Issue 80, 1st Quarter 2016 JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY
Global Health ISSUE EIGHTY, 1 Engagement
ST Inside U.S. Cyber Command QUARTER 2016 American Wolf Packs Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 80, 1st Quarter 2016 http://ndupress.ndu.edu
Gen Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Publisher MajGen Frederick M. Padilla, USMC, President, NDU
Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Production Editor John J. Church, D.M.A.
Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich
Copyeditor Erin L. Sindle
Book Review Editor Frank G. Hoffman, Ph.D.
Art Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Printing Office
Advisory Committee COL Michael S. Bell, USA (Ret.), Ph.D./College of International Security Affairs; LTG Robert B. Brown, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Brig Gen Christopher A. Coffelt, USAF/Air War College; Col Keil Gentry, USMC/Marine Corps War College; BGen Thomas A. Gorry, USMC/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Col Steven J. Grass, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Brig Gen Darren E. Hartford, USAF/National War College; Col Brian E. Hastings, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; RADM P. Gardner Howe III/U.S. Naval War College; LTG William C. Mayville, Jr., USA/The Joint Staff; MG William E. Rapp, USA/U.S. Army War College; LtGen Thomas D. Waldhauser, USMC/The Joint Staff; RDML Brad Williamson/Joint Forces Staff College
Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Stephen D. Chiabotti/School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/National War College; Mark J. Conversino/Air War College; Thomas P. Ehrhard/Office of the Secretary of Defense; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Col Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.)/Office of the Secretary of Defense; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Mark H. Jacobsen/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Thomas L. McNaugher/Georgetown University; Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.)/National War College; James A. Schear/Office of the Secretary of Defense; LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)
Printed in St. Louis, Missouri, by
Cover 2 images (top to bottom): Airman from 93rd Air Refueling Squadron prepares to refuel KC-10 Extender during all-female mission held to honor and commemorate Women’s History Month, March 13, 2014 (U.S. Air Force/ Veronica Montes); Hull Technician grinds piece of metal aboard Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Essex (LHD 2), December 1, 2015 (U.S. Navy/ Liam Kennedy); U.S. Army Captain demonstrates side choke during Marine Corps Martial Arts Program course aboard Military Sealift Command joint high-speed vessel USNS Millinocket (JHSV 3), July 27, 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/James Gulliver). About the Cover In this Issue U.S. Marine Corps Lance Corporal Edward A. McPherson, an AV-8 fixed-wing aircraft mechanic, Dialogue conducts preflight procedures at 2 From the Chairman south combat aircraft loading area in support of Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course (WTI) 1-16 at Forum Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, 4 Executive Summary Arizona, October 1, 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Jorge A. Dimmer) 6 Eight Signs Our Afghan Efforts Are Working By Richard H.M. Outzen 17 Advising the Afghan Air Force By Aaron Tucker and Aimal Pacha Sayedi Commentary Recall 78 An Interview with 131 The American Wolf 25 Enhancing Security Cooperation Michael S. Rogers Packs: A Case Study in Effectiveness: A Model for 86 Beyond the Build: How the Wartime Adaptation Capability Package Planning By F.G. Hoffman By Thomas W. Ross Component Commands Support the U.S. Cyber Command Vision Compiled by the U.S. Cyber Book Reviews Special Feature Command Combined Action Group 140 Fighting the Cold War 35 Global Health, Concepts, and 94 Joint Force Observations Reviewed by Joseph J. Collins Engagements: Significant of Retrograde Operations Enhancer for U.S. Security from Afghanistan 141 Duty and International Diplomacy By Aundre F. Piggee, Matthew Bain, Reviewed by Thomas F. Lynch III By Aizen J. Marrogi and David Carlson, Richard Lliteras, 143 Knife Fights Edwin Burkett Christopher Ostrander, Lawrence Pleis, Willie Rios, and Dennis Wilson Reviewed by Richard McConnell 37 The Future of Department of Defense Global Health Engagement Features Joint Doctrine By Gerald V. Quinnan, Jr. 101 Unconventional Warfare 145 Interorganizational in the Gray Zone Cooperation II of III: The 45 Separate and Equal: Building Humanitarian Perspective Better Relationships By Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. By James C. McArthur, Andrew with the International Connett, and Will Irwin J. Carswell, Jason Cone, Faith Humanitarian Community M. Chamberlain, John Dyer, By Paul A. Gaist and Ramey L. Wilson 110 The Aegis Warship: Joint Dale Erickson, George E. Katsos, Force Linchpin for IAMD Michael Marx, James Ruf, Lisa 54 Global Health Engagement: and Access Control Schirch, and Patrick O. Shea A Military Medicine By John F. Morton Core Competency 153 The Enduring IED Problem: By Thomas R. Cullison, Charles W. 116 Violent Nonstate Actors with Why We Need Doctrine Beadling, and Elizabeth Erickson Missile Technologies: Threats By Marc Tranchemontagne Beyond the Battlefield 160 Joint Doctrine Update JPME Today By Mark E. Vinson and John Caldwell 62 The Fourth Level of War 124 The Criticality of By Michael R. Matheny Collaborative Planning By Sarah Mussoni, Gert-Jan de 67 Building Joint Capacity Within Vreede, and Alfred Buckles the Reserve Component By Brent French U.S. Marine Corps General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, meets with Servicemembers before USO holiday troop visit at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan, December 8, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Robert Cloys)
From the Chairman Our Force and Our Fight
uring my first 90 days as Chair- on improving our joint warfighting capa- change. While the nature of war is man, I have engaged Soldiers, bility and joint readiness and developing enduring, the character of war today is D Marines, Sailors, Airmen, and leaders who will be the foundation of extraordinarily dynamic. Information Coast Guardsmen at all levels. I am Joint Force Next. This contribution to operations, cyber, space and counter- confident that our nation has the most Joint Force Quarterly is intended to pro- space capabilities, and ballistic missile professional and capable military in vide some initial thoughts regarding these technology are among the true game the world. The Joint Force has proved three priorities. changers on the modern battlefield. effective and resilient throughout years In the months ahead, my intent is to Both state and nonstate actors are of combat, kept the homeland safe, and use this space to share thoughts about constantly looking for ways to harness advanced our national interests across where we are headed, while generating an such capabilities in order to avoid our the globe. Every day, in every task, our open dialogue that will allow us to fully strengths and exploit our vulnerabilities. men and women in uniform deliver. leverage the insights and ideas of leaders This dynamic has significant implica- But we should expect no credit tomor- across the Joint Force. tions for how we will fight, and makes it row for what we did yesterday. probable that future conflicts will most We must continually adapt to meet Improving Our Joint often be transregional and fought across current challenges and innovate to de- Warfighting Capability multiple domains and functions. Driven velop the capabilities we will need to win The strategic landscape is characterized by this assumption, one of my highest future fights. As we do that, we will focus by complexity, uncertainty, and rapid warfighting priorities is to improve our
2 Dialogue / From the Chairman JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 ability to integrate joint capabilities in a Develop Leaders for transregional, multidomain, and multi- Joint Force Next New from functional fight. From my perspective, The men and women of the all-vol- our current organizational and command unteer force are our true competitive NDU Press and control constructs are optimized advantage and greatest asset. The future for the Center for Strategic Research neither for the current fight nor for the operating environment will place new Strategic Perspectives 19 challenges we will confront in the future. demands on leaders at all levels. To best Understanding Putin Through a Whether we are confronting state prepare our future leaders for success, Middle Eastern Looking Glass or nonstate actors, we must be able we must continuously assess and refine by John W. Parker to quickly and decisively bring to bear our leader development. The Joint Staff The resur- the full weight of the Joint Force. will lead an effort to define the qualities gence of Collaboration and cooperation across and characteristics of the leaders we Russian in- regions, domains, or functions is not will need in the Joint Force Next. This fluence in the enough. We must achieve true integra- study will inform how we will select, Middle East tion. The Joint Staff will lead an effort to train, educate, and manage the talent of has surprised further frame and tackle this challenge. tomorrow’s leaders. Moscow as much as any Joint Readiness Our Mutual Responsibilities other capital. A ready Joint Force is one that can Meeting the challenges of today’s Russia has done better than the effectively meet the steady-state require- dynamic and demanding operating envi- Kremlin and its Middle East experts ments of the combatant commanders, ronment while preparing the Joint Force feared when the Arab Spring began. deter our adversaries, and respond to win future fights will be a team effort. Despite Moscow’s deep involvement decisively in the event of a contingency. To be successful, we must harness the in the Ukrainian crisis, Russia is now A comprehensive approach to joint intellect, insights, and innovative ideas in a stronger position with national readiness requires that we focus on the from men and women across the Joint leaderships across the Middle East traditional metrics associated with unit Force. I have an obligation to encourage than it was in 2011, although its readiness while also assessing and adjust- and energize the dialogue. We all have stock with Sunni Arab public opin- ing our posture to deliver joint capabili- an obligation to contribute—it is our ion has been sinking. ties where it matters, when it matters. force and our fight. The Western reaction to Russian The Secretary of Defense, supported In closing, it is an honor to serve as actions in Ukraine has given Putin by the Joint Staff, determines the right your Chairman, and I look forward to a greater incentive to work toward inventory of Service capabilities and hearing from you. a more significant Russian profile in capacities to meet our national security the Middle East. As Moscow sees it, requirements across the range of military General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. this impulse by Putin is being recip- operations. The Secretary also deter- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff rocated in the region. mines how the force is best postured No outside power may be up to to support our defense strategy. The a controlling role in the region any Services, in turn, must focus on ensuring longer. But realism restrains all sides that units are properly led, trained, or- from believing that Russia is any- ganized, and equipped. When assessing where close to eclipsing the major joint readiness, we must consider all role the United States still plays in three of these elements. the Middle East. One combatant commander has suggested the term comprehensive joint readiness to describe a holistic view of the relationship between unit readiness, the Joint Force inventory, and the posture of the Joint Force. This is how we will define joint readiness in the future. We will refine our readiness processes and metrics to ensure that we maintain the right balance of unit readiness, the right inventory of joint capabilities, and the Visit the NDU Press Web site for optimal posture in support of our defense more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu and national military strategies.
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Dunford 3 General John R. Galvin, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, takes part in farewell ceremony in honor of troops of 1st Infantry Division, 1991 (DOD/Edward Pillars)
until his retirement in 1992. I was lucky enough to know him while an aide to his Executive Summary chief of staff, and he offered this junior officer a brief glimpse of the power and grace of a military officer whose service s we publish this 80th issue the 19th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was remarkable. Few senior officers in of Joint Force Quarterly, we of Staff, General Joseph F. Dunford, the Nation’s history have had to lead in A mark the transition of two of Jr., and the Senior Enlisted Advisor to such a period as that during the end of our biggest supporters and best com- the Chairman, Sergeant Major John W. the Cold War. Without question, General mentators, the 18th Chairman of the Troxell, USA, to the front of the joint Galvin was the right leader in the right Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin force and JFQ team. place at the right time. You do not have E. Dempsey, and the Senior Enlisted When the present is in such a state to take my word for it, but this is a life Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint of flux that even a dim light of under- every serving officer should learn from. Chiefs of Staff, Sergeant Major Bryan standing seems improbable, I find myself For two reasons alone—leadership by B. Battaglia, USMC. Each provided us turning to nonfiction accounts of lives example and thinking about the future of with important insights about the joint lived and the events the people found the military—I recommend his book to force and should take great credit for themselves navigating. One such account, the joint force. In keeping with General and pride in stewarding two important Fighting the Cold War: A Soldier’s Memoir Galvin’s example of thinking about the and popular NDU Press books, Lessons by former Supreme Allied Commander way ahead, I believe this issue of JFQ Encountered: Learning from the Long Europe (SACEUR) General John “Jack” offers articles that provide a number War (2015) and The Noncommissioned Galvin, USA (Ret.), is reviewed in this of interesting ideas about how efforts Officer and Petty Officer: Backbone of issue’s Book Reviews section. General before, during, and after warfighting can the Armed Forces (2013). We wish them Galvin was SACEUR and commander advance the joint force toward learning well in their future lives as we welcome of U.S. European Command from 1987 and applying those lessons he describes.
4 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 As we continue in a postcombat Rogers, commander of U.S. Cyber Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National phase for U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Command, director of the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship our Forum section provides two articles Security Agency, and chief of the Central joint military and security studies journal designed to with firsthand insights on where we are Security Service. Accompanying the inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and other partners on joint and integrated operations; headed and two articles that suggest how interview is a summary article that helps national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat the United States can more effectively explain how U.S. Cyber Command is de- terrorism; homeland security; and developments in training and joint professional military education to help our partners who are in similar cir- veloping and working to meet its mission transform America’s military and security apparatus cumstances as the Afghans. First, there of defending our networks and beyond. to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting freedom today. All published articles have been vetted is an assessment of U.S. performance Aundre Piggee and his co-authors—lead- through a peer-review process and cleared by the in Afghanistan by Richard Outzen, a ers from the joint team responsible for Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review. senior military fellow in the Center for the retrograde operations that ended NDU Press is the National Defense University’s cross-component, professional military and academic Strategic Research, Institute for National Operation Enduring Freedom in publishing house. Strategic Studies, at the National Defense Afghanistan—discuss their observations The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations University, who was asked by the theater from a successful and complex effort. expressed or implied within are those of the commander to evaluate the current In the Features section, four articles contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the situation and progress there. Aaron provide updates on how to deal with Federal Government. Tucker and Aimal Pacha Sayedi describe a range of uncertainty facing the joint Submissions and Communications how the U.S. advisor effort to help the force. U.S. Special Forces Commander JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from members of the Armed Forces, security Afghans build an air force is one success General Joseph Votel, USA, and his policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic story from the conflict with applicability co-authors discuss how unconventional specialists, and civilians from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration by email to to other partner nations. Discussing an warfare can effectively be used to work [email protected], with “Attention A&R Editor” in the important mission that can bolster the conflicts within the “gray zone,” or places subject line. Or write to: local forces’ ability to meet their mission, between peace and war. Returning JFQ Editor, Joint Force Quarterly Thomas Ross outlines how to plan for author John Morton focuses on the NDU Press 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 2504) fielding capability packages that allow evolving joint integration capabilities of Fort Lesley J. McNair effective security cooperation. Aegis-equipped warships in pursuit of in- Washington, DC 20319 More than a year ago, I was ap- tegrated air and missile defense. Thinking Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 Email: [email protected] proached by two of our authors, Aizen on the offense side of this missile de- JFQ online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm Marrogi and his colleague Edwin fense problem, Mark Vinson and John 1st Quarter, January 2016 Burkett, both military doctors with ex- Caldwell help us understand the state of ISSN 1070-0692 tensive backgrounds in providing medical play on violent nonstate groups seeking support around the world, and asked to to acquire and field missile technologies. consider global health engagement as a Sarah Mussoni, Gert-Jan de Vreede, JFQ theme. Our Special Feature section and Alfred Buckles suggest ways and approach. Next, speaking to what he sees provides the first set of discussions from techniques associated with better collab- as a gap in existing joint doctrine, Marc their efforts to broaden joint force aware- orative planning as a means to help those Tranchemontagne describes our current ness of the role health care plays not only in that business develop more effective state of affairs in countering improvised in military operations but also as a part of plans for all our joint operations. explosive devices and offers suggestions our national contribution to international In the Recall section, F.G. Hoffman, on how to solve the problem. As always, peace and stability operations. one of our nation’s leading thinkers on we round out this issue with the Joint Our JPME Today section offers a mix warfare, writes about World War II sub- Staff J7 joint doctrine update. of ideas from students and practitioners, marine warfare and shows how successful If you find our articles about warfare, two on jointness and one on warfare. adaptation to the threat environment is global health engagement, joint planning, Considering the traditional three levels of something the United States has done joint doctrine, or emerging threats inter- war most commonly discussed in school successfully for a long time. Three out- esting and would like to write a few words (strategic to operational to tactical), standing book reviews follow. of your own, or if you have important Michael Matheny makes the case for add- Our Joint Doctrine section has two thoughts to share with the joint force, ing another level between operational and important articles to consider. Following please let us hear from you. When a leader strategic. Brent French tackles the issue our global health engagement discussion, like Jack Galvin saw or thought of some- of how to help the Reserve Component a Joint Staff–interagency team brings thing important, he passed it on. JFQ is achieve jointness. us the second in their series of pieces dedicated to helping you do just that. JFQ Continuing our efforts to give you on Interorganizational Cooperation. access to the most senior joint leaders in James McArthur and his co-authors William T. Eliason our military, our Commentary section take a look at the humanitarian aspect Editor in Chief has my interview with Admiral Michael of getting to a whole-of-government
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Eliason 5 ANA 205th Corps Commander Brigadier General Dawood Shah Wafadar and Train, Advise, and Assist Command–South Commander U.S. Army Brigadier General Paul Bontrager conduct aerial battlefield familiarization flight in southern Afghanistan, August 4, 2015 (DOD/ Kristine Volk)
Eight Signs Our Afghan Efforts Are Working
By Richard H.M. Outzen
s the defense attaché tasked “fighting season 2015” unfold from a nate policy debates on Afghanistan, as with reopening the U.S. proximate vantage point.1 I returned well as observations on the realities of A Defense Attaché Office in with the impression that Afghanistan Afghanistan in 2014–2015 that merit Kabul, Afghanistan, beginning in late is better than it might have been—and balanced reassessment. I then conclude 2014, I had the opportunity to watch stable enough to warrant continued with eight observations that provide investment. In this article, I contend some basis for optimism for 2016 and that the high level of American beyond. (and Western) pessimism regarding It is not unfair for analysts to point Colonel Richard H.M. Outzen, USA, is a Senior Afghanistan’s security status deserves out that Afghanistan has had its share Military Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic reexamination. I offer some thoughts of dark days in 2015, including those Studies, at the National Defense University. on why pessimism has come to domi- of August 7–8 when a trio of attacks
6 Forum / Eight Signs Our Afghan Efforts Are Working JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 in Kabul left 48 people dead and more The National Intelligence Estimate, which take note of the changed trajectory as than 300 injured, and the Taliban sei- includes input from the country’s 16 intel- they consider the costs and benefits of zure of Kunduz City for several days ligence agencies, predicts that the Taliban sustained investment there. in early autumn.2 Yet given generally and other power brokers will become in- pessimistic assessments of how ready the creasingly influential as the United States What the Numbers Don’t Say Afghan government and security forces winds down its longest war in history, Judgments about progress in the were to survive the departure of most according to officials who have read the Afghan conflict come with the caveat Western troops at the beginning of the classified report or received briefings on its that unclassified information is less year, it is fair to state that, from a U.S. conclusions. The grim outlook is fueling a abundant and comprehensive than was perspective, the worst outcomes have policy debate inside the Obama adminis- once the case. From 2009 through not materialized. Based on the 2015 tration about the steps it should take over 2014, a variety of statistical param- fighting season—a long one, since the the next year as the U.S. military draws eters were tracked and published in Afghan National Defense and Security down its remaining troops.4 unclassified form under Section 1230 Forces (ANDSF) opened it with major of Public Law 110-181 (the so-called operations in February and March—it Pessimism was echoed in the public 1230 reports).10 These reports were appears that Afghanistan is stable enough sphere as well. Stephen Biddle of the issued semi-annually, but military to create space for political progress and Council on Foreign Relations argued, reporting was criticized as decreasingly that the sustained partnership may suffice for instance, that the ultimate failure transparent after 2011, and in 2013 to keep it so. There are trends and signs of the Afghan forces was so certain the International Security Assistance of growth, outlined below, that mark that the United States would be best Force headquarters had to retract some this as a watershed when compared to served to either cut a deal with the data it had used in previous years to the past decade. While it is possible that Taliban sooner rather than later or to assert progress in the campaign.11 Since economic and political efforts may lag end its participation altogether.5 Former that time, public data have become behind relative progress in the realm of U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry de- less abundant and less comprehensive. security—perhaps enough to undo that scribed American counterinsurgency in The Intelligence Community, the U.S. progress over time—there is reason for Afghanistan as an unequivocal failure, Embassy in Kabul, and the headquar- guarded optimism as 2016 begins. and lumped it together with Vietnam as ters for Operation Resolute Support another failed effort.6 Some who defend continue to collect data related to Dire Predictions continued serious U.S. involvement in overall security, but their products are The U.S. Intelligence Community Afghanistan, such as Anthony Cordesman not generally accessible to the public.12 and segments of the media have been at the Center for Strategic and Perhaps the best, most consistently consistently pessimistic in recent years International Studies, have also expressed available set of security-related data is regarding the prospects for stability in deep misgivings about the readiness that compiled by the Special Inspector Afghanistan after coalition drawdown. of the ANDSF and the cohesiveness General for Afghan Reconstruction The persistent tone of this skepticism of the Afghan government.7 Negative (SIGAR), a watchdog body that studies seems to have been established in assessments were also widespread among the impacts of U.S. civil and military gloomy National Intelligence Estimates both Afghans and foreign officials within assistance and includes non-U.S. data (NIEs) of 2008 and 2010.3 The late- Afghanistan.8 These projections reflected in its reports. Appearances before 2013 NIE reportedly went even further, the concerns and dynamics of late 2013 Congress or think tanks by Resolute setting a tone of expected failure that and 2014, but are overdue for assessment Support senior leaders provide some would persist throughout 2014 and in light of the past year’s developments. amplifying data, as do occasional into 2015, despite significant political Policy critics raised valid concerns, and publications from the Afghanistan and operational changes in Afghanistan the absence of catastrophe this year nei- Analysts Network, the International during that time. The Washington Post ther invalidates those particular concerns Crisis Group, and other research orga- described the 2013 version: nor precludes dramatic deterioration in nizations with focused efforts there. the future. Furthermore, the clear devel- Although the amount of public report- A new American intelligence assessment opmental gaps in Afghan security forces ing provided by the Department of on the Afghan war predicts that the gains and institutions are not a matter of debate Defense (DOD) has declined, Section the United States and its allies have made or interpolation; they are facts.9 One 1225 of the National Defense Autho- during the past three years are likely to have fighting season during which a largely rization Act (NDAA) for 2015 still been significantly eroded by 2017, even if independent ANDSF survives does not requires a semi-annual report to Con- Washington leaves behind a few thousand clear the slate. It does, however, indicate gress that remains a valuable source of troops and continues bankrolling the im- that worst-case planning for Afghanistan information. Together, these data sets poverished nation, according to officials increasingly looks like remote-case plan- reflect continued high levels of violence familiar with the report. ning, and that U.S. policymakers should in 2015, and in some cases troubling
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Outzen 7 Afghan National Policemen take break between explosive ordnance disposal and IED defeat classes at ANP Central Training Center–Kabul (DOD/Charity Edgar) security trends, but no evidence yet the previous year, impacted by Ramadan increasing in the north. Violence in Kabul of dramatic deterioration of either the and insurgent infighting.14 The fighting has also increased, a reflection of the fact government’s ability to govern or the has been bloody on both sides, and the that with foreign troops gone from much ANDSF to fight. The numbers are government has lost control of nearly of the country, insurgents have begun to striking in what they do not say—that a dozen district centers for varying pe- focus their attention more on the capital.16 despite the intentions of the Taliban riods of time. Many of those districts, The nature of the fighting has changed and the fears of many observers, secu- however, have been de facto beyond with the reduction of foreign troops rity in Afghanistan did not spiral out of government control for most of the past and the increased advisory emphasis on control in 2015. decade, and most of the district centers Afghan forces aggressively pursuing the During late 2014 and early 2015, the that insurgents occupied came back insurgents. With the exceptions of self-de- pattern of overall violence in Afghanistan under government control within days.15 fense and certain predesignated global conformed to the seasonal norms of Insurgents briefly held one provincial terror targets, only the ANDSF are now previous years: a drop in insurgent attacks center (Kunduz), but they were driven in fact authorized to engage in combat in fall and winter, an increase in spring, out without having consolidated control operations. This has led to a 59 percent and a peak in the summer.13 SIGAR over new or large areas. Theirs remains increase in ANDSF casualties, a rise as comparison of violent incidents per day in for the most part a hit-and-run fight, in predictable as it is concerning.17 While it is late 2014 and early 2015 found a slight a small number of cases a hit-linger-and- fair to say security conditions worsened in decrease September through November run affair. the latter half of 2015 as insurgents strove 2014, a 10 percent increase December DOD reporting to Congress indicates to show that ANDSF cannot secure the 2014 through February 2015, and a 6 that, on a national basis, violence across country on its own, it is unclear how long percent increase from February through Afghanistan was down in 2015 compared insurgents can maintain their level of sup- April 2015, compared to the same pe- to 2014 for much of the year. Violence port and effort when, at the end of 2015, riods a year prior. Summer 2015 data has decreased in the southern, eastern, they still could not take and hold popula- showed nearly a 5 percent drop from and western regions of the country, while tion centers from government forces.18
8 Forum / Eight Signs Our Afghan Efforts Are Working JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 The United Nations (UN) also tracks of President Hamid Karzai find Ashraf But those forces are not collapsing, and statistics related to insurgent attacks and Ghani, seated in October 2014, a more there are pockets of true excellence devel- overall violence in Afghanistan, primarily serious and committed partner. The oping. These include special units within for its project related to protection of National Unity Government (NUG) both the Ministry of Defense (special civilians in conflict areas. These statistics agenda is consistent with major American operations forces Kandaks and Kita-e help feed both semi-annual reports to national interests for Afghanistan: sus- Khas) and the Ministry of Interior (crisis the Security Council on protection of tained bilateral partnership, reduced response units); military intelligence, civilians and to the Secretary General’s corruption, and a definitive end to the which has greatly expanded collection periodic comprehensive reports on insurgencies. President Ghani spent much and analytical capabilities; and the Special Afghanistan. UN numbers show a con- of his adult life in the United States, has Mission Wing, which originated under tinuation into 2015 of the generally high written extensively on anticorruption the Interior Ministry but now supports levels of violence seen in 2014, and at programs, and has founded a nongov- the special operations of both ministries. some points increasing up to 10 percent. ernmental organization dedicated to Afghan artillery has shown its worth—es- Summer fighting decreased overall by strengthening weak states.22 Ghani and pecially the D-30 howitzers—providing 4.6 percent compared to 2014.19 In his chief executive Abdullah Abdullah effective fire support in remote areas. the fall, insurgents launched 19 percent have begun to improve governance Challenges remain in keeping them oper- more attacks overall than they did the and international confidence, and have ational and resupplied in a timely manner. year prior, although the increase in ef- proved more willing than Karzai to try Afghan commanders and staff are devel- fective (casualty-causing) attacks was a and work with Pakistan in matters of oping the ability to plan and coordinate more modest 4 percent.20 UN reports security.23 Admittedly, there are warning multicorps operations with combined note that the high levels of violence had signs of serious internal dysfunction: arms in various parts of the country. several contributing causes (for example, Ghani’s temper, his alleged favoritism These operations have not been perfect: mild weather and the ANDSF initiating toward Pashtuns in security ministry as- sequential not simultaneous, disruptive more operations). They also note that signments and corruption investigations, rather than decisive to the insurgents, following periods of increased violence, and his penchant for micromanagement and requiring the heavy involvement of levels dropped in response to ANDSF are examples.24 senior Afghan officers and international operations.21 Tensions within the NUG are rife. mentors. That they occurred at all is in- What we are left with at the be- Gradually, however, key appointments dicative of a dramatic increase in ANDSF ginning of 2016 is a mixed picture: have been made and actual governance capabilities, though, and a key indicator Afghanistan remains a violent and volatile begun. As Commander of Operation of increasing professionalism. country, facing steep challenges with Resolute Support General John Campbell, Advisors have praised increasing imperfect tools. Given the incomplete na- USA, has pointed out, predictions that self-sufficiency in previous years, but in ture of available data, observations from the NUG would fail in its first year were 2015 the metaphorical safety net (combat the field—admittedly anecdotal—can frequently heard, but did not come to enablers) provided by those advisors help round out public understanding pass.25 The advent of the NUG and shrank, making this the first substantively of the current situation on the ground. Ghani’s signing of the Bilateral Security independent test. Difficulties persist in Especially in the context of rapidly dete- Agreement ended the era of mutual the areas of logistics distribution systems, riorating crises in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, mistrust and recrimination between the tactical mobility, and indigenous air Afghanistan in 2015 looks like a relative Afghan government and its closest back- support, among others. The ability of the success and gives reason to think more ers—a huge and positive change from the Afghan government and security forces progress is in store. preceding years. to improve quickly enough to sustain I finished my tour in Kabul in the late The U.S.-Afghan partnership is also Western confidence remains an open summer of 2015 as one convinced that well served by the current healthy state question over the medium term. In 2015 this progress is feasible. My convictions of the American military-civilian team the improvement was unmistakable, come from signs I saw within the Afghan in Kabul. The current Ambassador and even during events as challenging as government, in its security forces, and in the Resolute Support commander con- the August Kabul bombings: “Afghan Afghanistan’s evolving relationship with sult frequently, support mutually, and security forces handled three complex Pakistan. Here are eight observations have linked their teams in a close and emergencies almost simultaneously, prov- based on my time there that provide a coordinated manner to support Afghan ing perhaps that training of Afghan forces basis for optimism in 2016 and beyond. counterparts. This has not always been has paid off. . . . In none of the three the case over the past decade.26 attacks, scattered widely around the cap- The Observations ANDSF Is Surviving and Maturing, ital, did the insurgents manage to breach We Have a Committed Partner Albeit Unevenly. The shortcomings of their targets’ inner defenses. Most of in the Afghan Palace. Americans who the Afghan forces and security institutions the victims were outside the walls, either served in Afghanistan during the tenure are too many, and too serious, to dismiss. passersby or defenders at the gates.”27
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Outzen 9 and the Afghan public. It is true that Figure 1. Security Incidents Per Day, 2013 2015 attrition reached troubling levels early in the year—4,000 security force members 80 per month. It bears mentioning, though, 70 that the 4,000 figure represents not only battle deaths, but also all losses (including 60 Absent Without Leave and Dropped 50 from Rolls [DFR]; in other words, those who chose or were compelled to leave 40 service). The single largest component of 30 attrition is DFR, and observers consider it sensitive to improvements in soldier 20 quality of life and leadership.31 We must 10 also consider that casualties and attrition should trend up as operational tempo 0 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 (OPTEMPO) increases. This occurred in 2014, and the high 2015 numbers are Dec-Feb Mar-May Jun-Aug Sep-Nov a continuation of that trend. The factors driving the trend are not mysterious, nor Formal assessment of the fighting in over ANDSF checkpoints (occasionally are they an indicator of insurgent success 2015 has stretched into early 2016, but by district and in one case a provincial cen- per se: “the combination of an increased late summer the overall trend was clear: ter), with insurgents grouping to attack OPTEMPO, assumption of greater weakly guarded areas before fleeing the security responsibilities, drawdown of This year, the Taliban have advanced in advance of reinforcements. The third coalition forces, and an aggressive pursuit some contested rural districts. . . . But the and least-publicized type of fighting was of the insurgency have all contributed to insurgency can’t boast of spectacular victo- the steady drumbeat of small, intelli- the increase in casualty rates.”32 Concerns ries that changed the course of the war. All gence-driven raids against select targets, about the sustainability of the ANDSF, of Afghanistan’s 34 provincial capitals re- typically more senior leaders or imminent given higher casualties and attrition, have main in government hands, as does the vast terror threats. While the second type of been raised by qualified observers, but majority of district headquarters. Overall fight (the checkpoint fights) inflicted this has more to do with factors within levels of violence, according to Afghan and serious casualties and made frequent Afghan control—that is, how they recruit U.S. military officials, are comparable to headlines, the other patterns kept the in- and retain soldiers—than it does with last year’s. This ability to maintain the surgents off balance and inflicted serious enemy effectiveness.33 General Campbell precarious status quo even after more than damage on their leaders and units in the has pointed out that 5 to 7 percent 120,000 U.S.-led coalition troops have de- field. ANDSF still suffer many shortcom- higher casualties during a four-fold parted the country represents, by itself, an ings, institutionally and operationally: increase in operations are not an indi- important achievement.28 supply distribution must improve, check- cator that attrition is impacting combat points must be consolidated, mobility readiness and that young Afghans are still Engagements between ANDSF and and air power are immature, and intel- signing up to fight.34 He has also denied the insurgents in 2015 basically followed ligence-sharing must occur with greater that the current casualty and attrition one of three patterns. The first consisted speed and reach.29 Senior ANDSF leaders rates are unsustainable if ANDSF leaders of large (multibattalion), fairly complex, understand the areas of weakness and give priority to remedying those factors well-scripted, and coached operations in- (assuming continued external advice and they can control.35 volving multiple services and corps. Such support) have every intention of resolving Resolute Support leaders and the operations were conducted in northern them.30 Given the serious shift in respon- Afghan security ministries have indeed Helmand, Zabul-Ghazni, the “iron sibilities from coalition to ANDSF this focused effort on understanding and triangle” of Azrah-Hesarak-Surobi, and year, it has been a performance that gives remedying the causes of force attrition, elsewhere. These operations did not have cause for optimism. and the rates dropped over the course of lasting effects on the target areas—that ANDSF Attrition Is Serious but 2015. By May 2015 the Afghan National will take time and better government Manageable. The Afghan National Army, Army (ANA) monthly average attrition provision of services—but they disrupted National Police, and National Directorate rate stood at 2.3 percent, compared with insurgent operations and prevented of Security fought hard and suffered 2.55 percent in January 2015 and well them from consolidating control over significant casualties in 2015 as they had down from the average rates in 2013 and many rural districts. The second type of in 2014, but the result was concern, not 2014 of 3.52 percent and 3.62 percent, fighting was the cat-and-mouse game crisis, for both the Afghan government respectively. The Afghan National Police
10 Forum / Eight Signs Our Afghan Efforts Are Working JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 average monthly attrition also dropped from January to May of last year, from 1.64 percent to 1.56 percent.36 Overall ANDSF force levels rose over the course of the fighting season. Once the intake and training of new recruits pick up in the fall and winter months, it should be possible to further close the gap between authorized force levels and the number actually serving. The perspective provided by one former senior security official is worth remembering. The Soviet-backed Afghan army survived and grew during the 1980s while suffering 2,000 battle deaths per year on a population base of 12 million; the ANA is suffering roughly 2,000 per year on a base of 31 million. Each death is regrettable and tragic, but in a society accustomed to its young men Afghan national police officer prepares to accompany members of Kunar PRT on foot patrol through fighting and dying, such numbers are downtown Asadabad (U.S. Air Force/Nicholas Mercurio) far from unsustainable.37 Senior Afghan leaders, including Minister of Interior investigations and reforms, including to making the efficient use of available Noor-ul-Haq Olomi, have similarly the institution of palace-level review of resources part of their organizational assessed that the losses are tragic, but virtually all government contracts and the culture. do not constitute a crisis.38 Afghans take suspension of senior officers associated The Insurgents Have Serious casualty reports with a great deal more with a corrupt fuel contract signed just Problems, Too. The year 2015 was a equanimity than do Western observ- before President Ghani took office.40 hard year for the Taliban and other ers, meaning that in political as well as The abuse of funds through inflated insurgent groups. The death of Mullah demographic terms the numbers are personnel strength reporting has been Mohammed Omar, the accepted leader sustainable. addressed through implementation of the Taliban, was confirmed during Afghans Are Adapting to a Resource- of an Automated Human Resources the summer. Suspicions that he was dead Constrained Environment. During my Information Management System that hindered Taliban unity prior to the public time in Kabul, I witnessed the Afghans will be tied to payment of salary and announcement, and infighting over who adapting to a more constrained resource allowances.41 should succeed him hampered unity in environment in which Western aid was Meanwhile, Resolute Support advisory the field thereafter: less freely given. Afghans are adapting, efforts have shifted focus from the field to both fiscally and operationally. While dif- the ministerial level, and have reorganized Mansour was Omar’s deputy. Many ficult, over the long term the adjustments along functional lines to better focus on commanders were outraged that Mansour made in the Afghan government and in transparency, force generation, and effec- concealed news of Omar’s death for more society will boost both accountability and tive resource management across ANDSF than two years and boycotted the meeting donor confidence, and, through this, the agencies.42 At the field/operational level, that appointed him. Mansour said the sustainability of long-term aid. Discipline the Afghans have had to adjust to the ab- deception ensured Taliban unity amid in security-related budgeting and expen- sence of coalition advisors in formations the 2014 withdrawal of NATO [North diture has been greatly enhanced since below the corps level and to less robust Atlantic Treaty Organization] troops. . . . late 2014 through the introduction of close air support and other combat Small skirmishes over the leadership have conditionality measures by Combined enablers. This has led to some degree of already begun, some Taliban say.44 Security Transition Command– frustration in the ANDSF and legitimate Afghanistan (CSTC-A). CSTC-A debate about how much battlefield risk As 2015 wore on, the Taliban also Commander Major General Todd should be incurred in the drive to make had to worry about radical elements Semonite, USA, has instituted a system of it self-sufficient. On the positive side, claiming affiliation with the Islamic Letters of Commitment, through which the Afghans have become quite good State in Khorasan, which challenged ANDSF leaders acknowledge the purpose at operating some of their own support them with both physical and rhetorical and proper usage of funds.39 platforms, especially Mi-17 helicopters attacks. This “red on red” fighting Corruption has been attacked and D-30 howitzers.43 Afghan political occurred in several parts of the country through an aggressive series of and military leaders appear committed and effectively presented the Taliban
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Outzen 11 Dand District governor talks with U.S. Army deputy commander of Train, Advise, and Assist Command–South (left) and interpreter at Kandahar Airfield security shura, June 27, 2015 (DOD/Kristine Volk) with a two-front war.45 It is also worth to end the conflict, but have improved the past decade. The routine availability noting that ANDSF-reported insurgent mutual understanding and may lead of electricity and telecommunications casualties were roughly three to four to solid progress. Afghan and Western access ranks high on the list, given the times higher in 2015 than the year counterparts may still mistrust Pakistan’s transformative effects that access has on prior; while such numbers tend toward Inter-Services Intelligence, but some education, political participation, and exaggeration, United Nations reporting have come to believe Pakistan Chief economic activity. Kabul is now home to based on Taliban documents showed of Army Staff Raheel Sharif is sincere roughly 4 million Afghans of all ethnic a steep rise in their casualties in 2013, in his desire to rein in militants. In any groups and is producing a generation of and these losses can only have increased case, Pakistani analysts have recognized young Afghans accustomed to schooling, with the rise in overall incidents in that the departure of most U.S. troops, following global issues, and interacting 2014–2015.46 Pakistan has moved more coupled with the more accommodating daily with people from other parts of the seriously against terrorist activity on its policies of Ghani, present Islamabad the country (or other countries). Insurgent territory, including scaling back support opportunity to rebalance its approach in attacks still occur, and will continue. In to at least some Afghan insurgents in the ways that help stabilize both its neighbor short bursts of activity (late November wake of the deadly attack on a school in and itself.49 2014, early August 2015), attacks in Peshawar in December 2014.47 This has Kabul Is Thriving: More Modern Kabul spike from time to time. After a led to a more serious and sustained series and Cosmopolitan and Still Relatively rise in intensity in late 2014, though, of discussions involving officials from Secure. It may be hard to notice for ob- overall attacks in Kabul in 2015 have Pakistan and Afghanistan regarding po- servers who have not stayed in Kabul for remained steady.50 With the coalition litical reconciliation between the Taliban extended stays separated by an interval of presence increasingly limited to Kabul and the Afghan government.48 The talks some years, but dramatic changes have and its environs, it follows that insurgents have yet to produce substantive steps taken place in the Afghan capital over will increasingly focus their attacks there.
12 Forum / Eight Signs Our Afghan Efforts Are Working JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 John Kerry listens as Afghan presidential candidate Ashraf Ghani addresses reporters at UN Mission Headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan, July 2014 (State Department)
It is notable then that insurgents only with the West, Russia has motive and costs of large-scale support or toleration rarely manage to successfully target coali- opportunity in Afghanistan to maintain of insurgent groups are decreasingly tion troops, that they kill far more Afghan some level of cooperation and commu- justifiable, and that some form of political civilians than they do foreign troops, nication with the United States and its participation in Kabul by the Taliban and and that they remain the primary threat NATO partners.52 The Chinese, anxious those they represent is the most desirable to Afghan civilians.51 While as noted to protect economic opportunities and outcome.55 They may hedge their bets, the Afghans are rather inured to such to get a handle on the grave problem of a but seem inclined to significantly reduce casualties, over time they will increasingly radical Islamist safe haven in Afghanistan their investment in insurgency. The fortu- damage insurgent narratives of defending that stokes China’s Uighur insurgent itous combination of Karzai’s departure the country and its people from foreign problem, are expanding engagement and the reduction of the U.S. military occupation. The bottom line is that if in- with the Afghan government. More presence in Afghanistan has created surgents could not seriously shake Kabul importantly, they are pressing Pakistan space for improved cooperation between in 2015, it is hard to see how they will to do all they can to secure a negotiated Western donors and these neighboring be better positioned to do so in subse- settlement with the Taliban.53 In the states, whose goals seem more aligned quent years, as the unity government and wake of both the U.S. drawdown and the now. The breadth and size of Kabul’s mil- ANDSF mature further. Iranian nuclear deal, Afghanistan stands itary diplomatic community—especially The Neighbors May Be Nervous to benefit substantially from increased the robust attaché contingents from these Enough to Work Together. The drawdown regional investment by Iran and perhaps neighboring states—reflect an enhanced of U.S. troops in Afghanistan has created also from tacit U.S.-Iranian cooperation readiness for dialogue. both uncertainty and opportunity for within Afghanistan.54 Pakistan seems The Biggest Variable Determining Pakistan, China, Russia, and Iran. Against increasingly reconciled to the fact that the Afghanistan’s Fate Remains Our the backdrop of worsening relations Taliban will not rule Afghanistan, that the Commitment. An Afghan general who
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Outzen 13 President Ashraf Ghani addresses members of Afghan National Army Special Operations Command during visit to Camp Commando, Afghanistan, October 6, 2014 (U.S. Army/Daniel Shapiro) works closely with Western counterparts failure and end up with a stable state in developmental progress, leading many opened a meeting in early 2015 by stat- Afghanistan. foreign policy analysts to call for patience ing, “Now I know you Americans have The army of the Democratic Republic in sustaining the effort.59 There is no lost all interest in Afghanistan, but there of Afghanistan fought effectively for sev- push from the U.S. public or policy- remain for us a few matters to discuss.” eral years after the withdrawal of Soviet makers to ramp down that funding, at He was only half-joking; many Afghans troops—in fact, only with the collapse least not yet. Conversely, there has been feared that with major crises in Syria, of the Soviet Union and the end of as- pressure to quickly reduce the number of Iraq, and Yemen, the United States sistance funding did they fail.56 Similarly, U.S. troops advising and administering had largely ceased paying attention to between 1972 and 1975 American assistance to the Afghans. The pressure Afghanistan and was interested only in military assistance to South Vietnam was was largely self-imposed; U.S. policymak- reducing resource commitments. This cut from $2.8 billion to $700 million, ers set a goal of 1,000 troops or fewer by would be unfortunate, for the trajectory and then down to $300 million; by 2017, despite the absence of any pressure of recent events in Afghanistan shows 1975 their army collapsed.57 The lesson from the American public or the people far more positive trends than we find is clear: having left an army that can and or government of Afghanistan to do so.60 in other crisis spots across the region. will fight, the United States and other In a sense this reflects the logic of the Afghanistan’s starting point in 2001 for Western donors need to ponder further Karzai years in Afghanistan, with declin- security, development, and governance cuts and drawdowns in a gradual manner. ing trust and declining mutual confidence was so low that even given the significant Current U.S. assistance levels of between U.S. and Afghan leadership. progress achieved to date, the remain- roughly $4 billion per year in security A year into Ghani’s tenure, with a ing challenges are significant and the assistance and $2 billion more in eco- year’s worth of fighting and proven via- chance of failure real. With a continued nomic assistance are significant costs, bility, the Obama administration appears investment of moderate scope—both and rightfully should curtail over time.58 to have recognized the need to critically in years and in billions of dollars—the The return on that significant investment reassess the assumptions that were driv- United States can buy down that risk of has been dramatic in terms of social and ing the steady decrease in forces. This
14 Forum / Eight Signs Our Afghan Efforts Are Working JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 pragmatic approach should be applauded Kunduz, Major Northern City, From Taliban,” ed by the Taliban as Fighting Season Begins,” New York Times, September 29, 2015, available New York Times, April 13, 2015, available at and sustained. The brief occupation of at
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Outzen 15 “Ghani Says Afghan Future Lies in Trade, Not “Afghan Forces Lose 4,000 a Month to Ca- 51 UN report A/70/359–S/2015/684, Foreign Aid,” Bloomberg Politics, May 4, 2015, sualties, Desertion—U.S. General,” Reuters, 5-7/17. available at
16 Forum / Eight Signs Our Afghan Efforts Are Working JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Afghan air force aircrew and NATO Air Training Command– Afghanistan air advisors stand together after first-ever all-Afghan C-130 flight, Kabul, Afghanistan, June 16, 2014 (U.S. Air Force/Vernon Young, Jr.)
Advising the Afghan Air Force
By Aaron Tucker and Aimal Pacha Sayedi
uccessful advising requires skill are gleaned from studying the Soviet Airlift as a Counterinsurgency in a broad range of competencies experience in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Tactic S that includes political-military Finally, developing effective advising The Hindu Kush mountain range relations, operations, and acquisi- postures can be guided by a conceptual extends from central Afghanistan, with tions. Advising the Afghan air force’s model that incorporates ideas outlined peaks more than 16,000 feet high, airlift mission seeks to strengthen the in Colonel John Boyd’s essay “Destruc- through the Badakhshan region in legitimacy of the Government of the tion and Creation”1 and by systems the northwest of the country, where Islamic Republic of Afghanistan as part engineering techniques. This article mountain peaks reach 24,000 feet. of the counterinsurgency strategy of breaks down the essential components Throughout history, this rugged terrain the International Security Assistance of a successful air advising posture, has isolated Afghanistan’s numerous Force (ISAF). Training at the U.S. Air applies it to the mission in Afghani- tribes, causing local government and Force’s Air Advisor Academy supports stan, and concludes with a summary family-based power structures to prevail. the initial qualification of students as of key points and suggested areas for Moreover, attempts by foreign powers air advisors, while additional lessons improvement. to install a strong central government have been strenuously resisted. Ancient invaders such as Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan simply bypassed Lieutenant Colonel Aaron Tucker, USAF, is Deputy Chief in the Turbine Engine Division at the Air terrain that was difficult to conquer, Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Colonel Aimal Pacha Sayedi, Afghan Air Force, is Commander of the 373rd Fixed Wing Squadron, Kabul Air Wing, and the first C-130 leaving ungoverned areas referred to as Aircraft Commander in the Afghan Air Force. yagistan, that is, lawless places. Deliv-
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Tucker and Sayedi 17 ering government services to isolated Successful application of advising tac- developing cross-cultural empathy and areas that would otherwise harbor tics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) the ability to relate to Afghan counter- insurgents enforces governmental could transform current Afghan capabil- parts. In contrast, most Soviet advisors legitimacy and is a critical part of the ities to a long-term, sustainable solution. during the 1980s had little specialized 6 Afghan counterinsurgency strategy. An North Atlantic Treaty Organization training or advisory experience. A air mobility capability increases Afghan Air Training Command–Afghanistan 1-week course covered the political, capacity to govern and administer (NATC-A) advisors are authorized to military, and economic situation while through presence and persistence. assist the Afghan air force in the direct instructors emphasized the importance Rotary-wing airlift is flexible and execution of their mission in support of of the Soviet internationalist mission its capability to reach remote landing the ISAF Train, Advise, Assist (TAA) and tried to impart a sense of optimism.7 zones is critical to the counterinsurgency mission under Operation Resolute During the course, Soviet advisors might mission in Afghanistan. It is expensive Support. Assessments are communi- also pick up additional reading on Afghan to operate and maintain, however. cated through the advisors’ leadership history or politics on their own initiative. Developing a less expensive, fixed-wing to indicate current trends and signs of airlift capability to replace rotary-wing definitive success. Personnel at each level Conceptual Models for assets on runway-to-runway routes would of leadership are responsible for advising Advising Postures reduce wear and tear on the rotary-wing their counterparts, so regular assessments Advisors spend a great deal of energy fleet’s limited life span. In addition to help maintain coherence throughout the developing postures that guide their passenger and cargo transportation, organization. Afghan personnel should counterpart relationships toward fixed-wing airlift can also provide casualty be the visible and actual force behind achieving a sustainable solution. evacuation (CASEVAC) and nontra- the mission because they are more ef- One conceptual model of use in this ditional intelligence, surveillance, and fective among the population and lend context is presented in John Boyd’s reconnaissance (NTISR) capabilities in legitimacy to the government during a essay “Destruction and Creation.” The support of Afghan National Security counterinsurgency. Advisor assistance essay outlines a thought process of the Forces (ANSF). Due to the cultural is required when Afghans have not yet destruction of a concept down to its importance of family and tribal bonds, developed the required skill set or gained components through analysis, followed dependable CASEVAC is critical to the the necessary experience for safe, effective by the construction of a conceptual morale and fighting spirit of ANSF sol- execution. The range of options along model through synthesis.8 Boyd also diers fighting for their country far from the advise-assist spectrum offers advisors uses the mathematical concept of differ- their families and home villages.2 a great deal of flexibility in responding to entiation to illustrate how to understand the tactical situation. Coordinated pos- a concept or response based on the way The Air Advisor in Afghanistan tures allow several lines of effort to work it changes relative to a given variable. The mission of the air advisor is to together to develop combat capability The advisor can then apply inductive assess, advise, assist, train, and equip and build Afghan forces to a sustainable logic to construct a conceptual model. Afghan aviation forces to achieve coun- capability. And as is often the case in Integration of the differentiated parts terinsurgency objectives.3 Generally irregular warfare, “success in one area allows the creation of an internally con- considered experts in their career fields, may coexist with failure in another and sistent and effective advising posture. the advisors bring a wealth of opera- uncertainty in most.”4 Similarly, Afghan operational tional experience and seasoned judg- Both combat aviation advisors networks such as CASEVAC or air ment to the dynamic task of mentoring and air advisors play a significant role transportation can be analyzed as sys- Afghan airmen in a fluid and often in irregular warfare. Combat aviation tems of interconnected systems. Systems challenging combat environment that is advisors graduate from a 1-year special engineering techniques are useful for typically unfamiliar to the advisor. For operations course and receive extensive understanding complex mission sets example, the 538th Air Expeditionary training focused on independent, small- and developing lean solutions that meet Advisory Squadron (538 AEAS) advised team operations in a specific region and validated operational requirements. For the 373rd Fixed Wing Squadron (373 cultural environment. A distinct 5-week example, the functional decomposition FWS) in the Afghan air force Kabul air advisor course instructs general pur- technique is similar to Boyd’s concept of air wing. Although each advisor was pose forces in three areas: core advising destruction and is informed by the Joint an expert airlift operator, the mission skills; specialized language, culture, and Operation Planning Process applied at of the 538 AEAS was not to execute regional studies; and advanced force-pro- the tactical level.9 In this process, mission an airlift mission, but to advise Afghan tection skills. It also provides a bridge stakeholders are first surveyed to validate counterparts in establishing a sustain- between the extensive combat aviation a complete set of requirements. Next, a able method for effective and efficient advisor course and the “slap dash” type complex task is decomposed from the sys- movement of passengers and cargo. of training provided to Vietnam-era tem level into progressively simpler tasks advisors.5 These courses are critical to until an individual work unit is defined.
18 Forum / Advising the Afghan Air Force JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 U.S. Army Train, Advise, Assist Command–Air personal security detail shift lead provides security while MD-530 Cayuse Warrior takes off with all-Afghan crew for combat mission, September 27, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Sandra Welch)
Lean management ensures that only destruction, and differentiation, a prop- defined mission is based on validated tasks that can be directly traced to a val- erly defined mission can be decomposed Afghan requirements and coordinated idated requirement receive resources for into relevant tasks and then individ- throughout Afghan and coalition leader- completion. Additionally, the interfaces uated for cultural and task suitability. ship. Afghans need to have direct input between tasks are defined and developed Synthesizing an advising posture starts when devising the requirements, and to support operation at system and with an assessment of the current their coalition advisors must listen care- system-of-systems levels. Applied to the Afghan capability and then establishes a fully to understand the Afghan vision that advisor mission, host nation economic, balance between advising and assisting drives their mission statement. Metrics cultural, and operational sustainability to reinforce a desired mode of opera- are derived from specific tasks that can be is the standard by which any materiel or tion. A set of advising postures estab- tracked and assessed on a regular basis. procedural solution should be judged. lishes the ability of an advising team to Advisors continually assess the effective- deliver coherent advice across a mission ness of their efforts, Afghan capabilities, Developing Advising Postures set that involves individual interactions and the assumptions in their advising Advisors leverage technical expertise in with Afghan counterparts. This allows posture. The assessment starts long be- the development and application of mil- for efficient and effective progress fore a materiel solution is identified and itary power with knowledge of Afghan toward a sustainable solution while at continues after equipment is fielded. culture and capabilities to construct an the same time advancing the coalition’s Destruct U.S. Methods/Paradigms. advising posture. This posture in turn counterinsurgency mission. The follow- Using their professional expertise in guides coordinated and coherent advice ing sections describe this process step employing airpower, advisors analyze and assistance. It is both flexible enough by step. coalition TTPs and deduce their appli- to respond to the tactical situation and Define the Mission. Good advising cability to the Afghan environment. The structured enough to direct lines of starts with a well-defined mission and an appropriate model of Afghan airpower, effort toward an identified endstate. accurate assessment based on mutually however, must be developed with intel- Through the processes of definition, beneficial security objectives. A properly lectual humility and with consideration
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Tucker and Sayedi 19 for Afghan strengths, capabilities, and coalition advisors to the Afghan air force working and flying alongside Afghan requirements. It should also be “less served 6-month tours, which were not partners are powerful mechanisms to intrusive and more insightful; less in con- long enough to enable them to become establish rapport, build relationships, and trol and more in support.”10 While there knowledgeable about their advising demonstrate a mission skill set. Thus, is institutional inertia for a technological mission and to establish a rapport with air advisors in Kabul work outside coali- solution,11 it is important for advisors their counterparts. Patience and sub- tion-secured compounds on a daily basis to weigh in on the sustainability of that tlety are required by both advisors and to properly engage with their Afghan technology in light of cultural, educa- counterparts to understand each other’s counterparts. tional, and economic considerations. perspectives, requirements, and strengths. After a period of seasoning, Afghan- Foreign military sale decisions often are When advising airlift operations, under- demonstrated proficiency allows advisors made at the diplomatic and strategic lev- standing transportation priorities helps to shift from assistance to advising while els, but make little tactical sense.12 advisors work with the Afghans to de- controlling the pace of the move to- Differentiate Regarding Afghan velop a sustainable solution. For example, ward an independent Afghan capability Mission/Culture. Advisors work with the movement of human remains to the through the enforcement of performance their Afghan counterparts to differentiate place of burial without unreasonable standards. Afghans should progress with between processes that are sustainable in delay is the top airlift priority due to diminishing mentor support without the Afghan environment and those that religious considerations. In addition, meddling merely to promote efficiencies. are not. Coalition processes are not nec- ANSF leave policies are designed to As T.E. Lawrence cautioned, it is “better essarily applicable to the Afghan air force, accommodate close ties with family and that they do it tolerably than that you and developing sustainable solutions is home villages. As a result, there is a large do it perfectly.”16 When Soviet advisors not possible without understanding the demand for troop transport from remote were held accountable for Afghan forces’ influence of culture, religion, politics, and bases back to the population centers performance, they tended to take control social considerations as an operational ne- around Kabul and Jalalabad. rather than advise Afghan forces. This cessity.13 With a heavy reliance on donor Construct an Advising Posture. imbalance slowed the development of countries that have a finite commitment Constructing advising postures requires Afghan capabilities. timeline and budget, Afghan operations time and patience in order to listen and The force protection/personal en- must conserve resources and vigorously observe. Reconciling what is said with gagement balance is carefully considered seek efficiencies in support functions what actually happens is crucial to devel- during the synthesis of any advising while preserving operational flexibility. oping practicable postures. Furthermore, posture, but the risk of an insider or Afghan officers require sound advice on effective advising postures balance Afghan insurgent attack is never completely how to provide airpower capabilities that success with the freedom to fail. Earned mitigated. Force protection and combat are both effective and efficient, but their success is excellent positive reinforcement skills training were increased after nine insights into sustainable practices are crit- of training, and Afghans take great pride NATC-A advisors were killed on April ical to finding a sustainable path to best in knowing their efforts have directly 27, 2011. The result was a decision to serve the Afghan people. The sustainable resulted in mission success. Conversely, harden the NATC-A staff offices and process should be a mix of technology, failure is an important training tool, and levy “guardian angel”17 requirements training, and support functions that en- the advising posture should manage risks on advisors. Under these requirements, ables affordable, sustainable, and capable and mitigate the consequences of failure advisor engagement with Afghan coun- airpower. Soviet advisors only knew how while promoting the ability of Afghans to terparts suffered significantly and resulted to replicate their experience in the Soviet live with their own decisions. An advising in policies and initiatives that were re- Union and could not differentiate their posture with too much emphasis on moved from Afghan realities. This type native ideological approach into a suc- assistance will result in overdependence. of fortress mentality is anathema to the cessful Afghan solution.14 Soviet advisors tended to complete a advising spirit and mission, and it is time Integrate Through Cultural task themselves rather than training their to return to embedded advising for staff Considerations. Successful advising counterparts. As a result, Afghans had advisors. Tactical-level advisors, however, postures integrate Afghan and coalition largely stopped working, preferring to remained embedded with the Afghans cultural considerations. Study of Afghan “lay all the burden and responsibility for and were able to adjust their advising history and culture before assuming practical work on the shoulders of the posture based on threat indicators while advising duties enables understanding advisors.”15 maintaining open relationships that pro- the context of Afghan airmen and their Ensure Balance. Advisors strive for duced significant results. In the 1980s, mission. Advisors need to immerse a balance between the advise and assist Soviet advisory teams were embedded themselves in their roles by attending functions, which is continually shifting, with the Afghan forces and, although meetings, flying on missions, and forming depending on the task and the maturity not authorized to do so, assisted with strong professional relationships with of the Afghan process. When balanced combat operations. They faced a threat their Afghan colleagues. Until 2008, with force protection considerations, of mujahideen infiltration in the ranks of
20 Forum / Advising the Afghan Air Force JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 U.S. Air Force Train, Advise, Assist Command–Air advisor pilot and guardian angel Airman and Afghan air force pilot after training flight on Cessna C-208, September 21, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Sandra Welch)
Afghan troops that was similar to the cur- cabin configurations for passenger or Mi-17s. Additionally, soldiers depend on rent insider threat of insurgent attacks on floor-loaded cargo/patient transport. fixed-wing CASEVAC to return home for Afghan soldiers and their advisors.18 However, a major C-208 deficiency is care and recovery. an unpressurized cabin and low service To establish a fixed-wing CASEVAC Fixed-Wing Airlift Advising ceiling. Unable to climb above the moun- capability, advisors assist the Afghan air Airlift in Afghanistan supports the tainous terrain, the aircraft’s en route force in assessing airfields, training flight counterinsurgency mission by extending operations through mountain passes and medics, and mentoring C-208 capabili- official services to the Afghan popula- valleys are required to be daytime visual ties. Airfields without a coalition presence tion, thereby increasing the legitimacy maneuvers even if airport approaches are are assessed for suitability by researching of the government. Airlift also provides under instrument flight rules. airfield characteristics such as runway a means to transport critical supplies Establishing a fixed-wing CASEVAC length, width, surface material and condi- across a mountainous country with capability is a military and economic tion, as well as taxi obstructions, security, limited roads. Finally, soldiers travel imperative. The Afghan system mirrors and fuel availability. C-208 pilots work home frequently to maintain the social the coalition medical evacuation process directly with Afghan flight medics from fabric of family and tribe, and airlift with rotary-wing lift from the point of the Kabul air wing hospital, attending to reduces soldiers’ time away from their injury to base hospitals. However, since litter and ambulatory patients who re- posts. These missions motivate airlift dedicated assets are expensive to operate, quire assistance during loading or flight. advisors and Afghan airmen to establish Afghan Mi-17 helicopters pick up soldiers Advisors coordinate with ANSF medics a sustainable airlift capability. close to the point of injury and take them to conduct training at their home airfield. C-208 Aircraft. The Afghan air to a forward field station or regional During these training sessions, medics force fleet of 26 C-208B Grand Caravan hospital. Wounded soldiers are next learn to configure the passenger cabin to aircraft is configured with a modern flown to the National Military Hospital accommodate litter patients, as well as to Garmin G1000 avionics suite and up in Kabul using fixed-wing CASEVAC, as load and properly secure litters. Medics to 10 removable seats (in addition to one C-208 can operate at 3 percent of and airlift planners also become familiar the pilot and copilot) to allow multiple the cost of generating the flights of two with C-208 CASEVAC capabilities and
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Tucker and Sayedi 21 in the province. The aerial photographs of the disaster area were quickly analyzed and provided to ground commanders and government officials to understand the magnitude of the mudslide and manage the risk of subsequent slides. C-130 Aircraft. In January 2013, Ashton Carter, then–Deputy Secretary of Defense, directed the U.S. Air Force to provide four C-130H aircraft and the requisite training to the Afghan air force by the end of September 2013.21 An arrival ceremony on October 9, 2013, celebrated the delivery of the first two aircraft. Expectations for the new capabilities they would provide were high as advisors worked to establish an advising posture and define the sustain- able solution while exercising the aircraft Salang Pass meanders through Hindu Kush Mountains and has been called one of most dangerous capabilities, command and control, and roads in world (U.S. Army/Michael K. Selvage) ground support infrastructure. Advisor operations, so they can request C-208 the windows thoroughly. Prior to the creativity and initiative enabled the first support instead of the more expensive start of such a mission, advisors conduct all-Afghan C-130 mission in June 2014. Mi-17 airlift. Finally, advisors educate extensive flight and ground training for The Afghan medium-airlift re- higher echelon leadership at shuras (con- the Afghan intelligence analysts. Some quirement consists of passenger, cargo, sultations) such as the Afghan National training flights might emphasize practice casualty, and human remains movement Army 203rd Corps Shura or National with camera equipment and coordination between main bases. The large majority CASEVAC Shura in December 2013. with pilots on selecting good routes and of missions carry up to 70 passengers Nontraditional intelligence, surveil- aspect angles for photographing specific and a baggage pallet loaded on the cargo lance, and reconnaissance is another ground targets. Pilots practice maneuvers ramp position. Occasionally, cargo mis- important capability that the C-208 can to orient the airplane for good photogra- sions are also tasked, but the planning provide. U.S. advisors and their Afghan phy from the windows, establish ground timelines for air transportation missions counterparts work together to differenti- tracks, and mitigate exposure to ground are centrally controlled by the Ministry ate coalition methodologies and establish threats. After the mission is completed, of Defense. Afghanistan has a robust skills that make sense for the Afghan mis- intelligence analysts apply imagery anal- ground transportation mode that moves sion, including TTPs, planning, analysis, ysis techniques to fix geospatial points, virtually all required supplies for the and exploitation. Confidence missions identify target features, and measure char- ANSF. Airlift transports passengers and and exercises are then used to validate the acteristic data. Such a continuum of flight sensitive cargo that must move quickly or training.19 Finally, the capability is proved and ground advising ensures that NTISR that is an attractive target for insurgent through success in support of real-world provides sound intelligence to the Afghan attack and theft (for example, ammuni- requirements. operational forces.20 tion, weapons, or leadership). Rather than requiring dedicated As coalition basing contracts to The C-130 is the largest and fastest assets, the C-208 is a suitable NTISR Kabul, an Afghan airfield assessment aircraft in the Afghan inventory. It is a platform due to its low operating cost, its capability is critical to survey airfields source of national pride, an indicator prevalence in the Afghan air force, and to support the dynamic airlift needs of of governmental legitimacy, and, as a its low visual and aural signatures. For counterinsurgency and humanitarian direct threat to the insurgents’ narrative, conducting NTISR, intelligence analysts relief operations. For instance, one of the a high-value target. As such, it normally receive a mission tasking and prepare a first airfields assessed was Feyzabad in flies to airfields where coalition security simple brief with global positioning sys- Badakhshan Province. Based on this as- is available to provide external security to tem coordinates and descriptions of the sessment, the Afghan air force was ready the aircraft and crew. To deliver sustain- targets. Pilots plan approach routing to to establish an air operations detachment able cargo and passenger capabilities, a mitigate threats and exploit advantageous there in late 2013. In May 2014, C-208 loadmaster posture that would work for sun angles. No modifications to the and C-130 crews executed airlift and both coalition-assisted and all-Afghan aircraft are typically required, although NTISR missions in support of humani- crews was developed. Cargo and passen- particular attention is paid to cleaning tarian relief operations after a mudslide ger loads that did not meet standards
22 Forum / Advising the Afghan Air Force JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 for safe transport were identified by the While their technical abilities had been a successful milestone in the medium air- loadmaster and assessed as an advising developed in a similar airlift aircraft, lan- lift capability of the Afghan air force was opportunity, with notification made to guage barriers remained. Second, damage achieved on June 16, 2014. the aircraft commander and the aerial to any of the small fleet of Afghan C-130s Aviation English Language port advisor. The aircraft commander would have a lasting, strategic impact Training. Advisors were developing a determined the time available to assess, on its medium-airlift operations due to passenger-only C-130 loadmaster sylla- advise, train, and assist aircrew and aerial limited heavy repair capability. Finally, bus in December 2013 when Raytheon port personnel. If time was not sufficient passenger missions with no cargo except a English language instructors announced to correct the problem, the cargo or pas- baggage pallet constituted 80 percent of that they had unfilled capacity for avia- sengers were refused. Discrepancies were the missions. tion English training. Because the four distributed to the appropriate advising Integrating the resulting Afghan mis- passenger-only loadmaster candidates teams to facilitate coordinated advising sion requirements with advisor resources were not proficient in English, they had postures. and capabilities allowed the synthesis of a not been identified for the loadmaster While pilots and a flight engineer practicable advising posture. Additional training pipeline in the United States. were in U.S. training programs in 2013, English instructors were available as a The fixed-wing advisors thus joined Afghan loadmaster students were not result of a realignment of a Raytheon their technical knowledge and expertise scheduled to complete training until contract (see below) to develop language with the Raytheon instructors’ language 2015. Therefore, to accelerate an initial lessons tailored to the loadmaster training instruction and curriculum development all-Afghan C-130 capability, advisor requirements. English instruction was skills to train loadmasters in Kabul. In initiative created a limited loadmaster integrated with C-130 aircrew proce- addition, Raytheon had remaining ca- course. Advisors noted that the vast ma- dures and systems training to support pacity to instruct more students. Thus jority of Afghan C-130 missions carried a loadmaster qualification course. The a 10-week Aviation English Training passengers, patients, or human remains, risk of aircraft damage was mitigated by (AET) course was developed in January with only a baggage pallet loaded on reserving training in winching operations 2014 to prepare 8 aircrew and 17 mainte- the cargo ramp. Advisors from the 538 or vehicle loading for the formal training nance students for success at the Defense AEAS were familiar with U.S. Air Force course at Little Rock Air Force Base, Language Institute (DLI) and follow-on training paradigms, as most had experi- Arkansas. Local loadmaster training technical training conducted in English. ence as schoolhouse instructors. U.S. Air focused on cargo compartment config- Four follow-on AET courses similarly Force loadmaster training is conducted uration for passengers, litter patients, or identified requirements from NATC-A using a syllabus that is structured around human remains. Only a baggage pallet stakeholders, resulting in a functional lesson plans and that employs classroom was loaded on the aft pallet position on English course for 108 students from learning, static load trainers, and flight the cargo ramp using a forklift. the Kabul air wing and DLI preparation instruction. (Static load trainers are non- The first C-130 mission with an courses for A-29 pilots and maintainers, flying aircraft that allow for continuous all-Afghan crew represented the conver- MD-530 helicopter pilots, students iden- training opportunities without the ex- gence of 9 months of assessing, training, tified for pilot training in the United Arab pense of using an aircraft maintained for advising, and assisting. The main risk Emirates, and Kabul air wing maintainers flying operations or the risk of damage was crew inexperience, and advisors identified for supervisory positions re- resulting in expensive repairs and impact and Afghan aircrew worked together to quiring English proficiency. on the flying mission.) This progression mitigate that risk. The mission was lim- To develop the AET advising pos- of instruction builds knowledge and skills ited to passengers, patients, and human ture, regular meetings with stakeholders for demonstration and practice with in- remains, with a baggage pallet loaded on defined the mission through an open creasing degrees of risk and expense. The the main ramp. A single stop at a familiar discussion of requirements. AET was highest risk of injury and damage occurs coalition-controlled field eased crew designed to instruct students in technical during cargo load training, particularly coordination and security concerns, and English to accelerate follow-on technical that involving winching operations or enabled a straightforward maintenance training. An analysis of the U.S. Air Force driving vehicles on board. recovery plan. High-ranking government process revealed a series of training events Advisors understood the risk of officials and international media were for each student: several months at DLI aircraft damage during loadmaster train- invited to welcome the crew at the end until the student achieved functional flu- ing and sought to mitigate the risk by of the mission, but no interviews were ency, followed by basic technical training differentiating U.S. Air Force training granted during preflight and departure (for example, maintenance, aircrew), and regarding the Afghan mission. First, for- to allow the crew to concentrate on ex- then specialized technical training (for mer C-27 instructor loadmasters assigned ecuting a safe airlift mission. A generous example, fuels, hydraulics, flight engineer, to the 373 FWS in Kabul were not slated timeline allowed for response to unfore- loadmaster). Differentiating this process for C-130 training in the United States seen delays without imposing stress on regarding Afghan considerations, advisors because of English language deficiencies. the aircrew. As a result of these measures, determined that it would be valuable
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Tucker and Sayedi 23 5 to shorten the time that Afghans are posture by which advisors can develop John A. Nagl, Institutionalizing Adapta- tion: It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor deployed for overseas training and that, and deliver airlift capabilities to the Corps (Washington, DC: Center for a New under an existing contract, Raytheon Afghan air force. American Security, June 2007), 4. See also had the expertise to develop and deliver A critical requirement that enables Michael A. Keltz, “Getting Our Partners Air- technical English training in Afghanistan. advisors to adapt coalition techniques to borne: Training Air Advisors and Their Impact Additionally, through a stakeholders’ the Afghan airlift mission is an intimate In-Theater,” Air & Space Power Journal, May– June 2014, 7. meeting, C-130 maintenance and knowledge of what works in Afghanistan. 6 Olga Oliker, Building Afghanistan’s Se- Pohantoon-e-Hawayee (Air University) To achieve this level of knowledge, ad- curity Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience advisors identified Afghans who could visors must immerse themselves in their (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011), 43. benefit from a DLI preparation course. missions, develop personal relationships 7 Artemy Kalinovsky, The Blind Leading At this meeting, 538 AEAS advisors with their counterparts, and seek to learn the Blind: Soviet Advisors, Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan, Working obtained NATC-A/J7 approval to con- and understand—and then create—advis- Paper #60 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson struct an AET capability. The integrated ing postures that are imposed on Afghans International Center for Scholars, January solution included Raytheon English in a coalition-centric environment. 2010), 8. instructors, advisors from the 538 AEAS It is time to return to the embedded 8 Boyd. to oversee operations and provide aircrew advisory posture and invert the ratio of 9 Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, subject matter expertise, NATC-A/J7 time spent between coalition and Afghan August 11, 2011), IV-1. to administer the Raytheon contract and workspaces. Afghans have had mentors 10 Jim Garamone, “Mullen Stresses Pre- advise the Afghan air force/G7 (Training for a generation, and their knowledge cision, Innovation to Graduates,” Air Force Office), and the 440 AEAS to provide and vision must be integral to the devel- Print News Today, June 10, 2010, available at maintenance subject matter expertise. opment of advising postures, not as an
24 Forum / Advising the Afghan Air Force JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 U.S. Navy Sailors perform casualty evacuation training in preparation for Exercise Eager Lion 15 in Jordan, May 3, 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Austin A. Lewis)
Enhancing Security Cooperation Effectiveness A Model for Capability Package Planning
By Thomas W. Ross
eveloping key capabilities of role in overall campaign strategies. Enabling collective action through partner nation militaries is an Elsewhere, the United States is seeking partner capacity-building plays as a D important pillar of U.S. national to develop the capabilities of select leitmotif throughout President Barack defense strategy. In critical missions, partner militaries to help them conduct Obama’s 2015 National Security Strat- such as military operations in Iraq and or support distinct missions, such as egy, which asserts that “in addition Afghanistan, building armed forces counterterrorism or counterprolifera- to acting decisively to defeat direct from the bottom up occupies a central tion, to diminish risks to U.S. security. threats, we will focus on building the capacity of others to prevent the causes and consequences of conflict to include Thomas W. Ross is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation in the Office countering extreme and dangerous of the Secretary of Defense for Policy. ideologies.”1 The strategy expresses
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Ross 25 U.S. commitment to strengthening the sets forth a Capability Package Planning capability cannot be equated with a single capabilities of partners to fight terror- Model (CPPM) intended to guide weapons system; rather, it is “provided by ism, support peacekeeping missions, assessment of capability requirements one or more systems, and is made up of deter aggression, prevent conflict, and and programmatic risks; to identify key the combined effects of multiple inputs.”6 respond to regional crises. inputs comprising a military capability; A subordinate definitional question, then, Despite the primacy of partner na- and to develop comprehensive capability is: What exactly are the key inputs to ca- tion capacity-building in U.S. strategy, packages that address capability require- pability generation? the fact is that investments to develop ments across all necessary dimensions While it may not always be reflected partner military capabilities have achieved and ensure that U.S. security cooperation in the context of foreign capabili- mixed results. The security cooperation investments are more closely linked to ty-building, U.S. and key allied defense community is rife with anecdotes about priority objectives derived from national establishments have developed sophis- U.S.-provided helicopters rusting away and defense strategic guidance. ticated understandings of the inputs in hangars after only a few years of use or The CPPM is intended for practi- essential to their own capability-gen- of armored Humvees sitting on blocks in tioners of security cooperation planning, eration efforts. The Joint Capabilities perpetual disrepair.2 Too often, U.S. mil- primarily those within the U.S. military Integration and Development System itary capacity-building efforts have failed but also for practitioners within the secu- (JCIDS) is used by the U.S. military to to deliver sustainable, effective partner rity components of other Federal agencies provide guidance for “identification of ca- capabilities that truly ease operational and other security exporters who wrestle pability requirements and capability gaps, burdens on U.S. forces. In a time of fiscal with similar challenges as U.S. military development of requirements documents austerity, the Department of Defense planners. In practice, these planners’ . . . [and] post-validation development must examine how it can do better with craft is carried out in a fast-paced context and implementation of materiel and the limited resources available. where time pressures, cultural contexts, non-materiel capability solutions.”7 It While many variables have under- security environments, leadership de- sets forth several key inputs to capability mined success in capability-building mands, and other factors often frustrate generation represented by the acronym efforts, at the core of the issue is how intentions to apply theoretical models DOTMLPF-P: doctrine, organization, misconceptions of what a capability without adjustments and improvisations. training, materiel, leadership and educa- entails lead to gaps in implementation. This model is intended not to dictate a tion, personnel, facilities, and policy.8 The Simply put, we have too often directly step-by-step checklist for planners but DOTMLPF-P approach urges military equated a capability with a weapons rather to shape thinking about how to planners to examine those eight catego- system and a minimal operator training plan security cooperation activities in the ries as they develop solutions to a military course. As one analyst writes, “Raising practical context. It is not meant solely capability requirement. These elements, armies is more sophisticated than this, for practitioners, however; policymakers under the JCIDS guidance, should be and involves engaging civil society, also need a clearer understanding of what considered in the context of available growing leaders, building institutions and capability-building should entail to guide resources and “must work in concert to instilling professionalism. Training and their decisions about associated resources, ensure consistent decision making while equipping alone only gives you better authorities, and strategies. delivering timely and cost effective capa- dressed soldiers who shoot straighter.”3 bility solutions to the Warfighters.”9 Capability is not simply a weapon or piece Defining Capability Several similar approaches exist of equipment; it is a complex system of To set the stage for a CPPM, we must elsewhere. The North Atlantic Treaty mutually reinforcing inputs that combine first define what we mean when we Organization has adopted the model to enable a military to achieve a necessary discuss a military capability. in whole cloth, but adds an I to the function in support of a specific mission. In a military context, capability entails acronym (DOTMLPF-I) to address To effectively develop partner nation the ability to perform a function in order interoperability. The United Kingdom’s military capabilities, security cooperation to achieve a military operational objective. Ministry of Defence Architecture activities must be planned in accordance The Joint Staff defines capability as “the Framework directs its capability devel- with a capability definition that encom- ability to achieve a specified wartime opment process to address training, passes all necessary inputs and supports objective.” Furthermore, “it includes four equipment, personnel, information, clearly defined objectives to develop major components: force structure, mod- concepts and doctrine, organization, these inputs. Only through planning ernization, readiness, and sustainability.”4 infrastructure, and logistics inputs.10 comprehensive capability packages— The Australian Ministry of Defence de- Interoperability is described as “an over- instead of imbalanced assistance that fines capability as “the capacity or ability to arching theme.” The Australian Defence prioritizes hardware—can the United achieve an operational effect . . . described Capability Development Handbook States maximize success in building in terms of the nature of the effect and identifies similar inputs to its capability partner military capabilities to offset risks of how, when, where, and for how long development model: personnel, organi- to U.S. national security. This article it is produced.”5 An effective military zation, collective training, major systems,
26 Forum / Enhancing Security Cooperation Effectiveness JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 supplies, facilities, support, and command and management. Various academic Figure 1. CPPM Step 1: Assessing and Focusing Capability Packages studies, such as those by Canadian de- fense scholar Christopher Ankersen and by a team of scholars at the University Strategic of Cambridge’s Centre for Technology Objective Management, have developed similar Partner Strategic 11 frameworks. Alignment These models vary in the inputs they identify, but they share critical characteris- tics. First, they emphasize that a capability is a complex and interlocking system of Absorptive inputs rather than a weapons system or Capacity Capability personnel unit. Second, they demonstrate that capabilities require inputs from several different levels of a military: at Partner Will/ Support the tactical level, where defense systems and their operators are organized and employed; at the operational level, Risk Analysis where these systems are linked with supporting functions such as logistics and intelligence; and at the strategic level, where policies, strategies, and doctrine guide and sustain. Finally, these models recognize that capability generation is a ing resources and how to understand, on building partner nation capabilities long-term undertaking requiring atten- map, and seek to mitigate risks to that directly support the provider’s stra- tion to sustainment across the various capability-generation efforts. The model tegic national security interests. Linking inputs. Each of these characteristics is requires detailed assessment of the capability-building focal areas to provider essential for effective capability package partner nation’s security environment strategic objectives should begin with an planning to build partner nation military and operational conditions that should assessment of the partner’s security envi- capabilities. be taken into account in planning, ronment: What shared interests or threats For the purposes of this article, then, including assessments of: are at stake, and which of these are of we can draw from these models a more highest priority to the provider nation? the provider nation’s strategic objec- refined definition of military capability: •• What missions would the partner ideally tives to be addressed an ability to achieve a specific military be capable of conducting in support of, the extent to which a partner operational objective that is supported, •• in tandem with, or in lieu of action by the nation’s defense strategy is aligned enabled, and sustained by all relevant provider? What are the critical capability with the provider’s own strategy defense systems at the institutional, stra- gaps hindering the partner from playing the extent to which a partner nation tegic, operational, and tactical levels. •• a more robust role in addressing priority is committed to building a particular With the benefit of this definition, shared interests? How might regional military capability let us now develop the CPPM itself. actors react to new partner capabilities? the extent to which a partner nation As noted, the model offers a concep- •• Ultimately, this assessment should enable has the capacity to absorb proposed tual framework for developing partner planners to hone in on capability needs assistance military capabilities as guided, clear, that have a clear, direct, and prioritized the risks associated with a potential transparent, achievable objectives •• link to national and military strategic capability-building investment. spanning the full spectrum of necessary objectives. capability inputs. While these factors are not the only Partner-Nation Strategic relevant factors determining success, they Alignment. Equally important is an as- Step One: Focusing Capability represent the core analytical questions sessment of whether partner nations have Development Efforts that should determine whether and how developed coherent national and military The CPPM is built upon the assertion investments in capability generation are strategies, as well as the extent to which that focusing on the right capability to undertaken (see figure 1). such strategies identify objectives that are build is half the battle. Step one of the Strategic Objective. Capability- compatible with provider nation strategic model offers a framework for assessing building programs will have the greatest objectives. Does the partner maintain where to invest limited capacity-build- strategic value to the extent they focus a compatible perspective on shared
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Ross 27 interests and threats? Does the partner’s costs include the long-term assignment militaries. These assessments should pre- national security or defense strategy take of personnel to support a new capabil- dict where capability-generation efforts account of such shared interests and ity; fuel, spare parts, and maintenance; are most vulnerable to failure, facilitate threats and prioritize development of development of supporting capabilities examination of capability trade-offs, capabilities to address them? Is the part- such as refueling or reconnaissance; and and enable planning of risk mitigation ner prepared to work with the provider so on. Assessing a partner’s capacity and measures. They should also help planners to develop military capabilities? Central commitment to absorb such costs should map where diplomatic intervention is to this assessment will be an examina- shape the scope of every capability-gener- needed, which individuals within a part- tion of how the partner understands its ation effort. ner military or government will be vital military capabilities and gaps and how In many cases, however, it is unreal- stakeholders, and where providers might it seeks to address shared interests or istic to expect a partner nation to bear all face resistance. In some cases, these threats through appropriate military associated long-term costs, and high-pri- assessments may help planners avoid capabilities. Partners may be strategically ority operational demands may make investments that are unlikely to bear fruit, misaligned with providers when strategic it equally unrealistic to avoid capabili- thus helping providers limit losses and guidance is absent or incomplete, when ty-building activities because of a lack of demonstrate to partner governments a there are widely divergent assessments absorptive capacity. Again, an assessment better track record of success. of core threats, or when partners seek of partner absorptive capacity should fundamentally incompatible solutions to not pose a binary choice of whether to Step Two: Defining threats that are mutually identified and proceed. Rather, such an assessment Capability Inputs prioritized. should identify risks to an effort and Step two of the CPPM moves from Strategic misalignment does not support the development of measures to identifying which capability should be necessarily argue for foreclosing further mitigate such risks. Such measures could built to assessing what comprises that security cooperation with a partner include long-term commitments of se- capability. It suggests a framework for nation; rather, it should lead to greater curity assistance to support sustainment, defining capability requirements so as to focus on intervention at the institutional investment in the development of institu- ensure that all essential inputs are iden- level instead of a focus on generating op- tional planning and budgeting capacities, tified and addressed. erational capabilities. Targeted assistance arrangements for the supply of parts and This article defines military capability in development of strategic guidance, maintenance services, or targeted training as an ability to achieve a specific military as well as mutual exchanges of strategic of technicians, logisticians, and other sup- operational objective that is supported, perspectives, can mitigate strategic mis- porting personnel. enabled, and sustained by all relevant alignment and lay the groundwork for Risk Analysis. Finally, planners defense systems at the institutional, deeper, more productive cooperation in should take into account systemic risks strategic, operational, and tactical levels. the future. within a partner nation that could While drawing upon the discussion of Partner Nation Support and Will. threaten the long-term viability of capa- the DOTMLPF-P model and related Success will also depend on whether bility-generation efforts. Risk assessments approaches, step two of the CPPM the partner supports a notional capa- should not only examine security dimen- framework seeks to operationalize this bility-generation effort and whether sions but also include analysis of political definition through a simpler approach that partner possesses the political will and economic instability risks, corruption to facilitate ease of use and applicabil- to invest (in terms of both funding and risks, risks associated with significant ity to a wide range of partner military effort) in developing and sustaining the changes in political direction of partner structures. It suggests that a military capability. Capability-building efforts nation governments, and similar factors. capability consists of proficiency in five may be doomed to failure by partners Such assessments should identify the primary areas: defense systems; personnel; who are not sufficiently invested in their types of risk and map out individuals and enablers; strategy, doctrine, and plans; completion because such partners are organizations likely to impact such risks, and institutional support and oversight less likely to pursue policy and budget for better or worse. (see figure 2). Each of these elements is decisions necessary to sustain and effec- Preliminary assessments of these five mutually reinforcing and interdependent. tively employ new capabilities. Persistent elements lay the foundation for smart Significant shortfalls in one area can deci- diplomatic engagement throughout the planning decisions by helping to identify sively undermine efforts to build capacity life cycle of a capability-generation effort the capability gaps that are most con- in others. The five elements are discussed is necessary to assess and maintain partner ducive to assistance or cooperation by in more detail below. commitment to the effort’s successful providers and by illuminating functional Defense Systems. The defense system completion. areas that serve strategic objectives, component of a capability requires that Partner Nation Absorptive Capacity. that are aligned with partner strategic a partner nation obtain materiel that is New military capabilities are almost guidance, and that can be supported and appropriately matched to the particular never developed without a cost. Such absorbed by partner governments and capability sought; thus, successfully
28 Forum / Enhancing Security Cooperation Effectiveness JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 planning a capability-generation effort Figure 2. Inputs to Full-Spectrum Capability Development requires that capability requirements are
defined with sufficient rigor and detail Weapons System to allow materiel solutions to be appro- Supporting Systems priately matched to needs.12 A defense Spare/Replacement Parts Munitions Defense System system may include a weapons system, ve- hicles such as aircraft or boats, munitions, Logistics Facilities & Infrastructure communications equipment, and other Maintenance defense articles, as well as the spare and Command & Control Personnel Intelligence Support replacement parts and support equipment Battlefield Medicine & Education necessary to maintain it. Training Personnel. The personnel compo- Professional Military Education nent requires that the partner nation Recruiting & Retention Enablers Capability United Organization & Allocation ensure appropriate military personnel are Deployment Management assigned, organized, and trained to sup- Reserve Component Affairs
port the capability—not only to operate National & Defense Strategy relevant equipment but also to provide Military Plans Strategy/Doctrine/Plans Doctrine & Concepts critical enabling and support functions. Tactics, Techniques & Procedures Trained personnel are not simply pro- ficient in operating a defense system, Resource Management Human Resource Management Institutional Support but also can do so in accordance with Acquisition, Logistics Systems & Supply Chains doctrine, policy, procedures, strategy, and Policy Oversight Interagency Governance commanders’ guidance. For a capability Public Relations to be fully developed, a partner military should maintain a training and education C4ISR—command, control, com- achieve specified objectives, ideally with system that provides for a steady pipeline munications, computers, intelligence, clearly defined relationships between de- of personnel adequately trained to sup- surveillance, and reconnaissance—enables sired ends and available ways and means. port the capability. The partner must also military leaders to exercise authority to Doctrine provides a common concep- organize its military forces appropriately direct resources and personnel to achieve tual foundation for how military forces to achieve and maintain a capability. specific missions. Interoperability is the should execute military strategies. As In a well-organized force, subordinate enabling function behind coalition oper- defined by the JCIDS, doctrine consists components coordinate action with other ations; it is the ability of different military of “fundamental principles that guide subordinate components and enable the services (both within and among nations) the employment of . . . military forces in broader component to accomplish its to operate together to achieve a common coordinated action toward a common mission. goal. As a 2001 RAND study demon- objective.”15 It is authoritative guidance Enablers. Every defense system is strates, interoperability includes “the to be followed except when commanders supported by an array of functions that ability of forces from different nations determine exceptional circumstances enable the effective, sustainable, repeat- to work effectively together given the require an alternative approach. Strategy able employment of the system. One of nature of the forces and the combined and doctrine inform military plans, which the most critical enabling functions—one military organizational structure”; “the provide formalized constructs for execut- that, when neglected, is among the most effectiveness of the combined military ing specific military actions. common points of failure in partner organizational structure”; and “the de- Institutional Support and Oversight. nation capacity-building efforts—is lo- gree of similarity of technical capabilities An effective military capability requires gistics. Logistics should be understood of the forces from different nations.”14 robust institutional support and over- to encompass several different functions Interoperability is thus not simply a mat- sight—that is, the institutional-level that empower a military to deploy and ter of effectively interfacing technologies; formal and informal processes and per- support its forces, including “deployment it includes organizational and institu- sonnel responsible for implementing such and distribution, supply, maintenance, tional elements as well. processes, who operate to plan, direct, logistic services, operational contract sup- Strategy, Doctrine, and Plans. sustain, and oversee institution-wide port, engineering, and health services.”13 Effective military capabilities are em- policies, programs, and activities in Infrastructure and basing are also relevant ployed in alignment with national support of effective and sustainable considerations. military strategies, according to military military action. Defense institutions Among several other enabling doctrine, in support of specific military oversee numerous functions that ensure a functions, two should be particularly plans. Military or defense strategies guide particular capability can endure. Among highlighted: C4ISR and interoperability. the use of the military instrument to the most critical is oversight: the active
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Ross 29 U.S. Army 173rd Airborne Brigade Soldiers conduct airborne operations during Exercise Allied Spirit II at U.S. Army’s Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, August 13, 2015 (U.S. Army/Caleb Barrieau) and persistent exercise of mechanisms to mechanisms for overseeing implemen- Step Three: Capability examine whether military programs and tation of capability-generation activities. Development Activities activities are meeting stated objectives, Despite the scant attention that this core Step one of the CPPM attempts to help timelines, policy and legal guidance, capability receives, no military capability planners assess which capability should and quality standards. Furthermore, will endure without robust institutional be built, and step two examines what defense institutions are responsible for oversight and support. comprises that capability. Step three providing clear policy guidance; ensuring These five categories provide a frame- suggests a framework for planning a long-term strategy for resourcing ca- work for conceptualizing essential inputs how to build the selected capability. It pabilities through budget planning and in developing a partner military capability. asserts that effective capability-gener- acquisition processes; ensuring long-term They capture the concepts of capability ation efforts require a sustained and force development and human resource development models used by the U.S. integrated set of security cooperation management strategies; and managing military and others, but are simplified activities across spectrums of duration, relationships, agreements, and activities for greater applicability and adaptability. scope, and difficulty. Just as a capabil- with allies and partners. Finally, defense An understanding of these inputs should ity cannot be equated to a weapons ministries often play essential, if not guide and enable assessments of partners’ system, a capability cannot be built leading, roles in managing civil-military capability gaps and requirements, con- through a single activity or program. relations and in managing intragovern- cepts for addressing the most pressing What is needed is a range of engage- mental or interagency processes. gaps across the spectrum of inputs, iden- ments, including both short-term and Institutional support and oversight tification of significant risks to an activity’s long-term programs; activities targeting are the most often neglected of the core success, and development of truly com- single individuals, small units, and capability components listed. Few of the prehensive capability packages that address broader audiences; and efforts requir- capability development models discussed multiple inputs in a mutually reinforcing ing more and less intensive activities. previously, for example, adequately fashion through the combination of ap- This framework groups security coop- highlight the criticality of institutional propriate security cooperation tools. eration activities into five main categories:
30 Forum / Enhancing Security Cooperation Effectiveness JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 contacts and engagements, exercises, Figure 3. CPPM Step 3: Capability Development Activities education, train-and-equip activities, and institutional capacity-building activities. These categories move roughly along a spectrum from short term to long term, Duration from the individual level to the collective level, and progressively toward a higher degree of complexity (see figure 3). Scope Exercises Contacts and Engagements. Most Education Train E uip Train militaries engage in a range of short-term, Institution Building Complexity/ evel of Effort small-scale activities designed primarily to Contacts/Engagements build military-to-military relationships, familiarize partners with new information such as tactics or doctrine, and develop effectiveness. As such, combined exercises Finally, education and training programs common standards and operating proce- can play an important role in supporting reach outside the schoolhouse through dures. Such activities can be categorized the development of military capabilities in mobile training teams and similar field- as contacts and engagements and may a partner country. based training. include military staff talks, subject matter To the extent possible, combined ex- Educational programs have proved expert exchanges, personnel exchanges, ercises should be designed specifically to effective as tools both to build mili- conferences and seminars, and similar put into practice partner nation military tary-to-military relationships and to activities. capabilities in development. Doing so impart essential skills to select partner na- While contacts and engagements allows such exercises to provide practical tion military personnel. However, rarely are primarily of benefit in building re- training in realistic scenarios to military are educational programs sufficiently inte- lationships, they can also be important personnel associated with a developing grated into broader capability-generation elements of broader strategies to build capability and to expose them to different efforts. Such programs offer opportuni- partner military capabilities and should models of how to exercise a particular ties to educate well-positioned current be planned as such. For example, subject capability. Furthermore, such exercises and future military leaders in skills and matter expert exchanges can assist in allow planners to assess progress in de- tradecraft directly associated with a de- shaping partner nation thinking about veloping capabilities, identify areas where veloping military capability, and thus to the development of doctrine for new progress is lagging, and adjust program- build a cadre of professionals across levels weapons systems or in highlighting ming accordingly. of rank and experience to manage and the need for enabling support such as Education. The education category sustain the new capability. logistics systems. Seminars can be used is intended to capture the range of train- Train-and-Equip Activities. Often to convene planners from two or more ing and education activities that target classified as “security assistance” within partner nations to develop approaches to individual students or participants for the United States, these activities consist interoperability. Military staff talks can tailored or structured learning, often of programs designed to convey materiel reinforce partner political commitment to in a classroom environment. The most to partner nations and to provide training the development of new capabilities. In common type of activity in this category relating to such materiel, though training short, contacts and engagements should is the inclusion of partner nation military often narrowly targets operators of the be integrated throughout the capability or defense civilian personnel in academic new equipment. These programs, which development life cycle to supplement, or continuing military education school- include sales, grants, and loans of military reinforce, and maintain commit- house courses. In the United States, equipment, have been the bread and ment to more enduring or intensive programs such as International Military butter of capability-building efforts.16 programming. Education and Training and the Counter However, too often they have focused Exercises. Many militaries conduct Terrorism Fellowship Program bring exclusively on delivery of a weapons preparatory exercises to train their hundreds of foreign military students into system without integration of supporting personnel to exercise essential military classrooms, ranging from military Service functions and capabilities. activities, prepare for likely scenarios, academies to civilian university graduate Train-and-equip programs are most and assess vulnerabilities in planning and schools, every year. Other educational effective when they develop packages execution. Combined exercises—those activities are more tailored to improv- that invest both in weapons systems involving two or more partner nation ing technical skills; for example, the and in necessary supporting equipment, militaries—are often used both to seek U.S. Naval Small Craft Instruction and such as logistics assets and intelligence, such training benefits and to help train Technical Training School teaches skills surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. partner military personnel, expose necessary for the effective operation and Such packages will ideally include training them to new tactics, and assess their maintenance of small maritime vessels. for system operators, military planners,
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Ross 31 Dutch soldiers take part in Combined Resolve, which trains participants in joint, multinational, and integrated environments alongside U.S. and NATO allies (U.S. Army/John Cress, Jr.) logisticians, personnel with critical C4ISR activities should target defense ministries cross-cutting approaches should be roles, and others in enabling functions. and, in some cases, other security minis- applied to each capability component. Maintenance of new equipment—a tries; service-level headquarters units; and However, with resources often limited, function often contracted out—is a core other strategic-level military units, such as planners will commonly need to make function that should be developed as part joint staffs or functional commands. choices about where to prioritize activ- of any significant new capability. An effective capability-generation ities; such choices should be informed Institutional Capacity-Building effort will plan and integrate activities by the capability gaps and programmatic Activities. Developing effective institu- across each of these five categories, risks identified through assessments un- tional systems for budget and personnel matching them across each of the five ca- dertaken in step one. management, strategy and doctrine pability components identified in CPPM development, strategic planning, acqui- step two. For example, building capacity Step Four: Overarching sition, logistics, military intelligence, and in the personnel component may involve Considerations other vital functions requires long-term institutional capacity-building activities The final layer of the CPPM highlights and carefully tailored engagement. to help a partner nation develop a viable three overarching considerations that Institutional capacity-building is the most professional military education plan; should be addressed throughout each often neglected element of capability educational programs to build knowledge of the other three steps. The first generation, yet it is the element most vital and skills among a key leadership cadre overarching consideration is assessment, to ensuring enduring capability. From the associated with a new capability; subject which entails evaluating capabilities, “ghost soldiers” on Afghan and Yemeni matter exchanges to examine approaches capability gaps, and capability-building budget books to the lack of logistics to force structuring and manning in efforts throughout a program’s lifecycle. systems driving the 2011 collapse of relation to the capability; and focused, A second consideration is sequencing: Mali’s army, U.S. capability development field-based training of a core group of the order and pace of programming efforts have been plagued by institutional personnel, both operators and enablers, planned as part of a capability-generat- neglect. Institutional capacity-building in support of the new capability. Such ing effort. Finally, security cooperation
32 Forum / Enhancing Security Cooperation Effectiveness JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 planners should consider how to address Figure 4. The Capability Package Planning Model sustainability: the potential for elements g of the capability to endure throughout a ncin ue capability-generation effort. Se S us t ta Assessment. Assessments should guide n in e m m e s n security cooperation activities throughout s t e s s the lifespan of a capability-generation A Strategic Contacts/Engagements Objective effort. Well-conceived initial assessments Partner Strategic Alignment help planners identify capability gaps Exercises and potential program risks to provide Absorptive Capacity a baseline to measure the results of Capability Education Enablers future investments and performance. Personnel
Defense System Train E uip
Intermittent evaluations of program PartnerSupport Will/ Institutional Support Strategy/Doctrine/Plans effectiveness steer course corrections Risk Analysis Institution Building to reorient programs that are failing to deliver desired results. Evaluations at the end of individual activities or broader capability development efforts produce vital feedback about what works and what Sustainment. Except in limited cases, to emphasize an approach to capabili- does not, providing lessons to future capability development efforts should aim ty-building that is rooted in best prac- planners and empowering policymakers to create capabilities that are enduring tices for force development and careful to address flaws in existing authorities, and sustained by partner nation militaries analysis and mitigation of programmatic policies, and resource allocations. Finally, themselves. This goal requires addressing risks. There are three broad implications assessments and evaluations are vital sustainment concerns throughout the of this conceptual framework. tools for pursuing accountability—that lifespan of a capability development effort First, capability development must be is, ensuring that partner legal, policy, and and across the capability spectrum. It de- planned as a long-term and multifaceted financial commitments are achieved—an mands, for example, that defense systems undertaking; it is unlikely that any single essential element of effective security provided to a partner be accompanied program or line of activity, no matter how cooperation. by budgetary estimates of the costs of robust, will successfully build an enduring Sequencing. A well-conceived sustainment and support over the life military capability. implementation plan for developing a of the system and that a viable plan for Second, the planning phase demands partner military capability will sequence meeting such costs is established. This far more emphasis than it currently re- activities according to order, duration, goal demands we examine how to build ceives. Because many security cooperation and intervening time to maximize success indigenous capacities for certain critical planners are already overtaxed, the only of the overall effort. Initial assessments functions, such as logistics, where possi- way planning will receive the attention will help identify what capability gaps are ble rather than only providing contract and resources it demands is for security most urgent, and persistent engagements support. It requires that we work with cooperation planners to be robustly will offer opportunities to refine those a partner to ensure that the capability supported by policy and programmatic conclusions. In sequencing security is adequately accounted for in national experts at combatant commands, within cooperation activities, planners should strategic and doctrinal guidance. When the Services, and in the Pentagon. consider the following questions: Are planners fail to develop long-term plans Without robust reachback, long-term there prerequisites to capability-building that plot out capability-generation efforts security cooperation planning will be work in a particular area? Will addressing over the course of sustained engagements overwhelmed by limited bandwidth and certain areas early in a capability-gen- and multiple activities, sustainment of the pressing deadlines. eration effort significantly mitigate risk capability nearly always suffers. Finally, building partner nation to the broader effort in the long run? military capabilities is an interagency Do the planned sequence and pace of Conclusion task, not a Defense Department mission activities comport with partner nation The Capability Package Planning Model alone. Military capability development absorptive capacity? What activities are offers a conceptual framework for how requires sustained diplomatic engage- needed during the course of the long- planners and policymakers should con- ment to ensure sustained partner nation term capability-generation effort to ceive of the critical analytical and pro- commitment. Furthermore, it requires maintain partner support for the effort, grammatic inputs to building partner sufficient capacities to exist across the and when should they occur? The order nation military capabilities (see figure partner government and interventions by and pace of activities should reflect such 4). The model is not intended to dictate other provider nation agencies to support analysis. a step-by-step planning checklist, but development of those capacities where
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Ross 33 necessary. For that reason, even the most ners to work with the United States to achieve (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, October 16, strategic objectives, with a primary connotation 2013), available at
34 Forum / Enhancing Security Cooperation Effectiveness JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Medical team members provide emergency room support as part of New Horizons Honduras 2015 training exercise, improving joint training readiness of U.S. and partner nation civil engineers, medical professionals, and support personnel through humanitarian assistance activities, August 7, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/David J. Murphy)
Global Health, Concepts, and Engagements Significant Enhancer for U.S. Security and International Diplomacy
By Aizen J. Marrogi and Edwin Burkett
he United States and its global Civil wars in Syria, Yemen, Ukraine, operations and subsequent withdrawal allies face a multitude of chal- and parts of Africa compound sectar- from Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, T lenges to peace and stability. ian disorder in the aftermath of U.S. decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict, political unrest in Egypt and Turkey, and Iran’s attempts to dominate the Colonel Aizen J. Marrogi, USAR, MD, is a Command Surgeon with the 352nd Civil Affairs Unit at Fort region—countered by pushback from Meade, Maryland, and Faculty Member at the Uniformed Services University (USU) in Bethesda, Saudi Arabia and Gulf allies—con- Maryland. Colonel Edwin Burkett, USAF, MD, MBA, FAAP, is the Director of the Global Health Division and Assistant Professor in the Department of Preventive Medicine and Biometrics at USU. He is also a tribute to geopolitical turmoil. Com- Family Physician, Flight Surgeon, and Air Force International Health Specialist. pounding matters are the emergence of
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Marrogi and Burkett 35 Daesh (the Islamic State of Iraq and the intention in the following articles on The first three articles published in Levant) and other extreme theocratic Global Health Engagement is not only to this issue aim to set the basis for Global groups and the uprooting of more highlight military and diplomatic applica- Health Engagement, discuss its place than 9 million human beings, causing tions, but also to discuss the challenges within the humanitarian community, a complex humanitarian catastrophe of leadership preparation, understanding the local cultural context, and look at rarely witnessed in modern times. health systems, and ethical and humani- aspects of health where DOD can har- Against these overwhelming difficul- tarian complexities. The U.S. military ness capabilities for positive impacts. The ties, Muslims, Arabs, and the rest of health system is rightfully focused and first article by Gerald V. Quinnan, Jr., the world expect and anticipate U.S. adequately prepared to meet its primary provides a background for global health forward engagement to help resolve mission of care for deployed forces as well and overview of the progress of DOD many of these threats. as forces and families at home. However, Global Health Engagement. Next, Paul Over the last 200 years, the United we are just beginning to improve capa- A. Gaist and Ramey L. Wilson discuss States has engaged in foreign conflicts bilities for Global Health Engagement in the interaction among nongovernmental against state and nonstate actors, with the joint operating environment. organizations, the larger humanitarian successful outcomes against the former The target audiences for this conver- community, and military forces. Agreed (Spanish- and Mexican-American wars, sation are military and Federal strategic rules of cooperation among actors oper- World War I, World War II, and the decisionmakers who impact the develop- ating in the same complex environment Gulf wars) and guarded withdrawals ment, organization, and employment of are crucial. when facing the latter (pirates of Tripoli, DOD health assets. Such leaders, in addi- The last article explores specific Red Russians, and Vietnam). Where tion to health leaders, must grasp the great skill sets about disaster relief (Thomas the United States has failed to achieve potential for the correct employment of R. Cullison, Charles W. Beadling, and full military and political victory has health in support of regional and global Elizabeth Erickson). These capabilities been against nonstate actors and groups interests. Since these leaders also serve as can be applicable on a sustainable basis in with strong ideological convictions and the integrators between and across agen- different types of operations, including motivations (current engagements with cies, a common basis of knowledge in humanitarian relief for displaced popula- Daesh and the Taliban appear to follow health will be invaluable in moving toward tions. The article on disaster relief also these lines). The challenge for U.S. lead- improved outcomes and strategic effects. touches on the agreements that govern ers is how to win asymmetric kinetic wars Joint Force Quarterly shall publish ad- such efforts, such as the Oslo Guidelines. against a motivated enemy who either in- ditional articles in the series in the future. The U.S. Government as well as other timidates or has the sympathy of the local Therefore, we have organized the series state and nonstate actors, friendly and population. In accordance with stability into four major categories and have pur- competitor, have all attempted to employ and counterinsurgency principles, efforts posely asked contributors from different health in some fashion for both altruistic to win must be directed at the population U.S. agencies and nonmedical disciplines reasons and for political outcomes. This as the center of gravity. to author pieces from their strategic series of articles is an effort to explore The health system of a nation includes viewpoints. Category one should help some of the multiple aspects of this arena essential services that can positively the reader understand the basics of global for future positive outcomes. JFQ influence a population if harnessed and health and appreciate the significance of sustained by the legitimate host nation health capabilities as strategic assets for authority. Additionally, the health system diplomacy and security. The second cat- is a development engine that has a cyclical egory focuses on how operational DOD relationship with intellectual, innova- health efforts can open doors and build tive, and economic growth. As part of a partnerships through security assistance, comprehensive approach to security and security cooperation, and shaping and stability, attention to the health sector can stability applications. The third category be a significant enabler of success in these highlights specific regional issues or complex operational environments. examples of health engagement and The United States has capabilities, activities by various agencies with a goal resources, and a historical desire to use of illustrating the depth of health engage- health in building strong partnerships ment that the United States is involved in through engaging the health sector of around the world. The final category in- foreign countries. Appropriate policy, cludes forward-looking articles intended doctrine, and authority for Department to stimulate the reader to contemplate of Defense (DOD) health engagement policy, doctrine, training, and employ- are currently being refined, and valida- ment needs that will optimize the future tion of outcomes is being pursued. Our application of DOD health engagement.
36 Special Feature / Global Health, Concepts, and Engagements JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 As part of Pacific Partnership 2013, U.S. Navy forces are joined by NGOs and regional partners including Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and New Zealand to improve maritime security, conduct humanitarian assistance, and strengthen disaster-response preparedness (U.S. Navy/Samantha J. Webb)
The Future of Department of Defense Global Health Engagement
By Gerald V. Quinnan, Jr.
he term global health has come nectedness of health matters around sion of Russia was the result of starva- into common usage in recent the globe. Diseases that have been tion, severe weather, and disease, the years and encompasses various unevenly distributed across the world most important of which was typhus, T 1 matters relevant to health, includ- have been of concern to militaries for which killed over 80,000 troops. His ing diseases that cross international centuries, perhaps throughout history. retreating army then spread typhus borders, factors that affect public Historians record that the decimation throughout Europe. Likewise, typhoid health globally, and the intercon- of Napoleon’s army during his inva- fever was a serious problem in World War I and the American Civil War.2 Spanish troops were severely affected Gerald V. Quinnan, Jr., MD, is a retired Health Service Corps Admiral and former Chair of the Department by yellow fever during the Spanish- of Preventive Medicine and Biometrics at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. American War, and Spanish influenza
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Quinnan 37 had disproportionate and decisive [was] established in 1942 to limit the in the annual World Health Assembly, effects during World War I.3 Coloniza- impact of malaria and other vector-borne where the lead health diplomat of each tion of Africa, Asia, and Latin America diseases (such as murine typhus) during member country votes regarding proce- by Western powers led to increased World War II around military training dures and programs being put forward awareness of diseases that were gener- bases in the southern United States and by the WHO. These relationships are an ally exotic to the imposing country, its territories, where malaria was still important part of the context in which motivating interest in developing means problematic. The center was located in GHE is executed. of prevention and control of diseases. Atlanta (rather than Washington, DC) The major growth of global health as Examples of efforts emanating from because the South was the area of the an academic discipline has been fostered such interest include the work of Walter country with the most malaria transmis- by a number of geopolitical events over Reed and William C. Gorgas in defin- sion.”4 Yellow fever epidemics occurred the past three decades. In 1978, the ing the transmission and prevention of on numerous occasions in the United WHO and the UN Children’s Fund yellow fever, research regarding cholera States during the 18th and 19th centu- convened the International Conference and diarrhea in Bangladesh, and the ries; one of the more serious outbreaks on Primary Health Care in Alma Ata, establishment of research laboratories caused more than 10,000 deaths in the Kazakhstan. This conference adopted (for example, the Pasteur Institute and Philadelphia area in 1793, which led a declaration that has come to be Medical Research Council laboratories President George Washington to move known as the Declaration of Alma Ata in Africa). Conversely, the invasion the Federal government to its present lo- (International Conference on Primary and colonization of foreign lands has cation in Washington.5 Other examples of Health 1978). The declaration stressed also long been known to result in the what are now considered tropical diseases the importance of social and economic introduction of exotic disease into the causing epidemics in the United States factors in the attainment of health and occupied lands, with the importation are plentiful, but in many cases vector reaffirmed health care as a human right. of smallpox and syphilis into North control has resulted in their elimination. It declared the inequality between America by colonists as outstanding Limited capacities to mount vector con- developed and developing countries to examples. trol efforts or to prevent human exposure be politically, socially, and economically Because of the importance of global underlie continued transmission of these unacceptable. Furthermore, it drew link- infectious diseases regarding force health diseases in the developing world. age between the health of people and the protection, the Department of Defense In the late 19th and early 20th cen- social and economic development that (DOD) has developed numerous pro- turies, various international efforts fostered world peace. The declaration has grams relevant to the infectious disease were made to standardize quarantine been repeatedly recognized by the UN dimension of the worldwide global procedures to limit transmission of chol- High Commission on Human Rights, health efforts, and these programs are era, smallpox, tuberculosis, and other which has emphasized the inclusion of a prominent dimension of the overall diseases. In the United States, officers of health as a basic human right in interna- DOD global health engagement (GHE) the Marine Hospital Service, the prede- tional law throughout the past 60 years.6 agenda. cessor organization of the U.S. Public These statements have emphasized the Many of the diseases that are impor- Health Service, boarded boats entering responsibilities of countries, international tant force health protection issues for territorial waters. Presently, the Federal organizations (IOs), nongovernmental deployed warfighters are diseases caused agency with responsibility for quarantine organizations (NGOs), and funding and by poverty, a factor that is relevant to procedures is the CDC. After World donor organizations to contribute to a the future GHE agenda. The high rate War II, the establishment of the United concerted effort in support of the goal of of typhus in Napoleon’s forces reflected Nations (UN) and its subordinate orga- equal access to health care for all. the abject poverty of Russian peasants at nization, the World Health Organization In 2000, the UN Millennium Summit the time. As a result of living conditions, (WHO), presented great opportunities issued the UN Millennium Declaration louse infestation was rampant. Since lice for multinational cooperation on health. that included a set of eight Millennium are the vector that transmits typhus, the Some advances that emerged included Development Goals (MDGs). Three risk of infection was high. The geographic the development of international health of the goals directly addressed health, distribution of typhus today reflects the regulations that standardized procedures one that was focused on environment prevalence of louse infestation. Many for restriction of movement of infectious was extensively health related, and other diseases that we refer to as tropi- diseases between countries, facilitation of the remaining four were focused on cal are also spread by insects and were vaccine and drug development, standard- poverty, education, and development. present in the United States and other ization and availability, and numerous The juxtaposition of the broader social developed countries in the past. The types of multinational cooperation for the development goals and health empha- predecessor of the Centers for Disease development of disease surveillance and sizes the relationships among them. Control and Prevention (CDC), “the health promotion activities. The impor- The MDGs were supported by the Office of Malaria Control in War Areas, tance of health as a global issue is reflected Organisation for Economic Co-operation
38 Special Feature / The Future of DOD Global Health Engagement JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 and Development, and the major donor Table. Areas of Focus of the U.S. Global Health Initiative countries agreed to provide funds to the Focus on women, girls, and gender equality World Bank and International Monetary Encourage country ownership and invest in country-led plans Fund for debt relief for the poorest coun- Build sustainability through health systems strengthening tries. In 2001, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria was Strengthen and leverage key multilateral organizations, global health partnerships, and private- sector engagement established by the UN and Group of 8, committing substantial funds to this ef- Increase impact through strategic coordination and integration fort to be administered by a secretariat in Improve metrics, monitoring, and evaluation Geneva. Today, the “Global Fund is the Promote research and innovation main multilateral funder in global health, channeling approximately US$3 billion purposes of implementation of the direc- funds have been important. In academia, annually—two-thirds of all international tive, DOD Directive 3000.05, “Military the Consortium of Universities for Global financing for [tuberculosis] and malaria, Support to Security, Stability, Transition, Health (CUGH), established in 2008, and one-fifth of all international financing and Reconstruction Operations,” was is- has been a consolidating force for diverse for AIDS.”7 sued in November 2005 and established types of research related to the principles In the United States, the U.S. the policy that “stability operations are and practice of global health and is an Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, a core U.S. military mission that the important forum for concerns relevant to Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of Department of Defense shall be prepared DOD GHE. Increasingly, universities are 2003 led to the establishment of the to conduct and support. They shall be establishing Global Health Programs in President’s Emergency Program for given priority comparable to combat accord with CUGH recommendations, AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which is now operations.”10 DOD has acted on many enhancing their ability to impact the administered by the Office of the Global fronts over the past decade to implement communities they serve. The Uniformed AIDS Coordinator. The U.S. Global the intent of this directive, including Services University of the Health Sciences Health Initiative (GHI) emerged from the ongoing efforts of the DOD Global formally established its program in 2013 a 2010 Presidential policy directive on Health Working Group to finalize the full and was admitted to membership in global development and is administered range of military requirements for imple- CUGH. The extensive engagement of by the Office of Global Affairs in the mentation via a doctrine, organization, academia reflects the widespread belief Department of Health and Human training, materiel, leadership, personnel, that education and research are essential, Services.8 GHI is responsible for coor- and facilities approach. The study by the and the increasing recognition that solu- dination of interagency efforts related Center for Strategic and International tions to problems require multifaceted to global health, including activities Studies titled Global Health Engagement: collaborative efforts of many different related to the Global Fund and PEPFAR. Sharpening a Key Tool for the Department health and non-health sectors of society. The GHI also served as a platform for of Defense reviews a series of policy devel- Such efforts recognize that environmen- engagement of the United States in de- opments regarding national security and tal factors are relevant to many chronic velopment of the Global Health Security defense since 2010, including a policy diseases and that sociocultural factors im- Agenda of 2011.9 The GHI has seven directive by the Secretary of Defense in pact greatly on maternal and child health. areas of focus (see table). As government- 2013.11 The policy directive includes key Factors that perpetuate the cycle of pov- wide coordinating programs, the GHI areas of focus of the GHI, as mentioned erty adversely affect population health. and Global Health Security Agenda apply above. The MDGs have served as a set to activities of all departments, including All of these international and U.S. of principles and have engendered DOD GHE. Some particularly relevant Government activities have been as- momentum for the improvement of considerations for policy are their focus sociated with a greatly increased focus global development and health. When on country ownership, systems approach on global health in the private sector. established, the intention was that they to health, coordination and integration Indeed, the WHO, many smaller foun- would be replaced after 15 years by a with key stakeholders, and monitoring dations, and many NGOs have worked new set of goals that would build on and evaluation. for decades to improve the health of progress made under the MDGs and set Regarding policy development populations around the world, but these new targets for development for the fol- relevant to DOD GHE, a whole-of-gov- major initiatives brought large amounts lowing 15-year period. Thus, the MDGs ernment focus on stabilization of peace of new funding and galvanized the ef- were to be replaced at the end of 2015 through development was established forts of organizations already engaged. by a set of Sustainable Development as a result of the 2005 National Security Private foundations, including the Gates Goals (SDGs).12 As with the MDGs, Presidential Directive 44, “Management Foundation and others, have mobilized the consensus process for writing of of Interagency Efforts Concerning funding. While the Global Fund remains the SDGs has been coordinated by the Reconstruction and Stabilization.” For the largest contributor, these private UN and has consisted of numerous
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Quinnan 39 international conferences that collectively positive spillover impact on health ser- USNS Comfort and USNS Mercy on have identified impediments to sustain- vices for the general populations. the missions Pacific Partnership and able development around the world. DOD and the CDC have been lead Continuing Promise in the Pacific and Health, clean water, and sanitation are agencies in global infectious disease in Latin America are visible examples. major goals, while the document includes surveillance efforts. DOD maintains Traditionally, these missions have been a strong emphasis on protection of the laboratories overseas at several sites, focused on the provision of direct care environment and mitigation of global including U.S. Army labs at Bangkok to host nation civilians, although this warming. The notion of equality for peo- and Nairobi and Navy labs at Cairo, focus is evolving. Individual Service ple of all nations regarding all the SDGs Lima, and Singapore. Satellite activi- components often carry out missions is an overarching principle. Since the ties are carried out at various locations with humanitarian intent, such as the consensus process has involved all of the by these laboratories. Each of the fixed Air Force Pac Angel and New Horizons organizations that have partnered in work- overseas laboratories carries out extensive exercises in the Pacific and Belize, ing toward achievement of the MDGs, the infectious disease surveillance while also respectively. The State Partnership momentum is likely to continue. carrying out extensive de facto health Program operated by the National diplomacy and assisting the host nation Guard engages with its partner nations’ Precedents and nearby countries in development of military, generally on an annual basis, As a result of recognition of its com- their own capacities for disease surveil- including humanitarian missions. These bined expeditionary and portable health lance. While a key justification for the engagements commonly have health ob- services capabilities, DOD is often asked maintenance of such laboratories relates jectives often involving direct care. Many to provide emergency support for inter- to protection of U.S. forces that may of these engagements are referred to national aid activities. These responses be deployed to the area, it is clear that as Medical, Dental, or Veterinary Civic may be land- or sea-based. Examples they have an important impact on health Action Programs and Medical Readiness include responses to the earthquakes locally and regionally and contribute Training Exercises. Additionally, each in Pakistan in 2005 and Haiti in 2010, significantly to the global disease surveil- geographic combatant command uses respectively, and the management of lance capability and results. Pivotal clinical its Commander’s Emergency Response logistics and public health for large trials leading to licensure of vaccines Program to support partner nation populations of displaced people as a against the Japanese encephalitis and engagements on an ad hoc basis, and result of conflicts in Kosovo in 1999 Hepatitis A viruses were possible because health engagements often are part of and Macedonia in 2001. These types of collaborative programs developed by these efforts. These types of engage- of operations are always conducted the U.S. Army laboratory in Thailand and ments involving direct patient care are in concert with civil authorities, with the Thai government. These laboratories generally believed to improve the per- responsibility for ongoing response also serve to catalyze international collab- ception and access of the United States management transferred to them at the orations, often between university global in other countries. earliest reasonable time. health researchers and host nation orga- The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) nizations. Disease surveillance activities Where Is DOD GHE Going? requires both that military forces provide are coordinated in DOD by the Armed Based on input from the Under Secre- care to enemy combatants on the battle- Forces Health Surveillance Center and its tary of Defense for Policy (USDP), the field and that conquering armies provide Global Emerging Infectious Surveillance Secretary of Defense for Policy issued a essential services to occupied populations. and Response Program (GEIS). Much cable in 2013 regarding global health The U.S. military has consistently carried of the funding for surveillance activi- engagement. A major point of emphasis out these responsibilities. The LOAC ties of the overseas laboratories comes of the cable is that DOD GHE should does not require provision of health care through GEIS. Additionally, the Defense be focused on capacity development to the local noncombatant populace, Threat Reduction Agency Cooperative and strengthening of host nation health but the U.S. military has a tradition Biological Engagement Program facili- systems and should include components of providing such care under limited tates capacity development of surveillance of monitoring and evaluation. This circumstances and on a temporary basis activities of partner nations. Collectively, concept is consistent with established until responsibility can be passed back to these activities constitute a robust disease principles of the GHI espoused by the host nation. During the recent con- surveillance network that serves to alert the U.S. interagency community, IOs, flicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. DOD to health threats and to also pro- NGOs, and academic organizations. military expended great effort toward mote public health around the world. The principle of capacity-building has helping those nations build healthcare DOD has traditionally used health as been widely recognized by military capability. The development of these an instrument for building relationships personnel involved in developing GHE capabilities not only was considered im- with partner nations.13 Diverse types concepts, and this policy should be portant for the stability of the host nation of engagements reflect this concept. significantly enabling with respect to security forces, but it also had potential The deployment of the hospital ships extending DOD funding authorities.
40 Special Feature / The Future of DOD Global Health Engagement JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Why are these developments impor- tant? The previous focus on providing direct care as the principal activities of Medical Action Programs and Medical Readiness Training Exercises has been predicated on DOD policy regarding appropriate use of Humanitarian and Civic Assistance funding, which was to be used for training of U.S. personnel. Numerous criticisms have been raised by individuals both within and outside of DOD of the benefits of providing direct care during these exercises.14 One area of concern is the relative risks and benefits to the patients of providing short-term care. What benefit is there to a patient with hypertension or diabetes to receive medical care on a single day? Even when the benefit seems completely obvious, the balance is not always clear. Surgical restoration of sight to a man who has gone blind is certainly life altering. However, if we have no data regarding the late complications and long-term success of the operation, we have an incomplete picture of the benefit/risk calculus and do not know if it could or should be better. A second type of concern often raised is that the provision of direct care by DOD personnel on these missions may serve to undermine the credibility and sustainability of the host nation health- care system. If a thousand individuals receive dental care during the course of a Dental Action Program, what do they think of the comparability of their local dental care provider and DOD provid- ers, and which patients, if any, are left to be cared for by the local provider? A focus on capacity development addresses these concerns. If the engagements are designed to support host nation health U.S. Marines with Joint Task Force 505, multinational forces, and humanitarian relief organizations services by extending the numbers of provide aid after two devastating earthquakes struck Nepal on April 25 and May 12, 2015 (U.S. patients who can benefit from care or Marine Corps/Hernan Vidana) by improving the standards of care by host nation providers, they should have Focus on capacity development has al- that there can be progressive movement long-term benefit to local health systems ready received substantial attention across toward capacity development over time. and ongoing benefit to patients. A focus GHEs. While Medical Action Programs The New Horizons 2014 exercise in on capacity development also includes still involve direct patient care to varying Belize was a 6-month-long engage- public health efforts. The capacity of host degrees, there is often an effort to design ment involving a series of coordinated nations to provide vaccination programs, these engagements as partnering activi- programs with the goal of progressively clean water, and perinatal care with at- ties with host nation personnel. There is addressing a series of needs within the tended births can have huge implications also a trend toward increasingly return- country. Similarly, Continuing Promise for the health of the population. ing to sites of previous engagements so 2015 visited 15 countries, 13 of which
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Quinnan 41 were repeat visits. Undoubtedly, follow- by the direct care activities characteristic resistant malaria. They could also po- ing the issuance of the USDP GHE cable of many Medical Action Programs, tentially collaborate with other players and output of the DOD Global Health Medical Readiness Training Exercises, involved in the elimination effort to ex- Working Group, the approaches used to and related activities. When these en- tend critical prevention measures to these focus GHE on capacity development will gagements are conducted primarily for remote areas. mature and become more systematic over strategic purposes, such as security of The success of host nation militaries time. These improvements should help U.S. forces or access to partner nations, in these contexts is of strategic interest to assure that DOD GHEs will strengthen there emerges the concern regarding DOD. The presence of resistant malaria essential capabilities of partner host whether they can be ethically conducted is a threat to U.S. forces, and the pos- nations and improve their stability in ac- so as to meet bona fide needs of the sibility that infected military personnel cordance with the new DOD mission. people of the partner nations. from the region could be deployed to The concern is often raised, particu- other countries means that the threat larly in the IO and NGO communities, Current Engagements could spread. U.S. Pacific Command that DOD is not and should not at- as Future Models (USPACOM) has considered these stra- tempt to be a humanitarian agency. This Across DOD there is increasing empha- tegic needs and is engaging with local concern is based mainly on two con- sis on integration of the principles militaries to strengthen their abilities to siderations. First and foremost, these expounded by the GHI and reiterated contribute to the elimination efforts. An organizations are concerned regarding in the USDP cable into the planning important principle exemplified here is their own safety. If they are seen to be and execution of GHE.16 The develop- that a strategically important health need doing humanitarian work side by side ment of a formal DOD policy by the was identified, and an engagement was with DOD personnel, they will not be Global Health Working Group will designed to meet that need. It is likely viewed as impartial and may become tar- firmly establish these principles of oper- that working with local militaries will im- gets of violence in settings of conflict or ation. Developing cohesive approaches prove future cooperative efforts and that where anti-American or anti-Western sen- across all commands to implement these effective response to the health need will timent is high. A second concern is that principles will be challenging consider- address a strategic concern of the United DOD does not meet accepted standards ing the large numbers of organizations States. However, neither of these out- of practice for a humanitarian organiza- conducting engagements that impact comes is likely to be achieved if the health tion as described by the International Red health overseas. Nevertheless, establish- need is not successfully addressed. Once Cross and Red Crescent Movement and ment of integrated, strategic approaches the strategic health need was identified, generally espoused by other humanitarian will certainly improve the efficiency and achieving the health outcome became the organizations.15 This code involves four effectiveness of GHE, and many efforts primary goal of the engagement. Health humanitarian principles: the humanitarian are already ongoing to this effect. To became the strategic imperative. imperative, independence, impartiality, illustrate the value of an expected new Three additional aspects of this en- and neutrality. The humanitarian impera- DOD policy, two current GHE exam- gagement in the Mekong region merit tive states that engagement should be for ples are worth considering. attention. First, the engagement is part the sole purpose of providing humanitar- An ongoing long-term engagement of the USPACOM strategic plan. While ian assistance wherever it is needed. If in Southeast Asia exemplifies how the medical engagements have long been DOD provides assistance based on secu- concern regarding beneficence can be activities in this and every geographic rity considerations, the assistance does and should be addressed. Within the command on an ad hoc basis, inclusion not address this imperative. Similarly, Greater Mekong region, there is a multi- of medical capabilities in strategic plan- DOD is unlikely to be impartial, inde- national effort to eliminate drug-resistant ning is a new approach due in substantial pendent, or neutral when operating in P. falciparum malaria. The Global Fund part to the efforts of recent Command the context of conflict. When considered and President’s Malaria Initiative, among Surgeons Rear Admirals Michael in these terms, it is clear that DOD is not others, funded the effort.17 The effort Mittleman, Raquel Bono, and Colin a humanitarian organization. However, involves many NGOs and IOs in an Chinn. The advantages resulting from the when the broad extent of GHEs is con- internationally coordinated strategy that inclusion of the engagement in the strate- sidered across the span of the range of evolved from one of controlling resistant gic plan are critical. The engagement can military operations, it is hard to deny that malaria to eliminating it. Successes in the then be included in the planning activi- DOD efforts have enormous humanitar- more accessible agricultural regions have ties of the command, and its long-term ian impact. highlighted the need to achieve success conduct and outcomes can be monitored The humanitarian impact of DOD ac- in the remote forest areas in the border on an ongoing basis. These are essential tivities is more obvious when considering regions of affected countries. Host nation features of effective global health practice. responses to disasters or support for large militaries have security responsibilities The second aspect of the Mekong populations of displaced persons than the that require them to operate in these engagement that deserves emphasis is more deliberate engagements represented regions and are at risk of infection with that DOD activities are integrated into a
42 Special Feature / The Future of DOD Global Health Engagement JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 USNS Mercy Servicemembers conduct mass casualty drill during Pacific Partnership 2015, July 16, 2015 (U.S. Navy/Mayra A. Conde) much larger effort involving numerous systematic impact on dimensions of the epidemic around. The U.S. Air National governments, NGOs, and IOs. With the public health effort that are measurable: Guard set up 10 expeditionary medical nature of DOD engagements being short how successful are the troops in deploy- support systems (EMEDS) for use by term—typically, the mission is executed ing specific malaria prevention methods? the various groups providing or plan- and the troops are promptly rede- Outcomes of this systematic type are ning to provide care for suspected cases ployed—integration of engagements into much more likely to be within the capac- of EVD in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra critical niches in ongoing global health ity of DOD to measure as evidence of Leone. One EMEDS near Monrovia efforts is a potentially powerful method effectiveness of GHE than measurements was manned by the U.S. Public Health of providing long-term impact as a result such as prevalence of resistant malaria. In Service for treatment of healthcare work- of one or more short-term engagements. the current global environment, GHE ac- ers with suspected EVD. The presence of The third aspect of the Mekong re- tivities almost always occur in the context this well-staffed and -equipped EMEDS gion engagement that deserves emphasis of a broader global health effort. Effective provided confidence that health care is the desired outcome of USPACOM integration of GHE activities into such workers had high-quality support avail- efforts. While elimination of resistant broader efforts and their planning so as to able when needed. The other EMEDS malaria is certainly a desired outcome of affect systematic capabilities that achieve were used by various NGOs (for example, the overall multinational effort, that goal longer term health outcomes should be Doctors Without Borders) for treatment is beyond the immediate scope of the a paradigm for maximizing impact and of patients with suspected EVD. The U.S. limited activities of the command. While providing a roadmap for measurement of Army led an effort to train host nation the details of USPACOM efforts are not effectiveness of engagements. and NGO personnel in methods recom- publicly available, they should be focused The second example that will be cited mended for use by the WHO when caring on training host nation military regarding is the DOD response to the Ebola virus for patients suspected of having EVD. prevention of malaria infection in their disease (EVD) epidemic, which involved Army and Navy personnel manned labo- own personnel and among migrant work- a variety of novel response types that were ratories that performed diagnostic testing ers transiting the border areas. If that is credited with being critical for the suc- for Ebola virus infection. The 101st the case, their efforts are designed to have cess of the international effort to turn the Airborne Division provided logistical
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Quinnan 43 12 support for all DOD activities in Liberia Open Working Group Proposal for Sustain- Notes able Development Goals (New York: United and for the U.S. Public Health Service Nations, n.d.), available at
44 Special Feature / The Future of DOD Global Health Engagement JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 U.S. Air Force Combat Controller from 23rd Special Tactics Squadron, Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida, watches pallets after airdrop of humanitarian aid for distribution in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, following magnitude 7 earthquake, January 18, 2010 (U.S. Air Force/James L. Harper, Jr.)
Separate and Equal Building Better Working Relationships with the International Humanitarian Community
By Paul A. Gaist and Ramey L. Wilson
You can’t surge trust.
—General James Amos, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps1
n today’s complex global landscape, and sustainable world is to be real- have in this important call to action understanding and taking the oppor- ized. As such, we need to sharpen the and, at the least, determine what each I tunities to build peace to prevent war focus of the roles the military and the side needs to know about the other. are increasingly paramount if a stable humanitarian assistance community This is especially true if we are to find those intersections and circumstances where the military and the humanitar- Paul A. Gaist, Ph.D., MPH, is an Adjunct Professor at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public ian assistance community are able to Health and a Health Scientist Administrator at the National Institutes of Health. Lieutenant Colonel work together and to recognize those Ramey L. Wilson, USA, MD, MPH, is a General Internal Medicine Fellow at the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center and an Assistant Professor of Medicine at the Uniformed Services University of where they cannot. Toward this goal, the Health Sciences. this article reviews the identity, prin-
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Gaist and Wilson 45 U.S. Soldiers assigned to Company C, 1st Battalion, 17th Regiment, unload humanitarian aid for distribution to town of Rajan Kala, Afghanistan, December 5, 2009 (U.S. Air Force/Francisco V. Govea II) ciples, and culture of the humanitar- enhanced meaning and consequences. by the U.S. Government (and, by defini- ian community, what it expects from In this regard, it is important that the tion, the Department of Defense) no military forces, and what it wants the civil society sector not be defined by an longer suggests an independent organiza- military to consider when it is plan- actual or perceived association with the tion that works as a co-equal, but now ning health engagement. Additionally, military. Thus, the military should find implies a relationship to use and leverage approaches and methods for construc- a word other than partner to describe a subordinate organization to serve U.S. tive interaction between the military the relationships it has with the civil interests. Just as then–Secretary of State and community forces are proposed. society sector without suggesting com- Colin Powell infamously revealed the To begin, the military should refrain mingled identities; co-equals, co-actors, U.S. Government’s perspective regarding from referring to the international hu- or colleagues would be more acceptable. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) manitarian community as partners. The Referring to those in the international by declaring them “force-multipliers” use of this word in general denotes both humanitarian community as partners and “an important part of our combat an identity and a relationship between is an association that can put them in team” in 2001, the word partner means two or more entities that are sharing in harm’s way, and this is a main reason for something different to the military than potential risks and gains. In this sense, it not using this term. Another reason is it does to the international humanitarian is assumed and accepted that in a part- the way in which the military now uses community.2 Speaking from that commu- nership, the affiliations, obligations, and the word to define its relationship to nity’s perspective, the words and terms consequences of one partner’s behavior the humanitarian community. With the we use can directly impact the ability to extend to the other (such as with co- word partner saturating the 2012 stra- find avenues and opportunities where owners of a business). In the contentious, tegic guidance in Sustaining U.S. Global coordination, cooperation, and possibly unsafe, and challenging environments Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century collaboration can exist. So let us start by in which both the military and civil Defense and the recently revised National using a different term to indicate working society organizations work as a matter Security Strategy, its meaning has subtly arrangements and/or agreements that of course, the words we use can have shifted in the military’s parlance. Its use may be formed and realized. To convey
46 Special Feature / Separate and Equal: Building Better Relationships JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 this and other key points with direct clar- hoped that our partnership would signal minate problems and promote change ity, this article speaks from the perspective a new model for civil-military interac- at the policy level, operational NGOs and with the voice of the civil society tion. Subsequent complex emergencies work to provide direct support to sector that is based on the authors’ in Europe and Africa and the wars in Iraq those in need, usually at the local level, experience working in and with the in- and Afghanistan, however, demonstrated and are more numerous. In general, ternational humanitarian community. As that continued efforts to improve the co- NGOs serve four basic areas of need: such, and as in the field, the authors span existence of humanitarian organizations humanitarian assistance, human rights, the military, health, and humanitarian and military forces operating in conflict civil society/democracy-building, and professions to provide insight about these areas were needed. With the recent in- conflict resolution.3 Health and public key cultures and speak to the essentials ternational response to the Ebola crisis health objectives relate to all these areas required for them to work effectively and and the new U.S. Government strategy and are often priority goals within them. productively together. of proactive engagement, especially in the domain of health, it seems fitting to re- What We Believe Working Together: The visit and review the principles and culture We appreciate that the military has its Civil Society Perspective of the humanitarian community. Maybe own culture, objectives, and ways of While we, the civil society sector, may the Ebola response in Liberia can be a operating, which we need to better not agree with the military’s use of the tipping point for improved collaboration understand. In turn, it is key that the word partner, we can seek ways to work and partnership as we move forward, fur- military understand our beliefs, culture, in partnership, in the form of condi- ther building on the successes achieved and operations. tional working relationships, as a means while responding to recent natural While each NGO and humanitarian to cooperate on mutual goals and disasters. IGO has a different mandate, objec- aims to relieve suffering and prevent tive, culture, and willingness to engage unnecessary death. The key is that those Who We Are with military forces, the majority define efforts are and will be highly contextual The international humanitarian com- themselves as humanitarian by identifying based upon the time, place, circum- munity comprises the various organiza- with the core principles of humanitarian stances, culture, mandates, and objec- tions and institutions that seek to relieve action, first proposed by the International tives of each actor and situation. The the unnecessary death and suffering Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) recent partnership of U.S. military and that comes from various sources, such and Red Crescent Movement: humanity, humanitarian medical forces in response as poverty, conflict, and injustice. Seen impartiality, neutrality, and independence. to the Ebola crisis in Liberia highlights broadly, the community includes finan- Humanity. The principle of human- the fluid relationships that will shift cial donors, international governmental ity states that all human suffering is based upon each specific context, espe- organizations (IGOs), and NGOs, each anathema and must be recognized and cially the level of violence. During disas- of which serves a different function. addressed wherever it is found. It focuses ter responses or epidemic outbreaks, Overall, these groups are often referred all activities on preserving and protecting there is no doubt that military forces to under the umbrella term civil society the life and health of those in need and possess unique skills and equipment organizations (CSOs) and/or the civil respecting others as fellow human be- that can assist with the response. In society sector. Financial donors provide ings. While military forces may be able to areas of conflict or violence, however, the funding for humanitarian work readily follow the spirit of this principle the distance between the military forces and include state entities, intergov- during a disaster response, they directly and the humanitarian community must ernmental bodies (which receive their violate this principle in the conduct of increase to protect the humanitarian funding from the states that participate military operations designed to destroy or space, especially when military or politi- in the institution), and private donors/ kill enemy combatants or when noncom- cal objectives extend beyond relieving foundations. Intergovernmental bodies, batants are placed at risk during military suffering or building capacity. which serve as both funding conduits operations. The reality is that military forces and coordinating agencies of policy and Impartiality. The principle of impar- will most likely be collocated with the implementation, include the various tiality articulates that all assistance and humanitarian community for the foresee- institutions of the United Nations care must be distributed solely based on able future, even in areas of violence or (UN) and other multistate organiza- need, with priority given to those who insecurity where the humanitarian com- tions. Nongovernmental organizations need it most. There can be no distinction munity desires a distinct separation from vary considerably and characterize on the delivery of assistance based upon belligerent forces for their own protec- themselves by function—advocacy age, nationality, race, gender, religious tion. In 1991, after the highly effective based or operational—and their scope belief, class, language, disability, health response in Iraq by the humanitarian of effort—community based, national, status, sexual orientation, political opin- community and coalition military forces transnational, or international. While ion, or social origin. While military forces during Operation Provide Comfort, we advocacy based NGOs work to illu- can act with impartiality during disaster
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Gaist and Wilson 47 U.S. Marine assigned to Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis Response–Africa prepares to land at U.S. Embassy in Monrovia to support Operation United Assistance in Liberia, October 13, 2014 (U.S. Marine Corps/Andre Dakis) responses and humanitarian crises, this is as standing for and/or promoting one Further summarized in the Code of impossible when they are acting as a bel- side or another. Specifically, the principle Conduct for the International Red Cross ligerent or in support of another political of neutrality declares that humanitarian and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs entity. As such, the current strategy of organizations must not take sides in any in Disaster Relief, the principles seek to the military to use health and medicine as hostilities or engage in controversies of a protect humanitarian actors from engag- a soft power to “win hearts and minds” political, racial, religious, or ideological ing in efforts that might fall outside is a direct affront to humanitarian prin- nature. As military forces serve as tools to humanitarian themes. Of special note to ciples. Military health engagements do political entities, they are, by definition, those in the military, Principle 4 of the not always target those with the greatest never neutral, even if operating under Code of Conduct specifically warns us need, but are often provided in an ef- conditions where they seek to be neutral, against working too closely with military fort to strengthen or change a particular such as part of a peacekeeping force. forces for fear of losing our independence group’s political perspective and/or as Independence. The principle of inde- or being used—either knowingly or un- part of a strategy to achieve non–health- pendence proclaims that humanitarian knowingly—as a source of intelligence. related military objectives. efforts must remain autonomous from As of April 10, 2015, there were 560 dif- Neutrality. Often the only way CSOs other objectives, such as political, eco- ferent NGOs that had formally endorsed are able to do their work is if they are nomic, military, or other motives, which the ICRC Code of Conduct and many seen as being neutral—not taking sides may attempt to influence the location others who embrace and operationalize one way or another. It is not that we are or operations of humanitarian action. its principles. blind to the injustice we may know and As declared by Médecins Sans Frontières With these core principles underly- witness; in fact, that injustice is often what (Doctors Without Borders), “[we] strive ing all humanitarian action, it is clear fuels our commitment and our often ex- to ensure that we have the power to freely that our partnerships with the military traordinary efforts. To gain and maintain evaluate medical needs, to access popula- will vary significantly based on the situ- access in conflict zones to carry out our tions without restriction and to directly ation and context. The very principle work, it is critical that we not be viewed control the aid we provide.”4 of independence allows each NGO to
48 Special Feature / Separate and Equal: Building Better Relationships JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 establish its policies of collaboration and ferent lens. To improve the chances of exponential growth in the number of partnership with military forces, but the beneficial interaction, it is essential that humanitarian organizations that wanted military should anticipate that its working the military have a basic grasp of our to provide disaster relief, respond to a relationships with us will change as op- culture and history. Before we talk spe- broad range of humanitarian crises, and erational contexts vary. In general, one of cifically about our culture, we want to build civil society globally. As occurs the following levels of engagement with emphasize that we take the previously with any rapid growth, the quality of the most NGOs or IGOs should be expected: discussed principles of humanitarian assistance provided by these new NGOs Principled Non-Engagement. NGOs action seriously. They are what define varied considerably, ultimately leading to or IGOs will avoid almost all collabora- our efforts and unify the humanitar- the professionalization of humanitarian tion and partnership to avoid any actual ian community. Military forces may be workers, the establishment of response or perceived loss of their independence. tempted to dismiss those principles as standards, and improved outcomes. Institutions such as the ICRC and idealistic or negotiable, but we would The humanitarian response standards, Médecins Sans Frontières usually hold this encourage them to resist that tempta- initially codified as the Sphere Project, perspective. tion. Those humanitarian principles are initiated a process that sought to identify “Arm’s-Length” Interaction. NGOs our core values. Failing to understand and teach the minimum standards that are willing to interact only indirectly them and their implications could lead we needed to operate safely and effec- through an international or regional to actions that would poison any inter- tively.6 It also defined specific measures intermediary, such as the UN Assistance action we might have in the future. and indicators in a number of areas: water Mission in Afghanistan, or through Although the humanitarian com- supply, sanitation, hygiene promotion, nonmilitary state institutions, such munity agrees on the humanitarian food security, nutrition and food aid, as the U.S. Agency for International principles, we do not all agree on how shelter, settlements, non-food items, Development’s Office of Foreign Disaster those principles should be implemented. and health services. By establishing a set Assistance. This interaction emphasizes We are a family, and like most families, of common standards, we significantly our perceived distance from military we often disagree on the details. This improved collaboration, and the stan- forces and our principle only to engage independence springs from our heritage, dards of the Sphere Project stimulated with military forces as a last resort. a culture of independent action and the development of other standards, such Proactive, Pragmatic, Principled autonomy, and our decisionmaking as the Code of Good Practice in human Engagement. NGOs will consider work- processes; we are not a hierarchical com- resource management and the Human ing in concert with military forces as long munity that operates in a way the military Accountability Partnership Standard for as humanitarian principles are protected is familiar with. We often operate by con- accountability and quality management. and the mission is conducted under the sensus and seek out collaboration, usually All of these standards are now being com- auspices of a larger humanitarian effort, understanding that none of us can tackle bined into Core Humanitarian Standards, such as part of the UN Cluster System, any of the major problems by ourselves. which will assist in coordinating efforts to respond to a humanitarian emergency. Evolving over time, these collabora- across the humanitarian space.7 While similar to the previous level of tions have led to common standards for As a result of the demands of various interaction, the perceived distance from humanitarian assistance that support the disasters ranging from earthquakes to military forces is decreased. Additionally, principles of humanitarian action. tsunamis and fragile states to war, the we may be willing to develop relation- The humanitarian community looks humanitarian community has developed ships with militaries through conferences to the establishment of the ICRC in into a cadre of professionals operating as or international bodies to proactively 1859 in response to the lack of concern a learning organization and a network of discuss and consider interaction when and medical care for the wounded left to networks that is capable, competent, and military units engage in relief activities. die after a battle near Solferino, Italy, as adaptable. We are adept at working with Active, Direct Engagement and the formal beginnings of humanitarian many groups, and the military is only one Cooperation. This level of interaction action. In 1863, the ICRC conducted of many actors that seek to have work- may only be possible during a disaster the first of many Geneva Conventions ing relationships with us. Our respective response or when military missions, such that established the humanitarian prin- cultures will likely clash and create the as those conducted by military hospi- ciples and neutrality of medical forces, potential for false expectations and mis- tal ships, closely follow humanitarian demanded care for all wounded, and understanding, but we should be able to principles.5 codified the protections for civilians on work through those issues if the need is the battlefield, thereby recognizing that great enough. While the humanitarian Our Culture non-belligerents, which include wounded community is a heterogeneous group of Military forces should consider interact- enemies, have rights and need protection organizations having different styles and ing with us as a cross-cultural experi- from abuse. With the end of the Cold mandates, our focus never waivers on the ence, an opportunity to see the same War and the subsequent complex emer- goals, principles, and practices that drive problems or challenges through a dif- gencies of the 1990s, we experienced an our humanitarian action. As we move
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Gaist and Wilson 49 forward, we encourage the military to principles often call us to work in those the development and health domains in consider us co-equals and to look for op- gray areas among belligerents to provide support of the current National Defense portunities both to learn from us as well care to those who are caught in the mid- Strategy. While we may not internally as to teach us about military cultures. dle. We reject a polarized perception that agree on the implications of these new states, “you’re either with us or against medical diplomacy operations, there is What We Want from us” as too simplistic a way to view a no doubt that the military has robust the Military complicated world. We can work through capabilities to operate in austere, uncer- How can we work together in a way that complexity to find areas of coopera- tain environments. These capabilities, that benefits both of our objectives and tion—even collaboration—if the military however, were designed primarily for mandates? To begin, we need oppor- understands our principles and works warfighting and may be inappropriate tunities in safe and neutral spaces/ with us with transparency and veracity. for health development and disaster communication channels to learn about Transparency does not mean that mili- assistance, especially if applied without each other in a forthright and construc- tary secrets have to be divulged or that an understanding of the local health tive manner. Collectively, we should Servicemembers have to be put at risk, context. Given the military engage- also design and conduct value-added but it does require honesty regarding the ment strategy in global health, the new needs assessments and establish expecta- motives of military actions and proposed Global Health Security Agenda, and tions concerning working separately health engagements. We would much the recent increases in the number and or together in the same disaster areas rather clearly know the military’s desired severity of natural disasters and potential and conflict zones. To accomplish even objectives and limitations in health and civil unrest predicted with continued these small steps, we need the military medical engagement and engage in global climate change and other global to understand us as embodied through open discussion on how we might work pressures, we anticipate increased use humanitarian principles and to deal with together. Hidden agendas or objectives, of military forces in health and disaster us with honesty and transparency. especially if contrary to our humanitarian engagements. We therefore entreat the The humanitarian principles, as principles, undermine any trust we can military to consider, prima facie, the fol- previously mentioned, provide the lens build and are a major barrier to having lowing question when conceptualizing through which we view and calibrate all any type of prolonged engagement with and planning health engagements and of our actions and those of others operat- the military. Simply put, that approach is responses: “Is this engagement doing ing in the name of humanitarian action. a non-starter and, if discovered once we more harm than good?” They establish our boundaries (which are working together, a deal breaker. The beneficence of a humanitarian the military calls “left and right limits”) In addition, it would be productive or health engagement may seem, at first and define our purpose of action. That and helpful if the military would focus consideration, self-evident and obviously said, we as a community are also quite on its areas of expertise and let us focus in the affirmative, but we encourage you pragmatic and understand that the mili- on our areas of competency. We see only to think more deeply about this ques- tary is not the “enemy.” Often, we want problems when the military attempts to tion. You can even talk with us about the same thing. Sometimes, however, become a quasi-developmental organiza- this. Almost always, if not always, we military and police forces are part of the tion, often putting individuals in charge would tell you that you should start by problem that is creating and sustaining who have little or no experience or train- identifying the various stakeholders, the humanitarian crises. When the military ing in humanitarian action and who fail potential positive and negative impacts of partners with forces or countries that are to fully understand the complexities of aid the engagement, and how those impacts violating human rights, it should expect delivery and development.10 As one exam- are prioritized. You need to ask yourself us to be less willing to work with it or ple of this, the lack of systematic follow-up whether you are willing to undermine else be perceived as a collaborator. Even and evaluations after most health engage- the effective delivery of humanitar- international military forces operating ments leaves the military uninformed and ian assistance or health development under a UN banner have been known to blind to the actual impact, positive or to achieve your strategic objectives. perpetrate humanitarian crimes on those negative, of its engagements. In fact, we Furthermore, is it possible to conduct they were sent to protect.8 We see these struggle at effective evaluation and follow- your health engagement in a manner actions, when they occur, as an assault up as well. Maybe this could be an area of where all stakeholders, especially those on core humanitarian values and “grim improvement that we pursue together. with a minimal voice, benefit from the reminders that working with military engagement? How are you protecting forces may have unforeseen, unintended What We Want the Military those who are most likely to be harmed consequences.”9 to Consider When Conducting by your operations? Does your action When we choose to distance ourselves Health Engagements increase or decrease the “humanitarian from the military, we are not signaling We are a pragmatic group and can see space” in which we operate? What are that we consider it our enemy any more that U.S. military forces probably are the economic impacts to the local health than it should view us that way. Our going to be used to a greater extent in system and humanitarian community?
50 Special Feature / Separate and Equal: Building Better Relationships JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Worker decontaminates caregiver leaving patient area of active Ebola treatment center built as part of Operation United Assistance in Suakoko, Liberia, November 22, 2014 (U.S. Army/Brien Vorhees)
Are you undermining the confidence and vaccination program and you have set analyze your proposed operation through long-term viability of the local health sys- back progress (which requires community the lens of public health ethics.11 The tem? Are you supporting the delivery of trust and acceptance of us and our work) 12 principles espoused in public health’s care that meets the standards of the local for years, if not permanently, in the in- code of ethics should challenge all who health system? What type of follow-up or ternational efforts to eradicate polio and engage in humanitarian action so that longitudinal care are you providing? other significant health threats. In many those who are most vulnerable to exploi- Another complementary approach parts of the world where we are most tation are protected, local health systems would be to plan and analyze the near-, needed, vaccination programs were al- are strengthened, the engagements mid-, and long-term impacts of your ready culturally or otherwise viewed with improve a current gap or deficiency in engagement with steps to measure the suspicion and met with resistance. Now their health system, and the engagement impact so that you can learn from your there are evidential counter-arguments is conducted with minimal negative experiences. It is quite clear that the im- defensively presented from the people impact and a greater likelihood of sustain- pacts of the alleged Central Intelligence and their communities when we try to ability and success. These ethics call for Agency’s (CIA) sham vaccination pro- explain and overcome such mistrust and engagement with indigenous popula- gram as a cover to find Osama bin Laden reluctance. Going forward, do not be sur- tions, communities, and humanitarian continues to have a significant negative prised if any efforts you make to support organizations in order to include effective impact on international health and de- or develop vaccine programs, or any other outreach as an integral aspect of all phases velopment. As the CIA is involved with health engagement for that matter, are of the engagement, including follow-up. security, as you are, we associate you with viewed suspiciously as covert attempts to To date, we are unaware of any formal those at the CIA and suspect that they are accomplish a military or security mission. military medical ethic that is being used embedded in your ranks. Humanitarian Our third suggested approach when to systematically evaluate and balance the workers and others have subsequently considering a global health engage- potential positive and negative impacts of been killed because of the “maligned” ment or health intervention is for you to military health engagements.
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Gaist and Wilson 51 Sailors provide humanitarian assistance in support of Operation Tomodachi (U.S. Navy/Patricia R. Totemeier)
The Way Ahead we could use to guide our future work to provide coordinated responses, cross- Of course, we in the humanitarian com- together. In this context, we under- level supplies, and minimize the transi- munity have room for improvement as stand interoperability to be the ability tion of care when military forces depart. well. Good intentions are not enough, for our organizations to work together, Can this same principle of interoperabil- neither for you nor us. Continued work from planning to the delivery of aid, in ity be applied to non-disaster engage- must be done to improve the planning, a way that minimizes the differences in ments so that we are not working in delivery, and measurement of aid and equipment or processes that lead to the cross-purpose with each other? To humanitarian action, and this is some- unnecessary loss of life or property and this end, we need health development thing that we can work on together. increases efficiencies in the overall use and engagement professionals in the We must continue to find those areas of available funds and other resources. military and Federal service who can of mutual interest and effort so that we The use of the UN Cluster System, for bridge the divide among our organiza- can use them to develop a greater level example, is an organizational process tions at all levels of engagement and of trust and cultural understanding. that facilitates early response and who are representative of all services, For example, developing better assess- information dissemination. The Sphere from strategic to the tactical, who ment and communication tools to make Project guidelines provide another tool have cultural and language skills to timely and useful distinctions about that establishes both a framework and appropriately assess, understand, and our objectives will help determine our a standard for collective response that partner in the health domain. Similarly, working relationships. This in turn will approaches an evidence-based method. you need to further explore creating allow us to collectively improve our What about exploring and develop- opportunities for our representatives to ability to identify, map, and plan con- ing the concept of interoperability in work in concert with your planners and tingencies and improve our effective- the areas of medical equipment and implementers. There has been signifi- ness in disaster areas and conflict zones. supplies, evacuation processes, and cant work and partnership in these areas As part of this, maybe your concept responses? This would allow military over the past several years, but more of interoperability is an approach that forces and the humanitarian community effort and focus are needed.
52 Special Feature / Separate and Equal: Building Better Relationships JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 9 Conclusion imperatives—ground rules, if you will— Ramey L. Wilson, “Disasters and Conflict Zones Around the World: The Roles and The humanitarian community has a will allow us to work together in honest Relationships of Military and Nongovernmental long history of advocating for and and productive ways as we confront and Organizations,” in Igniting the Power of Com- assisting those in need throughout the address the many challenges ahead. With munity: The Role of CBOs and NGOs in Global world. And as recent Kaiser Family formal dialogue, preplanning, under- Public Health, ed. Paul A. Gaist (New York: Foundation reports in 2014 and 2015 standing, and agreements, together we Springer-Verlag, 2010), 125. 10 Special Inspector General for Iraq Recon- re-emphasized, NGOs (both U.S. and can find improved and constructive ways struction (SIGIR), Learning from Iraq: A Final foreign) play an important role in and to do this. There are significant oppor- Report from the Special Inspector General for are key implementers of global health tunities for us to make progress toward Iraq Reconstruction (Washington, DC: SIGIR, efforts.12 As you expand into the health our mutual goals, to efficiently improve March 2013), available at
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Gaist and Wilson 53 U.S. Army medical doctor with Carl R. Darnall Army Medical Center at Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency excavation site searches for remains of five MIAs lost in B-24 crash from World War II, located near Riechelsdorf, Germany, September 1, 2015 (DOD/U.S. Air Force/Brian Kimball)
Global Health Engagement A Military Medicine Core Competency
By Thomas R. Cullison, Charles W. Beadling, and Elizabeth Erickson
n his February 2014 testimony to sixth line of effort was to “expand our Why Military Global the House Armed Services Commit- global health engagement strategy.” Health Engagement? I tee, Assistant Secretary of Defense This article is an overview of U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign for Health Affairs Jonathan Woodson global health engagement, including policy has been summarized as “speak articulated six strategic lines of effort such topics as current guidelines, health softly and carry a big stick.” This has supporting then–Secretary of Defense as a strategic enabler, health in disaster evolved over time into “smart power,”1 a Chuck Hagel’s “six strategic priorities management, and future directions for combination of “hard power” and “soft for reshaping our forces and institutions global health engagement. power” as outlined in the first Qua- for a different future.” Dr. Woodson’s drennial Diplomacy and Development Review.2 Many observers see topics, including health, that simultaneously Dr. Thomas R. Cullison is Senior Advisor to the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance benefit a population while advanc- Medicine at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. Dr. Charles W. Beadling ing U.S. interests as legitimate areas is Director of the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine. Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth Erickson, USAF, is Chief of Strategic Health Engagement Operations in the Surgeon’s Office at for international engagement. Others Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii. view such activities as inappropriate for
54 Special Feature / Global Health Engagement: A Military Medicine Core Competency JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 foreign militaries, believing all actors in (DODI), both developed in the context In recent years, relationships have the humanitarian space should behave of recent activities in Iraq and Afghani- dramatically improved between mili- apolitically, strictly following the human- stan, are widely considered GHE source tary medical organizations, other U.S. itarian principles of humanity, neutrality, documents: DODI 3000.05, “Stabil- Government agencies, and nongovern- impartiality, and independence, particu- ity Operations,” and DODI 6000.16, mental organizations (NGOs) involved larly during disaster response. In their “Health Support for Stability Opera- in global health activities. For example, extensive review of U.S. Department tions.” A 2013 Secretary of Defense medical staff members representing of Defense (DOD) health engagement, cable, “Guidance for DoD Global numerous civilian NGOs and universities Josh Michaud and his coauthors note Health Engagement,” codifies respon- routinely deploy with U.S. Navy hospital the concern voiced by many other sibility, scope, and funding for GHE ship missions. Military liaison officers are governmental and nongovernmental carried out by DOD organizations.5 assigned to the USAID Office of Civilian- humanitarian actors regarding military While this document makes great strides Military Cooperation to coordinate participation in this arena: in defining and aligning GHE activities, overseas development and defense activi- more granular direction addressing per- ties, and USAID representatives work This has led to some ambiguity and ten- sonnel requirements, monitoring and in geographic combatant commander sion regarding the role of DOD in [health evaluation, and research in this area is headquarters coordinating military engagement], with many in the global expected in the near future. theater security cooperation events health community having reservations with USAID development programs about DOD’s efforts but lacking a full Health as a Strategic Enabler in the respective regions. An integrated understanding of its work, and DOD at Over the past decade, DOD health whole-of-government approach to health times failing to give due consideration to activities have gained increased visibility security concerns supports achievement the methods and principles that define suc- as tools for advancing U.S. national of national security goals. cessful global health programs even as it has interests. The basic notion of enhancing increased its attention to such activities.3 strategic interests through relationship- Health Engagement in building has always been made clear. Geographic Combatant Guidelines for foreign military and Examples include annual U.S. Navy Commander Area of civil defense organizations have been hospital ship deployments such as Responsibility developed to address these concerns and Pacific Partnership and Continuing Operationally, geographic combat- discussions continue to resolve differ- Promise, and U.S. Air Force Opera- ant commanders guide GHE efforts ences,4 yet much work remains. tion Pacific Angel missions. In recent to support U.S. interests in their Numerous senior officials concur that years, a significant shift has occurred areas of operation through theater health is an effective, ethical platform within DOD health engagements from security cooperation plans, which are for engaging partner nations, both in a predominantly direct provision of care part of larger theater campaign plans. security cooperation capacity and as part activities (often known as medical civic Appreciation of GHE as a security of disaster response.5 Wisely executed, action programs) to more engagements cooperation capability varies somewhat U.S. DOD global health engagement focused on building partner nation among the commanders. Within U.S. (GHE), coupled with U.S. Agency for capacity. GHE programs range from Pacific Command (USPACOM), for International Development (USAID) de- assisting a developing nation to improve example, health engagement is seen as velopment efforts and State Department its population’s health through infra- a key enabler for full-spectrum theater diplomacy, can both advance our national structure improvement and educational security cooperation. The USPACOM security strategy and benefit health opportunities, to developing military surgeon prepares a Health Theater throughout the world. health interoperability with a medically Security Cooperation Plan, which sophisticated ally with whom the United provides general health engagement Current Alignment Guidelines States may regularly deploy in contin- guidance, emphasizing principles such Within DOD, strategic policy on health gencies. Successful DOD health engage- as focusing engagements on building engagement is generated by the Office ment planning considers political, social, capacity, capability, and interoperability; of the Secretary of Defense for Policy’s educational, and economic factors within planning engagements that are sustain- Office of Stability and Humanitarian a country; how the host nation’s popula- able and reciprocal; coordinating with Affairs, Assistant Secretary of Defense tion views its military; and regional rela- other organizations working in the for Health Affairs, and Joint Staff tionships that may encourage or dissuade global health arena; and using direct Surgeon. Coordination and input multilateral engagements. Thoughtful patient care if it is the only means to are sought from the Departments of use of health engagements as a theater achieve the engagement objectives. Health and Human Services, Home- security cooperation tool has paved the The plan also prioritizes health lines land Security, Agriculture, and Energy, way for broader security cooperation in of effort and functional areas for each among others. Two DOD instructions many nations. country, aligning efforts to reach
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Cullison et al. 55 theater campaign plan objectives. relationships, and explored complex Leverage Existing Capabilities. The Health engagement events are inte- issues of health and security. In U.S. U.S. military health system possesses grated within country security coopera- Central Command, this concept has unique assets that regularly provide tion plans, which security cooperation been applied in a regional setting with services of worldwide importance yet are officers develop with the interagency participants from partner nations, and little known beyond their narrow sphere. U.S. country team in keeping host plans are in place to expand this model DOD overseas medical research laborato- nation priorities. to USPACOM and other commands. ries have provided fundamental research Health engagement activities involve Growing global threats from infectious supporting force health protection a number of DOD health organiza- diseases that know no national borders against infectious diseases throughout the tions, including Service components necessitate collaboration, cooperation, world for over half a century. Working and subordinate units, National Guard and information-sharing, which academic alongside host nation military and min- State Partnership Programs, Army and programs promote. istry of health scientists and technicians, Navy overseas research laboratories, and Following the Ebola crisis in West these laboratories have strengthened both educational institutions such as the U.S. Africa, U.S. Africa Command established health systems and U.S. relationships Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, the African Partner Outbreak Response with partner nations.6 Collaboration Uniformed Services University of the Alliance. Using the U.S. Armed Forces among uniformed U.S. public health and Health Sciences (USUHS), and Defense Health Surveillance Center and CDHAM tropical disease specialists and their civil- Institute of Medical Operations. GHE as implementing partners, the alliance ian colleagues in numerous nations has activities may occur within scheduled is designed to improve African militar- resulted in enduring professional relation- military exercises (such as Cobra Gold ies’ ability to effectively support civilian ships and personal friendships. or Balikatan in USPACOM); within authorities to identify and respond to a Contribute to Established humanitarian assistance/disaster re- disease outbreak. International and U.S. Government sponse–focused engagements (such as Health Programs. Military medical Continuing Promise and New Horizons Focus Areas research initially performed to protect in U.S. Southern Command); as a series DOD health activities span a wide range troops in combat served as the founda- of subject matter expert exchanges; of engagement types and topics. We tion for public health efforts throughout within peacekeeping operations training; suggest the following general principles the world. To remain relevant, today’s or within multilateral structures such and focus areas for DOD global health U.S. military health engagement pro- as the Association of Southeast Asian engagement as the most effective. grams must be synergistic with ongoing Nations Defense Ministers Meeting–Plus Continue Military-to-Military civilian-sector programs carried out by Expert Working Group on Military Engagement on Health Issues Unique international organizations, national Medicine. Additionally, foreign military to Uniformed Armed Forces. U.S. mili- development agencies, NGOs, and other medical personnel attend short- and tary health capabilities are unmatched actors in the global health space. long-term training courses in the United by those of any other nation’s armed In 2000, world leaders established States, which results in strong relation- forces. We excel in many fields: industrial time-bound targets, the Millennium ships and paves the way for increased hygiene, preventive medicine, infec- Development Goals, to focus efforts in military health interoperability. tious disease, and combat trauma, to eight specific areas, three of which are Regularly scheduled academic mention a few. We are world leaders in directly related to health.7 Goal 6 com- programs and subject matter expert military-specific areas such as combat mits to “combat HIV/AIDS, malaria exchanges are extremely important. stress, aerospace medicine, aeromedical and other diseases” with specific targets Recently, the USUHS Center for evacuation, undersea medicine, and field to “have halted by 2015 and begun to Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance medicine. We have much to learn from reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS” and Medicine (CDHAM) has partnered with our colleagues in other nations, however, “have halted by 2015 and begun to geographic combatant commanders particularly about region-specific diseases, reverse the spread of malaria and other on regional health strategy symposia. practices, and successes. Subject matter diseases (particularly tuberculosis).” These engagements bring together expert exchanges should be just that: bi- Specific indicators have been established senior and mid-level health leaders from directional exchanges of knowledge and to track progress on each of these DOD health organizations, partner experience. These exchanges, whether endeavors. nations, the U.S. Government inter- during planned military exercises, inter- Concerns regarding the impact of agency community, and the broader national officer exchanges, educational rapidly spreading infectious disease on global health community to focus on programs, or medical conferences, result freedom of movement and the world the nexus between health and security. in expanded cultural understanding, economy led to the 2005 World Health These events have increased awareness increased medical competency of all par- Organization (WHO) International of and skills in GHE for DOD members, ticipants, and improved interoperability Health Regulations, committing all built interagency and whole-of-society between military medical services. signatory nations to high standards
56 Special Feature / Global Health Engagement: A Military Medicine Core Competency JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 in capability and availability.”8 These recommended that nations wishing to act Disaster Management and Humanitarian guidelines, updated in 2007 following bilaterally should make use of the Model Assistance, and the Center for Disaster the unprecedented international military Agreement set out in Annex I of the Oslo and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine. response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Guidelines. The U.S. Africa Command Disaster tsunami, discuss three levels of activ- Public health services and clinical care Preparedness Program (DPP) exemplifies ity: direct assistance, indirect assistance, are occasionally the central focus of a a sustained engagement methodology for and infrastructure support. Foreign disaster. Onset of the West African Ebola building disaster management capabilities militaries are expected to operate in the crisis was relatively gradual, with the and capacity. Since 2008, this effort has background in support of host nation number of cases increasing exponentially measurably enhanced disaster manage- and international civilian relief opera- over a period of several months. This led ment of all hazards in over a dozen tors, performing “indirect assistance” to concern that the disease would spread African partner nations. Additionally, and “infrastructure support” unless no to other regions including Europe, North several strategic benefits have been other capability is available to meet the America, and Asia. On August 8, 2014, achieved, such as building strong re- need. During the U.S. response to the the WHO Director-General declared the lationships based on trust, improving Haitian earthquake, over 13,000 U.S. epidemic a “public health emergency of cooperation between ministries within military personnel were involved in all international concern.” Shortly thereafter, the countries, and creating a network of three levels of response. Direct assistance President Barack Obama stated Ebola is subject matter experts for collaboration was provided in the form of medical and a “top national security priority for the across the continent. DPP promotes a surgical care on board the hospital ship United States” and committed significant whole-of-government effort throughout USNS Comfort until sufficient capability assets to the effort. U.S. military activity the entire disaster cycle, from preven- was available ashore. Indirect assistance was largely in the form of indirect and tion, mitigation, and preparedness to involved flying patients to the ship by infrastructure support, including airlift response and recovery. While the whole- military aircraft. Infrastructure support establishing a regional intermediate stag- of-government approach is essential to an included enabling logistic capabilities ing base, constructing treatment facilities, effective disaster management program, by restoring and operating the Port-au- training healthcare workers in personal the military-to-military aspect of DPP is Prince airport and port facilities. protective procedures for safe patient emphasized. The Oslo Guidelines address The Oslo Guidelines require transfer interaction, and assisting with laboratory the role of foreign military and civil de- of military relief functions to civilian and surveillance techniques. In keeping fense but do not apply to a nation’s own authorities once the immediate require- with the Oslo Guidelines, uniformed military participation in domestic disaster ment has been met. These often difficult U.S. Public Health Service providers, not response. The military is often a country’s transitions may be smoothed by estab- military medical officers, provided direct most critical resource in effective disaster lishing long-term working relationships care for healthcare workers who became management. between militaries and civilian disaster ill while tending to others. In many nations, adequate contin- response organizations through con- The above examples refer mainly to gency preparedness and response plans ferences, combined study of previous events occurring in the “respond” and do not exist. The DPP process begins events, and participation in each other’s early “recovery” phases of the disaster with a baseline analysis to identify disaster exercises. Annual disaster relief, search risk reduction cycle. Recovery, mitiga- management capability and capacity and rescue, and medical interoperability tion, and preparation activities are still gaps, which are prioritized in a strategic exercises during normal times develop occurring in all of these situations, in- disaster management work plan. U.S. host nation capability while establishing cluding infrastructure replacement and and host nation officials work together to expectations during actual crises. Using rejuvenation. create national disaster plans that are ap- scenarios presenting likely events allows “The time to exchange business cards plied during a tabletop exercise for likely for critical analysis and preparation that is not during a disaster” is a common scenarios such as floods, earthquakes, or will save lives. saying in disaster management. Much pandemic disease. In these sessions, tech- Foreign military response to natural less visible but equally important is nical experts are grouped not by agency disasters will often deploy based on ongoing international disaster planning or ministry but by function, representing bilateral agreements or multilateral trea- supported by U.S. agencies focused on command and control, logistics, health, ties. For example, U.S. military foreign whole-of-government capacity-building communications, and security. Working humanitarian assistance normally sup- within low- and middle-income coun- together with civilian colleagues, often ports the USAID Office of U.S. Foreign tries, assisting these nations to develop for the first time, participants develop Disaster Assistance following a formal internal capability to decrease the impact, important individual relationships as they request for assistance by the host na- shorten the recovery period, and, most form a national plan emphasizing military tion through the U.S. Ambassador and importantly, lessen human suffering. support to civilian authority, reinforcing a request from the State Department DOD entities involved in such work integration of military and civilian govern- for specific response capabilities. It is include the Center for Excellence in ment ministries and agencies throughout
58 Special Feature / Global Health Engagement: A Military Medicine Core Competency JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Anesthesiologist examines child before her surgery aboard Military Sealift Command hospital ship USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) during Continuing Promise 2015, August 3, 2015 (U.S. Army/Lance Hartung) the sustained engagement process. DPP Bringing these individuals together would J. Christopher Daniel and Kathleen H. has assisted partners in writing 9 all- have been unlikely without the relation- Hicks noted steady progress in many of hazard contingency plans and 10 military ships built through DPP over 7 years. these areas, particularly interagency co- pandemic preparedness and response ordination, with regular meetings at the plans. Each military pandemic plan aligns Future Directions assistant secretary level, and an increase with that country’s national pandemic Military global health engagement is in liaison officers among DOD, USAID, preparedness and response plan. a valuable mechanism to simultane- and Health and Human Services.10 The emergence of a network of ously improve disaster preparation and Certain structural reorganization—such African disaster management experts, response, increase population health as merging DOD bio-surveillance ac- which has been effective for regional co- around the world, and advance U.S. tivities under the Armed Forces Health operation, is another powerful outcome. interests through all phases of the con- Surveillance Center to better integrate Key individuals with both the technical tinuum of military operations, particu- with the U.S. Centers for Disease expertise and collaborative attitudes larly in Phases 0 (shape) and 1 (deter). Control and WHO worldwide disease were identified and recruited as facilita- In 2009, Eugene V. Bonventre and surveillance—demonstrates progress in tors, turning bilateral into multilateral his colleagues published an excellent integrating with U.S. and foreign part- engagements. The benefit of this network review of DOD GHE activities with ners in areas of common interest. was seen when representatives from two several recommendations for interagency other West African countries responded collaboration: creation of an overall Recommendations to a Liberian request for assistance to global health security plan that combines Several significant issues must be advance national policy and legislation to civilian and military disease surveillance addressed for global health engagement improve disaster management capabilities. capabilities, and creation of a common to become an accepted, routine military Although delayed for several months due interagency monitoring and evalua- capability. to the Ebola epidemic, Liberia has since tion capability to measure progress in Clear doctrine must be developed moved policy and legislation forward. health engagement activities.9 In 2014, for guiding DOD activities and for
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Cullison et al. 59 U.S. Southern Command conducts New Horizons Honduras 2015 joint humanitarian assistance training exercise with partner nations in Central America, South America, and Caribbean, June 27, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/David J. Murphy) establishing effective coordination requirements. Each military Service is near future. Extant education and train- with other U.S. Government and in- addressing this issue in its own way. The ing opportunities could be combined to ternational agencies with global health Air Force International Health Specialist form a core curriculum to which services responsibilities. (IHS) program, which began in 2001, may add instruction on unique capabili- Multiyear funding mechanisms must fosters an understanding of regional and ties or issues. be developed to support sequential global health issues, geopolitical issues, Data regarding GHE effectiveness, capacity-building efforts. GHE activities and joint planning methods. Air Force both from a health and a strategy perspec- in general are funded with same-year Health Service personnel may apply for tive, is sorely lacking. Outcome studies in dollars, inhibiting the establishment IHS special experience identifiers based terms of both health and strategic results of ongoing activities required to de- upon past experience in global health are needed to evaluate current efforts velop strong health capabilities and activities, foreign language proficiency, and guide future programs. Congress meaningful research projects needed cross-cultural skills, and completion of emphasized this point in section 715 of to establish strong relationships. The minimum training requirements. The the 2013 National Defense Authorization overseas laboratories and Defense HIV/ Navy is approaching GHE through Act. Current work on a measures of ef- AIDS Prevention Program are excellent the development of an Additional fectiveness process and learning tool is examples of success through thoughtful Qualification Designator that serves as well under way. This capability can be budgeting, and leveraging external fund- a means to identify health professionals helpful to military academic institutions ing could be emulated in other areas. who meet certain competency require- such as National Defense University, Personnel and training requirements ments coupled with global health-related USUHS, and Service war colleges, which are needed. Currently, military officers training, education, and experience. The seem ideal centers for such study. As sug- involved in GHE activities are largely authors of this article support ongoing gested in the 2013 Secretary of Defense self-selected through interest in this type efforts to establish a joint solution to this GHE cable, a percentage of funding of activity that is balanced with other issue and encourage clear guidance in the earmarked for monitoring and evaluation
60 Special Feature / Global Health Engagement: A Military Medicine Core Competency JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 could be used to support these efforts. on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, Revision 1.1 (New We understand that working groups have York: UN, 2007), available at
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Cullison et al. 61 ivilization began because the beginning of civilization is a mili- C tary advantage.”1 This observa- tion by Walter Bagehot is not far off the mark. Warfare certainly matured along with civilization as a violent expression of political will and intent. We currently view the art of warfare in three levels— tactical, operational, and strategic—but it was not always so. In the beginning, there were strategy and tactics. Strategy outlined how and to what purpose war might be used to achieve politi- cal objectives. Tactics directed how the violence was actually applied on the battlefield. For most of military history, tactical art was able to achieve strategic objectives as tribes, forces, and armies marshaled on the battlefield to destroy the enemy’s ability to resist their master’s political will. Although much debated, operational art was born at the end of the 19th century when the size of armies, made possible by the development of the nation-state, rendered tactics unable to bring about political results. Civilization has moved on. From a doctrinal, theoretical, and practical point of view, it is now time to consider a fourth level of war—the theater-strategic level of war.
Doctrine There is little written about theater U.S. Marine Corps officer assigned to Company strategy in U.S. doctrine. Joint Publica- A, The Basic School, prepares his ammunition tion 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, during “The War” field training exercise aboard includes only a single paragraph on Marine Corps Base Quantico, April 16, 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Ezekiel R. Kitandwe) what would seem an important subject. U.S. doctrine acknowledges the stra- tegic, operational, and tactical levels of war. However, doctrine also includes a theater-strategic level in an overlapping area that suggests this level bridges the operational and strategic levels.2 The Fourth Level Yet the operational level is defined as linking “strategy and tactics by estab- lishing operational objectives needed to achieve the military end states and of War strategic objectives.”3 So what is the theater-strategic level of war? What is By Michael R. Matheny theater strategy? The problem in placing theater strategy in some useful context is that we already have so many kinds of strategy and no real consensus on what Dr. Michael R. Matheny is a Professor of Military Strategy and Operations at the U.S. Army War College. they are.
62 JPME Today / The Fourth Level of War JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 On the menu of strategies, we can of responsibility] to support and advance and war. To better illustrate the tempo- find grand, national, national security, U.S. interests.”7 A theater campaign plan ral relationship, the classic diagram of national military, just plain military, and details the strategy and usually employs the levels of war should depict wheels of theater strategies. All of these are har- security cooperation, building partner increasing size. At the tactical level, the nessed to serve policy, but each varies in capacity, and force posture, among other wheels and events turn much faster than its objectives and means. There is a wide activities, to achieve the commander’s at the larger operational and strategic range of definitions of strategy, most of vision, advance U.S. interests, and pre- levels. which illustrate an attribute rather than pare for possible contingencies. This is Size matters. War is waged in a geo- its essential nature. They range from the eminently reasonable and desirable and is graphic context. Each level of war has general: Art Lykke’s famous “strategy arguably effective, but it largely addresses been historically associated with scale and equals ends plus ways plus means”; to steady-state or peacetime requirements. scope of effort. The tyranny of distance Lawrence Freedman’s more poetic “a There is no doctrine based on theory or contributes to the temporal relationship story told in the future tense”; to Colin practice for developing or executing the- between the levels. Tactics is the applica- Gray’s more specific “the use or threat of ater strategy in war. Specific contingency tion of technology to the battlefield to military power for political purposes.”4 plans, whether directed by DOD or self- defeat the enemy and thereby gain im- The Department of Defense (DOD) as- generated by combatant commanders, mediate or cumulative military results. serts that strategy is “a prudent idea or set address specific threats, generally with op- Operational art is applied to a spectrum of ideas for employing the instruments erational campaign planning. Where does of operations, connecting or synchro- of national power in a synchronized and theater strategy fit in wartime, particularly nizing battles and major operations to integrated fashion to achieve theater, with multiple theaters of operations? achieve strategic effect. This is particularly national, and multinational objectives.”5 Does the scale of effort—the intermedi- the case when a single major operation This suggests that strategy involves the ate theater objectives as opposed to such as Urgent Fury in Grenada (1983) whole weight of the U.S. Government in theater of operations objectives—justify a or Just Cause in Panama (1989) can the pursuit of national policy. Does the- fourth level of war? achieve strategic objectives. Theater ater strategy likewise involve all elements strategy in war should seek to synchro- of national power? Theory nize and arrange multiple campaigns in In the pursuit of U.S. national The assertion that it is time to consider a theater of war or area of responsibility policy, DOD has divided the world into another level of war directly relates to to achieve national strategic objectives. six geographic combatant commands. how these levels are linked and why In other words, theater strategy synchro- Combatant commanders oversee these they now need to be expanded. The nizes multiple theaters of operation. areas of responsibility and develop theater oft-quoted Prussian philosopher of war, Levels of war are also distinguished by strategies. By doctrine, a theater strategy Carl von Clausewitz, helped to establish objectives—how each level contributes to is “an overarching construct outlining the relationship between the levels of achieving the ultimate policy objectives. a combatant commander’s vision for war when he noted that “the concepts In cases where only one theater of opera- integrating and synchronizing military characteristic of time—war, campaign, tions is engaged in combat operations, activities and operations with the other and battle—are parallel to those of there will be almost complete congruence elements of national power to achieve na- space—country, theater of operations, between national, theater, and theater tional strategic objectives.”6 Combatant and positions.”8 Indeed, the relation- of operations objectives. Theater of commanders can only seek to synchro- ship between the levels of war includes operations planning and operations will nize and integrate, not to direct other time, scale, objectives, effect, and, sig- dominate national attention. Theater of elements of national power in the pursuit nificantly, the influence of policy. All of operations objectives and national objec- of unity of effort. Theater commanders these factors are interrelated—that is to tives will be virtually synonymous, and conduct business in the complex environ- say, interactive. For example, there is a theater strategy will be cast largely in a ment of national, international, coalition, temporal relationship between the levels supporting role. This relationship and the and alliance policy. The theater is where of war. Things happen much faster at role and function of theater strategy may policy meets the joint force. How is this the tactical level than at the operational well change, however, when the theater done and to what purpose? or strategic levels. Likewise, the conduct has multiple theaters of operations con- Combatant commanders work for and results of operational campaigns ducting military operations. the Secretary of Defense and President take less time than the full implemen- If, for example, war erupts on the through the Chairman of the Joint tation of national strategies. Indeed, Korean Peninsula, the national, theater Chiefs of Staff. Charged with geographic strategic results may take years to fully of operations, and theater objectives responsibilities, they employ “theater realize or even manifest. Clausewitz will perfectly align, leading to a victory strategy to align and focus efforts and pointed out that this is a natural conse- in Korea. The U.S. Pacific Command resources to mitigate and prepare for con- quence of the scale and objectives—the (USPACOM) commander will be cast flict and contingencies in their AOR [area relationship between battle, campaign, largely in a supporting role while the
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Matheny 63 Korean theater of operations commander strategic or political effects of the tacti- is no linear relationship between the garners national attention and, likely, di- cal action. President Lyndon Johnson levels of war. Indeed, even doctrine rect or close supervision by the Secretary was famously involved in picking targets recognizes that tactical events may result of Defense and President. In this case, in North Vietnam during the Vietnam in immediate strategic effect. This may the USPACOM commander will be cast War.10 His concern was not tactical ef- have increased in recent years due to the in a supervisory role, although it will be fects but the potential of hitting Soviet pervasive nature and potential influence a largely supporting role. If, however, at or Chinese advisors or personnel, which of media coverage of world events. As the same time a conflict erupts with the could catastrophically escalate the war. an example, the raid to capture or kill Chinese over Taiwan or elsewhere in the Likewise, President Barack Obama or- bin Laden certainly comes to mind. This region, the theater commander must now dered and then watched the tactical raid tactical or strategic compression is usually actively balance, prioritize, and synchro- that took out Osama bin Laden. In both rare and the effects are most likely transi- nize major operations or campaigns in cases, the effects of the action matched to tory. Despite the impact on U.S. public the theater to achieve national strategic policy objectives determined the relation- morale, al Qaeda and affiliated terrorists objectives. In this scenario, theater strat- ship between the tactical, operational, fight on without bin Laden. The tem- egy becomes an essential intermediary and strategic. poral relationship between the levels of level of war due to the scope, scale, and Finally, the levels of war are distin- war, if true, would suggest that the most nature of the conflict. Despite this critical guished by their tactical, operational, enduring effects at each level of war are theater-strategic role, political scrutiny theater-strategic, and strategic effect. most likely cumulative. In the planning will inevitably gravitate toward the the- Chance and the unique nature of violence and conduct of operations with endur- ater of operations with the most domestic give war a nonlinear character, but the ing results, the relationship between the and international political consequences. notion of levels of war enables us to vi- levels of war remains useful in arranging This is an example of the critical role of sualize and arrange resources to purpose operations, assigning tasks, and allocating policy as a distinguishing feature in the in a fairly linear or conceptual way. The resources. levels of war. purpose of each level of war is action—to There is an ascending quality to the get things done. In a practical reality, Practice role of policy in the levels of war that pro- this calls for some orderly approach to Theater strategy is as old as empires vides both context and constantly exhibits thinking, planning, and executing mili- contending for power and influence influence. This, of course, is nothing tary operations. Bounded, directed, and in distant corners of their reach. The more than reiterating Clausewitz’s most constrained by policy while wrestling leaders of the Roman, British, and famous insight that war is simply a con- with an adaptive animate enemy, planners French empires, as well as of succeeding tinuation of policy by other means. But and commanders seek to stack the odds empires, all sought to tailor strategy the role of policy varies with the level in their favor. The levels of war are a con- to specific regions while harmonizing of war. The tactical art largely involves struct that helps them achieve this. The those actions with the greater national the application of technology to the theater-strategic level is no less a tool than purpose. As war spread around the battlespace, so technology has more the operational or tactical framework for world, beginning with the rise of the influence than does policy at this level. planning and execution. nation-state in Europe, theater strategy Progressing from operational to strategic, What is the relationship of the levels became ever more necessary. Some the influence of policy grows, and at the of war in terms of effects? Do we need nations were better at it than others. strategic level, it predominates. Again, success at the tactical level to assure In the 18th century, for example, the Clausewitz anticipated this relationship success at the operational? Likewise, do British won and retained India but when he asserted that “Policy, of course, we need operational success to achieve lost the United States. World War I will not extend its influence to opera- theater-strategic or strategic effect? Logic demonstrated—and World War II con- tional details. Political considerations do suggests that success at one level makes firmed—that theater strategy was a criti- not determine the posting of guards or success at the next level more likely, but it cal path to national strategic objectives the employment of patrols. But they are in fact may be insufficient. History is full and success. Much like operational art, more influential in the planning of war, of cautionary examples where tactical or however, historians have largely ignored of the campaign, and often even of the operational success does not guarantee theater-strategic art as a specific area battle.”9 strategic success. German military history worthy of interest and study. Narratives The extent of policymaker involve- in the 20th century is certainly a case in of battles, campaigns, and national strat- ment in operational details has often been point. The list of U.S. tactical or even op- egies continue to dominate the story of a sticking point in civil-military relations. erational success in the limited wars since military history. Should the President be picking target 1945 leading to equally limited strategic For the U.S. military, current practice points or making tactical decisions from effect might also be cited. is rooted in World War II and postwar Washington, DC? The answer invariably All the levels of war function simul- solutions to filling the power vacuums lies with the question of the potential taneously. Some may argue that there left by the destruction of the German
64 JPME Today / The Fourth Level of War JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 U.S. Marines with Golf Company, 23rd Marine Regiment, 4th Marine Division, Marine Forces Reserve, sign roster alongside Brazilian marine corps during UNITAS Amphibious 2015, Ilha do Governador, Brazil, November 16, 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Issac Velasquez) and Japanese empires. Even before the has been involved in multiple theaters of involved counterinsurgency (COIN), war ended, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff operations in the war on terror. In terms building partner capacity (BPC), and decided to retain the unified command of scale, USCENTCOM established counterterrorism operations. Things still system that had proved so successful. separate theaters of operations as the war happen quickly at the tactical level, but In June 1945, the Joint Chiefs issued a spread across the Middle East, South COIN and BPC are inherently slow and directive appointing General Dwight D. Central Asia, and Africa. Afghanistan, expensive. Counterterrorism operations Eisenhower as commanding general of Iraq, and the Horn of Africa account for may be less expensive and more discrete U.S. forces in the European theater of three separate theaters of operations. The but, like COIN and BPC, the effects are operations. In December 1946, President potential for multiple and simultaneous cumulative. The strategic decision to Harry S. Truman approved the Unified theaters of operations within the same surge troops into Iraq in 2007 enabled Command Plan, which established seven geographic combatant commander’s area the operational decision to first secure geographic theater commands.11 Over of responsibility is obvious, particularly Baghdad. The many tactical actions the years, these commands have changed in the case of the Pacific and European that actually extended security to Iraq’s a great deal, but the requirement for commands. These potential separate the- capital took place daily, accumulating geographic responsibilities and the need aters of operations span the full range of to achieve operational effect. The tacti- to plan and orchestrate both daily and conflict, from state to nonstate to hybrid, cal, operational, theater-strategic, and potential military activities remain the in every region. national-strategic effects were linked but same. The distinguishing factors among Time and Effects. The temporal rela- not simultaneous and remain separated the levels of war—scale, objective, policy, tionship between the tactical, operational, in time. time, and effect—have also been evident theater-strategic, and strategic levels The tactical effects were undeniable at the theater-strategic level of war. remains constant. Most of the various and came quickly as U.S. forces worked Scale. Over the last decade, U.S. campaigns in the Middle East and South to expand security in the capital region. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Central Asia over the last decade have The operational effects took more time,
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Matheny 65 however, as the number of violent inci- while General David Petraeus, USA, ton, DC: The Joint Staff, 2010, as amended through March 2015), 249. dents decreased, providing an appearance commanded in Iraq in 2007.15 To win 7 JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Wash- of incremental progress that did not in Vietnam and Iraq was the theater of ington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2011), II-7. reflect the reality on the ground.12 It has operations, theater, and national objec- 8 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and also been argued that the troop surge tive. What, then, is the role of the theater trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princ- allowed the operational consequence commander? Is he an enabler or a sup- eton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 379. 9 Ibid., 606. of supporting or enabling the Sunni porter? Someone has to be looking after 10 See Dennis M. Drew, “Rolling Thunder Awakening that developed over the fol- the region, not just the hot war. What 1965: Anatomy of Failure,” CADRE Paper, lowing year.13 Regardless of the debate have our military actions in the Middle Report No. AU-ARI-CP-86-3, October 1986, about the operational effects of the surge, East, taken as a whole, done for our posi- available at
66 JPME Today / The Fourth Level of War JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Soldiers from Minnesota National Guard complete ruck march at Forward Operating Base Gerber, Kuwait, January 27, 2012 (U.S. Army/Trisha Betz)
Building Joint Capacity Within the Reserve Component
By Brent French
e should expect increased regional alignment throughout the After reviewing the constellation of dependency on the Reserve RC.1 RC contribution to all echelons laws, policies, and practices designed to W Component (RC) due to of combatant command planning and produce joint qualified officers (JQOs), post-sequestration, post–Operation execution will expand to allow “military I believe the current system is serving Enduring Freedom force reductions department apportionment of larger the AC well but has unintentionally within the Active Component (AC), Reserve Component formations . . . limited the joint potential resident in and simultaneous plans to increase to Combatant Commander OPLANs the RC officer corps to the detriment [operation plans].”2 Joint force presen- of the Department of Defense (DOD). tation, planning, and administration In this article, I argue that “joint,” will, by necessity, be a Total Force as defined by law and implemented Colonel Brent French, USAFR, Ph.D., is the endeavor. This prompts inquiry into within DOD, has become largely an AC Individual Mobilization Augmentee to the Director of Training in the Office of the Assistant the current state and future sufficiency competency and that national security Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. of joint competencies within the RC.3 would be better served by developing
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 French 67 U.S. Soldier assigned to 237th Support Battalion of Ohio National Guard provides perimeter security during medical evacuation training exercise at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, July 21, 2013 (U.S. Army/Darryl L. Montgomery) a new vision for joint competencies as If we believe DOD is better served by a status for RC general and flag officers component-neutral. diffusion of joint competencies through- may be a reasonable and durable solu- Our goal should be a purple Total out the Total Force, then the edges and tion to effect change over a multi-decade Force, but right now the RC is watery unintended outcomes of the current horizon. It took over two decades to fully lavender at best. There are fewer than joint qualification system merit inquiry implement JQO status as an O-7 pre- 600 joint qualified RC officers out of with an a priori understanding that both requisite within the Active Component, the 56,630 officers at the O-4, O-5, DOD and Congress share responsibility spanning the period from GNA in and O-6 grades actively serving in the for developing an adaptive force capable 1986 through the National Defense Reserve or Guard.4 For every RC joint of meeting the demands of an uncertain Authorization Act of 2007, at which time qualified officer, there are 15 AC joint future. waiving joint qualification for promo- qualified officers; closing this gap may Some argue there is no valid reason tion became extremely difficult. Moving require modernizing the legacy of the for joint expansion within the RC, espe- toward mandatory joint officer qualifica- Goldwater-Nichols Department of cially in light of Federal law that requires tion for the RC also needs to account for Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 joint qualification among AC (but not limited opportunities within the Guard (GNA) and asking pointed questions RC) officers prior to promotion to for joint experience due to the way joint about the adequacy of current outcomes. general or admiral.5 The solution to RC matters are currently defined by law and For example, are DOD’s best interests jointness, as seen from this perspective, joint positions are arrayed. For example, served by practices that segregate by is simple: require joint qualification for there are fewer than 150 joint positions component? Is an 85 percent disapproval RC officers prior to O-7 promotion, and for the 21,150 Army and Air National rate for National Guard joint experience until then there is no real requirement. Guard O-4s, O-5s, and O-6s compared applications acceptable? Are we doing This logic seems to presuppose that with 1,700 joint positions for the 35,480 enough to create an educational and the only reason for becoming a JQO is Reserve field grade officers. The interre- experiential base among the 90 percent promotion, and this may be ignoring the lated nature of Joint Officer Management of the RC force that serves part time? intent behind GNA,6 but requiring JQO entails complementary combinations of
68 JPME Today / Building Joint Capacity Within the Reserve Component JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 experience and education, and this im- control. For example, tenure standards needed to work in joint environments; plies that changing Federal law to make for part-time RC members serving in it is no accident that then–Chairman of general and flag officer promotion stan- joint billets are a matter of DOD policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General dards the same across components can as are joint experience application and Martin E. Dempsey discussed cross-com- only be successful if there are structural approval processes. Improving joint- ponent relationships in the same breath as changes to the joint qualification system. ness across the force continues to be a joint force development, stating that “we In the meantime, DOD—espe- shared responsibility between Congress will reexamine and revise the relationships cially the Office of the Secretary of and DOD, and to the degree DOD can among Active, Guard, and Reserve forces Defense’s Officer and Enlisted Personnel enhance jointness within the RC under of our military. And we will need to be Management (OEPM) area, the Joint the “extent practicable” clause in current even more joint—pushing interdepen- Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Manpower and Federal law, the need to depend solely on dence deeper, sooner.”11 Personnel (J1) directorate, the JCS Joint Congress for reform is obviated, although This article endeavors to reexamine Force Development (J7) directorate, close coordination and support should be cross-component relationships within the and the Service chiefs—has executed (and have been) the norm. context of joint interdependencies, spe- legislative and executive intent to the A discussion of specific concerns about cifically addressing RC progress on joint maximum (as evidenced by the hundreds RC jointness needs a caveat, namely, that education, joint billets and the standard of thousands of joint-exposed, -educated, we risk preoccupation with the tactical path to becoming a joint qualified officer, -experienced officers and enlisted mem- at the expense of the strategic. Strategic the experience path to joint qualification, bers over the last 30 years) and continues inquiry into joint force development and the need to acknowledge cross- to stay attuned to future demands of the must include discourse on the range of component experience. Total Force. The statutory requirement competencies the joint development for RC joint force development comes system should inculcate in our future of- RC Joint Officer Production directly from Federal law, specifically that ficer, enlisted, and civilian workforce, and Officers become joint qualified through joint education and experience “shall, this includes reexamining GNA from a a combination of education and experi- to the extent practicable for the reserve 21st-century vantage point. For example, ence. The educational component of components, be similar to [AC Joint Federal law defines the types of partner the qualification system emphasizes lon- Officer Management].”7 While I suggest organizations DOD can work with to gitudinal development. Cadets are given there are emerging opportunities to apply be eligible for joint credit, and the law joint awareness courses, field grade offi- this law for the betterment of national se- currently recognizes collaboration with cers (those in grades O-4, O-5, or O-6) curity, there is ample evidence of DOD’s people from other military departments, attend joint courses that last from 10 pursuit of this mandate. nonmilitary departments and agencies to 40 weeks, and new general and flag For instance, tremendous effort has of the United States, foreign military officers attend a 55-week joint program. gone into creating and sustaining an forces or agencies, and nongovernmental The experience component of the joint RC-feasible joint education pathway persons or entities.9 It is possible that a qualification system recognizes assign- (Advanced Joint Professional Military more inclusive definition could account ments in predesignated joint billets Education, or AJPME), and, on a smaller for current organizational arrangements (thus creating the standard path to scale, DOD RC promotion boards began unanticipated even a decade ago (the cur- accumulating experience) or emergent reporting joint qualification statistics rent list of eligible partners became law in and unanticipated jobs related to joint to Congress ex post facto in a manner 2006), such as Federal DOD support for matters for which the member must similar to AC reporting.8 DOD has also state governments and their agencies, or apply for credit after the fact (known been successful in promoting a culture future arrangements we are currently un- as the experience path).12 When a field that values joint education and experi- able to predict. For example, the desired grade officer completes joint education ence, evidenced, for example, in the way behaviors implied by partnership, joint and gains sufficient joint experience, he RC officers are mentored to understand integration, and collaboration include or she may request to become a joint that joint exposure will help their careers, interdependence, cooperation, and span- qualified officer. their Services, and the broader enterprise. ning beyond organizational boundaries, The majority of Active Component Selective screening for joint billets rein- competencies critical to successful national JQOs earn their credentials by attending forces this message. security strategy. I suspect our future will a 10-week residential course and serving The degree to which DOD has demand new levels of interconnectedness 3 years in a pre-identified billet at a com- enculturated jointness within the RC among Active and Reserve components batant command.13 The part-time nature provides a foundation for enhancing the in ways not envisioned during the GNA of Reserve Component service precludes Joint Officer Management system. While era nor fully anticipated by Total Force one-size-fits-all pathways, and DOD some changes to the joint development and Abrams Doctrine proponents in has over time successfully advocated for process require amending current stat- the 1960s.10 The ability to work across RC specific provisions such as full- and utes, a number of areas are under DOD component boundaries is the same ability part-time joint billets for the Reserve and
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 French 69 U.S. Army Reservist with 96th Sustainment Brigade participates in rifle training at Fort Hood, Texas, May 16, 2015 (U.S. Army/Kayla Benson)
Guard,14 as well as creating a 40-week Despite elements of the joint quali- One might anticipate proportionately low-residency joint education program fication system that support recognition higher AC qualification rates because as an alternative to the aforementioned of RC jointness, these investments there are four times more joint positions 10-week residential course. Furthermore, seem to have fallen short of producing in the AC than the RC (thus creating policies consistent with the idea articu- significant numbers of RC JQOs, and more opportunities to earn qualifying ex- lated in the 2005 CJCS Vision for Joint the Active Component to have an unin- perience), but current ratios indicate we Officer Development and reinforced by tentional monopoly on joint officers to may be overproducing JQOs within the the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review the detriment of the quality and quantity Active Component or underproducing (QDR) to “recogniz[e] joint experience of alternatives available to combatant JQOs in the Reserve Component. This is whenever and wherever it occurs in an commands and the CJSC. Low RC potentially problematic given that DOD officer’s career”15 are important to RC JQO production has created a situation intent is to diffuse jointness per the 2005 members who are five times more likely wherein the AC has 94 percent of DOD CJCS Joint Officer Development Vision. than their Active peers to become joint JQOs despite having 81 percent of all With the understanding that joint billets qualified through the experience path.16 joint billets. Another way of looking at grant experience leading to JQO designa- Moreover (as of 2010), RC members this imbalance comes from contrasting tion (as distinct from critical joint billets can receive credit for joint work done as the number of JQOs with the pool of that require JQO status as a prerequisite), civilian government (Federal, state, or eligible officers: 10 percent of all AC we can compare JQO production rates local) employees,17 all of which points field grade officers are joint qualified to billets by component to better under- to the foresight of the Joint Officer versus 1 percent of all RC field grade of- stand production rates. As one element of Management community. ficers (see figure 1). this comparison, the AC has 1.17 JQOs
70 JPME Today / Building Joint Capacity Within the Reserve Component JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 for each joint position as opposed to the Figure 1. Active and Reserve Joint Qualified Officers illets RC’s 0.33 JQOs for each position. By and Field rade Officer Population as of October 2014 applying the AC ratio to RC positions, we find a shortfall of 1,438 RC JQOs or, 100,000 conversely, a surplus of 4,833 AC JQOs. 8 497 These figures are not meant to be taken 7 289 literally because component differences 80,000 (for example, assignment rotations) jus- tify some disparities, but the gap indicates 568 60,000 a system working well for one component 1 721 but underserving another, and this gap continues to widen. During fiscal year 40,000 85 147 (FY) 2014, the RC produced 133 JQOs 56 630 while the AC credentialed nine times as 20,000 many (1,195); although this gap is in ac- cordance with current law and policy, it should prompt us to ask if DOD’s future 0 is best served by design parameters that Active Component Reserve Component contribute to these qualification rates. Joint Qualified Officers Joint Billets Population of Field Grade Officers JQO production can be further seg- mented to reveal gaps within the Reserve Component itself. Full-time RC members Table. New Joint Qualified Officer Designees for Fiscal Year 2014 are becoming joint qualified at higher by Component and Path rates than their part-time counterparts. AC Full-time RC Part-time RC Total RC Totals Nearly 40 percent (51) of the 133 RC Standard Path 1,055 33 16 49 1,104 JQOs credentialed in FY14 were full- time RC members, noteworthy because Experience Path 137 18 63 81 218 full-time members are only 10 percent of Totals 1,195 51 82 133 1,328 the overall RC.18 This hints at the pos- sibility that the part-time segment of the billet for 3 years) or an experience path The table shows pathways for the RC may be on the margins of the joint through which people self-nominate rel- 1,195 AC and 133 RC officers who be- qualification system as currently encoded evant experiences for credit. The experi- came JQOs in FY14; 84 percent (1,104 in law and policy. ence path offers a flexible counterpoint out of 1,328) earned their credentials Three conclusions can be drawn from to the occasionally cumbersome and through the standard path, and 16 per- the preceding discussion. First, AC JQO bureaucratic joint billet approval and cent (218 out of 1,328) became qualified production is robust and outpaces RC validation process. RC members who through experience. While the experience JQO production nearly 10 times over. serve full time in a joint billet for 3 years path is not especially important for AC Second, portions of the RC—full-time do not need to go through a boarding officers—only 11 percent (137 out of members—are well served by today’s process for credit, nor do part-time RC 1,195) earned joint qualification through joint qualification system and are gaining members who serve in a joint billet for this method—the opposite is true for the sufficient joint experience, education, and 6 years for 66 days a year (an additional Reserve Component. The majority (61 credentials. Third, the system that is work- 30 days per year in addition to normal percent, or 81 out of 133) of the RC of- ing relatively well for the AC and full-time drill). The “Six and 66” rule changed ficers who became joint qualified in FY14 RC does not appear to be working as well in 2014 (discussed in the next section), got there through the experience path. for the part-time RC, and this creates and part-time RC members are allowed The experience path is even more critical opportunities to improve the system for to satisfy experience requirements for part-time RC members; 77 percent greater effect by considering the way expe- through 3 years of normal drill (36 days (63 out of 82) became JQOs through riences are credited, the way education is per year, or 12 weekends plus a 2-week this self-nomination process. earned, and the way joint is defined. annual tour) plus an additional 10 expe- The importance of the experience rience points. This effectively means path to part-time RC officers implies that The Experience Path Is the experience path is the only pathway investments made in simplifying the ap- Critical for the RC available to RC members who serve part plication process, enhancing technology The practicum component of becom- time, and it heightens the importance used to apply and manage experience ing a JQO can be satisfied through the of this program—conclusions supported points, and streamlining applications standard path (filling a full-time joint through FY14 production data. and supporting documentation directly
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 French 71 Oregon National Guardsman assigned to 1186th Military Police Company provides security during mission at National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, August 23, 2015 (U.S. Army/W. Chris Clyne) benefit tens of thousands of RC members days, hence the name for the rule). DOD days per year plus 10 additional experience as well as the net beneficiary of Joint justified this policy by asserting that “RC points (“Three and 10”). The principal Officer Management: DOD. It is possible officers who perform part-time duty gen- benefits of the change include freeing up that joint experience opportunities may erally do not gain sufficient joint knowl- assignment rotations, which potentially shrink in a post–Operation Enduring edge and experience within [normal] . . gets more people into joint billets and Freedom security environment, and this . tour length requirements.”19 While this grants the Services more opportunity may lead to a concurrent withdrawal of may be true, it may not be, and the lack to develop Service competencies, and investment in enhancing the experience of joint competency assessments makes removing the requirement for the extra path application and approval process. In this impossible to gauge. While Six and 30 days of service per year avoids a large this case, we should do so only cautiously 66 may have enhanced the jointness funding obligation. I am less certain about and with full awareness of the implica- of the Servicemember, the costs were a Servicemember’s opportunity to earn 10 tions for RC officers and the future of RC ultimately unsupportable. The Services experience points. A 3-and-a-half-month jointness. lost an individual for 6 years, fully tour in a combat zone working on joint encumbered funding for an additional matters may be the shortest way, and the The End of the Six and 66 Rule 30 days for each of the 1,700 part-time noncombat pathway might involve a mix In 2007, DOD published the “Six and joint billets had the potential to surpass of joint exercise planning, taking courses 66 Rule” for part-time RC members, $10,000,000 a year,20 and RC joint such as the Reserve Components National which stipulated that joint experience qualified officers serving as of October Security Course, and finding a way to do 5 credit could be satisfied by serving in a 2013 became JQOs through the Six and months of full-time work in a joint billet. joint position for 6 years and perform- 66 path.21 On the positive side, there are a variety ing an extra 30 days per year in addition In 2014, DOD changed the Six and of ways to earn 10 points; however, this to the 1 weekend a month, 2 weeks per 66 Rule to grant full experience credit flexibility may also obscure the path for year obligation (for a total of 66 work- for 3 years of service in a joint billet at 36 Servicemembers and their mentors. While
72 JPME Today / Building Joint Capacity Within the Reserve Component JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 we can anticipate an increase in RC JQO Figure 2. Joint Experience Submission Approval Rates rade and production as a result of the new policy, Component eginning with the Member s Initial Self-Nomination the rate of increase is difficult to anticipate, Through Final Disposition from 2008 to April 2013 and simplifying the process should be a matter for future inquiry. The change from Six and 66 to Three and 10 is a net 49 gain for DOD, and it should be supported Active Component by new attention and investment in the Reserve Officers process that grants experience credit. Guard Officers 35 36 Variance by Component in Approval Rates for 28 Experience Credit 25 In 2013, over 80 percent of new RC 23 JQOs earned their credentials through 19 20 the experience path rather than the 16 standard path, while the opposite was true for new AC JQOs; 88 percent earned credentials through the standard path. As important as the experience O-4 O-5 O-6 path is to RC members, analysis of 5 years’ worth of applications for joint distance education with 3 weeks of credit shows the RC lags behind AC Separate but Equal Education residency) and is attended exclusively approval rates. Understanding why this Officers are required to complete joint by RC officers.24 AC officers do not at- occurs has not been fully explored and education before they are credentialed tend AJPME because it does not give should be shouldered in the future. as JQOs, and half of Active Component them joint education credit despite a There are a number of possibilities, officers satisfy this through a 10-week curriculum virtually identical to JCWS. including differences in process mentor- residential course run by the Joint Forces AJPME is unable to award the type of ing, experience in writing applications, Staff College called the Joint and Com- credit (JPME Phase II) AC officers need qualitative differences in experiences, bined Warfighting School (JCWS), while to become joint qualified officers. One and subjective factors, so my purpose is the other half participate in National of the main barriers preventing AJPME descriptive, not diagnostic. Defense University or senior Service from becoming a JPME Phase II grant- The National Guard is the least suc- school residential programs. JCWS ing program is a 2004 law that requires cessful when applying for experience expanded in 2012 by allowing the course Phase II programs to include 10 weeks credit. Figure 2 shows the results of to be delivered to four 20-person classes of residential sessions. While it is possible 30,363 self-nominations that were started per year adjacent to the two combatant that this law will change in the next sev- by Servicemembers beginning in 2008 commands at MacDill Air Force Base eral years, this outcome is uncertain; thus, through April 2013. The overall approval on a trial basis.22 The intent behind this it is worth understanding the arguments rate on National Guard applications was program was to expand joint profes- for running an integrated program.25 15 percent (422 approved out of 2,836 sional military education (JPME) Phase The first justification for integra- applications) versus 23 percent and 21 II throughput, empower combatant tion comes from the logic of the Total percent for the Active Component and commands to choose attendees, and Force. We fight as a team, so we should Reservists, respectively. One plausible reduce student time away from family.23 train and educate as a team, and the explanation is the lack of opportunity Furthermore, expanding this program Commission on the National Guard and to work joint matters at the state level promotes better combatant command Reserve articulated this perspective in its (which is extremely difficult the way joint outcomes and the diffusion of joint 2008 final report with comments about matters are currently defined in the U.S. knowledge, and the logical investment AJPME: Code), but I suspect Guard officers are evolution seems to be from centralized applying for experiences gained during and residential (pretrial) to decentral- No active component officers attend the contingency operations outside of the ized and residential (the trial itself) to program. Such segregation is obviously United States, although this is speculative decentralized with blended-residential counter to efforts to integrate the total and the situation merits further investiga- (distance education, which exists today force: indeed, the long-standing cultural tion. Our collective goal should be a joint as Advanced JPME). differences between the active and reserve experience crediting system that works Advanced JPME (AJPME) is a 40- components heighten the importance well irrespective of component. week blended program (combining
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 French 73 of incorporating officers into the same satisfy joint education requirements. One hood of spanning and cross-domain programs, which can provide common ex- might expect ongoing and accelerated success in other arenas. Boundary- periences [emphasis added].26 improvement of AJPME quality because spanning is a capacity unto itself; it is of the inclusion of a new community one answer to General Dempsey’s 2014 The Total Force justification has and the possibility of growth commen- challenge “to reassess what capabilities been argued by a number of authors and surate with demand, and this integrated we need most, rethink how we develop echoed in QDR commitments for RC path could create new opportunities and aggregate the Joint Force, and and AC equity. Then–Vice Chairman of for RC officers to attend in-residence reconsider how we fight together.”28 the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James seats vacated by AC or to participate Redefining “joint” to include cross- A. Winnefeld, Jr., commented that “the in expanded AJPME programs. The component work acknowledges existing Department must continue to emphasize Services (responsible for allocating seats forms of collaboration as well as allow- cross-component education and inter- across their components) will gain a new ing room for emergent relationships action.”27 The Total Force argument option for routing AC officers through (for example, Reserve and Guard part- has been countered with references to JPME Phase II and can, if they choose, nerships during Hurricane Sandy relief current law (mentioned above), and the send more high-potential RC officers operations). To this end, it is worth status quo has also been supported by to JPME Phase II in residence, thus af- considering policies to promote this quality concerns about degrading joint fording greater latitude in Total Force strategic vision and provide incentives educational and enculturation outcomes. development. While there are structural for cross-component work as a long- The quality argument may have inhibitors to sending RC members in term force development issue. been valid at one time, but is difficult residence en masse (thus necessitat- DOD has evolved beyond the original to sustain in light of ongoing AJPME ing AJPME), there may be greater RC inter-Service cooperative mandate of program improvements. The Joint Forces member willingness to attend school in GNA, and Congress has expanded the Staff College shares faculty and content residence due to a number of factors, boundaries of joint beyond sister-Service across the 10-week residential JCWS including stronger laws to protect civil- work. For example, the 2006 QDR and AJMPE. The AJPME program ian jobs and increased competition for strongly advocates for interagency com- drew significant praise during its recent promotion due to force reduction. As a petencies because: accreditation, and AJPME program matter of future inquiry, each Service can managers have reduced student rollback independently verify the RC appetite for much as the Goldwater-Nichols require- to 10 percent or less per class despite school in-residence while staying within ment that senior officers complete a a demanding 40-week commitment. the bounds of expanding jointness to the joint duty assignment has contributed to These all evidence AJPME’s merit. From extent practicable for the RC. integrating the different cultures of the a faculty and administrative viewpoint, In summary, integrating AJPME will Military Departments into a more effective program administrators see no major be a multiyear endeavor and will require joint force, the QDR recommends creat- challenges if AC officers were allowed to congressional support, persistence within ing incentives for senior Department and attend AJPME, and they report anecdotal DOD, and Service cooperation, but non-Department personnel to develop evidence of AC members interested in the payoff will be better joint outcomes skills suited to the integrated interagency attending AJPME due to the flexible across all components. environment [emphasis added].29 nature of the blended curriculum. If AC officers were allowed to attend AJPME, Redefining Joint and Rewarding This line of reasoning has helped shape there is a risk that Services could al- Cross-Component Collaboration new meanings of force integration, with locate all of their AJPME quotas to AC The strategic issue that transcends the implication that officers could earn officers, thus crowding out the RC and discussion about joint education policy, joint credit by working on joint matters undermining the original intent behind the joint experience credit process, with people from other military depart- AJPME. How this gets resolved is a topic and other Joint Officer Management ments, nonmilitary U.S. departments for future inquiry. implementation issues is this: we assume and agencies, foreign military forces or If Active Component officers at- cross-component compatibility at our agencies, or nongovernmental entities. tended AJPME and received full joint own peril and are subject to the falla- We have institutionalized an Army (circa education credit, we might expect cost cious beliefs that necessitated GNA in 2000) concept known as Joint, Inter- savings (if the low-residency AJPME the first place, especially during fiscally agency, Intergovernmental, and Mul- was used in lieu of a 10-week residential lean periods and in the absence of tinational (JIIM), and by 2008 JIIM course for selected AC members) and extended contingency operations. The had become operational doctrine as better acculturative outcomes through boundary-spanning practiced when well as a key tenet of military leadership cross-component interaction. In addition, Active, Reserve, and Guard members development. The ability to work across AC force development managers would stand shoulder-to-shoulder and focus on organizational boundaries and build have a third and more flexible option to common objectives increases the likeli- networks outside of normal hierarchies30
74 JPME Today / Building Joint Capacity Within the Reserve Component JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Soldiers participate in Sapper Stakes, a combined competition hosted by 416th Theater Engineer Command and 412th TEC to determine best combat engineer team in Army Reserve (U.S. Army/Michel Sauret)
has become a key component of the 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation to have a richer developmental experi- Chairman’s Capstone Concept for Joint During Joint Operations, the concept re- ence? Our current approach seems unable Operations, wherein the Chairman mains vital to the way the Nation projects to formally account for experiences at the urges DOD to: national and military power. tactical and operational level, yet these ex- The way we define integrated forces periences serve as critical building blocks become pervasively interoperable both is only half of the joint matters equation, for success at the strategic level. We do internally and externally. Interoperability and the content, type, and level of the not need to scale a cliff when all we need is the critical attribute that will allow work performed are given equal weight is a ramp. commanders to achieve the synergy from within the joint qualification system. Although we promote, recognize, integrated operations this concept imag- While joint education is premised on the and reward our officers for boundary- ines. Interoperability refers not only to longitudinal layering of new knowledge spanning, we mostly fail to recognize materiel but also to doctrine, organization, (constructivism), our ability to collabo- and promote boundary-spanning across training, and leader development. Within rate with others is assumed. For example, components, although this varies by Joint Forces, interoperability should be imagine two Army officers (with no Service. For example, the Marine Corps widespread and should exist at all echelons. previous joint experience points) working Inspector-Instructor program puts AC It should exist among Services and extend on a North Atlantic Treaty Organization and RC Marines into frequent contact, across domains and to partners.31 staff, one with previous tactical ex- and the Marine Corps has been able perience as part of an Alliance-heavy to support (rather than hinder) cross- Although use of the term IIM— Combined Joint Special Operations component flow through the prudent interagency, intergovernmental, and Task Force during Operation Enduring use of promotion policy and cultural multinational—has been subsumed under Freedom and the other without. Which transformation. The other Services have the term interorganizational as of 2011 officer is primed to make an immediate their own robust versions of Total Force with the publication of Joint Publication impact, to apply conditioned knowledge, integration, but none are accounting for,
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 French 75 promoting, or privileging work across system that improve how we account capacity interchangeably, although there are alternative interpretations. Joint competencies component boundaries in the same way for the things we value in a way that im- were defined in theCJCS Vision for Joint Of- they account for joint Service collabora- proves outcomes for all components; and ficer Development (Washington, DC: The Joint tion. This is partially due to Federal law possible new ways to improve our joint Staff, November 2005) as having a strategic that defines “joint” as working with more education system to promote greater mindset, critical thinking ability, and joint warf- than one military department, and one inclusiveness and cross-component inter- ighting skills, and then-Chairman General Peter Pace sought to “inculcate jointness in all colo- might argue DOD is required by law to action. There are limits to the amount of nels and captains,” 8. Jointness was defined in operate jointly, but we are not required enhancements that can be done within Margaret C. Harrell et al., A Strategic Approach by law to operate as an integrated Total the Department of Defense, and congres- to Joint Officer Management (Santa Monica, Force in the same way jointness is legis- sional will and cooperation will be needed CA: RAND, 2009), as a set of billet attributes lated. DOD and national security may be to improve outcomes for the Guard, related to joint matters. 4 Margaret W. Burcham, “Memorandum better served by an alternative arrange- Reserve, and Active components alike. JFQ for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense ment, one that encourages officers and for Military Personnel Policy: Joint Staff Input enlisted members to develop boundary- for the Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report to spanning capacity in a joint, interagency, Notes Congress,” December 2014. intergovernmental, international, non- 5 Priscilla Offenhauer, General and Flag Of- 1 ficer Authorizations for the Active and Reserve governmental, or Total Force context. Scott F. Donahue, Randy Buett, and Katherine Numerick, “Implementing Regional Components: A Comparative and Historical The proposed paradigmatic shift is from Alignment: The U.S. Army Reserve Approach,” Analysis (Washington, DC: Federal Research “JIIM” to “JITIM,” where the “T” U.S. Army Reserve Command White Paper, Division, Library of Congress, 2007), available stands for Total Force. Conflicts in Iraq February 2013; Vice Chairman of the Joint at
76 JPME Today / Building Joint Capacity Within the Reserve Component JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 and Reserve capabilities would ensure future 21 Personal communication with the Joint Review Report; VCJCS and ASD/RA, Compre- wars could not be fought without the RC, and Staff J1. hensive Review, 24. RC mobilization would bring “the will of the 22 Vincent C. Bowhers, “Manage or 28 Martin E. Dempsey, “Mount Up and people” into the fight. Educate: Fulfilling the Purpose of Joint Move Out,” Joint Force Quarterly 72 (1st Quar- 11 Martin E. Dempsey, “Moving Forward Professional Military Education,” Joint Force ter 2014), 4. Together,” Joint Force Quarterly 64 (1st Quar- Quarterly 67 (4th Quarter 2012), 26, avail- 29 Quadrennial Defense Review Report ter 2012), 4. able at
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 French 77 Admiral Michael S. Rogers: We are three organizations brought together under one leader because of the great synergy and complementary nature to the mission set among the three organizations. It was a very conscious decision to bring them together under one individual. You really get a lot of synergy by doing that, and you increase capability end-to-end as op- posed to breaking it into three different components. Of the three hats, the two that I really focus on externally are com- mander of USCYBERCOM and director of the NSA. USCYBERCOM has three primary missions. The first is to operate and defend DOD [Department of Defense] information networks, and to protect our information, data, and weapons systems. A lot of people tend to focus on the net- work piece, and that’s a very important part, but we’ve also got to be mindful that it’s about more than just the net- work. It’s data, but it’s also those combat systems that have vulnerabilities within them that we have to defend. The second mission set is to create the dedicated cyber mission force—much of it under our operational control—that DOD will then utilize and execute from the defensive to the offensive to support the combatant commanders. Our third mis- Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN sion is—when directed by the President in response to or in anticipation of cyber activity of significant consequence—to be DOD’s response element to try to fore- stall, if you will, attempts to penetrate, destroy, damage, or manipulate U.S. An Interview with infrastructure, such as the power grid or financial networks. For the NSA, we’re best known as a Michael S. Rogers foreign intelligence organization. We use signals intelligence as a tool to generate insights into what nation-states, groups, and actors are doing that are of concern to both us as a nation and to our friends and Joint Force Quarterly: You are in a unique position in that you wear three hats: com- allies around the world, and to help ensure mander of U.S. Cyber Command [USCYBERCOM], director of the National Security the security and safety of U.S. person- Agency [NSA], and chief of the Central Security Service [CSS]. The newest of these three, nel wherever they are in the world. The of course, is U.S. Cyber Command. Can you outline what your command’s mission and second mission set for the NSA—and the focus are, or what you think they should be? one that I think is increasingly relevant in the future, not that I think foreign intel- ligence isn’t, but it’s certainly being called Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN, is the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, Director of the National Security Agency, and Chief of the Central Security Service. He was interviewed in his Pentagon office by upon more and more—is information as- William T. Eliason, Joint Force Quarterly Editor in Chief. surance. We developed the cryptographic
78 Commentary / Interview JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 standards, for example, for all classified one exception: defending critical U.S. for our assigned forces that was easily systems within DOD. We partner with infrastructure. The biggest difference, understandable by the command, our other areas of the Federal Government though, is that USCYBERCOM is a partners inside DOD and across the U.S. to develop the same thing for the U.S. traditional Title 10 military operational Government, our industry and academic Government, and then we also partner organization. NSA is part of DOD and partners, and our nation’s allies and secu- with others to help develop the crypto- is an intelligence organization. Most of rity partners around the world. graphic standards more broadly for us what we do at NSA is under Title 50, I have this discussion all the time with as a nation. In addition, we help provide the part of the U.S. Code that addresses fellow leaders across DOD. This is the capability that defends DOD networks. the conduct of intelligence operations. one mission set where literally if we have We take our foreign intelligence insights They’re related but different, operating given you access to a keyboard, you now into what nation-states, groups, and actors under two different authorities with dif- are operating in this domain, and that are doing within this cyber arena and we ferent concentrations. As a result of those represents both a potential advantage ensure that they get to a broad audience authorities, USCYBERCOM is a tradi- and quite frankly a potential threat or both within the broader U.S. Government tional military operational organization. vulnerability. It is the nature of com- and then out into the private sector. It’s just focused on a very particular do- munications and the flow of information. Increasingly, the other aspect of our main—in this case cyber—but it does that Cyber and the network are such founda- information assurance mission is NSA’s on a global basis. That’s another thing tional features that they are inculcated in ability to do big data analytics—that is, that makes USCYBERCOM a little dif- almost every aspect of our personal and really in-depth digital forensics—and to ferent: we are defined by our mission, not professional lives. Because of this, one of provide expertise as to how somebody got by geography, as opposed to organiza- the points I try to make is that our ef- into your network, how do we get them tions like U.S. Central Command or U.S. fort has to be so much broader than just out of your network, and what should Pacific Command, where you’re defined the dedicated cyber mission force that your network configuration look like to in some ways by your geographic area. USCYBERCOM is focused on build- make sure it doesn’t happen again. As We are defined by our mission, and we ing and then employing. Because every part of that information assurance mis- do our mission on a global basis. Those single individual with keyboard access is sion, NSA has increasingly been called are the really big differences. And then a particular point of vulnerability, we’ve upon to provide expertise by partnering I remind people, “Hey, look, the fourth all got to realize that we’re all part of the with USCYBERCOM to support DOD, star comes from being the commander solution. This isn’t a case of “This isn’t and to support activity across the Federal of the U.S. Cyber Command and not something I have to worry about. This is Government, in the private sector, and from being the director of the National for USCYBERCOM to do,” or “This is in partnering with the FBI [Federal Security Agency.” something my chief information officer Bureau of Investigation] and Department is going to do.” Experience certainly of Homeland Security [DHS]. I never teaches those of us in government, as well thought, for example, that as director JFQ: You recently signed the as in the private sector, that you can have of the NSA I would be dealing with the USCYBERCOM’s Vision statement. The the greatest technical configuration in aftermath of a major penetration and statement aligns with DOD’s cyber strat- the world, all of which, if you’re not care- destructive act directed against a motion egy. How does this vision build on the DOD ful, can be undermined by the actions, picture company. But that is exactly what strategy? choices, and behaviors of users. We’ve happened in the case of the [Democratic seen that with spear phishing. We’ve had People’s Republic of Korea’s] destructive Admiral Rogers: We partnered with to deal with that on a significant scale in hack of Sony. In partnering with the FBI, others to help in the development of the Defense Department. we were asked to bring our capabilities in the strategy. It’s a much broader team order to figure out what happened, how than just us. I don’t want to pretend it happened, and how we can make sure it otherwise. The DOD cyber strategy is JFQ: You mentioned defending the doesn’t happen again. designed to articulate in a broad man- Nation’s vital interests in cyberspace. Can ner what we are trying to achieve within you describe in general terms how your cyber from a departmental perspective, command works that problem set, especially JFQ: How does your mission at and what are the basic goals that we are since most of cyberspace is not in DOD USCYBERCOM differ from those of your going to achieve to meet that strategy. networks? brother organizations, apart from what I asked our team at USCYBERCOM you just described? to think about how we would execute Admiral Rogers: If you look at the our set of responsibilities within that USCYBERCOM Vision, one of those Admiral Rogers: USCYBERCOM strategy. We needed to develop a vi- foundational tenets that I said is going is specifically focused primarily within sion that included a solid commander’s to drive the way we approach this, that DOD for most of its missions. There’s intent and a broad scheme of maneuver is, the scheme of maneuver and what
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Rogers 79 U.S. Air Force Airmen set up radio frequencies kit during weeklong annual exercise Vigilant Shield 15, emphasizing integrated DOD and civil response in support of national strategy of aerospace warning and control, defense support of civil authorities, and homeland defense (U.S. Air Force/Justin Wright) commander’s intent is, is that partner- of partnership.” We decided this was a for us on the defensive side is trying to ships are everything in this mission set. worthwhile endeavor when we asked overcome decades of investment in which And those partnerships can’t be just ourselves, “How can we build on DOD redundancy, resiliency, and defensibility within DOD. We’ve got to think more presence in Silicon Valley in the form, were never core design characteristics. broadly, both across the government and for example, of Reservists who are work- When we built the networks that we more widely in the private sector. So if ing there in the tech sector, and could take for granted today, to include the you look at key partners for us, they not we use that example as an initial proof majority of our weapons systems, it was only go to the [combatant commands], of concept?” If we make it work, then about efficiency, effectiveness, cost, and the Services, and our own subordinate there are a lot of other pockets of really operator ease of usage. It wasn’t, “We’ve commands, but they also go to other ele- high-tech activity, technological expertise, got nation-states, groups, and individuals ments in the Federal Government such and industrial capacity that we could attempting to penetrate these systems as the FBI and DHS. They go to private partner with. For example, Austin, the on a regular basis and we’ve got to build industry. I remind people that we’re an Triangle, Boston, and you could make a a system that makes that tough.” It was organization that applies technology to case for the DC-Metro area, particularly not a core design characteristic. It was a attempt to defeat technology and at- Northern Virginia. There’s a pretty good different world then. But we’re living in tempts to use technology against us. technology slice out toward Washington a world now in which much of the infra- Much of that technology is developed Dulles International Airport where we structure that we take for granted, that we in the private sector. It didn’t come from could find partners. use everyday to execute our operations the government. It’s not something around the world, was built around a dif- that DOD developed. So our ability to ferent environment and a different set of partner with the private sector is really JFQ: As your command works on turn- premises. Our challenge now is to overlay important for us. It’s why, for example, ing strategy and plans into operational defensive capabilities on those structures DOD created the Defense Innovation outcomes, what are some of the challenges of even as we work to change them from the Unit–Experimental [DIUx] construct in becoming effective at the operational level ground up. We’re trying to defend a set Silicon Valley. It’s why USCYBERCOM of cyberspace? of networks and a set of weapons systems has structured and created a similar and their capabilities in which defensibility effort aligned with DIUx but slightly Admiral Rogers: Our number one prior- was never built in. The system just isn’t as apart from it in what we call “the point ity is the defensive mission. The challenge efficient, and it doesn’t scale well.
80 Commentary / Interview JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 There is also the question of how to scenario. We also know that, culturally, these discussions—I was in a different educate a workforce. Again, when every it’s not tolerated, it’s unacceptable and role then and more junior—we asked, individual becomes an operator in this unprofessional, and you will be held ac- “How do we look at this as a more inte- environment, we’re often only as strong countable. We’ve got to, over time, do grated enterprise across the Department as our weakest link in the interconnected the exact same thing at USCYBERCOM. and do it from the very beginning, not as digital world of the network and our You can affect a significantly large num- an afterthought?” The total force package weapons systems. When operators don’t ber of people and potentially cost the allows us to achieve a greater range of make smart choices, you start to have sig- government significant money just by not expertise and capability than we would nificant operational impact, and we have paying attention. if we just sub-optimized any particular already experienced that across DOD element. concerning recent spear phishing issues. Frankly, when I talked to the individuals JFQ: One of the challenges any joint com- who had clicked on the links, I asked, mand has is how to work in support of JFQ: What effort is your command “Could you give me a sense of why you the joint force objectives. How will you at undertaking to get your stated goal of opened this attachment?” These were not USCYBERCOM work to this end of work- full-spectrum capability and capability junior, inexperienced people, mind you. ing with the joint force? development? And they said to me, “Sir, it was early in the morning and I had my head down Admiral Rogers: I think that’s one of Admiral Rogers: We’re building capacity and I’m blowing through my emails and the main strengths of the current con- in terms of the teams. The Cyber Mission I’ve got to keep moving. I’ve got to get struct, and I say this as someone who Force is approximately 6,200 people and ready for my first meeting.” You can has worked this from a Service perspec- 133 teams, and each team has a specific have the greatest system in the world, tive regarding generating capability to mission. There are three different types but it’s fundamentally undermined by an provide to a joint commander to employ. of teams, aligned along those three dif- attitude of “I’m in a hurry; I don’t have When we first approached cyber in DOD, ferent missions we talked about initially. time.” In the world we’re living in now, we were certain that the operational We’ve tried to optimize the teams, their do our personnel really believe we can capacity of this capability needed to be people, and their tools by the mission operate as a Department if the premise is, done within a broader joint framework. we’ve assigned to them. Again, it’s not “I only have time for this under certain We said from the beginning—even with aligned with the way we do things with conditions”? And it isn’t that they’re bad this new mission set—that we’ve got to the rest of the mission sets within the people. I don’t mean to imply that for build it that way from the ground up. Department. We’re generating a cyber one minute. But we need to embrace a We brought in the Services, and it was mission force capability mission. We’ve whole different thought process. a combination of the Services and the identified the tools and capabilities, and We have created a culture in DOD joint world that wanted to mandate a we continue to get more insights as we where we literally give probably a million joint training set of requirements so that actually use the force. For example, what people a weapon in some form, and yet every Service is generating capacity to are the additional enabling capabilities we’ve taught them, “This is something the same standard. We needed to build a and tools they need? Experience is help- we’ve given you for a specific purpose common scheme of maneuver across the ing us really refine the defense capabilities and it should be used in a very controlled Department so that every Service is gen- that offer the greatest return. If we’re manner under very specific circum- erating teams to a single blueprint. That’s not careful, cyber could become a mas- stances, and here are things we will not proved to be very powerful because it sive cost sump that consumes a huge tolerate.” For example, we all know that gives us maximum flexibility and because amount of resources. We’ve got to be the accidental discharge of a weapon is it makes us much more efficient with good stewards of the resources allocated an offense punishable by a court-martial. resources. We build to one standard and to us because we’re in a declining budget DOD culture teaches us that you use the one model across the entire Department. environment. Requirements far exceed weapon you’ve been given for a specific In addition, we also needed a total resources across the Department as a set of purposes within a lawful framework force solution regarding how to do this. whole, and as important as cyber is, I also and a specific set of authorities. You That solution has to involve the Active remind the force that no one is going to don’t take that weapon and just decide, Component, the National Guard, the write us a blank check. “It’s late at night, I’m on the post, it’s Reserves, and a civilian role. To maxi- What we owe the Nation is a priori- dark and cold, I’m in the eighth hour of mize effectiveness, we needed to bring tization of what we think we need, and a 12-hour watch, and I’m just tired and together all of those key parties to the how we prioritize it. If you’ll remember, bored. Hey! Let’s do a little quick draw.” fight. The answer can’t be all civilians or defensive priority number one is gen- We don’t do that because no one wants all contractors or that we’ll simply make erating that range of options to include to shoot someone accidentally or be shot it a Title 10 act of force so that we don’t the offensive piece, which is the priority by the person involved in this quick-draw need the Guard or Reserves. During number two mission. We have to make
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Rogers 81 sure we’re aligned appropriately. We’ve USCYBERCOM was created in no small normal scenario we’re using in cyber discussed the force, the improvements we part to help combatant commanders because there’s such a mismatch between think we need to make concerning both achieve their mission sets. This includes requirements and capabilities. Because the way our networks are configured and defending key cyber terrain and ensuring we’re still building this, as soon as we get the way we’re building them as we bring that their command and control and the an initial cadre we’re putting the team in the Joint Information Environment on- capabilities that they count on—from contact and working against opponents, line. We’ve also asked ourselves how we their networks to their weapons sys- while at the same time we’ve got to get change culture. As much as people love tems—are fully available and ready to more people to finish building out the to focus on technology when it comes operate as designed in the time and place team. We’ve got to finish their training. to cyber, I remind them that in the end, of their choosing. In addition, we want We’ve got to get them into exercises. We this is an enterprise driven by both men to be able to generate capabilities that just don’t have the time—we can’t afford and women in the workforce, and it’s meet their specific operational needs, not to wait. So it’s a different model that is significantly affected by the choices that what I think they need. USCYBERCOM not an insignificant leadership challenge, they—the operators of those keyboards I exists to help ensure the success of our whether you’re running one of those mentioned earlier—make. It’s also largely fellow operational commanders. And we 133 teams or you’re the subunified com- driven by what they do. If we don’t set are focused just on one particular domain mander trying to put it all together and an expectation, if we don’t train and and on one particular set of tools and ca- generate capacity and apply it now as op- educate, if we don’t make the workforce pabilities, just as U.S. Special Operations posed to waiting until all the man, train, aware of what the implications are for Command, for example, is focused on its and equip work is complete. And when our set of missions as a Department and own mission. I say “waiting,” I remind people that we the individual actions and choices they’re made the decision to start building this making, then we are sub-optimizing, and dedicated cyber mission force in fiscal it’s like fighting with one hand tied be- JFQ: What level of success has your com- year 2013. hind your back. You can have the greatest mand had so far in support of your mission, We gave ourselves between 2013 and system in the world, but if you have a and can you assess how far along you are 2016 to start to build. And our experi- workforce that continuously chooses to toward achieving your vision? ence in cyber is no different from the make bad choices in what they’re doing more traditional domains. It takes us, everyday on the network, it makes the Admiral Rogers: I would contend first depending on the skill sets, anywhere defensive problem incredibly hard. At the that we have to acknowledge that we from 6 to 24 months to provide indi- same time, on the acquisition side, we are not where we want to be, both as a viduals with their initial cyber training, need to ensure that defensibility, redun- Department and as an organization. One and that varies based on whatever their dancy, and resiliency are built into our of our challenges is figuratively building particular missions or skill sets are. Once networks, weapon systems, and platforms and flying the plane at the same time. If we give them basic individual training, from the ground up and not treated as a you look at the way we normally gener- then they’re ready to train as a unit. Our capability to be bolted on afterward. ate force capability as a Department—a experience has been that it takes about 2 To give commanders and policymak- fighter squadron, carrier strike group, a years. We started the first build in 2013, ers a greater range of options when using Marine Expeditionary Unit, or a BCT which meant the first operationally ready cyber as a tool, what are the capabilities [Brigade Combat Team]—we generally people started showing up in 2015, and we need to be generating? We’re in the will do the individual training, bring it’ll take us until about 2018 to finish the midst of working that out. When our the individuals together as a unit, give build so that the teams are trained and commanders and national policymakers them their equipment and their table of equipped and ready to fully employ. In ask DOD for a set of options to respond equipment and organization, make sure some areas we’re slightly ahead of sched- to an event, we want to be able to offer they’re outfitted in accordance with their ule, and in others we’re slightly behind. them a wide range of capabilities. We’re mission, and then spend a period of time Overall, we’ve probably exceeded in the early stages of this journey, but we training them from an early preliminary expectations because we’re creating know where we need to get to. stage to where they are ready to operate something completely new and we don’t in a complex, multidimensional environ- have a model to use. I’m satisfied with ment. Then we deploy them or employ where we are in generating capability and JFQ: Can you outline the enablers your them. Generally, we employ them only I’m pleased with our defensive focus. command is likely to bring to the joint force after we’ve completed those prepara- I think experience is giving us a sense commander to assist in meeting this joint tions. We’re not going to take a brand of where to find the greatest return on force mission? new BCT that has not even completed investment and where we need to focus. its training but has its initial cadre of It’s not a question of not knowing what Admiral Rogers: What I tell my people and, for example, deploy them to do; it’s the time needed to generate fellow operational commanders is to Afghanistan or Iraq. But that’s the the capability and the necessary resources.
82 Commentary / Interview JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 F-15E Strike Eagles participate in Red Flag 15-1, featuring aircraft from 21 different Air Force squadrons, offering realistic combat training involving air, space, and cyber forces from the United States and its allies (U.S. Air Force/Aaron J. Jenne)
It can’t be done in a few years. As I said generating the Cyber Mission Force. motivation, their commitment, and their in my last testimony before the HASC When the government shut down we focus on the mission. And particularly for [House Armed Services Committee] had to close all the schoolhouses, and the civilian part of the workforce, they and SASC [Senate Armed Services because we didn’t know how long the could be making a whole lot more money Committee], we’re dealing with decades shutdown was going to last, we said, in the private sector. Within this career of investment choices, and I can’t over- “We’ve got to let people plan here and field you don’t have problems getting come that in a couple years. It’s going to we can’t just jerk them around.” We sent jobs outside of government. What has take us some time. Meanwhile, we’ve got people home. We had people who were helped us is the mission and the sense of to be held accountable for execution of physically traveling to start schools and serving something bigger than yourself. our mission set. training. We had to stop exercises. That You’re doing something that makes a simple, short shutdown probably cost us difference, something that’s important to 6 months because of the unknown. Then the Nation. JFQ: Each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff we had to take time to bring the schools During the week leading up to the whom I’ve interviewed has mentioned back online. We had to rework temporary continuing resolution in October 2015, sequestration and how difficult it is to deal duty plans, we had to rework range access and with just a hint of another potential with. Obviously you’re a growth industry at time, and we had to rework exercises. government shutdown, there was more the moment, but even in a growth industry One of the points I tried to make when I perturbation in our workforce where you still have to have someone pay the bills. testified before the HASC and the SASC people started reaching out to me, partic- And if no extra money is coming in, how last week was that a lot of people tend ularly on the civilian side, saying, “Sir, this do you connect these two dots? to focus on the technology. It’s not that would be the second time in 2 years and, the technology isn’t important. But I quite frankly, I can’t build a future for Admiral Rogers: Look at the govern- remind them that USCYBERCOM, at its my family with this kind of uncertainty. I ment shutdown in 2013. We assessed heart, is an enterprise driven by dedicated have a mortgage to pay. I have children in that it probably cost us 6 months in men and women. That’s our edge—their college. I have bills. And I have a dream
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Rogers 83 I remind people that education doesn’t necessarily give you all the an- swers, but it teaches you how to think about generating answers. It gives you a frame of reference. And it reminds me that even as we often think that right now we’re dealing with the toughest issues, the one thing that’s been truly constant is the nature of man—the way people re- spond to challenges, the insertion of new technologies into societies. Do you think it’s a new phenomenon? I don’t think so. There’s great insight to be gained by studying how societies and militaries have dealt with both the injection and the development of game-changing tech- nologies before. How did these changes affect them? What kinds of choices did they make? What did nation-states, groups, and other actors do in response? Harpoon missile launches from guided-missile cruiser USS Shiloh (CG 67) during Exercise Valiant I’ve just had my 34th commissioned Shield 2014, focusing on real-world proficiency in sustaining joint forces at sea, in air, on land, and in anniversary and I think I have—more cyberspace (DOD/Kevin V. Cunningham) so than many—11 or 12 years of joint for what I want for my family. I can’t Admiral Rogers: I’ve always been a time. I loved my joint time. Don’t get meet these responsibilities if I’m working firm believer that education never stops. me wrong. The knowledge and insight I in an environment where, just on a casual Learning never stops. It doesn’t matter learned from a Service perspective about whim, politicians say, ‘Hey, we’ll just shut how senior you are. It doesn’t matter if what it means to be a Sailor and about the government down and go home. We you’re enlisted, officer, civilian. Learning what it means to be a maritime profes- might pay you, we might not pay you, is a lifelong commitment. Education is sional are foundational for me, and the but we’re not making any promises or an important part, and it’s a very im- joint world allowed me to build on that guarantees.’” And during a shutdown portant part of that learning dynamic. and to apply it in a broader context. you can’t legally be at work, so I don’t Each of us has to commit to the fact that But that joint time also helped me learn care how motivated you are or how much the U.S. Government, the military, and about the things the other partners bring you love what you do. If you show up, the Services aren’t necessarily going to to the table. How can you maximize all we have to make you go home. teach us everything we need to know. As those capabilities to achieve the broader Sequestration is hard for us to professionals, each of us has to invest in mission? That’s really been the power of overcome. It really demoralizes the ourselves and with our own time in the the joint side. I’ve got great pride in my workforce, both civilian and military, who quest to learn. It drives what you read. Service and I am proud to call myself a ask, “Is this something I want to build It drives how you spend your time. Do Sailor. But I also love the fact that I’ve my professional life around?” I tried to you go to symposiums? Do you go to met some amazing men and women in tell our congressional oversight orga- conferences? It’s all part of professional the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and nizations, “This is where you can really development and it’s something I always Coast Guard who make you say, “I’m make a difference for us: mature, steady thought was important. I loved my time glad we’re on the same team. You guys funding at a level you determine. There’s at NDU. I had just made O-6 when I are really good at what you do.” a cost to sequestration, and the perturba- was at the National War College. It gave tion has a human dimension to it.” me a chance coming off sea duty to step back and think. I went from there to JFQ: Is there anything else you’d like to dis- the Pentagon, where I was exposed at a cuss that we haven’t already talked about? JFQ: You’re a graduate of the National much more strategic and broader level to War College at the National Defense policy, resources, and operational topics Admiral Rogers: One thing that I find University [NDU]. How has your joint that, frankly, I didn’t have to worry about heartening is that I’ve been in command education experience had an impact on when I was a tactically oriented person, 18 months (I’ve been working in cyber your leadership approach, especially as you which was what drew me into the military off and on in the Department for about mentor your workforce? in the first place. It’s why I wanted to join 10 years), and I have not run into a sce- the Navy. Being at sea is what I love. nario yet where we didn’t have the level
84 Commentary / Interview JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Exercise Cyber Guard 2015 includes joint Service and civilian personnel performing operational and interagency coordination as well as tactical-level operations to protect, prevent, mitigate, and recover from cyberspace incidents (DOD/Marvin Lynchard) of expertise that we needed within the USCYBERCOM is only 5 years old. fundamentally compatible with what we organization. Sometimes we didn’t have Because we don’t have the history and think we need in cyber?” As I look back enough of it—it would be one or two we’re building the formal structure from on it 10 years later, I’ve come to the people—but we’re building from a really scratch, we get a little more flexibility. conclusion that cyber is an operational good place, and I love watching the inge- We have a lot more options. When I domain in which we do many evolutions nuity, agility, and innovation that the men started in cyber in the Department 10 that are similar to what our counterparts and women accomplish here. Every time years ago, my takeaway was that this was do in the other domains. For example, we go into contact with these opponents, so fundamentally different it was going we do maneuver, reconnaissance, fires, we learn and we change. What we’re to require developing a different lexicon, and defend key terrain. We need to doing now is different from what we were different terminologies, fundamentally maximize in cyber the utility of a com- doing a year ago. We are always asking different approaches, and a different mon joint terminology, a lexicon, and ourselves, “What have we got to change? organizational construct. For example, command and control structures such as What do we have to do differently to I was really concerned at the time about those that DOD uses to execute missions stay ahead of these adversaries? What are how to develop a workforce to execute across the other domains. That will help their TTPs [tactics, techniques, and pro- the mission set within the normal us assimilate a much broader workforce. cedures]? Should their TTPs shape the structure we use in the Department, If we treat this as something so special- way we structure ourselves, the way we where it’s shaped like a pyramid. That ized and so different that only a handful align ourselves, the way we organize, the is, it’s up or out. You tend not to do the of people truly understand, we’ll never command and control construct we use? same thing for years at a time. This is get to where we need to be. We need What are the tools and the capabilities particularly true for officers—we want to broaden this. We need to make sure we need?” This professional environment to broaden you; we want to give you a people have a broad understanding of it, has such a dynamic, constantly changing, greater set of experiences. So my concern even if you’re not involved day to day in agile, and innovative mission set. with that “pyramid” was, “Is that really this specific mission set. JFQ
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Rogers 85 U.S. Navy’s fourth Mobile User Objective System communications satellite will bring advanced, new global communications capabilities to mobile military forces (Courtesy United Launch Alliance/U.S. Navy)
Beyond the Build How the Component Commands Support the U.S. Cyber Command Vision
Compiled by the U.S. Cyber Command Combined Action Group
etworked technology is trans- went largely unrecognized. Today, works as a subordinate, unified com- forming society. That transfor- cyberspace ranks as its own warfighting mand under U.S. Strategic Command N mation has come with signifi- domain—one that intersects the four (USSTRATCOM) to conduct the cant change to war and the military natural domains. full scope of cyberspace operations. art. Until recently, cyber considerations Cyberspace operations demand un- These have three distinct mission areas: rarely extended beyond the comput- precedented degrees of collaboration, to secure, operate, and defend the ers and cables that supported kinetic which the U.S. Government must ap- Department of Defense Information warfighting functions. The natural proach holistically—leveraging resources Network (DODIN); to provide combat- domains—land, sea, air, and space— and expertise from industry, academia, ant command support; and to defend dominated the planning and conduct of and state/local governments, as well the nation against strategic cyber attack. operations, while the risks entailed in as allied and coalition partners. U.S. USCYBERCOM is building the cyber- using cyberspace for military purposes Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) space operations force of tomorrow, and
86 Commentary / Beyond the Build JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 looking beyond that build to how the Motivated by Mission operate Navy spacecraft, oversee infor- command will operate with mission part- Each of the Service components con- mation operations, coordinate Navy ners in this dynamic and contested space. tributes to USCYBERCOM missions by electronic warfare, and plan and direct USCYBERCOM and its components providing an array of cyber forces and operations under USCYBERCOM. act to help the joint force operate globally capabilities in order to defend DOD The Coast Guard focuses on three with speed, flexibility, and persistence. Information Networks, bolster the strategic priorities in the cyber domain: USCYBERCOM headquarters focuses capabilities of combatant commands, defending cyberspace, enabling op- on defining and achieving strategic objec- and strengthen our nation’s ability erations, and protecting infrastructure. tives and has delegated operational-level to withstand and respond to cyber CGCYBER ensures the security and cyber mission areas to three types of attacks of significant consequence. Each resiliency of Coast Guard information headquarters. The first of these is the component also fulfills Service-specific technology systems and networks to Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), requirements in cyberspace, which are ensure the full scope of Coast Guard ca- which defends the United States and correlated with and unique to the indi- pabilities. Maritime critical infrastructure its interests against strategic cyber at- vidual Service’s role in the domain of and the Maritime Transportation System tacks. The second type of headquarters land, sea, air, or space. (MTS) are vital to our economy, national comprises four distinct joint force head- ARCYBER’s three priorities are to security, and national defense. The quarters (JFHQs) in addition to Coast operationalize cyberspace operations to MTS includes ocean carriers, coastwise Guard Cyber Command (CGCYBER) support combatant and Army commands shipping along our shores, the Western to support the geographic and functional at echelon; pursue a more defensible rivers and Great Lakes, and the Nation’s combatant commands across the globe. network; and organize, man, train, and ports and terminals. Cyber systems not The standup of a JFHQ-Cyber by each equip ready cyber forces. These priorities only enable the MTS to operate with of the USCYBERCOM Service cyber strengthen both joint and Army cyber unprecedented speed and efficiency, components—Army Cyber Command capabilities, enable ground forces to but also create potential vulnerabilities. (ARCYBER), Fleet Cyber Command continue their dominance in the land This technology is inextricably linked (FLTCYBER), Marine Corps Cyberspace domain, and support the Army’s top goal with all aspects of Coast Guard opera- Command (MARFORCYBER), and of readiness to fulfill its primary mission tions. As the maritime transportation Air Forces Cyber (AFCYBER)—con- to win in ground combat. ARCYBER Sector Specific Agency (as defined by the stitutes a vital first step to integrating supports Army tactical forces and has National Infrastructure Protection Plan), cyberspace operations to deliver effects made delivering cyberspace operations the Coast Guard provides the unity of ef- in support of combatant commanders. capabilities to Army corps and below fort required to protect maritime critical The third type of JFHQs and newest a major focus. The integration of net- infrastructure from attacks, accidents, and of USCYBERCOM’s operational com- works, systems, and data has delivered disasters. mands, JFHQ-DODIN, provides unity unprecedented awareness and warfight- Along similar lines, MARFORCYBER of command and unity of effort to secure, ing capability to the tactical edge—to the is shaping the tools, doctrine, processes, operate, and defend the DODIN. point that it is now a dependency, which and capabilities to ensure Marine cyber Each of these components and its by extension makes it a vulnerability that mission teams provide effective support respective joint force headquarters have a must be protected. to USCYBERCOM and the joint force, vital role to play as we finish building the FLTCYBER’s missions align to while also ensuring Marine Air Ground Cyber Mission Force (CMF) and work those of USCYBERCOM. They are to Task Forces (MAGTFs) achieve victory together to bring the USCYBERCOM operate Navy networks as a warfighting on the modern battlefield. AFCYBER’s Vision to fruition. The main elements of platform, produce signals intelligence, mission statement—“Fly, Fight and Win this vision serve to organize and guide deliver warfighting effects through cy- In, Through, and From Cyberspace”— their efforts (see the interview with berspace, create shared cyber situational captures a breadth of responsibilities to Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN, in this awareness, and establish and mature the include extending cyber capabilities to edition of Joint Force Quarterly). JFQ Navy’s cyber mission forces. FLTCYBER the tactical edge of the battlefield. asked each of the component commands conducts operations in and through cy- Each Service, as part of the broader to summarize its efforts on behalf of the berspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, joint force team, is responsible for pro- collective enterprise toward implement- and space to ensure Navy and joint free- tecting its Service-specific cyber network ing the vision. This article represents a dom of action and decision superiority (for example, LandWarNet, AFNET, compendium of these contributions, while denying the same to the adversary. Marine Corps Enterprise Network, Navy organized around the main elements of Achieving this requires FLTCYBER to Marine Corps Intranet) to ensure its the vision’s intent. operate and defend the Navy’s networks ability to detect, mitigate, and defeat and shore-to-ship communications in- advanced persistent threats capable of cluding Nuclear Command and Control compromising the network and DODIN Communications (NC3), plan for and itself. The scale of this mission cannot
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 U.S. Cyber Command Combined Action Group 87 U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley watches officers from Army Cyber Institute demonstrate Cyber Capability Rifle during 2015 Association of the U.S. Army annual meeting, Washington, DC (U.S. Army/Chuck Burden) be overstated. The Navy Marine Corps the unity of effort for the operation and operating across the spectrum of conflict Intranet, for instance, consists of more defense of the entire DOD information in cyberspace, with appreciation for the than 500,000 end user devices, approxi- environment. effects that cyberspace operations have on mately 75,000 networked devices, and With its standup in 2010, the physical warfighting domains. nearly 45,000 applications and systems USCYBERCOM rapidly focused on The CNMF is a joint force of military across three security enclaves. providing mission assurance for the and civilian members from the Army, Each Service cyber component DOD information network, deterring or Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Coast focuses on configuring and operating defeating strategic threats to U.S. inter- Guard, and Intelligence Community. It layered defense-in-depth capabilities to ests and infrastructure, and supporting will comprise 39 teams and nearly 2,000 prevent malicious actors from gaining joint force commander objectives. While personnel spread over four locations. The access to Service-specific networks. This responding to evolving threats, a new force consists of three types of maneuver is an enterprise-wide effort in which the need surfaced for an agile force ready to elements, each with a unique and speci- components work in collaboration with engage adversaries in the tactical cyber fied mission. National Cyber Protection their parent Services, USCYBERCOM, fight when directed by the President. Teams (NCPTs) are defensive elements JFHQ-DODIN, the Defense This force gathered talent from across working within DOD networks and, Information Systems Agency (DISA), and the DOD and Intelligence Community when authorized, outside DOD networks, the National Security Agency (NSA). The to build teams with the capabilities and identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities, Service cyber components function at understanding needed to collaborate with assessing threat presence and activities, the operational and tactical levels of this foreign and domestic partners engaged in and responding to adversary actions. domain and rely on JFHQ-DODIN to the same mission. Since 2013, the Cyber National Mission Teams are maneuver ensure lateral coordination, information- National Mission Force has developed elements conducting on-network opera- sharing, and synchronization—ensuring into a highly proficient and agile force tions in neutral and adversary territory,
88 Commentary / Beyond the Build JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 looking for indications and warning of ad- Dominance Forces man, train, and equip significant consequence. Headquartered versary cyber activities, and enabling cyber forces; Space and Naval Warfare Systems at Fort Meade, Maryland, it has forces effects when authorized and directed. Command, as the technical authority, in Georgia, Texas, and Hawaii, and en- National Support Teams are analytic ele- delivers and sustains capabilities and gages with partners around the world. It ments providing planning, development, systems. FLTCYBER’s operational synchronizes efforts across disparate time and technical support to National CPTs partners execute the Navy’s mission every zones and optimizes the balance between and Mission Teams. The creation of teams day to reduce the network attack surface, on-site and remote operations to achieve with distinct, mutually reinforcing mis- educate both commanders and users, lasting effects. The success of the CNMF sions presents commanders with forces modernize unsupported systems, improve mission relies on establishing and nurtur- capable of confronting and defeating a patch maintenance and configuration ing partnerships, including relationships growing and creative series of threats. control, inspect compliance, and reduce with the NSA, DOD, and Intelligence our collective risk. Community, to widen its awareness and Powered Through Partnerships The Coast Guard has a unique set of capacity to deliver effects. The CNMF Cyberspace is the quintessential col- authorities to conduct cyber operations is strengthening partnerships with DHS laborative environment where teaming in support of its missions. It works with and FBI to enable future operational with partners inside and outside govern- partners across the Federal Government; success and expanding its partnerships to ment will determine how successful we in foreign governments; at the state, include other Federal agencies, industry, are in defending the nation. Adversaries’ local, tribal, and territorial levels; and academia, and the international sphere. targeting of both public and private in the private sector. At the Federal The cyberspace domain is primarily sectors underlines the necessity of build- level, the Coast Guard aligns capabili- owned and operated by private industry ing strong partnerships. ties and coordinates operations with the and thus the ability to collaborate with The Army’s cyber community Department of Homeland Security industry partners benefits the Nation’s cy- includes a triad of three critical part- (DHS) and works with the Federal bersecurity posture. The Army has hosted ners—ARCYBER, the new Cyber Center Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the NSA, multiple industry events including a Joint of Excellence (CCOE), and the Army USCYBERCOM, and other departments Service Academy Cyber Summit with Cyber Institute (ACI)—that collaborates and agencies. The Coast Guard trains its C-suite executives from industry and a to advance the state of the art in cyber operational personnel to the applicable twice a year Cyber Talks event held at the operations and work with the larger standards of all partners, and where ap- National Defense University that convenes Army to share cyber-related advances. propriate, integrates its cyber personnel innovators from industry and inside DOD The CCOE, located at Fort Gordon, into partner agencies to enhance coor- to share ideas. FLTCYBER leverages in- Georgia, is ARCYBER’s institutional dination. The Coast Guard also fosters dustry leaders to help defend the network. cyber component and is developing its relations with private sector members Experts from the Navy have worked with structure, curriculum, and methods of the Marine Transportation System to industry to use data analytics and create to meet future challenges and mission better understand its vulnerabilities and new techniques that better detect mali- requirements. The ACI, located at West support their cybersecurity efforts. cious activity. In the past, FLTCYBER Point, is the primary cyber innovation For AFCYBER, 25th Air Force (25 has also teamed with industry to conduct agent and bridge builder, responsible AF) continues to be a critical strategic defensive cyber operations on Navy for developing partnerships between partner across all missions because suc- networks. In addition to daily interac- the Army, academia, government, and cess in today’s cyberspace operations tion with industry partners, AFCYBER industry, while providing insight into hinges on the effectiveness of cyber intel- has developed Cooperative Research and future cyber challenges through inter- ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance Development agreements with cyberse- disciplinary analysis on strategic cyber (ISR) to meet warfighter requirements. curity, telecommunications, and cleared initiatives and programs. ARCYBER, AFCYBER and 25 AF have partnered defense contractors (comprising at least 28 CCOE, and ACI work together to de- on the Cyber–ISR–Electronic Warfare industry partners) to collaborate on inno- velop high-payoff external partnerships Mission Integration Team initiative aimed vative technologies and concepts, advance across the interagency community, U.S. at leveraging their respective unique the science and technology of cyberspace Government, and national and interna- capabilities to develop and field innova- operations, and exchange best practices. tional cyber communities of interest. tive, multidomain solutions in support of JFHQ-DODIN continues to partner with FLTCYBER, as the Navy’s combatant and air component command- industry to include exploring cooperative warfighting fleet in cyberspace, maintains ers’ urgent needs. research and development efforts and partnerships to leverage their strengths The CNMF plans, directs, and academic outreach. Additionally, it lever- and maintain focus on the missions. The synchronizes full-spectrum cyberspace ages DISA’s long-established industry, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for operations to be prepared to defend the academia, and research and development Information Dominance prioritizes and U.S. homeland and vital interests from efforts to improve its approach for shaping allocates resources; Navy Information disruptive or destructive cyber attacks of DODIN operations and defense.
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 U.S. Cyber Command Combined Action Group 89 Local partnerships also exist. The of officers and enlisted personnel. These maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Army has a relationship with Augusta, programs include electrical and computer Understanding that the “cyber platform” Georgia, and is building strong ties in engineering, computer science, cyber extends beyond traditional IT and busi- Atlanta to create a public-private “center systems operations, applied mathematics, ness systems, the Navy is extending its of gravity” in support of cyberspace operations analysis, and defense analysis. cybersecurity apparatus to all networked operations, workforce development, and The Naval War College, which hosts a capabilities including warfighting control technical innovation. AFCYBER has Center for Cyber Conflict Studies, is and combat systems, combat support, a long-standing relationship with San incorporating cyber into its strategic and and other information systems while Antonio, Texas (referred to as “Cyber operational level of war courses at both strengthening authority and account- City USA”), which includes civic-leader intermediate and senior graduate course ability. Task Force Cyber Awakening engagements to swap lessons related to levels, and has emphasized cyber in its (TFCA) was established to improve the cybersecurity and support programs to wargaming role. FLTCYBER partners Navy’s cybersecurity posture based on engage young students. The Air Force with the U.S. Naval Academy’s Center procedures devised for Operation Rolling Association’s “CyberPatriot” STEM for Cyber Security Studies, as well as of- Tide, the response to incidents involving (science, technology, enginneering, and fering summer training opportunities to the Navy Marine Corps Intranet in 2013. mathematics) initiative sees Airmen men- Academy and Reserve Officer Training The Navy realized it needed the ability to tor cyber teams as part of a nationwide Course (ROTC) Midshipmen. The Navy “maneuver” the network during cyber in- competition involving over 12,000 pri- is also working with the Johns Hopkins cidents. TFCA addresses organizational, mary and secondary school students. Applied Physics Laboratory, Carnegie financial, cultural, workforce, and techni- Each of the Service components Mellon, Penn State, University of Texas, cal issues. It includes development of a has ties to academia. CGCYBER is MIT Lincoln Laboratory, and University cyber resiliency plan—the CYBERSAFE leveraging its relationship with the U.S. of Hawaii. In addition, FLTCYBER program—that focuses on assuring the Coast Guard Academy and industry to has partnered with the University of survivability of critical capabilities. capitalize on its knowledge of trends in Maryland, Baltimore Campus, to offer in- The Army Chief of Staff challenged cyberspace. MARFORCYBER is leverag- ternships for recruiting skilled civilian and ARCYBER to demonstrate tactical cyber ing partnerships with The Johns Hopkins military cyber workforce professionals. integration at Brigade Combat Team– University, Carnegie Mellon University, level home-station training and at the and Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to Oriented Toward Outcomes Combat Training Centers. Lessons from build knowledge, skills, and experience The Commander’s Vision for these pilots are informing the Army’s em- in a continuous cycle of professional de- USCYBERCOM and its operational ployment and integration of cyberspace velopment. ARCYBER has championed components calls for integrating cyber capabilities and the convergence of infor- scholarships and collaborative research into new ways of defending, fighting, mation operations and electronic warfare. with top-tier academic institutions and partnering. To execute their mis- The Army will use exercises to inform the such as The Johns Hopkins University, sions, USCYBERCOM and its compo- concepts, organizations, and capabilities University of Maryland, Carnegie Mellon nents must turn strategy and plans into needed to support ground forces. These University, Virginia Tech, and Georgia operational outcomes. This requires experimental efforts are helping to cre- Tech. AFCYBER leverages expertise from commitment to an operational mindset ate a cultural shift in which innovators, the Air Force Research Laboratory, MIT whereby networks and cyber capabilities experimenters, and creative thinkers are Lincoln Laboratory, MITRE, Air Force are not administered but rather led by valued despite drawdowns and resource Institute of Technology, National Air and commanders who understand they are constraints. These efforts also teach op- Space Intelligence Center, Air University, always in real or imminent contact with erational forces how to integrate cyber/ and the U.S. Air Force Academy, as well adversaries. electronic warfare capabilities into their as academia and industry to meet grow- More than 5 years ago, the Navy traditional missions, how to defend their ing joint warfighter needs. created a fundamental shift from networks, and how to operate under de- FLTCYBER is well integrated into “Information in Warfare to Information graded network conditions. academia, in particular NPS, where the as Warfare,” and has assimilated this op- In the same manner with which FLTCYBER commander serves as the erational mindset. The Navy recognizes the Marines employ combined sponsor for the computer science, cyber that freedom of action in cyberspace is arms to conduct maneuver warfare, systems and operations, and master of essential to maritime operations. From MARFORCYBER is integrating and science in applied cyber operations cur- satellites orbiting above the Earth to synchronizing the employment of offen- ricula. These programs deliver graduates the “Silent Service” below the seas— sive and defensive cyberspace capabilities who meet the evolving operational needs and everything in between—the Navy to protect Marine Corps networks. of the Navy and other Services. NPS depends on cyberspace for assured Operating and defending these networks offers outstanding graduate degree pro- command and control, integrated fires, are as critical to the Corps as securing grams that contribute to the development battlespace awareness/intelligence, command posts and combat operations
90 Commentary / Beyond the Build JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 centers. In January 2015, then-Comman- dant Joseph Dunford directed integration of cyberspace operations using warfight- ing principles to increase the MAGTF capacity and capability to operate in and exploit the cyberspace domain. To achieve this end, MARFORCYBER has begun to unify its networks, adapt its manpower model to serve the unique requirements of the cyber domain, define standards for a sustainable cyber readiness posture, and reduce acquisition times to better equip forces with the tools they need to outpace the adversary. AFCYBER’s overhauled command and control structure has been at the cen- ter of transforming what was previously a reactive, maintenance-based planning approach to a more operationally focused strategy, plans, and execution process. Built around the joint planning process and modeled after an air operations cen- ter organization, Air Forces Cyber now produces daily cyber tasking orders that direct units in the field that perform the full spectrum of cyber operations. These operations include over 50 defensive cyber missions per day to defend key cyber terrain in support of combatant and air component commanders. To maximize the combat capabili- ties of its existing cyberspace operations forces, AFCYBER established a new force-employment strategy by des- ignating cyber “force packages” and synchronizing them in “vulnerability U.S. Navy’s fourth Mobile User Objective System communications satellite, encapsulated in 5-meter windows.” Like joint force employ- payload fairing, lifts off from Space Launch Complex-41, September 2, 2015 (Courtesy United Launch ment in traditional combat operations, Alliance/U.S. Navy) these concepts allow the decomposi- tion of existing and emerging cyber world. Realizing the need to operational- live-training environment. These simula- capabilities into smaller, more flexible, ize training, AFCYBER also mirrored tions are accelerating the development and consistent units of employment. cyber operations training based on les- and fielding of new tactics, techniques, The result has been simultaneous versus sons shared by its counterparts in air and procedures, and complement ef- serial actions, compressed execution and space operations and leveraged the forts to integrate cyber effects with both timelines, and less capability “left on the mission qualifications process to ensure kinetic and nonkinetic operations across ramp.” Two years ago, AFCYBER was cyberspace operators meet mission-ready multiple warfighting domains. able to conduct a few named operations qualification standards. The CNMF operates at the tip of the simultaneously in defense of AFNET Cyberspace operators from cyber spear, turning USCYBERCOM and key cyber terrain. Today, the same across all the Services participate in operational imperatives into executable teams are executing more than 15 named USCYBERCOM events such as CYBER actions. CNMF teams work together cyberspace defensive operations at once FLAG, in addition to Service-specific to achieve lasting effects on the enemy: across the AFNET, as well as providing exercises such as the Air Force Warfare offense informs defense, defense enables direct support across the full spectrum of Center’s RED FLAG, to hone skills offense. As such, the CNMF is poised cyberspace operations to combatant and through real-world, force-on-force exer- to deliver a wide range of response op- air component commanders around the cises that integrate cyber capabilities in a tions tailored to specific cyber actors and
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 U.S. Cyber Command Combined Action Group 91 scenarios. It provides opportunities for its flow of fresh talent. The Cyber Center of are exposing the next generation of in- people to grow as members of an opera- Excellence created the first-ever Cyber novative leaders to technical, policy, and tional force and empowers them as leaders Basic Officer Leader Course less than 10 operational concepts to prepare them who understand technical solutions and months after the branch was formed. for cyberspace operations. AFCYBER inherent risks while being able to commu- The Navy is on course to have leverages traditional Reservists, Air nicate with nontechnical senior military personnel assigned for all 40 Navy- Reserve Technicians, and Air National and policy leaders. Developing leaders sourced CMF teams in 2016 with full Guardsmen across the command to meet capable of directing cyber operations operational capability in the following its warfighting commitments. These integrates cyber as a tool in the greater year. Additionally, by 2018, 298 cyber Total Force members meet the same mission to protect national security. Reserve billets will also augment the demanding standards and serve alongside Cyber Force manning plan. The Navy has their Active-duty counterparts. Completing the Build made establishing and maturing its Cyber Like the Army, the Air Force insti- The Commander’s Vision for Mission Force a top priority. Working tuted a new cyberspace officer career USCYBERCOM and its operational with the University of Maryland Center field specific to Cyberspace Warfare components calls for accelerating full- for the Advanced Study of Language, Operations to develop Airmen with the spectrum capacity and capability devel- FLTCYBER is developing a Cyber requisite skills and expertise to meet the opment to give commanders and policy- Aptitude and Talent Assessment that will Nation’s emerging needs. The 2013 makers the options they need to execute identify talent across the spectrum of standup of a Cyber Weapons Instructor full-spectrum operations. Generating technology, analytic capability, and inge- Course at the Air Force Warfare Center the DOD cyber capability and capacity nuity. In an effort to meet the growing was a milestone on the way toward falls to the Service cyber components demand, the Navy is creating ways to bet- normalizing cyberspace operations in with their authorities to man, train, and ter assess, track, and manage cyber talent support of combatant and air component equip the force. in the workforce. commanders by focusing on the tactical Each of the Service cyber compo- FLTCYBER has several efforts under employment of these emerging capabili- nents is building maneuver elements way to identify individuals with critical ties. In addition, a Cyber Intermediate for the Cyber Mission Force by man- cyber warfare skill sets by building aware- Leadership program was developed to ning, training, and certifying teams to ness of Navy cyberspace operations and ensure cyber operators and intelligence USCYBERCOM standards. Over the associated career options. The U.S. Naval officers have the right professional past 2 years, the Army has begun align- Academy established a summer intern growth opportunities in key command ing command and control by assigning program with Task Force 1090, Navy and operational positions. Recently, the Network Enterprise Technology Cyber Warfare Development Group, AFCYBER established a Ready Cyber Command to Army Cyber Command enabling Midshipmen to gain exposure Crew program to ensure all cyberspace and building its Active Component CMF to a wide range of cyber operations over operators receive the right amount and with the goal of having all 41 Army a 6-week period as part of their summer type of continuation training to maximize CMF teams on track for full operational training. A similar program was estab- their combat effectiveness and, ultimately, capability no later than 2018. Reserve lished for Naval ROTC Midshipmen with mission success. Collectively, these steps Component forces are an essential part computer-related curricula that allow have become integral to developing of the Army’s cyberspace force, and them to work with Task Force 1020, Airmen into a ready cyber force ca- ARCYBER is also building 21 additional Navy Cyberspace Defense Operations pable of operating in joint and coalition CPTs, 11 in the Army National Guard Command, for their first class summer environments. and 10 in the Army Reserve. To help cruise. By 2020, the Marine Corps will have meet the Army’s demand for cyberspace The Air Force will contribute deployable, full-spectrum cyberspace talent, in September 2014 the Army nearly 2,000 Airmen to support the operations capabilities integrated into the created its first new career branch in joint cyber force. To meet the CMF’s MAGTF, enabling it to fight a single- nearly 30 years—the Cyber Branch and growing requirements, the Air Force battle across all five domains of warfare Career Management Field—to manage has restructured and expanded its train- using a combined-arms construct. Three cyber talent for the Service and allow ing and force development programs, of thirteen MARFORCYBER CMF career-long professional development. nearly quadrupling the rate at which teams have achieved full operational Since September 2014, the Army has cyberspace operators and intelligence capability and are operating in support handpicked approximately 300 Soldiers specialists qualify to join Air Force cyber of Marine Corps, USCYBERCOM, and from across the force to serve as the first teams in support of the CMF. Likewise, combatant commander missions. As it cohort of Cyber Branch officers from long-standing cyber programs such as enters the final stages of its CMF team lieutenant to colonel, and partnered the Air Force Institute of Technology as build, MARFORCYBER is establish- with ROTC, West Point, and the Officer well as new ones such as the Air Force ing the Marine Corps Cyber Warfare Candidate School to provide a continual Academy’s Cyber Innovation Center Group, which will be responsible for
92 Commentary / Beyond the Build JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 manning, training, and equipping the sophisticated intrusion attempts. Many of Lynn explained. JFHQ-DODIN had Marine Corps CMF teams. To support these cyber solutions were developed and no time to grow and learn before being the training and exercises of cyber units, fielded in weeks or months and we need thrown into the fight: “We are absolutely MARFORCYBER is also developing faster results. in the fight now.” The general cited seven a persistent training environment to ARCYBER is pursuing cyber analyt- named cyber operations that JFHQ- enhance military occupational skills ics capabilities to gather unprecedented DODIN has been involved in since proficiency, test and develop next genera- quantities of data across cyberspace, pro- reaching initial operational capability in tion solutions, host remote training and viding a clearer picture of Army networks, early 2015. Some were deployed opera- education of Marine Corps operating systems, and data. Coupled with architec- tions, while others were launched from forces, and refine tactics, techniques, and ture modernization, this effort is critical the component’s Fort Meade headquar- procedures. to protect the future force and its ability ters. The first operation began only days JFHQ-DODIN has built capability to fight and win. The director of DISA, after JFHQ-DODIN’s inception, and through the workforce that it continues who is dual-hatted as the commander required a deployed CPT to locate and to assemble and through lessons learned of JFHQ-DODIN, hopes to leverage mitigate the threat. from the frontlines of DODIN cyber technology to improve operations and We can expect that pace to intensify activity. Before the creation of this opera- influence traditional warfighting concepts in the years ahead. The JFHQ-DODIN tional headquarters, a Service responding such as deception, maneuver, battlespace, experience typifies the pace of cyberspace to an attack on its network would deal passage of lines, and defense-in-depth to operations for all USCYBERCOM com- with the problem more or less decisively, improve the overall defensive posture of ponents. Our current cyber quandary is but in isolation, thus leaving other the DODIN. One example is Software not some passing phase—it is the new Services and agencies potentially vulner- Defined Networks, which can provide normal for the joint force. Indeed, it is able to the same attack. Information the ability to create a network, and when the new normal for every government regarding the attack might be shared with necessary, kill a network and move the and military around the world. That is other interagency partners, but there was warfighters and assets to another network why USCYBERCOM published its vi- no joint mechanism to alert the rest of in a virtualized space, thus remaining sion last year. We have an opportunity the vast force of DOD network operators resilient and agile in the protection and to use our experience, our technology, to a new threat. JFHQ-DODIN assumed defense of our systems while ensuring the and the investments we have already this synchronizing responsibility. mission continues unhindered. made in training and infrastructure to People are the ultimate enabler of the stay ahead of would-be adversaries that joint cyber force, but they require tools In the Fight Now have arrived in cyberspace comparatively and capabilities. The Service cyber com- In cyberspace we are already in real recently. We must also ensure that our ponents are building new capabilities for or imminent contact with adversaries. ability to generate assured command and use in cyberspace, and sharing these with Every day, opponents attempt to access control continues even in a degraded the joint force. One of the most critical the DODIN to establish persistent environment—even as we also focus on components to maintaining our military’s presences in the critical networks we developing mission capabilities to provide warfighting advantage is the ability to rely on for mission success. The level of the joint force with more options within develop and rapidly field innovative cyber adversary activity varies greatly and is the cyber arena. USCYBERCOM, look- capabilities. The Air Force has established influenced by multiple factors, including ing Beyond the Build, has a vision to do seven cyber weapons systems to ensure geopolitical events and even significant just that. JFQ the cyber capabilities being presented anniversaries. DOD systems mitigate to the joint community are properly an average of two million “intrusion organized, trained, and equipped to attempts” each month, not counting meet the demands of an increasingly the billions of malicious emails that contested domain. The Air Force Life DOD receives annually, 85 percent of Cycle Management Center has strived which are blocked by a filter or defen- to streamline the ability to provide solu- sive capability. tions to support cyber missions through Lieutenant General Alan Lynn, USA, its “Rapid Cyber Acquisition” and “Real commander of JFHQ-DODIN and Time Operations and Innovation” director of DISA, highlighted the pace initiatives. These efforts have resulted of operations for JFHQ-DODIN last in the fielding of capabilities that have fall: “[JFHQ-DODIN recently] stood thwarted adversary exploitation of user up, so you would think we are just build- authentication certificates and the unau- ing it as we are flying it—and it would thorized release of personally identifiable be kind of a slow process.” But such a information, while also helping to block thought would be mistaken, General
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 U.S. Cyber Command Combined Action Group 93 Marine with Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, prepares to board CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter for mission in Helmand Province to disrupt enemy insurgents while retrograde operations take place nearby, August 16, 2014 (U.S. Marine Corps/Joseph Scanlan)
Joint Force Observations of Retrograde Operations from Afghanistan
By Aundre F. Piggee, Matthew Bain, David Carlson, Richard Lliteras, Christopher Ostrander, Lawrence Pleis, Willie Rios, and Dennis Wilson
umerous articles have high- lighted the monumental and Major General Aundre F. Piggee, USA, is Director of Logistics and Engineering (CCJ4) at U.S. Central N complex efforts by U.S. and Command (USCENTCOM). Major Matthew Bain, USMC, is a Logistics Strategist in the USCENTCOM coalition forces to draw down the CCJ4. Lieutenant Colonel David Carlson, USAF, is an Engineer Plans Officer in the USCENTCOM CCJ4. Colonel Richard Lliteras, USA (Ret.), is Deputy Chief of the Strategy and Programs Office in the force, close operating bases, and USCENTCOM CCJ4. Major Christopher Ostrander, USAF (Ret.), is Senior Procurement Analyst in the remove the equipment and supplies that Resource Integration Division in the USCENTCOM CCJ4. Colonel Lawrence Pleis, USMC (Ret.), heads the accumulated throughout Afghanistan Strategy and Programs Office in the USCENTCOM CCJ4. Colonel Willie Rios, USA, is Plans Division Chief in the USCENTCOM CCJ4. Master Sergeant Dennis Wilson, USMC (Ret.), is Deputy Battle Captain for during 13 years of combat operations. the Operations Division of the USCENTCOM CCJ4. The signing of the bilateral security
94 Commentary / Joint Force Observations from Afghanistan JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 agreement (BSA) late in 2014 with combat-enabling equipment and sup- the free flow of information and focus the Afghanistan government had a ported the materiel retrograde and force on the commanders’ goals. A monthly profound impact on our ability to close redeployments of many of our coalition general/flag officer–level meeting also the retrograde mission by December partners. The following observations, provided a venue to expedite decisions 2014. Prior to the signing of the agree- which are by no means all inclusive, are and synchronize efforts. Additionally, we ment, there was a legitimate concern an attempt to highlight those efforts from were fortunate to have liaison officers that we would have to rapidly accelerate joint force and combatant command from each of the national providers and throughput across all available means perspectives. several key coalition partners embedded and modes if conditions in the BSA into our staff. were unfavorable to our forces and Unity of Effort coalition partners. Anticipating this sit- Regarding retrograde objectives and Leveraging Lessons Learned uation, the responsible force drawdown, campaign support, the USCENT- with the Retrograde Plan materiel retrograde, and base closure COM vision was one and the same The JLEnt implemented literally hun- and transfer missions were collectively with that of the ISAF commander. It dreds of process improvements over the top priority for the commander of was our responsibility at the combat- more than a decade of combat opera- U.S. Central Command (USCENT- ant command level to pull the JLEnt tions in Afghanistan and Iraq, setting COM) throughout 2014. together to focus support at the the stage for success. The geographical The commander directed the respon- tactical level, to include stewardship location of Afghanistan and the condi- sible retrograde of all U.S. equipment and of resources, while maintaining an tions in-country did require a unique materiel from Afghanistan in support operational-level focus to meet the approach that was far more complex of President Barack Obama’s guidance guidance of the President and Secretary than retrograde operations in Iraq. In on the long-term U.S. force-manning of Defense. The USCENTCOM com- Afghanistan, we had specific guidance levels to support the enduring North mander was provided weekly updates on on the timing to complete retrograde Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the status of retrograde and redeploy- operations, and we dealt with a far dif- mission and the Service reset strategies. ment operations. During these updates, ferent situation than moving equipment Responsible retrograde was collectively the commander provided guidance on and materiel to an intermediate staging characterized by: the retrograde mission, priorities, and base in Kuwait for further disposition. critical tasks to sustain the ISAF com- Everything in Afghanistan had to either property accountability •• mander’s campaign plan. transit a border nation by ground trans- positive turnover from deployed •• Extensive and frequent interaction port or be moved via strategic airlift. forces back to Service control with our national logistics providers Nonetheless, when USCENTCOM disposition of hazardous material and •• and Service logistics directors was the received Joint Staff guidance to accelerate unexploded ordnance greatest factor that contributed to ret- the drawdown of forces and commence intent to clean up and close bases in •• rograde mission success. Early on, we large-scale materiel retrograde and base better condition than found acknowledged the criticality of complete closures, we were well postured to ex- transition of bases at a pace that the •• integration of efforts across the JLEnt. ecute. We used a series of rehearsal of Afghan government could manage The collaborative effort and anticipa- concept (ROC) drills for each stage of the optimization of the most efficient •• tory planning by our national partners drawdown to validate enterprise ability routes and modes of transportation throughout the entire drawdown phase and capacity to accelerate throughput as considering all the variables kept adjustments of industrial magnitude directed. One ROC drill was specifically conduct of retrograde in a manner •• transparent to the operating forces and conducted to address, coordinate, and that would not imply abandonment on track with the overall drawdown communicate the actions necessary from of the Afghan National Security plan. Close cooperation and constant across the enterprise to meet compressed Forces or jeopardize the conclusion contact between USCENTCOM, timelines, as well as to test our ability to of the BSA ISAF, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan deal with several other potential limita- seamless sustainment of the Inter- •• (USFOR-A), U.S. Transportation tions and restrictions. These ROC drills national Security Assistance Force Command (USTRANSCOM), Defense proved critical to preparing the joint and (ISAF) commander’s ongoing opera- Logistics Agency (DLA), Army Materiel coalition forces for a rapid, responsible tional campaign. Command, and senior Service logistics drawdown and for mission transition with From 2012 until December 2014, directors were critical to ensuring the NATO and the Afghan security forces. the Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt) force was fully supported while conduct- ensured sustainment was provided to ing simultaneous large-scale retrograde Simultaneous Sustainment our forces in Afghanistan. The JLEnt operations. of the ISAF Campaign Plan simultaneously planned and executed a The USCENTCOM staff facilitated By early 2014, mission requirements massive retrograde of U.S. combat and daily stakeholder interaction to maintain in Afghanistan were decreasing, yet
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Piggee et al. 95 planning efforts to sustain the force Distribution operations are challenging, Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan increased. It was crucial for the JLEnt considering the ongoing Afghan combat was used as a passenger transit point for to ensure that the flow of support to mission, a landlocked operations area, transfer between commercial airlift and the warfighter did not decrease. Adjust- reliance on regional neighbors with organic transport aircraft for movement ments were made to the assignment varying degrees of access, cooperation, into and out of Afghanistan. Loss of and use of transportation assets to and corruption, and a simultaneous this capability in July 2014 had a negli- maximize available resources to support reduction of coalition forces and con- gible effect thanks to a nearly seamless both retrograde and ongoing opera- tractors. From a distribution perspective, transition of the transit hub to Mihail tions. This plan worked effectively, as risk to the ISAF campaign while meeting Kogalniceanu Air Base in Romania and troops have received support for all retrograde objectives was mitigated by of tanker mission relocation to split loca- classes of supplies. establishing and maintaining robust and tions in Afghanistan and the Arabian Gulf Balancing the closure of critical sup- redundant lines of communications, region. ply nodes (supply activities, munitions a series of multimodal locations and The ground route through Pakistan storage sites, subsistence supply points, intermediate staging bases throughout (Pakistan ground lines of communica- and bulk fuel points) to ensure we kept the USCENTCOM and U.S. European tion, or PAK GLOC) was the most up with the closure of forward operating Command AORs, and robust global and economical means out of Afghanistan bases became a daily coordination func- intratheater transportation plans. and was critical to the U.S.-Pakistan re- tion across all commands. The drawdown The distribution network was effective lationship. It was important to maintain, of subsistence, fuel, and munitions in and flexible in meeting all require- and thus we always pushed to maximize Afghanistan occurred through the follow- ments as U.S. forces reduced posture the use of this route. However, due to ing actions: in Afghanistan. The system was flexible the ambiguity of the signing of the BSA, enough to change routings as required, it required us to keep equipment in Weekly meetings were conducted •• increase use of the multimodal modes Afghanistan longer than we would have with ISAF Joint Command and and nodes, and adjust channel flights to liked. This in turn made it necessary to USFOR-A to discuss the force reduc- increase cargo velocity as we executed the use our multimodal sites more than we tion and ensure that these commodi- drawdown. USCENTCOM materiel re- preferred (due to higher cost) to meet the ties were decreased commensurately. duction goals were consistently met. No commander’s timeline. The security situ- Bulk fuel consumption factors and •• military organizations exist worldwide ation on the ground in the vicinity of the stockage objectives were reviewed that can plan, design, implement, and Torkham Gate border crossing point into monthly and reduced as appropriate execute this complex system as effectively Pakistan, as well as the unpredictable situ- to meet mission requirements while or efficiently as U.S. Air Forces Central ation (rioting, new transit fees, delayed decreasing stockage levels across (USAFCENT), U.S. Army Central border crossing permissions, disruption Afghanistan. (USARCENT), and USTRANSCOM along the PAK GLOC, and so forth) that USCENTCOM, in coordination •• with its major subordinate commands: followed a number of leadership changes with DLA and USCENTCOM Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift in Pakistan, also drove us to push retro- Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, and Surface Deployment and grade across a series of alternate routes. Command, worked closely with Distribution Command. The Northern Distribution Network contracted vendors to ensure that the We also gained increased flexibility (NDN) that comprised several routes strategic supply chain was reduced through partnering with commercial through the Central Asian republics in conjunction with the decreasing partners via a commercial multimodal was another effective component in our force footprint. contract that allowed the airlift system to distribution network for moving non- Supplies were redistributed across •• increase the overall capacity available to critical, nonsensitive cargo into and out USCENTCOM’s area of responsibil- the theater. Use of the multimodals con- of Afghanistan. We established monthly ity (AOR) to support other mission tinued to increase during the drawdown, shipping guidance minimums (25–50 requirements. especially with the increased permissions containers) for the varying routes to Munitions were retrograded to the •• for throughput at Kuwait. The addition keep them viable, exercise the agree- theater storage area in Kuwait to be of Kuwait as an intermediate staging base ments, and maintain good diplomatic used in support of future mission (ISB) and multimodal location allowed relationships with the countries that requirements. for expedited movement of cargo out hosted portions of the NDN. Use of of Afghanistan, with final processing the network allowed USCENTCOM Establishing and Maintaining and cleaning of the cargo occurring in to continue to build relationships with Distribution Options Kuwait. The Kuwait ISB was another of the Central Asian states that will lead to Movement in Afghanistan and Pakistan many significant supporting efforts of continued partnerships in varying ways has always been subject to environmen- U.S. forces in the region by the govern- (exercises, counterterrorism interoper- tal, political, and security conditions. ment of Kuwait. ability, counternarcotics cooperation, and
96 Commentary / Joint Force Observations from Afghanistan JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Aerial porters from 19th Movement Control Team prep shipping container for 774th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron C-130 Hercules cargo plane at Forward Operating Base Salerno, Khost Province, Afghanistan, September 22, 2013 (U.S. Air Force/Ben Bloker)
so forth). Overall use of the NDN has the PAK GLOC; and 5 percent moved was critical, as it orchestrated the slowed significantly, and we no longer via the NDN. flow and tempo of logistics based on have published shipping minimums due USCENTCOM priorities. The com- to the limited number of cargo shipment Dedicated Enablers mand was the perfect fit for this task; requests. In addition to U.S. use of the The contribution of our USCENT- its primary mission is to provide single NDN for both retrograde and inbound COM Deployment and Distribution sustainment mission command to Army, sustainment cargo shipment, several Operations Center postured forward in joint, and multinational forces in sup- coalition partners retrograded to Europe Kuwait was a critical enabler through- port of USCENTCOM unified ground exclusively across the NDN. NATO con- out retrograde operations. The center operations, which enables the combatant tinues to use it to support its continuing bridges the tactical and strategic levels commander’s ability to achieve missions. Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. and is the USCENTCOM hands-on The USCENTCOM Materiel We plan to maintain NDN permissions organization that validates our Service Response Element (CMRE) was estab- for continued flexibility in the region. component, joint task force, coalition lished as a functional task force to provide Although there is not currently a robust partner, and interagency movement a dedicated headquarters focused exclu- requirement, continued development of requirements, and then coordinates sively on the retrograde of supplies and the modern Silk Road is an important support for those requirements via the equipment from the theater. In the past, key to Afghanistan’s economic future various providers. The center also trou- the retrograde effort was an additional and regional connectivity. During the last bleshoots emerging issues and ensures duty for units that were forced to juggle 90 days (September–December 2014) that stakeholders with equities are kept several missions. The simultaneous ex- of Operation Drumbeat, 42 percent of informed before those issues become ecution of a number of missions divided outbound retrograde cargo was moved significant problems. attention and resources, resulting in less via multimodal routes; 29 percent went Assigning the Army’s 1st Theater than optimal attention to retrograde. via direct air; 24 percent moved along Sustainment Command forward The CMRE construct proved that a
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Piggee et al. 97 singular focus facilitated the effective and retrograde. Directing JOPES use for ret- We included base closures and efficient retrograde of materiel. Materiel rograde was a paradigm shift that took the transitions in every facet of our overall accountability with Service headquarters enterprise some time to adjust to because redeployment and retrograde planning, increased substantially with the support we had never used it for the entire joint to include a series of ROC drills. This of the CMRE, and the retrograde mission force for such operations. Implementation became especially critical toward the end concluded on time with no negative im- of JOPES across the joint force was of our transition effort, when several large pact on the ISAF campaign. The CMRE challenging and largely facilitated with bases were closed or transitioned. also played a critical role in the base tran- support from USTRANSCOM. Through To help minimize the quantity of sition process. Engineers assigned to the the use of JOPES, USTRANSCOM was supplies that needed to be disposed of, CMRE completed the bulk of the base able to achieve a holistic view of all equip- USFOR-A developed a five-step process: descoping and deconstruction efforts to ment requiring transportation. We were consume: use stocks in place to the enable on-time base transitions. able to use already established theater •• maximum extent possible USFOR-A’s creation of the logistics hubs in Kuwait as an ISB, which redistribute: send to another unit Operational Contract Support enabled us to reduce cost by shortening •• that needs the materiel Drawdown Cell in August 2012 greatly the air leg prior to shipping the cargo for transfer or donate: using various legal enabled the responsible management of redeployment. •• authorities, provide the materiel to contractor personnel and equipment in coalition partners and the Afghan the Combined Joint Operations Area– Syncing Retrograde government Afghanistan. Its mission was to manage Base transitions were a key component retrograde: ship the materiel to mili- the drawdown of contracts, the contrac- of and intrinsically tied to the retro- •• tary units that need it or to depots tor workforce, and associated equipment, grade effort. During the July 2012– for future use and it enabled USFOR-A leadership to April 2014 time frame, approximately dispose: send to DLA disposition review and validate requirements and 320 U.S. and coalition bases closed or •• services, which sells nonmilitary weigh the benefits versus the impacts of were transferred to the Afghan govern- materiel as usable goods or cuts retaining contracted support. The efforts ment. The engineer community did a military items into pieces and sells it of the drawdown cell were extremely world-class job of planning and execut- as scrap. successful and will improve our abil- ing the massive base closure and transi- ity to effectively and efficiently employ tion mission with all of the stakeholders. There were several challenging issues contracted support in future large-scale This was particularly commendable related to base transitions. First was the contingencies. considering the limited ability of the balance of maintaining operations and DLA’s ability to rapidly establish Afghan security forces and other Afghan combat capability out of a base as long expeditionary worldwide disposition governmental organizations to accept as possible and yet still transitioning it on services on an industrial level was re- the number of locations we had to turn time. A related issue was the balance of markable and proved a major enabler over each month to remain on our providing security and force protection for the Services to divest of equipment directed timeline. as long as possible up until the date of deemed not cost-efficient to transport Closing and transferring bases was the base transition. We were able to work out of Afghanistan and back to home an important forcing function to get through these balances successfully. stations. Historically, DLA provided people and equipment out of the coun- Second was the balance of transfer- a suite of disposition services (usable try. Throughout the process, we had to ring too many bases and too much goods sales or scrap metal services) for contend with force manning level (FML) infrastructure to the Afghan govern- at least 30 percent of the equipment management and keeping enough engi- ment. Under President Hamid Karzai, designated for divestiture. The remain- neer assets in-country. As the engineer the government wanted all bases and all ing materiel would be inducted into FML decreased in 2014, we relied on infrastructure transferred to them. Over the Foreign Excess Personnel Property over-the-horizon engineer support from time, we realized that the government Program, which supports the transfer of USARCENT and USAFCENT to assist could not afford to maintain everything serviceable materiel to a qualified foreign with base descoping and deconstruction we were giving them, and they were be- government agency. DLA initiative and requirements. In addition, we relied on coming overburdened by infrastructure. disposition efforts in the AOR yielded contract solutions such as a multiple To address this, the Combined Security millions of dollars through transportation award task order contract to complete Transition Command Afghanistan is cost avoidance by processing as much base descoping and deconstruction ef- assisting the government to develop an materiel on site as possible. forts. With the limited FML we now have Afghanistan divestment strategy through The Joint Operational Planning and in Afghanistan, we rely almost exclusively which they will divest the excess bases Execution System (JOPES), primarily on the task order contract and other con- and infrastructure they accumulated from used for deployment and redeployment, tract efforts to descope and deconstruct us over the years. This divestment strat- was the system of record used for bases to enable base transitions. egy is important to ensure that former
98 Commentary / Joint Force Observations from Afghanistan JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 U.S. and coalition bases and infrastruc- ture are properly divested of and do not fall into the hands of our enemies. A third issue related to base tran- sitions has to deal with how much construction and buildup we undertake at our contingency basing locations. Experience has shown USCENTCOM that there needs to be a balance between building facilities similar to what we would have in the United States versus facilities that are adequate to last a few years during a contingency operation. In addition, we have realized that facilities and infrastructure turned over to the Afghans must be sustained and operated by them. In some cases, it may be more appropriate to build a facility that the Afghans will be able to afford and have the knowledge to operate and maintain in the long term. U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook helicopter operated by Soldiers with Texas and Oklahoma Army National Guard units carries sling-loaded shipping container during retrograde operations and base closures in Aside from the sheer number of sites Wardak Province, Afghanistan, October 26, 2013 (U.S. Army/Peter Smedberg) that required closing or transition (to include all the associated subfunctions the future. The following areas were past 2 to 3 years have focused on rede- such as environmental cleanup, ordnance particularly significant at the combatant ployment and retrograde operations, and sweeps, and the like), the responsible command level. this has consumed a majority of our ef- reduction of contractors and equipment Theater posture is critical to future forts as we right-size our force structure. also proved a base closure challenge. success. We have to ensure that the right Property accountability throughout Although planning efforts called for sustainment is in the right place to sup- an operation cannot be overemphasized, the reduction of contracted support, port operations. A failure to use joint particularly when the determination frequent changes to the base closure/ logistics processes to correctly set the is made to establish equipment pools transfer timelines led contractors to theater to meet emerging requirements in the AOR and rotate units into that evaluate the risks associated with reduc- will create unnecessary stress on U.S. equipment over a period of several years. ing personnel and equipment too soon. Servicemembers and ultimately will Accounting for everything after the fact is Many contractors opted to retain person- jeopardize our ability to meet combatant an excruciating and inefficient process. nel and equipment until just before the commander requirements. Coalition partners each bring unique scheduled closure to minimize risk. In An area related to redeployment and capabilities to the table, and it is in our many instances, this reluctance to reduce retrograde that illustrates the success we best interest to always consider them personnel and equipment actually ben- achieved involved the amount of com- and be as inclusive as possible. There are efited USFOR-A. Due to the prohibitive modities retrograded and returned to the many examples of coalition leadership cost of retrograding equipment used by supply enterprise system. Our ability to that were instrumental to the success of contractors, USFOR-A, in conjunction analyze and plan a deliberate drawdown retrograde operations across each sec- with contractors, determined that most ensured that critical sustainment stocks tor in Afghanistan, along the NDN, in equipment would be disposed of in were returned to the continental United shaping support access and capabilities Afghanistan. DLA planned accordingly States; this not only positively impacts en route between the AOR and home and ensured that sufficient capacity was home-station readiness, but also achieves stations, and in developing flexible plan- available to perform this task. In the end, cost avoidance to the Services, and ning options with ISAF, USFOR-A, the retention of equipment did not delay ultimately to DOD, by using already pur- USCENTCOM, and national provider base closures or transfers. chased commodities. staffs to keep things on track. An implication that senior logistics Treating retrograde as an operation Key Takeaways leaders should always consider when and not an administrative or logistics- As with any large operation, there entering an operation is our exit strategy; only function comes to mind. Another were many lessons learned throughout it is never too early to start planning and would be the USCENTCOM and ISAF retrograde operations in Afghanistan implementing redeployment and retro- commanders’ daily emphasis placed on that will serve the joint force well in grade processes. Our operations over the the logistics and sustainment community.
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Piggee et al. 99 Marine Corps and Royal Air Force helicopters fly in formation after departing Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, October 27, 2014 (U.S. Marine Corps/John Jackson)
Those two commanders put our efforts Close partnership among all stake- from Afghanistan. That country’s geog- on par with the Soldier and Marine holders—the combatant command, the raphy and climate, combined with the mission on the ground. It was clear to Services, and our national partners with security environment and limited trans- all levels of leadership that we had to the joint task force command in the portation infrastructure, presented one of do both at the same time and do them AOR—and keeping the enterprise focus the greatest logistics challenges encoun- well. Contractor accountability and the on the priorities of the joint force com- tered in the modern era of warfare. Never many lessons learned that were applied mander led to success in Afghanistan and before has so much been moved, over throughout Operation Enduring Freedom will remain critical in the future. Unity so long a time, by so many methods (air, is an area that continues to mature. And of effort at the general and flag officer land, and sea). Our collective joint logis- although USCENTCOM had the lead level among all stakeholders permeated tics enterprise moved people, equipment, for operations in Afghanistan, the entire our organizations and cannot be over- and supplies over oceans and continents, joint logistics enterprise collectively dem- emphasized. In that regard, the same numerous landlocked countries, into and onstrated that it is postured to support goes for building and maintaining similar out of one of the most remote regions globally integrated operations, along strong partnerships with our coalition in the world. The recently completed compressed timelines, with minimal risk and host nation counterparts throughout Operation Drumbeat, the last milestone to our commanders, the force, or the the AOR. These relationships also set the of Operation Enduring Freedom, was not mission, regardless of how large or how logistics enterprise up for rapid contin- only successful in setting conditions for rapidly the situation presents itself. This gency responses in the future, regardless the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s is a tribute to every stakeholder across of where they occur. enduring Resolute Support mission, but DOD and the interagency community U.S. Central Command and U.S. also has been critical to the Service reset that supported the operation. Success Forces–Afghanistan, with the support strategies, U.S. Central Command’s the- was a product of the entire joint logistics of U.S. Transportation Command, the ater reposturing, and the global reposture enterprise and required the steadfast Defense Logistics Agency, the Services, of the Department of Defense. JFQ commitment of every member of the and all of our logistics partners, success- team. Throughout the entire retrograde fully accomplished a significant task in operation, everyone remained “all in!” retrograding materiel and equipment
100 Commentary / Joint Force Observations from Afghanistan JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Special operations forces are extracted from mountain pinnacle in Zabul Province, Afghanistan, after executing air-assault mission to disrupt insurgent communications (U.S. Army/Aubree Clute)
Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone
By Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin
n the months immediately following the illegitimate Taliban government in operatives working alongside an indig- the terrorist attacks on the World Afghanistan that had been providing enous force of some 15,000 Afghan I Trade Center and Pentagon in the sanctuary for al Qaeda. This strikingly irregulars.1 The Taliban regime fell autumn of 2001, a small special opera- successful unconventional warfare within a matter of weeks. Many factors tions forces (SOF) element and inter- (UW) operation was carried out with a contributed to this extraordinary agency team, supported by carrier- and U.S. “boots on the ground” presence of accomplishment, but its success clearly land-based airstrikes, brought down roughly 350 SOF and 110 interagency underscores the potential and viability of this form of warfare. What followed this remarkably effec- General Joseph L. Votel, USA, is the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. Lieutenant tive operation was more than a decade of General Charles T. Cleveland, USA (Ret.), is a former Commander of U.S. Army Special Operations challenging and costly large-scale irregu- Command. Colonel Charles T. Connett, USA, is Director of the Commander’s Initiatives Group at Headquarters U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Lieutenant Colonel Will Irwin, USA (Ret.), is a lar warfare campaigns in Afghanistan and resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University. Iraq employing hundreds of thousands
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Votel et al. 101 While “Gray Zone” refers to a space in the peace-conflict continuum, the methods for engaging our adversar- ies in that environment have much in common with the political warfare that was predominant during the Cold War years. Political warfare is played out in that space between diplomacy and open warfare, where traditional statecraft is inadequate or ineffective and large-scale conventional military options are not suitable or are deemed inappropriate for a variety of reasons. Political warfare is a population-centric engagement that seeks to influence, to persuade, even to co-opt. One of its staunchest proponents, George Kennan, described it as “the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national U.S. Air Force CV-22 Osprey’s primary mission in 8th Special Operations Squadron is insertion, objectives,” including overt measures extraction, and resupply of unconventional warfare forces (U.S. Air Force/Jeremy T. Lock) such as white propaganda, political alli- ances, and economic programs, to “such of U.S. and coalition troops. Now, as constraints that made complete U.S. or covert operations as clandestine support Operations Enduring Freedom and allied victory virtually impossible for fear of ‘friendly’ foreign elements, ‘black’ Iraqi Freedom have come to an end, the of escalation. psychological warfare, and even encour- defense budget is shrinking, the Armed After more than a decade of intense agement of underground resistance in Forces are drawing down in strength, and large-scale counterinsurgency and hostile states.”5 support for further large-scale deploy- counterterrorism campaigning, the U.S. Organized political warfare served as ment of troops has ebbed. Our nation is capability to conduct Gray Zone op- the basis for U.S. foreign policy during entering a period where threats and our erations—small-footprint, low-visibility the early Cold War years and it was later response to those threats will take place in operations often of a covert or clandes- revived during the Reagan administra- a segment of the conflict continuum that tine nature—may have atrophied. In the tion. But, as Max Boot of the Council some are calling the “Gray Zone,”2 and words of one writer, the United States on Foreign Relations observed, it has SOF are the preeminent force of choice must recognize that “the space between become a lost art and one that he and in such conditions. war and peace is not an empty one”3 that others believe needs to be rediscovered The Gray Zone is characterized by we can afford to vacate. Because most of and mastered.6 SOF are optimized for intense political, economic, informa- our current adversaries choose to engage providing the preeminent military con- tional, and military competition more us in an asymmetrical manner, this repre- tribution to a national political warfare fervent in nature than normal steady-state sents an area where “America’s enemies capability because of their inherent pro- diplomacy, yet short of conventional war. and adversaries prefer to operate.”4 ficiency in low-visibility, small-footprint, It is hardly new, however. The Cold War Nations such as Russia, China, and and politically sensitive operations. SOF was a 45-year-long Gray Zone struggle Iran have demonstrated a finely tuned provide national decisionmakers “strate- in which the West succeeded in checking risk calculus. Russia belligerently works gic options for protecting and advancing the spread of communism and ultimately to expand its sphere of influence and U.S. national interests without com- witnessed the dissolution of the Soviet control into former Soviet or Warsaw Pact mitting major combat forces to costly, Union. To avoid superpower confron- territory to the greatest degree possible long-term contingency operations.”7 tations that might escalate to all-out without triggering a North Atlantic Treaty nuclear war, the Cold War was largely a Organization Article 5 response. China Human Domain-Centric proxy war, with the United States and knows that its assertive actions aimed at Core Tasks for SOF Soviet Union backing various state or expanding its sovereignty in the South SOF provide several options for operat- nonstate actors in small regional conflicts China Sea fall short of eliciting a bel- ing in the political warfare realm, espe- and executing discrete superpower inter- ligerent U.S. or allied response. Iran has cially those core tasks that are grouped vention and counter-intervention around displayed an impressive degree of sophis- under the term special warfare. Foreign the globe. Even the Korean and Vietnam tication in its ability to employ an array of internal defense (FID) operations are conflicts were fought under political proxies against U.S. and Western interests. conducted to support a friendly foreign
102 Features / Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 government in its efforts to defeat an Figure 1. internal threat. In terms of strategic application, UW represents the opposite Stabilizing Effects approach, where the U.S. Government supports a resistance movement or Foreign Internal insurgency against an occupying power Counterinsurgency Defense or adversary government. Both of these special warfare tasks U.S. rely heavily on SOF ability to build trust Special Warfare Campaigns Local Partner Main Effort Main Effort and confidence with our indigenous partners—host nation military and Major Combat paramilitary forces in the case of FID, Operations Unconventional Warfare irregular resistance elements in the case of UW—to generate mass through indig- enous forces, thus eliminating the need Destabilizing Effects for a large U.S. force presence (see figure 1). It is this indigenous mass that helps settlement. Similar successes against lower importance of interagency planning, co- minimize strategic risk during Gray Zone level insurgencies took place in neighbor- ordination, and collaboration; other U.S. operations: “Special Warfare campaigns ing Honduras and Guatemala. More Government departments and agencies stabilize or destabilize a regime by op- recently, U.S. SOF have played a central are not only frequently involved, but they erating ‘through and with’ local state or role in effective long-term FID efforts are also often in the lead. nonstate partners, rather than through conducted in support of the governments Unconventional warfare is funda- unilateral U.S. action.”8 As described in a of Colombia and the Philippines. mentally an indirect application of U.S. recent RAND study, discrete and usually Less well known and understood by power, one that leverages foreign popula- multi-year special warfare campaigns are those outside of SOF is the core task of tion groups to maintain or advance U.S. characterized by six central features: unconventional warfare. interests. It is a highly discretionary form of warfare that is most often conducted Their goal is stabilizing or destabiliz- •• Doctrine clandestinely, and because it is also typi- ing the targeted regime. This year marks the release of the first cally conducted covertly, at least initially, Local partners provide the main •• joint U.S. doctrine publication for the it nearly always has a strong interagency effort. planning, execution, and assessment of element. It can be subtle or it can be ag- U.S. forces maintain a small (or no) •• UW operations.10 The United States has gressive. The U.S.-indigenous irregular footprint in the country. been producing UW doctrine since the benefactor-proxy relationship, if success- They are typically of long duration •• first series of field manuals published ful, achieves mutually beneficial objectives and may require extensive prepara- from 1943 to 1944 by the wartime (although there can also be divergent tory work better measured in months Office of Strategic Services (OSS). interests between benefactor and proxy). (or years) than days. However, for the past seven decades, Advocates of UW first recognize that, They require intensive interagency •• that doctrine has been produced by the among a population of self-determination cooperation; Department of Defense U.S. Army. Despite the longstanding seekers, human interest in liberty trumps (DOD) elements may be subordinate recognition in Army doctrine that UW loyalty to a self-serving dictatorship, that to the Department of State or the is inherently joint and interagency in those who aspire to freedom can succeed Central Intelligence Agency. character, single-Service doctrine is at a in deposing corrupt or authoritarian They employ “political warfare” •• disadvantage in reaching joint and inter- rulers, and that unfortunate population methods to mobilize, neutralize, or agency audiences. Therefore, a joint groups can and often do seek alternatives integrate individuals or groups from UW publication was needed. to a life of fear, oppression, and injustice. the tactical to strategic levels.9 Army Special Forces remain the Second, advocates believe that there is Many examples exist of successful only element in the U.S. Armed Forces a valid role for the U.S. Government long-duration, low-visibility U.S. SOF- organized, trained, and equipped spe- in encouraging and empowering these centric FID operations in Latin America, cifically for UW. However, while Special freedom seekers when doing so helps to Asia, and Africa. From 1980 through Forces continue to play a central role in secure U.S. national security interests. 1991, U.S. support to the government the mission, Joint Publication 3-05.1, Historically, the U.S. military has of El Salvador fighting an insurgency in Unconventional Warfare, recognizes the conducted UW primarily in wartime to that country included an advisory force roles of other SOF, as well as important assist indigenous resistance movements that never exceeded 55 personnel. The supporting functions of conventional in defeating or causing the withdrawal of conflict ended with a favorable negotiated forces. It also provides insight into the a foreign occupation force. In peacetime,
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Votel et al. 103 UW can take the form of covert para- This was the case during the pro- forces will typically support three main military operations conducted by other longed U.S. UW campaign in support of elements of the resistance movement or agencies of the U.S. Government or Tibetan resistance fighters against Chinese insurgency—the underground, auxiliary, clandestine military operations. Through occupiers from 1957 to 1969, and again and guerrilla force. The underground is a diplomacy, development, and other with the UW operation in support of the cellular-based organization that operates means, other government departments Mujahideen in Afghanistan in their strug- in urban or other areas usually inacces- and agencies, such as the Department of gle against the Soviet 40th Army after its sible to the guerrilla force. Composed State and U.S. Agency for International invasion and occupation of that country. of part-time volunteers, the auxiliary Development (USAID), can help shape During the second Reagan administration, component clandestinely provides a wide the environment or provide support to however, the objective of the Afghanistan range of support to both the under- resistance in other ways. When Congress mission changed from a cost-imposing ground and guerrillas. Probably the most passed the Boland Amendment during strategy to forcing the withdrawal of familiar element is the guerrilla force, the 1980s, halting all but humanitarian Soviet forces from the country. The suc- an organization of irregular combatants U.S. aid to the Contras, USAID became cess of that mission had enormous political who comprise the armed or overt military the leading provider of support to the and historical ramifications, beginning a component of the resistance. Nicaraguan resistance. chain of events that eventually resulted in Often the resistance includes a If a resistance movement or insur- the collapse of the Soviet Union and an shadow government within the country gency exists within a country whose end to the Cold War. capable of performing government func- government threatens U.S. security in- In some cases, UW can be used as a tions on behalf of the movement. There terests, the movement asks for assistance regime change mechanism, enabling an might also be a government-in-exile from the United States, and the group’s indigenous resistance or insurgent group in another country—often as a result operational methods and behavior are to overthrow the existing government. of being displaced by an invading and deemed to be acceptable by the U.S. In a wartime supporting role, UW opera- occupying power—which remains the Government, the President of the United tions can be a shaping effort in support internationally recognized government States might approve initiation of UW of larger, conventional force operations, of the occupied state. Nearly all the operations. The target government could such as the very successful UW opera- countries of Western Europe overrun and be a state sponsor of terrorism or a pro- tions executed by U.S. SOF with Kurdish occupied by German forces in World War liferator of weapons of mass destruction Peshmerga forces in northern Iraq dur- II established governments-in-exile in technology. It might be a government ing the 2003 invasion of that country. London. engaged in ethnic cleansing or other Alternatively, it could be the main effort Methods used by the resistance in crimes against humanity, or a state in a military campaign, as was the UW meeting its objectives could include that willingly allows transit or provides operation that brought down the Afghan subversive activities such as mass protests, sanctuary or other forms of support to Taliban regime in 2001. work slowdowns or stoppages, boycotts, terrorists. Or it could be a state that ac- Unconventional warfare has often infiltration of government offices, and the tively and aggressively, even belligerently, been the option of choice in situations formation of front groups. These activi- takes action to expand its territorial sov- where the President (or a theater com- ties are primarily aimed at undermining ereignty with the result of undermining mander in wartime) wishes to initiate the military, economic, psychological, or regional stability. operations much sooner than could be political strength or morale of the gov- Under certain circumstances, the accomplished with the mobilization, ernment or occupation authority. prudent employment of coercive force, preparation, and deployment of conven- Sabotage can be a means of physically by empowering an indigenous opposition tional forces. Such was the case with the damaging the government’s military or element, can force a target government operation by the 5th Special Forces Group industrial production facilities, economic to do something it might not otherwise (Airborne) and Air Force Special Tactics resources, or other targets. During World be inclined to do. Under other condi- operators in Afghanistan in 2001. War II, sabotage targets for Allied SOF tions, the goal could be simply to disrupt A requirement might exist for op- included road and rail lines of communi- certain operations or activities of the erations in areas not easily accessible cation, hydroelectric power production hostile government, such as interfering to conventional forces or that lend and distribution facilities, telecommuni- with proliferation actions, safeguarding a themselves to UW in an economy of cations facilities, canal locks, radar sites, population group targeted for genocide force role in secondary theaters of war. port facilities, factories engaged in the by the incumbent regime, or imposing ex- Circumstances such as this resulted in manufacture of war materiel, and military traordinary and unexpected difficulties in several UW operations during World supply dumps or other targets. consolidating the occupation of a country War II, including those in Yugoslavia, Guerrilla warfare operations are car- that has been invaded, thus altering the Albania, Greece, northern Italy, Norway, ried out against military or other security adversary state’s cost and risk calculus. Burma, Thailand, Indochina, and China. forces to reduce their effectiveness and In conducting such operations, U.S. negatively impact the enemy’s morale.
104 Features / Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Jedburghs get instructions from briefing officer in London, 1944 (U.S. Office of Strategic Services)
Allied-supported World War II guerrilla Zone special warfare campaign could The complex nature of the future op- operations in occupied France, Belgium, include aspects of both missions, thus erating environment will often render and Holland, as well as those in the capitalizing on their synergistic effect. traditional applications of the diplomatic Philippines, were instrumental in facilitat- Among the U.S. objectives in initiating and economic instruments ineffective ing Allied ground campaigns. support to the Nicaraguan resistance in or inappropriate. Decisionmakers might Many types of information activities the early 1980s, for example, was to aid wish to avoid the political risks and are used to influence friendly, adversary, the U.S. FID program in El Salvador by consequences, including escalation and and neutral audiences. Resistance groups pressuring the Nicaraguan Sandinista mission creep, associated with direct craft narratives that best convey the government to halt its support to the military engagement. At such times, movement’s purpose and leverage key Salvadoran Farabundo Marti National UW might be the only viable option grievances of importance to the people. Liberation Front.11 through which the U.S. Government Another important purpose of informa- Today, “regional powers such as can indirectly achieve political objectives. tion operations could be to encourage Russia, China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, By supporting indigenous insurgencies, disparate resistance factions to work to- Nigeria, South Africa, Turkey, and Iran resistance movements, or other internal gether to achieve common objectives. assert growing power and influence. . . . opposition groups, the U.S. Government Because the FID and UW core tasks Sub-state actors (e.g., clans, tribes, ethnic can employ UW as a strategic tool of are so closely related, employing many and religious minorities) seek greater au- coercion, disruption, or to lead to the similar capabilities, a comprehensive Gray tonomy from the central government.”12 defeat of a hostile regime.
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Votel et al. 105 An Enigmatic History preventing the various resistance fac- The post–Cold War era brought two U.S. UW doctrine has evolved from tions—each with different postwar major UW successes for U.S. forces. First its World War II roots when the Allies political agendas and often violently op- came the operation to oust the Taliban conducted UW in at least 18 countries posed to one another—from fighting each regime in Afghanistan in late 2001, de- worldwide. Operations by U.S. forces other and keeping them focused on the scribed at the beginning of this article. The include a highly successful UW cam- common enemy, the German occupiers.14 second was the UW operation in northern paign in an “economy of force” role in One need look no further than Syria today Iraq that contributed to victory during the Burma and operations by stay-behind to imagine how much more difficult the 2003 U.S. invasion of that country. guerrilla leaders in the Philippines, Allied ground campaign to liberate France where UW proved invaluable to U.S. might have been had this internecine Civil Resistance land forces during the liberation of that rivalry not been held in check. With all of Today’s joint UW doctrine recognizes country. Probably the best prepared their tactical and operational successes, the variances of resistance that span the UW operations were conducted in the Jedburghs’ greatest strategic contribution breadth of organized opposition from European theater, where Allied SOF might have been in keeping the tenuous reform-oriented social movements17 benefited from an extensive and well- French Forces of the Interior coalition to social revolution,18 to insurgency, tested UW command and sustainment intact, making the Jeds truly warrior- and on to larger armed revolutionary infrastructure, to say nothing of state- diplomats. Eisenhower later wrote of the movements. of-the-art training and equipment. work of the Jedburghs and other SOE and Recently, there has been growing On May 25, 1940, when the German OSS special forces: “In no previous war, interest in UW operations that leverage defeat of France seemed all but inevitable, and in no other theater during this war, existing social movements and non- the British Chiefs of Staff met to consider have resistance forces been so closely har- violent, civil resistance–based social possible courses of action. Once France nessed to the main military effort.”15 revolution. Contributing to this inter- fell, they believed, Britain’s only hope Unconventional warfare continued est is the favorable track record of such lie in rescue by the as yet immobilized to play a significant role in U.S. foreign movements in comparison with armed United States. Until that time, “the best policy during the early Cold War years, resistance. Based on one recent study of hope would lie in subversion, to rot the often in the form of covert paramilitary 323 resistance movements whose objec- enemy-held countries from within.”13 operations led by the Central Intelligence tive was regime change or expulsion of a Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who Agency. Military UW conducted dur- foreign occupation force between 1900 saw great value in helping the people of ing the Korean War was only minimally and 2006, those movements following a occupied Europe to play an active part in effective, primarily because of a lack of strategy of “nonviolent resistance against their own liberation, signed the charter training and experience on the part of authoritarian regimes were twice as likely for the Special Operations Executive those charged with executing it. to succeed as violent movements.”19 (SOE) in July 1940. In April 1961, President John F. The main reason for this is that move- Four years later, Special Force Kennedy had to weather the politically ments choosing to follow a nonviolent Headquarters, an Allied UW com- embarrassing failure of the ill-advised Bay strategy attract a much larger domestic mand subordinate to General Dwight of Pigs affair in Cuba. Secretly working support base than armed and violent D. Eisenhower’s theater command and at a military base in Guatemala under the movements. While even the most success- staffed by the British SOE and the U.S. guise of a mission to train Guatemalan ful of the armed variety hope to attract OSS, along with Free French and other forces, U.S. Army Special Forces trained a support base numbering in the tens of Allied personnel, deployed several types of the rebel force of Cuban exiles in small thousands, supporters numbering in the special forces into denied territory in oc- unit guerrilla warfare operations.16 hundreds of thousands for nonviolent cupied Europe. Among the better known Unfortunately, those forces were then resistance campaigns are not unusual. units were the multinational Jedburgh employed in an inappropriate manner, Moreover, nonviolent movements find it teams. Deployed in support of the French attempting a conventional amphibious much easier to garner backing from the Resistance, “Jed” teams were primarily landing and beach assault against supe- international community, so important in assigned the dual mission of organizing, rior forces. building coalition UW support. equipping, training, and advising guerrilla Throughout the Cold War, many Figure 2 (created by the Naval forces; and serving as a communication hard lessons were learned in places as Postgraduate School’s Doowan Lee) link between the Resistance and the Allied wide-ranging as Eastern Europe, China, illustrates the relationship between so- high command in London. But they Indonesia, Tibet, North Vietnam, cial movements, social revolution, and served an additional purpose that was just Nicaragua, and elsewhere. One major unconventional warfare. An example of as important, though seldom mentioned success came during the 1980s with sup- the scenario depicted by sector G at the and largely unheralded. port provided to the Afghan Mujahideen center of the diagram can be seen in U.S. Many Jedburgh veterans later testi- that resulted in expulsion of Soviet occu- support provided to resistance elements fied that they spent much of their time pation forces from that country. during Serbia’s “Bulldozer Revolution”
106 Features / Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 that resulted in the overthrow of dictator Slobodan Milosevic, then president of Figure 2. what remained of Yugoslavia. When massive demonstrations in Social Unconventional September 1999 demanded Milosevic’s Movement Warfare resignation, he responded with a brutal D Indigenous crackdown by police and the army. One resistance movements B Externally sponsored opposition group, however, remained A Reform-oriented seeking to disrupt a guerilla forces to determined to oust Milosevic through social movements target regime harass, disrupt, or coerce a regime a campaign of nonviolent civil disobedi- ence. Otpor (Serbian for resistance), an G UW campaigns underground Serbian youth movement that mobilize indigenous social formed in 1998 by a dozen college stu- movements aiming dents, eventually grew to a nationwide for regime change grassroots popular movement claiming E Indigenous F Externally 20 movements sponsored a membership of more than 70,000. seeking to The Bill Clinton administration decided insurgency or coups overthrow a regime d tats for regime to support the movement and provided change much in the form of funding, computers, and political and military advice. The domestic anti-Milosevic cam- C Indigenous coups d tat paign culminated in October 2000 with a nationwide general strike and a march Social on the capital by hundreds of thousands Revolution of protesters from across the country. Milosevic finally announced his resigna- tion the following day, bringing to an end a brutal 13-year regime. can be armed or non-violent, but both consolidation or alliance of competing For several reasons, SOF are ideally must be planned for.”21 but compatible factions; or thwart or suited to contribute to U.S. support to Clearly, SOF have a traditional UW inhibit the development of competing such social revolutions. First and fore- role in providing the necessary organiz- factions or movements that are incompat- most, it must be remembered that just ing, equipping, training, and advising ible and adversarial. because a movement opts to follow a functions to support such an armed nonviolent strategy is no guarantee that resistance effort, but this role can have DOTMLPF Implications the revolution will remain nonviolent. a much greater chance of succeeding Much is already being done toward Several of the Arab Spring revolutions if SOF are involved as advisors early developing or upgrading joint and have shown that such movements must on, during the nonviolent resistance Service UW-related doctrine, and better be prepared in the event that severe campaign. Whether early U.S. support organizing and preparing our primary government repressive measures drive is covert or overt, if it reaches the point UW force. While some doctrine, them to abandon the nonviolent strategy where lead-agency responsibility transfers organization, training, materiel, leader and resort to an armed resistance cam- from the Department of State or another development, personnel, and facilities paign rather than forfeiting their cause. government agency to DOD, early in- (DOTMLPF) requirements have been In fact, in the case of Serbia’s Bulldozer volvement by SOF can ensure that such a identified and solutions determined, full Revolution, some elements of the resis- transfer is smooth and is executed at full implications should continue to emerge tance were prepared to do just that had it speed, much like the passing of a baton through a rigorous and disciplined become necessary. in a relay race, rather than a dangerous requirements assessment process. Participants at a recent UW/ and counterproductive stop-and-go affair. In recognizing a need for doctrine Resistance seminar (co-sponsored by SOF capabilities and expertise transcend updating, one Theater Special Operations U.S. Special Operations Command lead-agency boundaries. Command commander recently observed: Europe and Joint Special Operations An early decision to support a move- University) at the Baltic Defence College ment can also pay dividends, providing The conditions of 2014 are different than in Estonia observed that, based on the the opportunity for SOF or other U.S. those of 1944, and the tools with which experiences of some former Warsaw Pact Government departments or agen- unconventional warfare is waged today nations in their civil resistance–based cies to influence, shape, and steer the differ greatly. We must advance from the post–Cold War revolutions, “resistance movement; encourage and facilitate the nostalgic vision of remote guerrilla bases
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Votel et al. 107 in denied territory and adapt to a world To make a thorough assessment of a ical warfare has become a lost art which of split-second communications and data group and to be in a position to capitalize no department or agency of the U.S. transfer, non-violent resistance, cyber and on the advantages of early observation Government views as a core mission.25 economic warfare, and the manipula- and possible engagement, SOF should be tion of international law to undermine capable of recognizing the conditions and Conclusion national sovereignty. . . . In our era, uncon- early indicators of resistance. Unconventional warfare, whether con- ventional warfare is more likely to take the Materiel requirements are such that ducted by the United States or Russia form of a civil resistance movement, perhaps they apply to other SOF core tasks as well or any other state seeking to advance manipulated by foreign powers, that seeks as UW. Senior leaders have long recog- national interests through Gray Zone to provoke a violent government response nized that SOF require improvements proxy warfare, has a rich history but in order to destroy that government’s in denied area penetration and standoff continues to evolve to meet changing legitimacy in the eyes of the international capabilities and an ability to perform global conditions. One certainty in a community. Waging and countering this critical core tasks for extended periods in world of continuing disorder, a world new unconventional warfare demands high-risk situations.23 The requirement bereft of Cold War clarity and relative great sophistication and agility.22 for low-visibility and stealthy air platforms “stability,” where globalization has might not be limited to infiltration, exfil- enabled almost continuous change, is Implementation of emerging UW tration, and personnel recovery. Modified that the UW mission must continue to concepts and doctrine requires persistent, versions of these platforms could serve adapt and so must those responsible for low-visibility presence around the world as tankers or gunships, or platforms for executing it. and the development of a network of information operations, aerial resupply, U.S. forces can likely have the great- useful and influential contacts. Foreign precision strike, and terminal guidance. est chance for success in Gray Zone internal defense, security assistance, for- Materiel requirements might also UW operations when engaged early in eign officer exchange programs, foreign include a stealthy, long-endurance SOF a resistance movement’s development education and study opportunities, and drone with global surveillance and strike and continuously thereafter. As demon- special assignments are important means capability. Other payloads could provide strated in the U.S. operation to support of contributing to this. the capability to disseminate electronic Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance in 2001, To meet the challenges of UW messages via radio or television broadcast, however, it can also succeed with rela- support to social movements or social in standoff mode, to target audiences in tively mature and experienced resistance revolution, a deeper understanding of the denied areas. Unmanned aerial systems groups, when a benefactor state’s support dynamics of civil resistance and how UW might also have the ability to emplace re- might be just enough to tip the scales in can be conducted through such subver- mote unattended ground sensors capable favor of a movement that has been largely sive (and often nonviolent) movements of detecting, classifying, and determining stalemated. is required. Understanding conditions the direction of movement of personnel, One remaining requirement is that of where more violent methods might be wheeled vehicles, and tracked vehicles. determining what Gray Zone UW success problematic, if not counterproductive, looks like and establishing meaningful calls for an in-depth understanding of A Critical Policy Gap criteria for measuring the effectiveness the theories, concepts, and methods as- After a few early political warfare suc- of such operations. The very concept sociated with social movement influence, cesses in the 1950s, along with some of “winning” must be fundamentally mobilization, and activism. SOF must clear failures, President Eisenhower reexamined in the context of a future continually work to upgrade their train- once considered appointing a National environment where we will likely not ing regimen and education curriculum in Security Council (NSC)-level “direc- commit large military formations in deci- areas such as: tor of unconventional or non-military sive engagements against similarly armed warfare,” with responsibilities including foes. social movement theory •• such areas as “economic warfare, psy- A Gray Zone “win” is not a win in regional history, cultural studies, and •• chological warfare, political warfare, and the classic warfare sense. Winning is language proficiency foreign information.”24 In other words, perhaps better described as maintain- creation and preparation of an •• he saw the need for an NSC-level direc- ing the U.S. Government’s positional underground tor of political warfare, someone to advantage, namely the ability to influ- cyber UW tools and methods •• quarterback the habitually interagency ence partners, populations, and threats influence operations •• effort. This need still exists to achieve toward achievement of our regional or negotiation and mediation skills •• unity of effort across all aspects of strategic objectives. Specifically, this will popular mobilization dynamics •• national power (diplomatic, informa- mean retaining decision space, maximiz- subversion and political warfare •• tional, military, and economic) across ing desirable strategic options, or simply social network analysis and sociocul- •• the continuum of international compe- denying an adversary a decisive positional tural analysis. tition. As Max Boot has observed, polit- advantage.
108 Features / Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 In these human-centric struggles,
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Votel et al. 109 Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville recently completed combat systems update with latest Aegis Baseline 9 combat system, June 18, 2015 (U.S. Navy/Peter Burghart)
joint force with credible, effective, and The Aegis Warship affordable warfighting capabilities that as- sure friends and deter adversaries—should deterrence and conflict prevention fail. Joint Force Linchpin for IAMD Complicating the combatant com- manders’ calculus are the advancing antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabili- and Access Control ties in the hands of potential adversaries and rogue states that pose a major chal- By John F. Morton lenge to the maritime domain. From the Arctic to the Arabian Gulf, Russia, North Korea, China, India, Pakistan, and Iran all nder defense strategic guidance, 2012 guidance calls “Joint Force in have to varying degrees either deployed or U.S. combatant commanders 2020” is to project stabilizing force to are developing nuclear weapon and bal- U have been rebalancing joint forces support our allies and partners, and to listic missile capabilities. Combined with along the Asia-Pacific Rim with recali- help maintain the free flow of commerce other A2/AD capabilities that include brated capabilities to shape the regional along sea lines of communication in the sea-skimming and high-diving supersonic security environments in their areas of globalized economic system.1 cruise missiles, these threats to the global responsibility. The mission of what the Forces postured forward for deter- maritime commons translate into power- rence and conflict prevention are a ful tools for diplomatic coercion. substantial component to U.S. global en- The 2014 Quadrennial Defense gagement. The combatant commanders, Review put specific priority on increasing John F. Morton is a Senior National Security Analyst for TeamBlue National Security Programs, joint community, and Services are work- overall joint force capabilities to counter Gryphon Technologies LC. ing together to plan and resource this growing A2/AD challenges. In what
110 Features / The Aegis Warship JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 the Pentagon characterizes as the A2/ partner nation efforts in ballistic missile the Secretary of Defense for Policy has AD environment, defense officials are defense (BMD) in line with the European planned for initial operational capabil- now conceptualizing the high-end level Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), the ity [IOC] in July 2016. Phase III Aegis of the warfighting spectrum around administration’s missile defense strategy Ashore is due in Poland in 2018.) the integrated air and missile defense for Europe.4 Syring previously served (IAMD) mission. In December 2013, as the program executive officer for Modernized Aegis as the General Martin Dempsey, then Chairman integrated warfare systems (PEO IWS) IAMD Game Changer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, released his in the Navy office that was responsible The linchpin of regional IAMD is Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: for modernization of Aegis cruisers and surface warfare, then-Captain James Vision 2020 that spoke of the need for destroyers, new construction, and ongo- Kilby wrote in April 2014.5 The deputy IAMD to “be even more Joint—advanc- ing baseline upgrades to their combat for ballistic missile defense, Aegis ing interdependence and integrating new systems. combat systems, and destroyers in the capabilities.”2 Working with MDA in driving Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Senior military officials conceive of IAMD jointness is the Joint Staff’s Force (OPNAV) Surface Warfare Directorate high-end operations as IAMD-centric. Structure, Resources, and Assessment (N96), Kilby explained that the surface They view IAMD as a joint capability to Directorate (J8), specifically the Joint Navy’s fleet of 30 Aegis cruisers and be employed at the tactical, operational, Integrated Air and Missile Defense destroyers is capable of conducting bal- and strategic levels of war. Competitive Organization (JIAMDO). This group listic missile defense. His main points, IAMD strategies for today’s A2/AD leads in developing and fielding a however, addressed how a host of addi- environments are comparable to those comprehensive, integrated joint and tional Aegis ships are undergoing mod- strategies formulated during the Cold combined air and missile defense force in ernization and will be equipped with a War with reference to the Fulda Gap, support of Joint IAMD. Since June 2014, new combat system baseline that pro- such as the Follow-on Forces Attack JIAMDO directors have been two other vides advanced IAMD capabilities. Now subconcept. The strategies inform IAMD Navy flag officers, Rear Admiral Jesse A. a rear admiral, Kilby became the first requirements generation and acquisition, Wilson, Jr., and his recent successor, Rear commander of the newly established as well as the Planning, Programming, Admiral Ed Cashman. They have led Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Budgeting, and Execution process for JIAMDO in planning, coordinating, and Development Center in San Diego in systems and architectures. overseeing joint air and missile defense mid-2014. Prior to his OPNAV service, Joint IAMD describes the IAMD requirements, operational concepts, and he commanded the cruiser USS Mon- environment as an expanding battlespace operational architectures. They have also terey (CG 61), the first Aegis BMD requiring plans and operations that range headed the U.S. delegation to the North ship to deploy to the Mediterranean in across global, regional, transregional, and Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) March 2011 to support EPAA. homeland domains. “The regional and Air and Missile Defense Committee Kilby stated that the key feature intercontinental reach of ballistic mis- that develops and steers Alliance IAMD of Aegis IAMD modernization is the siles,” it continues, “alters the strategic policy, all the more important in view Baseline 9 combat system upgrade that and operational decision space.”3 IAMD of the current situation in the Eastern provides the ability to conduct integrated forces in a specific theater can extend to Mediterranean. fires via a sensor net linking ships and regional, transregional, and homeland These Navy appointments to the aircraft. Four Baseline 9 ships—two operations. As such, combatant com- joint community reflect the reality cruisers and two destroyers—underwent mander plans must allow for coordination that the foundational maritime IAMD certification in 2015. An additional BMD and handoff across combatant command enablers for active defense will be the destroyer, the lead Baseline 9 destroyer areas of responsibility. surface Navy’s modernized fleet of USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53), is home- Since May 2013, the Missile Defense Aegis-equipped warships. Mobile, ported in Hawaii. In August 2014, the Agency (MDA) has had technical author- forward-deployed Aegis cruisers and John Paul Jones replaced the Aegis cruiser ity over the IAMD mission. MDA now destroyers, variously upgraded, will serve USS Lake Erie (CG 70) as the deployable leads all joint IAMD engineering and as the combatant commanders’ net- BMD test ship assigned to the Barking integration efforts, including defining enabling nodes for globally integrated Sands Pacific Missile Range Facility on and controlling the IAMD interfaces joint force operations for access control. Kauai to support MDA and Navy testing and the allocation of IAMD technical (Augmenting the missile defense capabil- of IAMD capabilities. (The John Paul requirements. MDA’s current director ity of at-sea Aegis platforms in the NATO Jones Baseline 9 upgrade was co-funded is Vice Admiral James Syring, the first area of responsibility will be the land- by the Navy and MDA. Although the Navy head of the agency. His arrival in based Aegis Ashore variant. Under EPAA ship is an “integrated baseline ship” that 2012 coincided with a time when the Phase II, Aegis Ashore is in Romania is also deployable, it is not a combatant Aegis ship-based combat system came with a technical capability declaration that command asset.) John Paul Jones has to to be seen as a core element of U.S. and came at the end of 2015; the Office of date successfully completed four flight
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Morton 111 Crew of guided-missile destroyer USS John Paul Jones successfully engaged 6 targets with 5 Standard Missiles during live-fire test, June 19, 2014 (U.S. Navy) test events intercepting both short-range Engagement Capability (CEC), and 5th- cruiser. The lead Baseline 9 cruiser, USS ballistic missile and cruise missile targets generation F-35 fighter aircraft will be Chancellorsville (CG 62), is now under using the Standard Missile (SM)-6 Dual I “IAMD game changers.” operational control of U.S. 7th Fleet. The and SM-2 Block IV missiles. OPNAV’s Surface Warfare third Baseline 9 cruiser, USS Princeton The most complex variant of inte- Directorate is working to enhance the (CG 59), underwent combat system ship grated fires, wrote Kilby, is the emerging utility of NIFC-CA. Among the concepts qualification trials and integrated testing Navy Integrated Fire Control–Counter considered is making the Baseline 9 ships in July 2015. The initial NIFC-CA con- Air (NIFC-CA) capability that dramati- less reliant on assets of the carrier strike cept of operations, however, still requires cally extends the sensor net to allow for group by using an organic unmanned additional testing and refinement as the missile engagements beyond the radar aerial vehicle with the necessary data links Navy delivers the tactics, techniques, and horizon. NIFC-CA provides integrated to provide the tracking and targeting procedures (TTPs) needed to exploit the fire control for theater air and antiship information to the ship’s system as a way new IAMD capabilities. cruise missile defense in the tactical envi- forward for Aegis in its IAMD role. While the Baseline 9 cruisers go by ronment. The capability greatly expands In 2013, then–Chief of Naval the name “air defense cruisers,” the the over-the-horizon air warfare bat- Operations Admiral Jonathan W. Baseline 9 destroyers will be full-up tlespace for surface combatants to enable Greenert directed the Service to acceler- IAMD Aegis ships with both NIFC-CA third-party targeting and use of smart ate NIFC-CA’s fielding, achieving IOC of and BMD capabilities. The Baseline missiles. “If properly employed with the Increment 1 with the E-2D in 2014. The 9.C1 destroyers USS John Paul Jones, right tactics,” Kilby wrote, NIFC-CA, Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group USS Benfold (DDG 65), and USS the SM-6 surface-to-air/space missile, deployed with a squadron of E-2Ds and Barry (DDG 52) were slated to achieve the E-2D Hawkeye with the Cooperative the USS Normandy (CG 60), a Baseline 9 Navy certification in 2015 with open
112 Features / The Aegis Warship JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Erie equipped with second-generation Aegis BMD weapon system used launch-on-remote doctrine to engage target from Pacific missile range facility, February 12, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Mathew J. Diendorf) architecture BMD 5.0 combat system that limited the system’s anti-air warfare search and long-range surveillance and computer software. Benfold is now on (AAW) capability to an unknown extent. tracking and BMD signal processor station with the 7th Fleet’s Forward The MMSP, however, effectively inte- range resolution, discrimination, and Deployed Naval Forces in Yokosuka, grates signal-processing inputs from the characterization, as well as real-time ca- Japan. Barry will follow by 2017. BMD signal processor and the legacy pability displays. Based on the tactical threat picture, Aegis in-service signal processor for The Navy’s PEO IWS strategic vi- Baseline 9 Aegis destroyers will be able the radar. This integration enables the sion for Aegis modernization is simple. to allocate their computer resources SPY radar to go from single-beam to Smaller and more frequent upgrades more dynamically in a single computing dual-beam capability to meet the power to modular combat systems with open environment to maximize their BMD resource priorities for simultaneous anti- architecture and standard interfaces will performance without degrading their air warfare and BMD sector coverage. best enable the surface Navy to maintain air defense role. The principal enabler of The MMSP’s up-to-date commercial operational superiority in support of the this capability is the multi-mission signal off-the-shelf hardware and software algo- joint force in the A2/AD environment. processor (MMSP) for the Aegis SPY-1D rithms control radar waveform generation Aegis baseline upgrades strive for radar. Earlier BMD computing suites for and allow for simultaneous processing of commonality to reduce the combat the radar used a separate signal proces- both AAW and BMD radar signals. system footprint onboard ships. Future sor, meaning a BMD-equipped surface Critically, the MMSP improves Aegis baselines will bring additional IAMD warship could engage either a ballistic SPY radar system performance in littoral capabilities, notably, integration of ad- missile or an aircraft/cruise missile threat, environments, for example, against sea ditional off-board sensors as the joint but not both threats simultaneously. This skimmers in a high-clutter environment. force “sensor-shooter” networks mature situation resulted in difficult trade-offs For BMD, the processor also enhances and A2/AD counters in the access
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Morton 113 Ticonderoga-class Aegis guided-missile cruiser USS Chosin sails behind USS Chafee, USNS Guadalupe, and USS Preble for photo exercise at sea, February 13, 2015 (U.S. Navy/Andrew Albin) environment. A key developmental focus vision for fielding more systems. The Management and Communications is determining what other off-board ele- JIAMDO Vision and Roadmap describe network, the integrating element of the ments can integrate into the fire control the “to be” goals and desired states of ballistic missile defense system. loop and federated network to increase IAMD in 2020 and 2020–2030, respec- JIAMDO has been pushing the overall affordability and lethality. tively. Not anticipating a quantum leap Services to share common tracks for a to interoperability, JIAMDO is working shared-picture, integrated fire control JIAMDO: An Ally for Driving closely with MDA’s IAMD technical (IFC) and operational-level joint engage- Data-Sharing over the asessment to determine what interoper- ment zones (JEZs). JIAMDO funds and Sensor-Shooter Net ability is possible given Service budgets runs exercises for combatant commands The good news is that the question and willingness. and the Services to test TTPs for joint of how to share data is no longer a Modernized Aegis cruisers and de- IAMD missions. The annual Black Dart “cultural issue.” The Joint Integrated stroyers will plug into the strategic-level exercises, for example, test countermea- Air and Missile Defense Organization network of national sensors for missile sures against unmanned aerial systems. is helping to forge strong relationships defense. This sensor-shooter net will Joint IAMD challenges JIAMDO to le- across PEO IWS, MDA, combatant ultimately provide them with a flexible, verage ongoing efforts to improve the air commands, and the Services. The bad combined launch-on-remote/engage- picture (the common operational picture news, however, is that going from on-remote capability along the area and [COP] for wide-area surveillance and interoperable to integrated systems regional missile defense continuum, battlespace awareness), combat identifica- that seamlessly share data will require potentially extending to select homeland tion (CID), discrimination (for ballistic investments in systems testing and defense missions in the future. missiles), and IFC and battle manage- evaluation among the Services. The The potential for further IAMD ment, for example, via automated battle era of declining defense budgets and sensor-shooter networks to counter A2/ management aids (ABMA). Having em- increasing demand from combatant AD capabilities is leading both combat- braced the joint IAMD vision, the Office commanders for capacity as well as capa- ant commanders and JIAMDO to focus of the Secretary of Defense and combat- bility provides impetus to leverage effi- on track correlation and data links. ant commanders have accepted localized ciencies with joint and possibly Allied From an Aegis-platform perspective, JEZ integrated air and missile defense. systems. “Importantly, IAMD will need the farther out the sensor-shooter mix, JIAMDO is thus active in developing its to be even more Joint—advancing the more crucial the resolution of track JEZ approaches and their COPs. Indeed, interdependence and integrating new correlation issues. Tracks and data are it regards COPs as one of the so-called capabilities,” states the Joint IAMD.6 provided, for example, by Link 16, CEC, pillars of IAMD, along with CID, IFC, Affordability is key to the joint IAMD and the Command and Control Battle and ABMA.
114 Features / The Aegis Warship JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 JIAMDO has the responsibility to connecting two systems—the Army from scratch, the tactics, techniques and for developing the IAMD operational Integrated Fire Control Network and the procedures essential for effective employ- architecture—the broad-based descrip- Navy CEC—the JTMC Bridge has the ment of new weapons systems.” tion of how things work conceptually potential to enable additional kill chains. Kilby wants the Navy to assemble over the entire IAMD mission area. A At this point, however, JIAMDO and the Strike Group Staffs, ship crews, and Air fully functional joint IAMD architecture JSSET recognize the value of the Bridge. Wing personnel to do the significant, supports execution of current and future JIAMDO would like to see a broader, dedicated planning and integration essen- concepts with operationally representative future-looking effort toward an IAMD- tial for putting NIFC-CA, SM-6, Aegis positions for these systems. Applying a wide systems architecture based on the Baseline 9, CEC, E-2D, and F-35 to sea. systems-agnostic approach, a JIAMDO operational architecture. Studies are on- “This execution is operational rocket technical committee takes that archi- going, including an operational benefits science,” he concluded. “Those who tecture and then defines IAMD system analysis and cost benefit analysis. master it will be identified as the best and requirements in concert with the MDA brightest.” Joint Service Systems Engineering Team Looking Ahead Under command of the best and (JSSET), now that MDA has the respon- Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: brightest, modernized Aegis NIFC-CA sibility over IAMD technical assessment. Vision 2020 aspires to integrate policy, and IAMD warships will enable the Having technical authority over strategy, concepts, tactics, and training. Navy to maintain its historical role as the IAMD missions, MDA approaches in- The overarching imperative that sup- Nation’s provider of general purpose fleets teroperability architecture first by building ports integration must incorporate: operating away from American shores to on legacy systems that will then inform maintain maritime access and the security •• Creating an awareness of the IAMD ground-up design for future systems. of the maritime commons. JFQ mission and the benefits of its proper To execute the joint IAMD architecture utilization across the Department requirements for Aegis, MDA works of Defense, to include the develop- with its Aegis BMD component and the Notes ment of the enabling framework of Navy’s PEO IWS 7.0 (Future Combat concepts, doctrine, acquisition, and 1 Systems). IAMD interoperability require- Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Pri- war plans that support full integra- orities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, ments also apply to the Army Terminal tion of IAMD into combat opera- DC: Department of Defense, January 2012), High Altitude Air Defense and Patriot tions. Commanders must understand 3, available at
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Morton 115 Marines fire tube-launched, optically tracked, wire command-link guided-missile system from M-41 Saber weapon system during sustainment training at Udairi Range, Kuwait, July 10, 2012 (U.S. Marine Corps/Michael Petersheim)
Violent Nonstate Actors with Missile Technologies Threats Beyond the Battlefield
By Mark E. Vinson and John Caldwell
uring the summer of 2014, three major conflict with Hamas, Palestin- U.S. intelligence officials believe the overlapping crises involving ian Islamic Jihad, and other VNSAs airliner was shot down by pro-Russian violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) that fired more than 4,500 rockets and rebels using an advanced Russian SA-11 D 2 4 with missile technologies captured the mortars from the Gaza Strip at Israel. missile system. world’s attention.1 First, for 50 days in The second crisis occurred on July The third crisis seemed to erupt in July and August, Israel engaged in a 17, 2014, when Malaysian Airlines the spring and summer of 2014, when flight MH-17, a civilian airliner carrying the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq 298 people, was shot down at cruising and the Levant (ISIL) seized territory altitude by an advanced surface-to-air and captured advanced weapons as it Mark E. Vinson and John Caldwell are Adjunct Research Staff Members at missile (SAM) while transiting territory attacked across large stretches of Iraq the Institute for Defense Analyses. controlled by Ukrainian separatist rebels.3 and Syria. Among the weapons ISIL
116 Features / Violent Nonstate Actors with Missile Technologies JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 reportedly captured and used were VNSAs firing large numbers of rockets, and adapt its joint forces to be able to shoulder-launched SAMs, also known mortars, and missiles into its territory. address the range of regional and global as man-portable air defense systems For decades, the country has been at- threats, including those to its homeland, (MANPADS).5 ISIL claims to have used tacked by a hostile array of VNSAs using strategic assets, and allies, as well as to its MANPADS to shoot down an Iraqi a growing assortment of such weapons.8 military bases, ports, lines of communica- military helicopter.6 ISIL’s possession of According to the Israel Defense Forces tion, choke points, and operational areas. MANPADS threatens low-flying coali- (IDF) blog, prior to the start of the latest Although Israel may be unique in the tion aircraft as well as aircraft at Baghdad conflict, Gaza-based militants had fired magnitude of the threat of VNSAs with International Airport.7 more than 15,200 rockets at Israel since missile technologies, it also may provide As indicated by these crises, the 2001.9 Although Gaza VNSAs may be a the United States and its partners with availability of advanced missile tech- more active threat, Hizballah, a VNSA a valuable glimpse into the future. This nologies—particularly precision-guided operating from Lebanon, is a substantially article first explores the threats and asso- missiles—to VNSAs can be a game greater one. In July 2006, Hizballah ciated operational issues likely to emerge changer in their warfighting capabili- escalated its campaign against Israel with as missile technologies are proliferated ties against nation-states if they use the a cross-border ambush of an IDF patrol. to VNSAs. Second, it identifies the joint weapons to offset their air superiority With Israel’s strong military response, force capabilities that the U.S. military disadvantages with stand-off attack capa- the situation quickly intensified. Before may require to address these threats. bilities. This may be attributed in part to a ceasefire was secured 33 days later, a general absence of enforceable control Hizballah had fired nearly 4,000 rockets An Expanding Threat of the proliferation of missile technologies and missiles into Israel.10 Since 2006, The U.S. National Intelligence Coun- to nonstate actors. Counterproliferation there have been little more than threats cil’s Global Trends 2030 noted that is a term most commonly associated exchanged, but Israeli intelligence esti- the proliferation of “standoff missiles with the international conventions for mates that Hizballah has used the lull in will increase the capacity of nonstate the control of weapons of mass destruc- fighting to amass an estimated 100,000 actors” and that the availability of tion, specifically nuclear, chemical, and rockets (although some estimates are as “precision-guided weapons would allow biological weapons. However, without high as 150,000).11 The quantity of mis- critical infrastructures to be put at risk the control of international laws or siles and rockets that Hizballah possesses by many more potential adversaries.”17 the legitimacy and accountability con- prompted the IDF’s chief of operations As evidenced by the military capabilities straints of state governments, VNSAs to declare that Hizballah’s arsenal is of Hizballah, Hamas, ISIL, Ukrainian have gained access to an array of missile “similar to any national army’s.”12 separatist militias, and the many other technologies that grant state-like capa- In response to these missile threats, VNSAs around the world, the increas- bilities to threaten significant death and Israel has worked closely with the United ing availability of advanced missile tech- destruction. States to develop and evolve air and mis- nologies, coupled with improvements in sile defense capabilities to help protect its their capabilities, is significantly expand- Ominous View from Israel homeland and strategic assets.13 During ing the threat to Israel, the United Israel may be unique in terms of the the Gulf War in 1991, the United States States, and other partner states, both magnitude of the rocket and missile supported Israel with Patriot missile regionally and globally. threats from its VNSA adversaries, but defense batteries to help protect it from The global arms trade is big busi- these threats could be a leading indica- Iraqi Scud missiles.14 Since then, Israel ness. According to a 2012 Congressional tor of emerging threats not only to the has partnered with the United States Research Service report, more than $71.5 United States but to any nation-state. to develop a multitiered missile defense billion in arms transfer agreements were Despite substantial differences in their system that contains active defense sys- made in 2011 to developing countries security requirements, the United States tems, including the Iron Dome mobile alone.18 Besides the direct transfer of mis- and Israel share many interests and air defense system, as well as early warn- siles, proliferation can enable VNSAs to military challenges. Both are threatened ing/passive defense and counterstrike manufacture or modify missile capabilities as a result of the proliferation of missile capabilities.15 While the U.S. homeland by providing precursor, dual-use materials technologies to VNSAs, and both are has not been attacked by VNSAs employ- and the “know-how” to fabricate rockets. in persistent conflicts with VNSAs. As ing rockets or missiles, the United States VNSAs can obtain the materials and the such, the U.S. military should carefully anticipates that an enemy will use such knowledge to make their own rockets consider Israel’s threats and responses capabilities to contest deployment of mili- or can forge alliances with state sponsors to these threats for implications to the tary forces to operational areas and their and transnational criminal elements to future development of joint force capa- freedom to operate within those areas.16 obtain and smuggle weapons. In March bilities to counter irregular threats. Furthermore, with the proliferation of 2014, IDF special forces intercepted a Israel’s 2014 Gaza conflict is the portable and advanced missile technolo- ship in the Red Sea carrying an Iranian latest in a series of conflicts featuring gies, the United States must anticipate arms shipment headed for the Gaza
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Vinson and Caldwell 117 Soldier with 2nd Battalion, 263rd Air Defense Artillery, demonstrates FIM-92 Stinger man-portable air defense system at Bolling Air Force Base, April 14, 2010 (U.S. Army)
Strip and recovered several dozen Syrian (MTCR), established in 1987, now since 2008, Hamas has obtained longer- M-302 medium-range rockets (surface- includes 34 countries. As with the ATT, range rockets, extending the risk to Tel to-surface, 100-kilometer range) hidden the MTCR relies on signatory countries Aviv and Jerusalem in 2012 and to most in shipping containers.19 adhering to export control guidelines to of Israel in 2014.23 Improved preci- preclude the proliferation of unmanned sion will be a game changer, enabling Inadequate Arms Control delivery systems capable of delivering VNSAs to target specific high-value The United Nations Arms Trade Treaty weapons of mass destruction. The ATT civilian or military facilities, and increas- (ATT) entered into force on December and MTCR may help cooperative states ing requirements (and competition) 24, 2014, with the intention of reduc- control the legal arms trade, but they for active defense systems such as Iron ing the illicit arms trade by promoting are unlikely to dissuade the illegal sale or Dome for their dedicated protection. “accountability and transparency by transfer of arms to VNSAs. Greater VNSA missile capabilities will state parties concerning transfers of also increase the need for additional conventional arms.”20 Although the ATT When VNSAs Obtain Improved passive defense capabilities, such as shel- is a step toward preventing the prolifera- Missile Technologies ters and early warning, and more effec- tion of arms to bad actors, arms control The availability of improved missile tive integrated air and missile defense regimes are currently inadequate to technologies allows VNSAs to develop (IAMD) attack operations. address the proliferation of missile tech- missiles and rockets with greater range, In conflict regions, VNSA mis- nologies to VNSAs.21 So far, 130 states lethality, and precision, and in increased sile capabilities could deny deploying have signed the treaty, and 61 have rati- quantities. Perhaps the most signifi- forces access to ports and challenge fied it.22 However, the power of the ATT cant improvement so far is in range. their freedom of action in the area of relies on the compliance of signatories. Increased range extends the risks, and operations. Perhaps most significantly, More specific to missile technologies, fear, to a greater proportion of the adversary VNSAs could use MANPADS, the Missile Technology Control Regime population. With each major conflict advanced SAMs, and cruise missiles to
118 Features / Violent Nonstate Actors with Missile Technologies JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 contest U.S. and Israeli air and maritime superiority. Hizballah in Lebanon already possesses such capabilities. According to Major General Ya’acov Amidror, former national security advisor to the prime minister of Israel, in addition to an arsenal of “some 150,000 missiles and rockets, several thousand of which have a range that cover the entire State of Israel . . . Hizballah also has long-range anti-ship missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and modern anti-tank missiles.”24 Degraded air sup- port would seriously affect joint force operations that rely on air superiority for close air support, attack helicopter opera- tions, air-mobility operations, IAMD attack operations, and surveillance by low-flying unmanned aircraft systems and rd nd other reconnaissance platforms. U.S. Soldiers with 3 Battalion, 2 Air Defense Artillery Regiment, talk after routine inspection of Patriot missile battery at Turkish military base in Gaziantep, Turkey, February 26, 2013 (DOD/Sean M. Worrell) Cruise missiles also significantly threaten maritime operations because quantities of low-cost rockets can chal- seaports in the homeland and at inter- their low trajectory challenges timely de- lenge missile defense battle management mediate staging/transit facilities around tection and effective defense. During the capabilities, particularly when fired in the world, expanding and complicating 2006 Second Lebanon War, Hizballah barrages. Limited active defense capabili- IAMD resource allocation and protection fired a Chinese-made, Iranian-supplied ties could be stretched to protect military considerations. The impact of these ac- C-802 surface-to-sea antiship cruise capabilities, critical infrastructure, and tions would not only affect friendly force missile at the INS Hanit, an Israeli Sa’ar population centers, increasing one’s reli- power projection capabilities, but it could 5-class corvette patrolling the Lebanese ance on passive defense, attack operations, also have a major global economic effect coast 16 kilometers from the shore.25 The and IAMD battle management capabili- if commercial shipping and air transport missile struck the corvette, killing four ties. While Hizballah and Hamas rockets are affected. sailors and severely damaging the ship.26 have increased in quantity and range, they Ultimately, the proliferation of mis- In the future, VNSAs might use cruise have generally lacked a high degree of ac- siles and related technologies expands the missiles in the global commons to contest curacy.29 As a result, the IDF has not had capability of VNSAs to attack vital U.S. U.S. power projection capabilities and to fire as many of its limited numbers of interests and to contest U.S. freedom of joint force maritime access to forward missile defense interceptors. When VNSAs action globally, thereby increasing the risk areas of operations, affecting deployment improve on their accuracy or obtain of missile attacks both on the battlefield and sustainment efforts. VNSAs such as guided missiles, the IAMD protection and on the homeland. Hizballah, Hamas, and ISIL are already challenge will increase tremendously. using advanced antitank guided missiles Israel is a small country surrounded by Challenges and Capabilities (ATGMs) to challenge friendly force free- well-armed VNSAs that have repeatedly Although VNSAs have directly threat- dom of maneuver.27 The convergence of attacked it. With the notable exception ened Israel’s homeland with rocket and cyber and electronic warfare capabilities of the September 11 attacks, the United missile attacks for decades, the United in conjunction with VNSA missile attacks States homeland historically has been States, as a global power, faces a dif- could further exacerbate challenges to protected from such threats by both ferent set of challenges for countering joint force air and maritime superiority. oceans and friendly neighbors. However, these threats. Perhaps the greatest VNSAs can also obtain large numbers with VNSAs having increased access to challenge for the United States is to of rockets and missiles, creating a stand-off relatively small, portable missile systems adequately understand the nonstate capability to attack friendly forces or other (notably MANPADS and ATGMs), actors around the world that might high-value targets as well as the capacity to the risk that these organizations could threaten U.S. vital interests. Traditional sustain a high volume of attacks. During develop expeditionary capabilities to intelligence capabilities are challenged the 31 days of fighting between Hizballah expand the battlefield beyond the primary to understand the complex relation- and Israel in 2006, Hizballah fired an conflict region is growing. Individuals or ships of VNSAs and their networks. average of approximately 130 rockets per small teams of terrorists with MANPADS First, it is difficult to gain the necessary day.28 Even without high accuracy, large and ATGMs could target airports and cultural understanding to appreciate
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Vinson and Caldwell 119 Iron Dome battery in Ashkelon, Israel, intercepted approximately 8 rockets and BM-21 “Grad” rockets launched from Gaza, April 10, 2011 (Courtesy Israel Defense Forces) the dynamic connections between and will frequently use social media ment of American and Israeli IAMD the many global, regional, and local to obfuscate the facts. Ideology-based capabilities might produce new opera- VNSAs, proxy actors, state sponsors, VNSAs may not have easily identifiable tional and campaign-level requirements and transnational criminal organiza- or targetable centers of gravity. Adding for both offensive and defensive IAMD tions. In Gaza, even when Hamas to the complexity of intelligence opera- capabilities. This challenge was revealed was the acknowledged governmental tions are the temporary alliances VNSAs in November 2012 by the IDF’s suc- authority, other militant organizations form with other organizations and states cessful employment of the Iron Dome opposed to Israel, such as the Palestin- to achieve complementary short-term missile defense system during Operation ian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular objectives. When multiple extremist Pillar of Defense. Although Hamas, PIJ, Resistance Committees, the Army of groups are operating in a confined and other VNSAs fired more than 1,500 Islam, Tawhid wal’ Jihad, and Jund battlespace, motives and attribution of rockets and mortars at Israel from Gaza Ansar Allah, all pursued their own goals VNSA missile attacks could be difficult and the Sinai, Israeli officials reported and in many cases acted independently to determine. that Iron Dome shot down almost 90 of Hamas.30 Second, many of these percent of the rockets it engaged.32 groups are organized around political, Rebalance Offensive and Additionally, Israel’s civil defense system social, and military wings and operate in Defensive Capabilities of early warning and shelters passively small cells dispersed among the popula- As the proliferation of missile technolo- protected its civilian population.33 As a tion. Without a detailed mapping of the gies to VNSAs increases, the balance result, only three Israeli civilians were target population, it is difficult to gain of offensive and defensive capabilities killed during the conflict.34 Concur- intelligence on these organizations or to required to enable preventive and rently, the Israeli air force attacked more separate their true intent and capabili- protective IAMD operations may need than 1,500 targets in Gaza.35 Ultimately, ties from rhetoric.31 VNSAs are not con- to shift. The availability of missile the success of Israel’s IAMD efforts strained by the laws or norms of states technologies to VNSAs and the develop-
120 Features / Violent Nonstate Actors with Missile Technologies JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 removed the need and justification for Measuring Progress and logistics lines of communication an IDF ground attack into Gaza.36 and Success (including choke points, ports, and Successful missile defense operations Finally, it is difficult to measure prog- staging/logistic bases). Because missile buy valuable time both operationally ress and success in missile warfare with proliferation cannot be prevented, the and strategically. Operationally, they VNSAs. At the operational and strategic United States should pursue multina- protect key assets while offensive military levels, Israel has found that missile tional IAMD cooperatives to share the capabilities are mobilized, deployed, warfare with VNSAs lacks a decisive costs of a regional capability and the value and employed. Strategically, they reduce endstate. VNSAs must only show resis- of collective security from a common public pressure on senior political and tance (for example, by periodically firing threat. Such cooperatives should coordi- military decisionmakers. A successful rockets) and survive attacks to claim nate international and regionally tailored missile defense effort may also reduce the victory. Israel has largely measured collective IAMD strategies with a main need and justification for ground attacks. its strategic success by the length of effort focused on preventing VNSAs If IAMD capabilities prevent friendly ca- calm (that is, the period of deterrence) from obtaining and using missile tech- sualties, then the option of conducting a between major conflicts with VNSAs. nologies. Such efforts, collectively known ground attack, which carries with it both Although there are a number of as “left of launch” efforts, should include the greater likelihood of heavy damage useful tactical and technical metrics of strengthened counterproliferation, ex- to infrastructure and the potential for performance for missile defense (for ex- panded international and regional IAMD increased civilian and friendly military ample, the number of rocket attacks per security cooperation, more balanced casualties, may not be justifiable domesti- day or the number of civilian casualties), and integrated air and missile defense cally or internationally. Finally, effective these metrics do not add up to indicate capabilities, a wider scope of vulnerability IAMD may help deter missile attacks by operational or strategic success. A higher assessments, and adaptation to VNSAs’ changing the VNSA leader’s cost-benefit level of success might be indicated by a use of human shields. decision calculus.37 change in the way VNSAs conduct their Strengthen Arms Control Regimes. attacks. For example, Israel’s enemies As the global leader in the value of arms Countering VNSAs have evolved their primary concept of transfer agreements (77.7 percent of all in Urban Areas operations over the years from maneuver such agreements in 2011), the United VNSAs are also adapting defensively to warfare (through 1973) to suicide attacks States should lead international efforts U.S. and Israeli asymmetric advantages (Second Intifada) and then to missile at- to strengthen arms control regimes to of air superiority, precision engagement, tacks. If IAMD is successful, then VNSAs reduce or limit the proliferation of mis- and surveillance/reconnaissance. They will need to adapt, either by seeking a siles and related technologies to VNSAs.38 are concealing and protecting their different approach or perhaps by reinter- Such efforts will require greater inter- missile and command and control capa- preting their strategic intent sufficiently national cooperation and enforcement bilities underground among the civilian to enable a peace agreement. Ultimately, mechanisms to reduce smuggling and population in urban areas. VNSAs have strategic success may not be measured in dissuade violator nations. used expendable launchers to reduce terms of quantitative offensive or defen- Expand Security Cooperation firing crew exposure and to complicate sive metrics, but rather by the gain or loss Partnerships. Even with improved arms the friendly force’s attack operations of international influence and legitimacy control, VNSAs will continue to obtain decision calculus. By embedding their achieved as a result of the holistic efforts and use missile technologies to terrorize missile capabilities in urban areas, they of each combatant. populations and to offset their conven- try to deter friendly attack operations. tional military disadvantages against A related issue is the use by VNSAs Strategic and Operational states. Therefore, the United States of civilians as human shields, which can Implications for the should expand its efforts to develop have both a tactical defensive effect and United States international and regional security coop- a strategic offensive effect. Defensively, Broaden IAMD Strategy with “Left eration partnerships for IAMD against VNSAs can store missiles in schools, of Launch” Focus. The proliferation common VNSA threats. The Joint IAMD religious sites, and other sensitive facili- of missiles and related technologies to Vision 2020 identifies pursuing policies ties to prevent friendly attack. However, VNSAs has significantly extended the to leverage partner capabilities as one of an offensive strategic effect is achieved if threat of attack on U.S. interests well its six IAMD imperatives.39 Specifically, it the VNSA can “bait” an attack on missile beyond distant battlefields. In light of seeks to build partnerships and establish capabilities at sensitive locations and cause such ubiquitous VNSA-based threats, multilateral agreements to develop “an collateral civilian destruction and casual- the U.S. military should broaden its integrated defensive network of interop- ties. News and social media accounts of IAMD strategy and expand its global erable IAMD systems” that can “leverage civilian casualties, whether accurate or IAMD coverage requirements to include cost-sharing and help spread the burden not, could strategically influence domestic its homeland bases and deployment among willing participants.”40 Such an and international support and legitimacy. infrastructure, worldwide deployment, approach should pursue the cooperation
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Vinson and Caldwell 121 Rockets fired from Gaza toward Israel during Operation Protective Edge, July 16, 2014 (Courtesy Israel Defense Forces) of international stakeholders and regional Increase Integration and capabilities must be balanced and in- states with common security interests Cooperation Among Government tegrated with offensive capabilities to to dissuade, deter, and, if necessary, Organizations. Within the U.S. suppress or destroy VNSA attack capabili- preempt or respond to VNSA air and Government, there are overlapping ties, seize the initiative, and mitigate the missile threats. Perhaps the most valuable authorities and responsibilities among operational risks of adaptive adversaries. cooperation among international stake- military, law enforcement, and intel- Achieving the right balance may require holders and regional partners would be ligence organizations that also require trade-off analyses of joint force capabilities sharing relevant intelligence. In regions closer cooperation and better integration. using the context of planning scenarios where VNSAs have obtained ballistic and For example, VNSAs use transnational that include the extended VNSA missile cruise missiles, cooperative states should criminal organizations to smuggle missile threats. Beyond integrating specific IAMD ensure the interoperability and integra- technologies. Detecting and prevent- capabilities, intelligence, surveillance, and tion of their IAMD battle management ing such smuggling operations at home reconnaissance (ISR), information opera- systems (for example, command, control, and abroad could cross organizational tions, cyberspace, and electronic warfare communications, intelligence) and con- boundaries and authorities of all three capabilities should be integrated with duct multinational exercises to develop types of organizations. Therefore, these IAMD planning and employment. the tactics, techniques, and procedures organizations should jointly examine Conduct Wide-Ranging for their integrated employment. Each this cross-functional issue to develop Vulnerability Assessments. Increased nation’s IAMD personnel should be policies and authorities that close vulner- missile capabilities by violent groups that trained and ready to plan and employ able seams and improve coordination. profess the intent and capability to attack their capabilities in support of joint and Further, the counterproliferation capa- the United States and its global interests multinational operations. Finally, the U.S. bilities of these organizations should be will pose a more widespread threat. Such military should address the development interoperable and integrated. a threat will necessitate wide-ranging and management of personnel capable of Enable Balanced Capabilities vulnerability assessments to ensure key manning joint and multinational IAMD to Counter VNSAs with Missile infrastructure and deployment lines of positions at all levels. Technologies. Effective missile defense communication are protected. Overseas
122 Features / Violent Nonstate Actors with Missile Technologies JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 base security agreements should be re- Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, December Notes 2012, 60, 64. viewed and revised based on the global 18 Richard F. Grimmett and Paul K. Kerr, and unpredictable nature of some VNSA 1 For this article, missile technologies in- “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing threats. Force protection postures should clude short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic Nations, 2004–2011,” Congressional Research be reviewed for the continental United missiles; antiship and land-attack cruise missiles; Service, August 24, 2012, 6. States, intermediate and forward staging rockets; antitank guided missiles; surface-to-air 19 Itamar Sharon, “IDF intercepts major missiles (including man-portable air defense Iranian missile shipment to Gaza,” The Times of areas, and vulnerable transit/choke points systems); unmanned aerial systems; and the Israel, March 5, 2014. in between. War plans should not assume precursor materials, software, and intellectual 20 Daryl G. Kimball, “The Arms Trade unopposed movement of forces to the property for their manufacture. Treaty at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, conflict area of operations. IAMD pro- 2 Alon Ben-David, “No Fatalities in Israel’s July 2013. tection must start at the homeland and Iron Dome Zone,” Aviation Week and Space 21 United Nations Office for Disarmament Technology, September 1, 2014. Affairs, “The Arms Trade Treaty,” available at extend to protect bases, ports, strategic 3 “MH17 Malaysia plane crash in Ukraine:
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Vinson and Caldwell 123 U.S. Paratroopers assigned to 91st Cavalry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade, recover parachutes following jump during airborne exercise with German and Czech counterparts at 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command’s Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, October 1, 2014 (U.S. Army/Gertrud Zach)
bilateral agreement with Japan to The Criticality provide security for it. Furthermore, recent disputes over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea have placed a premium on how the United of Collaborative States postures to meet its obligations politically and militarily. President Obama confirmed that the U.S.-Japan Planning bilateral security pact applies to the islands. The asymmetric nature of By Sarah Mussoni, Gert-Jan de Vreede, and Alfred Buckles this situation demands a dynamic and flexible planning capability—not one focused only on military operations, but one that also integrates diplomatic, n both 2011 and 2012, the Barack of the factors necessitating this pivot information, military, and economic Obama administration announced a was the strained relationship between dimensions of power into a coherent pivot to the Asia-Pacific region. One China and Japan, as well as the U.S. I strategy. The complexity of planning these military operations is exacerbated by the Sarah Mussoni is a Program Analyst for the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Command and need to quickly respond to new threats Control Facility Program Management Office. Dr. Gert-Jan de Vreede is the Managing Director of the and challenges. As such, a 21st-century Center for Collaboration Science at the University of Nebraska Omaha. Alfred Buckles is Special Advisor planning process must be a joint enabler to the USSTRATCOM Commander’s Senior Advisory Group for National Nuclear Command and Control and Consultant to the Executive Director at the University of Nebraska Peter Kiewit Institute. He was that is flexible, dynamic, adaptable, and the former Director and Deputy Director of USSTRATCOM Operations and Logistics Directorate. collaborative.
124 Features / The Criticality of Collaborative Planning JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 This article focuses on the collab- to adapt, and too heavily based on Figure 1. Current Military orative aspect of the planning process assumptions, assessments, forces, and Planning: A Sequential Model because collaboration is less about circumstances not encountered during 3 expensive tools that may or may not be actual crisis situations. Step 1 Planning Initiation or become available, and more about Compounding this already challeng- approach or even mindset. Collaboration ing environment, joint planning is largely can be defined as working together to compartmentalized and authoritarian, Step 2 Mission Analysis execute a task to achieve an agreed-upon perhaps understandably much like the goal. When properly enabled, people military it supports. The result is often Step 3 Course of Action (COA) Development can work together toward a goal and time-consuming adjustments, extended combine their expertise, insights, and development timelines, and uninformed, resources while moving through some less responsive decisionmaking. Step 4 COA Analysis and Wargaming process to complete the task.1 Yet mili- In tomorrow’s global environment tary planning involves challenges due (which could literally be tomorrow), there to working in a large, culturally diverse, are a multitude of probable regions for Step 5 COA Comparison hierarchical, globally distributed team serious U.S. national security concern. with existing and emerging inter- and Any future military planning construct Step 6 COA Approval intra-organizational relationships and must understand the dynamic nature of benefits. Operational benefits of working the environment in which plans are cre- with such teams can be realized if the ated and executed as a sort of wiki, where Step 7 Plan or Order Development members are able to communicate in real planning artifacts are ever-evolving, the time and maintain a shared understand- planning environment is inclusive, and edge of anything affecting the plan; ing of commander’s intent, strategic the commander’s objectives are met. In continuous and collaborative flows of objectives, and resources. This shared this future environment, participants can information for planning. situational awareness must be maintained add fidelity and contribute to a com- Create directive: joint planning in a highly dynamic setting.2 The loss of mon operating picture by continuously •• objectives, concept plans, operations shared understanding due to stovepiping updating newly emerging knowledge plans, and concepts of operations or bottlenecking may result in decisions from a data-rich environment. To achieve derived from current and appropriate that are inconsistent with overall mission this, the collaborative planning process portions of the national and defense objectives. must be defined, accepted, and sold by guidance. We intend to discuss current chal- leadership. These processes will then lead Assess: understanding the situation, lenges and proposed changes to the to an architecture that can be used as a •• scope, and involved community. planning processes. Specifically, we pres- blueprint for the development and pro- Decide upon course of action: ent an overall planning framework and duction of future enabling tools. •• product resulting from the plan- introduce the collaboration engineering The future planning model (see figure ning process that is presented to approach as a way to design repeatable, 2) is envisioned as a cyclical, collaborative decisionmakers. It can be military, collaborative planning activities. exchange that emphasizes the planning diplomatic, or a combination. process as being a real-time capability. Execute: carrying out the plan. Military Planning: To do this, multiple procedures must be •• Present and Future performed simultaneously with current In the future planning environment, Today’s joint planning processes were and relevant information derived from situational awareness and shared under- designed during World War I and World an extensive data-rich environment, in a standing become the most important War II to support operations of the day real-time collaborative network of people inputs to the collaborative planning that involved sequential events, known and tools that drives the schedule that process. These originate not only from (or at least expected) battle rhythms, defines an agile virtual battle rhythm. The intelligence and diplomatic agencies, but and extended timelines (see figure 1). cyclical collaborative exchange allows for also from across the planning processes This method no longer seems appro- flexibility in battle rhythm—for instance, and community of interest so that appro- priate or in line with changing world being proactive or rapidly responsive priate courses of action can be developed, conditions that demand shorter decision rather than waiting for a scheduled meet- adjusted, and presented to decisionmak- cycles. The 24-month contingency plan- ing. Five critical procedures in the future ers. The wiki planning process thus ning cycle seems too sluggish to keep planning environment lead to relevant, creates living and continuously evolving up with the faster-paced world in which desired outcomes: artifacts throughout all phases of the we operate. Past missions and recent operation. Achieve situational awareness: spe- exercises demonstrate that off-the-shelf •• To realize the future planning pro- cific, focused, and inclusive knowl- plans are often too static, too difficult cess, appropriate collaboration processes
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Mussoni, de Vreede, and Buckles 125 Figure 2. Future Military Planning: A Cyclical Model sion-critical tasks that frequently recur. To design such processes, collaboration Battle Rhythm engineering recognizes different ways in which people work together toward goals and the best practices to guide them in these efforts. The five distinct Directive forms in which people work together (Planning Initiation) are called patterns of collaboration. Each collaboration process consists of a particular sequence of activities in which one or more patterns of collaboration among team members unfold. To pur- posefully create a pattern of collabora- tion during a process activity, a team Course of Action Situational Assess leader can use facilitation best practices (Develop, Analyze, Awareness (Mission Analysis) called “thinkLets” (see table 1). Decide) ThinkLets. A central foundation for collaboration engineering is the use of design patterns to support the design and transition of collaborative work practices. Design patterns are composed of named Execute and scripted procedures called thinkLets, (Operation order/ which are a best practice for a collabora- Execute order) tive task that creates one or more patterns of collaboration. The practitioner uses the thinkLet to evoke a certain pattern of team behavior by means of giving short and simple instructions to the team. For example, a LeafHopper thinkLet allows a team to brainstorm ideas for a collection Table 1. Five Patterns of Collaboration of topics simultaneously. The LeafHopper Pattern of Collaboration Description thinkLet defines how the team should set Diverge To move from having. up its workspace and what instructions To move from having many concepts to having a focus on, and members should receive. In this instance, Converge understanding of, the few concepts deemed worthy of further attention. the team can use a dedicated collabora- To move from having less to more understanding of the relationships Organize tion tool or a collection of papers on among concepts. the wall labeled with titles. Instructions To move from less to more understanding of the possible consequences Evaluate are to generate ideas for specific topics, of concepts. start with the most familiar or interesting To move from having less to having more agreement on courses of Build Consensus topic, and read what others generated action. and build on those ideas. ThinkLets represent a menu of must be defined and engineered; con- the quality and quantity of decisions and “collaboration Legos”: they can be cepts developed, approved, and applied; products and bring about unity of effort combined into best practice collaborative and architectures developed for tools to among disparate mission partners. problem-solving processes. When appro- be engineered. At present, there is no priately combined, thinkLets guide team common model of how military planners The Collaboration members through a reasoning process of should undertake collaboration. For the Engineering Approach collaboration patterns that allows them most part, collaboration happens by sheer Collaboration engineering is an to focus all their attention on a single, force of will and actions by individual approach to design and deploy col- more manageable reasoning task. During planners to meet a regularly scheduled laboration processes and technologies the brainstorming part of the course of battle rhythm. We propose that the “col- that are then transferred to practitioners action development, a variety of ideas can laboration engineering approach” is one to execute without the ongoing inter- be generated by means of requiring team viable way to purposefully design opera- vention of a professional facilitator. It members to produce as much informa- tional planning such that it will expedite specifically focuses on processes for mis- tion as possible without evaluating. In
126 Features / The Criticality of Collaborative Planning JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Participants of U.S. Army Africa Training Center Capabilities Seminar 2015 receive capability briefing at 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command in Grafenwoehr, Germany, November 3, 2015 (U.S. Army/Gertrud Zach) this case, the process of generating ideas Group Support Systems. A GSS is a communicate ideas and preferences anon- is separate from the process of evaluating suite of collaboration tools that support ymously and in parallel, thus alleviating information, allowing team members creative problem-solving and co-creation such challenges as dominance, evaluation to focus their attention on a single task in collocated and distributed teams. It apprehension, and ideation production- that is uninterrupted by interpersonal includes the software for electronic brain- blocking. Second, teams use a meeting discussions. storming and electronic voting as well structure that keeps them focused and on Each thinkLet has a catchy name to as the methods to accompany the tools time. For example, during a generation support recognition and memorization and the environment in which the tools task, an electronic brainstorming tool of the technique’s essence and provide a are used. More than 2 million people provides each participant with a different common lexicon between the private and worldwide, including members of the electronic page where a single, short idea public sectors. The thinkLet is known U.S. Army and Navy, have participated is entered. The system then randomly only to the practitioner who uses its script in GSS-supported meetings to encourage sends the page to another participant and as a sequence of things to say and do to creative problem-solving toward a com- brings a page containing someone else’s evoke the desired pattern of collabora- mon goal or task. Extensive case studies idea. Third, the GSS creates complete tion within the team. Each thinkLet also have shown that a GSS can reduce project records of the electronic discussions, en- defines the specific technology that the labor costs and calendar days required for abling future review and analysis. Finally, team must use to execute the script and completion by over 50 percent.4 features and functions in a GSS encour- the configuration of those tools—for The GSS supports a team along four age the alignment of team and individual example, the tool settings and pre-loaded fundamental dimensions (communica- goals. data. ThinkLets can make use of simple tion, deliberation, information support, Personnel from the U.S. Army pen and paper technologies or sophis- and goal congruence) to help address Research Laboratory did a case study ticated technologies, such as a Group some common challenges that may affect on the use of a GSS software tool at the Support System (GSS). team productivity. First, team members Command and General Staff Officer’s
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Mussoni, de Vreede, and Buckles 127 The benefits of and successful ex- Table 2. Thinklets for Mission Statement Process periences with the GSS cannot just be ThinkLet Name Pattern of Collaboration ThinkLet Purpose attributed to the tool itself. For a GSS- FreeBrainstorm Diverge To generate a broad, diverse set of creative enabled collaboration effort to succeed, ideas in response to a single brainstorm question while being inspired by the a precise collaboration process has to be contributions of other team members. carefully crafted. In the collaboration en- TreasureHunt Converge To have pairs of team members extract a list gineering approach, the potential of the of key ideas on assigned topics from a raw GSS is blended with the thinkLets design set of brainstorming comments. library to enable such collaboration pro- LeafHopper Organize To generate ideas in depth and detail on a set cesses. A thinkLets-based approach to the of topics of the team members’ own choice. collaborative creation of the deliverable BucketShuffle Evaluate To quickly evaluate prioritization of items mission statement is presented next. within category lists. Collaboration Engineering for Figure 3. Mission Statement Design Process with ThinkLets Mission Statement Creation A key activity of the planning process, whether it follows legacy planning FreeBrainstorm Name processes or a future dynamic model, Brainstorm diverse set of objectives Activity is to develop the commander’s mission from Headquarters statement. It must be a clear, concise Diverge Planning Directive Objective statement of the essential (specified and Protect population Pattern of centers in area of implied) tasks to be accomplished by TreasureHunt responsibility ThinkLet Template the command and the purpose(s) of Distill most those tasks. Although several tasks may relevant be identified during the mission analysis objectives
Converge phase, the mission statement includes Specified Task 1 Implied Task 1 only those that are essential to the Prevent enemy from Destroy enemy missiles capable of targeting overall success of the mission. The tasks LeafHopper launching missiles at population centers population centers that are routine or inherent responsibili- Identify implied and specified ties of a commander are not included in tasks for each the mission statement, which becomes Organize objective Essential Task 1 the focus of the commander’s and staff’s Prevent enemy from launching missiles at estimates and is reviewed at each step of BucketShuffle population centers the process to ensure planning is staying Essential Task 2 Evaluate and Destroy enemy missiles on course. Because of the statement’s prioritize capable of targeting importance to planning and the fre- “essential” tasks population centers
Evaluate in category lists quency with which it is accomplished, a thinkLets-based approach to developing Mission Statement essential tasks is presented below. In this By DDMMM , USSTRATCOM will have sufficient assets case, the specific product is the mission in Area of Responsibility to protect population centers, prevent enemy launching missiles at population centers, statement. Since the mission statement and destroy enemy missiles capable of targeting is derived from the essential tasks, the population centers. thinkLets-based method also creates the objectives and specified and implied Course, the Army’s tactics and decision- of plans through the GroupSystems tasks that make up the essential tasks. making course for field grade officers. brainstorming, organizing, and evalua- Process Design. A conceptual design The software GroupSystems was applied tion tools. Many students found that the using thinkLets has been created for the to the 17-step mission analysis process GSS greatly reduced the time required development of the mission statement. in the Military Decision Making Process to complete the mission analysis, im- This process can also be applied to other (MDMP). The MDMP is sequential, proved staff coordination, and resulted defense activities such as idea generation often cumbersome, and complex (and in a better product. Students noted that during course of action development. thus intimidating) when applied to to- synergism among individuals improved Figure 3 shows the notional design and day’s modern mobile and dynamic battle as the tool facilitated staff cross-talk and a thinkLets template. A summary of the space. The Army used a GSS for parallel interaction, which helped students profit thinkLets, patterns of collaboration, and planning to increase the speed and quality from others’ ideas and input.5 purposes is presented in table 2. The
128 Features / The Criticality of Collaborative Planning JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 U.S. Marine participates in coordinated beach assault with Portuguese and British counterparts during Exercise Trident Juncture 15, November 4, 2015 (DOD/Chad McMeen) collaborative process lets a team develop which display the objectives-related con- two or three members, and each sub- the event’s two categories of artifacts: ob- tributions for inspiration to add further group becomes responsible for one or jectives prescribe friendly events, and tasks detail. Next, using the TreasureHunt more objectives. The subgroups process describe friendly actions to create desired thinkLet, pairs of team members extract the raw information by extracting clearly effects or preclude undesired effects. The the most promising objectives from the formulated tasks, and, if necessary, by artifacts are related; a single objective may separate buckets into a central list, re- rewording the objectives during this have multiple tasks. The design process wording them where necessary. The team process as well. After each subgroup is allows a team to derive objectives and thus ensures that each objective in the list done, it reviews the work of the other task information in parallel. Furthermore, is clearly defined and unambiguous and subgroups, leaves comments, and pro- each artifact can be continuously modi- that no overlap between objectives exists. cesses the feedback received on its own fied, based on deeper insights as other Next, the team uses the LeafHopper work. During this part of the process, it artifacts are developed. thinkLet (organize) to collect informa- is also possible for directorates, divisions, The process starts with a tion regarding the effects and tasks for or components to delineate how they can FreeBrainstorm (diverge) and the objectives. During this thinkLet, support the objective conceptually. As TreasureHunt (converge) thinkLets each team member contributes relevant mission statement development includes sequence to create a list of clearly defined information to the objectives that he or geographically dispersed teams, electronic objectives. The team first generates as she knows or cares most about so that GSS tools should be applied to connect many objectives as possible, including the team collects a lot of raw information teams. As the process is conceptual, it information concerning their constraints, regarding the objectives’ tasks. This raw should be tested and then compared to restraints, assumptions, resources re- information is processed, consolidated, the old way of doing business in order to quired, and timing considerations. To this and prioritized during the BucketShuffle collect data and make improvements. end, the team makes contributions in par- thinkLet (evaluate). During this activity, Metrics. Metrics should be designed allel to a number of discussion categories, the team is split into small subgroups of and applied to measure the effectiveness
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Mussoni, de Vreede, and Buckles 129 and timely tools for the emerging national security playing field. Today’s complex national security environment requires accelerated de- cisionmaking by leadership and strong coordination of military operations to respond to emerging threats. The current planning process served its masters well despite being slow, static, and sequential. Now is the time for a paradigm shift to planning processes that are adaptive, dynamic, and timely, based on situational awareness and collaboration in support of everyday missions. JFQ
Notes
1 Gert-Jan de Vreede, Robert O. Briggs, and Anne P. Massey, “Collaboration Engineer- th nd U.S. Soldier with 3-27 Field Artillery Regiment, 2 Fires Platoon maps target areas during Exercise ing: Foundations and Opportunities,” Journal Dragon Strike at Avon Park Air Force Range, Florida, June 10, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Dillian Bamman) of the Association of Information Systems 10, no. 3 (2009), 121–137, available at
130 Features / The Criticality of Collaborative Planning JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 USS Steelhead (SS-280) refitted with 5.25-inch deck gun, April 10, 1945 (retouched by wartime censors) (U.S. Navy)
The American Wolf Packs A Case Study in Wartime Adaptation
By F.G. Hoffman
o paraphrase an often ridiculed and their militaries to adapt. Indeed, and suggests that U.S. forces can im- comment made by former Secre- it is virtually impossible for states and prove upon their capacity to adapt.2 In T tary of Defense Donald Rums- militaries to anticipate all of the prob- particular, that assessment calls for a rein- feld, you go to war with the joint force lems they will face in war, however vigoration of lessons learned and shared you have, not necessarily the joint force much they try to do so.”1 To succeed, best practices. But there is much more to you need. While some critics found most military organizations have to truly learning lessons than documenting the quip off base, this is actually a adapt in some way, whether in terms of and sharing experiences immediately after well-grounded historical reality. As one doctrine, structure, weapons, or tasks. a conflict. If we require an adaptive joint scholar has stressed, “War invariably The Joint Staff’s assessment of force for the next war, we need a com- throws up challenges that require states the last decade of war recognizes this mon understanding of what generates rapid learning and adaptability. The naval Services recently recognized the importance of adaptation. The latest Dr. F.G. Hoffman is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. The author would like to thank Dr. T.X. Hammes, maritime strategy, signed by the leader- Dr. Williamson Murray, and Colonel Pat Garrett, USMC (Ret.), for input on this article. ship of the U.S. Marine Corps, Navy, and
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Hoffman 131 Coast Guard, defines the need to create identify the enemy’s battle fleet so the contest and gauge success at these once- “a true learning competency,” including modern dreadnoughts and carrier task a-year evolutions. “realistic simulation and live, virtual, and forces could attack. Alfred Thayer Mahan Conceptually framed by war games, constructive scenarios before our people had eschewed war against commerce, or these exercises became the “enforcers of deploy.”3 History teaches that learning guerre de course, in his lectures, and his strategic realism.”12 They provided the does not stop once the fleet deploys and ghost haunted the Navy’s plans for “deci- Navy’s operational leaders with a realistic that a true learning competency is based sive battles.”8 laboratory to test steel ships at sea instead not only on games, drills, and simulations The postwar assessment from inside of cardboard markers on the floor at Sims but also on a culture that accepts learning the submarine community was telling: Hall. Unlike so many “live” exercises and adaptation as part of war. “Neither by training nor indoctrination today, these were remarkably free-play, This lesson is ably demonstrated by was the U.S. Submarine Force readied for unscripted battle experiments. The fleet’s the Navy’s refinement of wolf pack tactics unrestricted warfare.”9 Rather than sup- performance was rigorously explored, cri- during the Pacific campaign of World porting a campaign of cataclysmic salvos tiqued, and ultimately refined by the men War II. The tragic story of defects in U.S. by battleships or opposing battle lines of who would actually implement War Plan torpedoes is well known, but the Navy’s carrier groups, theirs was a war of attrition Orange.13 Both the games and exercises reluctant adoption of the German U-boat enabled by continuous learning and adap- “provided a medium that facilitated the tactics against convoys is not often stud- tation to create the competencies needed transmission of lessons learned, nurtured ied.4 There are lessons in this case study for ultimate success. This learning was not organizational memory and reinforced for our joint warfighting community. confined to material fixes and technical the Navy’s organizational ethos.”14 The success of the U.S. submarine improvements. The story of the torpedo Brutally candid postexercise critiques force in the Pacific is a familiar story. The deficiencies that plagued the fleet in the occurred in open forums in which junior Sailors of the submarine fleet comprised first 18 months of the Pacific war has been and senior officers examined moves and just 2 percent of the total of U.S. naval told repeatedly, but the development of countermoves. These reflected the Navy’s manpower, but their boats accounted for the Navy’s own wolf pack tactics is not as culture of tackling operational problems 55 percent of all Japanese shipping losses familiar a tale. Yet this became one of the in an intellectual, honest, and transparent in the war. The 1,300 ships lost included key adaptations that enabled the Silent manner. The Navy benefited from the 20 major naval combatants (8 carriers, Service to wreak such havoc upon the low-cost “failures” from these exercises.15 1 battleship, and 11 cruisers). Japanese Japanese war effort. Ironically, a Navy that shipping lost 5.5 million tons of cargo, dismissed commerce raiding, and invested Limitations of Peacetime with U.S. submarines accounting for little intellectual effort in studying it, The exercises, however, had peacetime almost 5 million tons.5 This exceeded the proved ruthlessly effective at pursuing it.10 artificialities that reduced realism and total sunk by the Navy’s surface vessels, retarded the development of the sub- its carriers, and the U.S. Army Air Corps Learning Culture marine. These severely limited Navy bombers combined. By August 1944, the One of the Navy’s secret weapons in submarine offensive operations in the Japanese merchant marine was in tatters the interwar era was its learning culture, early part of World War II.16 With and unable to support the needs of the ci- part of which was Newport’s rigorous extensive naval aviation participation, vilian economy.6 The submarine campaign education program coupled with war the exercises convinced the fleet that (aided by other joint means) thoroughly games and simulations. The interac- submarines were easily found from the crippled the Japanese economy.7 tion between the Naval War College air. Thus, the importance of avoiding This critical contribution was not and the fleet served to cycle innovative detection, either from the air or in foreseen during the vaunted war games ideas among theorists, strategists, and approaches, became paramount. In the held in the Naval War College’s Sims Hall operators. A tight process of research, run-up to the war, the Asiatic Squadron or during the annual fleet exercises in the strategic concepts, operational simula- commander threatened the relief of sub- decades preceding the war. Perhaps the tions, and exercises linked innovative marine commanders if their periscopes Navy hoped to ambush some Japanese ideas with the realities of naval warfare. were even sighted in exercises or drills.17 navy ships, but the damage to Japanese The Navy’s Fleet Exercises (FLEXs) This belief in the need for extreme sea lines of communication was barely were a combination of training and stealth led to the development of and studied and never gamed, much less experimentation in innovative tactics reliance on submerged attack tech- practiced. A blockade employing surface and technologies.11 Framed against a niques that required commanders to and submarine forces was supposed to clear and explicit operational problem, identify and attack targets from under be the culminating phase of War Plan these FLEXs were conducted under water based entirely on sound bearings. Orange, the strategic plan for the Pacific, unscripted conditions with opposing Given the quality of sound detection but it was never expected to be the sides. Rules were established for evaluat- and sonar technologies of the time, opening component of U.S. strategy. ing performance and effectiveness, and this was a precariously limited tactic of Submarines were to be used as scouts to umpires were assigned to regulate the dubious effectiveness.
132 Recall / The American Wolf Packs JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Torpedoed Japanese destroyer IJN Yamakaze photographed through periscope of USS Nautilus, June 25, 1942 (U.S. Navy)
Technological limitations restricted a perfect match for a generation of torpe- Submarines were to be confined to service the Navy’s appreciation for what the sub- does that were never tested.18 Nor did the as scouts and “ambushers.” They were marine could do. The Navy’s operational Navy practice night attacks in peacetime, placed under restrictive operating condi- plans were dominated by high-speed car- although it was quite evident well before tions when exercising with surface ships. rier groups and battleships operating at Pearl Harbor that German night surface Years of neglect led to the erosion of tactical no less than 17 to 20 knots for extended attacks were effective.19 Worse, operating expertise and the “calculated recklessness” periods, but the Navy’s interwar boats at night was deemed unsafe, and thus needed in a successful submarine com- could not keep pace. They were capable night training was overlooked before the mander. In its place emerged a pandemic of 12 knots on the surface and half that war.20 The submarine community’s of- of excessive cautiousness, which spread from when submerged. They would be far in ficial history found that the “lack of night the operational realm into the psychology of the wake of the fleet during extended experience saddled the American sub- the submarine community.22 operations. This inadvertently promoted mariners entering the war with a heavy plans to use submarines for more inde- cargo of unsolved combat problems.”21 pendent operations, which eventually Once the war began, however, the old Unrestricted Warfare became the mode employed against tactics had to be quickly discarded, and Ultimately, as conflict began to look Japanese commercial shipping in the new attack techniques had to be learned likely, with a correlation of forces not in opening years of the war. in contact. America’s favor, students and strategists Though they were a highly valuable Overall, while invaluable for exploring at Newport began to study the use of source of insights at the fleet and cam- naval aviation’s growing capability, the the submarine’s offensive striking power paign levels, the FLEXs had not enforced exercises induced conservative tactics and by attacking Japan’s merchant marine.23 operational or tactical realism for the sub- risk avoidance in the submarine world During the spring semester of 1939, marine crews at the tactical/procedural that were at odds with what the Navy strategists argued for the establishment level. In fact, a generation of crews never would eventually need in the Pacific. As of “war zones” around the fleet upon heard a live torpedo detonated, proving one Sailor-scholar observed: commencement of hostilities. These
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Hoffman 133 Chief Torpedoman Donald E. Walters receives Bronze Star for service aboard USS Parche (SS-384) (U.S. Navy/Darryl L. Baker) areas would be a type of diplomatic The Campaign modities, and the campaign could not exclusion zone, ostensibly to support Due to an insufficient number of boats, be seen as a success. The war’s senior fleet defense during war. However, limited doctrine, and faulty torpedoes, submariner, Vice Admiral Charles the proponents’ intent was to conduct the submarine force could not claim Lockwood, admitted that the submarine unrestricted warfare aimed at Japan’s great success. By the end of 1942, the force was operating below its potential long and vulnerable shipping lines.24 Pacific Fleet had sent out 350 patrols. contribution.26 Yet there was a gap between what Postwar analyses credit these patrols Tasked with the ruthless elimination submarines could do and what the with 180 ships sunk, with a total of of Japanese shipping, the Pacific Fleet emergent plans to conduct unrestricted 725,000 tons of cargo.25 Although this was not producing results fast enough. warfare were calling for. Well before Pearl sounds impressive, over the course of Some of this shortfall was the result of Harbor, the Navy’s senior leaders un- the year, the Navy had sunk the same faulty weapons, and some was attributed derstood that unrestricted warfare was a amount as the German U-boats had in to the cautious doctrine of the interwar strategic necessity. However, the implica- just 2 months in the North Atlantic. era. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral tions of this change were not acted upon This level of achievement was against Ernest King directed a new approach. He at lower levels in the Navy in the brief era a Japanese navy that had limited anti- wrote to Admiral Chester Nimitz at Pearl before Pearl Harbor. Doctrine, training, submarine warfare (ASW) expertise and Harbor on April 1, 1943, noting that “ef- and ample working torpedoes were all little in the way of radar. The damage fectiveness of operations and availability lacking. This created the conditions for inflicted had no impact on Japan’s of submarines indicate desirability, even operational adaptation under fire later. import of critical resources and com- necessity, to form a tactical group of 4 to
134 Recall / The American Wolf Packs JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 6 submarines trained and indoctrinated operational and tactical context facing the ships), encompassing a relatively wide in coordinated action for operations such submarine force was increasing in com- area. A convergence could bring together as now set up in Solomons, to be sta- plexity. By 1943, Japanese convoys were as many as a dozen boats swarming tioned singly or in groups in enemy ship becoming larger, more organized, and around a big convoy but without any approaches to critical areas.”27 Nimitz im- better protected. The escort command on-scene battle management.37 A single mediately directed the implementation of was employing more airplanes and newer U-boat would be easily driven off, but a King’s suggestion.28 Interestingly, despite techniques for detection and attack. pack would not be. They would stalk the his experience combating U-boats in the As Lockwood noted in his memoir, merchant shipping and pick off the slow- Atlantic and protecting the vital sea lines collective action was not unknown to est quarry every time. of communication to Europe, King was the submarine force. Before the war, King’s intervention about collective still oriented toward the employment of experiments had attempted simultane- action proved timely. The Japanese navy submarines against Japanese naval com- ous attacks by several submarines, but did eventually enhance its ASW efforts, batants. But in line with the pre–Pearl communications between boats were employing land-based surveillance, better Harbor vision of unrestricted warfare, not good enough to ensure safety in radars, and more coordination. As the the U.S. submarine force was following a peacetime operations. These tactics were U.S. boats were drawing closer to Japan’s strategy of attrition against Tokyo’s mer- cursorily explored late in 1941 but were home islands, their targets were hug- chant shipping, and the Navy submarine abandoned due to fears of blue-on-blue ging closer to shallow waters and staying force continued to emphasize individual incidents and limited communications within air coverage. This raised the risk patrols and independent command. They capabilities.33 that American submarines would be iden- had not been successful in dealing with Now, however, conditions were tified and attacked. Japanese warships in critical battles such different, radar had been perfected, Concerted action by the submarines as Midway. King apparently believed that high-frequency radio phones were in- could offset these changes in the operat- if they could be properly “trained and stalled, and communications were vastly ing context. Singular attacks would draw indoctrinated in coordinated action,” this improved.34 Coordination could be all the attention of an escort, ensuring shortcoming might be rectified. achieved, but the American submariners that the U.S. boats were driven deep At the same time, King was fully had little practice at it. The submarine and away from their wounded targets. engaged with responding to German force would have to investigate new Coordination by multiple boats would Kriegsmarine wolf pack tactics, or tactics on the fly in the midst of the war. allow continuous pressure on a Japanese Rudeltaktik. He was painfully aware how (Somewhat ironically, King called for shipping convoy and increase the stran- effective they were and was being strongly emulating German submarine tactics gulation that Lockwood was aiming to encouraged by both President Franklin just as that force was passing the apex of achieve. Multiple threats would distract D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston its operational effectiveness. May 1943 the convoy’s protective screen and gen- Churchill to adopt defensive measures was considered the blackest month for erate more opportunities out of each since the U-boats critically impaired Great the U-boats in the cruel Battle of the convoy that was found. Britain’s war effort.29 Moreover, King was Atlantic.35) The U.S. Navy did not embrace aware that the U.S. Navy was not generat- King’s message eliminated debate, but German wolf pack doctrine or terminol- ing the same aggregate tonnage results as the Pacific submarine fleet took its time ogy; the accepted term for the tactic was the German navy, and he may have con- to interpret fully the doctrinal and tactical coordinated attack group (CAG). An cluded that emulating the Germans could implications of the new approach. As a innovative submariner, Captain Charles produce better results.30 Lockwood, the result, the U.S. Navy did not employ the “Swede” Momsen, developed the tactics commander of Submarine Force Pacific same approach as the Germans. U-boat and commanded the initial U.S. wolf pack (COMSUBPAC), was certainly well aware wolf packs in the Kriegsmarine were ad in the early fall of 1943.38 American CAGs of the comparisons; in mid-1942, he hoc and fluid. When Admiral Karl Dönitz would initially have a senior commander wrote that “Germans getting 3 ships a day, received intelligence about the location on scene, but it would not be one of the Pac not getting one ship.”31 Furthermore, and character of a convoy, he would di- boat’s skippers, as Lockwood desired to his predecessor as COMSUBPAC issued a rect a number of boats to converge on an have his older division commanders get five-page summary of German wolf pack area where he expected the convoy to be. wartime experience on boats.39 tactics via a widely distributed bulletin in He would thus direct the assembly of the The investigative phase was exhaus- January 1943.32 wolf pack and coordinate its attack from tive and deliberate over several months. Comparisons between theaters may long distance. There was no on-scene Experienced submarine commanders, have driven King to propose the shift, commander or collective attack.36 The not staff officers, developed the required but he may have also detected trends U-boats were simply sharks, swarming tactics and communication techniques. In in Japanese ASW that would eventually and attacking at will, or swarming to des- an echo of prewar Newport, discussions weaken U.S. submarine effectiveness ignated areas when directed. The Atlantic evolved into small war games on the floor if changes were not put in place. The convoys were rather large (30 or more of a converted hotel, which conveniently
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Hoffman 135 had a chessboard floor of black and Lockwood and his team at Submarine damaging eight more with a gross ton- white tiles. The officers who would Force Pacific did not merely take King’s nage of 63,000 tons. While this met conduct these patrols developed their directive and implement it. He and the the measures of success that Lockwood own doctrine and tactics.40 The staff and commander of U.S. submarines based in wanted, the commanders involved were prospective boat captains tested various Australia, Rear Admiral Ralph Christie, less than enthusiastic. The comments ways both to scout for targets and then to were not in favor of the change in tactics. from the participating captains were gen- assemble into a fighting force once a con- In his memoirs, Lockwood noted in a erally mixed, with many indicating they voy was detected. War games, drills, and single sentence that he was directed to would prefer to hunt alone rather than ultimately at-sea trials were conducted to conduct wolf pack tactics by King. He as a member of a group. They believed refine a formal doctrine. Momsen drilled did apply groups of four to six boats in that the problems of communication his captains in tactics, planning to have his packs. And while he did develop the were technologically unsolvable and that three boats attack successively—one boat doctrine King tasked them to create, he the risk of fratricide was unavoidable. making the first attack on a convoy, then did not apply it as King desired, against Moreover, commanders preferred op- acting as a trailer while the other two military shipping or approaches to critical erating and attacking alone—consistent attacked alternately on either flank. He operational areas. Instead, Lockwood de- with the Navy’s traditional culture and also developed a simple code for use on ployed the CAGs to his ruthless campaign the community’s enduring preference the new “Talk Between Ships” system so of attrition against Japanese commerce. for independent action (and the rewards that boats could communicate with each The developmental process was entirely that came with it). Momsen, perhaps other without being detected or inter- consistent with bottom-up adaptation. reflecting an appreciation of the comple- cepted by the Japanese. Lockwood was permitted to develop the menting role high-level intelligence could The American approach rejected command and control process, tactics, and play, recommended centralized command the rigid, centralized theater command training program on his own. Centralized from Pearl Harbor rather than an on-the- and ad hoc tactical structure of the command from Pearl Harbor was re- scene commander, something Lockwood Germans.41 Consistent with its culture, jected, which reflected both the traditional immediately overruled.45 But various the U.S. Navy took the opposite ap- Navy culture of command responsibility packs were planned and began training. proach. CAGs comprised three to four and autonomy and Lockwood’s apprecia- Ingrained conservatism and fear of firing boats under a common tactical com- tion for how Allied direction finding and on a friendly vessel framed the emerging mander who was present on scene. signals intelligence in the Atlantic were fed tactics. These in practice emphasized “co- Unlike the Germans, these attack groups by Dönitz’s centralized control and exten- operative search” over collective attack.46 trained and deployed together as a sive communications. The need to explore innovative distinctive element. They patrolled in Even after his change of heart, tactics was directed from the top, but a designated area under a senior com- Lockwood and the submarine force the Navy leadership was patient in let- mander and followed a generic attack took their time to work out the required ting local leaders figure out the “how.” plan. Other than intelligence regarding doctrine and tactics in an intensive in- The validity of coordinated action grew potential target convoys, orders came vestigatory phase. The first attack group, on commanders such as Lockwood. from the senior tactical commander on comprised of the Cero (SS-225), Shad Whatever reservations they might have scene and not from the fleet commander. (SS-235), and Grayback (SS-208), was held, the American wolf packs continued This tactical doctrine called for suc- not formed until the summer of 1943. during the remainder of the year and cessive rather than swarming attacks.42 Momsen, who had never been on a com- were a common tactic during 1944. Subsequently scholars have been critical bat patrol, was the commodore and rode Unlike Dönitz’s Operation Paukenschlag of these deliberate and sequential attack in Cero. The pack finished its preparations (Drumbeat) in the Atlantic in early 1943, tactics, which negated surprise and sim- and deployed from Pearl Harbor in late Lockwood’s force began to win the war plified the job of Japanese escorts.43 September on its combat patrol from of attrition in the Pacific. The success was Strangely, there seems to have been Midway on October 1, 1943, exactly 6 likely due to the combination of finally little urgency behind COMSUBPAC’s months to the day from King’s message. having defect-free torpedoes and employ- doctrinal and organizational adaptation. This was hardly rapid adaptation, given ing new search tactics. But as Lockwood This top-down direction from afar (from the lessons from both the German suc- noted in a tactical bulletin, for the first Admiral King) appears to have been re- cess story in the Atlantic and the lack of time, tonnage totals between the German sisted until met with bottom-up evidence success in the Pacific. effort and that of the American subma- derived from experienced skippers. In The initial cruise was deemed a rine force “now compare favorably.”47 the records of this period, Lockwood success. Momsen’s CAG arrived in the One dramatic case gives an example appears to be guilty of delaying tactics, East China Sea on October 6, 1943. of how effective CAGs could be. In but captains John “Babe” Brown and It made a single collective attack on a late July 1944, Commander Lawson Swede Momsen convinced him to have convoy and was credited with sinking “Red” Ramage commanded the USS “a change of heart.”44 five Japanese ships for 88,000 tons and Parche, part of a wolf pack labeled
136 Recall / The American Wolf Packs JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 “Park’s Pirates” after Captain Lew Parks, Figure also aboard the Parche. The Pirates in- cluded the USS Steelhead, skippered by 1,000,000 200,000 Lieutenant Commander Dave Whechel, and the USS Hammerhead, whose skipper was Commander Jack Martin. 800,000 160,000 After a patch of bad weather and poor radio reporting, the Pirates found their 600,000 120,000 quarry. Although frustrated by miscom- munications, Martin identified a large
Japanese convoy on the evening of July 400,000 80,000 30. Although it was a long shot, Parks ordered Ramage to give chase, and for 8
hours the Parche chased down the fleeing 200,000 40,000 convoy. an an onna n o on What happened next was a maritime melee. Ramage surfaced inside the con- 0 0 D J F MA M J J A S N D J F MA M J J A S N D J F MA M J J A S N D J F MA M J J A voy in the dark and began a methodical 1942 1943 1944 attack, slicing in and around the larger Tanker tonnage afloat Tanker tonnage serviceable Tanker tonnage importing oil to Japan tankers and setting up shots that ranged (e cluding fleet oilers) (e cluding fleet oilers) (e cluding fleet oilers) from only 500 to 800 yards. Ramage’s Merchant tanker tonnage sunk boat passed within 50 feet of one Japanese corvette on an opposite tack S urce Mick Ryan, Submarine perations In The Pacific, ustralia e e ce ur al, 2013, 6 . that could not depress its guns enough to strike it.48 The Parche was almost rammed within a few months, Japan’s economic Korea to Japan. Lockwood’s staff meticu- once and was subjected to fire from lifeline was in tatters. lously planned this operation, partially numerous vessels as it raised havoc with Exploiting an increased number of motivated by his desire to avenge the the 17 merchant ships and 6 escorts of boats and the shorter patrol distances loss of the heroic Commander Dudley Convoy MI-11. afforded by advanced bases in Guam and Morton and the USS Wahoo in the north- Within 34 minutes, Ramage fired Saipan, U.S. patrol numbers increased by ern Sea of Japan in fall 1943. Each of the 19 torpedoes and got at least 14 hits. 50 percent to 520 patrols in 1944. These U.S. boats was fitted with FM sonar, and Lockwood credited Parche with 4 patrols fired over 6,000 torpedoes, which the crews received detailed training in ships sunk and 34,000 tons, while the had become both functional and plenti- its use. Once they had made the passage Steelhead got credit for 2 ships of 14,000 ful. They sank over 600 ships for nearly and were at their assigned stations in tons. Ramage’s epic night surface attack 3 million tons of shipping. They reduced the Sea of Japan, the submarines, work- earned him the Medal of Honor.49 His Japan’s critical imports by 36 percent and ing in groups of three, were scheduled daring rampage was a perfect example of cut the merchant fleet in half (from 4.1 to begin a timed attack throughout the a loosely coordinated attack relying on million to 2 million tons). While Japanese area of operations at sunset on June 9. individual initiative (not unlike a classic oil tanker production increased, oil im- This collective action group was unique U-boat commander’s approach in its ex- ports dropped severely (see figure).52 in that, instead of gaining an advantage ecution) rather than formal tactics or a set Lockwood took wolf packs to a new by concentrating their combat power on piece approach that failed to overwhelm level in 1945. Now a firmly convinced a single target or convoy, the Hellcats the escorts.50 advocate, he carefully planned an opera- concentrated as a group for their entrance After mid-1944, there were no major tion with nine boats, operating in three through the narrow Tsushima and then adaptations in submarine warfare during wolf packs, that would traverse the heav- disaggregated. Their simultaneous but the remainder of the Pacific campaign. ily mined entrances of the Sea of Japan.53 distributed attack was designed to shock Ships, doctrine, training, and weapons The development of an early version the Japanese and overwhelm their ability were highly effective. In a sense, the U.S. of mine-detecting FM sonar allowed to respond. submarine war did not truly begin until boats to detect mines at 700 yards and In Operation Barney, nine boats led the CAGs went to sea in late 1943. Until bypass them. Submarines could now by Captain Earl Hydeman successfully then, it “had been a learning period, a enter mined waters such as the Straits of surprised the Japanese and sank 27 vessels time of testing, of weeding out, of fixing Tsushima surreptitiously and operate in in their backyard.54 But it cost Lockwood defects in weapons, strategy, and tactics, areas the Japanese mistakenly believed one of his own boats, as the USS Bonefish of waiting for sufficient numbers of sub- were secure, cutting off the crucial food- under Lieutenant Commander Lawrence marines and workable torpedoes.”51 Yet stuffs and coal shipments transiting from Edge was lost with all hands.55
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Hoffman 137 Without King’s top-down interven- learning mechanisms to create, harvest, These teams or units might have to be tion, the adaptation to the use of CAGs and exploit lessons horizontally across created to experiment with new tactics or may not have been initiated. The success the joint force during combat operations? technologies. Commanders should codify of its adoption, however, was a function Such horizontal learning has been crucial a standard process to collect lessons from of letting local commanders develop in successful examples of adaptation in current operations for rapid horizontal their own doctrine. By the end of the the past.59 Based on this case study, and sharing. They have to be prepared to war, Lockwood was more enthusiastic several others conducted in a formal case translate insights laterally into modified about the prospects of the American wolf study of U.S. military operations, the fol- praxis to operational forces and not just packs. A total of 65 different wolf packs lowing recommendations are offered. institutionalize these lessons for future deployed from Hawaii, and additional Leadership Development. Senior of- campaigns via postconflict changes in groups patrolled out of Australia as well.56 ficers should understand how enhanced doctrine, organization, or education. Ironically, they never focused on King’s operational performance is tied to col- Dissemination. Commanders should original intent of serving as ambushers laborative and open command climates invest time in ensuring that lessons and against naval combatants. Instead, the in which junior commanders can be best practices are shared widely and packs remained true to Lockwood’s creative, and plans and tactics can be horizontally in real time to enhance guerre de course against Japan’s economy. challenged or altered. The importance performance and are not just loaded into of mission command should not excuse formal information systems. The Israel Cross-Domain Synergies commanders from oversight or learn- Defense Forces are exploring practices that The historical requirement to adapt in ing, from providing support, or from make commanders more conscious about the future may be complicated by the recognizing good or bad practices for recognizing changes in the operating en- evolving character of modern conflict absorption into praxis by other units. vironment from either their own forces or and the expectation that the joint force Professional military education (PME) the opponent.60 There may be something will need to gain and exploit cross- programs should develop and promote to practicing learning in this way and mak- domain synergies. The Chairman of the leaders who remain flexible, question ing it the responsibility of a commander Joint Chiefs of Staff Capstone Concept existing paradigms, and can work within instead of a special staff officer. for Joint Operations (CCJO) is predi- teams of diverse backgrounds to generate cated upon creating cross-domain syner- collaboration and greater creativity. Case Conclusion gies to overcome operational challenges. studies in military adaptation should be As Ovid suggested long ago, one can Another element is to seize, retain, and part of PME strategic leadership syllabi. learn from one’s enemies. The U.S. exploit the initiative in time and across Cultural Flexibility over Doctrinal Navy certainly did. The Service did domains.57 Some of this synergy will no Compliance. Joint force commanders not just emulate the Kriegsmarine; it doubt be gained in peacetime through should instill cultures and command improved upon its doctrine with tai- concerted efforts to improve interoper- climates that embrace collaborative and lored tactics and better command and ability. But if cross-domain synergy is to creative problem-solving and display control capabilities. To do so, Navy “become a core operating concept,” as a tolerance for free or critical think- submarine leaders had to hold some of suggested by former Chairman General ing. Cultures that are controlling or their own mental models in suspended Martin Dempsey (Ret.) in the CCJO, doctrinally dogmatic or that reinforce animation and experiment in theater then we need to also expect to seek conformity should not be expected to with alternative concepts. Lessons out new synergies in wartime.58 Here be adaptive. Commanders should learn were not simply harvested from exist- again, the submarine case study—with how to create climates in which ideas and ing patrols and combat experience and its numerous technological adaptations the advocates of new ideas are stimulated plugged into a Joint Universal Lessons (surface and air search radars, sonars, rather than simply tolerated. If institu- Learned System, as is done today. The and improved torpedoes) and coopera- tions are to be successful over the long submarine force had to carve out the tion with signals intelligence and the haul or adaptive in adverse circumstances, resources, staff, and time to investigate Army Air Corps—is evidence that trans- promoting imaginative thinking and ad- new methods in a holistic way from domain learning is both necessary and aptation is a must. concept to war games to training feasible, even in combat conditions. Learning Mechanisms. Commanders against live ships. This raises a set of critical questions should be prepared to use operations Because the eventual role of the Silent about joint adaptation in tomorrow’s assessments to allow themselves to Service was not anticipated with great wars. In future conflicts, how prepared interpret the many signals and forms foresight, the Americans had to learn will the joint community be to establish of feedback that occur in combat situa- while fighting. They accomplished this test units and create synergistic combina- tions. If needed, they may elect to create with great effectiveness, learning and tions on the fly? How prepared are we to special action teams or exploit formalized adapting their tactics, training, and tech- actively adapt “under fire” as a joint warf- learning teams to identify, capture, and niques. But the ultimate victory was not ighting community? Do we have the right harvest examples of successful adaptation. due entirely to the strategic planning of
138 Recall / The American Wolf Packs JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 11 37 War Plan Orange. Some success must be Albert A. Nofi,To Train the Fleet for War: Clay Blair, The Hunters, 1939–1942 (New The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923–1940 (New- York: Random House, 1998); Michael Gannon, credited to the adaptation of the intrepid port, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010). Operation Drumbeat, The Dramatic True Story submarine community. 12 Michael Vlahos, “Wargaming, an En- of Germany’s First U-Boat Attacks Along the Ultimately, the U.S. Navy’s superior forcer of Strategic Realism,” Naval War College American Coast in World War II (New York: organizational learning capacity, while Review (March–April 1986), 7. Harper & Row, 1990), 89–90. at times painfully slow, was brought to 13 Nofi, 271. 38 Blair, Silent Victory, 511–516; Roscoe, 14 Craig C. Felker, Testing American Sea 240. bear. The Navy dominated the seas by Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercises, 1923–1940 39 Library of Congress, Lockwood Papers, the end of World War II, and there is (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, box 13, folder 69, letter, Lockwood to Nimitz, much credit to assign to the strategies 2007), 6. May 4, 1943. developed and tested at the Naval War 15 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next 40 Galantin, 124–129. College and the Fleet Exercises of the War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Itha- 41 Padfield, 85–130. ca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 75. 42 Galantin, 129. interwar era. However, a nod must also 16 Nofi, 307. 43 Padfield, 404–405. be given to the Navy’s learning culture 17 Holmes, 47. 44 Blair, Silent Victory, 479–480. of the submarine force during the war. 18 Clay Blair, Silent Victory: The U.S. Subma- 45 Roscoe, 241. The Service’s wartime “organizational rine War Against Japan (New York: Lippincott, 46 Ibid., 341. learning dominance” was as critical as 1975), 41; Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against 47 NARA, RG 38, Naval Command Files, the Sun: The American War with Japan (New box 357, Commander, Submarine Forces the foresight in the interwar period.61 To York: Free Press, 1985), 484. Pacific, Tactical Bulletin #6-43, November 22, meet future demands successfully, the 19 Charles A. Lockwood, Sink ’Em All: 1943. ability of our joint force to rapidly create Submarine Warfare in the Pacific (New York: 48 Stephen L. Moore, Battle Surface: Lawson new knowledge and disseminate changes Dutton, 1951), 52. “Red” Ramage and the War Patrols of the USS in tactics, doctrine, and hardware will face 20 I.J. Galantin, Take Her Deep! A Subma- Parche (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, rine Against Japan in World War II (Annapolis, 2011), 116. the same test. JFQ MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 18. 49 Ibid., 110–116. 21 Roscoe, 57. 50 Padfield, 433. On the engagement, see 22 Felker, 62. Moore, 101–118. See also War Patrol Report Notes 23 See J.E. Talbott, “Weapons Development, #2, August 1944, available at
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Hoffman 139 as well as a fondness for history and litera- smile made you feel good, and his corny ture and a taste for adventure. Not one to jokes conveyed an assurance that he liked follow the crowd, Galvin spent his early you right away and was truly happy to be assignments in Puerto Rico and teaching talking to you at that moment. His ease at Colombia’s Lancero School, a Ranger cured your unease; his ordinariness allowed school–type course. Duty in the 101st you room to be your ordinary self, too (p. Airborne Division and the Armor Officer 296, emphasis in the original). Advanced Course subsequently followed, as did graduate school at Columbia Nearly one-fourth of Galvin’s memoir University and a teaching tour at West covers the end of the Cold War during Point. the Reagan years. He artfully showed Galvin later did two tough combat how the general-statesman navigated tours in Vietnam. Remarkably, in his political-military issues, lined up the al- first tour, he was relieved of his duties in lies, openly consorted with ambassadors, combat as a brigade operations officer. and coordinated with multiple bosses, Although the relief came at the behest of all while simultaneously developing new two powerful figures, Galvin was able to warfighting concepts and arms-control fight his way back and later commanded proposals. The Cold War was followed a battalion in the storied 1st Cavalry not by peace but by the First Gulf War. Division. Galvin does not mention in the Again, Galvin’s persona and skills shine book that he was awarded the Silver Star through as he opened the military cof- for gallantry. Most of his other high hon- fers of USEUCOM to support General Fighting the Cold War: ors also go unmentioned. Norman Schwarzkopf’s juggernaut, all A Soldier’s Memoir Brigade-level command in Europe with the expert help of the North Atlantic and command of a mechanized infantry Treaty Organization (NATO) nations By John R. Galvin division followed. In the latter assign- that turned Europe into U.S. Central University Press of Kentucky, 2015 ment, General Galvin latched on to Command’s rear area. USEUCOM’s 532 pp. $39.95 then-Captain David Petraeus, who ap- trained and ready forces played a starring ISBN 978-0813161013 pears time and again in the narrative as role in the desert war. Reviewed by Joseph J. Collins both a Galvin mentee and an intellectual After the Gulf War ended, Saddam alter ego. Galvin’s closest comrades are a Hussein began attacking the Kurds. In key part of the book, and each of them, the spring of 1991, USEUCOM under s the Cold War fades from like Petraeus, is described in careful detail Galvin came to their rescue and, with memory, it is essential that we by the author. the aid of Turkey and many nongovern- A study its course and absorb its Galvin’s senior assignments came mental organizations, launched a military lessons. In that spirit, General John as the four-star combatant commander rescue mission into northern Iraq. “Jack” Galvin, USA (Ret.), who com- in USSOUTHCOM and later as the USEUCOM’s rescue of the Kurds was a manded U.S. Southern Command Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. His brilliantly executed pick-up game, led by (USSOUTHCOM) and U.S. European professional contacts in Germany, Latin a then-obscure Army Lieutenant General Command (USEUCOM), wrote a America, and Spain also grew in rank, John Shalikashvili. Later, with General memoir, published several months and they became a great network. His Colin Powell’s blessing, Shalikashvili before his death in September 2015, contacts, education, and empathy made became Galvin’s successor as NATO that is both an important lesson in him the ideal general for maneuvering on Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. history and a tutorial in strategic leader- the political-military terrain. Whether it Galvin ended his career by spending ship. Written by a general who was also was Russian generals, German statesmen, nearly a decade in academia, teaching a prize-winning author and scholar, it is Margaret Thatcher, or characters such as and mentoring at West Point, The Ohio a delight to read. The real Galvin—son Panama’s Manuel Noriega, Galvin reveals State University, and Tufts University’s of Boston, family man, soldier-scholar, the people and personalities behind the Fletcher School, where he became the mensch—comes through on every page. policy. For example, in detailing his first dean. Galvin’s military career and educa- Galvin, who came from a working- meeting with Ronald Reagan: tional pursuits are testament to his call for class family in Boston, joined the us “to see the workings of our daily lives Massachusetts Army National Guard in Tall and wide-shouldered, he seemed to take on a larger scale than our backyards. . . . 1947 and was pushed by his superiors pains not to be overwhelming; he had the Our survival in the long run will depend to apply to West Point. He graduated in gift of being both impressive and unassum- on our recognition of this simple but 1954 with a bachelor of science degree, ing. His hearty handshake and down-home
140 Book Reviews JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 powerful understanding: that we need a years from 1969 to 1991 in the Central Colonel Joseph Collins, USA (Ret.), Ph.D., a former global perspective” (p. 491). Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, is the Intelligence Agency (CIA) and on the What accounts for Galvin’s success director of the Center for Complex Operations, National Security Council (NSC). While as a strategic leader? Having known him Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the the chronological approach to storytell- National Defense University. for some years, I am tempted to say that ing is similar to that found in Shadows, his most astounding trait was that he Duty sustains an intense and passionate was a wonderful, thoughtful man, but narrative unrivaled in Gates’s 1996 work. there must be more. First, Galvin had Duty is a conspicuously rich tome. that global perspective that he preached It came as little surprise that political about. He saw local culture and individu- passions were aroused by Duty’s early- als as very important. He found time to 2014 publication. With President Barack learn German and Spanish well, but with Obama still in office, Gates’s commen- a hint of a Boston accent. tary on the inner workings of security Second, he was a consummate mili- decisionmaking in the final 2 years of tary professional. He could talk tactics the George H. Bush Presidency and the with the captains and discuss arms- first 2½ years of the Obama administra- control proposals with the experts and tion was bound to generate a noisy and the eggheads. The details of operational partisan clash. Even before Duty hit art and the peculiarities of low-intensity stores, some labeled it as harsh and highly conflict were subjects that he mastered. critical of President Obama and claimed He knew when to stay at a high altitude that it painted an antagonistic portrait of and when to dive into the details, many a sitting President while failing to note of which were recorded on his omnipres- that Gates mainly chided White House ent note cards. counselors while applauding Obama’s Third, like the American eagle, Galvin decisionmaking style. A Republican for- did not flock. He was his own man. He mer defense policy advisor and university understood and wrote about the require- scholar wrote that it was less Gates’s criti- ments for low-intensity conflict when Duty: Memoirs of a cisms that were wrong than his timing. few in the Army cared about it. Galvin Secretary at War The politically inspired reviews of also wrote three books: two on the Duty focused on the superficial and By Robert M. Gates Revolutionary War and one on modern missed the substance. This included the Borzoi Books and Alfred A. Knopf, 2014 airmobile operations. Most generals do deeply etched lessons of executive-level 640 pp. $34.95 not have time to do this kind of in-depth strategic leadership when engaged in a ISBN 978-0307959478 intellectual work, but he did. Galvin complex and costly undertaking such as studied the past for clues to the future, Reviewed by Thomas F. Lynch III counterinsurgency and counterterrorism but he could also spot trends that were operations in two disparate countries with new factors for analysis. NATO was for- a domestic political dynamic that is any- tunate to have his leadership during the uty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War thing but collaborative. As the lead agent Mikhail Gorbachev years. Steeped in the is a valuable work by a unique for the conduct of that undertaking, Cold War for 40 years, Galvin also knew D public figure. Former Secretary Gates’s assessments tell us a great deal that change was a constant, even with the Robert M. Gates recounts his 4½ about how difficult an endeavor war is in Soviet Union. Finally, Galvin saw his mis- years at the helm of the Department general and how demanding counterin- sion as including the need to learn from of Defense overseeing two separate surgency operations are in particular. and to teach others, sometimes directly wars for first a Republican and then a From the beginning of Duty, Gates and other times so subtly that they did Democratic President. In this regard, reminds his reader that he was happily re- not notice that it was taking place. Bob Gates has no peer; he is the only tired from government and ensconced as Fighting the Cold War is a big book, Defense Secretary to serve for consecu- the president of Texas A&M University but it is worth every minute that you tive Presidents from opposing political before coming to the Pentagon. He invest in it, whether you are a historian, parties. had declined an administration feeler a student of leadership, a NATO-phile, Gates is no stranger to the business about a return to Washington in 2005 a USSOUTHCOM staffer, or just inter- of scribing memoirs. He previously pub- to become the first Director of National ested in the Cold War as seen through lished From the Shadows: The Ultimate Intelligence. He had grudgingly accepted the eyes of a general raised in Boston’s Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and a temporary appointment to serve on the working class. JFQ How They Won the Cold War (Simon Iraq Study Group (ISG) and was often and Schuster, 2007), recounting his surprised and irritated by what he saw
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Book Reviews 141 in Iraq, Kuwait, and elsewhere in that eyes, too many Air Force and Navy lead- explosives caches followed. He also took late-2006 venture. Thus, when called on ers saw the challenge of Iraq as an Army aim at the most expensive and poorly by President Bush to succeed Secretary and Marine Corps issue and were satisfied performing procurement initiatives across Donald Rumsfeld after the November to continue with business as usual. He the military Services, questioning their 2006 elections, Gates tells us that he also saw a labyrinth of procurement and relevance and financial sense in public took the job largely to show faith with operational bureaucracy lumbering along speeches. Gates reminds the reader that the young men and women in uniform with historic programmatic concerns and he was successful in a number of these he had met during his ISG travels. He largely unengaged with, if not downright procurement-busting endeavors, but suc- also took the job under the conditions ignorant of, the wars so many young cess came at a cost to his relations with that he would have Presidential sup- Americans were busy fighting. Here the members of Congress. The Secretary port to oversee a temporary troop surge new Secretary was in for an even harder grew increasingly weary of congressional in Iraq, to turn renewed attention to slog. So he resolved to use every tool parochialism and theatrics. It is in de- Afghanistan, to support an expanded at his disposal to change the Pentagon scribing his dealings with Congress that Army and Marine Corps to properly culture. Secretary Gates’s memoir becomes most resource these fights, and to push big- Gates tells us that he paddle-shocked frustrated—if not disgusted—in tone. ticket procurement programs into the the Pentagon toward inter-Service In 2007–2008, Secretary Gates put future to win the wars we were in. teamwork and counterinsurgency into place the strategic and operational True to Bob Komer’s Vietnam narra- focus. Within 3 months, he fired Army framework for fighting and winning tive of bureaucratic resistance and inertia, Secretary Francis Harvey over a fes- Defense Department components of the the newly minted Gates confronted the tering scandal over the treatment of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism challenges of a Pentagon largely run- wounded soldiers at Walter Reed Army fights we were in. That framework bore ning in place, constrained by outside Medical Center. He hired Navy Admiral fruit in Iraq before the end of the Bush forces and those deep within. Outside Michael Mullen as the Chairman of administration. But Duty reminds its the building, he found personal working the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late 2007. reader that success is both relative and relationships among the Department of It was Mullen, then the Chief of Naval fleeting. The effort to extend progress State, National Intelligence Directorate, Operations, who expressed his greatest from counterinsurgency in Iraq to the CIA, and NSC severely strained and leadership concern in early 2007 to be fight in Afghanistan began in 2008 but in need of serious repair. Gates tackled an astoundingly anti-parochial one: the would await the arrival of a new senior this challenge on instinct, working health of the Army. The Secretary then leadership team in early 2009—an with Cabinet-level colleagues suffering lost confidence in Air Force Secretary Obama administration team with its own from “Rumsfeld fatigue” in a man- Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff personalities and coordination challenges. ner that made it clear that the Defense General Michael Moseley, who appeared Secretary Gates tells the reader that Department would be part of an inter- committed to the procurement of an in this new White House, the debate agency team pulling together for success expensive fighter aircraft and seemingly over the way forward in what Presidential in the “wars we are in.” Gates supported without interest in the ever-deepening candidate Barack Obama had labeled a full range of authorities for the new counterinsurgency fight. The decline “the good war in Afghanistan” would be U.S. commander in Iraq, General David in confidence on these issues was com- unhelpfully bruising throughout 2009 Petraeus, and encouraged Petraeus’s pounded in 2008 when an independent despite its acceptable outcome late that close partnership with the new U.S. review of Air Force stewardship of its year. While Gates commends President Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker. The nuclear weapons arsenal revealed serious Obama’s decisionmaking style in the Secretary quickly saw the need for a point deficiencies. Gates relieved both. high-level debate on Afghanistan-Pakistan of fusion for Washington interagency Finally, the new Secretary grappled policy and strategy that dominated 2009, support to a holistic counterinsurgency with the intransigence of Pentagon he bridled at the manner in which he felt program in Iraq, offering then–Joint Staff bureaucracy. Frustrated with the plod- Vice President Joseph Biden and what Operations officer Lieutenant General ding nature of resource acquisition and he calls the White House “politicos” Douglas Lute to the NSC as master coor- planning processes, Gates insisted that came to display a paranoid mistrust of the dinator for the Iraq surge in military and newer, sharper programs focus directly on military. Gates recounts that this group of civilian efforts. In these and other efforts, the needs of the troops in the fight. He Obama political advisors consistently dis- Gates was a galvanizing agent with Bush’s accelerated funding and attention to the played aversion to any increase in military strategic-level leaders, generating a spirit Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat force growth in Afghanistan beyond that of collaboration never realized during Organization, which had been created which had been authorized late in the Vietnam and not before seen during the in February 2006. Programs to improve Bush administration. They did not want wars in Iraq or Afghanistan. explosive protection on Soldiers’ wheeled Afghanistan to become Obama’s war and Inside the Pentagon, Gates con- vehicles and to use persistent aerial obser- doom the President’s domestic agenda fronted a badly bifurcated culture. In his vation platforms to identify threatening in the process. Thus they argued for a
142 Book Reviews JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 revised American strategy in Afghanistan “got it” when it came to achieving results and Pakistan focused mainly on coun- in complex and messy military operations. terterrorism in Pakistan, an effort to be He got it that the culture of Washington accomplished exclusively from offshore so bureaucracy must be energized at the that the issues of American ground forces highest levels to get beyond business as and a more vigorous effort at counterin- usual, for a counterinsurgency fight re- surgency in Afghanistan would be moot. quires exceptionally detailed coordination Gates recounts that he was never that can too easily become passé. He got himself all in for full-up counterinsur- it that Pentagon culture will snap back gency operations in Afghanistan, but he into one of a procurement-acquisition- believed that some of it was necessary. budgeting miasma unless corralled and The Secretary’s comfort with Obama’s spurred. Bob Gates also got that change late-2009 decision on Afghanistan- is a difficult but worthy endeavor. He Pakistan strategy favoring the Gates implores both his readers—and those approach—one that viewed limited coun- remaining on the Obama security terinsurgency in Afghanistan as the means team—to stay the course in Afghanistan to the strategic end—ultimately proved and Pakistan and not prematurely pull unsatisfying, however. Gates uses Duty the plug. In this exhortation, Gates cor- to call out Vice President Biden, NSC rectly anticipates the unabating worries Afghan-Pakistan director Lieutenant about U.S. force posture and strategy in General Douglas Lute, and other White Afghanistan that continued to consume House politicos for never accepting the the Obama administration throughout President’s decision and for working to 2014 and 2015. Knife Fights: A Memoir sabotage it in the President’s mind “be- Duty is an excellent memoir of a free- of Modern War in fore it even got off the ground.” It is in speaking and self-critical former Secretary Theory and Practice this context that Gates writes that by early of Defense. It lays bare the emotional 2011, he was increasingly confronted and bureaucratic grit involved with spear- By John A. Nagl with “[a] president [who] doesn’t trust heading a complex contingency operation Penguin Press, 2014 his commander, can’t stand [Afghan in hostile parallel environments: at home 253 pp. $27.95 President Hamid] Karzai, doesn’t believe and in the field. Duty is an important ISBN 978-1594204982 in his own strategy and doesn’t consider work and a great read. JFQ the war to be his . . . a President who was Reviewed by Richard McConnell expressing premature doubts about his own strategy.” Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III is a Distinguished Research Fellow for South Asia, Near East, and Out of office for just over 2 years the trajectory of radical Islam in the Center ohn Nagl, the author of Learn- when he wrote it, Gates seems to have for Strategic Research, Institute for National ing to Eat Soup with a Knife, intended Duty, at least in part, as a Strategic Studies, at the National Defense offers an intimate portrait of the University. J vehicle of external caution to President education, experience, and practice that Obama and his advisory team in early contributed to his emergence as one of 2014. Gates’s passion for American men the premier advocates of counterinsur- and women in uniform and his belief gency (COIN) doctrine during the past that their role in Afghanistan deserved decade. In Knife Fights he provides an the President’s continuous full atten- unvarnished description of what it is tion—much as it had consumed Gates’s like to advocate doctrinal change to a attention as Defense Secretary—resonates nation at war. strongly. Nagl begins his story by giving read- On another level, Gates offers a ers vivid and engaging accounts of his unique vantage point on the special chal- early formative experiences: undergradu- lenges of executive leadership in both ate studies at West Point, his first combat bureaucratic and counterinsurgency action during Operation Desert Storm, warfare. Far from dyspeptic, Duty delivers and his graduate and doctoral studies at a tone of urgency and commitment that Oxford. These accounts depict a journey Secretary Gates rightly brought to a try- of experience combined with scholarship ing set of missions at a very trying time. that laid the foundation for Learning to He demonstrates to his reader that he Eat Soup with a Knife. Although Nagl’s
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Book Reviews 143 experience during Desert Storm was with Few senior U.S. leaders predicted the classic conventional warfare, he ultimately challenges that would result from the New from became interested in the ambiguous events that began on September 11, pursuits of counterinsurgency operations. 2001. Nagl asserts that the need for NDU Press It was at Oxford where Nagl came to be- ongoing doctrine, training, and leader for the Center for the Study of lieve that U.S. military leaders had walked development to deal with the challenges Chinese Military Affairs away from COIN doctrine after Vietnam. created by insurgents should have been China Strategic Perspectives 9 This resistance to counterinsurgency anticipated. This was not the case, how- China Moves Out: Stepping Stones operations constituted a hole in U.S. ever, because leaders incorrectly assumed Toward a New Maritime Strategy military doctrine waiting to be exploited that after Vietnam, U.S. forces would by Christopher H. Sharman by our enemies. never again engage in counterinsurgency Nagl describes what it was like to operations. The consequences of this watch that exploitation happen dur- mistaken assumption would become all ing his second deployment to Iraq in too apparent first in Afghanistan and then 2004–2005. He found himself in the in Iraq. According to Nagl, U.S. leaders unenviable position of attempting to can ill afford repeating this mistake by unify practice with the theories he had discarding the lessons gained over the studied at Oxford and use them against last 14 years at the cost of so much blood the thinking and adaptive enemies in and treasure: “The final tragedy of Iraq Anbar Province. This section of the book and Afghanistan would occur if we again contains descriptions of the difficulties forget the many lessons we have learned military leaders faced because of the lack about counterinsurgency over the past of planning for post-invasion operations. decade of war, and have to learn them yet The demobilization of the Iraqi army again in some future war at the cost of combined with senior leader refusal many more American lives” (p. 234). JFQ to recognize a developing insurgency In this paper, Christopher H. created opportunities that insurgents Sharman examines the geography, exploited. These descriptions will be Lieutenant Colonel Richard McConnell, USA history, and strategic focus of near (Ret.), is Assistant Professor in the Department of poignant for readers who may have expe- Army Tactics at the Command and General Staff seas active defense, which is China’s rienced similar challenges and ambiguities College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. current maritime strategy. He then while deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan. carefully illustrates how the New The chapter entitled “COIN Historic Missions expanded People’s Revisited” is one of the most engaging Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) portions of the book. Nagl provides requirements from traditional near detailed analysis of the last 14 years of seas operating areas to operations COIN theory and practice. Readers in the far seas. He next provides a interested in understanding the positions strategic framework for a new mari- of COIN advocates will find this section time defense strategy that would illuminating as it presents some thought- incorporate far seas capabilities. He ful reflections by Nagl. He also provides finally concludes by identifying sev- detailed discussions of the importance eral factors that, if observed, would of combat advisors in counterinsurgency indicate PLAN incorporation of far and the need to provide language and seas defense as part of an emerging cultural training to succeed. Nagl asserts new maritime strategy. that because most opponents cannot compete with U.S. conventional capabili- ties, irregular operations represent the most likely way future opponents will fight our forces. U.S. leaders who do not prepare for such a possibility do so at their own peril. Knife Fights is a window into the education, experiences, and leader de- Visit the NDU Press Web site for velopment of a warrior-scholar through more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu two different conflicts over two decades.
144 Book Reviews JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Eye exam conducted as part of U.S. Southern Command–sponsored and U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. 4th Fleet-conducted Continuing Promise 2015, August 4, 2015 (U.S. Navy/Kameren Guy Hodnett)
ecent observations from U.S. military involvement in major Interorganizational R combat operations in Iraq, counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, and humanitarian assistance in the United Cooperation II of III States, Haiti, and West Africa provide critical lessons for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider for The Humanitarian future joint force development.1 This article is the second in a three-part Perspective series on interorganizational coopera- tion and focuses on the humanitarian perspective. In it, we demonstrate how By James C. McArthur, Andrew J. Carswell, Jason Cone, Faith M. one particular challenge can adversely Chamberlain, John Dyer, Dale Erickson, George E. Katsos, Michael Marx, impact people, the commonality of James Ruf, Lisa Schirch, and Patrick O. Shea
Lieutenant Colonel James C. McArthur, USMC, is Chief of the Doctrine Division on the Joint Staff. Mr. Andrew J. Carswell is Senior Delegate to the U.S. Armed Forces for the International Committee of the Red Cross. Mr. Jason Cone is an Executive Director for Médecins Sans Frontières USA. Lieutenant Colonel Faith M. Chamberlain, USA, is a Civil-Military Affairs Officer at the Department of State. Mr. John Dyer is Senior Security Advisor at the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Mr. Dale Erickson is a Fellow in the Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. Colonel George E. Katsos, USAR, is a Doctrine Strategist on the Joint Staff. Mr. Michael Marx is a Senior Advisor for the United Nations (UN) Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Mr. James Ruf is a Senior Advisor at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Dr. Lisa Schirch is Director of Human Security at the Alliance for Peacebuilding. Mr. Patrick O. Shea is a Regional Executive for the American Red Cross. Significant contributions were also provided by Ms. Kelly Mader, Program Specialist at the U.S. Institute of Peace, and Mr. Andres Romero, Humanitarian Representative for Médecins Sans Frontières USA.
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 McArthur et al. 145 Table. Comparison of Humanitarian and U.S. Joint Military Principles challenges in working with the U.S. mili- 6 Humanitarian Principles U.S. Joint Military Principles tary. Here, we argue that the inclusion of humanitarian perspectives in joint doctrine Humanity: human suffering must be addressed Objective: direct every military operation toward wherever it is found; the purpose of humanitarian a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal would inspire increased candor and co- action is to protect life and health and ensure operation by humanitarian organizations. respect for human beings The final installment of this series will ex- Neutrality: humanitarian actors must not take Maneuver: place the enemy in a position of amine existing joint doctrine solutions that sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a disadvantage through the flexible application of could be used to mitigate issues raised by political, racial, religious, or ideological nature combat power interagency and humanitarian perspectives. Impartiality: humanitarian action must be Economy of force: expend minimum essential carried out on the basis of need alone, giving combat power on secondary efforts to allocate The following sections resume the use priority to the most urgent cases of distress, the maximum possible combat power on of the first article’s themes and integrate making no distinction on the basis of nationality, primary efforts lessons learned to demonstrate the value race, gender, religious belief, class, or political opinions that humanitarian organizations place on trustworthy relationships cultivated Independence: humanitarian action must be Unity of command: ensure unity of effort under autonomous from political, economic, military, one responsible commander for every objective between “people” when building an effec- or other objectives that any actor may hold tive “process” in pursuit of a shared and Security: prevent the enemy from acquiring regarding areas where humanitarian action is unexpected advantage meaningful “purpose.” being implemented (also known as Operational Independence during activities coordinated Surprise: strike at a time or place or in a manner by and with the United Nations Office for the for which the enemy is unprepared People: Understanding Those Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) Simplicity: increase the probability that plans Who Get Things Done and operations will be executed as intended Mindful communication among people by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and opens doors. In operational spaces, concise orders communication could be hampered Restraint: limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force if there is a lack of respect sensed by either humanitarian or military per- Perseverance: ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic sonnel during an engagement. When endstate U.S. military personnel interact with Legitimacy: maintain legal and moral authority civilian humanitarian volunteers, aid in the conduct of operations workers, and staff (hereafter referred to as “humanitarian workers”), an purpose, and organizational processes, unity of purpose, we think that the . . . appreciation of the four humanitarian namely, the difficulty in achieving a unity of understanding would be closer to principles—humanity, neutrality, impar- reciprocal mutual understanding of the reality.3 tiality, and independence (table)—will other organizations when seeking help facilitate a respectful environment. cooperation.2 The following comments While this issue eventually was ad- 7 These principles were formally pre- from a humanitarian organization dressed in the 2013 revision of JP 3-57, served in two UN General Assembly executive, made primarily to a military Civil-Military Operations, the comments resolutions and adopted by humanitar- audience at a conference organized by articulate the concerns that humanitarian ian organizations.8 For reference, the the North Atlantic Treaty Organization organizations have with being exploited U.S. military also follows its own set of (NATO), summarizes the challenge: by military forces and losing the ability to time-tested principles of joint opera- operate safely, as well as the importance tions (table) captured in joint doctrine I’d like to read you a paragraph from of having their equities correctly reflected (objective, offensive, mass, maneuver, Joint Publication [JP] 3-57 explaining in U.S. military joint doctrine.4 economy of force, unity of command, civil-military operations: “The activities This article features external viewpoints security, surprise, simplicity, restraint, of a commander that establish, maintain, of engagement with the U.S. military perseverance, and legitimacy).9 influence, or exploit relations between from international organizations (IO) with These 12 principles were formed military forces, governmental and [civil- regional influence, such as the United around the 9 traditional principles of ian nongovernmental organizations Nations (UN) and NATO, state-aligned war, with 3 additional U.S. military (NGOs)] . . . and the neutral or hostile intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), principles (restraint, perseverance, and operational area in order to facilitate mili- NGOs with single or multiple mandates, legitimacy) relevant to how the U.S. tary operations, to consolidate and achieve and treaty-based organizations such as the military uses combat power across the U.S. objectives.” . . . Such words leave me components of the Red Cross and Red conflict continuum, from peace to war.10 nervous. They leave all of us . . . nervous. Crescent Movement,5 all hereafter referred These two sets of principles arguably This mutual understanding is important to as “humanitarian organizations.” guide two vastly different purposes, with to us. While . . . we may not believe in a The first article identified interagency the former intended for impartial relief of
146 Joint Doctrine / Interorganizational Cooperation II of III JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 human suffering and the latter intended the ability of those populations to obtain Information-Sharing. Information- to inform development of a military life-saving humanitarian assistance—is the sharing and real dialogue are the force for socially sanctioned violence. highest priority. The unintended conse- foundation of effective civil-military Understanding differences in each can quence of military involvement in civilian cooperation. Neutral humanitarian help set realistic expectations when inter- tasks or in working with the civilian organizations are willing to share select action between the two does occur. population may be an erosion of the per- information focused on achieving hu- Despite a fundamental incongruity ceived distinction between humanitarian manitarian goals such as protection of of principles, humanitarian workers and workers and military personnel. This in civilians, but not information that might military personnel do in fact have many turn may result in threats to civilian ben- provide a military advantage to any party characteristics in common: willingness eficiaries and humanitarian workers, and to an armed conflict. In certain envi- to take risks to serve a higher purpose, may reduce local civilians’ trust in relief ronments, humanitarian organizations a culture of doing, the desire to be part organizations. With the exception of the share information to deconflict civil and of a team, pride in accomplishment, and ICRC and other specified organizations military efforts and to address the security strong moral commitment. Regardless mandated to work with armed forces of the local population. However, they of these traits, however, the benefit for and nonstate armed groups throughout will never share sensitive information that mutual understanding of the other’s an armed conflict, visible interaction endangers human lives or compromises approach is derived from a desire for posi- between humanitarian organizations their own impartiality and neutrality. tive outcomes on the affected population and the U.S. military ideally occurs In many cases, humanitarian orga- and the achievement of organizational only under exceptional circumstances of nizations will have been operational on goals. The success of communication insecurity or inaccessibility.12 A former the ground prior to the introduction of between armed forces and humanitarian head of a humanitarian organization the U.S. military and can thus provide organizations, therefore, is dependent provided his experience in a speech about important information that is normally upon mutual respect, awareness of the Afghanistan: “Our claim to act indepen- not available through military channels. perceptions created by interaction, an dently from our countries of origin, who This includes historical perspectives on understanding of the parameters of are so politically and militarily-engaged, the situation at hand, local cultural prac- information-sharing, and a reconciliation is naturally met with strong skepticism by tices and political structures, the security of terminology. local actors, especially by those hostile to situation as it pertains to the protection Mutual Respect. While introductions the international intervention.”13 of civilians, and the role and capa- are important, the first step in coop- Humanitarian organizations in bilities of the host nation government. eration is to call people what they call Afghanistan expressed concern that coali- Nevertheless, it is important to respect themselves. For U.S. military personnel, tion forces were occasionally failing to the neutrality of humanitarian organiza- failure to accurately identify humanitarian distinguish themselves from the civilian tions and to avoid creating the perception organizations may create unnecessary population by driving white civilian ve- that they are part of an intelligence- barriers in shared operations spaces. hicles that appeared similar to those used gathering mechanism.14 Like the U.S. military, humanitarian by humanitarian organizations, as well as Reconciling Terminology. The use of organizations insist upon distinctions by wearing civilian clothing. They were certain sensitive terms may complicate dis- among themselves. For example, U.S. also alarmed by the fact that Provincial course or cause unnecessary tension within military personnel are taught to refer to Reconstruction Teams sometimes placed professional relationships, resulting in the International Committee of the Red themselves in civilian concentrations, de- discord. For example, U.S. military use of Cross (ICRC), International Federation spite the fact that they may consequently the terms partnership and force multiplier of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies endanger the surrounding population. when categorizing humanitarian organiza- (IFRC), and national Red Cross societies, Based on global information flow, tions may undermine neutrality. Where such as the American Red Cross (ARC), humanitarian assistance in one part of partnership is used to describe cooperation as either NGOs or IGOs. Although the world may impact perceptions in with humanitarian organizations, it implies captured in joint doctrine as such, these another. For example, a humanitarian collusion with a political instrument of organizations do not fall under either organization seen as working closely with the state. Humanitarian organizations also of these titles. Rather, they are well- U.S. forces in a natural disaster response strongly object to being called a force mul- recognized, treaty-based organizations in one country may impact perceptions tiplier by the military, as the term implies founded in international law; the ICRC of the humanitarian neutrality of that a loss of organizational identity, neutrality, originated more than 150 years ago, and organization’s activity in a different and independence through incorporation the IFRC, supported by 189 national so- country affected by armed conflict. U.S. into a greater military body.15 One com- cieties, including the ARC, was founded military personnel who are not aware of ment by then–Secretary of State Colin nearly 100 years ago.11 these perception issues may unknowingly Powell is illustrative of this problem and Perceptions. For humanitarian work- impede the mission of humanitarian generated the following response from a ers, access to populations in need—and organizations. humanitarian organization:16
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 McArthur et al. 147 MH-60S Seahawk from “Golden Falcons” of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 12 delivers relief supplies in support of Operation Damayan in response to aftermath of Super Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda, Republic of the Philippines, November 17, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Peter Burghart)
In 2001, no less than Colin Powell pro- U.S. Government recognizes humanitar- emergencies. Through mutual promotion claimed “NGOs are such a force multiplier ian assistance in Federal law as assistance of better understanding of their respec- for us, such an important part of our “meeting humanitarian needs.”19 Joint tive mandates, roles, and responsibilities, combat team.” Even more unhelpful, hu- doctrine, however, separates that term both communities can appreciate each manitarians have been labeled as sources into foreign humanitarian assistance20 other’s strengths and communicate of information. It should be obvious to to define a broad set of activities outside more effectively, thereby lessening the you in the military that if we are part of the United States and defense support of need for their respective leaders to direct your team, if we are on your side, if we are civil authorities for domestic activities.21 collaboration.22 providing you with information, if we are Reconciling terminology is therefore advancing towards the same goals as you, a key element of positive civil-military Purpose: Understanding then we fall directly into the crosshairs of cooperation. Goals and Agendas the other side. It’s nothing personal, but we U.S. military personnel should expect Humanitarian organizations and the can’t afford this sort of unity.17 to encounter communication challenges U.S. military ultimately share one during their interactions with humanitar- overarching goal—that of changing The term humanitarian assistance ian workers. Adopting common terms of a current condition. When effective may also be problematic. The UN defines reference for outreach to humanitarian coordination takes place, the vital humanitarian assistance as material or organizations is therefore essential. Joint needs of affected populations can be logistical assistance provided for humani- military personnel and humanitarian addressed more swiftly and compre- tarian purposes, typically in response to worker participation in training and exer- hensively. The most critical aspect of humanitarian crises, with the primary ob- cises is a proven method for heightening effective coordination between these jective of saving lives, alleviating suffering, awareness, building trust, and increasing two bodies is context. Relationships and and maintaining human dignity.18 The the effectiveness of coordination in actual coordination mechanisms vary depend-
148 Joint Doctrine / Interorganizational Cooperation II of III JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 ing on the type of crisis, ranging from don’t have any principled objection to aid short-term humanitarian aid to longer natural disaster response to other needs being part of hearts and minds campaigns term development assistance to establish created by armed conflict and situations . . . [but] such aid should not be attached to food security, education, health care, and of violence. While the U.S. military is the term humanitarian.26 agriculture systems. Single-mandate hu- deployed as an arm of American foreign manitarian organizations may undertake policy and seeks a political outcome, In addition, humanitarian workers only short-term emergency humanitar- most humanitarian organizations are and their actions should be operationally ian missions. In contrast, multimandate devoted solely to ameliorating the con- independent from political and military humanitarian organizations may respond ditions of vulnerable populations.23 The personnel and actions. By virtue of its to emergency humanitarian crises as core of the humanitarian mandate is to specific mandate, the ICRC maintains well as to longer term issues of poverty, save lives and reduce human suffering, independence in decisionmaking and human development and social justice without regard to external political, action while at the same time consulting (also known as development assistance).29 economic, or military objectives. bilaterally and confidentially with all par- In contrast to long-term development Core Principles. As stated, hu- ties to an armed conflict regarding their activities, U.S. military deployment is un- manitarian organizations are bound by obligations under the Law of Armed derstood to be short term, goal oriented, the principles of humanity, neutrality, Conflict and other relevant international and task identified, and will transition impartiality, and independence. These laws.27 One of the many painful lessons based on an exit strategy informed by principles are derived from international from the conflict in Iraq was that violent political objectives. Humanitarian orga- law and are the best defense against fringe elements of a local population do nizations are generally of the view that claims of favoritism by the parties to not necessarily make such a distinction. the U.S. military should not take part in armed conflict and other situations of This led to the targeting by insurgent the business of long-term development. violence. groups of foreign nationals working for When short-term military goals are paired Humanity is the umbrella term for humanitarian organizations.28 with frequent military staff turnover, the imperative to prevent and alleviate Humanitarian Mandates and cooperation with humanitarian organiza- suffering wherever it may be found.24 National Interests. During armed con- tions becomes even more challenging. Neutrality means that humanitarian flict, humanitarian organizations and the One major role expected of the U.S. organizations must not take sides. They military often struggle to coordinate with military is to enable more permissive are more likely to call for and make use of each other due to different mandates and environments for humanitarian organiza- military assets in nonconflict humanitar- goals. In Iraq, many humanitarian orga- tion activities through the restoration of ian environments because the operational nizations refused to collaborate with U.S. order and security. Among the many po- implications of such cooperation are less or coalition forces. They passionately tential humanitarian tasks, U.S. military acute. A strict notion of neutrality that debated the moral and ethical dilemmas personnel can best contribute through fosters and maintains universal trust also of following U.S. troops into a war zone infrastructure support and indirect as- requires humanitarian organizations such when the conflicts were considered “wars sistance. Infrastructure support focuses as the ICRC to interact in good faith of choice” based on national interests. on reestablishing critical humanitarian in- with all parties to a conflict, including Some were willing to deploy based on frastructure, such as restoring or building armed nonstate actors where relevant.25 objective humanitarian interests; others bridges, clearing roads, and rehabilitating Impartiality requires humanitarian orga- were deterred by the political overtones air and sea ports. Indirect assistance fo- nizations to protect and assist the victims of the conflict. cuses on facilitating the delivery of relief of armed conflict and other situations Tsunami relief in late 2004 around supplies, including logistics, transporta- of violence without discrimination as to the Indian Ocean rim was largely a posi- tion, and the purification and provision nationality, race, religious beliefs, class, or tive story. The U.S. military responded to of water. However, direct assistance, such political opinions. They must endeavor requests from humanitarian organizations as the handing out of food or nonfood only to relieve suffering, giving prior- for transportation and did not seek to items, is best provided by humanitarian ity to the most urgent cases of distress. take charge of activities on the ground. organizations, preferably those that have Impartiality is also rooted in the practical Humanitarian workers appreciated that established relationships within local need to engender the acceptance of all the U.S. military provided such valuable communities. communities and warring parties, includ- support while permitting them to take When a natural disaster occurs within ing criminal gangs, rebel militias, and the lead in the relief operation. a lethal or uncertain environment (that is, so-called terrorist groups. As stated by a Time Horizons. Balancing relations in when a military force can be deployed), humanitarian organization executive: shared operational spaces with or without understanding the context of the emer- a shared purpose requires additional gency is key to establishing and working It may surprise you . . . that we have no effort when different time horizons within humanitarian coordination mecha- principled objection to military units de- are involved. Humanitarian organiza- nisms. In 2014, for example, the NGO livering aid as part of the war effort. We tions provide a range of assistance, from Doctors Without Borders (Médecins
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 McArthur et al. 149 Sans Frontières) publicly called on UN of sequestration or ramp-downs can be authority to field staff to adjust to sudden member states that possessed biological addressed through interorganizational changes in humanitarian needs.37 threat response capacity to assist in the cooperation on various levels of planning Issues including a lack of transpar- response to Ebola-affected countries in and execution. In contrast, humanitarian ency and an inability to access the U.S. West Africa.30 This was an unusual public organizations have four basic funding military’s decisionmaking and informa- request from a humanitarian organization sources: private donors, foundations, cor- tion-sharing processes can create tension that deliberately keeps a distance from porations, and governments, including between the U.S. military and humanitar- military and security agendas to protect that of the United States. Some of these ian organizations. The broad mission set its independence in nonpermissive envi- organizations have more reliable revenue and needs of the U.S. military make it ronments. In this case, however, meeting streams than others and can predict their difficult for humanitarian organizations urgent medical needs outweighed the funding levels further into the future. to identify key points of contact that can requirements to maintain distance from Large well-established organiza- speak with authority. Some organiza- military personnel. tions that regularly receive money from tions, such as the ICRC, employ former foundations, corporations, or govern- military officers to bridge the communi- Process: Understanding ments tend to have more reliable revenue cation gap. In situations where the U.S. Mechanisms and Bureaucracies streams than smaller ones. In particular, military is a supporting organization, it Even in the absence of shared objec- the latter group is more susceptible to must manage expectations on processes, tives between the U.S. military and economic downturns and donor fatigue.32 procedures, and structures. Commanders humanitarian organizations, there is a Additionally, organizations that focus on cannot assume that humanitarian orga- need on both sides to navigate organi- providing humanitarian assistance as part nizational decision cycles will coincide zational cultures and bureaucracies to of crisis response may have uneven fund- with their own, but they must understand identify commonalities to meet their ing streams because they receive most of a humanitarian organization’s require- own internal organizational goals. their funding only when disaster strikes.33 ments well enough to anticipate when Adequate logistics support and tactical Regardless of donations received, hu- and how to best engage. Along with airlift requirements, such as helicop- manitarian organizations will often be coordination centers, steering groups, ters and short-takeoff and -landing subject to donor pressures to comply and old-fashioned social interaction, the aircraft, are two areas that challenge with special requirements such as staff use and inclusion of qualified liaisons are humanitarian organizations. Some hiring and geographic location.34 Because important to facilitate interorganizational larger organizations such as the UN banking has transformed from a central- cooperation.38 and ICRC do maintain an independent ized institution-to-institution process to Methods of Work. In the future, U.S. logistical capacity both to maintain a decentralized and individually managed military participation in humanitarian their self-sufficiency and to preserve system, the ability to gain donations or activities is likely to involve support to the public perception of their indepen- transfer funds directly to projects around humanitarian workers who are already dence. The IFRC accepted an offer the world has increased exponentially.35 in place. Upon deployment, there is a to use national military assets such as Nevertheless, the increase of government propensity by the U.S. military to design helicopters to evacuate the victims of a funding channeled bilaterally, instead a separate system or structure to ad- major earthquake in Pakistan, as well as of through a multilateral coordination dress an issue rather than identify what an offer to use military ground escorts mechanism such as the UN, brings do- already exists and use that forum. As the in West Africa to support the emergency nors closer to operational decisionmaking U.S. military is generally eager to set up medical evacuation of a suspected and to coordination and negotiation with coordination mechanisms quickly, the Ebola-infected staff member. However, implementing organizations.36 functions of these structures are often these activities were conducted as a Decisionmaking. The organizational duplicative, and their actual usefulness last resort, when no other means were structures of the U.S. military and hu- is questionable. Although there is rec- available.31 Reconciling the bureaucratic manitarian organizations such as NGOs ognition of the need for a more unified systems of military and humanitarian are typically polar opposites. Command approach to crisis management, it appears organizations requires an understanding structures in the military are centralized that the various entities involved may of institutional funding, decisionmak- and vertical, with clear and well-defined hold different—indeed, opposing—view- ing, and work methodologies. lines of authority flowing hierarchically points as to what form coordination Funding. The U.S. military is from top to bottom. The chain of com- should take.39 funded by the U.S. Government with mand is structured so that it can respond Humanitarian organizations such as taxpayer money. Preplanned budgets quickly and promote fast and efficient de- local, regional, national, and international or emergency contingency funds with cisionmaking. In comparison, most NGO NGOs are loosely categorized into three congressional limitations are dictated organizational structures are horizontal, different areas or mandates of purpose: by the overall objectives of the U.S. fluid, and reliant upon a consensus-based humanitarian (providing food and Government. Fiscal constraints in times approach, leaving considerable decision medicine), development (building social
150 Joint Doctrine / Interorganizational Cooperation II of III JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 and economic institutions), and peace- military personnel may be a party to the humanitarian response capacity, predict- building (stability activities rebuilding conflict or be perceived as siding with ability, accountability, and partnership.43 governmental infrastructure). Some are combatants, humanitarian workers may characterized by a mix of these mandates not want to be closely associated with Conclusion and do not consider humanitarian aid and the military and may prefer to have as As U.S. military personnel engage in development assistance as incompatible.40 little visible interaction as possible. While diverse humanitarian aid or relief opera- However, when humanitarian relief is joint operations between humanitarian tions, their efforts are more effective delivered by the U.S. military as the first workers and military personnel will not when coordination is grounded in trust- responder on the ground, it may not be normally be acceptable, some degree of based relationships. When required, perceived as productive, as captured in a information-sharing is required to ensure the U.S. military should operate only 2010 report on the Haiti earthquake: that military operations do not negatively in support of humanitarian efforts. impact access to populations in need and Additionally, it should serve in a lead During the initial days of the response, the the effectiveness of humanitarian action. role only as a last resort and in extremis. U.S. military provided humanitarian aid The U.S. Government has also pro- U.S. forces can best be used in logistical directly to communities in the absence of posed coordination solutions in recent support when no humanitarian capa- NGOs and the UN because of the over- years. The Humanitarian Policy Working bility exists and where infrastructure whelming needs. . . . While this flexibility Group was initiated to build upon strong is damaged or destroyed. Commonly was important at that time, direction and existing humanitarian assistance capabili- required military assets may be identi- required action need to be more specific as a ties. Part of this initiative is the Good fied by various planning tools such as response evolves. This type of humanitarian Humanitarian Donorship, an informal the gap-fit analysis matrix developed by assistance is not a usual role for the mili- donor forum and network that every 2 the Consultative Group for Humanitar- tary and requires specific humanitarian years agrees on an agenda that will inform ian Civil-Military Coordination. When expertise such as registration systems, needs- policy discussions. Additionally, the U.S. the U.S. military does participate in based allocation of aid to avoid social and Civil-Military Working Group facilitated humanitarian activities, its leadership economic disruptions, and proper targeting by the U.S. Institute of Peace brings should enhance existing coordination of relief to at-risk populations. This led to together U.S. government civilian and mechanisms by assigning qualified missions such as food airdrops in urban military departments and international liaisons to all relevant organizations, settings, which can cause rioting, and humanitarian organizations to coordinate including Humanitarian Military Opera- the establishment of [internally displaced and inform each other of relevant issues. tions Coordination Centers in natural person] camps without clear support of the Similarly, the United Kingdom’s NGO- disaster responses coordinated by local authorities and other partners.41 Military Contact Group is a platform for UNOCHA. humanitarian organizations, the military, Both humanitarian workers and While some humanitarian orga- and the government to discuss issues and military personnel benefit from enhanced nizations raised concerns about the enhance mutual understanding. understanding of the respective roles and prioritization of flights allowed to land at At the global level, the UN Office missions of each. Joint training, partici- the Port-au-Prince airport soon after the for the Coordination of Humanitarian pation in exercises, and input into the earthquake, most accepted U.S. military Affairs (UNOCHA) determines strate- doctrine and guidance of each assist in activities as critical to the overall response. gies for humanitarian response and serves establishing mutual understanding, trust, Understanding organizational as the secretariat for the Consultative and rapport. Although some situations structures, proactively coordinating, Group for Humanitarian Civil-Military may involve unavoidable friction with and looking for opportunities to share Coordination, which focuses on bring- the military, humanitarian organizations in the decisionmaking process are the ing together humanitarian organizations can ultimately derive benefit to their cornerstones of successful interaction. and militaries under the framework of own goals by becoming more involved In a natural disaster, the most efficient the Asia-Pacific Conferences on Military in the development of U.S. military coordination may be realized through Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations. joint doctrine. As a matter of routine, collocating military personnel and Other such working groups and volun- deconfliction of roles and mutually ef- humanitarian workers in the same opera- tary organizations exist across the IGO ficient operations can be improved only tional facility. This allows for real-time humanitarian landscape as well. The when all parties have a clear institutional interaction and communication, effective UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee, understanding of the mandates, objec- task division based on identified needs for example, is a unique strategic inter- tives, and methods used by others who and available assets, and joint planning agency forum for coordination, policy operate in the same space. It may be time that responds to both emergent needs development, and decisionmaking.42 to bridge humanitarian and U.S. military and the transition of military assets away Lastly, the UN cluster system provides joint operations principles through a new from the operational area. In an armed operational and tactical coordination and principle reflected in policy and joint doc- conflict or a complex emergency, where decisionmaking structures to enhance trine: unity of understanding.
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 McArthur et al. 151 31 The third and final installment of the governments. UNOCHA, Guidelines on the Use of 12 Alison Lawlor, Amanda Kraus, and Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Interorganizational Cooperation series Hayden Kwast, Navy-NGO Coordination for Disaster Relief—Oslo Guidelines, Rev. 1.1, will extract issues identified from previous Health-Related HCA Missions: A Suggested November 2007, available at
152 Joint Doctrine / Interorganizational Cooperation II of III JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Explosive ordnance disposal technician, 11th Civil Engineer Squadron, prepares to dispose of IED as part of Operation Llama Fury, August 25, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Brittain Crolley)
The Enduring IED Problem Why We Need Doctrine
By Marc Tranchemontagne
I sometimes hear people express the hope that the IED threat will diminish as Western forces pull out of Afghanistan. Unfortunately, nothing could be further from the truth—the IED has now entered the standard repertoire of irregular forces in urban areas across the planet, and there are no signs this threat is shrinking; on the contrary, it seems to be growing.
—David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains
Commander Marc Tranchemontagne, USN s the Services and joint force and Asia, now is a good time to con- (Ret.), is an Associate with R3 Strategic Support update their doctrine after nearly sider what we have learned about oper- Group. He served more than 21 years as a a decade and a half of counter– ating in IED-rich environments. At the Special Operations Officer and Master Explosive A Ordnance Disposal Technician. improvised explosive device (IED) start of Operation Enduring Freedom operations in the Middle East, Africa, in 2001, we lacked counter-IED doc-
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Tranchemontagne 153 trine—as well as counterinsurgency and battlefields. Even in a conventional lethality or its explosive, incendiary, or counterterrorism doctrine—and had war, our adversaries are likely to turn to psychological effect. Explosively formed to figure things out on the fly. It was unconventional warfare tactics, using a penetrators and shaped charges incorpo- a steep learning curve with a high cost mix of special forces, paramilitary units, rate special liners that focus the explo- in lives lost and equipment destroyed, militias, and surrogates to counter our sive’s energy, allowing it to penetrate and the United States spent billions to military superiority. IEDs will figure in armor. Many IEDs incorporate military counter a weapon that costs only a few their order of battle. munitions or commercial components. dollars to make. Although IEDs are more closely as- The IED is frequently referred to as In addition to counter-IED doctrine sociated with irregular warfare, they have the weapon of choice of threat networks and assorted handbooks, manuals, and been used in every modern conflict, often globally. However, this expression does lexicons, we created rapid acquisition on a large scale as a matter of policy and not bear scrutiny. The weapon of choice authorities, notably the Joint IED Defeat doctrine. Explosive booby traps were construction has two implications: first, Organization, now a combat support used extensively in World War I by both that the user has a choice of weapons agency; new countermeasures such as sides, but that story is eclipsed by the and that among those choices the IED counter-radio-controlled IED elec- overwhelming carnage caused by artil- is preferred, and second, that the user tronic warfare (CREW) systems; a new lery, machine guns, and gas in that war. can choose to use or not use IEDs, as in intelligence process (weapons technical British, Australian, and New Zealand “Afghanistan is a war of necessity but Iraq intelligence [WTI]); counter-IED task troops, for example, covered their with- is a war of choice.” The first implication forces and other ad hoc units such as drawal from Gallipoli by booby-trapping is simply untrue, and the second does the Joint CREW Composite Squadron, their trenches and abandoned stores little to further our understanding of the Task Force ODIN, weapons intelligence to obstruct pursuit by Turkish forces.2 IED problem. Like weapon of influence, teams, and deployable counter-IED labo- During the Korean War, North Korean weapon of concern, weapon of interest, war ratories; law enforcement, interagency, troops, following Chinese and Soviet of necessity, and dozens of other inelegant and international partnerships; universal doctrine of the era, saturated areas that constructions using of, weapon of choice counter-IED training and specialized they abandoned with mines and booby is an uninspired kluge whose meaning courses in homemade explosives (HME), traps.3 IEDs, mines, and booby traps is too ambiguous to help us understand post-blast investigation, and IED elec- were such problems in World War II, the IED problem. The term ought to be tronics; counter-IED working groups and Korea, and Vietnam that the Services retired, especially in policy, doctrine, and other new staff elements; new families issued numerous field manuals and hand- other thoughtful writing. Not only is the of armored vehicles; and many innova- books to prepare deploying forces to deal syntax poor and the meaning imprecise, tive tools to meet the IED threat.1 Some with them. One of the earliest counter- but it also has become a cliché and a poor initiatives have been incorporated into IED pamphlets, German Ruses, was substitute for critical thinking. The words doctrine or have become programs of re- published in 1917. Its warnings remain we use matter because they frame how cord, some have been shelved, and others valid today.4 we think about and solve operational remain ad hoc. As a joint force, it is im- problems. portant to institutionalize what we have What Are IEDs? When terrorists have a choice of learned from hard experience in IED-rich The term improvised explosive device—a weapons, the IED is not always preferred. environments. weapon that is fabricated or emplaced Conversely, when terrorists have limited IEDs affect how we fight, that is, how in an unconventional manner incor- alternatives, the IED is often merely the we plan for and execute joint operations. porating destructive, lethal, noxious, best choice available. Threat networks Operating in an IED-rich environment pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals might choose other weapons for a variety creates additional challenges for U.S. designed to kill, destroy, incapacitate, of practical, social, or cultural reasons: al forces, just as operating in a chemical harass, deny mobility, or distract— Qaeda used airplanes in the September warfare environment would. Operation covers a wide range of explosive 11 attacks, al Shabaab gunmen used small Iraqi Freedom may represent the worst hazards, including roadside bombs and arms to attack the Westgate shopping case for an IED-rich environment, with explosive booby traps.5 At a minimum, mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in September numerous experienced, technology-savvy, an IED is made up of an explosive 2013, and Hutu militants used mostly externally supported violent extremist charge and a means of setting it off. machetes to kill nearly 1 million Tutsis organizations (VEO) with overlapping Typically, however, IEDs have five com- during the Rwandan genocide in 1994. and competing sectarian, nationalist, ponents: a container, a main charge, an In the United States, it is much easier and international agendas in a developed initiator, a switch, and a power source. to buy guns than it is to purchase explo- theater. Future operating environments, Some include enhancements such as sives or many of the precursor chemicals however, may match its complexity and additional fragmentation or pyrophoric, needed for making them. Many groups lethality. Today’s bomb makers will take chemical, biological, and radiological would certainly choose other weapons— their experience and expertise to other materials, which increase the bomb’s for example, man-portable anti-aircraft
154 Joint Doctrine / The Enduring IED Problem: Why We Need Doctrine JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 missiles and anti-armor rockets, chemical allows nonstate actors to operate in terms of casualties suffered, resources and biological weapons, mortars and without state sponsorship depleted, and time expended, and foster other indirect-fire weapons, or computer •• lethality, which compensates for a the sense that the conflict cannot be viruses—if they were available. Suicide lack of more powerful conventional won. IEDs can be used to harm a na- IEDs were pioneered by the secular weapons tion’s economy by restricting the flow of Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka in the 1980s, •• variability in design, which makes goods and services over internal lines of and today are used by many radical developing countermeasures and communication and creating a climate of Islamic groups. In spite of their effective- countervailing tactics difficult insecurity that discourages foreign invest- ness, however, their appeal is far from •• adaptability to the operating envi- ment, trade, and tourism. IED attacks on universal.6 There are many reasons for ronment, which makes IEDs more Iraqi oil pipelines, for example, denied threat networks to rely on IEDs, includ- versatile and difficult to detect the government much-needed revenue ing avoiding the potential constraints •• scalability, which allows terrorists to for reconstruction during Iraqi Freedom. imposed by a state sponsor, achieving modulate their level of violence IEDs are often regarded as an asym- rough parity with better-equipped •• deniability, which appeals to actors metric means to counter U.S. military government forces, inspiring fear, and who wish to avoid attribution strength, but military power is only one attracting media attention. These factors, •• low risk to the bomber relative factor. U.S. strength in the other ele- however, do not make IEDs necessarily to other means of attack, such as ments of national power—diplomatic, the weapon of choice. In contemplating ambushes and raids informational, and economic—serves to future contingencies, we ought to con- •• operational effects on movement and isolate adversary groups from the state sider the circumstances in which using maneuver and force protection sponsorship that could provide them with IEDs would be an attractive option for •• strategic and psychological effects the sophisticated conventional weapons our adversaries. generated by the high publicity that they would need to match U.S. and host- The phrase weapon of strategic influ- IED attacks garner. nation forces. U.S. hard power and soft ence also should be scrapped. A weapon power deter other nations from sponsor- At the strategic level of war, IED at- is a weapon, and it is how a weapon is ing terrorists or limit such support to tacks support our adversary’s propaganda, used that gives it its strategic influence. methods that are deniable, such as the portraying the host nation as impotent Other weapons have just as much strate- explosively formed penetrators that Iran and undermining U.S. national will. At gic utility. Shoulder-fired Stinger missiles provided to Shiite groups in Iraq.7 IEDs the operational level, our adversaries use helped hasten the Soviet withdrawal from provide terrorists a means to attack U.S. IEDs to shape how we fight—tempting Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan forces while avoiding the constraints that us to hunker down in heavily defended War from 1979–1989, and an assassin a sponsor might impose on them. outposts and venture out only in armored wielding a pistol murdered Archduke Operational. Our enemies use IEDs convoys, thereby distancing us from the Franz Ferdinand of Austria in June 1914, to shape the operating environment to people we need to engage. At the tactical triggering World War I. It is not the IED their advantage by impeding friendly level, our adversaries use IEDs to con- itself that is strategic but the terrorist act force movement and maneuver, defeat- strain our freedom of action, counter our for which it is used. Terrorism is always ing force protection measures, and superiority of arms, and attrit our forces. a political act—usually aimed at coerc- complicating logistics. IEDs constrain Strategic. Insurgent groups in Iraq ing governments or populations—and our mobility and hinder our freedom of and Afghanistan proved proficient at syn- therefore of a strategic nature. It is terror action, which isolates our troops from the chronizing IED attacks with information that is strategic; IEDs are merely another population they need to influence and operations to weaken public confidence means of terrorizing. protect. Suicide bombers give the enemy in the government, demonstrate their a means, in terms of space and time, to effectiveness, and undermine coalition re- Why IEDs? attack in our operational depth, including solve. Spectacular IED attacks gain media Like any other weapon, IEDs can be in our rear areas, such as an insider attack coverage and demonstrate a group’s used for various strategic, operational, on a command center. effectiveness, which furthers its recruit- and tactical purposes. IEDs are different Operating in an IED-rich environ- ing and attracts funding, especially when from conventional weapons, however, in ment forces commanders to allocate competing for resources against other important ways that make them appeal- limited resources to force protection VEOs. The presence of multiple VEOs in ing to a range of adversaries. These dif- and sustainment and slows the tempo of an operating environment, as witnessed ferences include the following: operations. To avoid IEDs, we rely on in Iraq and now Syria, is often accom- helicopters and cargo planes for inter- ease and low cost of fabrication using panied by higher levels of violence and •• theater lift, which increases cost and slows commercially available materials, makes the IED problem more complex. sustainment. During Operation Iraqi which makes them cost effective and IEDs help the insurgent raise the cost Freedom, multinational forces devoted of the conflict to an unacceptable level considerable resources to keeping main
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Tranchemontagne 155 supply routes open. Lesser roads were During the “seize the initiative” and doctrine, while the intelligence value of often impassible, which further con- “dominate” phases, in which the focus of IEDs is emphasized in EOD and WTI strained our mobility. The IED provides a operations is on capturing and occupying publications. Joint doctrine should give means for qualitatively and quantitatively the enemy’s territory, IEDs are primarily commanders an understanding of how inferior groups to operate over a larger an impediment to movement and ma- to reconcile the competing requirements area and strike at a time and place of their neuver that will be breached or bypassed of mobility, force protection, and IED choosing. This, in turn, reduces their like other explosive obstacles. Timing and exploitation. vulnerability as they attrit U.S. forces. tempo typically are more highly valued in It is also important in phases two IEDs serve as force multipliers that allow phase two and phase three operations in and three to preempt the IED problem insurgents to create larger effects on the order to bring about the enemy’s collapse by disposing of unexploded ordnance battlefield without massing forces. or culmination. (UXO) and captured munitions—some- Tactical. IEDs give our enemies tacti- In the “stability” and “transfer to civil thing we failed to do in Iraq. Unsecured cal advantages in ways that other weapons authority” phases, the IED becomes a Iraqi munition stockpiles were quickly do not. IEDs compensate for a lack of means for former regime elements and looted and became a major source of conventional weapons by providing other antagonists to continue the fight. enemy supply early in the insurgency. greater lethality, standoff, and surviv- In these phases of operation, the exploi- Similarly, in Vietnam, Viet Cong guer- ability than small arms. They also provide tation of IEDs provides U.S. forces a rillas used unexploded U.S. ordnance a countermobility capability against means to gain insight into the networks in booby traps and locally manufac- mounted and dismounted units, and a hostile to the occupying force, as it does tured munitions.11 Separatists from means to attack hardened targets such in counterinsurgency and counterterror- the National Organization of Cypriot as armored vehicles and fortifications. ism operations. Exploitation allows us to Fighters in Cyprus in the 1950s went as Like landmines, IEDs alter the terrain attribute IEDs to specific individuals who far as salvaging munitions from sunken to channelize movement into prepared can then be targeted. warships, which they then steamed out in ambushes. In addition, IEDs provide The competing demands of mo- order to obtain material for explosives.12 standoff that reduces the bomber’s vul- bility and intelligence are important Captured munitions and ammunition nerability by keeping him out of the range considerations when operating in an supply points must be guarded or de- of our weapons and sensors. The IED’s IED-rich environment. This language stroyed. UXO should be cleared from the indiscriminate nature and anonymity from the Marine Corps’s MAGTF C-IED battlefield as units move forward. These make it even more fearsome and effective Operations captures the distinction nicely: tasks must be planned for and have forces as a psychological weapon, heightening allocated to them. Phase zero shaping the combat stress of friendly forces. To effectively manage threats in an IED- activities should also include clearing In conventional warfare, when the rich environment, commanders must explosive remnants of war to prevent enemy is forced to withdraw, he typically provide guidance on appropriate actions munitions from past conflicts from be- mines and booby-traps any facilities or when an IED is encountered. Essentially, coming IEDs in future conflicts. stores he leaves behind. The presence the on-scene commander facing an IED of booby traps prevents soldiers from has to decide whether to mark and bypass Counterinsurgency taking shelter in captured buildings and or isolate the area for follow-on EOD [ex- Counterinsurgency provides the context bunkers, leaving them exposed to the ele- plosive ordnance disposal] neutralization for our recent experience in IED-rich ments and vulnerable to attack by aircraft and exploitation. Tactical considerations environments. The IED fight is in part and artillery.8 During the Korean War, and leadership guidelines will dictate a contest for control over the environ- the North Koreans even booby-trapped which action is taken. Finally, law of war ment and the population. We interdict timber, knowing that United Nations considerations must factor into the on-scene the bomber’s access to explosives by forces would be scavenging for firewood commander’s decision whether to destroy an clearing unexploded ordnance, destroy- to stay warm.9 IED. The principles of necessity, distinction, ing enemy ammunition supply points proportionality, and unnecessary suffering and arms caches, and regulating HME Countering IEDs Across must be weighed in making this decision.10 precursors, such as ammonium nitrate the Phases of Operation fertilizers. We restrict the bomber’s IEDs have different implications for Guidance would likely change across access to the electromagnetic spectrum each phase of operation. During the the phases of an operation, with assured with electronic warfare systems such as “shaping” and “deter” phases, they mobility taking priority in the “seize the CREW and Wolfhound, and we likewise are largely a force protection problem. initiative” and “dominate” phases and the restrict his access to resources through Routine peacetime presence and mul- intelligence value of IEDs taking priority counter-threat finance and supply chain tilateral exercises place U.S. forces in the “shape,” “deter,” “stabilize,” and interdiction. We restrict the bomber’s within reach of adversaries who might “enable civil authority” phases. Assured access to terrain with barriers, entry employ IEDs. mobility is emphasized in engineering controls, route clearance, and surveil-
156 Joint Doctrine / The Enduring IED Problem: Why We Need Doctrine JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Explosive ordnance disposal technician, 3rd EOD, 9th Engineer Support Battalion, performs sweep with metal detector during post-blast analysis training scenario at Emerson Lake training area, September 19, 2015, Twentynine Palms, California (U.S. Marine Corps/Levi Schultz) lance, and to the population through Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in Vietnam War, Viet Cong guerrillas de- counterinsurgency activities like census December 1988 was an IED concealed veloped many ingenious anti-helicopter taking and biometric enrollment, which in a suitcase, while the time bomb that devices that were designed to be triggered enable network targeting. Many coun- sank SuperFerry 14 in Manila Bay in the by the aircraft’s rotor wash.16 The grow- terinsurgency best practices are essential Philippines in February 2004 was con- ing commercial unmaned aerial vehical to countering IEDs, and many counter- cealed in a television set. market may provide new opportunities IED practices are good counterinsur- The nature of the target or the envi- for adversaries to use IEDs in the air. gency. A handwritten sign posted at a ronment, however, may significantly affect The maritime environment has seen Marine combat outpost aptly illustrated design and tactical employment. In World some high-profile IED attacks, most this relationship, stating that the “best War I, for example, French forces at notably the October 2000 suicide boat counter to IEDs = #1 the Afghan Salonika brought down a German aircraft bombing of the USS Cole in Aden, people, #2 ANSF partners and then by loading the basket of an observation Yemen, and the similar October 2002 at- metal detectors, dogs, GBOSS [ground- balloon with several hundred pounds tack on the French tanker MV Limburg. based operational surveillance system], of explosives and command-detonating Overall, however, IED attacks in the airplanes, etc. 80% of our IED finds it via a telegraph cable as the pilot tried maritime domain have been much less have been the direct result of tips from to strafe the balloon. The aircraft was common than on land. Operating at local nationals because of the respect destroyed and the pilot, who had previ- sea requires skills in navigation, coastal that you show to the people—and ously shot down several other observation piloting, ship handling, and combat because they’ve watched you ruthlessly balloons, was killed.14 During the Second swimming that are not easily acquired. It close with and destroy the enemy.”13 World War, the British Special Operations is also harder to blend into the popula- Executive developed an altimeter switch tion at sea, and weapons testing and The Environment for destroying an aircraft in flight.15 The rehearsals are more difficult. Media IEDs have been encountered in every aircraft at greatest risk, however, are he- coverage of an attack—vital to modern domain, but have seen use primarily licopters, especially medevac helicopters terrorists—is less reliable and less spec- in land-based attacks. Most IEDs used called upon to extract personnel wounded tacular far from shore.17 However, a few at sea or in the air have been little dif- in an IED ambush. Special care must groups, notably the Tamil Tigers, have ferent from those used on land. The be taken to ensure their landing zones been very effective in the maritime do- time bomb that brought down Pan Am are clear of secondary IEDs. During the main. Viet Cong sappers also conducted
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Tranchemontagne 157 Mine clearing line explosive charge launches from Company A, 4th Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division vehicle on Route Dodge, Paktika Province, Afghanistan (U.S. Army/Zachary Burke) some limpet mine and IED attacks changes to force protection measures.”19 capabilities. WTI finds its greatest utility against U.S. ships during the Vietnam The technical exploitation of IEDs— in irregular warfare in which a typically War, including the sinking of the USNS WTI—eventually became its own subset lightly armed, irregularly equipped enemy Card, a utility aircraft carrier.18 Sea ports of technical intelligence (TECHINT) improvises his own weapons and explo- are important logistics hubs for the and comprises a category of intelligence sives. These improvised weapons bear the movement of personnel, equipment, and processes derived from the technical unique signatures—technical, forensic, and supplies into theater and thus make and forensic collection and exploitation behavioral—of their builders, which desirable targets. The geography of rivers, of improvised explosive devices, associ- makes exploiting them useful for attribut- deltas, canals, inland waterways, archipe- ated components, improvised weapons, ing attacks to specific individuals, groups, lagic waters, and narrow and inland seas and other weapons systems.20 Tradi- and networks. make them suitable for interdiction with tional TECHINT and WTI differ in Attribution is an import distinction IEDs, including improvised sea mines, several important ways related to their between TECHINT and WTI. While to give irregular adversaries a limited sea- purpose, execution, and outcomes. TECHINT may be used to target a denial capability. While TECHINT applies to the full nation’s capacity to produce particular range of foreign war materiel, including weapons and systems, WTI is used to Weapons Technical Intelligence aircraft, armor, sensors, communications, target individual bomb makers and the One of the most important innova- and munitions, WTI applies only to terror network to which they belong. tions for countering IEDs has been improvised weapons, particularly IEDs, IED design is exceptionally variable the development of weapons technical and their components. For this reason, and minor differences in construction intelligence. In August 2003, coalition TECHINT has broader application, can tell investigators much about the forces in Iraq identified an operational especially in conventional warfare where bomber, his training, and his sources of need for an IED exploitation capability technical analysis can yield the scientific supply. Biometrics are rarely relevant to “to provide immediate in-theater analy- and technical intelligence needed to TECHINT but are essential to WTI, sis, technical intelligence and advice to ensure the survivability of U.S. systems which fuses technical and forensic infor- EOD personnel and provide advice on and to design countermeasures to enemy mation to produce biometrically enabled
158 Joint Doctrine / The Enduring IED Problem: Why We Need Doctrine JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 intelligence. While both TECHINT and it was constructed) but tactically (how IED expertise has several implications for WTI support countermeasure develop- it was employed and for what purpose). friendly forces. ment and force protection, WTI’s five Much of the most useful WTI analysis oc- Operational experience in IED-rich outcomes—force protection, component curs in theater at expeditionary labs. environments such as Northern Ireland, material sourcing, targeting, support to Like TECHINT, WTI benefits from Iraq, and Afghanistan has shown that prosecution, and signature characteriza- an interagency effort and its reports there are often hierarchies of bomb mak- tion—are more relevant to defeating are used across government. In 2013, ers, including experienced “master bomb adversary networks and supporting host- for example, the Federal Bureau of makers” who pass on their techniques to nation rule of law.21 Investigation (FBI) arrested two Iraqi others in the organization. For example, A single conventional munition may refugees in a sting operation in Kentucky Yehya Ayash, nicknamed “the Engineer,” yield ample technical intelligence about after their fingerprints were found to served as the chief bomb maker for the munition in question. Representative match latent prints collected from an Hamas and is credited with greatly im- samples are sufficient because mass- unexploded IED in Iraq.23 Federal law proving the technical sophistication of its produced munitions are identical and enforcement personnel provided key IEDs in the early 1990s.24 Master bomb attribution is not a factor. With IEDs, forensic capabilities and added rigor to makers may have learned their skills in however, every device must be exploited the evidence management processes terrorist training camps or through le- for the unique signatures of individual of the counter-IED task forces in Iraq gitimate occupations such as quarrying, bomb makers that can be correlated and Afghanistan. The FBI’s Terrorist chemistry, or electronics and then honed through pattern analysis and mapped Explosive Device Analytical Center con- them over the course of many years. A geospatially. Two people given identical tinues to fully analyze and exploit IEDs bomb maker’s special skills are not easily components and instructions will pro- recovered overseas. replaced, so removing the bomb maker duce IEDs that are surprisingly different from the environment usually has a direct in appearance, with unique biometric The Enduring Threat measurable effect on the rate of IED markers such as latent fingerprints and As a result of the proliferation of IED incidents. Experienced bomb makers are DNA and different behavioral markers knowledge available on the Internet, in a critical adversary capability that can be such as the placement of components or extremist publications, and at terrorist targeted, and the relationship between skill in soldering. As an example, consider training camps as well as the exploita- master and apprentice is a node that can how easy it is to pick out your child’s tion of readily available off-the-shelf be exploited. artwork from all the other nearly identi- technologies, VEOs are able to develop Successful countermeasures and cal masterpieces displayed in his or her and employ IEDs with a relatively countervailing tactics force the bomb classroom at back-to-school night. The small investment. The example of makers to alter their designs and tech- implication is that the volume of collected tactical—and perhaps operational and niques, thereby increasing the chance for material that must be processed for WTI strategic—success associated with IED error. Fielding unproven and perhaps less is unlimited (theoretically 100 percent), attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan may reliable IED designs carries increased risk which makes WTI much more labor in- inspire other violent actors to employ of failure and may require new tactics for tensive, at least for field collection, triage, IEDs to counter U.S. military strength employment. Effective IED countermea- and chain of custody management. and achieve their objectives. Various sures often have the desirable secondary TECHINT is conducted in both VEOs, including al Qaeda, have stated effect of stressing the bomb-making peacetime and wartime and is generally their intent to obtain and use chemical, network and forcing lethal errors on the a more deliberate, methodical discipline. biological, radiological, and nuclear bomb maker. It strives for a complete understand- weapons. New threat actors operating IEDs have been the signature weapon ing of a weapons system that can serve in different environments will use IEDs in the wars of attrition our enemies have as the foundation of development and in novel and unpredictable ways. Not waged against us in Iraq, Afghanistan, acquisition programs for new weapons, everything that is possible is probable, and other regions, and have featured countermeasures, and equipment. IED but the limitless variability of the IED in every major conflict in the modern use, by contrast, is almost always an act of will continue to be confounding for era. They have resulted in a high cost in violence related to criminality, terrorism, planners and strategists. casualties and materiel, and have impaired or war, which drives a heightened sense Knowledge of IED construction is our ability to achieve our objectives. of urgency to exploit devices quickly more readily available than ever, yet the Recognizing that the IED has been and and derive actionable information from requisite skills remain difficult to acquire. will continue to be a threat to U.S. forces them. WTI is often more urgent because Working with sensitive homemade explo- and mission accomplishment—through- obtaining combat information is a higher sives and complex electronics is risky, and out the range of military operations priority than waiting for fully developed even experienced bomb makers are killed and across all the phases of operation, intelligence.22 Not only does WTI seek by their own devices through error or in both traditional and irregular con- to characterize the IED technically (how miscalculation. The limited availability of flict—the joint force needs to capture
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Tranchemontagne 159 authoritatively and comprehensively the fundamental principles and best practices of operating in IED-rich environments Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision before they are forgotten. (to be signed within 6 months) As our force levels in Afghanistan fall JP 1-04, Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation and our operational tempo decreases, JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations now is a good time to consider what we have learned about IEDs and invest the JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence intellectual energy into ensuring our doc- JP 3-13.3, Operations Security trine is relevant to future conflicts. While JP 3-14, Space Operations the IED is not the only threat we face, its effectiveness suggests it is not going away JP 3-34, Engineer Operations any time soon. JFQ JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations Notes JP 4-01.5, Joint Terminal Operations JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore 1 JCCS-1 (Joint CREW Composite Squadron-1) was a Navy-run electronic warfare JP 4-03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water unit in Iraq that managed CREW systems and developed CREW-related tactics, techniques, and procedures. Task Force ODIN (observe, JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months) detect, identify, and neutralize) was an Army JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support aviation battalion in Iraq that flew the MQ-1B Warrior-Alpha unmanned aerial vehicle to JP 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare provide reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) against insurgents using JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The range JP 3-61, Public Affairs of materiel solutions that the Joint Impro- vised Explosive Device Defeat Organization JP 6-0, Joint Communications System (JIEDDO) fielded is extraordinary—aerostats, explosives detectors, electronic countermea- sures, patrol dogs, ground-penetrating radar, robots, personnel protective equipment, optics, Air-Ground Task Force] Counter-Improvised 20 JP 1-02, s.v. “weapons technical intel- mine rollers—and reflects the variability and Explosive Device Operations (Washington, DC: ligence.” unpredictability of the IED threat. Department of the Navy, Headquarters U.S. 21 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and 2 Ian Jones, Malice Aforethought: A History Marine Corps, November 14, 2012), 4–5. Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat of Booby Traps from World War One to Vietnam 11 Fleet Marine Force Reference Publica- Organization (JIEDDO), Weapons Technical (London: Greenhill Books, 2004), 33. tion (FMFRP) 12-43, Professional Knowledge Intelligence Handbook, Version 2.0 (Washing- 3 Ibid., 226. Gained from Operational Experience in Viet- ton, DC: DIA and JIEDDO, March 2014), 4. 4 General Staff (Intelligence) General nam, 1969, Special Issue, Mines and Boobytraps, 22 Combat information is “unevaluated data, Headquarters (GHQ), German Ruses (1st Print- (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine gathered by or provided directly to the tactical ing Co., R.E., GHQ, April 8, 1917), available Corps, July 20, 1989), 3. commander which, due to its highly perishable at
160 Joint Doctrine / The Enduring IED Problem: Why We Need Doctrine JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 NEW from NDU Press Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War NDU Press, 2015 • 488 pp.
This volume began as two questions from General Martin E. Dempsey, 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: What were the costs and benefits of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what were the strategic lessons of these campaigns? The Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University was tasked to answer these questions. The editors composed a volume that assesses the war and analyzes the costs, using the Institute’s considerable in-house talent and the dedication of the NDU Press team. The audience for this volume is senior officers, their staffs, and the students in joint professional military education courses—the future leaders of the Armed Forces. Other national security professionals should find it of great value as well.
The volume begins with an introduction that addresses the difficulty of learning strategic lessons and a preview of the major lessons identified in the study. It then moves on to an analysis of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq from their initiation to the onset of the U.S. Surges. The study then turns to the Surges themselves as tests of assessment and adaptation. The next part focuses on decision- making, implementation, and unity of effort. The volume then turns to the all-important issue of raising and mentoring indigenous security forces, the basis for the U.S. exit strategy in both campaigns. Capping the study is a chapter on legal issues that range from detention to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. The final chapter analyzes costs and benefits, dissects decisionmaking in both campaigns, and summarizes the lessons encountered. Supporting the volume are three annexes: one on the human and financial costs of the Long War and two detailed timelines for histories of Afghanistan and Iraq and the U.S. campaigns in those countries.
The lessons encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq at the strategic level inform our understanding of national security decisionmaking, intelligence, the character of contemporary conflict, and unity of effort and command. They stand alongside the lessons of other wars and remind future senior offi- cers that those who fail to learn from past mistakes are bound to repeat them.
Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Books/LessonsEncountered.aspx JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE EIGHTY, 1ST QUARTER 2016
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JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Our understanding of the importance and keeping peace is of women in building Around and activists are the globe, policymakers empower women as working to National Defense University, Washington, DC National Defense University, Washington, informed by a wide range of experts, from diplomats to military officials and from human rights activists to development professionals.together The goal of this book is to bring these diverse voices. As leaders in every region of the world recognize, no country can reach its full potential without the participation of all its citizens. This book seeks to add to the chorus of voices working to ensure that women and girls take their rightful place in more prosperous world. safer, building a stronger, Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Books/WomenontheFrontlinesofPeaceandSecurity.aspx agents of peace and to help addressagents of peace and as survivors the challenges they face of conflict. When women are important in peace negotiations, they raise involved issues that might be otherwise When women are overlooked. educated and enabled to participate in every societies—from aspect of their growing the economy to strengthening the security sector—communities are more stable and less prone to conflict. Women on the Frontlines of Peace and Security of Peace on the Frontlines Women Foreword by Hillary Rodham Clinton and Leon Panetta NDU Press, 2015 • 218 pp. This book reflects President women’s Obama’s commitment to advancing Barack participation in preventing conflict and keeping peace. It is inspired by the countless the frontlineswomen and girls on a difference who make every day in their communities and societies by creating opportunities and building peace. Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff University Press by National Defense Have you checked out NDU Press online lately? Have you checked