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The Humanitarian Impact of Drones THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF DRONES The Humanitarian Impact of Drones 1 THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF DRONES THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF DRONES © 2017 Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom; International Contents Disarmament Institute, Pace University; Article 36. October 2017 The Humanitarian Impact of Drones 1st edition 160 pp 3 Preface Permission is granted for non-commercial reproduction, Cristof Heyns copying, distribution, and transmission of this publication or parts thereof so long as full credit is given to the 6 Introduction organisation and author; the text is not altered, Ray Acheson, Matthew Bolton, transformed, or built upon; and for any reuse or distribution, these terms are made clear to others. and Elizabeth Minor Edited by Ray Acheson, Matthew Bolton, Elizabeth Minor, and Allison Pytlak. Impacts Thank you to all authors for their contributions. 1. Humanitarian Harm This publication is supported in part by a grant from the 15 Foundation Open Society Institute in cooperation with the Jessica Purkiss and Jack Serle Human Rights Initiative of the Open Society Foundations. Cover photography: 24 Country case study: Yemen ©2017 Kristie L. Kulp Taha Yaseen 29 2. Environmental Harm Doug Weir and Elizabeth Minor 35 Country case study: Nigeria Joy Onyesoh 36 3. Psychological Harm Radidja Nemar 48 4. Harm to Global Peace and Security Chris Cole 58 Country case study: Djibouti Ray Acheson 64 Country case study: The Philippines Mitzi Austero and Alfredo Ferrariz Lubang 2 1 THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF DRONES Preface Christof Heyns 68 5. Harm to Governmental It is not difficult to understand the appeal of Transparency Christof Heyns is Professor of Law at the armed drones to those engaged in war and other University of Pretoria. He is a member of the UN Anna Diakun Human Rights Committee and is a former UN violent conflicts. Those using force on behalf of Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, states have long had the aim of subduing their or arbitrary executions. 81 Country case study: United States opponents with as little harm to their own forces Rachel Stohl as possible. In addition, increasingly there are international and other norms that require more Perspectives precise targeting, sparing those not directly engaged in the conflict. 85 6. Human Rights Perspectives Shahzad Akbar Getting close to the target has traditionally placed one’s own forces in harm’s way. Drones Country case study: Yemen 97 provide an opportunity to bring an “unmanned” Waleed Alhariri weapons platform close to the target, from which force can be launched via remote control. If the 101 7. International Law Perspectives platform is destroyed by enemy fire, the cost is Adriana Edmedes measured in money, not in the number of lives of 115 Regional case study: Latin America one’s own forces lost. Hector Guerra Drones also provide those who use it with the 120 Regional case study: Europe argument that the maneuverability of the Jessica Dorsey platform, in close vicinity to the target, may allow more precise targeting. Even if the jury is still 127 8. Gendered Perspectives out on the veracity of the second claim, the Ray Acheson argument persists that this may be the case in the future. The appeal of the first claim, on the 141 9. Moral and Ethical Perspectives other hand, is evident. In an age of technology, Peter Asaro drones were bound to happen. 150 10. Religious Perspectives If a drone were to be used only in isolated cases, Emily Welty there would probably have been few questions asked. It is after all not easy to point out a principled difference between a single missile fired from a F16 flying at the speed of sound, when an on-board pilot presses the button, and the same missile being fired from a loitering drone, with the button being pressed by an operator in another country. However, what is 2 3 PREFACE THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF DRONES at stake is not the isolated use of a few drones, fact that the world is turning to remote controlled This debate thus seems centrally important from by a few countries, but rather a new way use of force. Considerations of the broader the perspective of asking the age-old question: altogether of releasing force; one that will play a humanitarian implications of the remote how do we solve problems? How and when can dominant role in the conflicts of the future, with controlled use of force are thus most apt we resort to the use of force? What is effective, more and more states—and non-state actors— and welcome. also in the long run? Clearly, a world in which using this technology. It is this evolving use of those who are far out of harm’s way have a drones as the weapon platform of the future that The chapters in this in this book do exactly that. button with which they can eliminate someone raises profound questions about the peace and They look at the implications of a world where whom they see as posing a threat half-way security as well as some of the core values of drones are becoming the new normal from the around the world, is very different from one the world we live in. perspective of the various societies involved— where such instant ”solutions” are not available, including the gender implications, and also the and different if less dramatic means to achieve I, and others, have argued that drones should psychological implications, from the perspective the same objective have to be found. follow the law, and not the other way around. of those who operate drones and their societies, Drone-using states have argued for a relaxed and those who are on the receiving side. What A thorough discussion of the broader application of norms covering the use of force are the implications for societies on both sides implications of the use of armed drones is also that have developed over centuries—for of the digital divide? Peace and security as well important for other reasons. This includes the example, what is to be considered an “imminent” as the humanitarian framework in which we fact that armed drones are increasingly being attack against which self-defence by a state is operate may be compromised not only because used not only in armed conflict and allowed; when do the more permissive rules of drones make it so much easier for those with counterterrorism operations abroad, but in international humanitarian law (IHL) apply to the this technology to use force, and thus lower the domestic law enforcement contexts as well. use of force; to what extent does human rights threshold for a resort to force, but also when the Moreover, remote controlled release of force is law regulate the use of force outside the scope less obvious fissures in societies are opened up. being replaced by autonomous use of force, of an ongoing armed conflict; and what sort of where computers will take the critical decisions. transparency is required? Force release, that is, is becoming more and more impersonal. We need a much better These are important questions, and warrant the understanding of the early manifestation of this full attention of the international community. But trend—armed drones in armed conflict—than we more than policing the legal boundaries of the currently have to serve as a basis to respond to use of force is required to ensure a responsible this broader phenomenon. For all these reasons, response to the challenges presented by drones. this book is a most welcome contribution to a In fact, the debate may to some extent have vital debate. become too legalistic, as if solving the legal aspects is all there is to meeting the challenges presented by drones as a whole. At least of equal importance is the extent to which we fully understand and think through the broader implications of this technological development. Applying legal frameworks to concrete cases very easily leads to an exclusive focus on the individual case. Using a legalistic lens only to look at armed drones may thus mean one could miss the wider and cumulative implications of the 4 5 THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF DRONES those people that are not the target than other states’ actual jurisdiction or officially designated Introduction forms of aerial bombing.1 They point to the zones of armed conflict. The authors of the lowered risk of casualties on the attacking side chapters in this study raise questions about Ray Acheson, Matthew Bolton, and Elizabeth Minor and claim that the ability of drones to loiter over whether this tempts policymakers to use an area for extended periods of time enables a violence in less restrained ways and displaces Humanitarian and human rights norms have more judicious use of force.2 The discourse that harm away from the attacking state onto the Ray Acheson is the Director of Reaching long sought to restrict the exercise of remote suggests that “drone strikes” are somehow a local population in the “target area”. Critical Will, the disarmament programme of violence. In the last two hundred years, the rapid more humanitarian form of violence than the Women’s International League for Peace and traditional warfare has dominated political and This approach to violence is arguably one of the Freedom (WILPF). She leads WILPF’s advocacy development of weapons technology has enabled main drivers of the development of weapons and research on weapons and militarism, which people to kill and maim others at increasing popular discussion, particularly in those always includes a gender perspective. distance, both physical and psychological. countries that make extensive use of UAVs. technology. As the most militarised country in Her work also includes monitoring and analysing Rifles, artillery, landmines, aerial bombing, and This discourse is grounded in elite, militarised the world, with over 800 foreign military bases international processes and forums related missiles all function to reduce the potential for power structures, where capacities for violence and the largest expenditure on weapons and war, to disarmament.
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