Middle East Council Inside Libya Chaos in the mediterranean Kwasi Kwarteng MP Leo Docherty March 2017 Conservative Middle East Council INSIDE LIBYA: CHAOS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN Conservative Middle East Council INSIDE LIBYA: CHAOS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY KEY FINDINGS • Field Marshal Haftar sees his mission as fighting jihadist terrorism. • A large degree of order and governance exists in Eastern Libya. • Despite being under pressure, the East remains stable while the West is plagued by disorder and insecurity. • The House of Representatives is a nucleus for the development of a Libyan Parliamentary system, and has a geographical reach across Libya. • Western Libya, particularly Tripoli itself, is dominated by warlords and criminal gangs; they all have an interest in prolonging the relative confusion in the West. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS • The UK should urgently engage with Haftar, the LNA and the HoR • The UK should support the LNA to secure Libya’s borders and bring an end to the illegal trafficking of people from Libya’s sea ports. • The UK should reconsider its view of the GNA and acknowledge its limited capacity to deliver any kind of governance or security for Libya. 1 Conservative Middle East Council INSIDE LIBYA: CHAOS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN DELEGATION TO LIBYA – MARCH 2017 OVERVIEW In the first week of March 2017 CMEC Vice Chairman Kwasi Kwarteng MP, and CMEC Director Leo Docherty, travelled to Libya to meet the Commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. They also met the Speaker of the House of Representatives (HoR), Aguila Saleh, and members of the House of Representatives. The purpose of the delegation was to gain a deeper understanding of the situation inside Libya itself. Since the revolution and overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 the political and economic conditions of that country remain extremely fluid. The enthusiastic optimism associated with the visit of Prime Minister David Cameron to Tripoli and Benghazi in September 2011, accompanied by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, has not been sustained. For the British government, Libya became less of a priority, while responsibility for fixing Libya’s many intractable problems, mostly regarding security and political governance, were left to the UN and EU. Despite the best efforts of these organisations, Libya appears to many observers as nothing other than a failed state. Riven by militias, home to ISIS and Al Qaeda, and with unguarded borders, Libya appears simply incapable of constraining the movement of tens of thousands of migrants who travel through Africa to Europe every year. It has been plausibly argued that the UK, despite its central role in the toppling of Gaddafi, has simply not paid enough attention to Libya since 2011. The delegation travelled to Libya on a flight from Alexandria to Al Bayda. From Al Bayda the CMEC team travelled by road to Al Rajma (near Benghazi), Al Marj and Tobruk, from where a flight was eventually taken back to Alexandria. The meetings took place in Field Marshal Haftar’s Military Camp in Al Rajma, in and around the city of Al Bayda and in Tobruk. The circuitous route afforded ample opportunity to closely observe the situation on the ground. The visit took place against the background of attacks against the LNA-held oil terminals of Al Sider and Ras Lanuf, on the western edge of Libya’s oil crescent, by militias aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli but reportedly containing jihadist elements. The loss of the oil terminal is a significant operational setback for the LNA. A counter attack is now underway and the battle continues as this report goes to press. 2 Conservative Middle East Council INSIDE LIBYA: CHAOS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN KEY FINDINGS 1. Field Marshal Haftar sees his mission as fighting jihadist terrorism. Field Marshal Haftar has a very clear focus on the operational challenge of defeating the jihadist militias in the west of Libya. He struck the delegation very much as an operational solider, a ‘soldiers’s soldier’, who did not concern himself with grand political strategy. Despite the ongoing attacks in the oil crescent, Haftar appeared composed and confident when the delegation met him. He sees himself as a Libyan nationalist and describes his mission as ridding Libya of the multitude of militias - both Islamist and criminal - that dominate the western half of the country. Although an observant Muslim, he appears to be largely secular in his world view. Haftar appears to be a self-confident military man, who is proud of his achievements. He described to the delegation a series of military operations over the last three years, often in minute detail. He spoke about the worsening security situation in Libya and the rise of jihadist militias that encouraged him to lead a military offensive against them. This became known as Operation Karama - Dignity. In 2014 I called for people to gather in Rajma with their own weapons…300 people came. We attacked the headquarters of the Islamists in Hawari, west of Benghazi and killed their leaders…after this 3,000 people joined us. Now we have 60,000. Benghazi is now free of jihadists, only a few remain on the western edge. Haftar points out that the LNA, since taking control of the oil crescent in September 2016, has allowed the oil to flow and the revenues to continue to be paid unhindered to the National Oil Company (NOC). …the funds go to the NOC and then to the Central Bank…but they are in the hands of the militias – the militias call the shots and Libyans are still poor… Haftar described his determination to secure the oil crescent and re-take the lost terminals. He also outlined his belief in the LNA’s ability – if enhanced militarily - to pacify the Jufra region in Southern Libya. Haftar sees his mission as a national project covering all of Libya. Both Haftar and the Speaker of the HoR described their desire for close relations with the United Kingdom. Haftar appealed for British help: We can end this chaos but we call on your government to help us… One of Haftar’s senior advisers described the suspicions many Libyans have about the presence of UK Special Forces in Libya who, while they are known to be present in the East, are not actively engaging with the LNA. There is a large degree of scepticism over UK’s role and intentions given the discreet supported currently given by other major powers. The adviser stated: People are asking – the Egyptians are backing us, the UAE, France and the Russians are backing us…the Americans probably will do…what are the British waiting for? 3 Conservative Middle East Council INSIDE LIBYA: CHAOS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 2. A large degree of order and governance exists in Eastern Libya. During the long road trips between Al Bayda, Al Rajma and Tobruk many well organised police and military check points could be seen. Traffic police were also visible. In the urban centres normal civilian life appeared to be going ahead unhindered by any security concern. Shops and restaurants were busy with customers. It was striking to the delegation that every soldier we saw appeared well equipped, and dressed in a distinctive military uniform. One unusual sight the delegation witnessed was a queue of around two hundred people outside the Wahda Bank in Al Marj. These people were waiting to take cash from their bank accounts. Such withdrawals have been severely restricted due to the withholding of funds from the East of Libya by the Central Bank of Libya in Tripoli. This is set against an economic backdrop in which Libya’s GDP has, according to some measures, roughly halved since the revolution of 2011. 3. Despite being under pressure, the East remains stable while the West is plagued by disorder and insecurity. Field Marshal Haftar and the LNA complain about a lack of money. The recent successful attacks by militias against LNA forces in the oil crescent show that the LNA is militarily vulnerable. Despite the LNA reportedly receiving some military support from the UAE, Egypt, and Russia, it is by all accounts under-trained and under-equipped. Despite controlling the oil crescent since September 2016, Haftar has not stopped the flow of oil from Libya’s oil crescent. Revenues from sales of oil to the international market are still flowing to the National Oil company and the Libyan Central Bank. The LNA continues to be adversely affected by the reported failure of the Libyan Central Bank to honour its agreement to send 40% of oil revenues to Benghazi, while 60% is reportedly received by Tripoli. Meanwhile, in the west a large number of different militias – some criminal, some jihadist – prevail. These include ISIS, Ansar Al Sharia, the Derna Mujahidin Shura Council, the Islamist Ajdabiya Revolutionaries Shura Council, Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade, Special Deterrent Force (Tripoli) and the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (a coalition of Islamist militias, including Ansar Al Sharia, the 17 February Brigade and the Rafallah Al Sahati Brigade).* In the west many of the militia leaders, such as Abdelhakim Belhadj and Khaled Al Sharif, were involved with the Libya Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), an organisation with loose links to Al Qaeda. Other leaders, such as Salah Badi and Ali Al Sallabi, were imprisoned under the Gaddafi regime. The political motivations of these different agents remain unclear. They do not have any organised political programmes, nor do they operate under party political labels. On the other hand, they have been effective at creating militias on the ground, and carving themselves positions of power and influence. * A full list of militias can be found in the Appendix on Page 11 4 Conservative Middle East Council INSIDE LIBYA: CHAOS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN The commitment of such people to a strong, functioning central government in Libya is doubtful.