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Human Rights Watch All Rights Reserved HUMAN RIGHTS Delivered Into Enemy Hands US-Led Abuse and Rendition of Opponents to Gaddafi’s Libya WATCH Delivered Into Enemy Hands US-Led Abuse and Rendition of Opponents to Gaddafi’s Libya Copyright © 2012 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-940-2 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world. We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice. We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable. We challenge governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law. We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org SEPTEMBER 2012 ISBN: 1-56432-940-2 Delivered Into Enemy Hands US-Led Abuse and Rendition of Opponents to Gaddafi’s Libya Summary ........................................................................................................................................... 1 Key Recommendations..................................................................................................................... 13 Methodology ................................................................................................................................... 15 I. Background .................................................................................................................................. 18 Libya from the 1970s to the 1990s ........................................................................................... 18 Flight from Libya ..................................................................................................................... 21 Libyan Islamic Fighting Group ................................................................................................. 23 Gaddafi’s Rapprochement with the West ................................................................................ 28 II. Detainee Accounts from Afghanistan and Morocco ....................................................................... 31 Mohammed Ahmed Mohammed al-Shoroeiya and Khalid al-Sharif .......................................... 31 Departure from Libya ........................................................................................................ 33 Arrest and Detention ........................................................................................................ 34 Afghanistan I .................................................................................................................... 38 Afghanistan II ................................................................................................................... 53 Shoroeiya’s Transfer and Treatment in Libya ..................................................................... 56 Sharif’s Transfer and Treatment in Libya ........................................................................... 58 Majid Mokhtar Sasy al-Maghrebi ............................................................................................ 60 Departure from Libya ....................................................................................................... 60 Pakistan ........................................................................................................................... 61 Afghanistan I ................................................................................................................... 62 Afghanistan II ................................................................................................................... 65 Transfer and Treatment in Libya ....................................................................................... 66 Saleh Hadiyah Abu Abdullah Di’iki .......................................................................................... 67 Departure from Libya ........................................................................................................ 67 Arrest and Detention ....................................................................................................... 68 Afghanistan I .................................................................................................................... 70 Afghanistan II ................................................................................................................... 72 Transfer and Treatment in Libya ........................................................................................ 75 Mustafa Salim Ali el-Madaghi ................................................................................................. 78 Morocco ........................................................................................................................... 79 Transfer and Treatment in Libya ....................................................................................... 80 Mustafa Jawda al-Mehdi ......................................................................................................... 83 Departure from Libya ........................................................................................................ 83 Arrest and Detention ....................................................................................................... 84 Peshawar ........................................................................................................................ 84 Islamabad ........................................................................................................................ 85 Afghanistan ..................................................................................................................... 85 Transfer and Treatment in Libya ....................................................................................... 88 III. Transfers to Libya that Began in Asia .......................................................................................... 91 Abdul Hakim Belhadj .............................................................................................................. 91 Departure from Libya ....................................................................................................... 92 Malaysia and Thailand ..................................................................................................... 93 Treatment in Libya ........................................................................................................... 99 Sami Mostefa al-Saadi .......................................................................................................... 102 Departure from Libya ...................................................................................................... 102 Treatment in Libya .......................................................................................................... 107 Muhammed Abu Farsan ......................................................................................................... 111 Departure from Libya ....................................................................................................... 111 Treatment in Libya ........................................................................................................... 115 IV. Transfer from Guantanamo Bay: The Case of Abdusalam Abdulhadi Omar as-Safrani ................. 117 Departure from Libya ....................................................................................................... 117 Transfer to Guantanamo ................................................................................................. 118 Transfer and Treatment in Libya ...................................................................................... 119 V. The Case of Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi ................................................................................................ 120 VI. Detainees Rendered From Other African Countries to Libya ....................................................... 132 Ismail Omar Gebril al-Lwatty ................................................................................................. 132 Mafud al-Sadiq Embaya Abdullah ......................................................................................... 134 Abdullah Mohammed Omar al-Tawaty ................................................................................... 136 Othman Salah (Sheikh Othman) ........................................................................................... 137 VII. International Legal Standards .................................................................................................. 141 Recommendations ......................................................................................................................... 149 Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 154 Appendix I: Tripoli Documents ....................................................................................................... 156 Appendix II:
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