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Rethinking the Drone War RETHINKING THE DRONE WAR RETHINKING THE DRONE WAR NATIONAL SECURITY, LEGITIMACY, AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS LARRY LEWIS DIANE M. VAVRICHEK A joint publication of CNA and Marine Corps University Press MCUP MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY PRESS Quantico, Virginia 2016 This book represents the best opinion of the authors at the time of printing. The views and opinions are the authors’ own, and do not necessarily represent those of CNA, the Department of the Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps University, or the U.S. government. MCUP MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY PRESS Marine Corps University Press CNA Corporation 111 South Street Arlington, VA 22201 www.usmcu.edu/mcupress www.cna.org 1st printing, 2016 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Lewis, Larry L. (Lawrence L.), author. | Vavrichek, Diane, author. Title: Rethinking the drone war : national security, legitimacy, and civilian casualties in U.S. counterterrorism operations / Larry Lewis, Diane Vavrichek. Other titles: National security, legitimacy, and civilian casualties in U.S. counterterrorism operations Description: Quantico, VA : CNA and Marine Corps University Press, [2016] | Includes index. Subjects: LCSH: Drone aircraft--United States--History. | Drone aircraft--Government policy--United States. | Drone aircraft--Moral and ethical aspects--United States. | Uninhabited combat aerial vehicles--Government policy--United States. | Terrorism--Prevention--Government policy--United States. | Targeted killing--Government policy--United States. | Civilian war casualties--Prevention. | United States--Military policy--Moral and ethical aspects. | United States--Military policy--Public opinion. | National security--United States. Drone Strikes in Pakistan The Future of Drone Strikes Improving Lethal Action Security and Legitimacy © by CNA Corporation (forthcoming) CONTENTS Illustrations vii Tables ix Preface xi Acknowledgments xiii Abbreviations xv PART I Drone Strikes in Pakistan: Assessing Civilian Casualties Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Chapter 2: Drone Strike Casualty Estimates 6 PART II The Future of Drone Strikes: A Framework for Analyzing Policy Options v PART III Improving Lethal Action: Learning and Adapting in U.S. Counterterrorism Operations PART IV Security and Legitimacy: Learning from the Past Decade of Operations vi | Contents ILLUSTRATIONS Figure 1. Disparate estimates for civilian deaths from drone strikes in Pakistan, Figure 2. Comprehensive process for reducing and mitigating civilian harm Figure 6. Perceived tension between mission success and CIVCAS Afghanistan Figure 9. Lethal action operations per year in Pakistan and Yemen Figure 10. Target type distribution for lethal action operations in Pakistan and Figure 11. Percent of lethal action operations that successfully targeted a senior leader, by target type vii Figure 12. Maximum/minimum combatant casualties from lethal action opera- tions with different target types Figure 16. Relationship between mission success and CIVCAS Figure 19. Strike on civilian convoy viii | Illustrations TABLES Table 2. Potential advantages of increased TME and perceived legitimacy - Table 6. Overall civilian death statistics for Pakistan and Yemen through August ix PREFACE The years since 9/11 have seen an evolution in U.S. national security practices with respect to counterterrorism operations, particularly when it comes to lethal force via the use of armed drones, also known as un- manned aerial vehicles, or UAVs. Drones constitute a recent addition to the long list of technological - ment of the crossbow, gunpowder-powered projectile weapons, chemical most advanced drones—the armed Predator and Reaper models—offer persistent surveillance as well as the ability to engage targets from almost anywhere across the globe, without a requirement for forces on the ground. This extended reach offers a clear example of how advances in technology can provide a new and effective option for using lethal force. Technological advancements and changing security practices affect- ing the use of force raise important ethical and practical questions, such as whether the technologies and practices should be used in warfare and whether self-imposed limits are appropriate for their responsible use, which can be addressed through national policy decisions, as well as such international laws and standards as the principles of humanity enshrined is no exception. U.S. national security practices, especially those involving armed drones, have raised numerous questions related to ethics and prac- ticality. This volume is a collection of four reports that collectively address these issues by exploring the themes of legitimacy, civilian protection, and xi national security interests. They address, for example, the following ques- tions in the modern counterterrorism context. Legitimacy Do U.S. means and methods of war enhance our perceived legitima- Civilian Protection to safeguard civilians from the effects of war when possible. How ef- fective are we in protecting civilians while being effective against the National Security Interests A sovereign nation has both the right and obligation to protect its own citizens and look after their welfare. How do our practices and adop- tion of lethal force technologies affect these interests in the short and This volume provides concrete recommendations for policy makers as well as military commanders, a number of which have, since the time of its writing, been incorporated into the recent U.S. policy guidelines related to civilian casualties. - ism practices, its analysis, frameworks, and conclusions can be applied in varying degrees to emerging technologies as well. These considerations can help a government ensure that its use of force is not only effective, but also responsible and consonant with its larger interests. xii | Preface ACKNOWLEDGMENTS analysis organization with more than 600 analysts and professional staff, is dedicated to developing actionable solutions to complex problems of na- tional importance. In addition to defense-related matters for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, CNA’s research portfolio includes policing, home- management. The authors gratefully acknowledge the individuals who aided their re- search by granting interviews; as well as the following colleagues for their Marc Garlasco, Matthew Grund, Lieutenant Commander Matthew Ivey (U.S. Navy, Judge Advocate General’s Corps [JAGC]), Captain Mark E. Rosen (U.S. Navy, JAGC, Ret), and Jonathan Schroden. xiii ABBREVIATIONS AAR After action report AFRICOM U.S. Africa Command AQAP al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQIM al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ASM Air-to-surface missile AUMF Authorization for the Use of Military Force BDA Battle damage assessment BIJ Bureau of Investigative Journalism BPC Building partner capacity CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned CENTCOM U.S. Central Command CIA Central Intelligence Agency CIVCAS Civilian casualties CIV K Civilians killed CNA Center for Naval Analyses xv COIN Counterinsurgency COMISAF Commander, International Security Assistance Force CPA Coalition Provisional Authority CT Counterterrorism DNI Director of National Intelligence DOD Department of Defense DOJ Department of Justice DPH Directly participate in hostilities EOF Escalation of force FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act FMS Foreign Military Sales FOIA Freedom of Information Act HUMINT Human intelligence ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IED Improvised explosive device IHL International humanitarian law xvi | Abbreviations IHRL International human rights law ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (a.k.a. IS, ISIS) JCCS Joint Civilian Casualty Study JCOA Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division/Joint Center for Operational Analysis JLLIS Joint Lessons Learned Information System KIA Killed in action MAM Military-age male MEK Mujahedin-e Khalq MILGROUP U.S. military group NAF New America Foundation NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCT Nation containing the target NGO Nongovernmental organization NSA National Security Agency OEF Operation Enduring Freedom OGA Other (i.e., nonmilitary) government agency Abbreviations | xvii OME Operational military effectiveness OPE Operational preparation of the environment PED Processing, exploitation, and dissemination PPG Presidential Policy Guidance QRF Quick reaction force ROE Rules of engagement SA Situational awareness SERE Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training SME Strategic military effectiveness SOF Special Operations Forces TLAM Tomahawk land attack missile TMA Traditional military activity TME Tactical military effectiveness TTP Tactics, techniques, and procedures UAS Unmanned aerial system UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle (“drone”) UCMJ Uniformed Code of Military Justice xviii | Abbreviations UN United Nations UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution USAID U.S. Agency for International Development Abbreviations | xix PART I DRONE STRIKES IN PAKISTAN ASSESSING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES BY LARRY LEWIS CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Drones (referred to as unmanned aerial vehicles or UAVs by the U.S. mili- tary)
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