security Activism

By Ely Ratner, Elbridge Colby, Andrew Erickson, Zachary Hosford, and Alexander Sullivan

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary 3

Introduction: The globalization of Chinese national security policy 6

Part 1: Key trends in China’s international security activism 11 Loosening of the noninterference principle 12 Deepening security partnerships 19 Growing force projection capabilities 28

Part 2: Implications for U.S. strategy and policy 42 Engagement: Seizing the benefits of a more active China 43 Shaping: Building the international security order 49 Balancing: The military challenge 58

Conclusion: Summary recommendations 63

MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

About the Authors

Dr. Ely Ratner is a Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS.

Elbridge Colby is the Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at CNAS.

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is an Associate Professor in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College.

Zachary Hosford, at the time of writing, was an Associate Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS.

Alexander Sullivan is an Associate Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS and a prospective Ph.D. student in political science at Georgetown University.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

China’s external behavior has entered a period of profound evolution. The rapid expansion of Chinese economic, political, and security interests around the world, backed by greater capabilities to advance and defend those interests, is driving Beijing to become increasingly active in international security affairs. Although the ultimate character of China’s future foreign policy remains uncertain – including to leaders in Beijing – China has already begun deviating from long-standing foreign policy practices in ways that reflect its changing constellation of interests and capabilities.

Part I of this study considers what we assess to be the three most significant and transformative trends in Beijing’s international security activism. Taken together, these developments portend a China increasingly willing and able to play a prominent and decisive role in international security issues:

LOOSENING OF ITS POLICY OF NONINTERFERENCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES’ 1 DOMESTIC AFFAIRS Although China’s noninterference principle continues to serve a variety of foreign policy goals, it is under considerable strain from demands to protect China’s growing overseas interests. We catalog how China is taking a more flexible approach to noninterference when key national interests are at stake, engaging in a range of economic, diplomatic, and military activities that depart from traditional definitions of noninterference.

Executive Summary DEEPENING SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS WITH COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD 2 The globalization of China’s national security interests has also led Beijing to embark upon efforts to develop deeper security relations around the world. We describe how over the last decade China has enhanced its security ties across the spectrum of defense activities, including military diplomacy, combined training and exercises, and arms exports.

INCREASING POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES 3 While still facing considerable limitations, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is becoming more sophisticated across the spectrum of power projection capabilities. In the next 10 to 15 years, we assess that China will likely be capable of carrying out a variety of overseas missions, including major international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation operations, securing of important assets overseas, defense of sea lanes, counterterrorism strikes, and stabilization operations.

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The expanding scope and scale of China’s interna- efforts, the United States should consider ways to tional security activism demand that Washington engage and shape Chinese-led multilateral initia- widen the aperture of its hedging policy toward tives and organizations. China in several domains. Part II considers the implications for U.S. strategy and offers policy Maintaining a competitive military balance in the recommendations. Western Pacific will be a crucial element of limit- ing the potentially destabilizing effects of the PLA’s U.S. military-to-military engagement with China expanding partnerships and power projection should continue focusing on developing opera- capabilities. Failing to do so would enable China to tional safety and crisis management mechanisms, field greater capacity for extraregional power pro- expanding existing agreements, and finding jection more quickly, render it able to focus more ways to ensure they will be used effectively when resources on deploying to a broader set of regions, needed. The Department of Defense should also and allow it to operate more effectively and deci- seek measures to reduce the likelihood of incidents sively across a greater set of domains. and accidents between China and U.S. allies and partners. As a result, even as the United States and its allies and partners must take due account of the military U.S.-China security cooperation will continue challenges posed by a more globally active PLA, it to be limited by legal and political constraints, still makes sense for Washington to concentrate on although there may be opportunities for coopera- maintaining key advantages over Chinese military tion on nontraditional security challenges and power at its leading edge in the Western Pacific. possibly new areas to include counterterrorism, This argues against military strategies that cede the maritime security, and arms control. Within exist- near seas and the airspace above them to China. ing engagements, the United States should pursue with China more interagency interactions, at lower Finally, U.S. defense cooperation in areas of levels and with third countries. expected PLA activism should be geared in part to assist countries in developing their own defen- To shape the environment in which China’s inter- sive counterintervention capabilities. This should national security activism occurs, the United States reduce China’s ability to project power in destabi- should seek to increase U.S. military access and lizing ways by making such efforts more difficult presence in areas where the PLA is most likely to and costly for Beijing. operate away from China’s shores, particularly in the Indian Ocean region. As China increasingly These recommendations and more are discussed in has both the political will and the military capabil- greater detail herein. ity to serve as an important security partner, the United States should also take measures to sustain and deepen its alliances, as well as augment its dip- lomatic engagement on China-related issues with countries that could be strategically significant for Chinese power projection.

Supporting the development of more capable and effective multilateral institutions will also be critical to managing China’s international secu- rity activism in a number of regions, including Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, Central Asia, the Pacific Islands, and the Arctic. As part of these 6 | Introduction THE GLOBALIZATION OF CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

INTRODUCTION: THE safeguarding China’s expanding interests around GLOBALIZATION OF CHINESE the world.4 His more ambitious successor, Xi, has NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY built upon the idea of achieving greater reach into world politics by calling for China to become a For more than three decades, leaders in Beijing “maritime power” and articulating visions of a have sought to enhance the power and legitimacy continental “New Silk Road” and “Maritime Silk of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) through Road” that aspire to tie Asia, the Middle East, and sustained economic growth, promotion of a stable Europe more closely to China through enhanced regional security environment, and the safeguard- trade and investment.5 ing of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity. China’s external behavior, official media, speeches, and government documents all reflect these endur- ... today, in important respects, ing foreign policy priorities. China is finished hiding its The principles through which China has pursued these aims were long equally persistent. Even after strength and biding its time. A the opening of its economy to the world in the late 1970s, China’s external behavior has been relatively confluence of factors emerging limited and ideological, reflecting an inward-look- over the last decade is compelling ing country primarily concerned with domestic stability and economic development, lacking the the People’s Republic of China to means or interest to play a more active role on the global stage.1 If anything, China’s leaders eschewed become active in global affairs international responsibility, seeking instead to as never before, with leaders in defend the country from outside interference and rebuild China from within until it had sufficient Beijing now pursuing a greater power to reassume its rightful position as a great power – a long-standing goal that President Xi role for Chinese diplomacy and Jinping and his predecessors have called the “great renewal of the Chinese nation.”2 The mantras the People’s Liberation Army describing and guiding Chinese foreign policy beyond China’s borders. during this period have included Deng Xiaoping’s oft-cited dictum of “hiding’s one’s strength and biding one’s time” and the notion of China’s peace- These efforts reflect the rapid expansion of Chinese 3 ful rise and development. economic, political, and security interests around the world, backed by greater capabilities to advance But today, in important respects, China is finished and defend those interests. Together, these trends hiding its strength and biding its time. A conflu- are pulling at the seams of what the world had ence of factors emerging over the last decade is come to understand as the traditional fabric of compelling the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Chinese foreign policy. to become active in global affairs as never before, with leaders in Beijing now pursuing a greater China’s remarkable economic rise is a well-known role for Chinese diplomacy and the People’s story. Clocking double-digit growth for three Liberation Army (PLA) beyond China’s borders. decades, it has become the world’s second-largest Then-President Hu Jintao articulated “new his- economy. This has resulted in growing connectivity toric missions” for the PLA in 2004 that included between China and the outside world. According 8 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

CHINA IS INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY Its reliance on imported natural resources, such as oil, is creating new overseas interests and vulnerabilities.

China’s Oil Imports by Origin, 2013 Saudi Arabia Angola Others Russia Oman Iraq Iran Venezuela Kazakhstan UAE Kuwait Congo Brazil Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, “China Country Analysis,” February 4, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ch. 0% 51015 20%

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to official Chinese statistics, in 2013 China’s total economy depends on seaborne trade.11 Within that trade in goods reached $4.2 trillion, an amount trade, China is heavily reliant on overseas natural larger than the entire Chinese economy in 2007.6 resources to fuel its economy, which remains man- Outward direct investment from the mainland ufacturing-focused and energy-intensive. China has exploded as well, increasing fortyfold between imported more than half its oil in 2013, a figure the 2002 and 2013, placing the PRC as the third-largest U.S. Energy Information Administration expects overseas investor, behind the United States and to grow to 66 percent by 2020 and 72 percent by Japan.7 2040.12 This places a high value not only on the sea lanes themselves, but also upon the stability of key This economic activity and its concomitant wealth suppliers in the Middle East and Africa. creation have also led to a surge in Chinese citizens going abroad as businesspeople, laborers, students, But Beijing’s increasingly outward orientation and tourists. The numbers are staggering, with is about more than just moving goods to and more than a million Chinese citizens employed from China. The presence of Chinese citizens, around the globe in Chinese investment projects, businesses, and investments overseas – many in almost 400,000 Chinese students studying abroad, dangerous, far-flung places – increases the salience and over 60 million Chinese tourists going over- for Beijing of regional and domestic stability out- seas annually.8 side its borders. As a result, transnational threats such as terrorism, extremism, and piracy are rever- The tremendous growth of PRC equities in the berating back on China in ways that challenge vital world underscores China’s growing power and economic and political interests. influence but has also created economic and political exigencies that are vastly increasing the Finally, all of these vulnerabilities are magnified complexity and scope of China’s national security by rising domestic awareness and expectations agenda. As Xi has declared, “China’s dependence among the Chinese public that Beijing will protect on the world and its involvement in international China’s interests wherever they lie. A more diverse affairs are deepening, so are the world’s depen- and vibrant media landscape in China, including dence on China and its impact on China.”9 an explosion in social media, is placing additional pressure on China’s leaders – sometimes buoyed by Managing and maintaining this interconnected- the government’s own nationalist propaganda – to ness with the world will shape Chinese foreign be sensitive and responsive to the country’s over- policy for decades to come. seas interests.

China’s economic miracle, after all, has been Leaders in Beijing are clearly cognizant of these predicated on interdependence with the rest of trends. The Chinese government’s official 2013 the world, which, according to the World Bank, defense white paper noted that: provided “a supportive global environment that undoubtedly assisted and accommodated China’s “With the gradual integration of China’s econ- rapid growth.”10 An open global system, especially omy into the world economic system, overseas among developed countries, has provided market interests have become an integral component access for Chinese goods, capital flows, transfers of China’s national interests. Security issues of technology and expertise, and access to critical are increasingly prominent, involving overseas resources such as energy – all enablers on which energy and resources, strategic sea lines of com- Beijing will continue to depend. munication (SLOCs), and Chinese nationals and legal persons overseas. Vessel protection at Similarly, open and secure shipping lanes are sea, evacuation of Chinese nationals overseas, crucial for China given that nearly half of its and emergency rescue have become important 10 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

ways and means for the PLA to safeguard its changing constellation of interests and capabili- national interests and fulfill China’s international ties. It should therefore come as no surprise that, obligations.”13 as Michael Swaine has assessed, Xi is calling for “a more activist, involved, and security-oriented At the same time, Beijing’s capacity to address these approach to Chinese diplomacy and foreign rela- emergent challenges has grown considerably. For tions.”16 Moreover, the underlying trends driving decades, China had few means to influence out- Beijing’s deeper engagement with the outside world comes overseas; as with many weak states, ideology are likely to intensify rather than dissipate. served as a convenient fig leaf for relative impotence. Now, however, China has growing geopolitical clout, an economy and military budget second only ... dynamic changes in China’s to that of the United States, and an increasingly sophisticated foreign policymaking and diplomatic rise are producing a country apparatus. In short, it has more tools than ever with which to advance its international preferences increasingly willing and able to through both inducements and coercion. play a more active role on defense Without a doubt, China’s international activism still and security matters around the faces significant constraints. Much of its foreign policy remains a refraction of domestic and bureau- world. cratic interests as leaders in Beijing wrestle with a bevy of internal issues, including environmental devastation, political instability, ethnic unrest, rising Although the most visible manifestations of these inequality, an aging population, corrupt institutions, trends have mostly occurred in the economic and an uncertain economic future. These challenges realm, major changes are already underway demand substantial attention and resources, distort reshaping China’s national security and defense China’s foreign policy, and limit its ability to wield 14 policy. This study considers what we assess to soft power. Moreover, China in many respects be the most important of these evolutions out to remains a “free rider,” a “partial power,” and even approximately 2030, the current horizon of unclas- a “selfish superpower,” happy to let others carry sified U.S. government documents.17 Three trends the burden and often unable to do so itself regard- 15 stand out as most likely and most significant from less. Despite these constraints, dynamic changes the perspective of the United States: in China’s rise are producing a country increasingly willing and able to play a more active role on defense • The loosening of China’s policy of noninterfer- and security matters around the world. ence in other countries’ domestic affairs;

The resulting globalization of China’s national • China’s deepening security relationships with security interests will serve as one of the most countries around the world; and consequential trends affecting the future of U.S. • The PLA’s increasing power projection national security policy and strategy. However capabilities. burdened by the weight of ideology, propaganda, and bureaucracy, China’s external behavior has Each of these trends is addressed in turn. The entered a period of profound evolution. Although second half of the report considers the strategic the ultimate character of China’s future foreign implications for the United States and offers rec- policy is uncertain – including to leaders in Beijing ommendations for U.S. policy. – China has already begun deviating from its long- standing foreign policy practice in ways that reflect | 11 PART 1

KEY TRENDS IN CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

We assess three trends in China’s international security activism that are likely to have significant effects on global politics and U.S. interests:

1 Loosening of the noninterference principle;

2 Deepening security partnerships; and

3 Growing force projection capabilities.

Together, these trends augur a China increasingly willing and able to engage on international security issues. Part 1A LOOSENING OF THE NONINTERFERENCE PRINCIPLE

Key Takeaways:

Although China’s noninterference principle continues to serve a variety of foreign policy interests, it has come under considerable strain from demands to protect China’s growing overseas interests.

As a result, China is taking a more flexible approach to noninterference when its national security interests are at stake. Over the last decade it has increasingly engaged in economic, diplomatic, and military activities that exceed traditional definitions of noninterference. MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

Loosening of the Noninterference Principle often a rallying point for China’s bilateral and mul- The policy of noninterference has been a core prin- tilateral relations, including in organizations such ciple of China’s foreign relations almost since the as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) founding of the People’s Republic, notwithstand- and the group of major emerging-economy nations ing fluctuating adherence in practice, particularly (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in support of revolutionary movements in the known as the BRICS. Noninterference also serves 1960s and 1970s. The norm of noninterference as a useful justification for China to avoid costly was enshrined as one of the “Five Principles of foreign entanglements while focusing instead on its Peaceful Co-existence,” codified in a 1954 treaty own internal development. Beijing’s genuine skep- with India.18 From China’s perspective, interfer- ticism of the efficacy of international intervention ence involves “purposefully constrain[ing] or further supports its noninterference principle. violat[ing] another country’s domestic policy or This complex interplay of factors has caused the political processes (including foreign policymaking PRC to use sovereignty and noninterference as, processes).”19 For decades, China’s stated policy has in the words of former Vice Foreign Minister been “mutual noninterference in domestic affairs,” Zhai Jun, “the axial tradition of [China’s] foreign meaning that it would not – and other states policy.”22 Senior Chinese officials routinely assert should not – meddle in the internal politics of the centrality of noninterference in categorical other countries, based on “the right of each nation terms. During Xi’s first trip abroad as president, he to autonomously choose its path of development.”20 underscored this in Moscow, saying, “Matters that This approach to noninterference has served a fall within the sovereign rights of a country should number of China’s national interests. Perhaps be managed only by the government and people of most importantly, Beijing seeks to limit the that country.”23 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi degree to which outside countries are able to take and other senior officials continue to make similar actions that foment instability or dissent in China, statements reaffirming China’s opposition to inter- undermine the Communist Party’s legitimacy, or national interference.24 otherwise constrain China’s development. To that Nevertheless, China’s growing overseas inter- end, China has traditionally sought to perpetuate ests are pushing Beijing to take a less doctrinaire international norms and practices that privi- approach to issues of sovereignty and interference lege strict notions of sovereignty and push back abroad. With more at stake in various military, against the liberal principle that the international economic, and diplomatic matters around the community can and should protect the rights of world, what happens inside other countries’ individuals regardless of national boundaries.21 borders is increasingly important to Beijing. Key This is particularly important for Beijing given Chinese interests overseas are now vulnerable to its domestic human rights record, as well as its civil war, domestic terrorism, state failure, anti- concerns about international support for indepen- Chinese sentiment over environmental and labor dence movements in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. concerns, and other sources of internal instability. A policy of noninterference also allows Beijing to shield friendly regimes from international pressure For instance, as a result of China’s large invest- and condemnation, particularly those with whom ments in and growing dependence on energy China has important economic and resource imports from unstable and dangerous places, equities. Beijing now has an abiding interest in the inter- nal stability of countries in the Middle East and A hard definition of sovereignty also contributes to East Africa. This is true as well for places such as Beijing’s international legitimacy and standing in Myanmar, Pakistan, and parts of Central Asia parts of the developing world. Noninterference is 14 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

CHINA IS INCREASINGLY INTERVENING BEYOND ITS BORDERS Over the past decade, China has frequently departed from its traditional policy of non-interference in the internal a airs of other countries.

North Korea

Syria Afghanistan

Iran

Libya

Myanmar Sudan Yemen Mekong River South Sudan

China has long held up the principle of noninterference in the internal a airs of other countries as a key tenet of its foreign policy. While it has persistent relevance in rhetoric, new interests have pushed China to loosen this policy through greater involvement in other countries’ domestic politics, SECURITY POLITICAL ECONOMIC participation in multilateral and unilateral economic sanctions, and security force deployments to other countries.

that not only possess natural resources but can also For diplomatic reasons as well, China is grow- provide alternative transportation routes away from ing more sensitive to the domestic policies and potentially vulnerable maritime choke points. Pang actions of its partners. In recent years, China has Zhongying, a leading professor at Renmin University, faced considerable international opprobrium for has said, “Dependence on overseas resources, markets supporting or shielding oppressive and violent and energy will oblige China to adjust its foreign pol- regimes. This occurred ahead of the 2008 Olympic icy by, de facto, abandoning some of its ‘nos,’ such as Games in Beijing when critics of China’s support ‘non-interference’ and ‘not taking the lead.’”25 Beyond for the regime in Sudan began speaking of China’s resource questions, China has growing equities in sta- “Genocide Olympics.”26 Suddenly, a rogue regime bility in the Muslim world, including in Central Asia halfway around the world was Beijing’s problem to and the Middle East, as a result of its strong desire not solve. China has faced similar reputational costs to see the rise of extremist groups that could directly for aligning itself with potential nuclear prolifera- or indirectly support potentially violent separatist tor Iran and the former Burmese military junta. movements in western China. | 15 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

Finally, the need to protect Chinese citizens abroad In doing so, China has adopted new diplomatic is also placing tremendous pressure on traditional tools and leveraged existing ones in novel ways notions of noninterference. According to official to engage more directly in the domestic affairs of media reports, the Chinese government has con- foreign governments. This includes the use of spe- ducted dozens of overseas evacuation operations cial envoys and party-to-party relations that stand over the last decade, rescuing tens of thousands of outside normal state-to-state diplomatic channels. Chinese citizens.27 In particular, the 2011 evacua- China’s “special envoys” are tasked by the state tion of more than 35,000 Chinese nationals from with extraordinary powers to engage in discrete Libya was a “wake-up call” for Beijing about the foreign policy activities. For decades, China has need to reassess its foreign policy principles and used this designation to send proxy attendees make good on its promise to protect Chinese citi- to ceremonial occasions in other countries. But zens abroad.28 recently the use of special envoys has decidedly shifted to “political” special envoys, empowered to As a result of these emergent interests overseas, deal with crises, express China’s voice on interna- China is taking a more flexible approach and tional hot spots, and represent China in important increasingly engaging in activities it has tradition- multilateral settings. For these positions, China ally opposed under the rubric of noninterference, has increasingly favored more senior diplomats including political engagement with (sometimes with greater regional knowledge, relationships in violent) insurgents and opposition groups, secu- the target country, and general sophistication. The rity operations in and around other countries, emergence and systematization of special envoys and the use of economic sanctions as a coercive has enabled more tailored approaches to complex tool. This has occurred throughout the developing political problems, maximizing China’s freedom world, with recent examples in North Korea and of maneuver and contributing to “a more offensive Myanmar in Asia, Sudan and Libya in Africa, and diplomacy to better serve its interests.”31 Syria in the Middle East. In recent years, special envoys have been promi- While by no means abandoning the principle of nent players in nearly every significant example noninterference altogether, Beijing now appears to of Chinese interference in the internal affairs be taking more of a case-by-case approach in ways of other countries, including in Sudan in 2007, that account for the growing costs of inaction. As Libya and Syria since 2011, Myanmar in 2013, and one European scholar aptly described, whereas Afghanistan in 2014. As one scholar has written, once China was comfortable hiding behind the “the Chinese government has chosen special envoy mantle of noninterference, it is now “caught diplomacy as its diplomatic method for becoming between the risks of being an absentee land- involved in internal affairs of African countries.”32 lord and the hard choices of exercising imperial 29 The same has been true in the Middle East, South power.” China’s noninterference policy is there- Asia, and Southeast Asia. fore evolving in ways that permit what Chinese academics are calling “creative” or “conditional” Similarly, China has also deployed representatives interference.30 But more than an effort to define a from the Chinese Communist Party to influence new and fixed set of criteria for action, this is better the domestic affairs of other countries outside of understood as an effort to reconcile China’s tradi- normal diplomatic channels.33 Beijing has used this tional foreign policy rhetoric with a new reality in practice to hedge against regime change by build- which strict adherence to noninterference some- ing ties with opposition parties.34 times runs counter to China’s interests.

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CHINESE INTERFERENCE IN PRACTICE equities during the subsequent partition of Sudan. China’s engagement with Sudan over the last In the ensuing years, Beijing repeatedly played the decade encapsulates both the pressures Beijing role of mediator between Sudan and South Sudan, faces to get involved in the domestic affairs of leading one Chinese commentator to describe foreign governments and the manner in which it China’s actions there as a “reversal of China’s past has begun doing so. The genocide in Darfur and low-key approach in international affairs.”40 the secession of South Sudan both harbored the potential to undermine China’s sizable energy Myanmar has also been the target of China’s investments in Sudan, threaten the security of tens newfound proclivity for greater involvement in the of thousands of its citizens living there, and dam- domestic politics of foreign countries. In addition age its international reputation.35 to publicly cultivating ties to the opposition politi- cal party headed by longtime dissident Aung San After refusing for years to address the Darfur Suu Kyi, China has openly mediated the ongoing crisis that began in 2003, China finally exercised peace process between Myanmar’s central govern- its leverage as Sudan’s largest oil and arms trade ment and the opposition Kachin Independence partner ahead of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. In Organization in northern Kachin state, which 2007, Beijing dispatched special envoy Liu Guijin abuts China. This has been in response to fears that to Khartoum to lean on the government to accept civil war could threaten China’s resource interests a sizable African Union-United Nations peace- in Myanmar and lead to a border and refugee crisis keeping force.36 This diplomacy was anchored by a on China’s doorstep.41 In 2013, China played a state visit from Hu Jintao himself, who reportedly leading role in the negotiations, providing a neutral told Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, venue for talks in China’s Yunnan province and “Darfur is a part of Sudan and you have to resolve guaranteeing the safety of the parties.42 During the this problem.”37 In testimony before the U.S. talks, China’s team, led by Special Envoy for Asian Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the U.S. Affairs Wang Yingfan, pressured participants into special envoy to Sudan, Andrew Natsios, welcomed forswearing internationalization of the conflict “China’s efforts to apply diplomatic pressure on (except, presumably, by China).43 the Government of Sudan,” and he noted that China was likely “the critical factor that led to the Elsewhere in the world, Beijing is increasingly Sudanese reversing their position” on the U.N.- active in hedging against political risk: still invest- sponsored peace plan.38 ing heavily in relations with ruling elites in stable non-democratic regimes but also building ties to With substantial investment and energy inter- opposition groups where power shifts – through ests at risk, the PRC also played a prominent role either orderly democratic processes or disorderly in mediating the secession of South Sudan. Well regime change – are possible.44 The instabilities before the January 2011 independence referendum associated with the Arab Spring, for instance, that ultimately divided Sudan, Beijing had already have led Beijing to take, in the words of Brookings initiated political contacts with members of the Institution scholar Jonathan Pollack, “tentative but Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the suggestive steps to modify China’s longstanding lead southern opposition group. Under the rubric policy of noninterference.”45 Hedging against the of party-to-party relations, representatives from potential fall of ruling regimes in North Africa the CCP International Department managed to and the Middle East, Beijing has worked to build cultivate ties with the future leadership of South ties with rebel groups in both Libya and Syria.46 Sudan. The head of the SPLM visited Beijing twice As part of these efforts, the Chinese government in 2008.39 This direct involvement in Sudan’s has repeatedly hosted Syrian opposition groups in domestic politics helped Beijing secure its energy Beijing, sent a special envoy to meet with them in | 17 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

largest-ever NEO.49 Later that year, China engaged ... Beijing is increasingly active in another unprecedented overseas security opera- in hedging against political risk: tion when it launched patrols along the Mekong River in mainland Southeast Asia after 13 Chinese still investing heavily in relations nationals were killed when Chinese cargo ships came under attack.50 The public outcry in China with ruling elites in stable non- spurred the PRC government into action, and democratic regimes but also within months Chinese border police were com- manding joint patrols with forces from Laos, building ties to opposition groups Myanmar, and Thailand.51 The Chinese govern- ment also reportedly considered a lethal drone where power shifts – through strike (with Naypyitaw’s approval) on the drug lord wanted for the murders, though it reconsidered in either orderly democratic favor of capturing him alive.52

processes or disorderly regime In early 2015, reports surfaced that a draft anti- change – are possible. terrorism law could create a framework for China’s military or security services to conduct counter- terrorism operations on foreign soil.53 Although Damascus, and subsequently called upon Bashar the law would reportedly require obtaining the al-Assad’s regime to work with them toward a host country’s permission, the creation of a formal 47 negotiated settlement. Chinese officials have also structure indicates China believes it may have to met with the Afghan Taliban and offered publicly intervene abroad in response to terror threats and to mediate a reconciliation agreement with the desires a legal framework to do so in advance. government in Kabul.48 The juxtaposition could not be starker with Beijing’s visceral invocations of Furthermore, although China has traditionally the noninterference principle when foreign govern- viewed international economic and trade policies ments meet with prominent ethnic and religious as under the purview of mutual noninterference, figures from China such as the Dalai Lama or now Beijing is using economic tools to influence 54 Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer. other countries’ foreign policies. China has also been more willing to employ unilateral economic China has also begun engaging in defense and sanctions, or the threat thereof, to pressure foreign security deployments that test the conceptual governments over key interests such as Taiwan, limits of noninterference. While still well short of Tibet, human rights, and territorial disputes. This major military interventions, these actions none- contrasts with much of the post-Cold War period, theless represent a significant change in China’s when China has opposed international sanctions willingness to flex military muscle abroad to on the grounds that they constitute a violation advance its national interests. On multiple occa- of state sovereignty.55 Under this logic, China sions in recent years, substantial threats to Chinese exercised its veto at the U.N. Security Council to citizens and workers overseas have provoked block sanctions against Sudan and Myanmar in unprecedented responses from Beijing, including 2007, Zimbabwe in 2008, and Syria since 2011. the large-scale noncombatant evacuation opera- Nevertheless, consistent with the overall softening tion (NEO) from Libya in 2011. The mission, which of China’s adherence to its noninterference prin- included one of the navy’s most modern warships, ciple, Beijing has shown an increasing willingness represented the PLA’s first operational deploy- to use coercive economic sanctions to shape the ment to Africa and the Mediterranean and its internal decisions of other countries.56 18 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

Beginning with North Korea in 2006, China None of this is to suggest that the policy of nonin- agreed to participate in a slew of international terference will disappear overnight. It continues to sanctions regimes against Iran in 2010, Libya in serve a number of Chinese interests and, for now, 2011, North Korea again in 2013, and South Sudan remains a useful diplomatic tool. Nevertheless, in 2015.57 And rather than simply serving as a pas- the policy is under strain and Beijing is cau- sive or unwilling accomplice, Beijing has at times tiously pursuing a more flexible approach as led these multilateral efforts. In the 2013 push to China increasingly involves itself in the political, punish Pyongyang for testing a nuclear weapon, economic, and security affairs of other countries. Beijing played a key role in drafting the measures, The ongoing expansion of Chinese interests and which took direct aim at North Korea’s leadership capabilities will only reinforce this trend. with new sanctions on cash transfers and luxury items.58 Indicative of Beijing’s more nuanced calcu- lus, a Foreign Ministry representative said in 2014 that, on the issue of new sanctions against South Sudan, “We will make a decision on our position in accordance with the pros and cons,” and indeed China approved a U.N. Security Council sanctions resolution against Juba in March 2015.59 While questions remain regarding the degree to which China has enforced sanctions – for example, on North Korea – its willingness to take the lead in crafting sanctions clearly signals a less doctrinaire approach in which adhering to the principle of noninterference may be a less decisive factor as compared with other material interests.

Indicative of Beijing’s more nuanced calculus, a Foreign Ministry representative said in 2014 that, on the issue of new sanctions against South Sudan, “We will make a decision on our position in accordance with the pros and cons,” and indeed China approved a U.N. Security Council sanctions resolution against Juba in March 2015.

| 19 Part 1B DEEPENING SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS

Key Takeaways:

The globalization of China’s national interests has led Beijing to embark upon efforts to develop deeper security partnerships around the world.

Over the last decade, China has enhanced its security ties across the spectrum of defense activities, including military diplomacy, combined training and exer- cises, and arms exports. MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

Deepening Security Partnerships From the perspective of recipient nations, Beijing Despite more than three decades of reform and is an attractive security partner because it pro- opening up, which has resulted in strong global vides “no-strings-attached” military assistance, economic ties with the world, China has assidu- differentiating itself from Western countries ously eschewed entangling alliances and instead that sometimes refuse to sell weapons to rogue maintained a largely “independent and self-reliant” regimes or gross violators of human rights. This national security policy.60 Throughout its history, has resulted in Beijing frequently serving as a key the PRC only twice established formal security security partner to countries that otherwise have alliances, with the Soviet Union in 1950 and North trouble finding international friends, including Korea in 1961, neither of which remains in effect Sudan, Iran, and Venezuela. today as a mutual security guarantee.61 For China, enhanced security partnerships support In addition to embracing a policy of nonalign- diverse strategic objectives, including balancing ment for itself, the Chinese government regularly externally and internally and securing access to denounces U.S. alliances in East Asia as relics of vital resources.65 As Scott Harold and Ali Nader the Cold War. At a regional conference in May have argued, China’s security partnerships are 2014, President Xi described alliances as “not also emerging to serve traditional “geostrategic conducive to common regional security.”62 Instead, balancing against the United States” and other Beijing has offered vague concepts of a “new potential rivals.66 China has made common cause regional security cooperation architecture” that and engaged in large-scale military exercises would be more inclusive and not directed at poten- with Russia under the rubric of the Shanghai tial adversaries.63 Cooperation Organisation.67 More recently, China has also sought to dilute the U.S. alliance system Part 1B As a result of this approach, however, China found in Asia by building closer partnerships with U.S. itself emerging onto the world stage at the turn of allies, including Thailand, Australia, and South DEEPENING SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS the century as a “lonely superpower,” lacking the Korea.68 Meanwhile, China’s historic “all-weather kinds of security partnerships it would need to friendship” with Pakistan, as well as its burgeoning defend, protect, and advance its rapidly multiply- relations along the Indian Ocean littoral, serve, as 64 ing overseas interests. Responding to its dearth Evan Feigenbaum has argued, to “bottle up India of security ties, Beijing has worked over the last in the subcontinent, forestalling the emergence of a decade to narrow this strategic deficit, deepening continental-sized rival and precluding more exten- its security partnerships as never before across the sive Indian security activities in East Asia.”69 spectrum of defense activities, including military diplomacy, combined training and exercises, and China has also used military diplomacy – includ- arms exports. ing specific bilateral military engagements with the United States – to reinforce its message of a peace- These activities complement and reinforce China’s ful rise, “assuage its neighbors’ concerns about political and economic relationships by providing the PLA’s growing military capabilities and inten- an additional mechanism through which Beijing tions”70 and combat what it calls the “China threat can support friendly and strategically important theory.”71 Along its troubled periphery, China has regimes. Two principal forces are at work. First, an also worked with partners, particularly in Central increasing number of overseas interests are com- Asia, to strengthen the internal and border security pelling China to contribute to the regime survival of its partners and undermine what Beijing refers and domestic stability of its partners; and second, to as the “three evil forces of terrorism, extremism greater wealth and capabilities are enhancing and separatism.”72 China’s ability to do so.

| 21 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

CHINA IS EXPANDING ITS SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS AROUND THE WORLD China is now the world’s third largest arms exporter, having sold or leased major conventional weapons to 48 countries over the past decade.

Aggregate Chinese Arms Exports, 2005–2014

$7,000 Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Arms Transfer Database.” Data generated April 1, 2015. SIPRI only tracks what it calls “major 5,000 SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) weapons,” which include aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare expressed in US$ m. weapons, armored vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships, and 3,000 at constant (1990) other major systems or components. [http://www.sipri.org/databases/yy_armstrans- prices fers/background] 1,000

2005–2009 2009–2014

China also uses its external security partner- the July 2014 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval ships to advance its own military modernization exercise when, invited to participate for the first and serve other domestic bureaucratic needs. time, China sent a spy vessel along with its larger Lacking major warfighting experience since the group of ships to monitor the exercises.74 1979 border war with Vietnam, the PLA relies on bilateral and multilateral exercises, overseas activi- Finally, China’s military-industrial base benefits ties and patrols, and extended U.N. peacekeeping enormously from increased security engagement. deployments to build much-needed operational The PLA has managed to acquire advanced tech- experience.73 China further uses these engage- nologies, in many cases dual-use, from abroad ments for purposes of intelligence gathering, as at through deepened partnerships with advanced economies. As one commentator noted, “If the 22 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

People’s Liberation Army went to war tomorrow, it would field an arsenal bristling with hardware As with China’s policy of from some of America’s closest allies: Germany, France and Britain.”75 China’s arms industry, noninterference, its commitment which is engaged in an extended process of adap- to nonalignment is likely to come tation to market forces, gains both one-time economic rewards and overall commercial exper- into ever-starker contradiction tise by selling arms abroad. Weapons sales and joint development can also lock in partners who with the reality that it is deepening become reliant on parts and maintenance. its partnerships in unprecedented China has further used stronger security ties to ways across nearly every facet of the support governments that can fill vital energy and natural resource demands, as well as those that lie security cooperation continuum. along critical sea lanes. Such efforts have pushed the deepening of China’s security ties through Leading Chinese scholars are now Southeast Asia, South Asia, and into the Persian Gulf and East African littoral. As two Chinese proposing potential policy changes, scholars associated with the Ministry of State such as Tsinghua University’s Yan Security have written: “As China powers ahead, it has begun to worry about resource security, Xuetong, who has argued that the protection of overseas interests and a stable regional order. The evolving considerations behind China “needs to develop more high- the conclusion of strategic partnerships reflect quality diplomatic and military the changing requirements of sustaining China’s growth and its evolving global role.”76 relationships” that “may even extend As with China’s policy of noninterference, its com- to providing security guarantees to mitment to nonalignment is likely to come into ever-starker contradiction with the reality that it select countries.” is deepening its partnerships in unprecedented ways across nearly every facet of the security CHINA’S ENHANCED MILITARY DIPLOMACY cooperation continuum. Leading Chinese schol- The rapid growth of China’s military diplomacy ars are now proposing potential policy changes, has been particularly notable in recent years, such as Tsinghua University’s Yan Xuetong, who including the use of high-level visits, defense has argued that China “needs to develop more dialogues, and personnel exchanges. Much of this high-quality diplomatic and military relation- has occurred under the rubric of over a dozen dif- ships” that “may even extend to providing security ferent types of official “partnerships” that Beijing guarantees to select countries.”77 Other Chinese has established with foreign governments, includ- experts have advocated the development of “quasi- ing “cooperative partnerships,” “comprehensive alliances” that would “allow China to benefit cooperative partnerships,” “strategic partnerships,” from the security advantages afforded by strategic and “comprehensive strategic partnerships.” These alignment while avoiding the risk, inflexibility and agreements vary in content but serve as both complexity of formal alliances.”78 Regardless, the canopies for subsequent agreements and tools for evolution of China’s security partnerships has been Beijing to criticize unfavorable actions as counter profound. to the spirit of the partnership.79 China’s relations | 23 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

with roughly 60 countries now receive one such close cooperation with the U.S. Navy” through designation or another.80 Meanwhile, the PLA’s repeated high-level engagements.87 In recent years, international engagements have expanded in China and South Korea have instituted a bevy of number and scope, including military exchanges security initiatives, including institutionalizing a with more than 150 countries and approximately bilateral defense ministers’ meeting, establishing 400 annual military-to-military “contacts.”81 hotlines between their navies and air forces (which Additionally, between 2003 and 2010, China set the stage for the establishment of one between reportedly trained over 10,000 foreign military defense chiefs), and agreeing in 2012 to increase personnel in subjects ranging from high-level military education exchanges.88 training for commanding officers, to technical China’s thirst for resources is further propelling courses in military medicine, engineering, and military diplomacy with energy-exporting coun- radar, to combat disciplines such as artillery and tries as well. As Iran’s top oil customer, Beijing armor.82 has elevated its security partnership with Tehran. China’s military diplomacy has been particularly In October 2014, China’s defense minister visited active in Asia. Beijing signed long-term coopera- Tehran, praising recent exchanges and train- tive framework agreements with all 10 countries ing and stressing that “China is willing to work of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations with Iran to further pragmatic cooperation and (ASEAN) in 1999 and 2000, with a defense coop- strengthen military-to-military ties.”89 This came eration clause included for six of them: Thailand, on the heels of the first-ever visit by Chinese naval the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Laos, and vessels to Iran, followed by a joint naval exercise in Brunei.83 China subsequently conducted security- the Persian Gulf. China has similarly expanded its related dialogues with a number of countries in the military outreach to other regional energy export- region, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, ers, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, Emirates, as well as other Middle Eastern countries which leading analysts suggest “have proved to be such as Lebanon and Turkey.90 useful venues to increase mutual security percep- China became Saudi Arabia’s largest export market tions and advance bilateral military cooperation.”84 in 2009 in the context of growing political and During Xi’s October 2013 trip to Indonesia, for defense ties.91 Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz’s example, the two countries agreed to upgrade first visit outside the Persian Gulf region after his bilateral relations to a “comprehensive strategic accession was to China.92 High-level Saudi defense partnership,” including efforts to bolster security officials visited Beijing in 2013 and 2014 – includ- ties through “defense consultations and navy ing Crown Prince (now King) Salman – and senior dialogues” and to commit to conducting combined PLA officials made reciprocal visits in 2014.93 In military exercises and cooperate on maritime 2013, Xi called for upgrading military-to-military security.85 relations with Saudi Arabia.94 The same year saw In doing so, China has worked to weaken the influ- the Saudi defense minister visit Beijing and declare ence of the United States. Beijing has sought to that “Saudi Arabia is ready to enhance cooperation deepen its security partnership with Seoul, in part, with China to protect peace, security and stability according to the former national security advisor in the [Middle East] region.”95 to South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, “to China’s military diplomacy has become truly draw the Republic of Korea as far away as possible global in nature, with Beijing actively forging from Japan and the United States.”86 This approach security partnerships in Africa, Latin America, is similar to – but exceeds – China’s effort to “wean and the Pacific Islands as well.96 Security issues Australia and New Zealand from their habit of have assumed an increasingly prominent role in 24 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

China’s engagements with Africa over the past are less robust than with Asian countries but have decade. China has participated in U.N. peacekeep- been increasing nonetheless. ing operations in more than 10 African countries.97 In the action plan resulting from the 2012 meet- JOINT EXERCISES AND OPERATIONS ing of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beyond high-level visits, port calls, and personnel (a multilateral mechanism involving China, 50 exchanges, China’s security engagements have seen African nations, and the African Union), China a substantial increase in bilateral and multilateral launched an initiative to provide financial assis- exercises. China did not conduct its first joint tance and capacity-building measures, such as exercise with a foreign military until an October 105 personnel exchanges to the African Union, “to 2002 counterterrorism drill with Kyrgyzstan. enhance cooperation with Africa on peace and Over the remainder of the decade China engaged security issues.”98 In 2015, official Chinese sources in over 40 exercises with more than 20 countries, speculated that concrete actions in this vein could during which time the exercises grew in size and 106 include assistance to the African Standby Force complexity. or rapid response forces through expanded train- Russia and Pakistan have been particularly ing, exercising, and intelligence sharing to support important partners in this regard. Sino-Russian peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and counterpi- combined exercises as members of the SCO have racy.99 Meanwhile, Beijing has high-level military provided the opportunity to engage in major dialogue with at least 11 African countries, and military exercises under the rubric of a multilateral Chinese naval flotillas have begun making port organization. The Peace Mission 2007 exercise in calls to African partners as part of their counterpi- Russia marked China’s inaugural “out-of-country racy missions in the Gulf of Aden, including stops deployment of combat aircraft,” among other in Angola, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania in firsts, and during the 2014 version of the exercise, 2014.100 China conducted live missile firing trials from an 107 China has also increased naval tours to the Pacific armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Pakistan Islands, with two People’s Liberation Army Navy has also been a particularly pivotal partner for (PLAN) vessels paying a goodwill visit to the China. In a signal achievement, they partnered region in 2010, stopping in Tonga, Vanuatu, and up for China’s first joint naval drill with a foreign Papua New Guinea before heading to Australia and counterpart off the coast of Shanghai in October 108 New Zealand. The hospital ship Peace Ark visited 2003. The two countries now engage in com- Tonga, Fiji, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea in bined air, sea, and ground exercises and since 2011 2014.101 Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff have regularly conducted the Shaheen air exercises 109 Wang Guanzhong visited Fiji and Vanuatu in 2013 that include offensive strike drills. The third and 2014 respectively, in each case pledging to iteration, in 2014, marked the first time that the deepen military relations.102 These deployments Chinese J-10 fighter participated in an overseas allow the PLAN to practice long-distance opera- exercise and also saw the Pakistan air force oper- 110 tions on the high seas. ating the jointly produced JF-17 fighter. These exercises provide China with opportunities to In Latin America, “(d)efense visits are coupled with practice deploying air and naval assets in ways that a rise in military personnel exchanges, which build would be required for effective power projection. upon China’s objectives to establish goodwill.”103 China has welcomed officers from at least 18 Latin China is also more regularly engaging in military American countries to learn foreign languages and exercises with U.S. allies and partners in Asia. study military planning and strategy at several China has held search and rescue, humanitar- Chinese military academies.104 These activities ian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and naval maneuver exercises with Australia since | 25 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

In this May 24, 2014 photo, China’s Harbin (112) guided missile destroyer takes part in a week-long China-Russia “Joint Sea-2014” navy exercise at the East China Sea off Shanghai, China. Source: AP Images

2004 and conducted its first live-fire exercise with frigate, a supply ship, and the hospital ship Peace the Australian navy in 2010.111 The Chinese and Ark.114 The United States has indicated it will Indonesian militaries train together in special invite China to the 2016 iteration as well.115 In operations, and Indonesian pilots have trained 2014, China also participated for the first time in on simulators in China, as both air forces operate Khaan Quest, a multilateral U.N. peacekeeping Russian-made Sukhoi fighter jets.112 Farther afield exercise in Mongolia, and upgraded its participa- in the Persian Gulf, China has started conduct- tion in the 2014 Cobra Gold exercises in Thailand ing exercises with oil and natural gas exporters as to “observer-plus” status, reflecting its expanded it seeks to secure access to energy. In addition to role.116 the September 2014 exercise with Iran, the PLAN’s increased presence in the Indian Ocean has ARMS SALES AND JOINT PRODUCTION boosted military interactions with Kuwait, Oman, Arms sales and joint production have also served the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.113 as key components of the rapid expansion and deepening of China’s security partnerships. The PLA is similarly more active in multilateral According to the U.S. Department of Defense combined exercises. In 2014, China for the first (DoD), China uses arms exports as “part of a mul- time participated in the biennial U.S.-led RIMPAC tifaceted approach to promote trade, secure access drill, the world’s largest multilateral maritime to natural resources, and extend its influence in exercise, sending a missile destroyer, a missile 26 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

the region,” further noting that many developing have also indicated that the J-31, a reportedly low- countries “view China as a provider of low-cost observable fighter aircraft, is intended for export.126 weapons with fewer political strings attached com- Pakistan, which to date has not followed through pared to other international arms suppliers.”117 on the deal to purchase J-10Bs despite strong sig- nals in that direction, has reportedly approached Over the last decade, China has increased the Beijing to buy J-31 fighters.127 volume, value, quality, and geographic scope of its arms sales. From 2010 to 2014, China signed Furthermore, China intends to provide subma- approximately $13.7 billion in conventional arms rines to international security partners, reportedly sales around the world, a 143 percent increase over agreeing to sell six export versions of its Yuan-class the previous five-year period.118 Similarly, from diesel-electric attack submarines to Pakistan and 2010–2014, China sent major arms to 35 coun- two attack submarines to Bangladesh, bolstering tries and increased its share of international arms Beijing’s already formidable surface ship exports exports to 5 percent, from 3 percent in the previous with recent sales of frigates to Algeria, Bangladesh, five-year period.119 Pakistan, and Thailand.128

China now ranks among the world’s leading In addition to China’s long history of provid- arms dealers. In 2012, China replaced the United ing ballistic missiles and associated technology Kingdom as the fifth-largest exporter in the to partners, including Pakistan, North Korea, world – the first time a non-Western country had Saudi Arabia, and Syria, Beijing has more recently ranked among the top five since the end of the entered the air defense export business, market- Cold War.120 The following year China displaced ing its wares to Turkey and Myanmar.129 This has France for fourth place.121 In 2014, China surpassed sometimes occurred clandestinely, as uncovered by Germany as the world’s third-largest exporter, a 2013 joint U.S.-Yemeni interception of Chinese behind only Russia and the United States.122 It fig- anti-aircraft missiles intended for Iran.130 China ures even more prominently in particular regions: has also attempted to sell an export version of the In 2010, China became Africa’s primary supplier of HQ-9 air defense missile system to Turkey, which weapons, with 25 percent market share.123 has since backed away from the deal due to eco- nomic and diplomatic concerns.131 Long regarded as an exporter of small arms and light weapons, China has matured into a source In part taking advantage of opportunities cre- of sophisticated weapons systems and is now ated by Washington’s export controls prior to exporting major platforms such as fighter aircraft, February 2015, China has actively pursued the submarines, surface ships, and ballistic and cruise sale of UAVs.132 Saudi Arabia, long unable to missiles – and more recently, UAVs and air and procure American UAVs due to restrictions missile defense systems. under the Missile Technology Control Regime, is reportedly purchasing China’s Wing Loong Chinese fighter aircraft are now providing an UAV, a similar design to the General Atomics alternative to Russian, European, and potentially Predator that is capable of firing air-to-ground U.S. designs. China has sought to sell J-10B fight- missiles.133 Furthermore, China is reportedly sell- ers to Pakistan under a 2009 deal and has received ing similar UAVs to unspecified countries in the inquiries from various Asian, African, and Latin 124 Persian Gulf, Africa, and Asia, possibly to include American countries. Saudi Arabia has appar- Algeria, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and ently also expressed interest to Islamabad in the Uzbekistan, among others.134 In January 2015, an joint Sino-Pakistani JF-17 Thunder fighter jet, armed UAV appearing to be a Chinese-made CH-3 despite being historically reliant on the United 125 drone crashed in an area of Nigeria where govern- States for tactical fighters. The Chinese media ment forces are fighting against the terrorist group 135 | 27 Boko Haram. MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

Finally, in addition to arms sales, China has deepened its security partnerships through joint weapons production. For example, Pakistan made a “political decision” to join China in develop- ing the JF-17 fourth-generation multirole combat aircraft.136 Similarly, China and Indonesia reached a defense industrial cooperation agreement in 2011.137 Under this framework, Beijing has pro- posed cooperation in defense electronics between Chinese and Indonesian firms and has transferred technology for its C-705 anti-ship missile to Jakarta for local production to serve the Indonesian navy.138 China is also partnering with Nigeria on offshore patrol vessels and with Argentina on light helicopters and potentially attack fight- ers, and Beijing regularly sends defense industry representatives to foreign countries to “explore the possibility of identifying joint or co-production projects.”139

In all, China is rapidly deepening its security partnerships around the world, expanding its military diplomacy, enhancing its joint exercises, and becoming an increasingly important player in the global arms market. These security ties serve a variety of key national interests, suggesting that these dimensions of China’s overall foreign policy will only grow over time.

28 | Part 1C GROWING FORCE PROJECTION CAPABILITIES Key Takeaways

While still facing considerable limitations, the People’s Liberation Army is becoming more sophisticated across the spectrum of force projection capabilities.

In the next 10 to 15 years, China will likely be capable of carrying out a number of overseas missions, including major international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation operations, securing of important assets overseas, defense of sea lanes, counterterrorism strikes, and stabilization operations. MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

Growing Force Projection Capabilities counterterrorism, stability maintenance, emer- China’s rise has led to a host of new globe- gency rescue, and international peacekeeping.143 spanning interests, and the ability to protect Subsequent top-level guidance has reinforced this and advance them is increasingly linked to the push for a more extroverted military. Shortly after Communist Party’s legitimacy.140 These new exi- assuming the reins of government, Xi Jinping gencies are driving the PLA to play a more active articulated the goal of building China into a global role, enabled by an increasing ability to “maritime power,” linking it to the country’s future do so. In fact, China has already made progress security and prosperity.144 Furthermore, China’s in developing the capabilities necessary to exact 2013 defense white paper mentioned as a key limited global power projection, though significant concern that “security risks to China’s overseas challenges remain. A future expeditionary PLA interests are on the rise” and that the PLA would will be of flexible utility for both cooperative and step up to protect them.145 The white paper devoted coercive purposes, and strategic intent may change an entire chapter to the PLA’s participation in as new capabilities come online. image-burnishing cooperative security activities China’s recent international security activism through which “China earnestly fulfills its inter- represents a growing departure from long-standing national responsibilities and obligations.”146 All of defense strategy and policy: The nation’s military these concepts are part of a broader interpretation has traditionally focused primarily on internal of China’s interests that is inseparable from the security, homeland defense, and protection of world beyond China’s shores or even the Asia- China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This Pacific writ large. latter goal was for many years narrowly defined to As a result, Chinese security forces have become mean securing China’s land borders and achiev- increasingly active in global affairs, participat- ing unification with Taiwan, although it was later ing in counterpiracy operations alongside an expanded to encompass regionally disputed ter- international coalition in the Gulf of Aden since ritories claimed by Beijing, including in the East 2009 and in the emergency joint noncombatant and South China Seas.141 Not only was a broader evacuation operation (NEO) that rescued 35,000 military presence not a stated CCP leadership goal, Chinese citizens from a rapidly collapsing Libya in it contravened both proximate priorities and sev- 2011. Chinese forces also have had a significantly eral foreign policy dogmas, such as the abjuration stepped-up role in United Nations peacekeeping of hegemony and interference in other countries’ operations (PKO), including a more than twenty- affairs. fold increase in troops deployed between 2000 and But over the past decade, as China’s leaders have 2014.147 China has also escorted Syrian chemical grown both more confident and more aware of the weapons to their destruction in the Mediterranean. threats attending globalization, they have redefined In March 2015, a Chinese frigate evacuated nearly the scope of China’s strategic interests and the 500 Chinese nationals from Yemen.148 PLA’s place in realizing them. In 2004, then-Pres- While these overseas operations may seem small ident Hu Jintao issued the “new historic missions” compared with U.S. global military activity, if for the PLA, a set of unprecedented strategic measured against China’s old baseline of virtually planning directions that included two drivers for a no security actions beyond its borders they are big more global presence: the need for the PLA to safe- and bold. Moreover, these are likely first forays guard Chinese interests overseas and the need to in what is a growing trend, especially as current support China’s international influence.142 China’s operations yield gains in experience and comfort 2009 defense white paper cited specific tasks that operating abroad. While the PLA remains signifi- flow from the new historic missions, including cantly behind the standard set by the U.S. military, 30 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

numbers of obsolete platforms. By the mid-1990s, THE PLA’S SHORTCOMINGS concerted PLA modernization efforts began their Despite China’s achievements in military modern- replacement with smaller numbers of new, more ization outlined in this report, it is important to modern, and sophisticated platforms knitted recognize the significant weaknesses that continue together with networked command and control. to bedevil the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In addition to capabilities shortfalls, the PLA suffers Today, as China’s military inches closer to a force from important institutional weaknesses, includ- structure that can support warfighting objectives ing a sclerotic and outdated command structure for a Taiwan or near-seas contingency and China’s that privileges the ground forces, poor civil-military shipbuilding and aviation industries have demon- relations, difficulty recruiting and retaining quality strated capability to consistently produce advanced personnel, a force that is heavy on commissioned products, an effort is underway to gradually officers but lacks experienced noncommissioned increase numbers of some of the more success- officers, lack of a professional culture, and wide- ful platforms that could be useful for distant spread corruption.150 These weaknesses, to the extent that they remain uncorrected, will limit Bei- operations. China is also developing new power jing’s ability to employ military force effectively. projection capabilities with obvious expedition- ary relevance, its inchoate aircraft carrier program being a prominent example. Along with greater air- and space-based systems to coordinate their so does the rest of the world. This does not mean use and experience gleaned from deployments such that the PLA’s growing capabilities are irrelevant. as the Gulf of Aden task force, China’s existing As one leading analyst has argued, the “Chinese and future assets could provide the foundation of a military will be neither hollow nor a juggernaut. fledgling global expeditionary force. It will be neither a third-rate force confined to its region nor one that will embark on large-scale It is unlikely (given CCP priorities if nothing else), overseas combat adventures.”149 Despite important that China in the next 20 years will have the capa- limitations, China is building capabilities across bility to deploy large belligerent armadas or launch a wide spectrum that will enable it to do more in full-scale invasions of distant lands if opposed by a the world in ways that will have increasing impact capable force. But this is not the sole metric of mili- on the international security environment in the tary power and influence. In the short to medium decades ahead. term, the PLA will likely be increasingly capable of conducting operations along a spectrum of global CHINA’S GROWING FORCE PROJECTION activities that support various strategic goals. These CAPABILITIES, ATTRIBUTES, AND MISSIONS include simple but diplomatically significant ship Political rhetoric and tentative forays into global visits, humanitarian missions in remote coun- expeditionary operations indicate that China is tries, more complex and contested versions of its moving toward building a PLA that can deploy 2011 Libya evacuation, and finally various types not only in China’s immediate periphery, but also of coercion, pressure, and even aggression against through Asia and ultimately around the globe. But non-state actors and weaker states. executing this goal is a formidable challenge, as China lacks many of the foundational elements of We assess China’s present and future capabilities previous global military powers: sustained overseas across five major attributes of a globally potent basing and presence, a robust inventory of force military: force projection, sustainment, capacity, 151 projection platforms, and doctrine and training command and control, and force protection. honed through operational experience. China’s military by the mid-1980s had accumulated large | 31 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

Force Projection combatants capable of embarking at least one Force projection is the ability to deploy the mili- helicopter.155 tary instrument of national power beyond one’s territory in response to requirements for military Meanwhile, China is also developing large amphib- operations.152 While this is an expansive term, here ious vessels that are specifically useful for Taiwan we refer specifically to expeditionary capabilities, contingencies, but also potentially for projecting naval and air platforms that can operate at and ground power. In recent years, according to a U.S. deliver effects over long ranges. senior intelligence officer, China’s “amphibious acquisition has shifted decisively towards larger, Projecting power at a distance is one of the most high-end, ships,” which has “signaled the PLA(N)’s difficult tasks a military can undertake, gener- emerging interest in expeditionary warfare.”156 ally requiring capabilities of a completely different Since 2007, China has produced three amphibi- kind than do operations that take place close to ous landing platform docks comparable in size one’s shores under the cover of friendly land-based to the previous generation of the U.S. Navy’s airpower. The distances involved in many putative equivalent, the San Antonio-class. China is also PLA global operations are, moreover, immense. reportedly working on an amphibious assault ship.157 Amphibious ships, as their name implies, Certain platforms and systems are particularly can facilitate ship-to-shore movement of forces, relevant for distant operations. Carriers and large- whether in the context of a ground invasion or a deck amphibious vessels are useful mainly for lower-intensity NEO.158 power projection ashore, though they can perform humanitarian missions as a lesser-included case, China is also developing a number of critical sup- albeit imperfectly. Aircraft carriers can project porting capabilities that to date have kept it from power ashore through the air and are especially achieving the range necessary for expeditionary good for strike. China’s well-known first carrier, operations. A key capability in this regard is the the Liaoning, while of dubious operational util- Y-20 heavy-lift jet transport, which began flight- ity at present, is serving as a training platform for testing in January 2013.159 In addition to furnishing a burgeoning program.153 For its future carrier mobility and strategic lift, the Y-20 could be outfit- air wings, China is developing its twin-seat J-15 ted with an airborne warning and control system fighter aircraft, a derivative of the Russian SU-33 (AWACS), which is used to choreograph long-range Flanker, which has apparently passed prototyp- air operations at great distances. The People’s ing and entered service as an operational training Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF’s) tankers aircraft.154 Catapults, flattop decks, and possibly remain limited in number and capability, although nuclear propulsion will be key indicators of prog- this could change rapidly if prioritized.160 ress. The first carrier is an experimental platform; it is what, and how many, China builds next that A wide range of potential force projection opera- will matter. tions – an evacuation operation in a nonpermissive environment being perhaps the best example Deck-borne aviation is useful not only for striking – would have a significant ground force compo- ashore by creating a protective screen of maritime nent as well. For contingencies against non-state supremacy around a task force so that it can con- actors, China could draw on skills honed by PLA duct strike and other expeditionary operations, but ground forces and PLAN marines during Sichuan also for gaining domain awareness and projecting Earthquake relief operations in 2008, by special power across wide swaths of ocean. To this end, in forces in Gulf of Aden anti-piracy operations, and addition to future carrier-borne fighter aircraft, the even by Chinese participants in U.N. peacekeeping PLAN has increased helicopter deployment and forces.161 China has trained for years to conduct an use, with each of the PLAN’s large modern surface amphibious landing on Taiwan or on various East 32 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

and South China Sea islets, and those skills could repeated deployments of task forces to the Gulf of be transferrable to more remote shores if supported Aden – 19 and counting – China is already pursu- with larger, longer-range platforms.162 ing several enablers for a far-seas logistics chain. The ability to replenish at sea, to conduct remote Long-range ballistic and cruise missiles – which repairs, and to have reliable access to friendly port China deploys in large quantities and are the key facilities are critical determinants of success in to its Asia-Pacific anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) conducting extended expeditionary operations, approach – are also relevant to power projection, as as are the infrastructure and access agreements they can hold adversary targets at risk to deter or needed to conduct equivalent air operations from a 163 compel. With improvements in space architec- forward airfield. ture, over-the-horizon targeting, and adaptation to existing sea-based launch platforms, such mis- Supplies and replenishment underway have pro- siles could be repurposed to constitute a potent, if gressed rapidly since the first anti-piracy task force narrowly focused, force projection tool. Chinese prepared to leave China in late 2008. In foreign nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), which ports, China is able to draw upon its state-owned have already reportedly ventured as far afield as China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) for the Persian Gulf, could be particularly formidable replenishment. The PLAN has also made great launch platforms given their high cruising speed, progress in perishables preservation and potable endurance, and potential for concealment.164 water generation.167 Its auxiliary fleet is expand- ing, particularly with long-range, high-speed oilers China’s growing capabilities in cyberspace and and replenishment ships. Supporting more than the electromagnetic spectrum can also facilitate limited long-range operations will require addi- a broad array of military operations, including tional replenishment ships, which China’s capable 165 “extended-range power projection.” shipbuilding industry has already started to build Many of the force projection platforms China cur- and has the capacity to build far more of, relatively 168 rently fields or will in the near future are, while not rapidly if requested. competitive with the United States, qualitatively To better support extended operations, China more advanced than most observers expected must also develop the ability to conduct sophisti- a decade ago and sufficient in numbers to give cated ship and aircraft maintenance and repairs the United States pause in certain contingencies remotely, either through tenders or overseas repair even if U.S. capabilities retain the advantage on facilities. Both ships and aircraft require depot- a ship-to-ship basis. While still small in number, level maintenance after a certain number of hours. with significant resources they could provide While the PLAN has reportedly made “significant a respectable force suited to a range of possible steps toward establishing the maintenance cul- contingencies. ture that marks professional navies,”169 there is Sustainment no evidence of regularly scheduled independent Sustainment is the provision of logistics and per- inspections mandated by an outside authority, sonnel services required to maintain and prolong a regimen that the U.S. Navy prioritizes. In the operations until successful mission accomplish- future, China’s military will not need tenders if ment.166 It often implies the ability to remain on it has access to technologically sophisticated port station for as long as required and to be supported facilities or the ability to bring technicians abroad. independent of land bases. Sustaining missions However, tenders will be necessary for true inde- of extended duration is difficult under the best of pendence, should neutral ports be closed off in circumstances, but becomes more so the farther a the event of hostilities. At-sea repair is not only a military gets from its shores. Driven in part by its logistics and supply factor, but also an indicator | 33 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

of a top-class professional force (one that Russia’s to a modest extent in practice. The PLAN now navy, for instance, never mastered). Access to uses a network of access points, with Port Salalah, neutral repair facilities in peacetime is not particu- Oman, foremost among them – all Gulf of Aden larly controversial; Pakistan has already offered task forces save the first have called there. China such services in Karachi.170 A more significant has also reportedly received offers to establish question is the caliber of venues and services military facilities in Djibouti,172 the Seychelles,173 available. Progress is being made in medical care and Pakistan.174 While “places” for logistics supply overseas, with land-based partnerships under are already being developed, political and mili- development.171 tary factors will likely constrain acquisition of U.S.-style “bases” for the foreseeable future. The nature, scope, and configuration of China’s emerg- Extended operations overseas ing overseas facilities access architecture will offer are extremely difficult without particularly important indicators of its intentions with regard to distant operations. reliable access to facilities Capacity abroad to undertake equipping, In order for the PLA to expand coverage while fulfilling existing missions of much greater impor- servicing, and other support tance, China must increase its overall capacity, which defines the sophistication and scale at which beyond replenishment. As a military can operate, in turn impacting that a result, China is pursuing military’s ability to execute a given mission set. In this context, capacity encompasses both req- neutral port access to supply uisite amounts of human and material assets and the organizational processes to generate military the PLAN in waterways in power effectively.

which it operates, such as the For China, at a basic level, this means upping ship and aircraft production. Qualitative improve- Indian Ocean and Gulf of ment has already been unexpectedly rapid. Aden, albeit with potential Establishment of new, modern shipyards dedi- cated to military ship production or expansion political costs and the risk of of military areas in co-production yards would greatly facilitate quantitative buildup. Similar operational vulnerability. requirements apply to aircraft of all kinds, space assets, and other primary and enabling platforms. Supporting such a buildup requires a large logistics Extended operations overseas are extremely dif- 175 ficult without reliable access to facilities abroad to and support infrastructure. undertake equipping, servicing, and other sup- In addition to having the hardware, the PLA needs port beyond replenishment. As a result, China is significant improvements in operational experi- pursuing neutral port access to supply the PLAN in ence and readiness. Hands-on training both waterways in which it operates, such as the Indian seasons military personnel and refines concepts of Ocean and Gulf of Aden, albeit with potential operation and other processes by which a military political costs and the risk of operational vulner- functions. Gradually increasing force deployment ability. Overseas facilities access has entered into to distant areas, as through the Gulf of Aden mis- Beijing’s policy debate and is already being realized sions, is slowly raising familiarity and readiness. 34 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

Much more will be needed if the PLA is to operate already “capable of supporting operation com- confidently far from its shores. mand and control of PLA forces west of the first island chain.”179 Its Beidou/Compass positioning, Finally, formal processes need to be developed that navigation, and timing (PNT) satellite constella- can organize, train, and equip forces capable of tion achieved regional coverage by the end of 2013 undertaking expeditionary operations. This entails and is on track to become only the third or fourth establishing appropriate commands to coordinate network to provide global coverage by 2020. As efforts and changing service cultures and exer- part of its Digital Earth initiative, Beijing plans cises to simulate truly realistic, joint operations. to significantly enhance its land- and space-based One cannot learn to manage the uncertainties remote sensing architecture, to include polar of expeditionary activities without challenging facilities. Having only four overseas ground sta- assumptions and boundaries in training. Lack of tions currently, China plans to establish “network these habits remains a significant challenge for 176 nodes” at the North and South Poles and in Brazil today’s PLA. as part of a “Digital Earth Scientific Platform” 180 Command and Control by 2030. China will almost certainly achieve Command and control systems are the facilities, enhanced open-ocean surveillance capabilities, a equipment, communications, procedures, and critical piece for a military ranging far and wide or personnel essential to a commander for planning, responding to contingencies where accurate infor- directing, and controlling operations of assigned mation is at a premium. and attached forces pursuant to the missions 177 Despite this ambitious hardware buildout, there is assigned. The PLA has recognized the necessity currently very little delegation to field command- of being able to orient and control assets through ers when it comes to overseas operations. Evolution sophisticated command and control systems. of organization, command, and coordination will This is especially true at great distances, yet those be essential to supporting operations of increased distances dramatically increase the difficulty of scope and scale. supplying the requisite command, control, com- munications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, Force Protection and reconnaissance (C4ISR). To detect, report, Force protection comprises preventive measures and direct activities over the Pacific and Indian taken to mitigate hostile actions against personnel, Oceans, China is thus developing an increasingly resources, facilities, and critical information.181 complete, integrated surface C4ISR network: Deploying large numbers of assets farther away It maintains the world’s second-largest fleet of from China imposes vulnerabilities on those units intelligence-gathering, surveying, and space event that increase with distance, at least to a point. support ships. Survey vessels, which typically pre- Especially in a scenario of confrontation or conflict cede naval operations, are studying relevant routes with another major military power, PLA assets ply- in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans.178 ing distant waters would be under threat of attack by the adversary’s forces. To address this, China Space-based systems with expanded geographic will have to develop open-ocean anti-submarine coverage are especially important to support warfare (ASW), currently an area of critical weak- expeditionary operations farther afield, for which ness. This involves increasingly quiet long-range few alternatives are available. China is rapidly nuclear submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and developing a constellation of remote sensing, com- helicopters. China currently deploys at least three munications, and data relay satellites impressive dozen relatively quiet conventionally powered in number and scope and growing in capability. attack submarines, with plans for at least a dozen According to a report by Taiwan’s ministry of more.182 Future generations of nuclear-powered defense, China’s on-orbit military satellites are | 35 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

attack submarines already contemplated may both provide “generational” technological upgrades OPPOSED INTERVENTION and free up current boats to roam beyond the Operating in a hostile foreign environment far Western Pacific.183 Moreover, China is thought to from safe havens represents the pinnacle of ex- be developing deck-borne maritime patrol aircraft peditionary military activities. It could implicate specifically for deep-water ASW.184 nearly all of the aforementioned categories, but it bears special emphasis because it depends in Additionally, as the PLAN ranges farther from part on opponent capabilities and will remain one China’s robust layers of land-based and coastal of the PLA’s most difficult challenges. Enablers for defense systems, further development of area high-intensity opposed operations are likely very air defense will be critical to protect vital assets. far in the future, and the PLA’s capability to act in Advanced surface vessels with long-range air opposition to major militaries will take decades to defense systems, such as Luyang-II and -III develop. Meanwhile, much of China’s overseas ac- destroyers – which have 3-D radars superficially tivities and presence will be “lower-end” in nature. similar to SPY-1 radar aboard U.S. Aegis destroy- ers, albeit likely less powerful – can strengthen expeditionary capabilities. By 2017, China is DISTANT OPERATIONS CAPABILITY SPECTRUM expected to possess 14 hulls spread over these two Force projection spans a continuum, from the basic classes, of which 13 were commissioned in 2013 or ability to defend ones shores to sustaining high-inten- later.185 In the words of the senior China analyst sity combat under increasingly contested conditions in the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, “These at great distances from mainland China. The table modern, high-end combatants will likely provide on the next page (“Increasingly Expeditionary PLA increased weapons stores and overall flexibility as Missions and Force Postures”) delineates categories surface action groups venture more frequently into of force projection capability and describes each in blue water in the coming years.”186 terms of its purpose along with our assessment of the 188 While ASW remains a weakness, the PLA’s prog- PLA’s current status in achieving it. ress in other areas such as area air defense has In a sense, China is prepared for relatively complex given observers pause and could presage a more operations on its periphery and fairly basic tasks at a rapid trajectory for generating capabilities that distance. The PLA already possesses formidable near- could safeguard and enable other kinds of expe- coast defense and near-seas active defense. It has also ditionary activities abroad. Moreover, leading developed a low-end limited expeditionary capability analysts assess that the PLA intends on making that allows China to engage in peacetime and low- these capabilities expeditionary. During train- intensity operations around the world. ing with the Liaoning, for instance, according to one leading U.S. analyst, the PLA has assembled The first three layers, up through extended blue- “group[s] of vessels more closely resembling a water counterintervention, constitute the expansion combined expeditionary strike group than just a of China’s existing A2/AD capabilities to cover a carrier group.”187 wider geographic zone. The PLA could graduate to possess such capabilities by 2020, and this would, Finally, particularly in approaching shore and among other things, limit the U.S. military’s freedom landing, contending with naval mines and of maneuver within the first island chain. It is not land-based threats such as missiles may become an expeditionary capability per se but provides an necessary. Ashore, counterterrorism and disabling important baseline for present efforts. These missions of improvised explosive devices may be required. are exquisite but relatively “thin” in terms of the vari- ety and quantity of systems required. 36 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

INCREASINGLY EXPEDITIONARY PLA MISSIONS AND FORCE POSTURES

MISSION GOALS STATUS

Delay enemy invasion of waters/airspace NEAR-COAST DEFENSE up to ~12 nautical miles from China’s coast- Developed from 1949–1980s. line and ~300 miles inland.

Achieve sea/air control for a certain time Pursued 1987 present; already NEAR-SEAS ACTIVE DEFENSE in certain area(s) of near seas, first island – achieved.* chain, and its inner and outer rims.

Ability to “deny” access by holding oppos- ing forces at risk throughout China’s EXTENDED BLUE-WATER periphery and all approaches thereto to Achievable in theory by 2020. COUNTERINTERVENTION a distance of 1,000+ nm from territorial waters/airspace.

All of the above, and ability to conduct maritime interdiction operations and high- Achievable in theory by 2030. Low LIMITED EXPEDITIONARY level NEO, when necessary, in/above far end already achieved. seas.

All of the above, some form of global presence even if thin, and ability to surge BLUE-WATER combat-ready forces in/above core stra- In progress. Post-2030 at earliest. EXPEDITIONARY tegic far-oceans areas (e.g., Persian Gulf). Ability to seize, attempt to hold small features.

All of the above and the robust presence of Indeterminate; several decades GLOBAL EXPEDITIONARY combat-ready naval/air forces in all major away if at all. strategic regions of world.

* China has major capabilities to support, although this does not guarantee that it can overcome evolving U.S./allied countermeasures.

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The next three layers are far more complex, or naval forces in all major strategic regions of world. “thick.” Given sufficient Chinese prioritization, The ability to engage in major combat operations the PLA could attain a limited-expeditionary presupposes comprehensive capability to contest capability by 2030, able to conduct contingency for supremacy in all domains and engage in distant operations at greater distance. With such a force joint forcible-entry operations and amphibious structure, China could conduct opposed NEOs, as assault. Given these tremendous requirements, this well as limited maritime interdiction operations benchmark remains too far in China’s future to in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. At a merit serious consideration at this stage. minimum, such a force would be capable of distant low-intensity conflict, freedom of navigation opera- MISSION SCENARIOS tions, carrier operations, distant ASW, anti-surface The PLA has been making progress, however warfare, and anti-air warfare. Supporting airpower slight in some cases, on all components of a more operations could include aerial refueling, over- robust global capability. China is not just buying water flight, extended-duration maritime patrol equipment, but learning how to project power by and intelligence collection, anti-ship missile strike, maintaining hardware and training to use it. Based and strategic bombing. Landing and land power on its expanding military and growing overseas operations could require mine countermeasures interests, China in the next 10 to 15 years could and point defense against cruise missiles. possess the capability to execute at least six major overseas missions of unprecedented scope and It is also possible to imagine that China could, with intensity, listed here in rough ascending order even limited success in enablers, conduct opera- of difficulty: major international humanitar- tions that are “thin” (in that they do not implicate a ian assistance and disaster relief; NEO; securing massive or diverse expeditionary force) but distant. of important assets overseas; defense of sea Examples could include limited precision strike or lanes; counterterrorism strikes; and stabilization uncontested special operations forces (SOF) raids, operations. such as a NEO or counterterror strike off a distant shore. The PLA is highly likely to participate in a major international HA/DR operation in the coming Most ambitious would be a blue-water or even years in the aftermath of a nontraditional security global expeditionary posture (the latter being the disaster, such as a typhoon, cyclone, earthquake, or term PLAN planners use to categorize today’s U.S. tsunami. China has seen the reputational windfall Navy) and air operations to go with it. Chinese that the United States has gained from relief efforts sources show no conclusive evidence of aspiration after disasters in places such as the Indian Ocean to such capabilities by 2030 or even for some years in 2004, Haiti in 2010, Japan in 2011, and the after, although some interpret former PLAN com- Philippines in 2013, and Beijing was stung by its mander Liu Huaqing’s writings as calling for such inability to contribute militarily to the 2004 Asian a navy by 2050.190 tsunami response.

Beyond all aforementioned capabilities, a Already stepping out in this domain, China has blue-water expeditionary posture (the global begun deploying its hospital ship, the Peace Ark, expeditionary low end) would require some form to international relief zones.191 Future applications of global presence by forces of at least limited of its aircraft carriers or amphibious vessels could numbers and capability and the ability to surge provide needed capacity in disaster areas. Even combat-ready forces into core strategic areas. A where China may not have interests or citizens at full global expeditionary posture, maximal in risk, it is possible that Beijing will participate in scope and intensity, would require all this and humanitarian operations around the globe in an also the robust presence of combat-ready air and effort to provide the world and Washington with 38 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

CHINACHINA OIL IS INCREASINGLIMPORTS BY ABLEORIGIN TO PROJECTPCT OF POWER TOTAL BE YOND ITS BORDERS This map depicts notional overseas missions the PLA will be capable of performing in 2030. It is not intentended to make concrete predictions.

N.N. Ko Korereaa N.N. Ko Korereaa CeCentralntral Asia Asia

MediterraneanMediterranean

PaPakistankistan PPersianersian Gulf Gulf

PaPakistankistan

MyanmarMyanmar

Sudan/S.SudanSudan/S.Sudan SouthSouth China China Se Seaa IndianIndian Ocean Ocean

Indian Ocean StraitStrait of of Malacc Malaccaa

Major humanitarian Noncombatant evacuation Securing high-value assets Defense of sea lanes Counterterrorism strike Stabilization operations assistance/disaster relief operation

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evidence of its peaceful rise. Without foreign oppo- similar to a U.S. Marine expeditionary unit. sition or opposed entry, the PLA could already Chinese special forces might well be too small to dispatch the hospital ships, aircraft, and field render the kind of large-scale, long-term protection hospitals required to make a major international provided by the U.S. Marine Corps’ rapid response contribution. force (about 1,000 Marines, albeit not all necessar- ily deployed simultaneously). Given the increase in Chinese citizens abroad, NEO is a second likely major mission for the PLA. Although the 2011 evacuation of Chinese workers from Libya was a qualified success, Beijing cannot Based on its expanding military and afford to fail in protecting Chinese citizens abroad growing overseas interests, China from large-scale violence or in the event of a state collapse. China is thus likely to devote significant in the next 10 to 15 years could resources to be able to respond flexibly, and the attention devoted to the Libya operation in the possess the capability to execute at 2013 defense white paper indicates that the PLA feels similarly. As a result, the large-scale evacu- least six major overseas missions of ation of thousands of Chinese, potentially in an unprecedented scope and intensity, environment too dangerous for the usual Ministry of Foreign Affairs chartering of civilian vehicles, listed here in rough ascending order ships, and aircraft, will be needed. of difficulty: major international In the event of a major NEO, Chinese forces could already get ashore and handle most threats to its humanitarian assistance and people, whether from anti-Chinese riots or broader instability – with sufficient advanced planning. disaster relief; NEO; securing of For evacuation of citizens stranded inland dur- important assets overseas; defense of ing complicated, rapidly evolving situations, additional capabilities and experience may be sea lanes; counterterrorism strikes; needed: improved intelligence coordination with diplomatic and other local assets, selecting among and stabilization operations. landing craft, helicopters, and other hardware.

Civilian and existing military assets are useful for certain scenarios. Assuming they can be diverted The PLA could also lead a third overseas mission of from more proximate concerns, amphibious ves- securing high-value assets, of which an increasing sels and other surface combatants with airborne number are in Chinese hands around the world. or surface ship-to-shore connectors can secure a In fact, in many cases they are owned by state- landing zone and flow special operations forces or owned or closely government-linked enterprises. other troops and materiel ashore. Other aspects of Examples of this type of operation include recov- these operations will remain more difficult for now. ery of shipping vessels taken by pirates or energy Airlift requires significant numbers of aircraft, and infrastructure seized by local subnational forces. China has yet to develop a substantial cargo air- This would implicate many of the same capabilities craft fleet. To support coastal NEOs and have some as an opposed NEO, although it is likely to be more capacity to intervene farther inland, China would tailored, perhaps with greater involvement from benefit greatly from being able to quickly dispatch special forces. A more intensive variant of securing one to two brigades of rapid deployment troops, important assets would be a mission to neutralize 40 | weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A potential MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

contingency in this regard would be ensuring that infrastructure, thereby pre-empting or retaliating China could be a decisive first mover in North against groups that may support violent separatists Korea in the event of regime collapse and ensuing within China. Such a challenge could emerge in unsecured nuclear weapons and material. failed states or ungoverned spaces in Afghanistan or other Central and Southwest Asian countries, Three additional missions would likely be more a problem that could worsen if Western militaries complex and difficult to execute, particularly if largely disengage. Should the threat of radicaliza- there were actual opposition or even a lack of sup- tion or terrorist violence in Xinjiang intensify, it port from key countries concerned. would place substantial pressure on the leadership The PLAN could potentially be equipped to move to devote high-end resources to meet it, including toward a fourth, probably protracted, mission of aviation and unmanned aerial vehicles. Beijing has sea lane protection and defense. This is of critical also undertaken considerable security cooperation salience for China, which in 2040 is expected to with countries in Central Asia that suffer from 193 import nearly two-thirds as much oil as the United extremist elements. In a not-so-distant future States consumes today overall, of which two-thirds in which the PLA has developed advanced special will be seaborne and over half will come through operations or other capabilities that are globally the Strait of Malacca.192 China can already defend scarce, it is not difficult to imagine Beijing under- vessels against non-state actors such as pirates and taking direct action against a terrorist threat inside terrorists, but opposing another major navy is far a foreign country, particularly if at that govern- 194 more difficult, and PLA strategists fear that the ment’s behest. China is reportedly drafting an United States could close critical economic lifelines anti-terrorism law that would provide the legal 195 in a crisis. framework to do just that.

The PLA will likely spend years building on Finally, a sixth mission could be some form of previous capabilities to protect critical waterways stability operations in a friendly or strategi- against disruption by non-state actors, including cally important country. China’s increased U.N. off the Gulf of Aden and, potentially, in the Strait peacekeeping activities are preparing the PLA for of Malacca. China will also gradually increase its this type of operation. The Ministry of Defense own SLOC disruption capabilities, which would announced in September 2014 that China, for the provide it with a powerful lever to coerce smaller first time, would be sending a battalion to a peace- 196 states, many of whom have weak or nonexistent keeping mission, in this instance to South Sudan. navies. Finally, the PLAN could work toward With an increasing number of security partners achieving some capability to comprehensively and a wide array of overseas interests, there are any protect its own ships from attack by a capable number of circumstances in which Beijing would adversary, a difficult challenge surmountable by want to assist a country with defense against both only the world’s most sophisticated and experi- foreign and domestic sources of instability. With enced navies. Nothing short of a robust blue-water Chinese lives and critical equities at stake, Beijing carrier strike and battle group capability answers could very well be under substantial domestic pres- this threat. sure to act.

Counterterrorism and counterterror strike In sum, China has growing capabilities – it has comprise a fifth set of missions, including basic increased the amount and quality of its military counterterrorism, partnership capacity-building, hardware dramatically in the last decade and is and security force assistance. High-end operations working on doctrine and training to match its could include direct action against terrorist train- steel. The leadership appears committed to invest- ing camps to destroy an Islamic State-like group’s ing in critical enabling capabilities to expand | 41 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

the effective range of China’s military might. In different combinations and contexts, a panoply of these capabilities could allow China to undertake a range of military activities outside its immedi- ate environs. Some of these, such as the ongoing counterpiracy deployments to the Gulf of Aden or increased HA/DR cooperation, would likely find a congenial international reception. Others might be more controversial.

In sum, China has growing capabilities – it has increased the amount and quality of its military hardware dramatically in the last decade and is working on doctrine and training to match its steel. The leadership appears committed to investing in critical enabling capabilities to expand the effective range of China’s military might.

42 | PART 2

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY AND POLICY

For at least two decades, the United States has maintained a relatively consistent hedging policy toward China, seeking to build a cooperative and stable relationship with Beijing while also preparing for the potential that the relationship will become more competitive and confrontational. This policy has three principal elements:197 first, engagement with China to deepen mutual understanding, enhance areas of cooperation, and manage areas of disagreement; second, a shaping component that seeks to induce and integrate China into an institutionalized and rules-based international order; and third, a balancing component that strengthens U.S. military power, as well as U.S. alliances and partnerships, to deter and if necessary defeat Chinese aggression.

A China that is more willing and able to be an active player in international security affairs will have implications for all three dimensions of Washington’s China policy, creating new opportunities for cooperation and sharpening areas of competition. The core strategic insight of this paper is a simple one: The expanding scope and scale of China’s international security activism demands that Washington widen the aperture of its hedging policy toward China in several domains. The remainder of this report discusses the strategic implications for the United States and offers recommendations for U.S. policy. Part 2A ENGAGEMENT: SEIZING THE BENEFITS OF A MORE ACTIVE CHINA MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

Engagement: Seizing the benefits of a more The first is to build cooperative capacity to address active China international problems. Opportunities for collec- In addition to appreciating the limits of Chinese tive problem-solving will increase as China gains power, U.S. strategists should avoid knee-jerk more experience and capacity, particularly on reactions that invariably view increased Chinese transnational issues such as piracy, illegal fishing, activism as a threat to U.S. interests. In fact, organized crime, and nontraditional threats such China’s more global activism has already at times as natural disasters and humanitarian crises. U.S. comported with U.S. interests, including Beijing’s officials have repeatedly expressed the desire to applying greater pressure on North Korea, helping deepen cooperation with China on global issues. to manage political crises in Sudan, and contribut- Vice President Joe Biden expressed this aspiration ing to anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.198 in August 2011 in Beijing, saying that “a rising While serious challenges will no doubt emerge, China will fuel economic growth and prosperity greater Chinese capabilities and political will to and it will bring to the fore a new partner with participate in world affairs will increase oppor- whom we can meet global challenges together.”200 tunities for the United States and China to work together to manage major international problems. In addition to appreciating the China may also take on regional and global responsibilities on its own that redound to the limits of Chinese power, U.S. benefit of the United States, even if not done for any reason approximating American concep- strategists should avoid knee-jerk tions of “responsible stakeholding” or an altruistic reactions that invariably view Part 2A contribution to global public goods.199 In pursuit of its own international interests and security, China increased Chinese activism as a may therefore assume the kind of burden-sharing ENGAGEMENT: SEIZING THE BENEFITS role it has traditionally eschewed. threat to U.S. interests. OF A MORE ACTIVE CHINA There is also, of course, the possibility that greater Chinese international security and defense activ- U.S.-China security ties also harbor the potential ism could be largely irrelevant to the United States, to stabilize bilateral relations through dialogues in places where U.S. interests are not at stake. In and mechanisms that reduce miscommunica- this vein, even if not a net positive, more Chinese tion, misunderstanding, and miscalculation. activism should not be viewed with concern. This is important for operational safety as U.S. Against this backdrop, there may be new, albeit and Chinese forces increasingly operate in close limited, opportunities for enhanced U.S.-China proximity to each other. It is also vital for crisis security cooperation as the PRC develops greater management, given the potential for incidents and military capabilities and is engaged in more places accidents to occur in multiple theaters across the on more issues. globe. In this regard, the two confidence-building measures (CBMs) signed during President Barack PURPOSE OF COOPERATING WITH CHINA Obama’s trip to Beijing in November 2014 and the U.S. security cooperation with China seeks to multilateral Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea achieve multiple aims, many of which could grow (CUES) that was agreed upon at the 2014 annual increasingly important as the PLA is ever more Western Pacific Naval Symposium may contribute present and active in international security affairs. to avoiding potential crises.

| 45 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

At a more strategic level, engaging China on may, in certain circumstances, have unintended defense and security issues can provide deterrent consequences that could result in the unauthorized value by offering opportunities for the United disclosure of defense articles, technical, data or States to communicate its political will, intentions, defense services to China.”203 and capabilities. The United States further aims to glean a better understanding of the PLA’s doctrine, In addition to these legal and military operational training, plans, and capabilities. As an ancillary concerns, there are political considerations on the effect, U.S. security cooperation with China tends U.S. side that limit the nature of security coop- to facilitate U.S. cooperation with other regional eration with China. These result in part from the partners, particularly in Southeast Asia. In the cur- United States’ not wanting to provide capabilities rent security environment, few countries want to or training that China might use against its own be seen as choosing sides between Washington and people. For instance, although counterterrorism Beijing, and most therefore find it easier to coop- cooperation with China may make sense when erate with Washington on security matters when facing common threats, it is difficult to ensure that relations between the two powers are relatively sta- China does not turn these skills on its own citizens ble. Military cooperation with China can therefore to suppress political movements in areas such as send an important signal to the rest of the region Xinjiang and Tibet. In addition, U.S. officials have that countries can work with Washington without expressed concerns about China transferring mili- compromising their relationship with Beijing. tary technologies or capabilities to rogue regimes and state sponsors of terrorism.204 LIMITS ON COOPERATION A final impediment to future security cooperation Despite these goals, there are substantial limita- could be the potential for a consensus to grow in tions on the extent to which the United States and either Washington or Beijing that the existing mili- China can and will engage in security cooperation. tary-to-military contacts and exercises were failing Perhaps most importantly, the United States and to have their intended effects.205 This could occur China often either have competing goals on inter- if U.S. officials determined that PLA reciproc- national security issues or, even when they share ity and transparency were ultimately insufficient, similar aims, want to pursue differing approaches. PLA behavior was excessively unprofessional and In addition, the U.S. Congress placed legal limits assertive, or China was refusing to use institutions on certain types of security cooperation through and mechanisms put in place to manage instability the 1990 Foreign Relations Authorization Act and crises. Of course, China could similarly cancel and the 2000 National Defense Authorization security cooperation, as it has done several times Act, which restrict U.S. arms sales to China and before, if it believed that U.S. policies were unac- activities that would result in “inappropriate ceptably violating its core interests.206 exposure” of certain operational areas to the PLA, OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE COOPERATION respectively.201 The U.S.-China relationship is relatively well- These are designed to prevent U.S.-China military- institutionalized to engage on the broader set of to-military cooperation from offering the PLA issues that are likely to accompany a more active excessive insight into U.S. technology, doctrine, Chinese foreign policy. Senior-level engagements capabilities, training, and vulnerabilities that and dialogues are frequent and occur among the would contribute to its warfighting capability.202 leaderships and across regional and functional Moreover, the Department of Defense has also issues. As a result, Washington and Beijing are noted that “PLA participation or observer status in already discussing a wide variety of global foreign military training exercises of nations in possession policy and national security issues. In this sense, of U.S. military equipment, systems, and weapons there is no pressing need for new major dialogues 46 | or additional leader-level mechanisms. MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

Likewise, the existing architecture of U.S.-China a crisis – precisely the purposes for which they are military-to-military cooperation provides a solid intended, and needed most.207 Implementation of foundation upon which to build: It includes the new CBMs will be critical, and U.S. officials frequent senior-level exchanges and military may want to consider ways to test China’s willing- diplomacy; regular defense bureaucracy engage- ness to actually use hotlines through unannounced ments, including the Defense Consultative Talks, calls during peacetime or in another nonprovoca- the Defense Policy Coordination Talks, and the tive fashion. In this sense, Washington should Military Maritime Consultative Agreement; stress-test these mechanisms to increase the likeli- functional and regional dialogues, including con- hood that they are available when truly needed. tacts between high-level military and diplomatic officials; communication mechanisms and confi- The United States should, to the extent possible, dence-building measures such as hotlines; and now pursue interagency dialogues that break down bilateral and multilateral exercises. U.S. officials bureaucratic silos on both sides. This is helpful on should design these engagements at least in part the U.S. side to ensure that military engagements to better understand China’s overseas intentions are coordinated across political, diplomatic, and and force projection capabilities. In addition, the intelligence channels. Even more important, how- United States should continue pursuing dialogues ever, is to bring together various agencies in the with China on issues where engagement remains Chinese system, which lacks an agency analogous underdeveloped, including strategic missiles and to the U.S. National Security Council to coordi- 208 nuclear weapons, space, and cyber. nate policy between departments. For instance, future engagements on maritime issues with the With Chinese and U.S. forces increasingly coming PLA Navy should also include representatives from into contact overseas, U.S. officials should priori- the Chinese Coast Guard, Foreign Ministry, and tize operational safety and crisis management in fisheries agencies. their military-to-military engagements with China, focusing on institutional mechanisms to avoid The United States should also seek to enhance conflict and regulate behavior during crises. The engagements below senior levels. This will widen CBMs signed in November 2014 were an important the breadth of bilateral engagement and help to start but must be built upon through additional build working relationships among future lead- annexes, as provided for by the agreements. It ers. It is also the case that lower-level military will be important, for instance, to conclude at the engagements can provide unique insights into earliest possible date an aerial counterpart to the professional competence, as well as equipment and maritime rules of the road already agreed upon training at operational and tactical levels. and ultimately to expand the rules of engagement As a matter of practice, the United States should in unexpected encounters to include coast guard, also pursue trilateral and multilateral coopera- not just naval, vessels. In addition, the United tion with China. This can help eschew concerns States should continue pressing for notification of in Asia that the two leading powers have designs ballistic missile launches, which represent a key on establishing a G-2 condominium to manage area of both Chinese opacity and potential threat regional security without input from the rest of the to U.S. forces and facilities. region. It can also soften concerns that coopera- It will be particularly important to ensure that tion with the United States means picking sides communication lines, often referred to as hotlines, against China. In this context, U.S. officials should revive the idea of a U.S.-China-India trilateral are open and reliable. To date, U.S. and Chinese 209 officials have used hotlines on at least five occa- dialogue. The United States should also consider sions, but never on an impromptu basis or during trilateral dialogues with China and key U.S. allies in Asia and NATO. | 47 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

Sailors from the People’s Republic of China, People’s Liberation Army Navy ship Yueyang (FF 575) board the guided-missile cruiser USS Port Royal (CG 73) to perform a visit, board, search and seizure drill during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise 2014.

Given legitimate concerns about not wanting to activities in the South China Sea. At the same strengthen the capabilities of the PLA, the United time, U.S. officials should not be seduced by the States should avoid cooperating with China for idea that Chinese cooperation and adherence to cooperation’s sake and should instead engage in international norms overseas will refract back to international security cooperation only when its behavior in the near seas. With that in mind, China can make a meaningful contribution to U.S. Chinese cooperation in distant seas or the Arctic national interests. In that context, the United States may be a good thing in and of itself but is unlikely and China are likely to find that it will be easier to suffice as a strategy for encouraging similar to cooperate on security matters outside of Asia, behavior in East Asia. where the competitive elements of the relationship are less acute. For instance, joint capacity-building In terms of particular cooperative activities, and operations to combat rising piracy in the congressional restrictions will prevent the United Gulf of Guinea hold more promise than similar States and China from collaborating at higher levels of the conflict spectrum, even as the PLA 48 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

grows more capable of doing so. This will continue better understanding of China’s intentions and to limit cooperation mostly to softer, nontradi- activities will be increasingly necessary as the PLA tional missions such as humanitarian assistance and the U.S. military find themselves operating and disaster relief, search and rescue, military in similar places. That said, significant legal and medicine, pandemic control, and counterpiracy.210 political constraints will remain. In this context, Taking into consideration critical political and the United States should focus on crisis manage- operational hazards, the United States should ment and improving the quality of dialogue on key explore potential opportunities to cooperate areas of competition, as well as finding potential with the PLA on counterterrorism or stability opportunities for cooperation on softer security operations. issues and the possible provision of global public goods. Nonproliferation and arms control may also be an issue area where the countries can do more together in ways that would be acceptable and Taken together, a more global and advantageous to both sides. As the PLA’s capabili- ties improve and its presence is felt more widely activist China will open up new around the world, China could come under increasing international pressure to join arms opportunities for the United States control regimes. Similarly, as China’s overseas and China to deepen security security interests continue to expand, Beijing may see greater value in limiting the proliferation of cooperation, particularly on dangerous weapons and materials. This could lead to opportunities for the United States and China to nontraditional security threats. A cooperate on existing arrangements, for instance better understanding of China’s if Beijing decided to join the Proliferation Security Initiative. intentions and activities will be Finally, the PLAN is gaining the ability to patrol increasingly necessary as the PLA and protect critical SLOCs. This is likely to occur first in East Asia and then in the Indian Ocean and the U.S. military find themselves covering key transit routes from East Africa and the Persian Gulf. For purposes of transparency and operating in similar places. coordination, the United States should encourage China to expand its maritime contributions within multilateral frameworks. The United States should explore holding discussions with partners from the Gulf of Aden anti-piracy patrols, for example dur- ing ongoing Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings in Bahrain, to consider how those operations might be more closely integrated and broadened in scope and geography farther into the Indian Ocean.

Taken together, a more global and activist China will open up new opportunities for the United States and China to deepen security cooperation, particularly on nontraditional security threats. A | 49 PART 2B SHAPING: BUILDING THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORDER MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

Shaping: Building the International the South China Sea and into the IOR with which Security Order the United States could improve its own situational To best manage the effects of increasing Chinese awareness, as well as that of its allies and partners. international security activism, the United States should proactively support a rules-based regional and international security order. To this end, Geopolitics abhors a vacuum. the United States should step up efforts in three As the PLA develops more domains: increasing U.S. military access and presence in areas where the PLA is most likely to sophisticated force projection operate away from China’s shores; sustaining and deepening U.S. security cooperation with key allies capabilities and maintains greater and partners; and supporting the development of military presence overseas, the more capable and effective regional and multilat- eral institutions. We address each of these in turn. United States should accelerate INCREASING U.S. MILITARY ACCESS AND and expand existing efforts to PRESENCE IN LIKELY AREAS OF PLA ACTIVISM Geopolitics abhors a vacuum. As the PLA develops develop additional and more more sophisticated force projection capabilities and maintains greater military presence overseas, the widely distributed access and United States should accelerate and expand exist- presence arrangements. ing efforts to develop additional and more widely PART 2B distributed access and presence arrangements. This should include deepening cooperation with Furthermore, both as a deterrent in peacetime and SHAPING: BUILDING THE INTERNATIONAL countries in Southeast Asia and along sea lanes a means of escalation control in the event of crisis that will see the projection of Chinese naval power, or war, the ability of the United States to oper- SECURITY ORDER particularly in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). ate out of multiple, diverse locations throughout This will permit the United States to capitalize Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Persian Gulf on opportunities for cooperation while manag- will help to reduce the effectiveness and attrac- ing potential instabilities posed by more frequent tiveness to Beijing of coercion and aggression. overseas Chinese military activities. Additional transit points for naval combatant vessels and U.S. bomber and fighter aircraft would The strategic and operational advantages of a more also augment the ability of the United States to diversified force presence are many. Greater dis- amplify the signaling and deterrent power of its persal of U.S. forces can provide wider reach into military presence, as well as to disperse in the Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, regions that event that China’s precision-guided weapons st are emerging as convergence points in 21 -century decrease the attractiveness of massing forces in 211 geopolitics and international economics. With few locations, particularly in Northeast Asia. With the East and South China Seas remaining danger- forward-deployed troops and pre-positioned equip- ous flashpoints in the region, new arrangements for ment, the United States would also have surge U.S. access and presence would permit the United capacity in ways that significantly enable U.S. States to respond more rapidly to possible crises power projection.212 Taken together, these effects and conflicts over disputed territories and resource of a more diversified U.S. military presence would exploitation. Such arrangements could also provide contribute to the overarching U.S. goal of prevent- more frequent and better-quality intelligence, sur- ing regional conflicts. This can be done, in part, veillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in through a “places not bases” approach in which | 51 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

the United States seeks access agreements to local agreements, which had the advantages of being less military and commercial facilities. expensive, less vulnerable in aggregate to local or long-range attack, and more politically viable and In addition to deterring Chinese coercion against versatile.216 allies and partners, a more dispersed U.S. presence throughout the Indian Ocean region would help Today, the United States is pursuing a similar to address potential challenges by China to the strategy in East Asia, albeit in response to a dif- global commons. The United States has a substan- ferent set of security challenges. In the context of tial interest in protecting increasingly important China’s growing anti-access capabilities, which sea lanes, which serve as the lifeblood of global have increased the vulnerability of U.S. bases in commerce. As a subset of this, American forward- the Asia Pacific, particularly in Japan, the Obama deployed naval forces help to ensure that potential administration has sought to develop a military choke points, notably the Straits of Malacca and presence in the region that is “more geographically Hormuz and critical sea lanes in the East and distributed, operationally resilient and politically South China Seas, remain open to maritime traf- sustainable.”217 U.S. policymakers have begun fic. Enhanced U.S. military presence throughout operationalizing this strategy by securing new the Indo-Asia-Pacific region will allow the United presence agreements in Australia, the Philippines, States to continue making substantial contribu- and Singapore, while continuing to explore addi- tions to the maintenance of stability, free trade, tional opportunities for enhanced training and and open access to the global commons.213 These access in Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, locations could also provide opportunities for and elsewhere. sea control over critical choke points if necessary, thereby providing further deterrent power over The United States should extend this approach a China that will remain dependent on overseas to key regions where the PLAN is expanding its energy and resources. presence and where the effects of China’s over- seas military activities will be most pronounced. Finally, U.S. overseas military presence also pro- Although Obama administration officials have vides critical opportunities for building partner addressed this as an aspirational goal, it should capacity and enhancing interoperability with allies receive renewed focus in the face of China’s and partners, which can be called upon to supple- increasing global security role.218 Outside of East ment or in some instances replace operational roles Asia, particular attention should be paid to the of the U.S. military.214 Here the U.S. Army could Indian Ocean region, where China has been deep- draw on its strengths in languages, cultural knowl- ening its partnerships with littoral countries as edge, and partner engagement and training to play part of its nascent “Maritime Silk Road.”219 a useful role in the Asia-Pacific rebalance even as the Air Force and Navy bear greater responsibility A number of island locations could support a for high-end operational capabilities. distributed and episodic U.S. presence throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific. U.S. officials should explore This approach is consistent with U.S. defense the financial viability, political sustainability, and strategy over the last decade.215 The George W. military utility of several candidate sites, including Bush administration sought a more diversified Australia’s Cocos Islands and Christmas Island; overseas U.S. military presence in response to the India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands; Britain’s uncertainties associated with efforts to combat and Diego Garcia (where the U.S. Navy and Air Force disrupt transnational terrorist networks. The 2004 already operate facilities, but more could be done); Global Defense Posture Review described a strat- and the Maldives, Seychelles, and Comoros, where egy of eschewing the establishment of new major France maintains a small military presence. In the operating bases in favor of smaller rotational access Western Pacific, the United States should explore 52 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

further access and facilities development in what As a result, U.S. officials will have to determine Chinese strategists term the second island chain, which security partnerships will require additional including in the U.S. Northern Marianas (beyond attention and resources, especially those that are Guam), various Japanese islands, and Palau. indispensable but potentially at risk from being undermined by China. Given the importance Additional comprehensive access agreements of America’s alliance architecture in the region, and mega-bases of the traditional variety may be special attention should be given to ensuring that neither forthcoming nor even desirable from a closer ties with China do not significantly compro- political or financial perspective. The key will be mise Washington’s alliances. This is particularly to bolster existing key nodes such as Guam and true insofar as Chinese scholars have articulated Diego Garcia, supported by an evolving portfolio a strategy of seeking to strengthen ties with U.S. of additional locations to supplement logistics, allies such as South Korea, Thailand, and Australia training, and operations; and to augment capacity with the explicit intent of weakening America’s and disperse vulnerable assets during tensions or alliance architecture.224 crisis.220

Guam and Diego Garcia themselves would benefit from several improvements. Guam could profit in ... Washington will, in particular from increased military aviation plat- some instances, have to forms, facilities, and support resources.221 Further improvements in Guam’s civilian infrastructure work harder to sustain and power generation would better support the influx of Japanese personnel training there and of its relationships with U.S. personnel and their families associated with recent increases in platforms based there, includ- governments that may regard ing the pending home-porting of an additional – or come to regard – China nuclear-powered attack submarine.222 Pier enlarge- ment and facilities upgrades to improve electrical as an alternative or more capacity, sewage treatment, and water supply could enable Diego Garcia to support additional Indian attractive source of arms, 223 Ocean operations. assistance, and even the SUSTAINING AND DEEPENING SECURITY COOPERATION WITH KEY ALLIES AND PARTNERS provision of regional security. China increasingly has both the political will and the military capability to serve as an important security partner for countries not only in Asia, but Previous CNAS research has underscored that a outside the region as well. Although this does not strategy of enhancing the political sustainabil- inherently create competitive dynamics with the ity of U.S. defense relationships needs to create United States, Washington will, in some instances, an affirmative rationale for security cooperation have to work harder to sustain its relationships with the United States combined with actions with governments that may regard – or come to that insulate that cooperation from any number 225 regard – China as an alternative or more attractive of potential political challenges. These include source of arms, assistance, and even the provision those associated with political liberalization and of regional security. regime turnover, external pressure, accidents and incidents, and changes in the regional secu- rity environment. U.S. policymakers should not | 53 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

assume that this kind of shared sense of purpose industrial base amid austerity and maintain influ- is well-developed between the United States and ence and security partnerships amid rising Chinese its allies. This is true even where countries have competition, Washington will have to weigh com- a shared history and common values with the peting objectives in a fashion that other leading United States and even where public support for arms producers have long had to do and in at least the alliance is strong. To manage potential percep- some cases will need to reduce restrictions on U.S. tion gaps, the United States should establish or defense contractors’ foreign sales. This is particu- institutionalize, as it already has with certain close larly the case with such systems as UAVs, where partners, dialogues to address China-related issues. China may be on the cusp of benefiting tremen- dously from U.S. self-restriction.227 Washington Of course, China’s increased international activism can shore up its influence with important security has implications beyond U.S. treaty allies. There partners without necessarily releasing top-level is an important subset of countries that deserve technology. particular U.S. attention given their strategic importance to managing the expansion of Chinese Meanwhile, it is critical to ensure that U.S. policy- defense activities, including India, Indonesia, making, negotiations, and engagement on security Malaysia, Myanmar, and Vietnam in South and cooperation are done within the broader context Southeast Asia and key littoral East African states of bilateral relations. The deepening of security including Kenya, Mauritius, Madagascar, and ties in these countries will be closely connected to Comoros. The United States should also aim to political relationships insofar as both are derivative deepen its engagement on China-related issues of and feed back into the overall health of bilateral with countries that are expanding their security ties. Security cooperation should not be viewed cooperation with Beijing and may consider host- in strictly military terms and should be designed ing PLA forces, including Djibouti, Pakistan, within the context of active diplomacy and alli- and the Seychelles.226 The goal throughout these ance management.228 Security cooperation, when engagements should be to enhance U.S. partner- appropriate, should therefore occur outside of ships and gain greater situational awareness, not narrow military-to-military realms. Joint bilateral to undermine China’s relationships with these dialogues with State Department and Department countries, which would be both difficult and of Defense officials drive policy coordination in counterproductive. Washington and ensure that both military and political interests are represented from partner As the United States deepens its security part- countries. nerships throughout the Indian Ocean region, the potential for China to serve as an alterna- Finally, security cooperation should also be tive security partner should shape the degree to developed in concert with broader engagement which governance or human rights concerns, in strategies that include robust economic initia- Myanmar or Thailand, for example, constrain the tives. For the long-term sustainability of U.S. scope and pace of U.S. defense cooperation. U.S. partnerships, it is critical to take actions that disengagement will have less influence and be more undermine the oft-heard notion of the dichotomy detrimental in cases in which China, or perhaps of the United States as the vital security provider another country such as India, could backfill the and China as the leading economic partner. This security role of the United States. heightens the degree to which countries may see a contradiction between their security cooperation The United States will also have to re-examine the with the United States and their broader economic costs and benefits of its export control policies as interests. China emerges as an alternative supplier of higher- end capabilities. To preserve the U.S. defense 54 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

Marrying defense initiatives with economic been a driving rationale for greater U.S. engage- endeavors can alleviate these concerns and instead ment with regional institutions in Southeast Asia. build an alternative narrative that security and The inclusiveness of the ASEAN Regional Forum economics are complementary. Initiatives such (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and free-trade Plus (ADMM+) sends important signals that the activities more broadly, should therefore be treated door is open for a China willing to contribute to as strategic opportunities to enhance U.S. and a rules-based system. If U.S. forces are support- regional security. ing these regional initiatives, it can also reduce the effectiveness of accusations from Beijing that ADVANCING REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL the United States is seeking to contain China and COOPERATION that countries should therefore limit their security U.S. cooperation with allies and partners to build cooperation with the United States. Furthermore, a more robust regional and international order can as the United States participates in multilateral help to establish the rules, norms, and institutions discussions and activities, it is critical to continue in which China’s increasing activism occurs. This contributing to areas clearly outside the domain will only go so far in shaping Chinese behavior, but of geopolitics. Most regional states will grow wary it can help set the diplomatic context such that a of U.S. engagement if they perceive it as focused broader collective of states can recognize and react primarily on potentially sensitive and contentious to potentially destabilizing behavior. Multilateral issues related to China’s rise. institutions can also create opportunities for U.S.-China cooperation and China’s integration The value of consistent engagement cannot be into cooperative activities that might not occur overstated, particularly in the context of growing otherwise. perceptions abroad of U.S. retrenchment, defense cuts, partisanship in Washington, and war fatigue In addition to providing a forum for regional states among the American people. U.S. officials should to bind together to balance China’s hefty influ- therefore commit, whenever possible, to a reliable ence, regional institutions can also work to prevent engagement calendar if they expect partner gov- disputes by moving burgeoning crises – over mari- ernments to make costly and at times politically time rights and resource competition, for instance risky decisions to deepen security cooperation with – from the military domain to one of legal and the United States. U.S. officials should articulate a diplomatic wrangling. These institutions also pro- baseline set of activities in key regions in which the vide forums to manage U.S.-China competition. By United States will participate at appropriate levels creating a diplomatic cushion between the United regardless of political parties and election cycles States and China, regional institutions can attract in the United States. Examples in Asia include both sides to engage in discussions and activities U.S. secretary of defense attendance at the annual that might be more difficult if one capital or the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore and the bien- other were perceived as being the primary leader nial ADMM+ ministerial, as well as high-level or beneficiary of the effort. Multilateral institu- participation in the ARF, East Asia Summit, Pacific tions also provide safe diplomatic platforms for Islands Forum, and Arctic Council. countries to cooperate with the United States when governments might be reluctant to participate in As the United States seeks to support the con- similar activities on a purely bilateral basis. struction of a rules-based regional order in Asia and beyond, it is incumbent upon allies and Multilateral institutions can also create avenues partners to participate and at times lead in this to weave China more closely into the regional process. Partners such as Singapore and India, security architecture, building habits of coopera- as well as allies such as Australia and in Europe, tion and reinforcing norms of behavior. This has | 55 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

The United States should advance cooperation with leading regional institutions

ARCTIC COUNCIL

SCO

SAARC

ASEAN IORA EAC

PIF

ASEAN IORA SAARC ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHWEST ASIAN NATIONS INDIAN OCEAN RIM ASSOCIATION SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Australia, Bangladesh, Comoros, India, Indonesia, COOPERATION Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, Maldives, Nepal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Pakistan, Sri Lanka United Arab Emirates, Yemen ARCTIC COUNCIL Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, PIF SCO Russia, Sweden, United States PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall China, Kazakhstan, Kygyzstan, Russia, Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan EAC Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu 56 | Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

have regional influence that extends well beyond trafficking in persons, illicit arms, and narcotics.229 aggregate population or military power. The ability The United States should consider working with to strengthen norms and institutions is often more allies and partners to build a COP in Southeast about political will and legitimacy than defense Asia as a template for similar information-sharing budgets and military forces. U.S. allies and part- regimes in other key maritime regions, including ners also have distinct comparative advantages the Indian Ocean and the Arctic. that can be leveraged, such as European experience running regional institutions. As the United States seeks to Over the last several years, the United States has significantly deepened its engagement with deepen its engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN-centered institutions and meetings. This has generated critical opportu- regional institutions in Southeast nities for regional discussions and produced Asia and beyond, a particular unprecedented forms of regional security coop- eration, particularly in the ADMM+ mechanism. focus for multilateral cooperation As China’s military reach extends, so too should U.S. efforts to strengthen the role and legitimacy should be the development of of regional institutions beyond East Asia. The counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, the multilateral maritime domain Proliferation Security Initiative, the South Asian awareness architectures, also Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (formerly known as common operating known as the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation), which the United States pictures (COPs). joined as a Dialogue Partner in 2013, all provide existing institutional mechanisms that can be bol- stered to address emerging regional security issues As China’s overseas military presence increases, associated with the rise of China. In this context, the United States should also pursue multilat- U.S. policy toward a variety of multilateral institu- eral measures to reduce the likelihood that crises tions, including the Arctic Council and the Pacific between China and U.S. allies and partners occur Islands Forum, should also be closely integrated because of accidents, incidents, or miscalculation. with U.S. strategy toward China. Minimizing the probability of entrapment and unwanted conflict puts a priority on risk reduction As the United States seeks to deepen its engage- mechanisms between China and other regional ment with regional institutions in Southeast Asia militaries. The United States can contribute to the and beyond, a particular focus for multilateral development of multilateral confidence-building cooperation should be the development of multi- measures such as crisis hotlines and incidents- lateral maritime domain awareness architectures, at-sea agreements by expanding the November also known as common operating pictures (COPs). 2014 U.S.-China CBMs and the April 2014 CUES Shared and public maritime ISR can serve sev- agreement.230 eral U.S. and regional interests simultaneously, including helping to deter aggression; increase With Beijing continuing to drag its feet on the interoperability; build partner capacity; and China-ASEAN Code of Conduct (CoC), the United contribute to combating nontraditional security States should find alternative means to develop threats such as natural disasters, illegal fishing, and rules of the road for the South China Sea. Options | 57 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

include developing a similar code with a smaller United States should at least seek dialogues with grouping of willing countries or working with these organizations to build some degree of institu- ASEAN on an “early harvest” of the CoC in which tional engagement. countries in the region could identify and immedi- ately implement specific initiatives for which there was strong consensus. Finally, the United States should Although Washington should work to advance also watch carefully China’s open and inclusive institutions, the United States should not permit China to undermine efforts to strengthen and establish the development of liberal institutions that sup- port America’s economic and political aims. multilateral institutions that exclude Rather than deferring to global agreements, this the United States. The United will mean at times building coalitions of like- minded countries to advance multilateral efforts States should seek to engage these in areas as diverse as trade, climate, and cyber. U.S. officials should not succumb to the oft-cited organizations in some capacity, to but misguided notion that major transnational better understand their activities issues cannot be managed without Sino-American cooperation, which implicitly gives Beijing a veto and help to shape their agendas and on U.S. initiatives. In fact, China has often shown a greater willingness to cooperate precisely when rule-making. Specifically, the United the United States has demonstrated the ability to move forward without Beijing. The Trans-Pacific States should seek observer status at Partnership is an excellent example of how a the SCO. “minilateral” approach is more likely to succeed than a broad-based global agreement, including in ways that remain open to eventual Chinese participation.

Finally, the United States should also watch carefully China’s efforts to strengthen and estab- lish multilateral institutions that exclude the United States, including the BRICS mechanism, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Mechanisms in Asia (CICA), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the SCO, as well as the more general push by China for a regional security architecture that emphasizes “Asia for Asians.”231 The United States should seek to engage these organizations in some capacity, to better understand their activities and help to shape their agendas and rule-making. Specifically, the United States should seek observer status at the SCO. Where U.S. membership or even observer status is either not possible or not desirable, the 58 | Finally, the United States should also watch carefully China’s efforts to strengthen and establish multilateral institutions that exclude the United States. The United States should seek to engage these organizations in some capacity, to better understand their activities and help to shape their agendas and rule-making. Specifically, the United States should seek observer status at Part 2C the SCO. BALANCING: THE MILITARY CHALLENGE MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

Balancing: The Military Challenge region in order to limit damage from these capabil- Greater Chinese activism in international security ities and impose costs on the PRC; and third, help affairs will generate a variety of political quanda- allies and partners develop effective counterinter- ries for the United States, but at its core it will also vention capabilities and strategies – in other words, be a significant military development in Asia and to possess independent deterrent capabilities that beyond. And even as this more active PLA provides include, if possible, indigenous A2/AD envelopes opportunities for collaboration in addressing prob- to hamper the PRC’s ability and desire to project lems of mutual concern, it will also pose potential military power in coercive or destabilizing fashion. challenges to the interests of the United States and its partners. Somewhat paradoxically, maintaining a favor- able or at least competitive military balance in the The PLA is still several decades away, at best, from Western Pacific will be the most crucial element being able to fight a major war outside the Asia- to limit the potentially destabilizing effects of the Pacific region, much less against the United States. PLA’s expanding partnerships and power projec- But this does not mean that greater Chinese force tion capabilities. This is where the PRC is focusing projection capabilities, however limited, will not be its efforts and the United States should do what able to undermine U.S. interests globally or con- it can to keep it that way. Despite China’s grow- front U.S. forces closer to China. China is already ing capacity for extraregional power projection, “showing the flag” in areas beyond its traditional attaining military superiority in maritime Asia horizon in the Western Pacific and, over time, appears to be the PLA’s primary aim in the foresee- will be able to use force more effectively in these able future.233 China’s military modernization will regions. Greater overseas presence and capabil- likely remain principally focused on Taiwan and ity will present Beijing with a widening array of other disputed areas within the first island chain options for using its newfound power in ways that and subsequently, over the medium term, outward are inimical to the United States and the values to the second island chain.234 it seeks to promote, including coercion against weaker countries, collaboration with potential U.S. To the extent that the PRC is able to secure mili- adversaries, and disruptive measures in the global tary dominance in these zones, it will represent a commons. And in the event of conflict between the dramatic change in the strategic landscape of the United States and the PRC, China will also have Asia-Pacific and set the stage for the PLA to turn the ability to hold at risk more U.S. interests than a greater proportion of its efforts and resources has historically been the case. toward improving its capabilities for effective power projection beyond the region. Doing so This raises the question of how the United States would enable China to field greater capacity for should adapt its defense strategy and posture extraregional power projection more quickly, ren- to respond to a China that has greater will and der it able to deploy to a broader set of regions, and capability to use its military farther from China’s enable it to operate across a greater set of domains. shores. At the most general level, the United States Moreover, these forces would be less constrained and its allies and partners will want military capa- operationally, as greater Chinese presence and bilities to dissuade, deter, and defeat any plausible influence over key access routes in the South China scenario involving a military challenge by China Sea and the first and second island chains would 232 in the Western Pacific. More specifically, the facilitate PLA power projection.235 These factors, in United States should pursue three goals simultane- turn, would create more opportunities for China to ously: First, strive to maintain a favorable balance assert itself beyond the Western Pacific and jeopar- of power in the Western Pacific; second, ensure the dize a wider array of U.S. interests. ability to hold Chinese assets at risk outside of the

60 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

Therefore, even as the United States and its allies rests upon the ability to deploy a military that can and partners must take due account of the military project power effectively and ultimately decisively challenges posed by a more globally active PLA, around the globe. This ability in turn is predicated it nonetheless still makes sense for Washington on the United States’ fielding a military able to to concentrate on maintaining key advantages best any challenger in areas of particular con- over Chinese military power at its leading edge in cern to Washington, including East Asia.239 But the Western Pacific. In addition to preventing the Washington’s satisfaction of these criteria is under creation of a zone of Chinese military dominance, increasing pressure from China’s development of with all its strategic ramifications, successfully an increasingly formidable A2/AD system and doing so will tend to localize and confine the its growing capacity to project force within the impact of China’s growing military power. If the Western Pacific. In fact, in the coming decades it is PLA cannot effectively project and sustain its very likely that the military balance in the Western military forces into the Western Pacific, any opera- Pacific between the United States and China will tions beyond that area will ultimately be of limited be considerably more competitive than it is today. effect.236 Note that this is an additional argument against pursuing strategies of “offshore balancing” In response, the United States should focus on and “offshore control” that cede the near seas to developing new doctrine and strategies designed China.237 to gain access, conduct suppressive strikes, and ensure freedom of military action against an opponent, particularly a highly capable adversary such as China.240 Accordingly, the Department If the PLA cannot effectively project of Defense and other relevant elements of the and sustain its military forces into U.S. government, including Congress, need to sustain and redouble their focus on adapting the the Western Pacific, any operations U.S. military to prepare for operations against highly capable adversaries, including the PRC.241 beyond that area will ultimately Although it is beyond the scope of this report be of limited effect. Note that this to recommend specific programs and systems, candidate focus areas should include developing is an additional argument against and maintaining U.S. and allied advantages in C4ISR, including electromagnetic and cyberwar- pursuing strategies of “offshore fare; extending U.S. and allied supremacy in the undersea domain; maintaining the ability to strike balancing” and “offshore control” effectively against defended targets with long-range that cede the near seas to China. anti-ship, air-to-air, and anti-surface missiles; hardening select U.S. facilities; and developing more advanced missile defenses.242

The problem, however, is that achieving the goal These efforts should be coordinated with of effectively deterring and, if necessary, defeat- nascent initiatives at the Pentagon to design a st ing the PLA in East Asia will not be easy due to “new offset” strategy for the 21 century. Such its growing professionalism and technological an approach is geared, as former Secretary of sophistication, China’s increasingly cutting-edge Defense Chuck Hagel has said, to develop “game- changing” technologies and wed them with defense industrial base, and the PRC’s expand- 243 ing pool of resources available to invest in its new operational concepts. Particularly ripe military.238 Long-standing U.S. national strategy areas of focus include directed-energy weapons, | 61 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

robotics, miniaturization, big data, and advanced designed to help penetrate China’s formidable A2/ manufacturing.244 AD umbrella in the Western Pacific and to identify and strike at key targets will also likely be read- At the same time, the United States should ily available for use against Chinese extraregional directly address the PLA’s growing capability for power projection assets or the capabilities designed extraregional power projection as a subsidiary to support them. This is particularly so because in but important objective, since such capabilities both cases the arena of Sino-American military could be used to considerable effect in the event of competition will primarily take place in the mari- conflict. For instance, long-range nuclear-powered time, aerospace, and cyberspace/electromagnetic attack submarines (which China is currently build- domains rather than in that of land warfare. Just ing) could be used in a “commerce raider” effort to as the United States’ primary strategic concern in harass and reduce U.S. supply efforts. Such efforts East Asia will be the PLA’s ability to project power have generated benefits well above their costs in the into the Western Pacific, so too its leading concern past, for example in the Civil War and both world 245 beyond that immediate region will be China’s abil- wars. ity to project power into the Indian Ocean, and to Moreover, the mere presence of the PLA, even if a lesser degree in the Arctic and the South Pacific. not capable of conducting major war, could have Conversely, the United States will be less directly strategic effects on U.S. behavior during crises and concerned about China’s ability to act across its 247 conflicts. The presence of the Soviet navy in the land borders, for instance into Central Asia. Mediterranean, including repeated surge deploy- ments of ships and aircraft during regional crises Just as the United States’ primary such as the 1967 Six-Day War and 1973 October War, complicated U.S. policymakers’ calculations strategic concern in East Asia and raised the possibility of escalation.246 Even where China is not party to a conflict, PLA pres- will be the PLA’s ability to project ence beyond the Western Pacific could raise similar quandaries during contingencies outside of Asia, power into the Western Pacific, so such as in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. too its leading concern beyond that Going forward, the Pentagon should therefore assess the effects of potentially destabilizing active immediate region will be China’s and passive PLA presence in its war games and plans outside the Asian theater. ability to project power into the

Finally, the United States must also plan for the Indian Ocean, and to a lesser possibility that its efforts to maintain a favorable military balance in the Western Pacific will prove degree in the Arctic and the South insufficient and thus that the arena for military Pacific. competition will shift increasingly beyond the near seas. Should this undesirable eventuality come to pass, the United States cannot afford to have This defense effort should not be unilateral on neglected preparing for it in advance. the part of the United States. Rather, the United States should seek to enlist the cooperation and Fortunately, the capabilities needed to compete in assistance of its allies and partners in raising the the Western Pacific are not mutually exclusive of costs and risks to China of behavior hostile to U.S. those required for dealing with an extraregion- and allied interests. In particular, U.S. defense ally deploying PLA. U.S. and allied capabilities cooperation geared to respond to China’s military 62 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

modernization and expansion could profitably zones where it is expected that the PLA will be able take the form of encouraging states to adopt their to operate should increasingly focus on promot- own defensive A2/AD capabilities to deter China’s ing these states’ abilities to field capable A2/AD ability to project power in destabilizing ways, both networks. As Jim Thomas and Evan Montgomery within and outside the Western Pacific region – have argued, where possible, Washington should what has been termed a “hedgehog” or “porcupine” “encourage and enable its allies and partners to approach.248 This is attractive for a number of field serious military capabilities that will allow reasons. First, A2/AD is clearly a promising focus them to assert their sovereignty over territorial of military investment.249 An A2/AD capability can waters, land borders, and airspace, limiting China’s significantly raise the costs and risks of projecting ability to project power beyond its immediate power into the network’s zone and usually does so periphery.”250 In concrete terms, the United States in a cost-favorable way. should pursue this effort through a variety of direct and indirect avenues, including arms sales, train- Second, U.S. allies and partners may be less willing ing, defense industrial cooperation, and strategic or able to take on the difficult mission of strikes engagement, as well as through more shaping ini- against defended Chinese targets. Doing so would tiatives designed to facilitate collaboration among be too contentious politically and too demand- allies and partners. ing in terms of military requirements. Focusing their efforts on strategies of defense, delay, and Needless to say, this cooperation will have to be interruption, particularly in their own environs, tailored to reflect the intensity of the partners’ is therefore more realistic both from political and threat perception, their extant capacity, and the capability perspectives. In addition, such concen- degree to which it is politically viable for them to tration would enable specialization in these roles, engage in these activities with the United States. likely generating superior capabilities to what Nonetheless, the United States can help provide for would be produced if these states were to invest direct defense of their sovereign terrestrial, mari- their resources with less focus. time, and aerial space, for instance through the sale of sufficiently capable anti-ship, anti-air, and Last, but by no means least, enlisting the aid of counterinvasion weapons and their associated bat- allies and partners to deter and stem Chinese tle management and integration systems. Key areas coercion can relieve the United States of some of for consideration include short-range air defenses, the political and military burden of defending missile defense, unmanned aerial vehicles, naval them while simultaneously strengthening the cred- mines, mobile launchers, anti-ship cruise missiles, ibility of the deterrent. Armed with effective A2/ and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.251 AD capabilities of their own, many regional states will be able to handle lower-level Chinese provoca- Theater campaign plans and their associated tions without needing recourse to direct American exercises should be revised in part to reflect these involvement (even if that involvement remains capacity-building priorities. As part of this, a an implicit threat and thus a deterrent to Chinese more integrated theater-level approach should be escalation). In this way, the United States can avoid developed to outline the division of labor between being cast as the principal protagonist in every act the services. Although the Asia theater is largely of Chinese belligerence. It is not in America’s stra- considered an air and naval domain, U.S. ground tegic interest to have Chinese provocations against forces can contribute to these efforts through third parties invariably be a test of U.S. credibility training and working with U.S. allied and partner and commitment. militaries, particularly to improve their capacity for defense of their territory.252 Accordingly, U.S. defense engagement with its allies and partners in the Western Pacific and in | 63 Conclusion SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

CONCLUSION: SUMMARY protection. When possible, this cooperation RECOMMENDATIONS should be embedded in multilateral mechanisms.

A principal goal of this report is to underscore that U.S.-China security engagements should focus profound changes are underway in Chinese foreign on operational safety and crisis management policy that portend greater willingness and ability mechanisms, including the implementation and to engage in international security affairs in the 21st expansion of existing CBMs. century. The key trends cited in the report – loos- • U.S. officials should consider ways to test China’s ening of the noninterference principle, deepening willingness to use hotlines through unan- security partnerships, and increasing force pro- nounced calls during peacetime or through other jection capabilities – together call for the United nonprovocative means. States to widen the aperture of its hedging policy to seize the benefits and manage potential instabili- • Additional annexes to existing CBMs should ties associated with a more active China. In this include an aerial counterpart to the maritime context, we offer the following key insights and rules of the road. Rules of engagement in unex- recommendations for U.S. policy. pected encounters should also be expanded to include coast guard and other government- The U.S.-China relationship is relatively well-insti- controlled platforms, not just military vessels. tutionalized to engage on the broader set of issues And the United States should continue pressing that are likely to accompany a more active Chinese for reciprocal notification of ballistic missile foreign policy. launches. • There is no pressing need for new major dia- To help build a more stable security environment Conclusion logues or additional leader-level mechanisms. in which China’s security activism occurs, the The United States can use existing mechanisms United States should increase U.S. military access SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS to communicate its political will, intentions, and presence in areas where the PLA is most likely and capabilities, as well as glean a better under- to operate away from China’s shores. standing of Chinese civilian leaders’ policy goals • Pursuing an approach of “places not bases,” the and the PLA’s force projection doctrine, train- United States should accelerate existing efforts to ing, plans, and capabilities. In addition to more develop additional and more widely distributed substantive interagency dialogues and greater access and presence arrangements. This should lower-level contacts, Washington should pursue include deepening cooperation with countries in more minilateral arrangements, including a U.S.- Southeast Asia and along sea lanes that will see China-India trilateral dialogue. the projection of Chinese naval power. In par- As China gains additional experience and capacity, ticular, U.S. officials should explore the financial opportunities for collective problem-solving may viability, political sustainability, and military increase, particularly on transnational issues such utility of establishing or expanding U.S. military as piracy, illegal fishing, human trafficking, and use of several candidate sites in the Indian Ocean drug smuggling, and nontraditional threats such as region, including Australia’s Cocos Islands and natural disasters and humanitarian crises. Christmas Island; India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands; Britain’s Diego Garcia; and the Maldives, • Taking into consideration critical political and the Seychelles, and Comoros. operational hazards, the United States should As China is increasingly able to serve as an alter- explore opportunities to cooperate with the native supplier of arms, assistance, and regional PLA on counterterrorism, stability operations, security, the United States will have to do more to nonproliferation and arms control, and SLOC sustain and deepen its security cooperation with | 65 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

key allies and emerging partners. • Particular focus and resources should be devoted to the development of multilateral maritime • Special attention should be given to nurtur- domain awareness architectures, also known as ing ties with U.S. treaty allies. There is also common operating pictures (COPs). The United an important subset of countries that deserve States should first work with allies and partners particular U.S. focus given their strategic impor- to build a COP in Southeast Asia as a template tance to managing the expansion of Chinese for similar information-sharing regimes in other defense activities, including India, Indonesia, key maritime regions, including the Indian Malaysia, Myanmar, and Vietnam in South and Ocean. Southeast Asia and key littoral East African states including Kenya, Mauritius, Madagascar, • The United States should also pursue multilat- and Comoros. The United States should also eral confidence-building measures to reduce the aim to deepen its engagement on China-related likelihood of crises between China and U.S. allies issues with countries that may consider hosting and partners. To this end, Washington should PLA forces, including Djibouti, Pakistan, and the consider multilateralizing components of the Seychelles. November 2014 U.S.-China CBMs to key coun- tries in Southeast Asia, including notification of • To help strengthen ties with these key countries, exercises and the maritime code of conduct, so the United States should institutionalize dia- that similar mechanisms are in place between logues to address China-related issues or at the China and other regional countries. very least ensure that China is addressed suf- ficiently in existing diplomatic channels. When • While still supporting the China-ASEAN Code possible, this diplomacy should include officials of Conduct process, the United States should also from both the State Department and Department pursue additional means to develop rules of the of Defense. Security cooperation should also road for the South China Sea. Options include be developed in concert with broader engage- developing a similar code with a smaller group- ment strategies that include robust economic ing of willing countries or working with ASEAN initiatives. on an “early harvest” of the CoC in which coun- tries in the region could move more quickly on • Furthermore, as China emerges as an alternative specific widely accepted initiatives that could be supplier of higher-end military capabilities, the implemented immediately. United States should re-examine the costs and benefits of its arms export control policies. • The United States should seek ways to engage with Chinese-led institutions that otherwise To establish the rules, norms, and institutions exclude the United States, including the BRICS around which China’s international security activ- mechanism, CICA, the AIIB, and the SCO. ism occurs, the United States should seek to build Specifically, the United States should seek more capable and effective multilateral organiza- observer status at the SCO. tions and regional institutions. Maintaining a competitive military balance in the • In addition to continued focus on ASEAN and Western Pacific will be a crucial element to limit- ASEAN-centered institutions, U.S. officials ing the potentially destabilizing effects of the PLA’s should ensure regular, high-level engagement expanding security partnerships and power projec- in the South Asian Association for Regional tion capabilities. Cooperation, the Indian Ocean Rim Association, the Arctic Council, and the Pacific Islands • Although it is beyond this report’s scope to Forum. recommend specific programs and systems,

66 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

candidate focus areas should include developing and maintaining U.S. and allied advantages in C4ISR, including electromagnetic and cyberwar- fare; extending U.S. and allied supremacy in the undersea domain; developing significant offen- sive naval mining capabilities; maintaining the ability to strike effectively against defended tar- gets with weapons such as long-range anti-ship, air-to-air, and anti-surface missiles; developing more advanced missile defenses; and hardening select U.S. facilities. Meanwhile, the United States should directly address the PLA’s growing capability for extra- regional power projection as a subsidiary but important objective.

• This effort will not necessarily require unique capabilities, but the Pentagon should continue taking steps to assess the effects of active and passive PLA presence in its war games and con- tingency plans outside the Asian theater.

This defense approach should be far more than just a U.S. effort.

• U.S. defense cooperation should encourage states to adopt a “hedgehog” or “porcupine” approach to deter and defang Chinese projection of power in destabilizing ways. Key areas meriting consideration include electronic countermea- sures, short-range air defenses, missile defense, unmanned aerial vehicles, naval mines, anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. To this end, theater cam- paign plans and their associated exercises should be revised in part to reflect these capacity-build- ing priorities and a more integrated theater-level approach should be developed to outline the division of labor among services.

| 67 Endnotes MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

ENDNOTES 14. Linda Jakobson, “China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors,” (Lowy Institute for International Policy, December 2013), www.lowyinstitute.org/ 1. Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and publications/chinas-unpredictable-maritime-security-actors; Chin-Hao International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 20-27.. Huang, “China’s Soft Power in East Asia: A Quest for Status and Influence?,” NBR Special Report #42 (The National Bureau of Asian Research, January 2013), 2. Xinhua, “Xi pledges ‘great renewal of Chinese nation,’” Xinhua, November http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/preview/SR42_preview. 29, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-11/29/c_132008231. pdf. htm. 15. Thomas Friedman, “Obama on the World: President Obama Talks to Thomas 3. Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford: Oxford University L. Friedman About Iraq, Putin and Israel,” New York Times, August 8, 2014, Press, 2014), 24-26; Dingding Chen and Jianwei Wang, “Lying Low No http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/opinion/president-obama-thomas- More? China’s New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy,” China: l-friedman-iraq-and-world-affairs.html?_r=0; Shambaugh, China Goes An International Journal, 9 no. 2 (September 2011), http://www.academia. Global: The Partial Power; and Andrew Erickson and Austin Strange, “‘Selfish edu/2846188/Lying_Low_No_More_Chinas_New_Thinking_on_the_Tao_ Superpower’ No Longer? China’s Anti-Piracy Activities and 21st-Century Global Guang_Yang_Hui_Strategy. Maritime Governance,” Harvard Asia Quarterly 14 no. 1/2 (Spring/Summer 2012): 92-102. 4. James Mulvenon, “Chairman Hu and the PLA’s “New Historic Missions,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 27 (January 9, 2009), http://media.hoover.org/ 16. Michael Swaine, “Xi Jinping’s Address to the Central Conference on Work sites/default/files/documents/CLM27JM.pdf. Relating to Foreign Affairs: Assessing and Advancing Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 46, 14 http:// 5. “Xi advocates efforts to boost China’s maritime power,” Xinhua, July 31, carnegieendowment.org/files/Michael_Swaine_CLM_46.pdf. 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-07/31/c_132591246. htm. 17. Most prominently the National Intelligence Council’s quadrennial Global Trends reports. It is within this period that China’s interests and capabilities 6. Jamil Anderlini and Lucy Hornby, “China overtakes US as world’s largest can be assessed with some confidence. goods trader,” Financial Times, January 10, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/ cms/s/0/7c2dbd70-79a6-11e3-b381-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3EoPIWZwd; 18. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s World Bank World Development Indicators database, generated September Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence,” http://www.fmprc. 25, 2014. gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18053.shtml. Endnotes 7. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “Inward 19. Shi Yinhong, “Intervention in International Politics: A U.S. Case [Guoji and Outward Foreign Direct Investment Flows, Annual,” UNCTADStat zhengzhi zhong de duiwai ganyu–jian lun lengzhan hou meiguo de duiwai Database, http://unctadstat.unctad.org, generated March 18, 2015; Nargiza ganyu],” American Studies [Meiguo yanjiu], 1996 No. 4 (Chinese Academy of Salidjanova, “Going Out: An Overview of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Social Sciences, 1996), http://ias.cass.cn/show/show_mgyj.asp?id=461. Investment,” (U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, March 30, 2011), http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/GoingOut.pdf. 20. “Hu Jintao’s Report to the 17th Party Congress,” Xinhua, October 24, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/24/content_6938749.htm. 8. Salidjanova, “Going Out: An Overview of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment”; “China becomes largest source of overseas students,” 21. Jonathan E. Davis, “From Ideology to Pragmatism: China’s Position on Xinhua, August 2, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013- Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era,” Vanderbilt Journal of 08/02/c_125110114.htm Transnational Law, 44 no. 2 (March 2011), 217-281.

9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “The Central 22. “Protecting our Interests While ‘Making a Contribution:’ An Interview Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs Was Held in Beijing,” with Vice Foreign Minister and State Special Envoy Zhai Jun [“Zuo gongxian” November 29, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/ de tongshi weihu liyi: waijiaobu fubuzhang, Zhongguo zhengfu teshi Zhai Jun t1215680.shtml. jieshou benkan caifang],” World Knowledge [Shijie Zhishi] (July 2012), 25.

10. “China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society,” 23. Xi Jinping, “Follow the Trend of the Times and Promote Peace and (World Bank, 2013), 6, http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/ Development in the World,” (Moscow State Institute of International document/China-2030-complete.pdf. Relations, Moscow, March 23, 2013), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1033246.shtml. 11. David C. Gompert, “Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 75. 24. Foreign Minister Wang Yi , “Exploring the Path of Major-Country Diplomacy With Chinese Characteristics,” (Luncheon of the Second World Peace Forum, 12. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “China,” February 4, 2014 http:// Beijing, June 27, 2013), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/ www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ch. wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1053908.shtml.

13. Information Office of the State Council, The People’s Republic of China, 25. Pang Zhongying, “Does China need a new foreign policy?,” (paper The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, (April 2013), http://news. presented at a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute conference xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681_3.htm. on “The Hu Jintao Decade in China’s Foreign and Security Policy (2002-2012):

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103. Jon Brandt et al., “Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the 113. “Chinese warship arrives at Port of Salalah in Oman for replenishment,” Caribbean: Implications for US Foreign Policy” (American University School of Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, press International Service, December 2012), 13. release, October 8, 2014, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Photos/2014-10/08/ content_4542052.htm; Shane McGinley, “China aims to boost military links 104. Brandt et al, “Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean,” with Kuwait,” ArabianBusiness.com, November 28, 2011, http://www. 13. arabianbusiness.com/china-aims-boost-military-links-with-kuwait-432338. html; Mahmoud Habboush, “Middle Kingdom visits Middle East as Chinese 105. “Top ten firsts of Chinese military diplomacy from 2002 to 2012,” People’s navy docks at Port Zayed,” The National, March 25, 2010, http://www. Daily, September 26, 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/7960693. thenational.ae/news/uae-news/middle-kingdom-visits-middle-east-as- html. chinese-navy-docks-at-port-zayed; Daniel J. Kostecka, “Places and Bases: The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean,” 106. General Liang Guanglie, “A Better Future through Security Cooperation: Naval War College Review, 2011 no. 1 (2011), 64, https://www.usnwc.edu/ General Liang Guanglie” (International Institute for Strategic Studies getattachment/0ecf6fde-e49e-485a-b135-c240a22e8a13/Places-and- Shangri-La Dialogue Fourth Plenary Session, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, Bases--The-Chinese-Navy-s-Emerging-Supp; and China’s Navy Extends June 5, 2011), http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/ its Combat Reach to the Indian Ocean, U.S.-China Economic and Security archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2011-4eac/fourth-plenary-session-b880/ Review Commission Staff Report (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review liang-guanglie-e6a2. Commission, March 14, 2014), http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/ Research/Staff%20Report_China%27s%20Navy%20Extends%20its%20 107. Peace Mission is a multilateral exercise conducted with Russia and other Combat%20Reach%20to%20the%20Indian%20Ocean.pdf. SCO members. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (2009), 55, http://www.defense.gov/ 114. Chinese fleet joins others for RIMPAC exercise,” Xinhua, June 14, 2014, pubs/pdfs/china_military_power_report_2009.pdf; and Gordon Arthur, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-06/14/c_133407649.htm. “China confirms CH-4 UCAV in PLA service at ‘Peace Mission 2014’ drill,” IHS Jane’s 360, September 1, 2014, http://www.janes.com/article/42619/ china-confirms-ch-4-ucav-in-pla-service-at-peace-mission-2014-drill. | 73 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

115. Sam LaGrone, “China Invited Back for Future RIMPAC Exercises,” 125. Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan, Saudi Arabia ‘in talks over Al-Khalid MBT, JF-17 USNI News, July 3, 2014, http://news.usni.org/2014/07/02/ deal’,” IHS Jane’s 360, January 27, 2014, http://www.janes.com/article/33148/ china-invited-back-future-rimpac-exercises. pakistan-saudi-arabia-in-talks-over-al-khalid-mbt-jf-17-deal.

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123. Larry Hanauer and Lyle J. Morris, “Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, 134. Wendell Minnick, “China Pushes Into SE Asia Market With Array of Reactions and Implications for U.S. Policy” (RAND Corporation, 2014), 17, Weapons,” Defense News, April 14, 2014, http://www.defensenews.com/ http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/ article/20140414/DEFREG/304140023/China-Pushes-Into-SE-Asia-Market- RR521/RAND_RR521.pdf; and Pieter D. Wezeman, Siemon T. Wezeman, and Array-Weapons?odyssey=mod%7Cnewswell%7Ctext%7CFRONTPAGE% Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, “Arms Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa,” SIPRI Policy Paper 7Cp. 30 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, December 2011), 10. 135. Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “Did An Armed Chinese-Made Drone Just 124. Wendell Minnick and Usman Ansari, “Pakistan Deal for Chinese J-10 Crash in Nigeria?,” Popular Science, January 28, 2015, http://www.popsci.com/ Fighters Uncertain,” Defense News, October 9, 2013, http://www.defensenews. did-armed-chinese-made-drone-just-crash-nigeria. com/article/20131009/DEFREG03/310090017/Pakistan-Deal-Chinese-J-10- Fighters-Uncertain; and “J-10 fighter not yet approved for export,” People’s 136. Edward Wong and Nicola Clark, “China’s Arms Industry Makes Global Daily, October 11, 2013, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/8421772. Inroads;” Jon Grevatt, “Myanmar looks to acquire JF-17 aircraft,” IHS Jane’s html. 360, June 17, 2014, http://www.janes.com/article/39375/myanmar-looks-to- acquire-jf-17-aircraft; and “Pakistan & China’s JF-17 Fighter Program,” Defense 74 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

Industry Daily, June 25, 2014, https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/ 150. See, passim, Michael S. Chase et al., “China’s Incomplete Military stuck-in-sichuan-pakistani-jf17-program-grounded-02984/. Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army” (RAND Corporation, February 2015). 137. “Indonesia, China to strengthen defense cooperation,” Jakarta Post, March 23, 2011, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/03/23/indonesia-china- 151. Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici with Isaac Kardon and Joshua strengthen-defense-cooperation.html. Wiseman, China’s Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles, and Potential Solutions, China Strategic Perspective 3 (National 138. “RI studies offer in electronic defense industry cooperation with China,” Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies December 2010), Antara News, May 8, 2012, http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/81934/ 2, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ ri-studies-offer-in-electronic-defense-industry-cooperation-with-china; ChinaPerspectives-3.pdf. “TNI eyes closer cooperation with China,” The Jakarta Post, February 26, 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/02/26/tni-eyes-closer- 152. Adapted from United States Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of cooperation-with-china.html. Military Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (United States Department of Defense, November 8, 2010 [as amended through January 15, 2015]), http://www.dtic. 139. The Military Balance 2014 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/. February 5, 2014), 470; “China to export new-type patrol ship to West Africa,” People’s Daily, February 24, 2014, http://english.peopledaily.com. 153. Minnie Chan, “Shanghai shipyard ‘to build second Chinese cn/98649/8545398.html; Edward Wong and Nicola Clark, “China’s Arms designed aircraft carrier,’” South China Morning Post, October Industry Makes Global Inroads;” Carlyle A. Thayer, “China’s International 22, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1621671/ Security Cooperation Diplomacy and Southeast Asia;” and Wendell shanghai-shipyard-build-second-chinese-designed-aircraft-carrier. Minnick, “Argentina, China Could Jointly Develop Fighters,” Defense News, February 22, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/ 154. Jesse L. Karotkin, Senior Intelligence Officer for China, “Trends in China’s strike/2015/02/22/argentina-china-could-jointly-develop-fighters/23602417/. Naval Modernization,” Statement to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Testimony before U.S-China Economic and Security 140. Oriana Skylar Mastro, “China’s Military is about to Go Global,” The Review Commission, January 30, 2014, 6. National Interest, December 18, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/ chinas-military-about-go-global-11882. 155. Karotkin, “Trends in China’s Naval Modernization,” 3.

141. M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in 156. Ibid., 5. The larger the amphibious ship, the greater the sea state it can China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). handle comfortably and the more supplies it can transport–hence, the greater the intended range. 142. James Mulvenon, “Chairman Hu and the PLA’s ‘New Historic Missions,’” China Leadership Monitor, no. 27 (Hoover Institution, Winter 2009), http:// 157. Ronald O’Rourke, China’s Naval Modernization Implications for U.S. Navy media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM27JM.pdf; Permanent Capabilities–Background and Issues for Congress, RL33153 (Congressional Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Research Service, December 23, 2014), 33-34. Geneva, “The 10th Conference of Chinese Diplomatic Envoys Stationed Abroad Held in Beijing,” http://www.china-un.ch/eng/xwdt/t156047.htm. 158. Ibid., 32-33.

143. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 159. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China China’s National Defense in 2008 (January 2009), https://www.fas.org/ 2014, 36. programs/ssp/nukes/2008DefenseWhitePaper_Jan2009.pdf. 160. Oriana Mastro, “A Global Expeditionary PLA: 2025-2030,” (paper 144. “Xi advocates efforts to boost China’s maritime power,” Xinhua, July 31, presented at “The PLA in 2025” conference, sponsored by National Bureau of 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-07/31/c_132591246. Asian Research and Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, Carlisle, PA, htm. February 23, 2014).

145. The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces. 161. Dennis Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (Routledge, 2006), 103. 146. Ibid. 162. Daniel J. Kostecka, “From the Sea: PLA Doctrine and 147. United Nations Peacekeeping, “Troops and police contributors,” January 4, Employment of Sea-Based Airpower,” Naval War College Review, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors. 64 no. 3 (Summer 2011): 15, 19, https://www.usnwc.edu/ shtml. According to the 2013 national defense white paper, China has getattachment/61dc4903-260f-4158-947c-d40fd2f708c5/ contributed 22,000 troops to 23 peacekeeping missions, which ranks as the From-the-Sea--PLA-Doctrine-and-the-Employment-of-S. most of any permanent Security Council member. 163. Evan Braden Montgomery, “Time to Worry about China’s Military Rise,” 148. Shannon Tiezzi, “Chinese Nationals Evacuate Yemen on PLA Navy Policy Brief (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Frigate,” The Diplomat, March 30, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/ Kennedy School, June 2014), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ chinese-nationals-evacuate-yemen-on-pla-navy-frigate/. montgomery-pb-final-june2014.pdf.

149. Mastro, “China’s Military is about to Go Global.” | 75 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

164. Jeremy Page, “Deep Threat: China’s Submarines Add Nuclear-Strike 182. IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships database, https://www.ihs.com/products/janes- Capability, Altering Strategic Balance,” The Wall Street Journal, October 24, fighting-ships.html. 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-submarine-fleet-adds-nuclear- strike-capability-altering-strategic-balance-undersea-1414164738. 183. Karotkin, “Trends in China’s Naval Modernization,” 7-8.

165. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 184. Karotkin, “Trends in China’s Naval Modernization,” 10. 2014. 185. O’Rourke, China’s Naval Modernization Implications for U.S. Navy 166. Adapted from DOD Dictionary of Military Terms. Capabilities, 27.

167. Pang Wenqiang et al., “Purifying Salt Water: The Lifeline of Far Seas 186. Karotkin, “Trends in China’s Naval Modernization,” 4. Warships,” People’s Navy, February 27, 2012, 4. 187. Dean Cheng, “Taking China’s Carrier Operations Seriously,” War 168. Karotkin, “Trends in China’s Naval Modernization,” 5. on the Rocks, May 14, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/ taking-chinas-carrier-operations-seriously/. 169. Dale Rielage, “Fit to Fight,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 140 no. 4 (April 2014). 188. These are not PLA-defined benchmarks. Note also that these are notional categories with substantial overlap between them. Furthermore, they do not 170. Daniel J. Kostecka, “Places and Bases: The Chinese Navy’s Emerging progress perfectly along a single continuum, as there are at least two vectors Support Network in the Indian Ocean,” Naval War College Review, 64 no. 1 of distance and difficulty. (Winter 2011), 71. 190. Nan Li, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From 171. Liang Qingsong, “A Robust Review of Two Years of Carrying Out Escort ‘Near Coast’ and ‘Near Seas’ to ‘Far Seas’,” Asian Security, 5 no. 2 (May 2009), Responsibilities by the People’s Navy (Part 4),” People’s Navy, 28 December 168. 2010, 1. 191. Kyle Mizokami, “Peace Ark: Onboard China’s Hospital Ship,” 172. “Djibouti Welcomes China to Build a Base,” Global Times, 8 March USNI News, July 23, 2014, http://news.usni.org/2014/07/23/ 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/2013-03/08/c_124434216.htm. peace-ark-onboard-chinas-hospital-ship.

173. Li Xiaokun and Li Lianxing, “PLA Navy Looks at Offer from Seychelles,” 192. Mikkal Herberg, “China’s Search for Oil and Gas Security: Prospects China Daily, December 13, 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011- and Implications,” in “China’s Energy Crossroads: Forging a New Energy and 12/13/content_14254395.htm. Environmental Balance,” NBR Special Report (The National Bureau of Asian Research, November 2014). 174. Michael Beckley, “China and Pakistan: Fair-Weather Friends,” Yale Journal (March 2012), 9, http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Article- 193. Richard Weitz, “SCO Security Cooperation Has Multiple Motives,” Michael-Beckley.pdf. Hudson Institute blog, September 25, 2014, http://www.hudson.org/ research/10667-sco-security-cooperation-has-multiple-motives. 175. Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Military Modernization: Many Improvements, Three Challenges, and One Opportunity,” in China’s Challenges, 194. China has already contemplated doing something similar: using a drone ed. Jacques deLisle and Avery Goldstein (Philadelphia, PA: University of to attack a Burmese drug lord wanted for the killing of Chinese citizens Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 178-203. (with Naypidaw’s approval). Shannon Tiezzi, “China and the Lethal Drone Option,” The Diplomat, January 15, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/ 176. Michael S. Chase et al., “China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: china-and-the-lethal-drone-option/. Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),” (RAND, 2015), 44-68. 195. “China Focus: Lawmakers weigh China’s draft anti-terrorism law,” Xinhua, February 25, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015- 177. Adapted from DOD Dictionary of Military Terms. 02/25/c_134017683.htm

178. Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, 196. Shannon Tiezzi, “China triples peacekeeping presence in South Sudan,” “U.S. Pacific Command Posture,” Statement to the Senate Armed Services The Diplomat, September 26, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/ Committee, U.S. Senate, April 9, 2013, http://www.armed-services.senate. china-triples-peacekeeping-presence-in-south-sudan/. gov/imo/media/doc/Locklear%2004-09-13.pdf. 197. Evan Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific 179. Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan, 2011 National Defense Report Stability,” The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2005-06), http://archives.cerium. [Zhonghua minguo yibainian guofang baogaoshu] (2011), http://afrc.mnd. ca/IMG/pdf/Strategic_Hedging_and_the_Future_of_Asia-Pacific_Stability. gov.tw/mndreport/pdf/100report.pdf. See also http://www.us-taiwan.org/ pdf reports/2011_august22_taiwan_national_defense_report.pdf. 198. Thomas Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China:Responding 180. Huadong Guo and Ji Wu, eds., Space Science & Technology in China: A to Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2011), Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing: Science Press, 2010), 76. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67477/thomas-j-christensen/ the-advantages-of-an-assertive-china. 181. Adapted from DOD Dictionary of Military Terms. 76 | MAY 2015 | CNAS.ORG

199. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick “Whither China: From 214. Michael O’Hanlon, “Unfinished Business: U.S. Overseas Military Membership to Responsibility?,” (National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Presence in the 21st Century,” (Center for a New American Security, June New York City, September 21, 2005), http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/ 2008), 13, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/OHanlon_ zoellick/rem/53682.htm. UnfinishedBusiness_June2008.pdf.

200. Vice President Joseph Biden, “Remarks by the Vice President at Sichuan 215. Michèle Flournoy and Janine Davidson, “Obama’s New Global University,” (Chengdu, China, August 21, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ Posture: The Logic of U.S. Foreign Deployments,” Foreign Affairs (July/ the-press-office/2011/08/21/remarks-vice-president-sichuan-university. August 2012), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137717/ michele-flournoy-and-janine-davidson/obamas-new-global-posture. 201. Shirley Kan, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, RL32496 (Congressional Research Service, November 20, 2013), 10, http://fas.org/sgp/ 216. United States Department of Defense, Strengthening U.S. Global Defense crs/natsec/RL32496.pdf. Posture: Report to Congress (September 2004); Pettyjohn, U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783-2011. 202. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2010 (2010), 55, 217. Thomas Shanker, “U.S. Won’t Become Isolationist, Gates Tells Worried http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_cmpr_final.pdf. Asian Leaders,” The New York Times, June 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes. com/2011/06/04/world/asia/04gates.html. 203. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 (November 218. Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, 20, 2013), 23, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf. November 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/ americas_pacific_century. 204. Kan, U.S.-China Military Contacts, 57. 219. Tim Sullivan, “India, China quietly struggle in Indian Ocean,” Associated 205. Randy Schriver, “Bound to Fail,” The Washington Times, July 25, 2011, Press, September 20, 2014, http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AS_ http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/25/bound-to-fail/. INDIAN_OCEAN_COMPETITION?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAU LT&CTIME=2014-09-20-02-38-05. 206. Scott Harold, “Expanding Contacts to Enhance Durability: A Strategy for Improving U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relations,” Asia Policy (The National 220. Carnes Lord and Andrew S. Erickson, “Bases for America’s Asia-Pacific Bureau of Asian Research, July 2013), 105, http://www.nbr.org/publications/ Rebalance (Part 1 of 2),” The Diplomat, May 2, 2014, http://thediplomat. element.aspx?id=653. In the past, Chinese officials have cited “three com/2014/05/bases-for-americas-asia-pacific-rebalance/; Carnes Lord obstacles” holding back the development of closer security cooperation: U.S. and Andrew S. Erickson, “Bases for America’s Asia-Pacific Rebalance (Part arms sales to Taiwan, the restrictions imposed by the 2000 NDAA and the 2 of 2),” The Diplomat, May 6, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/ continuation of U.S. surveillance activities near China’s shores. “China eyes bases-for-americas-asia-pacific-rebalance-part-2/. new-type military relations with U.S: Defense Ministry,” Xinhua, May 12, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-05/12/c_13870266.htm. 221. Andrew S. Erickson and Justin D. Mikolay, “Guam and American Security in the Pacific,” in Carnes Lord and Andrew S. Erickson, eds., Rebalancing U.S. 207. Interview with senior Defense Department official. June 26, 2014. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 14-35. 208. Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, “Crowding the Waters: The Need for Crisis Management in the East China Sea,” Foreign Affairs 222. U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy online, March 23, 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143285/ for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready (March 2015), 11. adam-p-liff-and-andrew-s-erickson/crowding-the-waters. 223. Walter C. Ladwig III, Andrew S. Erickson, and Justin D. Mikolay, “Diego 209. Scott Harold, “Extremely Desirable but Exceptionally Difficult: An Garcia and American Security in the Indian Ocean,” in Lord and Erickson, American Perspective,” in Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives eds., Rebalancing U.S. Forces, 130-79. from China, India, and the United States, ed. Mohan Malik (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2014), 85-96. 224. Authors’ conversation with Chinese scholars, November 2013.

210. Harold, “Expanding Contacts to Enhance Durability” 225. Ely Ratner, “Resident Power: Building a Politically Sustainable U.S. Military Presence in Southeast Asia and Australia,” (Center for a New American 211. Robert Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Security, October 2013), http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/ Power (Random House: 2010). CNAS_ResidentPower_Ratner.pdf.

212. Stacie Pettyjohn, U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783-2011 (Santa Monica, 226. Christopher Yung and Ross Rustici, Not an Idea We have to Shun: Chinese CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), 10-11, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/ Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century, China Strategic Perspectives MG1244.html. No. 7, (National Defense University, October 2014), 48, http://ndupress.ndu. edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-7.pdf. 213. U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready (March 2015), 11-13, 227. For an example of excessively restrictive thinking in this regard, see http://www.navy.mil/local/maritime/150227-CS21R-Final.pdf. Micah Zenko and Sarah E. Kreps, “Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation,” Special

| 77 MORE WILLING AND ABLE: CHARTING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

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228. Kurt Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward, “New Battle Stations?,” Foreign 239. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review names the ability to “project Affairs (September/October 2003), 95-103; O’Hanlon, “Unfinished Business: power and win decisively” as one of three pillars of U.S. defense strategy U.S. Overseas Military Presence in the 21st Century.” alongside protecting the homeland and building security globally. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (March 4, 2014), v, 229. Ely Ratner, “A Summer Calendar for Advancing U.S. Policy toward the http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf. South China Sea,” (Center for a New American Security, May 2014), http:// www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_SCSAgenda_ 240. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Operational and Access Concept (JOAC), Ratner_0.pdf. v. 1.0 (January 17, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/joac_jan%20 2012_signed.pdf. 230. “Navy Leaders Agree to CUES at 14th WPNS,” U.S. Department of the Navy, press release, April 23, 2014, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display. 241. J. Randy Forbes and Colleen Hanabusa, “Time for Congress to Rebalance asp?story_id=80532. on Asia-Pacific: Resp. Forbes & Hanabusa,” Breaking Defense, October 29, 2013, http://breakingdefense.com/2013/10/time-for-congress-to-rebalance- 231. Zhang Yu, “Xi defines new Asian security vision at CICA,” Global Times, on-asia-pacific-reps-forbes-hanabusa/; Alex Gray, “Forbes Announces May 22, 2014; Sebastian Heilmann, et. al, “China’s Shadow Foreign Policy: Bipartisan Asia-Pacific Security Legislation,” Office of Congressman Randy Parallel Structures Challenge the Established International Order,” China Forbes, , April 28, 2014, http://forbes.house.gov/news/documentsingle. Monitor, no. 18 (Mercator Institute for China Studies, October 28, 2014), aspx?DocumentID=377674; Clark A. Murdock, “Building the 2021 Affordable http://www.merics.org/fileadmin/templates/download/china-monitor/ Military,” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 1, 2014), http:// China_Monitor_No_18_en.pdf. csis.org/publication/building-2021-affordable-military; and Robert Work and Shawn Brimley, “20YY: Preparing for War in the Robotic Age,” (Center for a 232. This assumes that the United States will continue pursuing some New American Security, January 2014), http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/ variant of its post-1941 strategy of forward defense and engagement. files/publications-pdf/CNAS_20YY_WorkBrimley.pdf. Ashley Tellis, “Balancing Without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China,” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014), http:// 242. J. Randy Forbes and Elbridge Colby, “We’re Losing Our Military Edge carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing_without_containment.pdf. Over China. Here’s How to Get it Back,” The National Interest, March 27, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/were-losing-our-military-edge- 233. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China over-china-heres-how-get-it-ba-10134; U.S. China Economic and Security 2014, 27; and Andrew Erickson, “China’s Modernization of its Naval and Air Review Commission (USCC), “Hearing: China’s Military Modernization and Power Capabilities,” in Strategic Asia 2012-2013: China’s Military Challenge, ed. its Implications for the United States,” January 30, 2014, http://www.uscc. Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, gov/Hearings/hearing-china%E2%80%99s-military-modernization-and- 2012), 94. its-implications-united-states; and Anthony H. Cordesman, “Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: Chinese and Outside Perspectives,” 234. Mark Cozad, “China’s Regional Power Projection: Prospects for Future (Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2, 2014), http://csis.org/ Missions in the South and East China Seas,” in Beyond the Strait: PLA files/publication/140702_Chinese_MilBalance.pdf. Missions Other Than Taiwan, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Strategic Studies Institute, April 2009), 287-325, http://www. 243. Jon Harper, “Hagel: DOD will develop new ‘offset strategy,’” Stars strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB910.pdf. and Stripes, November 15, 2014, http://www.stripes.com/news/us/ hagel-dod-will-develop-new-offset-strategy-1.314438. 235. For an example of this in the Taiwan context, see Iskander Rehman, “Why Taiwan Matters,” The National Interest, February 28, 2014, http:// 244. Sydeney J. Freedberg, Jr, “Hagel lists key technologies nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-taiwan-matters-9971?page=show. for US military; Launches ‘offset strategy,’” Breaking Defense, November 16, 2014, http://breakingdefense.com/2014/11/ 236. James B. Thomas and Evan B. Montgomery, “Developing a Strategy for hagel-launches-offset-strategy-lists-key-technologies/. a Long-Term Sino-American Competition,” in Competitive Strategies for the st 21 Century: Theory, History, and Practice, ed. Thomas Mahnken, (Palo Alto: 245. O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Stanford University Press, 2012), 257-274. Capabilities; Vice Admiral James R. Fitzgerald, USN (Ret.), “More than Submarine vs. Submarine,” Proceedings, (February 2013), 32-37. 237. David Ochmanek, “Sustaining U.S. Leadership in the Asia-Pacific Region: Why a Strategy of Direct Defense Against Antiaccess and Area Denial Threats 246. Gordon McCormick, “The Soviet Presence in the Mediterranean” (RAND is Deisrable and Feasible,” (RAND Corporation, 2015), 8-10, http://www.rand. Corporation, October 1987), 7-13, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/ org/pubs/perspectives/PE142.html. pubs/papers/2008/P7388.pdf; and John L. Scherer, “Soviet and American Behavior During the Yom Kippur War,” World Affairs, 141 no. 1 (Summer 1978), 238. Kathrin Hille, “China boosts defense spending by 10.7%,” Financial 3-23. Times, March 5, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ccf2a93a-8539- 11e2-88bb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3EjaoirMy; Military and Security 247. Amphibious and highly mobile ground forces that are adjuncts of power Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014; and Phil Stewart, projection forces – akin to U.S. Marines and airborne forces – present a “Chinese military spending exceeds $145 billion, drones advanced: U.S.,” different and more troubling capability.

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248. Jeremy Renken, “Strategic Architectures,” Center for International Maritime Security, February 12, 2014, http://cimsec.org/ strategic-architectures/9941.

249. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work, “National Defense University Convocation,” (National Defense University, Washington D.C., August 5, 2014), http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1873.

250. James Thomas and Evan Montgomery, “Developing a Strategy for Long-term Sino-American Competition,” in Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice, ed. Thomas Mahnken (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 266.

251. Ochmanek, “Sustaining U.S. Leadership in the Asia-Pacific Region: Why a Strategy of Direct Defense Against Antiaccess and Area Denial Threats Is Desirable and Feasible,” 15; and Andrew Krepinevich Jr., “How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2015), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143031/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/ how-to-deter-china.

252. Terrence K. Kelly et al., “The U.S. Army in Asia,” in The U.S. Army in Asia, 2030-2040 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2014), 85-102.

| 79 About the Center for a New American Security

The mission of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) is to develop strong, pragmatic and principled national security and defense policies. Building on the expertise and experience of its staff and advisors, CNAS engages policymakers, experts and the public with innovative, fact-based research, ideas and analysis to shape and elevate the national security debate. A key part of our mission is to inform and prepare the national security leaders of today and tomorrow.

CNAS is located in Washington, and was established in February 2007 by co-founders Kurt M. Campbell and Michèle A. Flournoy. CNAS is a 501(c)3 tax-exempt nonprofit organization. Its research is independent and non-partisan. CNAS does not take institutional positions on policy issues. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the authors.

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