So Marshall, Who Knew His Dickens, Must Have Thought That Fall and Early Winter of 1944

I T was the best of times, it was the worst of times.” So Marshall, who knew his Dickens, must have thought that fall and early winter of 1944. The bright certainty of summer, fading in the weak sunlight of au- tumn’s half promises, ended in chilled and darkening hopes at mid- December. Victory, so close at hand in August, seemed far away on the eve of Christmas. The advances in northwest Europe and in Italy north of Florence stirred momentary optimism abroad while at home the politics of a presidential election emerged as a temporary embarrassment for the War De- partment. The siege of Metz, the drive on Aachen, the dreadful losses in the Hurtgen Forest were sometimes overshadowed by politics as New York’s Republican governor, Thomas E. Dewey, sought to deny Franklin Roosevelt a fourth term in the White House. The approach of victory abroad had brought to the surface old suspi- cions and divisions between the Western Allies and the Russians; it had also reawakened partisan hopes on the home front. Silent temporarily in the face of foreign challenges, Roosevelt’s oppo- nents became active as Allied fortunes prospered. Mid-summer 1944 saw a renewal of interest in the background of the Pearl Harbor disaster, and Congress called for further investigations into the background of the attack. From late July until late October 1944 separate Army and Navy inquiries were made.1 Both the Army and Navy were especially disturbed because full answers to the questions raised would involve the disclosure that the Japanese diplomatic code, which they were still using, had been broken before Pearl Harbor. Although efforts were made to preserve secrecy, some information leaked out. Demanding an accounting from, Roosevelt, Repre- sentative Forest A. Harness, Republican of Indiana, cited General Mar- shall’s message on the morning of December 7, which indicated that it was Victory Deferred 47= thought that the Japanese would be presenting an ultimatum at I p.m. and that their embassy had been told to destroy their code machine.2 At this point Marshall was informed that Governor Dewey was in full possession of information concerning the diplomatic code and was plan- ning to reveal it in a campaign speech. He was appalled at the possible consequences. He recognized that politically it was smart for the Republi- can nominee to say that the President knew of Japanese intentions prior to December 7 and failed to act. But to the Army and Navy, still crucially dependent on reading intercepted enemy messages, the revelation that they had broken Japanese codes would be tragic. Marshall later described the situation: “At this time the sinking of Japanese vessels was developing at a rapid rate. General MacArthur was then making his final preparations for the invasion of the Philippine Islands and getting vital information. We were [still] getting vital information. . . .” Hearing that Mr. Dewey was in the Middle West on a campaign tour and fearing that he might divulge cryptographic secrets without realizing their continued imperativeness to the Army and Navy, Marshall asked his intelligence advisers to draft a message to the governor. He eliminated a paragraph from the letter asking Dewey to persuade the Republicans to stop their inquiries into the breaking of codes and then sent it to King for concurrence. Marshall explained: “This letter of course puts him [Gover- nor Dewey] on the spot, and I hate to do it, but see no other way of avoiding what might well be a catastrophe to us.” Just what Dewey could do without giving his reasons for not acting he did not know, “but at least he will understand what a deadly affair it really is.” Anticipating that party leaders would probably oppose Dewey’s dropping of the issue, Mar- shall considered calling in Republican House Floor Leader Joseph Mar- tin and explaining the danger of the attack so he would understand Dewey’s attitude. The whole thing, Marshall told Admiral King, “is loaded with dynamite but I very much feel that something has to be done or the fat will be in the fire to our great loss in the Pacific, and possibly also in Europe.’’ King heartily assented. The letter was taken to Dewey in Tulsa by special courier, Colonel Carter Clarke of the War Department staff. After looking at the first paragraph the Republican candidate declined to go further. Marshall had asked him to stop before reading the reasons he was outlining unless he could agree in advance not to pass the information on. The request was unusual, and the governor said frankly to Clarke that he would make no such pledge since (1) he already had considerable information on the subject, some of which he thought was probably enclosed, and (2) he could not believe that such a letter would be written by Marshall and King without the President’s knowledge. Having taken the plunge, General Marshall decided to go further on his own. In a slightly changed version, which he sent by Clarke to the 472 Organizer of Victory governor, now back in Albany, he said he was willing that Dewey read the entire letter provided he communicated to others only facts that he then had or that he received from someone other than Marshall. Dewey replied that on an issue of this magnitude, he owed it to his party to seek the counsel of a major political adviser and proposed that he be allowed to discuss the information with Elliott Bell, a close personal friend and political strategist. Marshall agreed to the ~ondition.~ This matter arranged, Dewey now read Marshall’s assurance “that nei- ther the Secretary of War nor the President has any indication whatsoever that such a letter has been addressed to you or that the preparation or sending of such a communication was being considered.” The only per-’ sons who knew of the message were Admiral King, the seven key officers concerned with cryptographic matters, and the secretary who typed the letter. “I am trying my best to make plain to you,” he explained, “that this letter is being addressed to you solely on my own initiative, Admiral King having been consulted only after the letter was drafted, and H am persisting in the matter because the military hazards involved are so serious that I feel some action is necessary to protect the interests of our armed forces.” Having set the stage, Marshall then outlined the tremendous advantage that the United States had gained from breaking the diplomatic code. He cited the successes at Midway, submarine activities in the Pacific, and Halsey’s current raids. “Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as well as Japanese, but our main source of information regarding Hitler’s intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima’s messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events. “You will understand,” he continued, “the utterly tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, German or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we now possess.” He then spelled out the possible consequences of partisan speeches in Congress. Revelations about American cryptographic activities could also prove embarrassing to America’s allies. He told of difficulties that had arisen because various U.S. agencies failed to coordinate their actions. “Some of Donovan’s people”-i.e., from the Office of Strate- gic Services-had raided Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal without telling U.S. military officials that they had such action in mind. As a result the Japanese had changed their military-attach4 code, thus denying information to the Army and Navy that had earlier been available. The conduct of General Eisenhower’s campaign and all operations in the Pacific, Marshall continued, were closely related in conception and timing to information secretly obtained. Such information contributed greatly to final victory and to the saving of American lives. “I am presenting this matter Victory Deferred 473 to you . . . in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign,” Marshall concluded 5 Dewey accepted the General’s word that his action was not a political trick and that the diplomatic code should be kept out of the political campaign. It is possible that Dewey’s action cost him thousands of votes that could have been garnered by the revelations. At any rate the matter was never mentioned publicly until shortly after the war’s end. Then someone-Marshall assumed it was a member of Governor Dewey’s staff- revealed to the Joint Congressional Committee the existence of the correspondence. Within a short time Marshall was under heavy pressure to release it to the commi ttee.6 Not until the disclosures of 1945 did General Marshall inform the White House of what he had done He explained to Truman, who had succeeded Roosevelt five months before, that only a part of his letter to Dewey should be released because some of the paragraphs affected other countries 7 The President reacted with his usual hearty approval of Marshall’s initiative, writing at the bottom of the letter, “Dear General: As you know I have the utmost confidence in you and your judgment. I suggest you give both of these-memo and letter to Dewey-to the Press for tomorrow. It will stop all the demagogues.” 8 Marshall appreciated the vote of confidence but still felt that the whole text should not be published. The Joint Chiefs of Staff now proposed that the entire correspondence be given to the Joint Congressional Committee in executive session with the warning that certain information involving foreign governments not be published. Shortly after discussing the matter with the Chiefs of Staff at Fort Myer on September 27, the President accepted their recommenda- tion 9 In the broader context of global war the political stirrings of an Ameri- can presidential campaign were fairly minor as millions of I men risked their lives on the battlefields and in the battle fleets across the world. While Roosevelt labored to make American electoral history, his forces on many fronts continued their struggle against the enemy At Quebec it had appeared possible that the Allies could press north- ward rapidly in Italy and make a landing in Istria in mid-October. This was not to be. Shortly before the meeting Alexander had ordered an assault by the U.S. Fifth and the British Eighth Armies against the Gothic Line, whose 170 miles of fortifications ran from the west coast near Massa along the northern Apennines to the Adriatic near Pesaro Rimini fell on September 21, but the advance slowed quickly as the tired soldiers, weakened by withdrawal of units for service in southern France, faced the nine rivers and “hundreds of minor watercourses” between the Adriatic and Bologna. Unusually bad weather, a staple in Italy during the war, brought the Allied armies to a standstill near the end of October. The 474 Organizes of Victory Fifth Army, battling for Bologna, was forced to go over to the defensive when it was less than 10 air miles from its objective. Not until the following April-on the twenty-first-did Bologna fall.10 Replacement shortages, lack of ammunition, and the withdrawal oE troops for service in Greece strained Alexander’s troops still further. On October 14 General Wilson examined the situation and decided that Italy was unlikely to contribute materially to Allied progress in the next few months. He believed that the Russian advance, still gathering momen- tum, was more likely to effect Kesselring’s withdrawal than would Alex- ander’s advance.” Still refusing to countenance such an abortion of his Italian designs, Churchill asked Roosevelt for three divisions. But his own staff planners in London argued against him, insisting that Italy must now adapt to the steadily increasing needs of OVERLORD. Three courses were open in Italy: (1) a spring offensive accompanied by an assault on Istria or the Dalma- tian coast; (2) withdrawal of the American portions of the Fifth Army (one armored and four infantry divisions and one equivalent division) for Eisenhower’s theater; or (3) withdrawal of British and Empire troops to form a strategic reserve. The British planners estimated that the line of the Adige-Piave could be held by eight to ten infantry and four armored divisions, permitting the release of four or five armored and six to eight infantry divisions. Only the greatest necessity, they maintained, could justify Churchill’s effort to commit one airborne and three infantry divisions in a December offensive. The British Chiefs of Staff agreed in general with their planners. However the subject proved academic on October 16, when Roosevelt, heeding the recommendations of his own military advisers, refused Churchill’s request.12 Marshall’s views on the Italian theater were undoubtedly influenced by his recent visit to American units in Europe. Accepting the Joint Intelli- gence Committee report that there was a possibility of finishing the war before the year’s end, the Chief of Staff decided to go to Europe for con- ferences with Eisenhower and a close look at the divisions then in the line. He also thought it would be a good opportunity to indoctrinate former Justice Byrnes, director of War Mobilization, on the Army’s needs. Specifically he urged Byrnes to go along to see what could be done to hasten unloading of ships at Cherbourg and to speed transport of ammunition to the front. Byrnes gladly accepted and the two men, accompanied by several members of the War Department staff, set off on October 5 in the presidential plane, the Sacred Cow. After a brief stop in Newfound- land they flew nonstop to Paris, the first such flight since Eindbergh had made it alone in a one-engine plane from Roosevelt Field, Long Island, to Le Bourget in ig~7.l~ Eisenhower, Bradley, and Bedell Smith met the party at the airport and talks with the Supreme Commander began at once. On October 7 Mar- Victory Deferred 475 shall set out for Verdun by plane, having the pilot ‘fly low over the Ar- gonne area so that he could view the terrain in which American forces had fought in World War I. Later he drove by car through the St. Miliiel sector and visited the billet where lie had stayed in Souilly in the late summer of 1918. From Verdun, Marshall and Bradley traveled to Patton’s headquarters at Ctain near Metz. There, after lunch, the Third Army Commander presented his staff and his plans for taking Fort Driant. Mar- shall fired his usual “very incisive questions” on the details of the coming battle, which Patton promptly answered.14 , , On the eighth Marshall and Bradley flew to Eindhoven, Holland, to visit ,Montgomery’s 2 i Army Group headquarters. Their trip was marked by a dismaying performance by the fighter escort furnished by the Ninth Air Force. Of the four (planes sent for this duty one became mired on the runway, where it was hit by a second when it attempted to fly over it. The third, after a poor landing on the airfield in Holland, burst into flames as it came to a halt near the wing tip of Bradley’s plane The pilot of the fourth plane was frightened away by the fire. When air headquarters offered four more fighters, Bradley’s aide declined them, saying, “I’m sure the general couldn’t take another day like this one.” When he finally reached British headquarters, Marshall found the Field Marshal at odds with Eisenhower over his coming operations In a private conference in his office caravan Montgomery presented his case. He complained that since Eisenhower had taken over direct control of operations, the armies had become separated geographically. As Mont- gomery recalled it later, he liad said. “There was a lack of grip, and oper- ational direction and control was lacking. Our operation had, in fact, become ragged and disjointed, and we liad now got ourselves into a real mess ” Marshall spoke little, but the Field Marshal was uncomfortably aware that he did not agree.10 Keeping quiet proved to be a chore. Marshall said in 1956: “I came pretty near to blowing off out of turn ” Marshall recalled that “it was very hard for me to restrain myself because I didn’t thinkithere was any logic in what he said but overwhelming egotism.” Marshall’s restraint nearly failed him later in the day when he went with General Devers to Luxeuil in eastern France to visit General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. De Lattre, noted for his histrionics and sharp tongue, seized the opportunity to denounce General Truscott bitterly. He charged that the latter’s VI Corps had shown up well in recent fighting because it had taken the gasoline allocated to French troops.18 In an amazingly bland version de Lattre later wrote that he took advantage of Marshall’s hurried visit to acquaint him with the inadequacy of his supplies: “General Marshall at once showed surprise at a complaint which he visibly had not expected, but he recognized it as being well founded and promised me that he would put the matter right.” General 476 Organizer of Victory de Lattre’s attack was made not only in front of American and French officers but in the presence of Allied correspondents. The Chief of Staff was furious with de Lattre and with William Bullitt, then a major in the French Army, who stood by without saying anything. Marshall’s temper flared, but he decided to avoid a scene by terminating the discussion. “I just stopped the thing right where it was and walked out.” 19 The matter still rankled years after. When the ground-force headquarters for NATO was being organized, de Lattre was proposed for the command. Knowing that Marshall, now Secretary of Defense, had been angry over several episodes during the war, the Frenchman asked him if he would oppose his selection. The anger that the Chief of Staff had banked that day at Luxeuil was paid out with interest. “I said,” Marshall related later, “ ‘That was the most outrageous business of yours. I restrained myself very, very carefully from tearing you down to the ground. Because what you did was a most culpable performance for a man who had any idea of how Allied forces must get along. And in the next place you didn’t have a leg to stand on. You celebrated all the way up the road. You were late on every damn thing and there weren’t any [supplies] to divide and you were critical of Truscott, who is a fighter and not a talker. . . . I am not going to oppose you on this at all because as a matter of fact the command doesn’t amount to much right now. It will, but doesn’t right now. You are no man to command any Allied thing because you are a po- litico.’’’ Not wishing to be unjust, Marshall added to the biographer: “Actually he was a good fighter. He did a good job out there in Indo- China, where he died as a result of it. But the performance there [earlier] was terrible-right in front of all those reporters-but fortunately they didn’t bring it up at all. I think they spared me because I was so outraged by it. I was outraged at my people . . . for standing there and letting it go on . . . [And] Bullitt didn’t say a damn word. He just stood there and smirked. God knows what he told the reporters. I was out with him right then. . . .” 20 Marshall spent the night of October g with Major General Manton Eddy of the XI1 Corps at Nancy. Next morning he breakfasted with Pat- ton, who asked for promotions for several of his officers. On the tenth Marshall went with Patton and Eddy to the 35th Division, where he asked many questions, especially about the adequacy of winter clothing and the comfort of the troops. His pace unrelenting, he pushed on to the 80th Division and to meetings with the commanding generals of the 26th In- fantry, the 4th and 6th Armored, the 5th, goth, and 83d Infantry divisions and with his old friend General Walker of the XX Corps. After spending the night at Arlon, Belgium, at the Ninth Army headquarters of General Simpson, he was up early on the eleventh to visit Corps Commanders Middleton (VIII), Gerow (V), and Collins (VII) and divisions under their commands, and he spent the evening with General Hodges at First Army headquarters at Verviers, Belgium. During the day Victory Deferred 477 lie liad gone by armored car into Germany in the vicinity of Aaclien-on liis first visit to German soil since 1919 On the twelfth fie visited the 30th Division Command Post, where lie was greeted by its commander ant1 by tlie commanders of the XIX Corps, the 2d Armored Division, and the 29th Division Thirty minutes later lie went to XIX Corps lieadquarters at Maastricht, Holland. He flew to Versailles that afternoon and spent the following day at Eisenhower’s headquarters, leaving Paris on Friday evening for Newfoundland. The flight back was comfortable save between Newfoundland and Maine, where headwinds reached sixty miles an hour, and tlie pilot found he had the lowest barometer recording lie had ever seen. They stopped briefly in Newfoundland on tlie fourteenth and were back in Washington in tlie early evening 81 It had been a stirring experience for the Chief of Staff to visit front-line units and talk with the men who had fought their way eastward from tlie beaches. Photographs show him speaking earnestly to headquarters troops of tlie V Corps in a dark wooded area near Luxembourg, laughing with Major General Wade H. Haislip over a cup of coffee, and accepting flow- ers froiii a smiling boy and girl in France In this mosaic we find him reaching out more closely than at any other time in the war to the men who fought and the people who were being aided. He promised dozens of tlie officers and men with whom lie talked that lie would send word to their families on liis return to say that lie liad seen them and they were well. This practice, which lie hat1 begun as an aide to General Pershing, was carefully observed. He informed Mrs. Patton that “I saw George the second day after I arrived” and that lie “looked in splendid health and in fine fettle and full of fight.” To Mrs Eisenhower lie wrote: “I wanted to tell you that Eisenhower was looking very well and handling himself and his job beautifully. Of course he is under a very heavy strain but bears up under it wonderfully and has exhibited a store of patience to meet the various trying incidents of his position other than the direct conduct of the campaign.” 52 In another vein General Marshall summarized the high points of his trip for his old friend Major General Frank McCoy:

I had an intensely interesting inspection trip in France, covering an immense amount of ground in a very short time I was astonished at the repetition of situations and localities from the days when you and I were in that part of France The right of Patton’s Third Army was in the village and No Man’s Land in the exact spot that I found in October 1917, when I arranged for the induction of separate battalions of the First Division into a French front. The coincidences of this sort were apparent all along the front and I even found in one place that our Fifth Division was deployed in its old World War sector with its same companion, the 90th Division, on its left and the commander of the Corps a former officer of the Fifth Division During my hurried trip I started out after a night at Verdun, flew to Holland to see Montgomery and then immediately South the same morning to the Bel- 478 Organizer of Victory fort front. During the next four days, three of them a downpour of rain, 1 went through five Armies, eight Army Corps, sixteen divisions, and also saw the commanders and staffs of eight other Divisions.23 The General regretted being too rushed to see Madame Jouatte, in whose home at Gondrecourt he and several other officers of the 1st Divi- sion had been billeted in World War I. However he had instructed Gen- eral Patton to inquire after her health and to leave some supplies for her when the Third Army swept through her area of France. The old lady had been sent away to a quiet sector, and she wrote from there to express her appreciation for the General’s interest. To Eisenhower, Marshall radioed on his return: “The trip was im- mensely profitable to me and to those with me because I do believe that in a very short time we learned a great deal about conditions with you and therefore are much better prepared to meet your requirements from this end.” 24 Above everything else Marshall had received a better perspective on the pressing difficulties his commanders faced. General Bradley in par- ticular had disputed the notion that the war could be ended in 1944. He and Eisenhower and their staffs had laid out for Marshall and Handy the ,various serious shortages in ammunition and personnel that must soon be remedied if they were to continue on the offensive. For his part the director of War Mobilization, James Byrnes, had received confirmation of the Army’s argument that the time had not yet arrived to cut back war production. The immediate problem on Marshall’s desk when he came back to his Pentagon office was the Stilwell imbroglio. Since the previous year there had been continual difficulty between Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell over strategy, the use of Chinese troops, the matter of supply, air versus ground priorities-in which General Ghennault, with some aid from the White House, sided with the Generalissimo. The final showdown came in the late summer and fall over Stilwell’s efforts to revise the command situation and to bring Chinese Communist forces into the fight against Japan. At Stilwell’s urging War Department officers had prepared at Quebec a draft message for the President to send Chiang urging agreement with Stilwell’s proposals. Although Roosevelt softened the message somewhat, its tone was still strong. Delivered by Stilwell personally, the communication was taken by Chiang as a personal affront. A few days later he noti- fied Ambassador Patrick Hurley that he could not appoint Stilwell as field commander. Shortly before he left for Europe, Marshall had helped draft two replies by the President, one disagreeing sharply on the question of firing Stilwell and the other suggesting that Stilwell be retained only as commander of Chinese troops in Yunnan and Burma. The President se- lected the milder version, but it failed to win a change of heart from the Generalissimo. Instead he made it clear that he did not want Stilwell in any post but was willing to have another American officer in his place. It was at this point in the controversy that Marshall returned from his Victory Deferred 479 European tour. His first impulse was to fight the issue,’but he ended by accepting the President’s decision to recall Stilwell. He managed to write into Roosevelt’s reply the statement that no American could assume responsibility for the operations of Chinese forces in China. He agreed only that the War Department would furnish an officer to take Stilwell’s post as one of Chiang’s Chiefs of Staff. Chiang Kai-shek had already suggested Generals Eisenhower, Patch, Krueger, and Wedemeyer as officers of the type he would like to have. At the War Department’s suggestion the President proposed General Wede- meyer, who shortly afterward became commanding general of U.S. Forces in China Stilwell’s return to Washington less than a week before the presidential election posed the possibility that he would lash out at Roosevelt and create a political uproar. Determined to prevent any controversial head- lines, Stimson and Marshall devoted theinselves to “trying to keep him out of reach of all newspaper men and not give them an opportunity to catch and distort any unwary word just before the election.” 25 Marshall might well have given these instructions personally to Stilwell when he arrived at the National Airport on November 3, but in the course of the day he had learned that Field Marshal Dill was dying at Walter Reed Hospital, and he was there when Stilwell’s plane touched down. However he himself penned instructions that the former CBI commander was to confine himself to the statement that he had been ordered home and make no other comment. He sent Colonel McCarthy to meet the plane with those instructions and had Generals Handy and Surles there to im- press on him the need of discretion. Later that evening when General Marshall visited the Stilwells at the guest house at Fort Myer, he indicated that he had in mind giving him the Army Ground Forces command and subsequently a command in the Pacific or Europe. A few weeks later Stilwell succeeded Lieutenant General Ben Lear in the Ground Force command; in the spring of 1945, when General Buckner was killed, Mar- shall named Stilwell as Tenth Army commander. At the war’s end the former CBI commander took over the Sixth Army at the Presidio at San Francisco. He was still serving in this post at the time of his death in October 1946. Although deeply disappointed by the developments in the China Thea- ter, Marshall could spend little time deploring what had happened in an area where the United States would take a less important role than it had initially planned. He had never been willing to commit large combat forces to the China-Burma-India Theater, and now it seemed more realis- tic to proceed by way of the Philippines and the islands of the Central Pacific. Immediately facing him was what came next in Europe. In retrospect it seemed remarkable that as late as October 20, General Marshall discussed a quick ending of the war in Europe. Although Gen- eral Bradley and others a few days before had poured cold water on his 480 Organizer of Victory hopes for ending the war in 1944, he directed the attention of the Com- bined Chiefs of Staff to “an undecided question, that is, whether or not we should conduct the war in France during the next two and one-half months on the basis of playing everything for a conclusion.” This would, he believed, have a bearing on the decision to permit use of the highly secret design for setting off projectiles near a target without explosion by contact (the proximity fuse), as well as the choice of air targets and the timetable for moving ground units. An effort to go all-out in 1944 would require concentration on battle areas, rather than a major effort against long-range strategic targets, and a release of strategic reserves and supplies from theater stockpiles.26 The replies from Europe were guarded. General Eisenhower believed that with more troops and supplies, he could hasten the end of the war, but he made no promises. At the end of October the British Chiefs of Staff accepted the view of their planners that the earliest date that could be suggested for the end of the war was January 31, 1945, and the latest was mid-May. To launch an all-out offensive before Antwerp had been opened to shipping, they argued, would be to court failure and perhaps prolong the war well in 1945 They also questioned Marshall’s proposal for changing the main air effort. They therefore proposed that the United States Chiefs of Staff withhold the proposed directive for the time being. On November 1 Marshall directed that nothing be done until further notice.27 One gets the impression that the reply was not unexpected. General Marshall was aware that General Bradley felt the forces in Europe were in no position to end the war soon, and his firsthand knowledge of supply and manpower difficulties was reinforced by General Eisenhower’s Octo- ber 20 message reminding him that the shortage of artillery ammunition was becoming acu te.28 General Marshall informed Eisenhower that ammunition was being shipped as fast as it could be produced but that he saw no prospects of increasing loadings of certain critical items in October or early Novem- ber.*OHe was worried not only about production but about the fact that ammunition ships were awaiting discharge in French ports and that there was divided responsibility for supply in France.30 To complicate matters the Germans began to drop V-2 bombs on the port of Antwerp just as plans were’beingmade to make major use of it. The Chief of Staff warned Eisenhower against putting everything in “the Antwerp basket.” The Supreme Commander replied that he was avoiding that danger, although conceding that he could not receive in French ports “all the ammunition that we should have.” He stressed the critical shortages in medium artillery calibers (105 mm. and 155 mm.). Despite the difficulties involved, he still felt that Antwerp was the sine qua non for the final attack against Germany.31 In late November, Eisenhower sent Marshall a chilling report on Brad- Victory Deferred 481 ley’s situation. The 12th Army Group commander estimated that he had on hand only enough ammunition to permit him to continue the current offensive until December 15. He would then have to assume a static position indefinitely “It would not be enough even for this if we were against

an enemy capable of any offensive action ” Unless German resistance col- ’ lapsed, the crossing of the Rhine under these circumstances was out of the question.3“ In early December, Churchill wrote gloomily to Roosevelt over lost op- portunities. General Marshall helped draft the President’s reply that Eisenhower’s broad-front strategy was developing according to plan.33 Marshall’s current state of mind emerges more clearly in his letter of De- cember 8 to Admiral Stark in London: “We are engaged in a good many heavy battles now, with the great problem of munition deficiencies here at home to meet the tremendously increased demands. However, I am decidedly optimistic rather than pessimistic about the progress of the war and I think anyone is bound to be who analyzes for a moment the pre- dicament of the enemy. By comparison our situation is a rosy one in contrast to the desperate plight of the Germans and the clear evidence of disaster facing the Japanese.” 3-1 Yet in writing his old friend, General Marshall expressed greater cheer- fulness than he probably in truth felt. In November lie had suffered one of his severest personal losses of the war with the death of Field Marshal Dill. The British officer had not been well for some months, but the Chief of Staff was disturbed on his return from Europe in mid-October to find him on the critical list at Walter Reed. He had seen signs that Dill was slowing up a year earlier at the first Quebec conference, when Brooke noted that the Field Marshal was suffering from the effects of an operation for an old hernia. In the spring of 1944 Dill was weakened by anemia, and during the summer he was so ill that Marshall directed that arguments over ANVIL be kept off his desk. At the second Quebec meeting in September, Brooke observed that Dill was showing evidence of serious physical deterioration. Churchill’s physician examined the doctor’s analy- sis shown him by Dill and thought: “I saw at a glance that he was not reacting to treatment, and I doubt if he will last long. I wonder if he knows?” 35 Seriously concerned, Marshall sent Dill to Hot Springs under Sergeant Powder’s watchful eye. Despite careful attention the Field Marshal’s con- dition grew worse, and he was quickly transferred to Walter Reed Hospi- tal. He was conscious on November 1, but apparently knew 110 one the following day. Marshall made his farewell call on the afternoon of the third, when Stilwell arrived in Washington and shortly before his own departure for a meeting of the Business Advisory Council. Next day the Field Marshal was dead. Months earlier Marshall had done everything possible to prove to Prime Minister Churchill the importance of keeping Dill in Washington. Organizer of Victory Now he was determined to show British and Americans alike what the Field Marshal had meant to Allied unity. At the services for Dill at the National Cathedral, Marshall read the lesson for his old friend. Learning from Lady Dill that her husband had expressed a wish to lie in Arlington National Cemetery, he moved at once to make this possible. Stimson recorded that Dill “was a noble character and won the hearts of all of us in the War Department and the Army who came in contact with him.” His death, he observed, would be especially hard on Marshall. A few days later the Secretary spoke of the elaborate preparations the Chief of Staff was making to honor Dill’s memory. Stimson pleased him by citing as a precedent for special tribute the fact that the British government had arranged for a tablet to be erected in Westminster Abbey in World War I in memory of Ambassador Walter Hines Page.36 Armed with the Abbey precedent, Marshall found his way around regulations against burial of foreign soldiers in Arlington. Even more impres- sive, he succeeded in getting members of Congress to pass an unusual resolution of appreciation for Dill’s services. Nor did he stop there. Decid- ing that an equestrian statue should be erected in his friend’s memory, he moved after the war in the face of other regulations barring such memorials in Arlington Cemetery. At length he roused the opposition of some Amer- ican Legion officials and barely managed to get tabled a resolution by one of the Legion’s state conventions opposing his action. He also took a lead- ing role in raising money for the monument, working closely with former Ambassador Robert Woods Bliss, who headed the drive, The statue, lo- cated near the Fort Myer Drive at the front of the cemetery, was unveiled by President Truman in 1950.~’ Aware of Marshall’s deep affection for Dill, Churchill in thanking him for the condolences sent by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff said, “He did all he could to make things go well and they went well.’’ 38 Mindful of Churchill’s moves to recall Dill some months earlier, Mar- shall chided him gently: “Few will ever realize the debt our countries owe him for his unique and profound influence toward the cooperation of our forces. To be very frank and personal, I doubt if you or your cabinet associates fully realize the loss you have suffered and the U.S. also has suffered for that matter, in purely post-war adjustments by his death. I am hopeful that his interment in the American Valhalla of Arlington where his services may be memorialized will result in a continuation of his great and beneficent influence in the troubled years to come.’’ 39 On December 16, the day after Congress acted on its resolution of appreciation, Marshall wrote Lady Burghley, who had been his and Dill’s hostess in Bermuda the previous spring: “With all the bickerings that are going on and are inevitable in the future it is to me most refreshing to have his wonderful example of a great service not restricted solely to his own country but extended to the United States and the world in general.” 40 Victory Deferred 483 Marshall’s deep friendship had been reciprocated by the Field Marshal, as Lady Dill made clear in her letters to him: “He really loved you, George,” she wrote on December 22, “and your mutual affection meant a

great deal to him-he always trusted you iniplicitly ” A few weeks later she wrote again:

Thinking back on that time, it seems that yours was such a lovable, kindly presence, never obstructing, yet always there to share our JOYS and sorrows and give us both your very precious friendship Your thoughts for us, with lovely invitations to relax in beautiful places, dinners to meet interesting people-ball game seats-Thanksgiving lunch with the hunting folk, then the great honour of the Howland Memorial Prize at Yale, ending in that last invitation of all-that Jack should rest in Arlington, and his work and ideals should be cherished in the resolution which has been passed by both Houses-for all that I can never thank you adequately- George . 41 Dill’s post was taken a few weeks later by Field Marshal Wilson, the Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean “Jumbo” Wilson, renowned for his affability, tried extremely hard to fill Dill’s place with Marshall ‘But he never succeeded It was almost as if the Chief of Staff resented anyone else’s trying to replace his old friend Marshall could never find ’ again the casual touch that marked his relationship with Dill Wilson apparently sensed that the close ties could never be reknit and was somewhat ill at ease. Often he could do little more than forward and answer messages. Possibly the sharp tone that appeared at times in Anglo- American correspondence after November might have been moderated had Dill lived. Or again, perhaps the memory of his lighter touch still had some magic. Fortunately the biggest differences on operations had been settled There were still sharp issues to be settled but not dangerously divisive matters requiring the close friendship and personal skill that had been supplied by Dill 42 The question of the five-star promotion that Stimson thought he and Marshall had buried in the spring of 1944 returned to plague them in mid-September. From Quebec came word that Roosevelt wanted the bill passed by Congress Informed by Marshall of the President’s directive, the Secretary gave way on September 13. And he managed an ingenious solu- tion that would make the measure less distasteful to Pershing’s friends. He and McNarney arranged for adoption of the title “General of the Army” for the five-star Army rank, so that Pershing would continue to be alone in bearing the title “General of the Armies.” Having made that gesture, Stimson went to Walter Reed Hospital to congratulate the World War I leader on his eighty-fourth birthday. Next day he announced his concurrence with the new five-star bill but added in his diary that, the Navy had insisted its chiefs needed five-star rank to deal with the British. He grumbled, “Nobody has had more to do with the British than Mar- shall and he has seen no need [for more rank].” 43 484 OTgmiZeP Of ViCtOT

As Congress continued BO delay action on the bill into late November, Marshall was blamed by some columnists for holding up the legislation. Stimson was disgusted and indicated that he would be glad if the whole matter was stuck in Congress. On the twelfth General Handy brought word that the bill would be passed and that he had worked out seniority arrangements with the Navy. Admiral Leahy ranked first, then Marshall, and then Admiral King, MacArthur, Nimi tz, Eisenhower, Arnold, and Halsey were to be the other five-star 0fficers.4~The legislation and approval of the new generals went through on December 15. Marshall, who had returned from a two-day inspection trip, was in the Pentagon shortly after noon when word came of the approval of the nominations to the new rank. Me had just finished talking with General Stilwell about his new assignment as chief of the Army Ground Forces when he was sum- moned to Stimson’s office.As he and Arnold went in one door, more than a score of the top commanders of the Pentagon came in the other. They joined in toasts to the new Generals of the Army.45 December also saw another milestone for Marshall. The last day of the year marked his sixty-fourth birthday, an age at which he normally would be required to retire. Stimson noted this in mid-November, adding that the President could extend the term, but that he thought it would be better for Congress to act. With his cooperation this was done.4s Notification of Eisenhower’s nomination for new rank did not reach the Supreme Commander until December 16 (he actually ranked from December 20). It was almost the last good news he was to hear for the next ten days. In a final gamble Hitler struck suddenly that day in the Ar- dennes. His surprise stroke ended Allied hopes for a quick termination of the war. Despite the optimism Marshall had expressed ten days earlier to Admi- ral Stark, there were reasons why he and his colleagues in Washington and Europe should have been worried. During his recent visit to the western front, the Chief of Staff had traveled along the widely stretched VI11 Corps Sector in the Ardennes, where three divisions-two relatively inex- perienced and one exhausted from long and strenuous fighting-held a ninety-mile forested front in elgium. His commanders told him that they were taking a calculated risk and were not perturbed. The terrain and the road net in the area did not seem favorable for an attack. Besides the Germans were in a desperate state and barely able to hold 011.47 Since his visit there h,ad been many signs of a German build-up in the Ardennes. Later intelligence chiefs could point to statements that showed the possibility of attack. The enemy’s intentions were hidden by the fact that the German Army, hard pressed on all fronts, was calling on semi- invalids, the old, and the very young to fill its ranks. Bombing attacks on the oil supply of the Reich had produced serious fuel shortages. True, there was evidence of enemy troop movement along the Allied front, but since the Germans were probably aware of American preparations for an Victory Deferred 485 offensive on December 13, it seemed reasonable to assume that they were getting set to meet the attack. Above all there was a misreading of the German mind. After a period of rustication Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt had been returned in the fall to command the enemy forces in the West He was known to be a cautious commander. Montgomery's Chief of Intelligence went so far as to say that if Hitler were running the show, the Allies could expect some surprises. But since von Rundstedt was now in charge, there need be no fear.48 From an'Allied viewpoint it seemed absurd that the Germans, already badly hurt, would leave their protected positions for an area less suited to defense. But Hitler, whose troops were in desperate conditions on all fronts, could not afford to play it safe. As matters stood, he had two choices. If he could catch the Americans off balance in the Ardennes, perhaps he could sweep through to Antwerp, knocking out the timetable for the offensive and seizing and destroying vital stocks At best a smashing success might slow Allied preparations until there might be a chance for a negotiated peace At worst time might be gained to develop some miracle weapon-the jet fighter, for example, against which the Allies, as Bedell Smith recently noted, had no effective counterweapon. The gamble was extreme, but earlier risks had worked for Hitler. All in all it seemed better to hazard loss than to wait for certain disaster. Carefully the Fuhrer gathered his armored units, hoarded precious gasoline, trained special troops who would spread disorder by dressing in American uniforms and driving American jeeps in the Allied rear areas, and guarded the secrecy of his plans. When his weather experts were able to predict five days of bad weather, sufficient to ground the feared Allied bombers, Hitler unleashed his attack in the Ardennes. On the front held by the VI11 Corps the German attack went well Two regiments of the green 106th Division were overrun, the 99th Division fell back, and the 28th Division was hard hit.49 But the north flank held. The seasoned 2d Division dug in; elements of the 1st Division stood firm on the Elsenborn Ridge at Dom Butgenbach. As V Corps brought up reinforcements, the attackers were forced to side- slip southward. Thrown off schedule, they lost the opportunity for a real breakthrough in the first twenty-four hours It meant that time was gained for the defenders of the road net farther south. The first reports were not alarming. As late as the morning of Decem- ber 18 Marshall and Stimson agreed that the Germans could not get very far. Recalling the last desperate German counterattack of 1918, the Secre- tary of War and the Chief of Staff were still not worried 50 In a sense they were reflecting the attitude of the commanders in the field. However, developments on December ig put matters in a different light Eisenhower had already ordered forward his last American reserve-the 82d and the ioist Airborne divisions. That evening, explaining that General Brad- 486 Organizer of Victory ley’s headquarters in Luxembourg was almost out of touch with the First Army in the north, General Eisenhower shifted command of the First Army temporarily to Field Marshal Montgomery. General Patton was ordered to break offhis attack and send troops to the relief of Bastogne. It now became clear to Washington that the Germans might be able to delay the day of European victory. Knowing that the enemy breakthrough meant that shortages in manpower and ammunition would soon become critical, Marshall moved at once to reduce the deficits. The Chief of Staff informed Eisenhower that he had given orders that he was to be left free to give his complete concentration to the fighting. “I shall merely say now that you have our complete confidence.” He explained later: “I kept ’down the messages to Eisenhower; I made them recall one they sent during the Bulge; I said,

‘Don’t bother him.’ ” Marshall was heartened by the President’s attitude. Through all the crisis, “Roosevelt didn’t send a word to Eisenhower nor ask a question. In great stress Roosevelt was a strong man.” 51 The worst of the German attack was over by Christmas. In the end it was the quick recovery of ground units, the digging in of the seasoned divisions, the prompt shift of units from other fronts, and the lifting of the mists, which permitted tremendous air strikes against the enemy, that turned the trick. Later, two episodes would be recalled in the Battle of the Bulge. One was General Patton’s suddenly breaking off an attack in the Third Army sector and turning his units in a go-degree shift toward Bastogne to make the dramatic drive that ensured the holding of that keypoint in the Allied road net. The other was the spirited defense of the threatened Belgian town by the ioist Airborne Division, supported by elements of the loth Armored Division. When the Germans struck, the ioist Division commander, Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, was in the United States, at General Ridgway’s request, for discussions with General Marshall. He did not leave Washington until December 22 after a final talk with the Chief of Staff-and then chafed at delays that prevented him from rejoin- ing his unit. He need not have worried. On that date his second in command, Brigadier General A. C. McAuliffe, having looked at the best the Germans had to offer, had replied to their polite invitation to surrender with the famous rejoinder, “Nuts.” 53 Other than supporting Eisenhower with supplies and men, Marshall in- tervened chiefly by his sharp reactions to British pressure for a change in command. Since early fall Montgomery had pushed for the appointment of a ground commander between Eisenhower and the army groups. Al- though he declared his willingness to serve under Bradley if the Supreme Commander so decided, it seemed unlikely that this arrangement would be acceptable to the British. Believing such a move unwise, Eisenhower continued his personal command of the Allied forces. Eisenhower’s action on December i g giving Montgomery command of Victory Deferred 487 all Allied troops north of the Bulge seemed to the British to justify a reopening of their demand for either a ground commander or two ground commanders of equal power, controlling forces north and south of the Bulge. The latter arrangement, which would leave the U.S. First and Ninth armies under Montgomery, was not acceptable to General Bradley. Marshall was willing to go along with Eisenhower’s move as a temporary expedient, but he was irritated at Montgomery’s use of the incident to force the appointment of a permanent ground commander. Fearing that under the pressure of events Eisenhower might feel inclined to make some concession to British demands, the Chief of Staff radioed him near the end of December: “My feeling is this: under no circumstances make any concessions of any kind whatsoever. You not only have our confidence but there would be a terrific resentment in this country following such action. I am not assuming that you had in mind such a concession. I just wish you to be certain of our attitude on this side.” Once more Marshall had acted to strengthen his subordinate’s position before he was asked for support. Proclaiming his full backing and his confidence for the success of future operations, the Chief of Staff concluded with a New Year’s thought: “You are doing a fine job and go on and give them hell.” 53